Venezuelas

The events that transpired in Caracas on January 3rd drew global attention to the future of Venezuela’s well-known hydrocarbon industry, while another strategic facet of the country´s economy has remained largely unnoticed: mining. 

Historically overshadowed by the sheer scale of Venezuela’s oil-based economy, the country’s mines became an increasingly important source of revenue as sanctions closed the spigot on petrodollars during the Maduro years.

Alongside the vast reserves of hydrocarbons, the country’s privileged geological endowment covers extensive metal and mineral deposits. Concentrated largely in the Guyanese Shield in the southeast of the country, these reserves include some of the region’s largest gold reserves, extensive iron ore deposits, and a range of minerals that have been labelled as critical for the global energy transition by actors like the European Union. 

Despite its vast mineral wealth, Venezuela’s mining sector remains poorly governed. Reforming it will be essential to rebuilding a stable republic.

The harsh reality is that the mining sector in Venezuela is currently a cesspool of some of the most atrocious activities conducted by the regime in the last decade, from human trafficking to international guerrillas like the Colombian Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) controlling illegal mining operations that cause considerable environmental damage and serve to finance terrorist acts abroad. The fact remains that if these actors continue to be a force in the sector, the hopes of establishing a strong and robust Venezuelan economy will be slashed before they even get off the ground. 

All conversations start with the regime’s establishment of the infamous Orinoco Mining Arc in 2016. This Zona de Desarrollo Estratégico Minero Nacional contains an estimated 7,000 tonnes of gold, alongside millions (literally millions) of tonnes of iron ore and bauxite, as well as dozens of other high value resources. In theory, it is managed by the State and the armed forces. In practice, investigations by Human Rights Watch, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the International Crisis Group, and research projects such as SOS Orinoco consistently describe it as a criminal economy dominated by irregular armed groups, through which the Venezuelan regime captures significant revenue from gold extraction and international sales. 

It’s important to mention that three important developments have happened in recent days. The first is that on March 9th 2026, the National Assembly in Venezuela approved the first draft of a new mining reform law. Supported by the Rodríguez-led executive, the bill presents the first significant set of changes to the Venezuelan mining law that has been in full effect since 1999, since the gold reform in 2015. Among the most important aspects of the bill are the extension of concessions from 20 to 30 years, the welcoming of both national and international companies to directly develop projects in Venezuela, and the introduction of an “international arbitration program”.

When the strong control of a mafia-like regime is combined with a lack of true judicial safeguards for foreign investment in the country, most of the reliable foreign investors will be scared away.

This law comes following two key visits from high-ranking Trump administration officials. Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum had discussed Venezuela’s potential as a reliable source of strategic minerals. And previously, Secretary of Energy Chris Wright said the same about oil. Today came the announcement from Swiss commodity trading giant Trafigura, where they are committing with Minerven to help build a program for the responsible sourcing of Venezuelan gold.

Rebuilding Venezuela’s mining ecosystem will be an uphill battle that will require more than a few high-level visits, a tenuous attempt at legal reform, or a single agreement from a renowned international trader. The shadow mining economy is a key issue in the consolidation of a future Venezuelan republic that aims towards a stable political and economic development. This will in turn place some pressure on Delcy Rodríguez and the regime’s inner circle to address a system that has been successful under their watch. Without a doubt, there’s a big question mark over their willingness to dismantle one of its main cash cows, but this should remain a key issue in discussions over Venezuela’s future.

But just cleansing the system is not nearly enough to revitalize the sector. Because for Venezuela to become a key exporter of gold, iron and critical materials, international standards must be adopted. That is why Venezuela must create a true pathway for foreign investment to become an engine for the sector. One of the main concerns is just how much control the state exerts over the mining system, which can be argued to be even larger than the one seen in the energy industry. Three key State-owned companies “officially” control most of the mining operations in Venezuela: Corporación Venezolana de Minería (CVM), Corporación Venezolana de Guayana (CVG) and Minerven.

