Venezuelas

The United States says it will control sales of Venezuelan oil “indefinitely” and decide how the proceeds of those sales are used, as President Donald Trump’s administration consolidates control over the South American country after abducting its president.

The US Department of Energy said on Wednesday that it had “begun marketing” Venezuelan oil on global markets and all proceeds from the sales “will first settle in US-controlled accounts at globally recognized banks”.

“These funds will be disbursed for the benefit of the American people and the Venezuelan people at the discretion of the US government,” it said.

“These oil sales begin immediately with the anticipated sale of approximately 30-50 million barrels. They will continue indefinitely.”

The announcement comes just days after the Trump administration abducted Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro on Saturday in what legal experts say was a clear violation of international law.

The US has said it plans to “run” the country and take control of its vast oil reserves, with Trump saying on social media on Tuesday that Caracas would hand between 30 and 50 million barrels of oil over to Washington.

The US actions against Venezuela come amid a months-long pressure campaign by the Trump administration against Maduro, who has been charged in New York with drug trafficking offences that he denies.

That has included a partial US naval blockade against Venezuela and the seizure of several vessels that the Trump administration says were transporting oil to and from the country in violation of US sanctions.

Earlier on Wednesday, US special forces seized two Venezuela-linked vessels – including a Russian-flagged ship in the North Atlantic – for allegedly breaching those sanctions.

The seizures came as senior US officials briefed lawmakers on Capitol Hill about the Trump administration’s plans in Venezuela.

Reporting from Washington, DC, Al Jazeera’s Alan Fisher said most Republicans have backed Trump’s actions while Democrats have raised a slew of questions.

That includes “how long this operation in Venezuela will continue, what it will cost, [whether] any American servicemen actually be deployed on the ground in Venezuela, and what is the Venezuelan reaction,” Fisher explained.

“The Trump administration [is] hoping to get everyone on side before the end of the day,” he added.

Democratic Senator Elizabeth Warren wrote on social media that Wednesday’s briefing was “worse” than imagined.

“Oil company executives seem to know more about Trump’s secret plan to ‘run’ Venezuela than the American people. We need public Senate hearings NOW,” she said.

Three-phased plan

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio told reporters on Wednesday that the Trump administration is pursuing a three-phased plan that begins with the sales of Venezuelan oil.

“That money will then be handled in such a way that we will control how it’s dispersed in a way that benefits the Venezuelan people, not corruption, not the regime,” Rubio said.

The second phase would see US and other companies gain access to the Venezuelan market, and “begin to create the process of reconciliation nationally … so that opposition forces can be amnestied and released from prisons or brought back to the country”.

“And then the third phase, of course, would be one of transition,” Rubio added.

Gregory Brew, a senior analyst on Iran and energy at Eurasia Group, said the US announcement about controlling Venezuelan oil sales hints at “a return to the concessionary system” in place before the 1970s.

Brew explained in a social media post that, under that system, “producer states own the oil but it is Western firms that manage production and marketing, ultimately retain the bulk of the profits”.

A group of United Nations experts also warned that recent statements from Trump and other administration officials about plans to “run” Venezuela and exploit its oil reserves would violate international law.

Specifically, the experts said the US position contravenes “the right of peoples to self-determination and their associated sovereignty over natural resources, cornerstones of international human rights law”.

“Venezuela’s vast natural resources, including the largest proven oil reserves in the world, must not be cynically exploited through thinly veiled pretexts to legitimise military aggression, foreign occupation, or regime-change strategies,” they said.

Political situation unstable

Renata Segura, the Latin America and Caribbean programme director at the International Crisis Group, noted Venezuelan authorities have not commented on the US saying it plans to control sales of the country’s oil.

“And so we have to assume that either [the Venezuelan authorities] have accepted these terms, or that they’re just going to be forced to accept them,” Segura told Al Jazeera.

Venezuelan Vice President Delcy Rodriguez was sworn in as president earlier this week following Maduro’s abduction, stressing on Tuesday that “there is no foreign agent governing Venezuela” despite US claims to “run” the country.

Segura explained, “There’s a lot of debate within the [Venezuelan] regime itself about how to move forward” amid the US pronouncements, stressing the political situation remains far from stable.

“It’s very important what the army might do,” she said.

“The military forces in Venezuela control enormous amounts of power – both economic but also on the streets – and there might be a moment in which they think they’re not going to be on board with this particular arrangement that the United States is presenting.”

CARACAS, Venezuela — Venezuela’s opposition supporters have long hoped for the day when Nicolás Maduro is no longer in power — a dream that was fulfilled when the U.S. military whisked the authoritarian leader away. But while Maduro is in jail in New York on drug trafficking charges, the leaders of his repressive administration remain in charge.

The nation’s opposition — backed by consecutive Republican and Democratic administrations in the U.S. — for years vowed to immediately replace Maduro with one of their own and restore democracy to the oil-rich country. But President Trump delivered them a heavy blow by allowing Maduro’s vice president, Delcy Rodríguez, to assume control.

Meanwhile, most opposition leaders, including Nobel Peace Prize winner María Corina Machado, are in exile or prison.

“They were clearly unimpressed by the sort of ethereal magical realism of the opposition, about how if they just gave Maduro a push, it would just be this instant move toward democracy,” David Smilde, a Tulane University professor who has studied Venezuela for three decades, said of the Trump administration.

The U.S. seized Maduro and first lady Cilia Flores in a military operation Saturday, removing them both from their home on a military base in Venezuela’s capital, Caracas. Hours later, Trump said the U.S. would “run” Venezuela and expressed skepticism that Machado could ever be its leader.

“She doesn’t have the support within, or the respect within, the country,” Trump told reporters. “She’s a very nice woman, but she doesn’t have the respect.”

Ironically, Machado’s unending praise for the American president, including dedicating her Nobel Peace Prize to Trump and her backing of U.S. campaigns to deport Venezuelan migrants and attack alleged drug traffickers in international waters, has lost her some support at home.

The rightful winner of Venezuela’s presidential election

Machado rose to become Maduro’s strongest opponent in recent years, but his government barred her from running for office to prevent her from challenging — and likely beating — him in the 2024 presidential election. She chose retired ambassador Edmundo González Urrutia to represent her on the ballot.

Officials loyal to the ruling party declared Maduro the winner mere hours after the polls closed, but Machado’s well-organized campaign stunned the nation by collecting detailed tally sheets showing González had defeated Maduro by a 2-to-1 margin.

The U.S. and other nations recognized González as the legitimate winner.

However, Venezuelans identify Machado, not González, as the winner, and the charismatic opposition leader has remained the voice of the campaign, pushing for international support and insisting her movement will replace Maduro.

In her first televised interview since Maduro’s capture, Machado effusively praised Trump and failed to acknowledge his snub of her opposition movement in the latest transition of power.

“I spoke with President Trump on Oct. 10, the same day the prize was announced, not since then,” she told Fox News on Monday. “What he has done as I said is historic, and it’s a huge step toward a democratic transition.”

Hopes for a new election

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Sunday seemed to walk back Trump’s assertion that the U.S. would “run” Venezuela. In interviews, Rubio insisted that Washington will use control of Venezuela’s oil industry to force policy changes, and called its current government illegitimate. The country is home to the world’s largest proven crude oil reserves.

Neither Trump nor Rodríguez have said when, or if, elections might take place in Venezuela.

Venezuela’s constitution requires an election within 30 days whenever a president becomes “permanently unavailable” to serve. Reasons listed include death, resignation, removal from office or “abandonment” of duties as declared by the National Assembly. That electoral timeline was rigorously followed when Maduro’s predecessor, Hugo Chávez, died of cancer in 2013.

On Tuesday, U.S. Sen. Lindsey Graham, a close Trump ally who traveled with the president on Air Force One on Sunday, said he believes an election will happen but did not specify when or how.

“We’re going to build the country up – infrastructure wise – crescendoing with an election that will be free,” the South Carolina Republican told reporters.

But Maduro loyalists in the high court Saturday, citing another provision of the constitution, declared Maduro’s absence “temporary” meaning there is no election requirement. Instead, the vice president — which is not an elected position — takes over for up to 90 days, with a provision to extend to six months if approved by the National Assembly, which is controlled by the ruling party.

Challenges lie ahead for the opposition

In its ruling, Venezuela’s Supreme Court made no mention of the 180-day limit, leading to speculation that Rodríguez could try to cling to power as she seeks to unite ruling party factions and shield it from what would certainly be a stiff electoral challenge.

Machado on Monday criticized Rodríguez as “one the main architects of torture, persecution, corruption, narco-trafficking … certainly not an individual that can be trusted by international investors.”

Even if an election takes place, Machado and González would first have to find a way back into Venezuela.

González has been in exile in Spain since September 2024 and Machado left Venezuela last month when she appeared in public for the first time in 11 months to receive her Nobel Prize in Norway.

Ronal Rodríguez, a researcher at the Venezuela Observatory in Colombia’s Universidad del Rosario, said the Trump administration’s decision to work with Rodríguez could harm the nation’s “democratic spirit.”

“What the opposition did in the 2024 election was to unite with a desire to transform the situation in Venezuela through democratic means, and that is embodied by María Corina Machado and, obviously, Edmundo González Urrutia,” he said. “To disregard that is to belittle, almost to humiliate, Venezuelans.”

Cano writes for the Associated Press.

WASHINGTON — A highly confidential CIA assessment produced at the request of the White House warned President Trump of a wider conflict in Venezuela if he were to support the country’s democratic opposition once its president, Nicolás Maduro, was deposed, a person familiar with the matter told The Times.

