Wars

Good vibes weren’t invented in Marin County. But reading “Morning in Marin,” David Perlis’ history of the place and its outsize cultural influence for much of the 20th century, you get the sense it served as America’s leading countercultural way station.

Hosts of spiritual-minded sorts called it home: Alan Watts popularized Zen Buddhism in the ’60s, alongside poets Gary Snyder and Kenneth Rexroth. Francis Ford Coppola decamped there to write his script for “The Godfather,” and it’s where his compatriot George Lucas conjured up the “Star Wars” universe. (The cuddly Ewoks in “Return of the Jedi” were named after the region’s Miwok tribe.) Jack Kerouac sought enlightenment there; his compatriot Neal Cassady was imprisoned there, in San Quentin. It was the Grateful Dead’s retreat, Robin Williams’ launchpad, and the solid ground upon which Philip K. Dick questioned reality.

Why all these people, in this place, at that time? Perlis, an artist, radio host and Marin native, doesn’t strive for sociological or demographic explanations. His strategy is to sinuously move from moment to moment, artist to artist, as if in one continuous tracking shot, pausing only for a moment to catch some of the interesting characters he spots along the way. Over there, film critic Pauline Kael; and there, poet and sitcom star Suzanne Somers; and look, there’s bar-band singer Hugh Cregg, who’ll eventually use the stage name Huey Lewis.

Author David Perlis

(Jordan Blackman)

Still, Perlis breaks the flow just enough to offer a few reasons why the region became America’s affluent bohemia. It is, of course, gobstoppingly gorgeous, with Mount Tamalpais, Stinson Beach, Point Reyes and Bolinas practically designed to be edenic retreats. (Fairfax, he writes, is “ribboned with waterfalls, tufted with moss.”) Its isolation made it a counterculture haven for those looking to avoid San Francisco’s bustle: Gay poet Elsa Gidlow made her home there in the 1940s, among the first of many misfit pioneers. Wreckage from the 1906 earthquake was used to build the first “arks,” houseboats in Sausalito, providing a quirky infrastructure. Add some slow-growth initiatives, and you get artsy scrimping arrivistes; add LSD, legal until 1966, and you have a party.

So by the late ’60s, Marin had become a haven for a particular type: creative, interested in Eastern spirituality and profoundly disinterested in social convention (not to mention conspicuously white). Perlis’ portrait of the county at the height of the decade suggests a region that had escaped — or at least refused to look at — the worst of America’s turmoil. “Despite atomic bombs, rampant racism, political violence, and the war in Vietnam and Marin, there is hope, a sincere, emphatic belief, in an imminent inner revolution,” he writes. “When Zen, acid, or whatever your trip is, opens enough minds that people can outgrow this absurd, unwinnable conflict with nature and themselves.”

Perlis writes that with a slight smirk — of course nobody outgrew the conflict. Sure, a lot of people made a mint on the dream of transcendence: The Grateful Dead became a premier touring act, Lucas taught the country the ways of the Force and Sausalito’s Record Plant became the studio of choice for Sly Stone, Fleetwood Mac and more. But in the process, Marin became a kind of parody of itself, satirized by the writer Cyra McFadden in her 1977 novel, “The Serial.” In a world of what Perlis calls “swimmable wealth,” enlightenment sure looked a lot like narcissism in caftans. “I have no idea how I manage to do it,” Dick muses about his productivity at one point, prompting Perlis to bluntly break into the narrative: “I do. Drugs.”

Perlis could have gone further than that. One of the peculiarities of the Marin cultural scene, at least in Perlis’ reckoning, is that it hardly seems like a scene at all. Otis Redding and Frank Herbert and Linda Ronstadt and Anne Lamott and Shel Silverstein and Van Morrison all had little in common and interacted even less; if Marin was an incubator, it’s one where every egg hatched a different, brand-new species. Communal activity seemed relegated to the checkout aisles where locals kibbitzed over “The Serial,” or druggy extravaganzas that would in time claim Dick and various Dead members and associates as victims.

