Yemen

Sanaa, Yemen – The United Nations-recognised Yemeni government and the Houthi group have been using warplanes, missiles, drones and other weapons as they engage in intense fighting on multiple fronts in the country’s north, west and central regions.

At least 194 people have been killed and 880 others wounded in the past two weeks of fighting in parts of Taiz, the western coast, al-Jawf, Marib and Dhalea, according to aid agencies.

Iran-backed Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah (supporters of God), have intensified attacks on the coastal district of al-Makha (Mocha) located on the western coast, among others, to gain a foothold in the Red Sea – a vital shipping lane.

On the other hand, government forces have been battling to expand in Taiz and boost their control of Marib, an oil-producing region in the north.

Fighting has also been raging in the al-Jawf governorate bordering Saudi Arabia and Dhalea, which connects the Houthi-controlled north to the country’s south under the internationally recognised government.

Experts say gains or losses on any of these strategically important fronts could have significant consequences for either side.

Taiz and western coast fronts

“The hills and mountainous areas of Taiz and the western coast are key targets for the Houthis, who have repeatedly attempted to advance there,” Yazeed al-Jeddawy, the research manager at the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, said.

“The Houthis are trying to seize commanding terrains, cut supply routes between the coastal Mocha district and Taiz, and prevent government troops on the western coast from linking up with the Taiz Military Axis,” said al-Jeddawy.

In Taiz and along the western coast, al-Jeddawy says, the immediate contest is over the heights and roads connecting Taiz to al-Makha.

Situated roughly 60km (37 miles) from the Bab al-Mandeb strait, al-Makha enjoys a highly strategic position on the Red Sea. For a month now, the Houthis have launched missile and drone attacks on the city, causing massive damage to its port facilities and killing and injuring several civilians.

Recently, the group has also attempted to extend its ground operations towards al-Makha city.

“The Houthis seem intent on tightening their hold around [al-Makha] and moving closer to the Dhubab–Bab al-Mandeb area. A substantial advance would strengthen their position near the southern entrance to the Red Sea and give them greater leverage over international shipping,” he added.

Fuad Mussed, a Yemeni political analyst and author, told Al Jazeera that the strategic importance of the western coast and Taiz fronts stems from their proximity to Bab al-Mandeb, a chokepoint connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and one of the world’s most important shipping routes.

“The Houthis seek to move closer to this vital waterway to threaten maritime traffic. Such a move aims to keep the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb under the influence of Iran and use them as leverage against regional and international powers. This is a strategy Tehran has been pursuing for years,” Mussed said.

Iran has blocked the Strait of Hormuz, a global oil chokepoint, to use it as leverage in the war against the United States. It has also warned that its allies could shut shipping via Bab al-Mandeb. Iran also attacked Saudi Arabia’s pipeline used to export oil from the Red Sea.

In July, the Houthis declared a blockade against Saudi vessels transiting through the Red Sea – an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz.

Marib and al-Jawf fronts

Over the past few weeks, pro-government forces have attacked Houthi-held territories in Marib and al-Jawf, facing further retaliation from the Houthis.

Saddam al-Huraibi, a Yemeni political commentator, said the Marib front is fateful for both sides.

“Marib is a government stronghold in north Yemen. So, a Houthi expansion in Marib would threaten government presence and weaken its leverage in the north. That is why pro-government troops are ready to fight tooth and nail on this front line,” al-Huraibi told Al Jazeera.

For the Houthis, the takeover of Marib will deepen the group’s authority and step towards controlling the oil and gas infrastructure. The Iran-backed group captured vast swaths of northern Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa, in 2014, but Marib has remained in government hands since.

“Dominating Marib’s oil and gas resources has been a Houthi goal for over a decade. Without facing a crushing defeat in Marib, they would keep fighting to achieve that goal,” al-Huraibi said.

Adjacent to Marib, al-Jawf is also a hub of tense fighting between the Houthis and government forces. A government gain there would lay the groundwork for further advances, while a strong Houthi defence could undermine government forces’ morale and prompt them to retreat.

“Government-aligned forces have lately focused much of their offensive effort on al-Jawf. Government gains in al-Jawf would ease the threat to Marib while requiring the Houthis to defend a much broader area,” al-Huraibi said.

Al-Jeddawy said government gains could open routes towards the north – Saada, Amran or Houthi positions north of Marib.

The Houthis have carried out attacks in Saudi Arabia, including energy facilities in the country’s south. They have also accused Saudi Arabia of launching multiple attacks in al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Marib and Taiz provinces in support of government forces.

The Dhalea front

Fighting on the Dhalea front, a strategic gateway between Houthi-held territory and the southern governorates, has intensified in recent weeks.

Fighting there did not fully stop during the relative calm, which began in April 2022 following the UN-brokered ceasefire.

A Houthi advance there could open a route for their fighters to reach other southern territories. On the other hand, a Houthi setback would encourage government forces to push towards Ibb, controlled by the group.

“[Houthi] advances in Dhalea could expose the southern hinterland, while [government advances] could threaten Houthi positions and supply routes towards Ibb, al-Bayda and, farther north, Sanaa,” al-Jeddawy noted.

With the escalating fighting, the Houthis face pressure on several fronts, but the group has been readying for a range of scenarios, Khaled Ghorab, a pro-Houthi general, said.

“The [Houthi] Yemeni armed forces were never caught off guard by the prospect of escalation; rather, they worked to build and develop their own military capabilities based on tactical combat plans designed to counter a comprehensive, sustained attack launched simultaneously from land, sea and air,” he said.

Ghorab noted that this state of readiness enables the Houthi forces to carry out a direct response to sources of the threat – whether deep within enemy territory or at sea – targeting military bases or aircraft carriers as far as the Horn of Africa.

While the warring parties compete to seize strategic positions on several front lines, the latest escalation is also closely related to the wider regional confrontation.

“Iran has an interest in keeping Yemen and the Red Sea active as sources of leverage, while parts of the government camp believe the Houthis are under growing strain and that this is an opportunity to weaken them,” al-Jeddawy, the Sanaa-based researcher, said.

“The escalation still reflects domestic military and political aims, but its timing and direction cannot be separated from the regional war,” he told Al Jazeera.

The war in Yemen is threatening to open a new front as the Iran-allied Houthi rebels are trying to advance along the Red Sea coast, through the mountain chains of Taiz province, edging closer to strategic ground that overlooks one of the world’s most vital maritime arteries.

For the internationally recognised Yemeni government, this is an offensive with global consequences.

In Wednesday’s interview with Al Jazeera, Yemen’s Ambassador to Qatar, Rajeh Badi, a former government spokesman, said that his government and its armed forces had not violated any truce since 2021.

The Houthis, he argued, are “the aggressors”. “What we are seeing now is a surprise Houthi offensive to seize strategic ground along the Red Sea, in order to allow Iran, through its Houthi proxy, to tighten its grip on maritime routes,” Badi said.

He added that the Houthis, who have advanced on al-Makha (Mocha) and al-Waziyah, and over large stretches of the mountain chain overlooking the Red Sea in Taiz province, “want commanding positions to launch more effective strikes on ships and disrupt navigation in the Red Sea”.

Badi said the Yemeni government responded by opening fronts in al-Jawf, Marib and al-Bayda, and that the consequences could extend far beyond Yemen.

“We are now facing a real threat that does not stop at Yemen’s borders,” he said. “It threatens the entire region and the world. If the Houthis manage to choke maritime traffic in the Red Sea, we will be looking at another Hormuz in these waters – with potentially even greater impact.”

The Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb “represent a vital artery for global shipping, for both energy and food supplies”, he added.

A chokepoint that belongs to the world

Bab al-Mandeb connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. To the north, the Red Sea leads to the Suez Canal, while farther east, beyond the Arabian Sea, lies another critical chokepoint, the Strait of Hormuz. This geography is what gives Yemen’s conflict consequences far beyond its borders, as Saudi Arabia is already being drawn into the confrontation.

The Houthis have targeted Saudi territory, civilian infrastructure in the kingdom’s south and Saudi-linked vessels in the Red Sea.

Major-General Turki al-Maliki, spokesman of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, said the Houthis on Wednesday attacked Saudi cities of Khamis Mushait, Abha, and Jizan with ballistic missiles and drones. He did not elaborate on any casualties as a result of the attacks.

Badi, who has spoken to the media for the first time since taking up his post, said those attacks are designed to change the nature of the war.

“By targeting Saudi territory, civilian infrastructure in the kingdom’s south, and Saudi-linked vessels in the Red Sea, the Houthis are trying to drag Saudi Arabia into their war. Their calculation is simple: they want to rebrand this conflict as a Saudi-Yemeni war,” he said.

The ambassador assessed that “every time their militias suffer heavy losses inside Yemen at the hands of the Yemeni armed forces, they respond by firing missiles and drones at civilian sites in Saudi Arabia, in an attempt to inflame Yemeni public opinion and convince the outside world that Yemen is at war with Saudi Arabia”.