The problem is not the fact that State-owned companies operate in the country, but rather that the State that operates them is basically a criminal organization. When the strong control of a mafia-like regime is combined with a lack of true judicial safeguards for foreign investment in the country, most of the reliable foreign investors will be scared away. The ones who can start to create pathways to reintroduce Venezuela into the broader global economy, and transform the country into a crucial source of minerals. 

The main reason why foreign direct investment must drive the growth patterns is due to the fact that international operators can bring much needed expertise and technical know-how to develop stable mining projects across the region. It is important to note that for Venezuela to eventually meet high operational, environmental and safety standards, some time must pass. Many of these international companies have vast experience operating in less than ideal scenarios in countries like Angola or the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and they have managed to meet the minimum benchmarks to sell on Western markets. Thinking that in only a couple of years Venezuela will meet the same standards as minerals sourced from Europe, Canada or Australia is plain wishful thinking. For the industry to take off, production should start, as soon as viable, and as soon as a realistic negotiation and hopefully a government change can happen.

In this vein, the main Western drivers of foreign investment into mining globally, Canada and Australia, have adopted strict technical instruments like the NI 43-101 and JORC following mining scandals like BRE-X in the late 1990s. These frameworks are meant to prove the reliability standards to even invest in mining companies both locally and abroad. These regulations, which are widely accepted interchangeably worldwide, have created considerable scrutiny for the international mining sector, and the ones who can reliably bring these instruments into Venezuela are Western actors who have included them into their internal practices. If international actors bring these in, they can become a major first step in establishing the global standards required for projects in Venezuela. An important facet of this scenario is how retribution for past seizures of assets from companies like Crystallex International and Rusoro Mining will factor into the negotiations into the future of the Venezuelan mining industry.

The Venezuelan armed forces must commit to cooperating with international companies, switch their allegiances, and start a pushback against the criminal structures across the territory.

Thinking that high international standards will be adopted quickly might be too idealistic, but future negotiations in the country should include three key elements. First, territorial control must eventually be regained. Waiting to purge the Arco Minero before starting full production would be unrealistic, as it will require a comprehensive, and time-consuming security strategy. In this case, and considering that international investors will most likely bring in their own private security, there should be a commitment from the high command of the Venezuelan armed forces to cooperate with these companies, switch their allegiances, and start a pushback against the criminal structures across the territory.

Furthermore, international observers should be welcomed into the country with open arms to provide both expertise and external oversight with a true “punitive” capacity to ensure the transparency of the process. While this is happening, the third standard will come naturally, which is the systematic integration of international compliance levels. 

These two steps can eventually lead future governments in the country to invest in the creation of internal independent agencies that oversee the entire process, which will hopefully be embedded into the broader State apparatus that will be revamped in the coming years. 

The reality is that the current situation in Venezuela presents an interesting path towards the reactivation of the mining industry. The sector will be crucial, and the road to restart will be long. As more than a compromise between an unreliable government partner in Delcy Rodríguez and her cadre of officials, and the global hegemon, the industry is in desperate need of foreign investment and a firm commitment from international operators to start implementing the world-class standards. Because eventually, these players will be the ones to push for the creation of viable frameworks during the rebuilding of the Venezuelan Republic.

Changes in Venezuela are slow and imperfect, but they are happening. The question is not whether chavismo will attempt to produce results that benefit Venezuelans, because it has no alternative. The real question is how it will do so and who is on the playing field trying to shape those outcomes.

The reform of the Hydrocarbons Law, the enactment of the Amnesty Law, and the proposed reform of the Mining Law seem to indicate that the vehicle for implementing the institutional measures demanded by the United States is the National Assembly. A National Assembly that lacks legitimacy and does not represent the majority of the country’s political sectors.

Two weeks ago, Tareck William Saab resigned from his position as chief prosecutor, and Alfredo Ruiz resigned as ombudsman. Both had held those posts since August 2017 and had used the justice system against those who think differently. Following their resignations, the National Assembly confirmed Larry Devoe as acting head of the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público) and appointed Saab himself as acting ombudsman. While Saab’s resignation represented a step forward, appointing Saab as acting ombudsman was a direct violation of the Constitution. These dissonant signals only confirm that the Rodríguez leadership has no political will to move toward a democratic transition.