The assessment was a tightly held CIA product commissioned at the request of senior policymakers before Trump decided whether to authorize Operation Absolute Resolve, the stunning U.S. mission that seized Maduro and his wife from their bedroom in Caracas over the weekend.

Announcing the results of the operation on Sunday, Trump surprised an anxious Venezuelan public when he was quick to dismiss the leadership of the democratic opposition — led by María Corina Machado, last year’s Nobel Peace Prize laureate, and Edmundo González Urrutia, the opposition candidate who won the 2024 presidential election that was ultimately stolen by Maduro.

Instead, Trump said his administration was working with Maduro’s handpicked vice president, Delcy Rodríguez, who has since been named the country’s interim president. The rest of Maduro’s government remains in place.

Endorsing the opposition would probably have required U.S. military backing, with the Venezuelan armed forces still under the control of loyalists to Maduro unwilling to relinquish power.

A second official said that the administration sought to avoid one of the cardinal mistakes of the invasion of Iraq, when the Bush administration ordered party loyalists of the deposed Saddam Hussein to be excluded from the country’s interim government. That decision, known as de-Baathification, led those in charge of Iraq’s stockpiles of weapons to establish armed resistance to the U.S. campaign.

The CIA product was not an assessment that was shared across the 18 government agencies that make up the U.S. intelligence community, whose head, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, was largely absent from deliberations — and who has yet to comment on the operation, despite CIA operatives being deployed in harm’s way before and throughout the weekend mission.

The core team that worked on Absolute Resolve included Homeland Security Advisor Stephen Miller, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan Caine and CIA Director John Ratcliffe, who met routinely over several months, sometimes daily, the source added.

The existence of the CIA assessment was first reported by the Wall Street Journal.

Signs have emerged that Trump’s team was in communication with Rodríguez ahead of the operation, although the president has denied that his administration gave Rodríguez advance notice of Maduro’s ouster.

“There are a number of unanswered questions,” said Evan Ellis, who served in Trump’s first term planning State Department policy on Latin America, the Caribbean and international narcotics. “There may have a been a cynical calculation that one can work with them.”

Rodríguez served as a point of contact with the Biden administration, experts note, and also was in touch with Richard Grenell, a top Trump aide who heads the Kennedy Center, early on in Trump’s second term, when he was testing engagement with Caracas.

While the federal indictment unsealed against Maduro after his seizure named several other senior officials in his government, Rodríguez’s name was notably absent.

Rodríguez was sworn in as Venezuela’s interim president Monday in a ceremony attended by diplomats from Russia, China and Iran. Publicly, the leader has offered mixed messages, at once vowing to prevent Venezuela from becoming a colonial outpost of an American empire, while also offering to forge a newly collaborative relationship with Washington.

“Of course, for political reasons, Delcy Rodríguez can’t say, ‘I’ve cut a deal with Trump, and we’re going to stop the revolution now and start working with the U.S.,” Ellis said.

“It’s not about the democracy,” he said. “It’s about him not wanting to work with Maduro.”

In an interview with Fox News on Monday, Machado said she had yet to speak with Trump since the U.S. operation over the weekend, but hoped to do so soon, offering to share her Nobel Peace Prize with him as a gesture of gratitude. Trump has repeatedly touted himself as a worthy recipient of the award.

“What he has done is historic,” Machado said, vowing to return to the country from hiding abroad since accepting the prize in Oslo last month.

“It’s a huge step,” she added, “towards a democratic transition.”

Caracas, January 5, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores have pleaded not guilty to charges of “narcoterrorism” after being arraigned on Monday.

During a short session in a New York court, Maduro told Judge Alvin Hellerstein that he was the president of Venezuela and had been “illegally captured” in his Caracas home.

The Venezuelan leader was kidnapped by US special operations forces in the early hours of January 3 following US bombings against military installations.

He was indicted on charges of “narcoterrorism conspiracy, cocaine importation conspiracy, possession of machineguns and destructive devices, and conspiracy to possess machineguns and destructive devices against the United States.” Flores faces the same charges except narco-terrorism conspiracy.

Maduro is being represented by Barry Pollack, who previously defended Wikileaks founder Julian Assange. Pollack did not request bail but questioned the legality of Maduro’s “military abduction” and stressed that the Venezuelan leader is “entitled to the privilege” of being treated like a head of state.

Flores’ attorney, Mark Donnelly, said that her client had sustained “significant injuries during her abduction” and requested that she receive medical attention.

The trial is set to resume with a hearing on March 17.

US officials have issued repeated “narcoterrorism” accusations against Maduro and other high-ranking Venezuelan leaders over the years. However, they have never produced court-tested evidence to sustain the claims. US prosecutors reportedly withdrew claims of Maduro leading the so-called “Cartel de los Soles” in their indictment. 

Drug trafficking reports over the years from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) have found Venezuela to play a marginal role in global narcotics trafficking.

China and Russia condemn US violations of international law

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) held an emergency session on Monday to address Washington’s military attacks and kidnapping of Maduro and Flores. The session ultimately produced no resolutions.

Russian UN Ambassador Vasily Nebenzya accused Washington of seeking to return the world to “an era of lawlessness.”

“We cannot allow the United States to proclaim itself as some kind of a supreme judge with the right to invade any country and hand down punishments with no regard for international law,” Nebenzya said.

Chinese representative Fu Cong accused the US of “trampling Venezuela’s sovereignty” and demanded that the Trump administration cease its “bullying and coercive practices.”

Both Moscow and Beijing labeled Maduro’s abduction a violation of the UN Charter and demanded the Venezuelan leader’s release. Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and several other nations joined the condemnation of the Trump administration’s military operations against Venezuela. 

For his part, Venezuelan UN Ambassador UN Samuel Moncada decried the “illegal and  illegitimate armed attack” against his country that had caused civilian casualties. Unofficial reports have tallied over 80 killed during the January 3 strikes.

In response, US representative Mike Waltz claimed that Washington was not at war with Venezuela and that the military operations constituted a “law enforcement” action.

Delcy Rodríguez sworn in as interim president

Monday likewise saw the Venezuelan National Assembly take office for a new five year term. 277 deputies, elected in the May 2025 elections, were sworn in. Jorge Rodrìguez was once more chosen by his peers to lead the legislative body. During his speech, he emphasized the importance of national unity in the present context.

Rodríguez stated that his main mission is to secure Maduro’s release and return to the South American nation. He likewise pointed out the absence of Cilia Flores, who was also elected to a new term as legislator.

The January 5 session concluded with the swearing in of Vice President Delcy Rodríguez as interim president following a Supreme Court ruling last Saturday.

“This is a historic commitment that I assume with the certainty that national unity and the people’s strength will guarantee our sovereignty,” she said. Rodríguez expressed “pain” over Maduro and Flores’ kidnapping but vowed to “work tirelessly” for peace.

In the wake of the January 3 attacks, US President Donald Trump has issued renewed threats against Caracas, demanding privileged access to oil resources.

In a Sunday cabinet meeting, Rodríguez urged respect for Venezuelan sovereignty and called on the US government to establish an “agenda of cooperation” with Caracas.

Condemnation comes as Nicolas Maduro appeared in a court in New York and pleaded not guilty to drug charges.

The unprecedented January 3rd US attack and the capture of Nicolás Maduro has shaken Venezuela’s political board. Today, after the new chavista legislature was sworn in and Jorge Rodríguez was ratified as its president, we saw the latter taking the oath of his sister, Delcy, as Nicolás Maduro’s acting president. As this was happening, Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, were being arraigned in a New York court. It’s Monday, January 5th, all of this could change in months, weeks, or even days. This is where the different players stand.

Delcy and Jorge Rodríguez

It’s widely being reported that Delcy Rodríguez backstabbed Maduro and Flores, giving away their coordinates for a Delta Force unit to take them out on January 3rd. While it’s easy to imagine the Rodríguez siblings lobbying hard for a chavismo-without-Maduro outcome that sought to end months of US hostilities in the Caribbean, it can’t be ruled out that the White House just grew tired of Maduro calling Trump’s bluff and decided to snatch him and his wife while unilaterally handing the reins of the country to the beleaguered siblings, the two chavistas that US diplomats know best at this point (a mixture between the Rubio and Grenell approaches, leave the “moderates” but get Maduro). Those two are far from being in a comfortable position. On one hand, they must deal with a US government that, according to Politico, is asking Rodríguez to stop the flow of drugs, expel Iranian and Cuban agents, and block US adversaries from Venezuelan oil. Por ahora, other more complicated asks may come later. 

Apart from this, the Rodríguez house must keep itself safe from the most predatory clan within the ruling coalition, embodied by Diosdado Cabello and the web of security agencies he leads. It’s fair to say that chavismo is quite good at maintaining cohesiveness in the toughest circumstances. However, the ease at which the US entered Venezuela and captured its dictator makes the current equilibrium quite fragile. Delcy and Jorge may have an insurmountable challenge ahead of them: keeping the US satisfied in whatever appears in Trump and Runio’s (or Stephen Miller’s!) agenda, while making themselves unexpendable for the safety of Cabello et al until who knows when. At some point, something’s gotta give.

