Events in Yemen are escalating quickly and dramatically, reaching the point of armed clashes erupting between the Arab coalition supporting the internationally recognised government in Yemen, led by Saudi Arabia, and the so‑called “Southern Transitional Council” (STC), backed by the United Arab Emirates.
Many view these developments as a natural outcome of a long, cumulative trajectory of complexities the country has experienced since the civil war erupted in late 2014, and the humanitarian and economic repercussions that followed.
External interventions had a profound impact in creating political and administrative chaos that intensified internal divisions and exposed what remained of the legitimate state to further weakness, culminating in the loss of its most important sovereign tools: unity of territory and decision-making. These developments and events add further complexity to an already complex picture, and Yemen will not be safe from their future repercussions.
On the other hand, others view the situation from another, less bleak angle. The strong reaction to the STC’s moves — on the part of the Yemeni president (chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council, or PLC) and, behind him, the Saudi‑led Arab coalition — is a new and important variable, completely different from the usual approach to many similar events. So, there is hope that these events and changes will mark a new phase that works to correct the imbalances and deviations that accompanied the Arab coalition’s intervention over more than a decade.
Watching carefully are the Houthi rebels in northern Yemen, who have remained silent, apparently waiting to see what these events will produce as they continue to strike at the unity of the components of the Arab coalition’s leadership and undermine the legitimate government. In any case, they realise that the eventual outcome will ultimately be in their favour. Therefore, the Houthis, according to multiple reports, are currently intensifying their military preparations, redeploying and dispersing their forces along the theatre of operations adjacent to contact points on the fronts: the northeast (Marib), and the southwest in Taiz and Bab al-Mandeb, preparing for zero hour.
So, what is the nature and background of this bilateral conflict between allies? Where have these events and developments led Yemen, and where will they lead it? And what are their implications for the future of the country and the region?
There is broad agreement that what is happening today is merely an initial result of a deep internal conflict of interests between the two main coalition states — Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Although most of this conflict remained hidden, its accumulations continued to roll and grow like a snowball.
To understand how matters reached this point of an explosion of conflict between allies, we must first understand the background of this rivalry and conflict.
In late March 2015, Saudi Arabia led a coalition of 10 Arab and Muslim countries to intervene militarily in Yemen — later it was called the Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Yemen, with the aim of restoring the authority of Yemen’s former legitimate president, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, from the grip of the Houthi coup forces.
At the outset, the coalition achieved major, tangible successes on the ground before differences began to emerge between the two main allies, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
There is a widespread and well‑grounded belief that the UAE entered this war with a plan to achieve purely geopolitical and strategic interests. Some argue, however, that this was not necessarily the case at the beginning, but that it may later have turned to exploiting weakness, vacuum, and internal divisions in order to redraw its strategy anew in light of that.
On the ground, the UAE formed, trained, and financed local forces loyal to it, using them to achieve its own objectives, away from the coalition and the legitimate government. Within just two years of its intervention, it managed — through its own local forces — to impose control over all strategic maritime outlets along southern and eastern Yemen, reaching the western coast of Taiz governorate in the country’s southwest, where the strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait lies.
Over 10 years of the coalition’s intervention, the UAE established and built a hard-hitting army of its own militias, becoming the strongest force on the ground and the greatest threat to the interests of its ally (Saudi Arabia) in Yemen, including the system and the legitimate government that it had supported and sponsored from the outset. It can be affirmed that Riyadh committed fatal strategic mistakes in dealing with these deviations, remaining silent and failing to take decisive action on the ground to curb its ally’s overreach — perhaps settling for minor protective measures, and often acting merely as a “mediator” to resolve disputes that flared up from time to time — until the axe finally struck the head.
Military escalation
In early December, the STC, which was founded and backed by the UAE, triggered a military escalation by seizing control of the governorates of Hadramout and al-Mahra in eastern Yemen. This angered Saudi Arabia and pushed it out of its usual diplomacy and calm. Many may interpret this major shift in its policy as stemming from the fact that it views these two eastern governorates bordering it as a geographic extension of its national security, and that any compromise to their security constitutes a direct threat to its national security, something Riyadh stated explicitly in its recent statements issued in the wake of the crisis.
Accordingly, the head of the PLC dealt with these developments with great seriousness, describing them as unacceptable “unilateral measures”. Under the authority granted by the Power Transfer Declaration (April 2022), he called on the Saudi-led Arab coalition to intervene militarily.
The next day, coalition aircraft struck military equipment that had arrived on two ships from the UAE’s Fujairah port to the port of Mukalla in Hadramout. In response, Yemeni President Rashad al-Alimi declared a state of emergency and called on the UAE to end its presence in Yemen. Later that day, the UAE Ministry of Defence announced the withdrawal of what remained of its forces in Yemen (the UAE had previously announced in October 2019 that it was withdrawing its forces from Yemen).
The military escalation led to major, rapidly unfolding military and political repercussions, particularly after the STC continued to refuse to heed calls and threats by the coalition leadership and the Yemeni president to withdraw its forces from the two governorates.
Someone could ask: Why does the STC refuse to withdraw its forces despite the threats and successive strikes? The answer is that doing so would deal a powerful blow to its secessionist project. Clearly, the council’s takeover of these two governorates — both of which reject its project — raised broad hopes among southern separatists of declaring their state, but Saudi Arabia’s decisive intervention (in the name of the Arab coalition) dealt a crushing blow to that project.
Escalation and repercussions
With the start of the new year, government ground forces — formed by the Yemeni president through a presidential decision on January 27, 2023 under the name Homeland Shield, with Saudi support — began moving towards Hadramout and al-Mahra (east) to liberate them from STC forces, under air cover and support from coalition aircraft, and liberation and control operations began. In response, forces from the UAE-backed Giants Brigades, coming from Taiz’s western coast, moved towards Hadramout governorate to reinforce and support STC forces.
Amid the accelerating escalation and its repercussions, the head of the STC, Aidarous al-Zubaidi — also a member of the PLC — moved quickly to issue what he called a “constitutional declaration” (January 2, 2026), in which he announced what he termed the independent “State of the Arab South”, during a two-year transitional period.
While the country’s official institutions at the national, regional, and global levels have so far ignored this declaration, many Yemenis dealt with it ambivalently, each according to their affiliations and loyalties.
For the Southern separatists, they expressed overwhelming joy at the announcement of their state, while their opponents mocked the move as a leap over reality, an attempt to escape forward over facts and local and international laws and regulations. Some considered it merely a desperate attempt to rid the council of the pressure of promises it had made to those dreaming of secession, at a time when it became evident that secession was no longer easy after the recent events and developments.
Regardless of interpretations, even if this declaration has no legal effect, its political, economic, and administrative impacts will not be easy, whether in terms of deepening divisions among Yemen’s elite and the public (North-South), preserving the legal standing of the Yemeni state, or even the continuity of managing the fragile state.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, its dangerous repercussions for the main battle to restore the state and relieve Yemenis from the consequences of a decade of war and state collapse.
Clearly, the Yemeni scene is becoming more complex, with events accelerating, positions erupting, and reactions escalating. No one knows precisely where developments in Yemen are headed.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