The process to appoint the heads of the Citizen Power branch has begun with the convening of the Evaluation Committee, and once again the academic world and civil society organizations have decided to participate. The nomination of Dr. Magaly Vásquez for chief prosecutor is a clear example and reflects the same logic that led human rights organizations to participate in the discussions around the Amnesty Law: when civil society comes together, it can take advantage of even minimal conditions to make itself heard and push decision-making toward, at the very least, more “palatable” outcomes.

Will a future democratic government treat the Amnesty Law as illegitimate? Will the hydrocarbon contracts signed by the interim government of Delcy Rodríguez be recognized?

In this process, as in the legislative debates mentioned earlier, there is an absence: the representation of all the country’s political actors. This absence (which includes a large portion of the opposition) is not simply an act of selfishness. On the contrary, their position is rooted in values and principles that prevent them from recognizing any legitimacy in the National Assembly. That stance deserves respect and admiration. However, it is worth asking whether that inflexible position is preventing them from becoming involved in processes that are producing real consequences for real people, inside and outside the country.

We know that these steps are not gestures of democratization. They appear instead to be targeted concessions designed to manage external pressure and preserve power. But achieving the appointment of a credible chief prosecutor or ombudsman could, even if only gradually, begin to rebuild a degree of institutional independence.

This leads me to ask those in the opposition who still remain on the sidelines: if we do not recognize these processes from their origin, what happens to their results when an eventual political change arrives? Will a future democratic government treat the Amnesty Law as illegitimate? Will the hydrocarbon contracts signed by the interim government of Delcy Rodríguez be recognized? Will the institutional reforms that may emerge within the framework of the path outlined by the US be rejected? These questions arise when one notices the absence of the main political figures, or when their presence remains limited to criticism.

These are not rhetorical or ill-intentioned questions. Nor is this about abandoning principles. Rather, it is about recognizing that civil society organizations need backing, especially from political parties and movements. As was demonstrated on July 28, 2024, when society’s desire for change translates into participation and is channeled by political parties, it becomes an overwhelming movement with the potential to materialize that will for change.

At the same time, we must be realistic: the response of opposition leaders cannot be unconditional recognition of the National Assembly. Structurally, it remains an instrument of authoritarian control. What can materialize, however, is support for civil society in the processes in which it is already participating. These expressions of support do not seek to legitimize lawmakers elected under questionable circumstances. Rather, they seek to recognize the work and struggle of the intermediary organizations that are fighting to open spaces for institutional life.

Turning this transition into a Venezuelan process requires Venezuelan actors to claim leadership over the institutional processes now unfolding.

A clear example of support could be the one mentioned earlier. The process to appoint the heads of Poder Ciudadano should not be rejected from the outset. Instead, those who have chosen to submit their candidacies before the National Assembly’s Evaluation Committee—and who possess the necessary technical and civic credentials—should receive public support, while their names are circulated in the public arena. Put more plainly: make noise about it. Doing so would increase the cost for the regime, in the eyes of the Trump administration, of selecting individuals who are the complete opposite: people without technical qualifications or chosen solely for political loyalty.

Choosing to support participation from an external position carries implications that become clearer with every issue appearing on the legislative agenda. The reform of the Mining Law presented this week, for example, cannot follow the path taken by the Hydrocarbons Law, which was approved without consultation, transparency or the participation of those who will bear its costs.

Venezuelan scholars, environmental organizations, and Indigenous communities must be sitting at the table in the discussions on the mining law. And the opposition, if it truly aspires to represent Venezuelans and not simply oppose the regime, could present its own reform proposals to the organizations that decide to participate in the process. In this way, participation would be effectively “outsourced.” The direct actors are not recognized, but the work of leading institutions is acknowledged.