The Venezuelan business elite

For this actor, Plan A for unlocking the country’s near-permanent, multidimensional crisis has always been a transitional government led by reformist and pragmatic figures who, in their view, would prioritize preserving the economic order built over the past five years. The Rodríguez siblings served as the bridge between the ruling elite and organizations such as Fedecámaras and Conapri—leaders of the domestic private sector who, in recent years, benefited from de facto dollarization, price deregulation, tariff exemptions for certain products, and informal privatizations driven by the drastic shrinking of the Venezuelan state.

If the new chavista setup was to last without Maduro and Cilia at the helm, the business elite would be betting on a continuation of what Venezuela was between 2019 and 2023, when the logic of the so-called Pax Bodegónica prevailed, before political instability surged again in 2024. Beyond enjoying a fairly exclusive relationship with what The New York Times calls “Venezuela’s industry captains,” the Rodríguez siblings embody the socioeconomic architecture that has been wobbling since Maduro’s electoral fraud: a spiraling exchange rate, the revocation of licenses granted to oil companies that had returned to the country, and more recently, the US naval blockade of Venezuelan crude in the Caribbean.

In the coming weeks and months, this actor is likely to push for what it has sought since 2019: the lifting of sanctions on PDVSA (and, of course, the oil blockade); the expansion of oil licenses to companies that benefited from the 2023-2024 Barbados Agreement; further deregulation of private-sector activity; and continued access to the ruling elite still that remains running the country.

The Trump administration

The United States bypassed Venezuela’s defenses with little resistance, bombed the capital’s main military installations (possibly destroying weapons and air-defense systems), and penetrated the country’s most important military complex to capture what it considers the two kingpins of an international drug-trafficking network threatening US national security. All of this without suffering a single combat casualty.

In line with its newly unveiled foreign policy doctrine, the US showed the world it is willing to remove its enemies in its old backyard, as it did a century ago, and to carry out spectacular interventions in its own hemisphere—not only in distant places like Iran or Syria. Collateral damage from the so-called Operation Absolute Resolve appears low compared to previous US interventions such as Libya (2011) or Iraq (2003), though the true human toll of January 3 is still unknown.

The operation also exposed Cuban presence within Venezuela’s security apparatus that has long been questioned by some foreign analysts. On Monday, Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel admitted that 32 Cubans who were “on mission” in Venezuela died as a result of the January 3 attacks. This revelation may give Washington leverage to demand that Delcy Rodríguez purge Cuban networks from the Venezuelan state in the near future.

A big win for Trump in general terms, but the question is how impactful it may be back home—where it actually matters to him. How much do Americans care about Trump ending a dictator’s run and dangling him for people to see in a New York court? How much do they care about the business that may come from Bolivar’s homeland? Also, while it’s great to see Maduro dragged out of his home and delivered to a court of justice, some of the actions and decisions of T2 during this whole process may come back to judicially haunt him in the future—unless he’s able to go full Chávez and stay on forever.

International intermediaries close to the Rodríguez siblings

One of the great ironies of this episode is that some of the figures who downplayed the events of July 28 and advocated for a “negotiated solution with chavismo” amid the conflict with the United States (which, according to Trump, could have meant a safe exile for Maduro) are now seeing their desired outcome materialize through military intervention.

Delcy Rodríguez—the “Deng Xiaoping” of chavismo, who has cultivated influence and contacts in Western countries—is, for now, in charge of steering the transition. Figures such as special envoy Ric Grenell and former Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero may play a role in maintaining cooperation between the US administration, the European Union, and the teams of Delcy and Jorge Rodríguez, with whom they have long-standing ties.

Diosdado Cabello

The interior minister survived the US attack. Washington prioritized capturing the presidential couple over going after the regime’s chief enforcer—arguably its most dangerous figure. Cabello responded by appearing publicly with a group of armed men that included DGCIM Colonel Alexander Granko Arteaga and CICPC Director Douglas Rico.

Simply surviving the incursion is a victory for the Cabello clan, which now has the opportunity to regroup, reassess its options, and consider off-ramps that seemed unnecessary just a month ago. Still, Cabello’s medium-term options may be limited. Too much rapprochement and cooperation between Delcy Rodríguez and Trump could lead to another “anti-corruption” episode that takes down the Cabello clan, as happened to El Aissami in 2022. On the other hand, a refusal by Delcy Rodríguez to advance Washington’s agenda risks triggering a second wave of US aircraft, with Cabello as a potential primary target.

Faux opposition lawmakers in the 2025 National Assembly

With an interim government supposedly under pressure to enact reforms to “re-steer” Venezuela after Maduro’s capture, figures such as Henrique Capriles, Stalin González, Antonio Ecarri, and Bernabé Gutiérrez—recently sworn in—gain renewed relevance. More than 20 supposedly opposition politicians, many of whom failed to secure enough votes to legislate, have just taken office.

The 2025 National Assembly is likely to present itself as a venue for approving new agreements and “national unity pacts” in response to US aggression. This group—often referred to as the faux opposition or systemic opposition—can act as a proxy for real power centers, backing initiatives and extracting favors that may empower them. In the coming months, this could yield:

1. More releases of political prisoners;
2. The lifting of political bans for specific opposition politicians (or a combination of 1 and 2); and
3. New political appointments for faux opposition figures as part of a prospective “national unity government.”

María Corina Machado and the opposition

The US attack doesn’t seem to have been carried out with prior consultation with Team Machado, which had no time to craft an immediate response and watched as President Gustavo Petro became the first international leader to react. More troubling for them is that both Donald Trump and Marco Rubio have made clear, for now, that Machado or her allies are not being considered to lead the transition. The preference seems to be to run the country in the coming months through de facto power holders, including the ruling elite and the existing security apparatus.

Machado can celebrate the fall of chavismo’s top boss, but it doesn’t look like she can claim to have access to “the room where it happens.” Por ahora. At this moment, it seems unlikely that the military option will allow Edmundo González Urrutia to take the presidential oath right now. Or ever. However, this doesn’t mean that she’s done. Machado has yet to do her next move, and if she waits for the right moment, and plays her cards correctly, it may pay off.

This hiccup may be a blessing and not a curse. While at this moment we see highly unlikely that we will see the enforcement of the result of the 2024 presidential elections, if the Trump administration tried to impose the proclamation of the rightful winner, it could easily backfire. The coming months are going to be highly unstable. Machado could take her time to put that Nobel to good use and strengthen international alliances (in the US and the EU) that could back her up if and when she decides to return to the country. Then, she would have a chance to go back to the ground to lead the political movement that she built and perhaps run in an election without a stand in dummy. Is it unlikely that she will be allowed to run? Absolutely! But this is the transition path that we’re on. If Trump and Rubio follow through, eventually we could get to a place where she can get there. Hindsight is 20/20, but it is what it is. Trump wasn’t going to force Edmundo. It would’ve required a scorched earth campaign, with the US assuming much more responsibility—NOT GONNA HAPPEN.

The Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB)

Without repeating what has already been said, Venezuela’s military forces stood out for their complete inability to resist the US attacks. They failed to shoot down a single helicopter that roamed the Caracas valley in the early hours of January 3. The humiliation is nearly total for a force that has spent 20 years chanting anti-imperialist slogans while claiming readiness to withstand a Yankee onslaught in perfect “civic-military-police unity,” or even to reclaim the Essequibo.

The myth of Russian, Chinese, and Iranian defense systems—sold by Chávez until his death—has also evaporated. The FANB’s response to the “imperialist aggression” (without naming Trump or the United States) made no reference to soldiers killed in combat, for whom there is still no official figure. Nor was there an accounting of the cities and facilities attacked.

Within both the FANB and the PSUV, the discourse insists on Maduro’s release while refusing to acknowledge how defenseless the territory proved to be during a limited bombing campaign. Internally, this should:

1. significantly demoralize mid- and lower-ranking officers in the Army and National Guard, who may now see themselves as cannon fodder; and
2. generate greater mistrust among generals and military regions that may well consider cooperating with the US to save themselves in the event of a second wave of attacks.

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Gustavo Petro

The United States upended the scenarios of both leaders. Nicolás Maduro and his wife were forcibly removed from power, yet the country did not collapse nor descend into the kind of bloody Libyan-style civil war that Brazil and Colombia had predicted. January 3 sets a troubling precedent for Venezuela’s neighbors: Washington did not consult Lula, who had repeatedly offered to mediate with Trump during the conflict.

The possibility of a golden exile for Maduro—facilitated by allies in the old regional left—has been buried, or at least reduced to very low odds. Both Lula and Petro are now watching, in real time, as Venezuela—whether under chavismo or another political force—may be drifting into the US sphere of influence, without Washington incurring significant reputational damage during the operation.

Maduro’s capture could also provide Washington with compromising information about three decades of alliances between chavismo and figures of the regional left, including Petro and Lula—valuable ammunition ahead of elections in both South American countries and as the US seeks to reassert its hemispheric dominance.

Venezuelan society

There have been celebrations in the diaspora over the imprisonment of Maduro and Cilia Flores. It is also possible that many inside Venezuela harbor cautious, if private, optimism about what has happened and what may come. But Venezuela remains far from the political changes people are waiting for—let alone those demanded by the more than seven million voters of July 28, 2024.

Even though the U.S. managed to decapitate the regime’s leadership, chavismo remains standing. Meanwhile, confusion reigns. The uncertainty Venezuelans already felt in their daily lives continues to grow, reflected in long lines at grocery stores and supermarkets in the hours following Absolute Resolve.

History will judge whether this truly marks the beginning of a democratic transition.  For now, colectivos and security agents will keep rounding up activists, journalists and ordinary Venezuelans. The official dollar exchange rate has just surpassed Bs. 300—five times its value in February 2024. The material precarity of Venezuelans will not change unless the country shows real signs of deep transformation in the months ahead.

