Iranian F-5s Bombing U.S. Forces In Kuwait Should Be A Wake-Up Call: Ex-USAF General
“I want to talk a little bit about forward [forces] and air base defense. Let’s be clear, we got our rear-end handed to us from drones and other vehicles, aerospace vehicles, if you will, including three F-5s that took off in Iran and flew low level and dropped bombs on an airbase,” retired U.S. Air Force Gen. Glen VanHerck just declared during a panel discussion today centered on counter-drone defenses at the annual Space & Missile Defense (SMD) Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, at which TWZ is in attendance. Before his retirement in 2024, VanHerck served as head of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).
“That’s embarrassing as an airman to me to say that happened,” VanHerck added, noting that this was the first time in decades U.S. forces had been subjected to an aerial attack of this kind.
A series of reports, as well as unconfirmed claims from Tehran, state that Iranian F-5s targeted Camp Buehring in Kuwait on an extremely dangerous low-level bombing mission. The attack reportedly came on or around March 1, just three days after U.S. and Israeli forces began launching combined strikes on Iran.
At the time of writing, the U.S. government still does not appear to have officially confirmed the Iranian F-5 strikes on Camp Buehring. TWZ has reached out to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in light of VanHerck’s remarks today, and the command declined to comment.
NBC News was first to report on this attack in a story in April, citing anonymous U.S. officials. At that time, the outlet also said only that a single Iranian F-5 had struck Camp Buehring. American forces have been present at this base continuously since the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
In June, Iranian state media outlet PressTV aired a segment with additional claimed details about the operation, as well as interviews with what were said to be the pilots who took part. That report said that a trio of heavily refurbished Iranian F-5s, known locally as Kowsars, had been sent on the mission. Iran acquired a fleet of 166 F-5E/Fs from the United States in the 1970s under the regime of the Shah. How many of those jets were still operational to any degree when the latest conflict broke out on February 28 is unclear. The Iranian Air Force was heavily targeted by U.S. and Israeli forces from the start.
According to PressTV, the F-5s flew to Kuwait from Iran at extremely low altitudes, at times below 50 feet, and at high speed to evade detection, including by E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) jets flying above. The pilots maintained radio silence the entire time.
The PressTV report also claimed that pilots followed a route specifically designed to avoid Patriot surface-to-air missile batteries and other air defenses at Camp Buehring. Though this remains unconfirmed, it is worth noting that Patriot has known limitations when it comes to its engagement envelope. New capabilities are being developed for the system now to expand its flexibility to address targets approaching from different vectors, as well as ones that have already passed overhead. Without the aid of some type of look-down sensor capability, ground-based air defense systems more broadly cannot see through the horizon or topography, either.
Furthermore, the PressTV report claimed that F-5 strikes caused broader chaos and confusion that contributed to a Kuwaiti F/A-18 Hornet fighter shooting down three U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle combat jets. Americans and Kuwaiti authorities acknowledged this friendly-fire incident at the time, which thankfully did not result in any fatalities, but have yet to offer an official explanation for how it occurred.
Many questions remain about how Iranian F-5s would have been able to ingress and egress from Kuwait unscathed, and successfully drop unguided bombs on Camp Buehring in the process. It’s unclear where the jets launched from, and it is very possible they needed to carry significant extra fuel in external tanks just to have made the trip to and from Iran in the first place. This would also have impacted their top speed and capacity to carry ordnance.
As an aside, a pair of Iranian Su-24 Fencer swing-wing combat jets also attempted to strike targets in Qatar on March 2, but that would have been a much shorter trip across the Persian Gulf. Those jets were also shot down by Qatari F-15s before they could reach their destination.
In addition to the sensors associated with Patriot and other air defense systems on the ground, as well as E-3s in the air, the U.S. military has spent years developing a more integrated air and missile defense network with allies and partners across the Middle East. It is also worth noting here that Iran very actively targeted air and missile defense radars in the region early in the conflict, something we noted was its own separate wake-up call, as you can read more about here. This raises a question of what else Iran may have brought to bear in support of this operation. Iranian forces could have launched additional missile and/or drone strikes against sensors, command-and-control nodes, and other sites to help clear the way. Electronic warfare, cyber attacks, and/or deception of various kinds could have been employed, as well.
During the panel today, VanHerck said he did not believe any of this should have come as a surprise, and that it speaks to larger issues surrounding base defense facing the U.S. military today.
“People are like, ‘How come that happened? We got surprised.’ No, we didn’t get surprised,” he said. “What happened was we had two services pointing fingers at each other, and nobody made a decision on whose mission and role responsibility that was, candidly.”
Whether VanHerck’s comments here reflect his specific understanding of what happened during the attack on Camp Buehring in March, or if he was speaking more generally, is unclear. The two services he refers to here are the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army. As part of the delineation of official roles and responsibilities after the Air Force was split from the Army in 1947, the latter service was given the lead role in defending both services’ bases against aerial attacks. Today, the Army has a broader responsibility for ground-based air and missile defense across the joint force, abroad and at home, as well.
“The department needed to say it is this service or that service’s responsibility moving forward,” VanHerck continued today. “I’m not taking sides in that. The bottom line is, we didn’t make the decision, we accepted risk, and now we’re paying the price of that risk that we accepted, candidly.”
Now, “the Air Force chief has stood up and said, ‘Okay, I’m going to take that mission on,’” VanHerck also noted. “What we can’t have happen in the next year is a bifurcated solution where you have Patriots and THAADs [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems] operating up here, and you have counter-drone … down here, and they’re not fusing data and sharing C2 [command and control] and collaboration. That can’t happen, and we’ve got to make sure we get together and don’t allow that to happen.”
The Air Force is still very early in the process of taking on more responsibility for defending its facilities against aerial threats from the ground, and has been focusing first on acquiring and fielding new counter-drone and counter-cruise missile capabilities. Similar developments may now be afoot in the Marine Corps, particularly when it comes to ballistic missile defense. The Marines are already in the process of fielding a host of new and improved lower-tier anti-air and counter-drone systems.
For its part, in recent years, the Army has acknowledged significant gaps in its air and missile defense capabilities and capacity, especially when it comes to addressing drone threats. The service is also fully aware of the strains on its higher-end Patriot and THAAD units after decades of persistent operational demands in response to crises globally. TWZ has repeatedly called attention to concerns about the ability, or lack thereof, of the Army’s Patriot force to adequately meet operational demands now, let alone in the event of a future high-end fight against an opponent like China.
The PATRIOT Missile in Action
All of this is now further wrapped in a succession of reports that U.S. stockpiles of anti-air interceptors for Patriot and THAAD, as well as other critical munitions, are now very worryingly low after months of fighting with Iran. This follows heavy expenditures of surface-to-air missiles and other weaponry by U.S. and allied forces in the course of other conflicts and crises in recent years. Efforts to replenish those stocks, as well as expand other air and missile defense capabilities and capacity, are underway now, but are still years away from yielding real fruit.
When it comes to Iran’s reported F-5 attacks on Kuwait earlier this year, much remains unknown and unconfirmed. However, it is certainly the opinion of retired Gen. VanHerck that it should be taken seriously and speaks to the urgency with which much bigger problems with the U.S. air and missile ecosystem need to be addressed.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com