The conflict, he said, is fundamentally about Yemen’s state and its future. The Yemeni people are fighting to “reclaim their state, their republic, their dignity and their stability”.

Iran’s hidden hand

Behind Yemen’s fragmented front lines, a larger regional confrontation looms, and its architect, according to Badi, is Iran.

The official said that Tehran’s relationship with the Houthis is now impossible to hide. “Iranian officials openly boast about it, and Houthi leaders proudly talk about their ‘strategic’ ties with Tehran,” he said.

The Houthis are “one of Iran’s key regional arms – just like Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in Iraq. Many of Tehran’s other proxies have come under pressure,” he added.

“Former Yemeni President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi used to say that if Iran gains control over Bab al-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz, it will not need a nuclear weapon – its grip over these two chokepoints would be more powerful than any nuclear arsenal. Events have proved him right,” Badi recalled.

‘We have exhausted all peaceful avenues’

For Yemen’s government, the alternative to another war was supposed to be diplomacy.

Badi urged the world “to stand with us so we can rid ourselves of this scourge – a threat that no longer targets Yemenis alone”.

“We have exhausted all peaceful avenues. For more than 13 years, we have been engaging in dialogue rounds and signing agreements, whether inside Yemen or after the Houthis seized the capital, Sanaa,” he said.

Badi added that the Houthi rebels have effectively “buried peaceful options. Peace is simply not part of this movement’s culture or mindset. That is what ultimately forced us to take up arms”.

“The world must understand this difficult equation,” the ambassador concluded, that the Houthis are “an armed proxy, an extension of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Houthis do not represent us”.

DUBAI: The US has accused Yemen’s Houthis of triggering the latest escalation in violence in the country, as renewed fighting threatened to unravel years of relative calm and draw it deeper into the wider regional conflict.

The US Embassy in Yemen said on Wednesday that the Iran-backed group had brought “nothing but suffering” and accused it of turning Yemen into a base for Iran to “undermine Arab unity and security.”

“The terrorist Houthis and their Iranian backers miscalculated by underestimating the resolve of the Republic of Yemen’s legitimate government, the Yemeni Armed Forces, and the Yemeni people to end Houthi aggression and brutality,” it said on X.

It cited an Aug. 7 statement by the UN Security Council, which condemned Houthi missile attacks against Saudi Arabia and commercial vessels and warned that the group’s actions threatened regional security, navigational rights and efforts to secure peace in Yemen.

The statement came a day after a major Houthi attack on southern Saudi Arabia wounded 73 people, including women and children, and struck energy facilities in Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan and Najran.

Fires broke out at several sites and operations at some facilities were temporarily halted, according to Saudi authorities, who described the attacks as a “dangerous escalation” and vowed to take measures to deter further strikes.

DUBAI: The US has accused Yemen’s Houthis of triggering the latest escalation in violence in the country, as renewed fighting threatened to unravel years of relative calm and draw it deeper into the wider regional conflict.
The US Embassy in Yemen said on Wednesday that the Iran-backed group had brought “nothing but suffering” and accused it of turning Yemen into a base for Iran to “undermine Arab unity and security.”
“The terrorist Houthis and their Iranian backers miscalculated by underestimating the resolve of the Republic of Yemen’s legitimate government, the Yemeni Armed Forces, and the Yemeni people to end Houthi aggression and brutality,” it said on X.
It cited an Aug. 7 statement by the UN Security Council, which condemned Houthi missile attacks against Saudi Arabia and commercial vessels and warned that the group’s actions threatened regional security, navigational rights and efforts to secure peace in Yemen.
The statement came a day after a major Houthi attack on southern Saudi Arabia wounded 73 people, including women and children, and struck energy facilities in Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan and Najran.
Fires broke out at several sites and operations at some facilities were temporarily halted, according to Saudi authorities, who described the attacks as a “dangerous escalation” and vowed to take measures to deter further strikes.

Yemen’s more than a decade-long civil war has flared up once again after the Houthi rebel group launched an offensive in several locations against Saudi Arabian-backed government forces. The conflict has already spilled over beyond the country’s borders with the Houthis launching an attack on southern Saudi Arabia, targeting oil facilities and wounding dozens of people this week.

The renewed hostilities are the most serious since a United Nations-brokered truce halted large-scale fighting in 2022, after eight years of a full-blown conflict that killed tens of thousands of people in one of the world’s poorest countries.

So who is involved in this conflict? Here’s a look at the main actors:

The Houthis

The Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah (supporters of God), are an armed group controlling most parts of Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa, and some of the western and northern areas close to Saudi Arabia.

The Houthis emerged in the 1990s but rose to international prominence in 2014, when the group rebelled against Yemen’s government, forcing it to step down and causing a crippling humanitarian crisis.

The group then spent years, with Iran’s backing, fighting a military coalition led by Saudi Arabia. The two warring sides have also repeatedly tried to hold peace talks.

Seen as part of a regional alliance known as the “axis of resistance” backed by Iran, the Shia Zaidi group nevertheless has its own base, its own interests – and its own ambitions.

The Houthis have demonstrated their missile and drone capabilities during the Yemen war in attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, targeting oil installations and vital infrastructure. They have also proven resilient, defying more than 10 years of bombing by the Saudi-led coalition, as well as US and British strikes in recent years.

The group has gained international prominence for its attacks on Israel and shipping in the Red Sea since the start of Israel’s genocide in Gaza in October 2023.

Saudi Arabia

Riyadh entered the Yemen war when it led a military coalition against the Houthis in March 2015, seeking to restore the government of then-President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Back then, Saudi Arabia and Iran were at the peak of a regional competition, both deeply distrusting each other. An Iran-supported group expanding control at the kingdom’s southern border was unacceptable, hence the military action.

This was before a China-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023 marked the beginning of a more practical and less confrontational relationship.

Presidential Leadership Council

The PLC was established in 2022 when the former president, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, formally transferred his powers to the new eight-member body.

It represents the internationally recognised government of Yemen, with a mandate to manage the country’s political, security and military affairs, and to steer negotiations towards a permanent ceasefire. It is chaired by Rashad al-Alimi, an adviser to Hadi and former interior minister with the government of the late president, Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Its membership is drawn from a mix of northern and southern politicians and military-linked leaders in a bid to unite major anti-Houthi forces under one roof.

The PLC is backed by Saudi Arabia and the alliance that Riyadh leads.

Islah party

The Yemeni Congregation for Reform, better known as Islah, is a Sunni Islamist movement with historic ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. It is a faction within the recognised PLC-led government but has long had an independent identity. Its major stronghold has long been Marib, the country’s sole gas-producing region with one of its largest oilfields.

National Resistance Forces

The National Resistance Forces is a government-aligned military faction led by Tareq Saleh, nephew of the late former President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

The force has maintained ties to Saudi Arabia and, like the Islah party, is part of the PLC. It aims for a unified Yemen, positioning itself as a counterweight to both the Houthis and southern secessionists.

Military operations in Yemen intensified on Wednesday with clashes expanding across several fronts, according to reports by Saudi-owned news channels Al Arabiya and Al Hadath.

The Yemeni armed forces reported that fighting with the Iran-backed Houthi militia has been continuing on the Taiz fronts of Toil and Al-Barah, and claim to have inflicted heavy losses on the group.

Al Arabiya and Al Hadath have reported that Yemeni government forces have captured areas in southern Mahreb, as well as several positions in the northern and southern sectors.

The forces have also reportedly captured new positions and villages on the Al-Kaddah front west of Taiz during an operation against the Houthis.

The offensive was accompanied by heavy clashes, artillery fire and airstrikes targeting Houthi positions, gatherings and reinforcements in the area.

Al Arabiya and Al Hadath sources also said the Yemeni armed forces had launched a counterattack against Houthi positions on the Meris front north of Al-Dhale Governorate.

The sources also reported that Yemeni military aircraft had carried out several airstrikes on the Houthi-held Helan Mountains west of Marib.

Political analysts believe that the latest Houthi attacks open a new phase in Saudi Arabia’s approach to the Iran-backed group, marked by a shift from managing and containing escalation to firmly deterring it. They said that Riyadh will not accept the targeting of its citizens and residents on its territory, or attacks on its vital facilities.

The analysts told Asharq Al-Awsat that this phase is witnessing an advanced level of political, military, and security coordination between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s legitimate government, strengthening the latter’s ability to confront sources of threat and reshape the balance of power on the ground.

Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan said on Tuesday that his country would not hesitate to defend itself against attacks by the terrorist Houthi militia and would use all available means to protect its interests.

Speaking at a press conference with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, in Moscow, the Saudi foreign minister said the Kingdom is putting forward diplomatic solutions to avoid further suffering for Yemen and its people, and will not hesitate to support what serves the interests of Yemen and the region. He highlighted that the path of diplomacy for dealing with the Houthis remains open.