Yet, never underestimate the indomitable Venezuelan spirit.

The Maduros

Well, not much to say about this. While Nicolás Jr. (aka Nicolasito) has to submit himself to the rule of the Rodríguez siblings, Maduro and Cilia are in for a ride and will be paraded as trophies as they dive into a complicated trial. Will they rot in jail? Probably, beyond the drug charges, there’s a couple of jurisdictions that want them for human rights violations. And besides, who would pardon a drug trafficker? Right?

Delcy Rodriguez, formerly Venezuela’s vice president, has been formally sworn in to lead the South American country following the abduction of Nicolas Maduro in a United States military operation.

On Monday, Rodriguez appeared before Venezuela’s National Assembly to take her oath of office.

Speaking before the legislative body, composed largely of government loyalists, Rodriguez reaffirmed her opposition to the military attack that led to the capture and removal of Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores.

“I come with pain over the kidnapping of two heroes who are being held hostage: President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores,” Rodriguez, 56, told the assembly.

“I swear to work tirelessly to guarantee the peace, spiritual, economic and social tranquillity of our people.”

A former labour lawyer, Rodriguez has been serving as acting president since the early-morning attack that resulted in the abduction. Explosions were reported before dawn on Saturday in the capital, Caracas, as well as at nearby Venezuelan military bases and some civilian areas.

Monday’s swearing-in ceremony was overseen by Rodriguez’s brother – the president of the National Assembly, Jorge Rodriguez – and Maduro’s son, Nicolás Maduro Guerra, who held a copy of the Venezuelan Constitution.

Other members of Maduro’s inner circle, including Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello and Defence Minister Vladimir Padrino, were also in attendance.

The ceremony took place as Maduro, her predecessor and former boss, faced an arraignment proceeding in a New York City courthouse.

Federal prosecutors in the US have charged Maduro with four counts related to allegations he leveraged government powers to export thousands of tonnes of cocaine to North America.

The charges include narco-terrorism conspiracy, cocaine importation conspiracy, the illegal possession of machine guns and other destructive devices, and conspiracy to possess such guns and devices.

Maduro and his wife have pleaded not guilty to the charges, and their allies, including Rodriguez, have denounced the pair’s abduction as a violation of international law, as well as Venezuelan sovereignty.

In court on Monday, Maduro maintained he remained the rightful leader of Venezuela, saying, “I am still president.”

The administration of US President Donald Trump, however, has signalled that it plans to work with Rodriguez for the time being, though Trump himself warned that her tenure as president could be cut short, should she fail to abide by US demands.

“If she doesn’t do what’s right, she is going to pay a very big price, probably bigger than Maduro,” Trump told The Atlantic magazine in a Sunday morning interview.

A day earlier, in a televised address announcing the attack, Trump had said his administration plans “to run the country until such time as we can do a safe, proper, and judicious transition”.

On Air Force One on Sunday, as he flew back to Washington, DC, Trump doubled down on that statement.

“Don’t ask me who’s in charge, because I’ll give you an answer that will be very controversial. We’re in charge,” he told reporters.

He added that Rodriguez is “cooperating” and that, while he personally has not spoken to her, “we’re dealing with the people who just got sworn in”.

The Trump administration’s seeming willingness to allow Rodriguez, a former labour lawyer, to remain in charge has raised eyebrows.

Rodriguez, who served as vice president since 2018, is known to be a stalwart “chavista”: an adherent of the left-wing political movement founded by Maduro’s mentor, the late Hugo Chavez. She has held various ministerial roles under Maduro, including leading the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

But Trump’s allies in the Republican Party have argued that keeping Rodriguez in place is simply a practical reality.

“We don’t recognise Delcy Rodriguez as the legitimate ruler of Venezuela. We didn’t recognise Nicolas Maduro as a legitimate ruler,” Republican Senator Tom Cotton told CNN on Sunday.

“It is a fact that she and other indicted and sanctioned officials are in Venezuela. They have control over the military and security services. We have to deal with that fact. That does not make them a legitimate leader.”

While on Air Force One, Trump largely avoided committing to new elections in Venezuela, indicating he would instead focus on “fixing” the country and allowing US oil companies access to its vast petroleum reserves.

One reporter on the aeroplane asked, “How soon can an election take place?”

“Well, I think we’re looking more at getting it fixed, getting it ready first, because it’s a mess. The country is a mess,” Trump replied. “It’s been horribly run. The oil is just flowing at a very low level.”

He later added, “We’re going to run everything. We’re going to run it, fix it. We’ll have elections at the right time. But the main thing you have to fix: It’s a broken country. There’s no money.”

Recent presidential elections in Venezuela have been widely denounced as fraudulent, with Maduro claiming victory in each one.

The contested 2018 election, for example, led to the US briefly recognising opposition leader Juan Guaido as president, instead of Maduro.

Later, Maduro also claimed victory for a third term in office during the 2024 presidential race, despite election regularities.

The official vote tally was not released, and the opposition published documents that appeared to show that Maduro’s rival, Edmundo Gonzalez, had won. Protests erupted on Venezuela’s streets, and the nonprofit Human Rights Watch reported that more than 2,000 protesters were unlawfully detained, with at least 25 dead in apparent extrajudicial killings.

The opposition has largely boycotted legislative elections in Venezuela, denouncing them as rigged in favour of “chavistas”.

Monday’s swearing-in ceremony included the 283 members of the National Assembly elected last May. Few opposition candidates were among them.

Venezuelan state TV footage shows Vice President Delcy Rodriguez being formally sworn in as interim president in Caracas days after President Nicolas Maduro was abducted to face narco-terrorism charges in New York.

Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro – recently abducted with his wife by US commandos from his home – has appeared in a federal courtroom in New York City for a hearing on alleged “narco-terrorism” and other charges.

Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, were brought before US District Judge Alvin K Hellerstein at 12pm (17:00 GMT) on Monday for a brief legal proceeding that kicks off a long legal battle over whether they can face trial in the United States.

Handcuffed and wearing blue jail uniforms, Maduro and his wife were led into the court by officers, and both put on headsets to hear the English-language proceeding as it was translated into Spanish.

Maduro pleaded not guilty in the US court, telling the judge: “I was captured. I am innocent and a decent man, the president of my country.”

Across the street from the courthouse, the police separated a small but growing group of protesters from about a dozen pro-intervention demonstrators, including one man who pulled a Venezuelan flag away from those protesting the US abduction.

The left-wing leader, his wife, son and three others could face life in prison if convicted of allegedly working with drug cartels to facilitate the shipment of thousands of tons of cocaine into the country. Some observers say there is no evidence linking him to cartels.

Maduro’s lawyers said they’ll contest the legality of his arrest, arguing he is immune from prosecution as a sovereign head of a foreign state, though he is not recognised as Venezuela’s legitimate leader by the US and other nations around the world.

Flores also pleaded not guilty to US charges against her during the arraignment. Hellerstein ordered the Venezuelan leader to next appear in court for a hearing on March 17.

‘Attacks’ against US people

Near the end of the hearing, Maduro’s attorney Barry J Pollack said his client “is head of a sovereign state and entitled to the privilege” that the status ensures.

Pollack said there were “questions about the legality of his military abduction”, and there will be “voluminous” pretrial filings to address those legal challenges.

Earlier, images showed the pair being led handcuffed and under heavy guard from a helicopter en route from a detention facility to the courthouse, two days after they were forcibly removed from Caracas in a brazen US special forces operation.

“The United States arrested a narco-trafficker who is now going to stand trial in the United States,” US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz told an emergency UN Security Council meeting about the US attack on Venezuela on Saturday.

Waltz accused Maduro of being “responsible for attacks against the people of the United States, for destabilising the Western Hemisphere, and illegitimately repressing the people of Venezuela”.

Samuel Moncada, Venezuela’s ambassador to the UN, accused the US of carrying out an illegal armed attack against his country.

Venezuela was subjected to bombing, the destruction of civilian infrastructure, the loss of civilian and military lives, and the “kidnapping” of Maduro and his wife, Moncada said.

The abduction of a sitting head of state breached a core norm of international law, the personal immunity of leaders in office, he added, warning that such actions set a dangerous precedent for all countries.

Vast oil wealth

All eyes are on Venezuela’s response to the swiftly moving events after US President Donald Trump said late on Sunday that the US is “in charge” of the South American nation, which has the world’s largest proven oil reserves.

Interim President Delcy Rodriguez, who took the place of her ally Maduro, initially took a defiant stand against the seizure of the president in what some observers labelled a return to “US gunboat diplomacy”. But she has now offered “to collaborate” with Washington.

Venezuela’s opposition appreciates US intervention to remove Maduro from power, but is alarmed by Trump’s comments about US plans to “run” Venezuela, apparently with members of his government, one analyst said.

“Trump doesn’t recognise the decision of the Venezuelan people. We are not a colony of the US. We are an independent country,” Jose Manuel Puente, a professor at the Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administracion, a private university in Caracas, told Al Jazeera.

“We want to initiate a transition to democracy, to rebuild the institutions, to rebuild the economy, to rebuild the oil sector. And we don’t see that from Trump until now.”

Rodriguez has served as Maduro’s vice president since 2018, overseeing much of Venezuela’s oil-dependent economy and its feared intelligence service, and was next in the presidential line of succession.

She’s part of a band of senior officials in Maduro’s administration who now appear to control Venezuela, even as Trump and other US officials say they’ll pressure the government to fall in line with their vision for the oil-rich nation.