The irony, as the region stumbled into the ’80s, is that between its wealth and carefully cultivated isolation, Marin came to exemplify the ethos of conformist America: every man for himself. The actor Peter Coyote resisted: “When a Buddhist is thinking about shooting out traffic lights, it’s time to leave,” he quips. Others dug in: Huey Lewis and the News climbed the charts with a song titled “Hip to Be Square,” though to his credit, he explains to Perlis that it was meant to be a song about the difficulty of reconciling affluence and bohemian values. The man knows where he lives.

Perlis’ book isn’t a dismissal of Marin’s cultural moment, or even really a critique of it: His story is more something to be wondered at, like fog rolling over Mount Tamalpais. And Perlis’ storytelling skills make it seem like good fun as he pingpongs from artist to artist, each somehow inventing a meaningful, or at least recognizable, cultural touchstone. Marin gave us New Age music and Pablo Cruise; it also gave us Jim Carroll’s indelible punk classic, “People Who Died.” But one of the things to wonder at amid the good vibes is whether a different, more coherent, more sober scene would have been more meaningful, more enduring.

A regular contributor to The Times, Athitakis is a writer in Arizona and the author of “The New Midwest.”

Six months into the war on Iran, the largest US oil companies have posted their biggest profits since 2022, selling less oil at far higher prices. But the conflict is also putting their longstanding Gulf investments at risk, exposing the industry’s uneasy balance between wartime gains and mounting geopolitical vulnerability for investors worldwide.

Since the war began on February 28, Brent crude has risen about 22 percent, from $72 to $88 a barrel.

The Strait of Hormuz – through which one-fifth of the world’s oil and natural gas was shipped before the war – remains largely closed to commercial traffic, though Iran and Oman agreed last week on a temporary maritime route. Iran says the strait will not fully reopen until the United States fulfils its commitments under a lapsed interim peace deal, leaving longer-term security and management arrangements unresolved.

In the absence of a lasting resolution, the disruption is likely to continue supporting higher energy prices and creating windfalls for producers, despite placing energy companies’ regional assets and future projects at greater risk.

Rahul Choudhary, vice president of Upstream Research at Rystad Energy, an independent energy research company, said the conflict has already reduced the amount of oil and gas US energy firms are drawing from the Gulf region.

“Overall we expect US companies’ share of gas supplies [from the region] to fall by around 40 percent this year compared to last year [and] the share of oil supplies to drop by 30-35 percent,” he told Al Jazeera.

While higher commodity prices have helped offset the immediate financial impact, Choudhary said prolonged disruption is likely to delay major projects and weigh on the future growth plans of US oil and gas companies with a presence in the region.

Who has profited?

The surge in the oil price since early March, when Iran first closed the Strait of Hormuz, has delivered a windfall for oil companies, but gains have been tempered by challenges in the Gulf.

Chevron has limited exposure to Arab Gulf supply disruptions, with the region accounting for just 5 percent of its total global output. The group reported its highest quarterly profit in six years of $12bn in adjusted earnings on July 31.

ExxonMobil, by contrast, has been far more exposed to disruption in the Middle East, with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian attacks on US-linked infrastructure in the region affecting its operations in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which together account for 20 percent of its global equity upstream supply, according to Choudhary.

“We already saw in H1 [the first half of] 2026, the company’s upstream earnings dropped by around $1.3bn compared to H1 2025, due to lower upstream volumes from the Middle East. However, the shortfall was covered well by higher commodity prices,” Choudhary said.

The contrast highlights a broader divide between those US energy companies which have benefitted from tighter global supply – and the corresponding rise in the oil price – and those with assets, partnerships or operations in the Gulf at greater risk of disruption caused by recent attacks on energy facilities.

Where are US energy companies exposed in the Gulf?

The Gulf’s energy sector is dominated by state-owned giants such as Saudi Aramco, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) and QatarEnergy.

Although these national oil and gas companies retain control over the region’s reserves and core infrastructure, US energy firms have carved out strategic positions across the region.

US companies generate revenue through stakes in production assets, joint ventures, production agreements, refining and petrochemical projects, as well as through long-term contracts to provide equipment, engineering and operational expertise.

ExxonMobil has some of the largest US commercial interests in the Gulf.