Prince Faisal added that the Houthis prefer to put their narrow personal interests ahead of Yemen’s interests, while the country’s legitimate government has provided an opportunity to negotiate with them responsibly. He described their latest escalation as part of their pattern of provocation.

The limits of Saudi Arabia’s patience

Dr. Abdulaziz Sager, chairman of the Jeddah-based Gulf Research Center, said Yemen’s legitimate government is fulfilling its responsibilities in confronting Houthi attacks targeting civilians and vital infrastructure across the country. He added that the government has worked to mobilize its capabilities and resources, and consolidate its ranks, particularly at the military level.

“The Kingdom will not tolerate any attacks against citizens, residents or vital facilities on its territory, and that its patience has limits,” Sager said. He expects Riyadh to respond “firmly and decisively against the sources of fire, in a manner proportionate to the scale and intensity of the attacks,” citing recent developments in Iraq.

He added that the Houthis had misread Saudi patience, saying that “they do not adhere to reason or logic and continue to receive instructions.” He said that the group had been given several opportunities over the past years but failed to make use of them.

A more decisive phase

Yemeni writer Saleh Al-Baidani said the latest developments point to “a shift from managing and containing escalation toward a more decisive approach focused on deterrence.”

He told Asharq Al-Awsat: “The Kingdom has provided ample opportunities for de-escalation and a political settlement, but the Houthis misread this restraint, treating it as a permanent limitation on Saudi action rather than a calculated political choice that could be reassessed as circumstances evolve.”

He added that the recent attacks on Saudi territory and vital facilities have elevated the threat to a level that makes the previous approach increasingly difficult to sustain. Al-Baidani said: “When the Houthis evolve from a party to the Yemeni crisis into a regional pressure tool more directly linked to Iran’s calculations and its wider confrontation in the region, the approach to dealing with them inevitably changes.”

According to Al-Baidani, the escalation is no longer linked solely to the Yemeni file, but has come to affect Saudi national security, the security of the Red Sea, energy supplies and the safety of international maritime corridors.

Saudi-Yemeni coordination

The Yemeni writer highlighted that coordination between Saudi Arabia and the legitimate government has entered a different phase compared to previous years, whether at the political, military or security levels.

He added: “The Kingdom appears more aware of the importance of having a Yemeni partner capable of managing the confrontation on the ground, while the Yemeni government realizes that any serious move against the Houthis requires a regional umbrella and political, military and economic support.”

Al-Baidani concluded that the success of the next phase remains contingent on the ability of the Yemeni side to unify military and political decision-making, and to transform multiple forces and fronts from a point of weakness into a source of pressure on the Houthis.

He added: “If that is achieved, we may not be facing a fleeting military round, but rather an attempt to reshape the balance of power that has settled over the past years.”

On Tuesday, Yemeni government forces expanded the scope of their field advance on a number of fronts, managing to liberate the Al-Yatama area in the Khabb wa ash-Sha’af district of Al-Jawf Governorate, northeast of Sanaa, a day after recapturing the Al-Labanat area in the same governorate. This came in parallel with the launch of a large-scale military operation in Al-Bayda Governorate, southeast of Sanaa, and the continuation of clashes on the western coast and west of Taiz, on the sixth day since the start of the Houthi escalation.

The advance comes at a time when government forces have begun, over the past few days, to shift from containing Houthi ground attacks to regaining the initiative on several axes, capitalizing on the group’s retreat from some positions, while army units, resistance forces and the Giants Brigades continue their operations on more than one front.

Yemen’s Houthi group has carried out attacks in southern Saudi Arabia, with Riyadh saying that dozens of people have been wounded, as fighting between the Iran-aligned group and pro-Saudi forces in Yemen sharply escalates.

The Houthis on Tuesday said they targeted Saudi energy sites belonging to oil giant Aramco in southern areas, with the group’s military spokesperson calling it “a broad operation”.

Saudi authorities confirmed attacks on several facilities and installations related to the energy sector in the south of the country, vowing a firm response. Riyadh also accused the Houthis of wounding at least 73 people in the attacks.

The conflict between the Yemeni armed group and Saudi Arabia is unfolding as the Houthis are currently fighting Yemen’s Riyadh-backed internationally recognised government, which announced that it was launching counteroffensives against Houthi-held positions across several provinces on Monday.

The renewed hostilities are the most serious since a UN-brokered truce halted large-scale fighting in 2022, after eight years of a full-blown conflict that killed tens of thousands of people in one of the world’s poorest countries.

The escalation also comes as the strategic importance of Yemen’s Bab al-Mandeb Strait grows amid Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a key passageway for global oil and gas supplies.

The Houthis have sought to advance towards the vital Red Sea shipping route, while government forces say their campaign ultimately aims to retake the Houthi-held capital, Sanaa.

So what do we know about the latest fighting, and what comes next?

How did the fighting between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis unfold?

The Houthis on Monday said Saudi Arabia launched multiple attacks on Houthi-held areas.

The group said Saudi attacks using aircraft and cruise missiles struck al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Marib and Taiz provinces.

Moreover, the Houthis accused Saudi Arabia of carrying out an air strike on a prison in al-Hazm, the capital of al-Jawf, killing seven people and injuring seven others. Riyadh did not immediately comment on the attacks.

At the same time, the Houthis claimed to have shot down Saudi reconnaissance drones over al-Jawf and al-Bayda.

Meanwhile, on Tuesday, Major-General Turki al-Malki, the Saudi spokesman for the Riyadh-led coalition in Yemen, said the Houthis carried out attacks on the Saudi cities of Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan and Najran, injuring at least 73 people, among them women and children.

According to a statement from Saudi Arabia’s Energy Ministry, the strikes also triggered fires at multiple oil installations and utility sites across the kingdom’s southern provinces.

Southern Saudi Arabia is home to key oil infrastructure, including the Jazan refinery, one of the kingdom’s largest, with the capacity to process 400,000 barrels of crude per day.

Shortly after, the Houthis announced that they had targeted Saudi energy infrastructure operated by oil giant Aramco in the south using drones and ballistic missiles.

The group’s military spokesman, Yahya Saree, said the attacks were retaliation for recent Saudi attacks on Houthi-controlled areas across Yemen.

Why is this escalation taking place now?

A key focus of the fighting is the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the narrow waterway connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.

The Houthis declared a blockade against Saudi shipping in July. The Houthis have also pushed towards government-held areas near al-Makha (Mocha) and territory bordering the Bab al-Mandeb Strait amid reinforcements and counteroffensives from government forces.

The strait’s strategic importance has increased dramatically because Iran’s restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz have forced Saudi Arabia to rely more heavily on its Red Sea export route. Between March and mid-July, Saudi seaborne crude exports through Bab al-Mandeb were eight times higher than during the same period in 2025.

In 2024, about 4.1 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products passed through the strait daily on average – about 5 percent of the global total.

Ahmed Nagi, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, said the strait holds importance “when we look at the Houthis’ broader strategy”.

“The move towards the western coast is not only about gaining territory on the ground. It also has a maritime dimension,” he told Al Jazeera.

“The Houthis have already linked their military campaign to the Red Sea and the shipping routes around Bab al-Mandeb. So gaining more control over the … western coast could give them greater depth and allow them to sustain pressure on maritime traffic in the Red Sea. In that sense, the ground offensive and their maritime campaign are closely connected.”

The latest escalation also follows fighting that resumed in July after an Iranian aircraft attempted to land in Sanaa without Saudi authorisation, followed by strikes on Sanaa airport and Houthi retaliation.

What is happening between government forces and the Houthis?

On Sunday, Yemen’s internationally recognised government said its warplanes had struck Houthi positions in Hodeidah, Marib and al-Jawf, as fighting spread across several fronts.

On Monday, government-aligned forces stepped up their counteroffensive. They announced a ground push towards the al-Labanat mountains in al-Jawf, while also reporting rocket attacks on Yatma and “intensive battles” with Houthi fighters in the province. Government forces also claimed advances towards Dhi Na’im district in al-Bayda.

The Houthis said they had repelled the advance towards al-Labanat and inflicted casualties on government-aligned forces. Houthi official Mohammed al-Farah also claimed the group fired ballistic missiles at reinforcements in al-Jawf.

By late Monday, government-aligned forces reported carrying out further air attacks against Houthi positions west of Taiz.

Al Jazeera could not independently verify the battlefield claims by the Houthis or the Yemeni government.

Rashad al-Alimi, who heads Yemen’s Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council, meanwhile said on Monday that government forces had made significant gains against the Houthis, pointing to advances in al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Taiz and Hodeidah.

“Our armed forces will continue to carry out their constitutional duty until state institutions are restored and their authority extends over the entire territory of Yemen,” al-Alimi said in a statement.