On Sunday, some 2,000 Maduro supporters, including rifle-wielding men on motorcycles, rallied in Caracas with crowds shouting and waving Venezuelan flags. The Venezuelan military, loyal to Maduro, announced it recognised Rodriguez and urged calm.

The White House indicated on Sunday that it does not want regime change, only Maduro’s removal and a pliant new government that will enable US companies to exploit the country’s vast oil reserves – even if the government is filled with his former associates.

United States President Donald Trump has promised to “take back” Venezuela’s oil reserves and unleash them onto the global market after abducting Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.

But exploiting the Latin American country’s vast reserves would face a host of big hurdles, from decrepit infrastructure and legal obstacles to leadership uncertainty in Caracas and an excess supply of oil in the global market, experts say.

Venezuela possesses the world’s largest known oil reserves – estimated to be some 303 billion barrels – but currently produces only a tiny fraction of global output. Its estimated output was 860,000 barrels per day (bpd) in November, less than 1 percent of the world’s total, compared with 3.7 million bpd during peak production in 1970.

The oil sector’s decline has been blamed on the combined effects of US sanctions and years of underinvestment, mismanagement and corruption under Maduro and his left-wing predecessor, Hugo Chavez.

While the Trump administration could boost supply in the short term by lifting sanctions, restoring Venezuela’s output to anything near peak levels would require huge investment and likely take years, according to energy analysts.

‘Venezuela’s oil infrastructure is in poor shape’

Oil prices moved only slightly in trading on Monday amid market expectations that output would remain largely unchanged for the foreseeable future.

“Venezuela’s oil infrastructure is in poor shape overall, due to lack of maintenance for both equipment and oilfield wells,” Scott Montgomery, a global energy expert at the University of Washington, told Al Jazeera.

“The state oil company, PDVSA, is well known to suffer from corruption and lack of expertise – many well-trained people have left the country to work elsewhere – and has been unable to invest in the country’s petroleum sector,” Montgomery added.

Thomas O’Donnell, an energy and geopolitical analyst based in Berlin, Germany, estimated that Venezuela could return to peak production in five to seven years in the “absolute best” circumstances, including a peaceful transfer of power.

“Longer term, if things are sorted out, yes, Venezuela can become one of the world’s biggest producers of oil. As far as how long that takes, that has all to do with the transition and what is put in place to manage that – both the country’s security and also to manage the investments,” O’Donnell told Al Jazeera.

Mixed messaging from Trump administration

Trump’s administration has provided conflicting messages on Washington’s exact plans for Venezuela and its oil reserves.

On Saturday, Trump said the US would “run” Venezuela and that US oil companies were ready to invest billions of dollars to build up the country’s dilapidated infrastructure and “get the oil flowing”.

In interviews with US media on Sunday, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio sought to downplay Trump’s remarks about controlling the country, saying the president was referring to “running policy” and his plans related to spurring private investment, “not securing the oilfields”.

Trump later on Sunday said Washington was “in charge” of the country and was “dealing with” members of the acting administration without providing details.

Under international law, the US has no claim of ownership over Venezuela’s oil reserves, as sovereign states possess the right to control and use their natural resources under the United Nations-endorsed Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources.

Foreign investors, however, can claim compensation when authorities seize their assets.

ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips were awarded $1.6bn and $8.7bn, respectively, in international arbitration following the Chavez government’s 2007 nationalisation of the oil sector. Caracas did not pay out in either case.

US oil giants, including Chevron, ExxonMobil, and ConocoPhillips, have not commented directly on Trump’s claims about planned investments in Venezuela.

Chevron is the only large US oil company currently operating in Venezuela, the result of an exemption to US sanctions first granted by the administration of former President Joe Biden.

Consultancy Rystad Energy, based in Oslo, Norway, has estimated that Venezuela’s oil sector would need about $110bn in capital investment to return to its mid-2010s output of about 2 million bpd.

Patrick De Haan, an analyst at energy price tracker GasBuddy, said companies may be reluctant to commit to large investments in the country when global oil prices are hovering around $60 a barrel due to a glut of supply.

“It will take a longer amount of time than many likely realise. Oil companies in a low-priced environment of today would likely be cautious investing billions with oil prices already low,” De Haan told Al Jazeera.

“In addition, Trump seizing Maduro could lead to loyalists sabotaging efforts to increase output. A lot would have to go right to yield the most optimistic timelines.”

US companies are likely to carefully weigh political developments in Venezuela following their experiences with the Chavez government’s expropriation of their assets.

“Oil companies are not likely to rush into a situation where the state is in turmoil, security is lacking, and no clear path forward for political stability exists,” the University of Washington’s Montgomery said.

Maduro due in court in New York

Interim President Delcy Rodriguez, who was Maduro’s deputy, is now leading the country following a ruling by Venezuela’s Supreme Court.

Maduro is scheduled to appear in a New York court on Monday to face charges related to alleged drug trafficking and working with criminal gangs.

Venezuela’s government has condemned the Trump administration over Saturday’s bombing and overthrow of Maduro, labelling his capture a “cowardly kidnapping”.

Russia, China, Iran and Brazil, among other countries, have accused Washington of violating international law, while nations including Israel, Argentina and Greece have welcomed Maduro’s forced removal.

OPEC, which sets limits on production for its 12 members, including Venezuela, is another factor in the Latin American country’s potential oil output.

“Venezuela is a member of OPEC, and like many countries, may become more actively subject to quotas if output climbs,” De Haan said.

Phil Flynn, a market analyst at the Price Futures Group, said reviving Venezuela’s oil production would face “significant challenges”, but he was more bullish about the near-term prospects than other analysts.

He said the market could conceivably see a couple of hundred thousand more barrels a day coming online in the coming months.

“We’ve not had a free Venezuela, and sometimes the US energy industry has the capability to do a lot more than people give them credit for,” Flynn told Al Jazeera.

Venezuela’s interim president Delcy Rodriguez met with the country’s cabinet of ministers following the abduction of Nicolas Maduro. She has expressed willingness to work with the US, while Donald Trump warned of serious consequences if she fails to cooperate.

UN Security Council to meet on Maduro’s abduction as Trump insists US in control of Venezuela.

The United States has bombed Venezuela and toppled Nicolas Maduro, who was seized and taken to New York.

U.S. President Donald Trump has confirmed that Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro and his wife were flown first to the U.S. Navy’s Wasp class amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima following their capture overnight. TWZ had highlighted the high likelihood that the Iwo Jima had played a central role in last night’s operation in our initial reporting, where readers can otherwise first get up to speed on the details that are known so far.

Trump shared new details about the operation while speaking by phone earlier this morning with Fox News.

“Yes, the Iwo Jima,” Trump said when asked if Maduro and his wife had been taken first to a ship. “They’re on a ship, and they’ll be heading into New York.”

As TWZ previously wrote:

“With what appears to be a very large contingent of 160th SOAR [the U.S. Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment] helicopters spearheading this operation, it seems likely that the USS Iwo Jima would be used to support them, especially as much of this ship’s air wing has been moved ashore. The special operations mothership M/V Ocean Trader is also a critical part of this effort as it has been in the region for months and sailing with the Iwo Jima, but its ability to support many helicopters is much more limited than an amphibious assault ship.”

“He was in a house that was more like a fortress than a house. It had steel doors, it had what they call a safety space, where it’s solid steel all around,” according to Trump. “He was trying to get into it, but he got bum rushed so fast that he didn’t.”

Trump noted that U.S. forces had “blowtorches” and other equipment they were prepared to use if Maduro had been able to make it into that secure space. It has previously been reported that members of the U.S. Army’s Delta Force were in the lead on the ground.

“I think we had nobody killed … [but] a couple of guys were hit” and a helicopter was hit “pretty hard,” Trump added, but did not elaborate. Details about casualties on either side of the operation remain limited.

“I’ve never seen anything like this. I was able to watch it in real time, and I watched every aspect of it.” Trump also told Fox News. “We were prepared to do a second wave. We were all set — and this was so lethal, this was so powerful, that we didn’t have to.”

Other details about the full U.S. force package involved in the operation in Venezuela are still emerging. This includes a picture now circulating online showing a new addition to U.S. forces in Puerto Rico, U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptors. The U.S. military has been building up a large array of air, naval, and ground assets in the region for months now, which TWZ has been tracking closely.

Jan. 3 (UPI) — The United States early Saturday morning staged a daring “large strike against Venezuela,” during which the country’s president, Nicolas Maduro, was captured and flown out of the country.

President Donald Trump announced on Truth Social that Maduro and Maduro’s wife had been captured, with the New York Times reporting that they were flown by helicopter to the USS Iwo Jima and that both will eventually face charges in the Southern District of New York.

“The United States of America has successfully carried out a large scale strike against Venezuela and its leader, President Nicolas Maduro, who h as been, along with his wife, captured and flown out of the country,” Trump said in the Truth Social post. “This operation was done in conjunction with U.S law enforcement.”

Trump said that a news conference will be held at 11 a.m. EST from Mar-a-Lago, his golf club in Florida.

This is a developing story. Please check back for updates.

At least 7 explosions have been heard in Venezuela’s capital, Caracas, followed by a low-flying aircraft, according to The Associated Press.