The company has been a major partner in Qatar’s LNG sector for decades, holding stakes in several QatarEnergy LNG joint ventures linked to the expansion of the North Field. The field is the Qatari section of the North Field-South Pars structure, the world’s largest natural gas field, which Qatar shares with Iran, where it is known as South Pars. ExxonMobil also holds an interest in the UAE’s Upper Zakum offshore oilfield alongside ADNOC.

Similarly, ConocoPhillips joined the North Field East (NFE) and North Field South (NFS) expansion projects with QatarEnergy in 2022 to increase export capacity at Ras Laffan.

The US group, Occidental Petroleum, has become one of the largest foreign producers in Oman, operating the Mukhaizna heavy oilfield, the country’s biggest producing oilfield. It also holds interests in UAE gas and pipeline projects.

Chevron maintains a smaller but strategically important Gulf footprint. Through Saudi Arabian Chevron, the company operates oil assets in the Saudi-Kuwait Partitioned Zone, including the Wafra field. In July, it said it was exploring potential routes to move Iraqi crude to Mediterranean export terminals, which could reduce reliance on the Strait of Hormuz.

Where have attacks on energy facilities taken place?

According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), a US-registered independent conflict monitor, Iran and Iran-backed groups in the region have carried out at least 172 attacks on nonmilitary infrastructure across the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries since the US and Israel launched their war on February 28.

Energy infrastructure has been hit hardest, with oil and gas facilities, along with power plants and desalination plants, accounting for nearly half (48 percent) of all strikes on nonmilitary targets.

The UAE, Kuwait and Bahrain have suffered the highest number of successful strikes, with the majority aimed at oil and gas facilities.

Among the sites that have been struck are Kuwait’s Mina Abdullah and Mina al-Ahmadi refineries, the Bahrain Petroleum Company oil refinery, and ADNOC’s al-Ruwais Industrial City and the Habshan gas complex.

There have also been several strikes on Saudi Aramco facilities, most recently a drone strike on July 27 on the Abqaiq processing complex, one of the most critical nodes in Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure, processing more than seven million barrels of oil per day.

Nasser Khdour, Middle East assistant research manager at ACLED, said: “Oil and gas facilities, power plants and water desalination plants are likely to remain key targets for Iran because disruption to these sectors can increase economic pressure on Gulf states, while disruption to global energy supplies increases prices and pressure on the US during periods of escalation.”

In March, a drone attack close to the Saudi Aramco-ExxonMobil SAMREF refinery in Yanbu disrupted oil loading at the city’s Red Sea port. While the attack had only minimal operational impact, it highlighted the vulnerability of US-linked energy assets in the region.

Qatar’s Ras Laffan Industrial City, the world’s largest LNG export hub, which hosts major joint ventures between QatarEnergy, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips, also came under repeated attack in March, at one point forcing the plant to halt production entirely. In June, an explosion as a result of a “technical malfunction” on Qatar’s Barzan gas project, where ExxonMobil holds a stake, killed at least 13 people.

“In terms of gas assets being impacted, major blows have been [dealt to] companies [that are] part of LNG projects in Qatar: ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips,” Choudhary said.

He added that ExxonMobil’s share of LNG supply from Qatar is expected to fall significantly this year to about four million tonnes compared with 13 million tonnes last year, while ConocoPhillips has also experienced reduced volumes to one million tonnes this year compared with 2.5 million tonnes last year.

The attacks on Qatar’s LNG infrastructure could have longer-term consequences. Damage to LNG trains at Ras Laffan could take years to repair, according to QatarEnergy, while delays to Qatar’s North Field expansion projects could push back planned supply growth.

“The attack on LNG trains 4 and 6 at Rasgas damaged roughly 13 million tonnes of capacity, which will take anywhere between three to five years to come back online with a total repair cost estimate of around $3bn,” said Choudhary.

He added that the second most impacted gas project has been the Shah gas project in the UAE, in which Occidental Petroleum has a 40-percent stake and where drone attacks in March caused a fire at the gas plant that halted operations.

The conflict has also affected ExxonMobil’s oil interests in the UAE, Choudhary said. Production from Upper Zakum, where ExxonMobil has a 28 percent stake, was reduced between March and May when export routes were disrupted, limiting the ability to move offshore crude.