Yemen’s deputy defence minister, Major-General Samir al-Sabri, said in comments aired on state television that the government had resolved to “retake Sanaa”.

Majid al-Nuzaili, a spokesperson for government-aligned forces, said the goal of the offensive was to “liberate Yemen from the grip” of the Houthis “and restore Sanaa as a capital for all Yemenis”.

What is the humanitarian situation on the ground?

The World Health Organization said on Monday that at least 728 people have been killed or wounded in Yemen since August 23, with the majority in Taiz and along the western coast.

It said an estimated 21,000 people, roughly 3,000 families, have been displaced from Taiz alone since Thursday.

Al Jazeera’s Yousef Mawry, reporting from Sanaa, said the casualty count is expected to rise.

“These casualties are said to be in the hundreds from both sides, especially as we have reports of air strikes being conducted in the governorate of al-Jawf,” he said.

The Crisis Group’s Nagi said the world was witnessing “significant deterioration in what is already a catastrophic situation”.

“We saw in the past few days a lot of displacement from areas where there has been fighting between the two sides, especially in Taiz,” he noted.

“Those are the direct impacts, but there are also indirect ones. The economic situation is likely to get worse, which will put even more pressure on the humanitarian situation. Ultimately, I think it will depend on how long this round of fighting lasts. The longer the conflict continues, the greater the humanitarian impact will be.”

What’s next?

Analyst Hisham al-Omeisy said the fighting in the war-torn country was no longer simply a domestic one.

“We are way beyond the concept [of it] being domestic. It all started with the Houthis pushing to control Bab al-Mandeb and the western coast, to control the chokehold on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula, with the Iranians controlling the Strait of Hormuz,” al-Omeisy, a senior Yemen adviser at the European Institute of Peace, told Al Jazeera.

“This is definitely not domestic, especially when the Houthis have started attacking Saudi Arabia as well for the better part of the last month, and now escalating since today [Tuesday].”

Domestically, the Crisis Group’s Nagi said it was “unclear” what the outcome of this round of fighting will be, describing the situation on the ground as “very fluid”.

“But what we are seeing is that the government seems to be in a stronger position than at any time before, and it sees this round of fighting as an opportunity to consolidate its position and gain more territory from the Houthis,” he added, while warning that this did not mean the Houthis were weak.

“It’s true that the Houthis are fighting in Taiz, and they were the ones who launched the offensive against government forces there and made some gains. But on other fronts, in al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Marib and elsewhere, government forces have advanced and gained several key areas, while the Houthis have been on the defensive.”

On whether there will be a winner in this conflict, al-Omeisy said that in the long term, he expects a negotiated settlement.

“Look at the history of Yemen … we always inevitably reach some sort of a deal, so it’s not going to be a winner-takes-all,” he said.

“I don’t imagine there’s going to be a push to regain the capital [Sanaa], for instance. It’s going to be a bloodbath if they [government-aligned forces] do that.”

“There’s going to be a humbling of the Houthi forces. There’s going to be losses. But eventually, you will need a political deal,” al-Omeisy added.

According to Saudi political analyst Khaled Batarfi, the Houthi strikes will trigger a response but not a prolonged war.

“This is an escalation, of course,” Batarfi told Al Jazeera. In past attacks, Saudi Arabia tried “to not get engaged in a civil war, keep its distance and not to respond to attacks. But now this is too much [of an escalation],” he said.

“The coalition will have a say on that. This is a civil war inside Yemen, and it affects us as one of the parties. And so any response … in the same way [will be] an eye for an eye. But I don’t see a prolonged war – not with Iran and not with the Houthis.”

Yemen’s internationally recognised government has launched a series of air attacks against Houthi positions in the country, marking a significant escalation in the conflict, with some of the country’s heaviest fighting since a fragile truce in 2022.

Government warplanes carried out at least 15 strikes on Friday against Houthi positions, gatherings and vehicles in the western provinces of Taiz and Hodeidah, according to the Yemeni military.

The air assault against Houthi positions provided support to government forces fighting a major Houthi offensive towards the Red Sea coast and the strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s most important shipping routes.

These are not the first air attacks by government aircraft since Yemen’s fragile truce began to unravel in July. On July 25, government aircraft struck Houthi missile and drone launch sites and weapons depots in Marib and al-Jawf, according to Yemeni military officials cited by the Reuters news agency.

And less than two weeks earlier, on July 13, Yemen’s internationally recognised government said its forces had struck the runway at the Houthi-held Sanaa International Airport to prevent an Iranian aircraft from landing.

However, the latest attacks mark a significant step up in the government’s use of its own air power against the Houthis, after Saudi-led coalition aircraft provided much of the aerial firepower supporting anti-Houthi forces during the most intense years of Yemen’s war.

Friday’s air campaign comes as the Iran-backed Houthis, who have been vying for control of Yemen for years, attempt to advance through western Taiz and southern Hodeidah towards al-Makha (Mocha), and territory overlooking the critical Bab al-Mandeb Strait at the opening to the Red Sea.

Control of the area could strengthen the Houthis’ position along the Red Sea, where the group has previously attacked commercial and military vessels, while threatening a key government supply route.

The fighting unfolds against a backdrop of the wider regional conflict, with the Houthis recently declaring a Red Sea maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia, while disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz during the US-Israel war with Iran has raised the strategic importance of alternative routes through the Red Sea. This means any expansion of Houthi influence around Bab al-Mandeb could have consequences for shipping far beyond Yemen.

Here’s what we know.

What has happened?

Fighting erupted on Thursday as Houthi forces launched a major offensive along front lines in western Taiz and southern Hodeidah, using ballistic missiles, drones and artillery as ground forces attempted to advance towards government-held territory along the Red Sea coast.

The fighting has centred on areas west of Taiz and around al-Makha, a government-held port near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

A Yemeni official in Aden told the AFP news agency that the Houthis were seeking to capture hills overlooking Bab al-Mandeb and al-Makha before pushing towards the coast.

Al Jazeera’s Yousef Mawry, reporting from Sanaa, said Houthi forces had made gains in western Taiz.

“According to military officials from the internationally recognised government, the Houthis have been able to take some of those territories,” Mawry said. “In western Taiz, they’ve managed to take over a strategic military base, which is settled on top of a strategic mountain and gives the Houthis an overview of the entire area.”

Mawry said there had been particularly heavy fighting around al-Barah and Maqbanah, where a main road is used to resupply government forces stationed in Taiz and al-Makha.

More than 120 fighters have been killed since the Houthi offensive began, according to an AFP tally, making the clashes among Yemen’s deadliest in years.

Several civilians were also reported killed and others injured after a ballistic missile hit a restaurant in the al-Makha area, according to government-run Saba TV.

On Saturday, at least four civilians were killed and nine others injured in a Houthi missile strike on a crowded road in southwestern Yemen, according to Saba news agency.

The attack by the Iran-backed group on Saturday targeted a gathering of civilians along the strategic Heijah al-Abd Road, south of Taiz city, Saba said, citing local and medical sources.

What is behind the latest tensions?

The Houthis seized Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, in September 2014 and subsequently took control of much of northern and western Yemen, prompting a Saudi-led coalition of Arab countries to intervene in support of the internationally recognised government in March 2015.

A United Nations-brokered truce in April 2022 sharply reduced fighting. Although the agreement formally expired six months later, large-scale hostilities between the Houthis and Saudi-backed government forces remained relatively limited and Saudi Arabia pursued negotiations with the group.

No comprehensive peace agreement followed, however, leaving front lines largely frozen rather than ending the conflict.

That fragile status quo came under increasing pressure after the United States and Israel launched their war against Iran on February 28, but tensions escalated further in July with the government air force strike on the Houthi-held Sanaa International Airport, preventing an Iranian aircraft from landing.

What do we know about Yemen’s air force?

The modern Yemeni Air Force was created after North and South Yemen unified in 1990, bringing together two militaries equipped with both Soviet and Western aircraft.

Its fleet subsequently included MiG-21 and MiG-29 fighters, Su-22 fighter-bombers, US-made F-5 fighters and a range of helicopters and transport aircraft.

But Yemen’s armed forces fractured when the Houthis seized Sanaa and the political crisis descended into war in 2014 and 2015.

When Saudi Arabia intervened soon after, its coalition targeted airbases, air-defence systems and combat aircraft in a bid to prevent the Houthis from making use of Yemen’s air force.

That left the Saudi-led coalition – rather than the Yemeni government’s own depleted air force – providing much of the air power supporting government forces during the subsequent war.

Saudi-led coalition aircraft conducted tens of thousands of air raids between March 2015 and the 2022 truce, striking Houthi military positions and providing air support during major government ground offensives. The campaign also caused extensive civilian casualties and became one of the most controversial aspects of the war.