Our pendulum of hope and frustration oscillated with particular violence in 2025. We went from seeing Nicolas Maduro and his dictatorship acting with total impunity to being—apparently—threatened by the biggest military force in the world, the US armed forces.  However, the year is ending with the typical bitterness of a Maduro Christmas: asphyxiating inflation, empty airports, and painful video calls across continents, with the addition of an uncertainty about 2026 that feels more blurry than ever. Hyperinflation is threatening a comeback, migration remains as an escape valve, and we’re forced to struggle with assessing the likelihood and potential effects of an unprecedented scenario such as an American military intervention. We might need more rum than usual in tonight’s ponche crema.

The January of dispair

2025 started with a January of traumatic disappointments. An opposition demonstration in Caracas and other cities on January 9th showed little turnout, perfectly understandable after months of unprecedented state terror following the theft of the presidential election by the Maduro regime. The main event was the dramatic reappearance of Maria Corina Machado, who was in hiding since August 2024, followed by the news of her being kidnapped for some hours by chavista goons. On this very opaque incident, when she was forced to record a video from a park in Caracas, we still feel the complete story is yet to be told. Machado was physically attacked and threatened, making everyone aware that not even her was safe from a dictatorship that is no longer disguising but exposing its cruelty. Soon, that message would be underlined by the disappearance of the candidate that represented the “center” in the election, Enrique Marquez, who dared to defy the Supreme Court about its contribution to the fraud. Marquez was recently released but has remained silent since then. Also, the regime took president elect Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia’s son in law, Rafael Tudares, who remains in jail and isolated to this date. 

Then, on January 10th, it was clear that Gonzalez Urrutia’s promise about returning to Venezuela was impossible to accomplish. Maduro took oath for a second illegitimate term in a hall of the Legislative Palace, smaller than the one when presidents used to celebrate their inauguration, but even with that modest ceremony he made evident that the world was unable or unwilling to punish him for stealing the election, and that once again the armed forces decided to keep supporting the Bolivarian Revolution, as they had done in every crossroads since the failed coup of April 2002. 

Maduro got away with it, one more time.

The betrayal of El Catire

A few days after Maduro’s inauguration, Trump had his own, also in an unconventional venue inside the Capitol, and signed a barrage of executive orders that signaled the tempo of T2. Trump’s new term went in sync with the hateful discourse on Venezuela he advanced during the campaign, and not with the hopes of Venezuelans in the US. A tweet from one of those popular and deeply irresponsible Venezuelans that spread nonsense in social media, as proven by this investigation, led Trumpism to embrace the narrative that Venezuelan migrants are weapons sent by Maduro to infect the US, which led to the removal of TPS for around 600,000 Venezuelans. 

While he charged against migrants, Trump sent a special envoy, Richard Grennell, to greet Maduro and Jorge Rodriguez in Miraflores Palace. They made a deal: in exchange for the release of ten prisoners with American citizenship (including a Venezuelan accused of killing three people in Madrid) and the renewal of the operating license for American oil company Chevron, Maduro would take deportees in chartered flights from the US. Trump would also send almost 300 Venezuelans to the CECOT megajail in El Salvador and even the infamous Guantanamo, where they were treated as terrorists even when few of them had ties with Tren de Aragua (the infamous Venezuelan transnational gang) or committed any serious crime. The Venezuelans in CECOT would be eventually shipped to Venezuela. They and their families were traumatized; Machado and Gonzalez Urrutia only asked to respect due process (which did not happen); and both Trump and Maduro won: the first by looking as being tough on crime, the latter by greeting the deportees in the Maiquetia tarmac as a good dad that welcomes home the victims of imperialism. 

One landmark to explore in this story: the shattering of a century-long fascination with the US by many Venezuelans, who are now seeing that the country they aspired to live in and prosper is suddenly treating us as pariahs. 

The flight of the guacamayas

The idea of tolerating and normalizing Maduro was confirmed in May with the parliamentary election that served to assign new roles to people coming from the opposition. Besides the group of the faux opposition—those who rebelled in 2017 against the leadership of Accion Democratica, Primero Justicia and Voluntad Popular and took part in stealing those party brands with Maduro’s SUpreme Court—the May election produced a new kind of co opted opposition, led by no other than Henrique Capriles. Along with Stalin Rivas and Juan Requesens (this one a special case that deserves his own story), Capriles went back to square one of his political career, being a lawmaker, this time not against chavismo but subordinated to it, as the new face of the “good opposition” that Maduro used to show to the rest of the world as proof of his democratic tolerance. Capriles embraced the anti-sanctions rhetoric, criticizes Machado and claims for continuing the electoral path after the massive fraud of 2024 even before actually seating in the National Assembly, which is supposed to happen in a few days.

May 2025 also saw another big development in the real opposition: the escape of the Machado team that was under siege in the Argentina embassy. The breakout humiliated Diosdado Cabello’s repressive apparatus and made even more visible how useless Lula is, given that Brazil was supposedly in charge of the embassy after Caracas broke diplomatic liaisons with Buenos Aires. It gave Machado’s very disciplined team the ability to move at ease in the world, lobbying with the Trump administration and coordinating the plans for the “day after.”

Looking at the sky 

The climate changed dramatically in August with a Reuters scoop saying that the Southern Command started a naval deployment in front of Venezuelan waters just after the US increased the rhetoric against Maduro, Cartel de los Soles and Tren de Aragua. Without interrupting the Chevron operation in Venezuela and the deportation flights, warships and planes actually began to accumulate in Puerto Rico and other islands, while Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and other pro-Trump governments offered assistance to the US in its fight against the drug trafficking and the security concerns represented by the chavista regime. 

It looked like suddenly Trump had changed his mind about leaving Maduro be, or rather listened to Marco Rubio’s plan of toppling chavismo to make Cuba and all the Latin American left collapse. It also seemed a casus belli was in the making, with some international support. The US discourse would lean harder—helped by years of indictments and sanctions by previous Democrat and Republican administrations—on the the designation of Maduro as chief of Cartel de los Soles and Tren de Aragua, and therefore the leader of two criminal organizations considered terrorists by the US.

In September, a video revealed the bombing of a boat that according to the US was shipping drugs from Venezuela to Trinidad. Eleven Venezuelans were killed. 

Next, more boats manned by unknown civilians were attacked (and continue to be targeted in the Caribbean and the Pacific Ocean) and the Southern Command populated the sea with drones, war planes, a submarine, more warships and the USS Gerald Ford. Some of us became addicted to OSINT tweets about F35s and B52s patrolling the borders of Venezuelan airspace, closer and closer, and even drawing obscene radar traces in the map. At the same time, the total lack of due process in the attack on boats, and the weaknesses of the narrative against Maduro as a narco instead of the enabler of crimes against humanity he really is, increased the pressure on Trump from Democrats, some Republicans and pundits with different interests and motivations across whole world. The Monroe Doctrine and gunboat diplomacy have returned, they say. Maduro, of course, activated the only defense he really has against such a threat: posing his regime as a victim of imperialism, and making dozens of media outlets write headlines about the millions of militia men he raised to fight an American invasion, ignoring the fact that milicianos are mostly senior citizens trying to survive and that the only thing that the armed forces are doing is watching among themselves in search of traitors, and increasing the repression on their hostages: Venezuelans in Venezuela.

We got used to looking at the sky, not only to see if a missile was coming on Fuerte Tiuna. The canonization of two Venezuelan saints in October was an opportunity for the new Pope to criticize Maduro, but the miracle that Machado kind of promised did not happen either. The day of the canonization there were no demonstrations against the regime in Venezuela. Maduro cancelled the big event he had scheduled in the Monumental stadium. The Church focused on the religious character of the event, but even so, cardinal Baltazar Porras would be harassed and get his passport confiscated. 

The Nobel

Everyone was discussing whether Trump would get his deeply desired Nobel peace prize when we were surprised by the news that the winner was no other than Maria Corina Machado—although she dedicated the award to Trump.

Actually, the Nobel became a new case of foreigners using our tragedy to play the moral high ground in their respective political arenas, like the Colombian writers who refused to take part in the Hay Festival in Cartagena de Indias next January because Machado was also invited. The same people that could accept invitations from chavismo and ignore the international reports of continuing human rights violations, issued by the researchers of the International Crime Court or the UN Fact Finding Mission who just closed their offices in Venezuela given the absolute lack of cooperation from the dictatorship. 

Even with that noise around, the prize served to turn part of the attention to the main story behind it, the effort made by thousands of volunteers to win the election and prove that Maduro stole it. The two powerful speeches read during the ceremony in Oslo reminded the world the real nature of what Venezuelans are going through, by mentioning for instance the death in custody of former Nueva Esparta governor Alfredo Diaz, a landmark in repression during the chavista era. That December 10 culminated in the arrival of Maria Corina, after hours of disturbing uncertainty on her whereabouts. She had managed to escape the siege and now was out in the world, with increased maneuvering range. That same day, the US announced it had seized a tanker shipping Venezuelan oil to Cuba, making December 10th the worst day Maduro had since July 28, 2024, and opening new questions. 

Still waiting on the gringos

The main question we’re asking ourselves at the end of 2025 is whether the US will ever make a direct attack on the chavista regime. Has Trump decided to push Maduro out just by showing the weapons but refraining from using them on FANB, ELN or FARC dissidents on Venezuelan soil? 

We really don’t know. Maybe all that naval deployment is just about changing the American geopolitical doctrine and replenishing the Americas of military assets to reassert dominion in the “Latin American backyard.” Maybe Trump’s plan (assuming he has any) is to break the regime with an oil blockade. 

What we do know is that Trump is mistaken if he expects that the chavista regime would break without a clear, unquestionable threat to their personal safety. 