What is at stake is more than a specific law or appointment. January 3 set in motion a process of transition in Venezuela that we hope will reach a safe harbor and conclude with free elections. But we cannot forget that there is also a risk that these changes will become little more than a negotiation between the US and remnants of chavismo. Turning this transition into a Venezuelan process requires Venezuelan actors to claim leadership over the institutional processes now unfolding. On one side, civil society must act as the principal driver. On the other, the opposition must decide whether it will remain on the margins or become an active ally.

Transitions are never perfect, because in most cases the preexisting institutions are not trustworthy. Yet decisions made within those institutions tend to be more durable than the circumstances that gave rise to them. Participating in a flawed process does not mean surrendering one’s principles. Refusing to acknowledge the reality of the moment, by contrast, allows others to shape what will become the legal and institutional architecture of the transition. And possibly, the political landscape of the coming decades.

Two months after January 3, the country has found itself at an unprecedented crossroads with three main political actors: the chavista regime, the government of the United States, and the Venezuelan opposition.

Chavismo now faces a historically unique situation after 27 years of political (as well as social and economic) control. It is under pressure from the US to move toward a transition, while at the same time trying to contain the tensions that exist within its own internal structures.

For its part, Washington is trying to steer a transition in Venezuela that is acceptable for both its domestic and foreign policy, leveraging the influence it gained from the capture of Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores over both the regime and the opposition.

And the opposition has entered a situation of undeclared conflict. In just a few days, the opposition landscape has shifted in unimaginable ways, with the perception of inaction from María Corina Machado, the sudden emergence of Enrique Márquez during the State of the Union address, and the rest of the opposition reassessing its options.

The inevitable amid uncertainty

The path toward a transition at this moment is uncertain. The regime is seeking a balance between satisfying US demands while avoiding, as much as possible, the deterioration of its own internal political and economic arrangements. At the same time, it continues to move quickly to consolidate control over the process, and more and more details are emerging about how it is setting the guidelines for the Rodríguez siblings. For instance, the visit this week by Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum.

The opposition universe appears to be an earthquake, above all amid the practical disappearance of María Corina Machado from public debate and, more recently, the “Márquez effect,” whose medium or long-term impact remains uncertain. Where there is consensus, however, is on the need for a new election. Marco Rubio, María Corina Machado, and now Enrique Márquez are on the same page: there must be new elections that legitimize the political transition. As for the Rodrigato, we can imagine what it thinks about that.

A new election to choose the opposition’s presidential candidate would be a way to confront several elephants in the room.

Until just a few days ago, it would have been easy to argue that the opposition’s presidential candidate should be Machado. After all, the results of July 28, 2024 were fundamentally the result of her leadership, and she would have been the presidential candidate if the Maduro regime had allowed it.

But Márquez’s appearance in Washington DC and his subsequent press conference suggested that this Zuliano “black swan” could be acting with the acquiescence of both the Rodrigato and the Trump administration. Evidence of this includes Márquez being invited to Trump’s address, as well as his comments about a figure as close to the Rodríguez siblings as José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero.

For that reason, it now seems that there will be an election sooner or later. It also seems that, as things stand today, we could head into that election with at least two candidates on the opposition side.

That would be a good scenario for the Rodrigato.

New primaries

In times of legitimacy crisis, the proper course is to look to the sovereign. Given everything that has happened, it seems necessary to call a new primary vote to choose an opposition candidate—whoever the Rodrigato’s candidate may be—in the presidential election that must take place given Maduro’s absolute absence.

A new election to choose the opposition’s presidential candidate would be a way to confront several elephants in the room. The first is the need to present the other two actors (the regime and the United States) with an electoral calendar that should not be unnecessarily delayed. The second is the convenience of unifying and strengthening party structures. If the process is well managed, it could encourage a reunion of the different opposition forces around a common and higher objective.

Another elephant shaking Venezuela’s narrow public space is the urgency of restarting citizen mobilization around a concrete political initiative. Finally, those primaries could once again make it possible to go into a presidential election with a single candidate, preventing the regime from promoting multiple “opposition” candidacies to divide the electorate.