Between 2014 and 2022, Human Rights Watch documented dozens of apparently unlawful coalition air attacks on homes, markets, hospitals, schools, detention centres and other civilian sites.

In 2024, the US and the United Kingdom launched a new round of air attacks against Houthi positions in Yemen following strikes on Israel-linked shipping in the Red Sea. Earlier this year, the US Pentagon disclosed that US military attacks against Yemen’s Houthis killed 153 civilians in 2025 and wounded another 243. The US had previously denied its attacks had caused civilian deaths.

The conflict in Yemen has caused a huge humanitarian crisis. In 2021, the UN estimated that 377,000 people had died in Yemen since 2014, with 60 percent the result of food shortages and lack of accessible health services.

Why is the Yemeni government using its own air power now?

Previously relying on Saudi-led coalition air force power, the government’s decision to deploy its own warplanes now comes as it tries to blunt a Houthi offensive that initially made gains across several fronts in western Taiz and threatened the main road linking Taiz with the Red Sea port of al-Makha.

Mohammed al-Basha, a Yemeni American analyst and former spokesperson for Yemen’s embassy in Washington, told Al Jazeera that the Houthis had achieved “some initial gains during a surprise, multi-axis offensive across western Taiz” this week, temporarily capturing positions and threatening areas overlooking the Taiz-al-Makha corridor.

But those advances did not produce the wider breakthrough the group appears to have sought, he said.

“The front did not collapse, the Taiz-al-Makha corridor was not severed, and attempts to expand the offensive towards other strategically important positions were stopped,” al-Basha added.

Government and allied forces recovered much of the territory lost during the first day of fighting, according to al-Basha, while Houthi advances on several other axes were contained or repelled.

The government has since sent reinforcements, and the use of aircraft gives those forces another means of attacking Houthi positions and concentrations as they try to retake high ground and prevent the group from cutting the Taiz-al-Makha road.

Why have the Houthis launched this offensive now – and what happens next?

Al-Basha said Jabal Numan, overlooking the Taiz-al-Makha road, is one of the most important remaining contested areas, while a Houthi attempt to capture Jabal Dhu Ba’s, north of Hays, was repelled by National Resistance forces.

Taking such high ground could allow the Houthis to observe and threaten government supply routes, while losing it could make further advances towards al-Makha substantially more difficult.

“The first day therefore ended with a mixed battlefield picture,” he said. “The Houthis gained ground through the initial surprise and speed of their multi-axis assault, but much of that ground was subsequently recovered.”

The arrival of new government-aligned forces, coupled with air support, could make it harder for the Houthis to repeat their initial breakthrough.

“The next phase is likely to be more difficult,” al-Basha said. “Both sides are reinforcing, several positions remain contested, and control of Jabal Numan remains a key immediate objective.

“The coming hours will likely centre on attempts by anti-Houthi forces to recover the mountain, consolidate their lines and prevent another Houthi push towards the Taiz-al-Macha corridor.”

It has been six months since February 28, when the US and Israel shocked the world by launching missile strikes on Iran, killing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and several senior Iranian officials in Tehran, as well as scores of children in a school in Minab, southern Iran.

US President Donald Trump then claimed the conflict would only last “four to five weeks”.

In the months since, the war has erupted on several other fronts, reaching as far as the Caspian Sea. It has triggered a global oil supply crisis as the US and Iran battle for control of the strategic Strait of Hormuz, through which more than one-fifth of oil and natural gas cargo transited.

And it has resulted in an estimated 8,000-10,000 deaths, as well as tens of thousands of injuries.

The conflict is also realigning the global order, experts say, as new alliances form and dominant ones show signs of crumbling.

Here’s what we know:

Has the US achieved any of its war objectives?

The US’s goals were not initially clear: officials first claimed the strikes were carried out in preemptive self-defence.

According to demands presented on the eve of the war, and a jumble of sometimes contradictory statements from Trump and senior US defence officials, they include the following:

Iran’s nuclear programme

Despite Trump’s claim that the US had “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear capabilities when it joined in at the end of Israel’s 12-day war on Iran in June 2025, the US and Israel again claimed in February that Tehran was just weeks away from developing nuclear weapons.

Repeated strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites during the war have likely caused vast damage to the facilities, but it is believed Tehran still possesses 440kg of highly enriched uranium, which could be used to make a weapon.

The Trump administration wanted Iran to hand over this stock to the US and to commit to zero enrichment of uranium going forward. Iran refused to do this, although at one point appeared open to the possibility of handing the stock over to a third country. Iran also insisted on retaining the capacity to develop a nuclear power programme, which requires much lower levels of uranium enrichment.

Later, Trump briefly floated the idea of US troops retrieving the stock by force – a potentially dangerous mission.

In the June 17 memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed by both sides, Iran agreed not to pursue a nuclear weapon – something it had always pledged anyway. The MoU unravelled as its vague wording led to disagreements about what it actually stipulated.

Clark Summers, a US military veteran and professor at Belmont Abbey College in North Carolina, said the US “can rightly assert that these ends have been achieved. Although for how long before Iran can rebuild is difficult to assess.”

But Iranian expert and professor at the Australian National University (ANU), Alam Saleh, disagreed, and noted that Iran’s nuclear power programme is still intact. “The US lost even before the war,” he said, adding that the effort also shows that Washington failed in last year’s 12-day war.

Regime change in Iran

On day one of the war – February 28 – the US killed Khamenei alongside several other senior officials. Trump, two days earlier, said regime change is “the best thing that could happen”.

As the US launched missiles, he also called on “Iranian patriots who yearn for freedom to seize this moment to be brave, be bold, be heroic, and take back your country”.

Iran’s political leadership has, however, remained largely the same under the new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei – the late ayatollah’s son.

Summers told Al Jazeera that the goal may have been “ad hoc” or improvised rather than well-planned. But “killing leaders does not mean strategic achievements, even if it’s a tactical success,” Saleh said.

Ending support for regional proxy groups

Iran’s “axis of resistance” is an umbrella comprising a number of armed groups around the region that it funds. This includes Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and several smaller groups in Iraq and Syria.

There are no signs that Tehran’s support for them has ended, and this demand did not appear in the MoU signed by the US.

Hezbollah went to war with Israel in Iran’s defence, and Iran has refused to negotiate an end to the war unless the Lebanon front is included. The Houthis, meanwhile, have launched a blockade on Saudi Arabia in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, partly in support of Iran.

Iran’s ballistic missiles programme

Washington swore it would “raze” Iran’s missile facilities to the ground when it launched the war on February 28. The US also pledged to destroy Iran’s navy.

Trump has since claimed that about 82 percent of Iran’s missiles are gone and the navy is degraded.

In April, he also said that 158 Iranian naval vessels had been hit, while US Central Command (CENTCOM) has continued to announce dozens of strikes on command centres of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Iran, however, has continued to fire missiles, most recently launching a long-range missile in July that killed three US soldiers in Jordan.

Furthermore, the demand for an end to Iran’s ballistic missiles programme was also absent from the July MoU.

Control of Iranian oil

In June, Trump said the US would seize and control Iran’s Kharg island, the heart of Iranian oil production.

To date, the US does not control any Iranian territory.

What have the US and Iran gained and lost during the war?

Besides the US demands at the start of the war, several other pressure points have emerged during the conflict.

Control of the Strait of Hormuz

Soon after the war began, Iran in effect closed the narrow but critical Strait of Hormuz, which passes through its territorial waters as well as those of Oman. Since then, shipping traffic has slumped from more than 100 ships per day to an average of about five.

To enforce this closure, Iran began striking vessels in the strait, the only route to the open ocean for Gulf oil and gas producers, which had not gained its explicit permission to pass through.

The US responded with its own naval blockade on Iranian ports in and around the strait. This is continuing.

Despite a large number of expletive-laden demands from Trump since then – many of them on social media – that Tehran reopen the strait, Iran has not budged. It is currently negotiating plans for the future of the waterway, through which more than one-fifth of the world’s oil and natural gas supplies were shipped before the war, with Oman.

As part of these negotiations, Iran announced this week that it has agreed to a shipping route, which it will partially control, with Oman.

While Trump has recently claimed that the US has “full control” of the strait and that it is open to vessels, shipping remains at an all-time low and Iran has continued to fire at any vessels trying to pass without its permission.

Iran sees the strait as its main piece of leverage in the war with the US, which Salah said, Iran views as an “existential threat”.

Economic impact

• Iran: The war’s impact on Iran’s economy has been severe. The Iranian rial has in effect collapsed. Food prices have surged amid the war, and the US blockade and renewed sanctions have hampered Iranian oil exports, with the blockade cutting oil revenue by at least $6bn. Tehran’s economy has long been battered by US sanctions, although the fragile ceasefire provided temporary relief. Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said last week that economic pressure is a “rerun we know by heart” and that the country knows how to survive it.
• US: US consumers have also felt the pressure of the war at the petrol pump, making the conflict highly unpopular. A July poll by The Associated Press revealed that two-thirds of Americans are against the conflict. While many tend to forget there’s a war, Summers said, they do remember it acutely when petrol prices rise. In states like California, gasoline prices doubled. That anger will likely translate into a political backlash against Republicans in November’s midterms, experts say.