The Venezuelan drama has many similarities with a hostage crisis. Maduro & Co. are a gang assaulting a bank branch and depleting its vault while holding the clients and personnel kidnapped; SWAT arrived, but instead of storming the bank after so many negotiators had failed, they decided to cut the food supply. The chavista regime can endure that by transferring all the hunger to the hostages; they have done it before.  In the meantime, another negotiator with a savior complex may appear to attend the “political crisis.”.

Marco Rubio said that Maduro would not play with Trump as he did with Joe Biden. But that is precisely what Maduro is doing so far, waiting out this new threat. So far, the US president is bluffing. He had issued several vague threats, but during T2 he has never really made a commitment to remove Maduro and induce a regime change in Venezuela. His speech against Maduro and Venezuelans can stretch well into the next year, keeping him (and us) as scapegoats and villains in a story about the pure American race being polluted by a foreign evil.

2026: another level of uncertainty

Just after Trump said something very vague about destroying a port in Venezuela on Christmas eve, CNN claimed that the CIA executed a drone strike on a beach used by Tren de Aragua to export drugs—not a chemical plant in Maracaibo as it was though because of OSINT reports in social media—, with no victims. We have no details, but if this is true, this implies the first clear violation of Venezuelan sovereignty by the US, a historical landmark and a hint that the whole thing could escalate into bombing military facilities and spread chaos within the regime.  

Our assessment is that the panic wave necessary to push the chavista elite to eat itself and collapse must not be taken for granted, due to the resilience of the regime and the dependency on Trump’s decision-making. Not even a dramatic cut of oil income because of the pressure on oil tankers will necessarily bring down the dictatorship in the short term.

Polls in the US indicate that attacking Venezuela is not in fashion. Trump has already started to pay a political price without making a dent in the chavista alliance. On the contrary, a criminal like Maduro is being defended by the global left and Cabello is gaining more and more power as the Great Inquisitor. The regime released dozens of political prisoners, but retained those of strategic importance, and with Machado out, the opposition was deprived of its more significant leader in the country. 

Time is running out for the increasingly unpopular Trump, who must take care of the midterm election in 2026, and for Marco Rubio, who might leave the cabinet to run for Florida governor. Time is helping Maduro and Cabello, whose only goal is to remain in power day after day. 

Common Venezuelans, on their part, continue to see how everyone speaks on their behalf without considering their opinion, or the fact that they are prohibited to express it. More than geopolitics or Trump’s polls or CIA drones or the USS Gerald Ford, they are worried by the exchange rate and the luring of hyperinflation. All this uncertainty and the fall of oil income will make their lives harder. 

However, 2026 could be the year when the US increases pressure to the point that the regime breaks and a democratic transition starts. It still is a possibility. We must hope for the best, without blinding ourselves to the challenges of reality and the unstable nature of the guys who can define the outcome.

Last week, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy and Homeland Security offered a sharply different account of Venezuela’s 1976 oil nationalization. It is provocative, but it does not hold up to the record.

President Carlos Andrés Pérez (1974-1979) proclaimed the takeover of the petroleum industry on January 1, 1976. The announcement occurred at the Mene Grande oilfield in Zulia. Crucially, the transfer from private control to a state-run model went smoothly. The major multinationals were compensated, invited to work with the new state-owned company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), as service and technology providers, and the process triggered no diplomatic incident with the United States. A brief look at the facts does not support claims of “theft of American wealth and property,” since “the tyrannical expropriation” was precisely engineered to avoid the kind of rupture Miller describes.

The nationalization of the Venezuelan petroleum industry responded to global events unfolding in the Middle East around 1970. To be sure, Venezuelan politicians had long dreamed of granting the state full control over the most important sector of the country’s economy. However, plans for an eventual state takeover of the oil fields remained nebulous, a goal set for a distant future. Muammar Qaddafi (1969-2011) in Libya, of all figures, provided Venezuelan lawmakers with a concrete horizon for materializing full control over the hydrocarbon sector. The Libyan strongman unilaterally increased royalties and taxes on multinationals, with Iran pursuing a similar approach. OPEC then formalized this push for higher prices at its December meeting that year. What followed in 1971 sent shock waves across the world: Libya nationalized its oil industry, followed by Algeria and Iraq. This process quickly expanded to the rest of the Middle East, setting the backdrop for the fuel shortages of that decade and the energy crisis of 1973. 

This global context greeted President Rafael Caldera (1969-1974), a Christian Democrat of COPEI, who was intent on capitalizing on these favorable winds. Soon, every political faction in Congress sought to outdo the other in displaying their anti-corporate credentials. Caldera stood at the top as the most nationalist of the pack, passing an unprecedented package of bills and decrees destined to expand government control over the industry significantly. By the time he handed power to Carlos Andrés Pérez from Acción Democrática (AD), de facto state control over the entire industry was already in place. Nationalization became the only politically safe position when the electoral campaign of 1973 started. Once elected, Carlos Andrés Pérez authorized the creation of a Presidential Commission in charge of studying the state takeover and proposing a bill to that effect, to be approved by Congress in 1975. Ordinary Venezuelans shared this renewed fervor for ownership over the national riches of the country, though in a conflicted way.

Polls by the weekly political magazine Resumen showed broad support for nationalization. Yet respondents also rated working conditions at the foreign oil companies very favorably and many wanted foreign capital to remain involved after the takeover because they trusted the firms’ experienced managers. At the same time, they doubted the state’s capacity to run complex industries, while still believing it could improve over time and that a state-run oil sector was in the nation’s interest. That nuance rarely appeared in Congress.

The nationalization became a fait accompli without antagonism with the U.S. government or the multinationals

COPEI and a constellation of center-left and leftist organizations pushed for an immediate, total takeover without any foreign role. Some opposed compensation altogether and even welcomed a showdown if necessary, seeing local employees working for these multinationals as threats to a “genuine” nationalization of the industry. Venezuelan managers soon came under attack from politicians accused of having “their minds colonized” by the American and British firms. They were also viewed as “centers of anti-Venezuelan activity.” Insults in the press and public spaces galvanized domestic employees to take action. Led by Venezuelan mid-level managers such as Gustavo Coronel from Royal Dutch Shell, the managerial class came together to form Agrupación de Orientación Petrolera (AGROPET). The nonprofit aimed to help the country prepare to take full responsibility for the hydrocarbon sector.

From March 1974 through 1975, AGROPET ran a public campaign for an orderly, compensatory nationalization built on continuity, not a politicized break. Their activities included appearing on radio programs, giving TV interviews, publishing in newspapers, and participating in public forums, including congressional meetings, and talks with members of the  Presidential Commission mandated by President Pérez. The irony of this body is that it gathered representatives from prominent sectors of society. And yet the Commission excluded the people who actually ran the industry.

AGROPET quickly steered the nationalization debate back toward a technocratic solution. The organization’s pivotal moment came in January 1975, when its leaders met with President Pérez and laid out what became the blueprint for the 1976 nationalization. They argued for an industry built on administrative efficiency, technological progress, apoliticism, and sound management not a politicized rupture. Their model envisioned a holding company with four affiliates that would absorb concessionaire operations. The new organizational culture would blend practices inherited from the Creole Petroleum Corporation and Shell, and the nationalized industry would retain ties to its foreign predecessors. Under this proposal, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) became, in effect, the direct descendant of the multinationals that built Venezuela’s modern oil industry. It perpetuated the business philosophy of the multinationals. Persuaded by Venezuelan managers, Pérez sided with the technocrats and sent an amended nationalization bill to Congress, crucially allowing foreign capital to return under Article 5. The AD-dominated legislature defended the bill and enacted it in August 1975. Two months later, Creole and the other firms accepted a compensation package of about $1 billion for their expropriated assets.

The nationalization became a fait accompli without antagonism with the U.S. government or the multinationals. It constituted less a watershed than a continuation of relationships the Venezuelan state and foreign oil companies had built across the twentieth century on new terms. PDVSA quickly signed service and technology agreements with the very companies it had expropriated. What’s more striking is that this smooth outcome became, in part, an unintended consequence of Venezolanization: the deliberate integration of Venezuelans at every level of the corporate ladder, a policy initiated by Creole and Shell in the 1940s. Unusual in the industry at the time, it stood out as a strand within a broader set of corporate social responsibility practices these companies implemented in Venezuela. Locals trained through that system helped make the transition to state control orderly and broadly beneficial.

For much of the political opposition, however, the outcome felt bittersweet. They denounced its chucuta nature (a “half-baked” nationalization) and framed Article 5 as outright betrayal. Many wanted the kind of dramatic showdown associated with Cárdenas in Mexico, Mossadegh in Iran, or Velasco Alvarado in Peru, cases where claims of expropriation and “theft” of U.S. property could at least be mounted. Venezuela in 1976 stood far away from that drama, and once the transfer was complete, business continued as usual despite the lamentations of certain congressmen. Venezuela’s 1976 oil nationalization was engineered to preclude confrontation. Getting the history right matters. If the current U.S. administration wants to cite this episode to justify pressure, escalation, or exceptional measures, it has chosen a poor example, precisely because the process avoided the kind of rupture Mr. Miller invokes. So, por este camino no es.

As the United States reasserts its hemispheric priorities in its recent National Security Strategy document, Latin America and the Caribbean are once again cast as a zone of interest, with Venezuela squarely in Washington’s sights. Puerto Rico—still a US colony more than a century after the 1898 invasion—plays a central role in this imperial architecture, serving as both a military platform and a living example of colonial rule in the region. 