The primaries that chose Henrique Capriles as the candidate for the 2012 presidential election, and the primaries that selected María Corina Machado as the candidate for the 2024 presidential election, were good precedents for successfully resolving several political problems. Considering the sovereign is a good idea, or at least most of the time.

Venezuela has been going through an unprecedented political transformation(?) since the extraction of Nicolás Maduro. All political stakeholders will try to pitch the possible outcome  according to their respective interest: the Trump administration will say that it’s going fantastic; the Rodriguez regime will try to appear independent and in control; Team Machado will push for the full restoration of political rights; smaller actors like Enrique Marquez will try to conquer their own space; and the people will need to have proper tool, amid a sea of misinformation, to try to navigate between confusion and uncertainty.  

Media outlets like Caracas Chronicles are doing our best to reduce such uncertainty, but there are new initiatives sprouting everywhere, such as the one that friend of the blog Pablo Hernández Borges is leading with a team of researchers and technologists. Umbral (umbral.watch), defined as “a free, open-source analytical platform for monitoring and documenting Venezuela’s regime transformation in real time,” allows anyone with an internet connection to contribute, as follows: 

• Scenario Analysis with Citizen Participation. Five evidence-based trajectories for Venezuela’s political future, from full autocratization to complete democratic consolidation. Any person can rate the probability of each scenario on a 1 (least likely) to 5 (most likely) Likert scale. Results are disaggregated by profile and aggregated in real time, visible to all on the platform’s landing page.
• Citizen News Evaluation. Every article in the news feed can be voted on by users, who link it to whichever of the five scenarios they believe it signals. 
• Historical Trajectory. A V-Dem-style democracy index spanning 1900–2024, mapping four major regime transformation episodes in Venezuela’s history (like Pablo did in this piece).
• Political Prisoners Tracker. Arbitrary detention statistics with demographic breakdowns, sourced from leading Venezuelan human rights organizations.
• Internet Connectivity Monitor. Real-time IODA (Georgia Tech) data on BGP, Active Probing, and Network Telescope signals, both nationally and across all 25 Venezuelan states, visualized through a choropleth map and horizon heatmap.
• GDELT Media Signals. Daily-archived instability index, media tone, and article volume from the Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone, annotated with key political events.
• Fact-Checking Feed. Curated posts from three Venezuelan fact-checking accounts: @cazamosfakenews, @cotejoinfo, and @Factchequeado.
• Interactive Timeline. Democratic Episodes Event Dataset (DEED) with bilingual (Spanish/English) events.
• Reading Room. A curated archive of books, academic articles, investigative journalism, and reports on Venezuela.
• Prediction Markets. A Polymarket contract dashboard tracking Venezuela-related markets.

It’s Rotten Tomatoes for political junkies hooked on the Venezuela stuff.

To develop Umbral, Pablo, who is a data scientist with a PhD in Political Science from Texas Tech University, got the support of NGOs Ciudadanía Sin Límites and Code for Venezuela. The platform is fully bilingual (Spanish and English) and its source code is publicly available on GitHub, ensuring complete methodological transparency. Its analytical architecture is grounded in the Episodes of Regime Transformation (ERT) methodology by the V-Dem Institute, which frames the inherent uncertainty of authoritarian transitions through concrete, evidence-based scenarios. 

Umbral is not just an observatory—it is a space for active civic participation. The goal is for community-generated data to complement—and ultimately calibrate—the academic models underpinning the platform.

Check it out: https://umbral.watch

Venezuela’s National Assembly has passed an amnesty law amid the political, economic, and social shifts the country has been experiencing following the removal of Nicolás Maduro by the United States. On February 5, the first debate on the amnesty bill took place, and after two weeks of consultations it was unanimously approved on February 19. Although the law includes significant changes compared to the version approved in the first stage, it still contains gaps that make it impossible to speak of genuine reconciliation.