Relations with allies

• Iran: Iran’s targeting of US military assets as well as both military and nonmilitary infrastructure in neighbouring Gulf states and Jordan has not made it popular regionally, experts note. Iran has hit infrastructure in Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain. Those states have called this a violation of their sovereignty. However, Iran’s economic and political ties with China have held, as Beijing has managed a delicate dance by advocating against sanctions on Iran while refraining from becoming fully entangled in the conflict. Trade relations with Russia also remain strong.
• US: The US has faced reluctance from its NATO allies to back it up in this war. Despite being asked directly by Trump, they have refused to join the war. Spain and Italy, in particular, have highly criticised the conflict, while Germany, Israel’s strongest ally in Europe, has done the same. France rejected calls to send warships to enforce the blockade. Gulf allies, Pakistan and Turkiye have all similarly refused, while in Asia, Japan, Australia and South Korea all declined to get involved. Gulf allies are also likely weighing the fact that it is the US’s war on Iran which has caused them to become targets.

Military capabilities

• Iran: US experts say that claims Washington has degraded Iran’s military capabilities are correct. Several army bases have been struck while Iran’s ballistic missile stockpiles are down by about 82 percent, according to Trump. However, Iran is still launching missiles and, while nuclear facilities have been damaged, it still has possession of its enriched uranium stockpile. Experts point out that Iran likely has a bigger appetite for an atomic weapon now than before the war began. Tehran has also continued to produce and deploy its mass-produced, cheap Shahed drones. An estimated 1,221 military personnel were killed by April, although the real toll is likely higher.
• US: The US has lost 18 soldiers and more than 750 have been wounded. That’s “quite low”, Summers said. However, US media reports suggest the Pentagon has severely depleted stockpiles of some of its most powerful and most expensive weapons – particularly its Patriot defence missiles – something Washington denies. Those missiles are only produced in the dozens annually and cost millions of dollars each. In August, the US signed a $22.9bn deal with manufacturer Raytheon to boost Tomahawk cruise missile production from 60 to more than 1,000 annually.

Is there an outright ‘victor’?

Observers say there is not.

“Both of them have not achieved anything,” Saleh of ANU said, noting that the US has failed to translate military superiority to actual gains despite being a “superpower” fighting a “middle power”.

China and Russia are likely observing Washington’s weaknesses, making new military calculations in the event of a future conflict with the US, he said. That has implications for Taiwan, especially as the US has now deployed its last aircraft carrier in the Pacific to the Middle East. The shift leaves the US without an aircraft carrier in the Western Pacific, despite Washington’s previous strategic emphasis on the region.

“Iran surviving also does not mean it’s a winner,” however, Saleh said. “This might be a defeat for the US, but it’s not a victory for Iran either.”

Taiz, Yemen – Mohammed Al-Homaidi, a labourer in his 30s, has been working at the al-Makha (Mocha) port in western Yemen since its reopening in 2021.

Even though he was reliant on a daily wage, his earnings provided a decent standard of living for his family.

But things changed on August 9, when the Red Sea port was targeted by Houthi attacks that killed at least seven people.

With the conflict between the Yemeni government and Houthi forces escalating after a long-standing truce collapsed last month, finding daily work was no longer his priority, but his safety.

“It was around 12:30pm when the explosions [were heard] at the seaport, which was full of workers at the time. I couldn’t understand what was happening, and we couldn’t flee because the explosions were continuous,” Al-Homaidi told Al Jazeera. “After about an hour and a half, I ran outside the port and didn’t stop until I reached home.”

Thirty more people were injured in the barrage of Houthi drone and missile strikes that targeted the port and surrounding areas.

Houthi forces have continued to target the port and surrounding areas on a near-daily basis, resulting in dozens of deaths and injuries.

On August 11, the Houthis targeted a vessel at al-Makha port, killing three Pakistani crew members and injuring eight other seamen.

Three days later, the Houthis targeted two cargo ships at the Red Sea port, damaging the facility’s remaining infrastructure.

Due to the repeated Houthi attacks, operations were suspended last Friday to avoid putting the port’s 1,500 workers’ lives in danger.

For Al-Homaidi and other workers whose salaries were dependent on their daily labour, the port’s closure means a new struggle to put bread on the table.

“I am happy that we are safe at home today, but we are jobless now because we rely on daily wages,” Al-Homaidi said. “I don’t have any savings, and our food at home is running out. How can I provide basic needs for my family?”

Life beyond the seaport

Al-Homaidi also has experience working in al-Makha’s other major industry: fishing. But dangerous attacks around the Red Sea mean this is not an option for him and his colleagues at the port either.

Local fishermen have been ordered by local authorities not to go out to sea until further notice – but with money running low, a group of fishermen still ventured out on August 11. Their families are continuing to desperately search for them after they failed to return home.

With near-daily Houthi attacks on al-Makha, public beaches, parks, the coastal walkway and other areas have also been closed.

Families avoid going outside due to the threats of Houthi drones and missiles, and a strict nightly curfew for motorcycles is in place from 11pm to 6am.

Compounding the community’s suffering is a complete blackout of landline and mobile communications. Residents who can afford it use Starlink satellite internet. But for most Yemenis in al-Makha, there is no way to reach the outside world.

Back to square one

Abdulmalik Al-Sharabi, director of al-Makha port, confirmed to Al Jazeera that repeated Houthi attacks have forced the port to halt operations. At least six merchant vessels carrying commercial cargo have been struck since the most recent bout of violence, resulting in casualties among civilians and seamen.

“More than 1,500 port workers lost their jobs, while 16 were killed and 22 injured as a result of the Houthi attacks,” Al-Sharabi told Al Jazeera English.

Missile strikes have specifically targeted civilian infrastructure at the port and in surrounding areas, he said.

“The attacks targeted commercial and service areas, workshops, equipment, and the port pier, destroying it to the point that it ceased operations,” Al-Sharabi noted.

Operations across 30 shipping and customs clearance agencies have ground to a halt, affecting workers.

The port, which was closed between 2015 and 2021, serves as an economic lifeline for Taiz governorate as well as other Yemeni economic hubs such as Lahj, Hodeidah and Ibb. With it now closed, traders there will be forced to route imports via the port of Aden, driving up logistics costs.

“We were happy to have a seaport with such operational capacity, but today we are back to square one,” Al-Sharabi said.

No money, no food

Abdulraoof Abdullah, a fisherman in his 50s from al-Makha, has no source of income for his eight family members other than the fish he caught in the Red Sea. Due to the instability off al-Makha’s coast, he has not been out to sea since August 11.

“We are out of work now, and our homes are almost empty of food. We try to secure meals each day either by going into debt or asking friends for help,” he told Al Jazeera English.

With the port closed and food imports reduced, Abdullah said he expects prices to rise in the market, and he has no choice “but to pray to Allah.”

“We don’t have money to buy food for today, so how could we possibly have money to stockpile food?” he added.

“Most residents in Makha are fishermen, and we are currently out of work,” Abdullah said. “When we have jobs, we can buy food; otherwise, we will have to displace to another area where we can find work to support our families.”

Trading woes

Rashad, a local trader in al-Makha who preferred to be identified only by his first name, was importing goods through shipping agencies at the port since 2021. Given that his warehouses are just a few kilometres from the port, this was by far the cheapest option.

“Our goods are currently held up in Djibouti, and shipping costs have surged due to ongoing tension in the Red Sea,” Rashad told Al Jazeera. “Furthermore, we were just informed that our cargo will now be redirected to Aden, meaning we will have to pay significantly more for overland transport from Aden to al-Makha.”

With the warehouses still stocked with food from earlier orders, prices have not yet risen. But if the port remains closed, traders will be forced to increase prices on future shipments arriving via Aden.

“I am a resident of al-Makha before I am a trader. Any price increase directly impacts my family and neighbours – something I desperately want to avoid. But unless al-Makha seaport reopens soon, price hikes will be inevitable,” he added.

Although Rashad didn’t have any cargo on the ships that were recently hit in Houthi attacks, he said he feels empathy for other traders who suffered financial losses.

“Some people assume traders are financially comfortable, but we are in a state of constant worry. We track our shipments for months until they safely reach our warehouses,” he said.

“No one can imagine the devastation felt by traders who lost everything at al-Makha port. The harsh reality of this war has impacted every single Yemeni, and we are no exception.”

Yemen’s Ministry of Information denounces Houthi attacks on Marib as ‘escalation’ that threatens lives and increases suffering.