Beyond the UAE, the most significant impact on US companies’ oilfield operations played out in Iraq. A drone attack hit the Sarsang oilfield in March, followed by an explosion at one of its storage facilities in April, together causing damage to the field.

Looking ahead, Choudhary said higher prices could support cash flows, but prolonged conflict risks could threaten future growth. ExxonMobil’s $10bn Upper Zakum and Qatar LNG expansions could face delays, while ConocoPhillips remains exposed through investments in higher-risk markets, including its planned 42-percent stake in BP’s Kirkuk operations in Iraq.

“For companies like Chevron and Occidental Petroleum, whose presence are in less volatile countries like Israel and Oman respectively, the impact of escalations will not be as severe, as we have not seen significant disruption in these countries,” said Choudhary.

US oilfield service companies in the Gulf

Oilfield service giants, including US firms SLB (formerly Schlumberger), Halliburton and Baker Hughes, provide drilling technologies, equipment and operational expertise across the Gulf, supporting Saudi Aramco, ADNOC and QatarEnergy.

For oilfield service companies, the outlook is mixed, according to Chinmayi Teggi, energy research analyst at Rystad Energy, a research group. While higher oil prices and energy security concerns could lift demand over time, near-term margins remain under pressure from higher logistical costs, supply-chain disruptions and delayed projects.

“For the Big Three (SLB, Baker Hughes and Halliburton), the conflict continues to weigh on regional revenues,” Teggi told Al Jazeera, adding that second-quarter Middle East revenues were down 8-10 percent compared with the previous year across the three companies, while higher oil prices meant revenues were higher in other geographies.

However, a recovery in suspended operations and production could help drive growth into 2027.

For US companies, therefore, the Gulf remains both an opportunity and a risk.

“The impact on US companies will depend on the extent of exposure and countries in which these companies are present,” Choudhary said.

Their investments have secured US access to some of the world’s most important oil and LNG projects, but the conflict has exposed the risk of operating in a region where energy infrastructure has become increasingly vulnerable to geopolitical conflict.

US President Donald Trump has repeatedly warned Iran against restricting access to the Strait of Hormuz, arguing that the waterway must remain open to global commerce.

But for companies with billions of dollars invested across the Gulf, the challenge isn’t just about keeping shipments moving – it is ensuring the infrastructure remains secure, they say.

Faced with having to fight as technology rapidly transforms the nature of warfare, the U.S. Marine Corps on Wednesday unveiled its vision for the future of ground combat. Dubbed Ground Combat Element (GCE) 2040, the document lays out how Marines will fight and what kinds of equipment and training they will need to succeed, down to the squad level. Though the document doesn’t mention a specific adversary, it focuses heavily on the kind of littoral, anti-access battle a future Pacific fight would entail.

“I think that you would agree that the global security landscape today demonstrates an intensity for that kind of modernization,” Lt. Gen. Jay M. Bargeron, Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies, and Operations, said today during a media roundtable to introduce GCE 2040 that TWZ attended virtually. “It’s a landscape that’s defined by rapid technological change and the reemergence, importantly, of peer-level adversaries like China and Russia.”

A working concept of the plan was presented for the first time back in April during a panel at the Modern Day Marine Expo held in Washington, D.C. 

Ground Combat Element 2040 Teaser

In a future fight against enemies with ubiquitous sensors, advanced artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) capabilities, waves of expendable drones, offensive and defensive electronic warfare systems and long-range precision weapons, smaller Marine units like rifle squads will have to act more independently to defend themselves and execute successful attacks.

The new plan recognizes that “widespread use of drones underscores the need for effective organic protective measures across the GCE, down to the squad level. The evolving drone threat presents the most significant risk to ground maneuver, requiring layered active and passive counter-UAS capabilities to retain the initiative. Survivability must be addressed by comprehensively encompassing improved training, updated doctrine, and technological advancements.”

You can see an example of how small drones are being used against Ukrainian forces in the following video.

The ubiquity of drones on the battlefield has devastated both Russian and Ukrainian forces, which are each using these weapons to create an ever-growing no-go zone. Bargeron acknowledged that providing protection from drones for smaller Marine units presents a major challenge.

“The ability for our lowest echelon units – squad, platoon, company – to defend themselves against one-way attack systems is really maybe one of the biggest holes in our swing, and so we’re working hard on that,” the general admitted.