Throughout the entire process, the ruling party’s narrative has been that chavismo “forgives” those who committed crimes, rather than acknowledging that the judicial system acted in a biased, arbitrary manner and contrary to the law. This is important to underscore because amnesty laws arise as special justice mechanisms through which the State recognizes its partial use of the justice system, especially in political contexts.

This newly approved amnesty law cannot be perceived as a sign of reconciliation. On the contrary, it seems to be a mechanism that allows the Rodríguez siblings to manage the release of prisoners without recognizing the State’s responsibility for more than two decades of political persecution. At the same time, however, we must view the consultation processes—promoted from within the structures of chavista power—as spaces where sectors of civil society and civic organizations raised their voices and, in one way or another, managed to be “heard” and “taken into account” to some extent.

To “forgive” prisoners, the presidency already has the authority to decree pardons under Article 236 of the Venezuelan Constitution. If the Executive Power is already able to order releases, what function does this law actually serve?

The answer to that question reveals the structural insufficiency of the law that was passed. It establishes no mechanisms for reparation and continues to exclude hundreds of individuals who have been persecuted. At its core, the law does not correct injustice. It merely attempts to cloak in legality the discretionary manner in which power has exercised persecution. It follows the same logic that has been used for years with pardons (the last of which came on Christmas 2025, days before the US military intervention) which are presented as gestures meant to project a “goodwill” image of the State while avoiding any acknowledgment of the harm caused.

Changes and silences

From the outset, we expected an imperfect law that would at least have room for improvement. In that regard, the law introduced important changes compared to the draft approved in the first debate, such as providing legal representation for those abroad. It also revised the list of excluded crimes, narrowing it to the crime of corruption (previously referred to as “crimes against public assets”), incorporated the possibility of appeals against court decisions on amnesty, and ordered notification to foreign bodies to lift international alerts or arrest warrants. It can even be said that it broadened the scope of acts eligible for amnesty. However, it also made significant omissions.

The statute could be amended to create a commission entirely independent from State bodies, composed of representatives of civil society, relatives of victims, and experts capable of making binding decisions.

The law must include all persecuted individuals. There can be no distinctions or exclusions, because persecution itself made no such distinctions. For this reason, any meaningful improvement of the current law must begin by eliminating the exclusion set out in Article 9 concerning “persons who are or may be prosecuted or convicted for promoting, instigating, requesting, invoking, favoring, facilitating, financing, or participating in armed or forceful actions against the people, the sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, on behalf of States, corporations, or foreign individuals.” If the crime of rebellion is generally defined as an uprising against authority, then it is a political act like any of the other amnestiable offenses.

Recognition, inclusion, and non-discrimination must be the minimum standards for any amnesty that seeks to be considered a step forward in the pursuit of justice.

Lacking external oversight

In transitional justice contexts, international frameworks are clear in their assessment of amnesties: they cannot be left in the hands of the very institutions that participated in the persecution. The approved law establishes that verification of amnestiable cases falls to the courts and the Public Prosecutor’s Office, whose highest-level official stated in November 2024 that there were no political prisoners in Venezuela (nor minors unjustly imprisoned), only individuals who committed crimes and were prosecuted in accordance with the law. This underscores a problem as obvious as it is serious: this amnesty law cannot, on its own, correct the very bodies responsible for human rights violations.

The final text incorporates an advisory body to monitor the law’s implementation, one of the recommendations made by experts who engaged with the Interior Policy Commission. This body takes the form of a Special Commission of the National Assembly composed of figures directly linked to the State’s control and coercive apparatus, including Nicolás Maduro Guerra and Iris Varela, the former Minister of Prisons.

To ensure impartiality and credibility, oversight of the law’s implementation should fall to an independent body. Given that Venezuela lacks a genuine separation of powers, the statute could be amended to create a commission entirely independent from State institutions, composed of representatives of civil society, victims’ families, and experts in human rights and transitional justice, with powers to review case files, request information, and make binding decisions. In other words, technical specialists must be able to effectively oversee the application of the law.

Memory and non-repetition

If we aspire for the amnesty law to contribute to Venezuela’s reconciliation process, it cannot be limited to releasing individuals. The law must repair the harm caused and guarantee that persecution will not occur again.