Yemen’s Houthis have launched several strikes on the government-held city of Marib, also hitting residential neighbourhoods, according to local authorities.

The group hit the city with four ballistic missiles and four drones on Saturday, causing several injuries and damage to homes, vehicles and property, Marib’s provincial authority said.

A fifth ballistic missile later in the day also injured one person, Marib governorate officials said on X.

A sixth ballistic missile was launched by the Houthis towards Marib overnight, officials added early on Sunday.

It described the strikes as part of an “ongoing assault that threatens the lives of civilians, displaced persons’ camps, and residential neighbourhoods”.

Marib hosts the largest number of internally displaced people in Yemen, with more than two million of the roughly five million Yemenis forced from their homes over the course of the war living there.

Video footage verified by Al Jazeera showed destruction in the aftermath of Saturday’s strikes.

Yemen’s Ministry of Information said on X that the continued targeting of Marib’s densely populated areas marked a dangerous “escalation” that threatens lives and increases suffering.

The attacks on Marib came alongside clashes further south, where Yemeni government forces claimed drone strikes killed three fighters from the Iran-backed Houthis on Saturday, including field commanders, and wounded others along the Maqbanah front west of Taiz.

A separate strike destroyed a Houthi military vehicle in Jabal al-Zuhayb, killing several more fighters, a military source told the Yemeni News Agency (Saba).

The attacks are part of a rapid escalation that has gripped Yemen since early August, when Houthi missile and drone strikes on military camps in Marib and Hadramout killed at least 30 government soldiers, the deadliest single episode of the conflict in years.

Days later, Houthi missiles killed at least two civilians and wounded 14 in Marib, and further strikes killed seven people in the port city of al-Makha (Mocha).

The Houthis, backed by Iran, control much of Yemen’s northern territory, including the capital, Sanaa.

United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg warned the UN Security Council on Thursday that Yemen faces its highest risk of returning to full-scale war since the UN-brokered truce of April 2022, as fighting has intensified on multiple fronts and threatens to unravel more than four years of relative calm.

As the conflict in Yemen rages on and spills over into the Red Sea, developments in recent weeks reveal a new trend worth pondering. The Houthis group, which for years almost monopolised the advantage of drone warfare, has begun facing fire from the same weapon used by its opponents on multiple fronts.

This does not mean that the balance of power has shifted, or that the Houthis have lost their missile and drone superiority. However, the increasing use of this type of warfare by the forces loyal to the internationally recognised government may change the nature of the confrontation, especially if it shifts from scattered operations to an organised and sustained capability.

For years, the Houthis were able to use drones as one of the most important weapons of asymmetric warfare. They were able to monitor their opponents and strike their gatherings, command centres and facilities far from the lines of contact, while government forces were mostly in a position of defence and interception.

Today, the equation is no longer that simple.

Forces affiliated with the government have announced in recent days the use of drones against Houthi positions in Marib, al-Jawf, Taiz, Hajjah, al-Dhalea and other fronts – and have shown video of a number of those operations.

It is not yet possible to speak of parity in drone power. The Houthis have years of experience and a more advanced missile and drone infrastructure. However, the government does not necessarily need full parity in order to bring about change on the battlefield.

It is enough for Houthi gatherings, vehicles, artillery, reinforcements and command centres to become vulnerable to strikes for them to be forced to change their patterns of deployment, movement and supply. In war, forcing the enemy to change its behaviour is in itself a military achievement.

It would be wrong to say that the Houthis have moved onto the defensive. They are carrying out broad offensive operations: they have struck Marib and Hadramout, repeatedly targeted al-Makha (Mocha), escalated against Saudi Arabia and once again moved their operations to the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb.

But there is a difference between the group being on a strategic defensive and beginning to act on some fronts as though it must prepare for a possible attack.

Here, the geography of the recent strikes becomes more important than their number.

Marib, Taiz, al-Makha and the western coast are not random fronts; they represent key gateways for any potential ground war.

Marib is the gateway to the east and one of the government’s most important military and political centres of gravity. Striking camps and movements there not only causes losses, but can also expose deployments, defences, response speed and sources of reinforcement.

Taiz is the central and coastal junction. Activating its fronts can pin down large forces and prevent their easy redeployment towards the western coast or other fronts.

Al-Makha and the western coast carry a different significance. South of the city lies Bab al-Mandeb and to the north the road extends towards Hodeidah. Therefore, the repeated targeting of al-Makha with missiles and drones can also be seen as a test of a front that could become very important if a ground operation begins along the coast.

When we combine what is happening in Marib, Taiz, al-Makha, al-Dhalea, al-Jawf, Saada and Hodeidah, it becomes difficult to view each front as a separate incident.

This does not mean that the decision for a ground war has been made, but it does mean that the parties have begun to act as though this possibility must be taken seriously.

For this reason, the most important indicator in the coming period will not be the number of missiles or drones, but the movement of forces and reserves, and the transfer of ammunition.

When this movement begins to concentrate on a specific axis, we will have moved from testing the front to preparing the front.

It is precisely in this context that the recent statements of Presidential Leadership Council Chairman Rashad al-Alimi should be understood.

Al-Alimi offered the Houthis the option of laying down their arms and participating in the political life of the country, but he also said that from now on, no Houthi action would go without a response or comprehensive deterrence. He defined the strategic objective as restoring state institutions, stressing that sustainable peace is based on the state’s monopoly over arms and sovereignty.

If these statements hadn’t been accompanied by action, they could have been seen as escalating political rhetoric only.

But what gives Al-Alimi’s latest message its weight is what is happening on the ground: government drones have entered the confrontation openly, artillery is operating on more than one front, military readiness is increasing and the government is speaking more clearly about deterrence.

The real test for the government would be whether these moves turn into a sustained operational doctrine, whereby any Houthi attack incurs a direct cost, or the old pattern is maintained where government forces absorb strikes and issue limited responses.

All of this is happening within a larger regional context. The turmoil in the Strait of Hormuz and the US-Israeli war on Iran are raising the strategic value of the Red Sea. The less secure Hormuz becomes, the more important Saudi energy and trade routes to the west become.

Here, the value of Bab al-Mandeb automatically rises as a power card in the hands of the Houthis.

The geographic equation is highly complex: Iran can exert pressure on Hormuz, the Houthis have the ability to threaten Bab al-Mandeb and Saudi Arabia is strategically positioned between the two corridors.

In return, Riyadh is working on arrangements to protect the Red Sea, while Yemeni government forces are showing greater activity on the ground.

This may lead to a formula different from the previous war: Yemeni forces taking on the bulk of the ground confrontation, while Saudi Arabia and its partners provide support, deterrence and protection for maritime routes.

The danger is that everyone is now approaching the brink of war: the Houthis are testing how much pressure they can exert on Saudi Arabia, the Yemeni government, and international navigation. Meanwhile, government forces are testing new tools and their ability to regain the initiative and Saudi Arabia is trying to build a new deterrence, while the US-Iranian confrontation continues in the background. This widens the margin for strategic error that could lead to an open war.

A series of Houthi attacks in recent weeks, which are among the deadliest in years, is raising fears that Yemen could be sliding back towards all-out war as conflict spreads across the Middle East.

A 2022 truce led to the end of heavy fighting between the pro-Iranian Houthis and Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces, which had been ongoing since September 2014.

But a series of clashes over the last month between the two sides – intensifying in the last two weeks – has led to civilian and military casualties and threatened to reignite the war.

Here is what we know.

What are the latest attacks?

The Houthis have killed a number of civilians in a series of attacks on the government-controlled west coast port of al-Makha, also known as Mocha.

There was also an attack on a commercial vessel in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait on Tuesday, which Yemen’s coastguard said killed six people and injured 10 others. The Houthis said the vessel was carrying weapons.

It followed the Houthis targeting Yemeni government military sites in eastern Yemen with drones and rockets, killing at least 30 government soldiers and causing further clashes. The Houthis have also attacked Saudi Aramco’s Jazan oil refinery.

In response, Rashad al-Alimi, chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), said the internationally -recognised government would not accept “a new truce that reproduces previous experiences”.

“No action by the Houthi militias will go unanswered or unchecked,” al-Alimi said, according to Yemen’s Saba news agency.

But he also appeared to leave space for a political way back, saying the Houthis could still “lay down their arms, engage in political life and compete through the ballot box on an equal footing with all other Yemenis”.

What is behind the latest tensions?

The Houthis seized the capital Sanaa in 2014 and have since fought a war with the government for control of the country.

Although the intensity of the war declined significantly after the 2022 truce, no comprehensive peace settlement followed.

The fragile status quo came under increasing pressure after the United States and Israel launched their war against Iran on February 28 .

On July 13 , Yemeni government forces – which are backed by Saudi Arabia – attacked Sanaa airport, reportedly to prevent an Iranian aircraft carrying a Houthi delegation from landing. The government accuses Iran of arming the Houthis.