Cira Pascual Marquina spoke with Puerto Rican geographer, author, and longtime activist Déborah Berman Santana about the continuity of US imperialism, the island’s strategic function in projecting imperialist military power in the region, and why Venezuela’s insistence on sovereignty represents such a profound threat to US interests. 

Drawing on decades of grassroots struggle against militarization, including the successful campaign to halt US Navy bombings in Vieques, Berman Santana situates today’s escalation against Venezuela within a broader history of colonial control, neocolonial coercion, and popular resistance in the continent.

The US has just issued a new National Security Strategy document that shifts its focus to the Western Hemisphere. From your perspective in Puerto Rico, what does this reveal about Washington’s imperial ambitions, and how does it impact the Caribbean and specifically Venezuela?

From Puerto Rico, and with the history of US-Latin American relations in mind, what is being presented as a “new” security strategy is really the old one. Even before the Monroe Doctrine, Thomas Jefferson was already worried that Spain’s colonies might become independent before the United States was strong enough to take control of them. Hemispheric domination has always been central to US policy.

What this document makes clear is that Washington wants absolute control over the Western Hemisphere, regardless of what happens elsewhere in the world or how competition with China or Russia evolves. When US officials say “America for the Americans,” they mean the entire hemisphere for the United States: its peoples and its resources, all under US imperialist control.

The Caribbean is still referred to as the US “backyard,” even by sectors of the US left. Venezuela’s oil—the largest proven reserves on the planet—is treated as US oil. Bolivia’s lithium is viewed as US lithium. The strategy simply reasserts the United States as the dominant power, the plantation owner of the hemisphere.

There is nothing new in this policy paper except how openly it is stated. I don’t believe the substance would be radically different under a Democratic administration; it would simply be expressed in more polite language.

Puerto Rico is identified as a US “territory,” but in reality, it’s an occupied colony. How does that colonial status enable the buildup of US bases and military deployments, and why is Puerto Rico so central to projecting imperialist power in the Caribbean, especially toward Venezuela?

In the US Constitution, “territory” essentially means property. The US Supreme Court has defined Puerto Rico as an unincorporated territory belonging to, but not part of, the United States. “Unincorporated” means there is no obligation to ever make Puerto Rico a state.

The simplest analogy is a pair of shoes: they belong to you, but they are not part of you, and you can dispose of them at will. That is how Puerto Rico is legally understood. We don’t even have the limited sovereignty administratively allowed for Native peoples in the US. This is not my opinion; it is established by Supreme Court rulings.

This colonial condition makes militarization extremely easy. For roughly twenty years there was a visible reduction in US military presence, but that period is clearly over. The US does not need to negotiate with us. If it chooses to offer compensation, it may, but it is under no obligation.

There are six US military bases in Puerto Rico. Four were never meaningfully demilitarized. Two—Ramey in Aguadilla and Roosevelt Roads in Ceiba—were supposedly closed and slated for civilian redevelopment. In practice, that process has been partial at best.

I live near Ceiba, and since the summer, there has been a dramatic increase in military air traffic. The airstrip, which had been used for regional civilian flights since 2004, is now filled with F-35s, Hercules aircraft, and Ospreys. No permission was requested. The military simply took it over.

If the US decides to deploy additional warships or aircraft carrier groups—as it recently did with the USS Gerald R. Ford—it can do so without even consulting us. Whether this is intended as a prelude to an actual attack on Venezuela or primarily as pressure, it clearly sends a message.

It is the logic of a bully: “I am here, and I am ready to hurt you unless you comply.” Even without an invasion, the buildup is meant to force concessions, deepen internal divisions, or provoke instability in Venezuela. I doubt this will succeed, given Venezuela’s strong commitment to sovereignty, but it clearly reflects the US’ strategic thinking.

Venezuela faces escalating economic, political, and military pressure. Why is the Bolivarian Revolution perceived as such a threat to US imperialist interests?

The United States seeks to remain the dominant global power, but when that dominance is challenged—especially by China—it insists on absolute control of this hemisphere. In this worldview, Latin America and the Caribbean are US turf: their resources belong to Washington, and their peoples are treated, implicitly, as subjects.

What the US will not accept is a country that insists on real sovereignty, a country that engages with Washington as an equal. Venezuela’s decision to control its own resources and choose its own trading partners is intolerable to US policymakers.

That is why Cuba has faced a blockade for more than sixty years, why Nicaragua is targeted, and why Venezuela is now under such intense pressure. A Russian ship making a courtesy visit to Venezuela or expanded ties with China are treated not as sovereign decisions, but as provocations.

The real threat to Washington is not Venezuela in isolation, but the precedent it sets. The Bolivarian process represents a living challenge and a model that could inspire others across the region. That is why US policy aims either to overthrow the government or to force it to abandon its sovereign course.

And it would not stop with Venezuela: Cuba would be next, and Nicaragua would follow. Donald Trump has openly warned Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro that they could also “be next.” This military buildup sends a message to all of Latin America and the Caribbean—Mexico included—about the limits Washington seeks to impose on sovereignty.

As one billionaire ally of Trump [Elon Musk] once crudely said about Bolivia’s lithium: “We coup whoever we want.” It may sound blunt, but it reflects a long-standing reality. When US interests are challenged, it resorts to coups—soft or hard. It prefers banks over tanks, but ultimately it will do whatever is necessary to maintain imperialist control.

While Puerto Rico is under direct colonial rule, much of Latin America faces neocolonial domination. How do these models operate together today?

Puerto Rico is a colony with no sovereignty, now effectively governed by a fiscal control board imposed by the US Congress. Appointed under Obama and maintained by subsequent administrations, this unelected body can veto budgets and policies. Its priority is not social well-being, but debt repayment—most of it owed to Wall Street hedge funds.

This structure enforces privatization: electricity, education, and public services. Environmental protections are also under attack. But colonialism works by degrees. A country can be formally independent and still be coerced through debt, IMF pressure, financial blackmail, economic war, etc.

Chile’s water privatization after the Pinochet coup is one example. Haiti is another—it is formally independent, yet occupied and burdened with illegitimate debt. Elsewhere, intervention comes through NGOs, the National Endowment for Democracy, election interference, or direct coups, as in Honduras in 2009.

In Venezuela, when the right wing loses elections, the US cries fraud. When it wins, there is silence. This selective logic serves as justification for sanctions, isolation, and ultimately military threats.

The US justifies its military buildup in the Caribbean using anti-drug rhetoric. What does this narrative conceal?

Historically, Washington claimed to be fighting communism. Later, it was terrorism. Now the target is supposedly drugs. Yet it is widely known that drug demand is driven by the United States itself, and that many of its closest allies have been deeply involved in drug trafficking. It’s allowed as long as they remain politically obedient.

Meanwhile, fisherfolk across the Caribbean are targeted and killed under the pretext of drug interdiction, without evidence and without inspections. This is not about drugs. It is about control.

Most people understand this, even within the United States. The real objective is hemispheric domination and control over strategic resources—above all, Venezuelan oil.

Puerto Rico has a long history of resistance to militarization. How do those struggles connect today with Venezuela and the broader region?

Puerto Rico has consistently resisted US militarism. The struggle against US Navy bombings in Vieques was long and difficult, but it ended in a victory: the base was shut down. Although the land has yet to be fully cleaned up or returned to the community, the pueblo won that battle.

The same anti-militarist, independentista, and socialist forces that fought in Vieques continue to resist today, grounded in the understanding that Puerto Rico is part of the Caribbean and Latin America. Simón Bolívar himself insisted that his liberation project would remain incomplete without Cuba and Puerto Rico.This struggle is far from over. It will not be complete until Puerto Rico is free and can stand alongside Venezuela, Cuba, and other pueblos of the region in a hemisphere that truly belongs to its people—free, just, and sovereign.

The US has seized a vessel in international waters off the coast of Venezuela, US officials have told BBC News partner CBS.

It is the second time this month that the US has seized a ship off the country’s coast.

The move comes after US President Donald Trump on Tuesday said he was ordering a “blockade” of sanctioned oil tankers entering and leaving Venezuela.

Venezuela has not yet responded to the latest US seizure, but has previously accused Washington of seeking to steal its oil resources.

The BBC has contacted the White House for comment.

The operation was led by the US Coast Guard, similar to the operation earlier this month, CBS reports. The ship was boarded by a specialised tactical team.

In recent weeks, the US has been building up its military presence in the Caribbean Sea and has carried out deadly strikes on alleged Venezuelan drug-smuggling boats, killing around 100 people.

The US has provided no public evidence that these vessels were carrying drugs, and the military has come under increasing scrutiny from Congress over the strikes.

The US has accused Venezuela President Nicolás Maduro of leading a designated-terrorist organisation called Cartel de los Soles, which he denies.

The Trump administration accuses him of and the group of using “stolen” oil to “finance themselves, Drug Terrorism, Human Trafficking, Murder, and Kidnapping”.

Venezuela – which is home to the world’s largest proven oil reserves – is highly dependent on revenues from its oil exports to finance its government spending.

Trump’s announcement of a “blockade” came less than a week after the US seized an oil tanker believed to be part of the “ghost fleet” off the coast of Venezuela, which allegedly used various strategies to conceal its work.

The White House said the vessel in question, called the Skipper, had been involved in “illicit oil shipping” and would be taken to a US port.

Venezuela’s government decried the move, with Maduro saying the US “kidnapped the crew” and “stole” the ship.