Protecting these forces will require a forward, layered approach involving ground-based air defenses (GBAD) and other means, Bargeron explained. From longer ranges, systems like the Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS), Light Marine Air Defense Integrated Systems (LMADIS) and Medium-Range Intercept Capability [MRIC], will defend Marines, he said.

In addition, Bargeron said the Marines will also rely on a system called “Home Alone,” which a spokesman for the service told us “is a Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft System (CsUAS) that is a semi-fixed site GBAD solution that supports our layered defense structure.” The Marines declined to provide any details about how that system works, citing its classified nature.

For protection at the squad level, “the GCE 2040 integrates both active and passive measures to ensure organic protection,” a Marine official told us. “A key component of this is the Organic Counter-small UAS, or O-CsUAS, initiative. This program has fielded dismounted kits directly to the squads. These kits provide Marines with the ability to actively and passively detect drone threats and to defeat them using both kinetic and non-kinetic means.”

Those kits are “complemented by the use of frangible 5.56 ammunition for standard-issue rifles, which is more effective against aerial targets, and the continued employment of passive countermeasures like multi-spectral camouflage, dispersion, and displacement to degrade enemy targeting,” the official added.

Bargeron noted that the Marines have already purchased 400,000 of the frangible counter-drone rounds and that they are undergoing training on how to use them.

You can read more about the Marines’ emerging doctrine for devolving air defense down to the individual Marine in our story here.

Drone Round: The Next Evolution of Counter-UAS

As noted earlier in this story, GCE 2040 also calls for providing squads with longer-range offensive weapons.

“What we’re trying to do is to bring precision strike capabilities down to the lowest level,” the general noted. “That’s a great example of using advanced technology to enhance the lethality of Marines that are already doing that job. The OPF [Organic Precision Fires] increases the individual Marine’s or Marine rifle squads’ ability to strike targets, at ranges that you had previously needed fixed-wing air or aviation fire support or indirect fire.”

The goal is for squads to be able to strike targets at a range of about 20 kilometers, Bargeron stated. 

“So in the hands of the individual Marines to be able to strike targets like that…will be dramatic,” he exclaimed.

Bargeron added that the Marines are currently using the Neros Archer first-person view (FPV) drones for this purpose. They are “capable of carrying a 2 kg/4.5 lb payload over 20 kilometers,” the company asserts on its LinkedIn page.

They are also being sent to Ukraine, where the use of these systems by small units is a daily fact of life, not a vision for the future.

Bargeron offered no other details on specific offensive squad-level longer-range weapons options that will be developed and fielded over the coming years.

The plan itself is vague in terms of overall timelines, noting that there will be a “phased approach to modernization” occurring across “three overlapping time periods.”

• Near-Term (2026-2030): This period focuses on refining and accelerating ongoing Force Design modernization efforts, addressing the immediate threat of drones, and setting conditions for future investments.
• Mid-Term (2031-2035): Investments in AI and autonomous systems will mature, enhancing headquarters functions, streamlining logistics, and improving operational tempo. Drone/unmanned formations and layered counter-UAS capabilities become critical.
• Long-Range (2036-2040): The GCE is transformed by AI-enabled command and control, widespread Human-Machine Teaming, and resilient, dispersed formations. It operates with increased combat power and survivability, providing the Joint Force with a decisive advantage on key littoral terrain.

Ukraine has shown American troops up close and personal how difficult it is to defend against drones. In a recent training exercise in Germany, U.S. Army soldiers were trounced by Ukrainian drone operators, only improving their performance after the lessons learned from initial engagements. While there are still many unknowns about the goals and rules put in place for that exercise, which accomplished its mission of learning, it underlines long-standing questions about why the U.S. military has taken so long to adapt to a glaringly different battlefield. Whether the new Marine Corps plan will do so fast enough, especially as major foes, especially China, are moving aggressively in employing new weapons and tactics based on lessons learned in global conflicts, is still up for debate.

That being said, the Marines acknowledge that GCE 2040 is a work-in-progress, but the changes it is trying to address are critical to operating against threats the U.S. military has yet to face at the scale it would against China or Russia.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com