The rebel movement responded by launching missiles towards Saudi Arabia. Then, on July 20 , the Houthis announced a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia, threatening oil shipments diverted towards the Red Sea and attacking Saudi Aramco facilities in Jizan and Yanbu.

Is Saudi Arabia changing its approach?

As the attacks have intensified, Saudi Arabia has begun to take a more proactive approach to its security – both in Yemen and across the region, according to experts.

Some analysts believe the prospect of the Houthis ultimately blocking Bab al-Mandeb – the narrow strait connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean – may have helped push the Saudis to change their strategy.

Saudi Arabia was somewhat insulated from Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz because it could use its East-West Pipeline to transport oil from fields in the east to the Red Sea, bypassing the strait.

If the Houthis were to severely restrict shipping through Bab al-Mandeb, that would threaten the Red Sea route for one of the world’s largest oil exporters.

Last month, Riyadh announced a new international alliance intended to protect shipping in the Red Sea from Houthi attacks. Dozens of countries were invited, with the kingdom saying 13 had agreed to participate.

It is also deepening its security relationships with Pakistan and Turkiye through a new joint defence agreement, while Saudi coordination with Washington also appears to be strengthening.

The Saudi Defence Minister, Khalid bin Salman, recently met US Vice President JD Vance amid reports that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had secured US support for potential military action against the Houthis.

But in Yemen, the shift in the Saudi position may have been more visible when the Saudis intervened against the United Arab Emirates-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) at the end of last year. That allowed Yemen’s fractious anti-Houthi coalition to coalesce around the Yemeni government and present a more united front against the rebels.

Simon Mabon, professor of international relations at Lancaster University in the UK, said Saudi policy on the issue has changed significantly.

“After years of attempting to de-escalate and work towards an accommodation with the Houthis, Riyadh appears to have concluded that approach is no longer viable,” Mabon told Al Jazeera.

“Saudi Arabia’s concern has become particularly acute because conflict around the Strait of Hormuz has increased the importance of alternative oil and shipping routes through the Red Sea.”

But rather than trying to totally defeat the Houthis and retake the capital Sanaa, Mabon said Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government now appear to be focused on pushing Houthi forces away from the coast.

“That’s a marked shift from what we had been seeing previously,” he said.

Could Pakistan and Turkiye be drawn into the war?

The Saudi-Pakistan-Turkiye agreement potentially raises the stakes of any further Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia.

Al Jazeera’s Yousef Mawry, reporting from Sanaa, said the latest attacks were being interpreted by some experts as a direct defiance of the new defence pact.

Pakistan has been directly affected by the recent escalation. Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said three Pakistanis were killed and another person injured in a Houthi attack on a vessel in the Red Sea.

“Pakistan strongly condemns the Houthi attack on a non-combatant commercial vessel,” Dar said, adding that the government was in contact with Saudi and Yemeni authorities.

But experts say the defence pact does not mean that Pakistani or Turkish troops will join the war in Yemen on behalf of their ally.

Wolfgang Pusztai, a security policy and defence analyst, told Al Jazeera that the agreement so -far is “just ink on paper”.

What role is Iran playing?

Iran has long cultivated a so-called “axis of resistance” of governments and groups opposed to Israel and the United States, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, armed groups in Iraq and Syria and the Houthis in Yemen.

The Houthis supported Iran towards the end of March by launching attacks towards northern Israel and have since threatened to expand their operations in the Red Sea.

Last month, Iran reportedly asked the Houthis to prepare to close the Red Sea oil route if the US attacked Iranian power infrastructure.

A source close to the Houthis told Reuters that missiles and drones had been positioned near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait in Yemen’s highlands overlooking Hodeidah and the Gulf of Aden.

Mohammed Albasha, a Yemeni American analyst and former spokesperson for Yemen’s embassy in Washington, said the Houthis’ attacks on Saudi Arabia should therefore also be understood within the broader US-Iran confrontation.

“By threatening Saudi shipping there, the Houthis can increase pressure on both Riyadh and Washington, while supporting Iran in its wider confrontation with the United States,” Albasha said.

Is another all-out war imminent?

Analysts say the crucial question is whether the latest attacks are intended to pressure the Saudi and Yemeni governments, or whether the Houthis believe they are simply taking the initiative in a new potential ground war.

The Houthis also say Saudi Arabia is using the port of al-Makah to reinforce and resupply government forces and believe Riyadh and its Yemeni allies are preparing an offensive against Houthi-held territory.

Nadwa Al-Dawsari, Associate Fellow at the Middle East Institute, said those fears may be fuelling the current escalation.

“Since January, there has been significant progress towards bringing Yemen’s different government forces under a more unified command,” Al-Dawsari told Al Jazeera.

“Government forces have also demonstrated growing air capabilities, carrying out air and drone strikes against Houthi missile and drone launchers and other military sites.”

“The Houthis’ objective in this recent escalation is to disrupt these preparations before government forces are ready, degrade their capabilities and force them onto the defensive.”

Ultimately, she said, the Houthis are trying to shape the rules of any coming confrontation so that “if escalation takes place, it happens on their own terms”.

While a Saudi-led ground offensive is not inevitable, the Houthis have also shown over the past decade that they cannot be defeated by air power alone, Mabon said.

“Yemen’s mountainous terrain makes a ground campaign exceptionally difficult, while Riyadh has little appetite to become trapped again in a prolonged war,” he said.

A Saudi-backed offensive led by Yemeni government forces is still more plausible than a large Saudi ground deployment, he added.

The consequences of major fighting on the ground between the two sides will inevitably mean that civilians will suffer most.

“Amidst all of this, the tragedy is that people in Yemen are paying the price,” Mabon said.

“It wasn’t long ago that Yemen was facing one of the worst humanitarian crises since the Second World War. People are struggling, and continued fighting will make it far worse.”

The deaths on board the Egyptian-owned Tihamah mark first shipping deaths linked to Houthis since the US-Israel war on Iran began.

Yemen’s internationally recognised government has accused the Houthi rebel group of killing at least six people and wounding 10 others in a double-tap strike on a cargo vessel in the Bab al-Mandeb strait.

The attack on the Egyptian-owned Tihamah on Tuesday marks the first shipping deaths linked to the Iran-aligned Houthis since the United States and Israel launched the war on Iran on February 28.

Yemen’s Transport Ministry said three Pakistani nationals and one Indonesian national were killed after the Houthis fired three ballistic missiles at the commercial ship, sparking a fire and causing “significant damage” to the vessel.

Yemen’s coastguard said in a separate statement that the Houthis fired another missile at the ship as rescue personnel were evacuating the dead and wounded.

“The attack struck the site of the rescue operation and resulted in deaths and injuries among the forces participating in the response operation,” the coastguard said.

At least two troops were killed in the second strike.

Ten people were wounded in total, including seven crew members, it added.

Houthi-Saudi truce unravels

Yemen’s Foreign Ministry condemned the attack and called on the international community “to move from condemnation to effective and decisive action” against the Houthis.

There was no official comment from the Houthis.

But the Houthi-run news agency Saba reported that the ‌group had attacked a Saudi ship carrying military equipment in Bab al-Mandeb. It did not name the ship, and there was no immediate Saudi response to the report.

In a separate incident on Tuesday, the US military said it fired on a ship attempting to break its blockade of Iranian ports in the Gulf of Oman. The US Central Command said a Navy helicopter fired two Hellfire missiles at the Panama-flagged Vela Nova cargo vessel, but did not say if any crew members were wounded.

The escalation in Yemen follows the collapse of a years-long truce in the country’s civil war between the Houthis and the Saudi-backed, internationally recognised government.

The breakdown of the United Nations-backed 2022 truce followed a Saudi air strike on the runway of Sanaa airport on July 13, preventing the landing of an Iranian flight carrying a high-ranking Houthi delegation.

The Houthis then attacked the Abha airport in southwestern Saudi Arabia and announced a blockade on Saudi shipping in the Red Sea. They have also attacked Saudi vessels as well as oil facilities in the kingdom, adding further disruption to the global economy.

The Saudi-led coalition, in turn, has struck Houthi-controlled Hodeidah and Kamaran, Yemen’s largest island in the Red Sea.

The Houthis have also launched attacks on government-held areas in Yemen, including the port city of al-Makha (Mocha) on the Red Sea and the central city of Marib, killing dozens of troops and civilians.

Yemen’s internationally recognised government on Tuesday said the Houthis launched 10 missiles and four drones during a series of further attacks on sites on the country’s western coast.

The Houthis said they had launched ballistic missile and drone attacks “targeting Saudi military buildups, weapons depots and command posts” in al-Makha and the central Marib province.

The UN has called for restraint, saying the renewed hostilities risk “drawing the country into a broader regional confrontation, with devastating consequences for its people”.