Article 14 maintains the elimination of records and criminal histories of beneficiaries. This provision, far from promoting reconciliation, may erase evidence necessary to reconstruct patterns of persecution. Preserving documentation is a cornerstone of transitional justice. An amnesty that erases archives risks becoming a mechanism of impunity. Thus, while cases must indeed be extinguished, the files should be preserved and made available so that the Commission responsible for verifying the amnesty can confirm that victims have been repaired.

The discussion is no longer about whether persecution occurred, but about how it will be repaired and what independent mechanisms are needed to review each case.

Moreover, the law does not prescribe any mechanism for reparation. But all of this depends on the State recognizing its victims, restoring their rights, providing both symbolic and material reparations, and adopting institutional reforms that serve as safeguards to prevent the justice system from once again being used in a partisan manner.

One element removed from the draft approved in the first debate was the extinction of administrative actions. While this may seem minor, in the Venezuelan context it is vital. Amnesty should not apply only to criminal cases. In Venezuela, administrative mechanisms—such as political bans on opposition figures—have been used arbitrarily and constantly

Without these elements, the amnesty risks becoming a clean slate rather than a commitment to truth, justice, and non-repetition.

Political signals

The US has not issued a statement on the approved law. Representatives of the Trump administration, including the president himself, have primarily insisted on the release of political prisoners and the safe return of those in exile. We will see whether there is a statement (which, in my view, will come and will amount to a “green light”) and whether this law fits within the steps announced by Washington to evaluate the conduct of those in charge of the Venezuelan government.

After the law was approved in the chamber, lawmakers immediately presented it to the Executive. Delcy Rodríguez signed it publicly and, in her speech, called for speed in evaluating cases that do not fall under the law. That call can take several paths: issuing final convictions, granting pardons, or decreeing dismissals. The difference among the three is enormous. The first would mean completely forgetting those who are not amnestiable and keeping them imprisoned; the second would amount to a simple pardon, without acknowledging injustice; and the third would be an admission that there is insufficient evidence to proceed.

Jorge Rodríguez’s statements are also important to note: he publicly acknowledged the unjust application of the Anti-Hate Law and the possibility of reforming it. He also recognized that there are more than 11,000 cases linked to political persecution. That acknowledgment, although it did not come with an admission of responsibility, dismantles the narrative that these are “isolated” incidents or that the amnesty concerns only “individual cases.” Whether this is a gesture of “democratization” or simply the result of international oversight now conditioning the government, admitting the magnitude of persecution creates a crack in the official discourse. A crack that civil society and the opposition must seize.

When we speak of reconciliation and pacification in Venezuela, we mean that it’s the State that must cease to be a violent actor. Today, with an insufficient amnesty law in place, we cannot speak of such reconciliation. But considering these signals, the discussion is no longer about whether persecution occurred, but about how it will be repaired and what independent mechanisms are needed to review each case.

Venezuela needs real reconciliation. And such reconciliation is only possible if the State acknowledges that it systematically used the justice system to persecute those who think differently. The approved law is insufficient, but it may yield partial results. That is why it is important for civil society to be present at every public forum to demand truth, reparation, and review of case files. The more contradictions those interventions induce among powerful factions, the greater the pressure to make decisions that would not be made voluntarily. This amnesty law does not resolve persecution, but it does create a space for persistence, oversight, and civil society coordination that can push for real change. As the transition advances and the political landscape shifts, the amnesty law can be adjusted, expanded, and corrected. Its enactment is not an endpoint. It is a starting point that can evolve.

Caracas, February 17, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuela’s Navegantes del Magallanes claimed the 2026 Serie de las Américas baseball tournament after defeating Colombia’s Caimanes de Barranquilla 10–9 on Friday, February 13, at the Estadio Monumental Simón Bolívar in Caracas.

The Colombian squad stunned fans with a commanding 5–0 lead in the opening inning and maintained a five-run advantage for much of the game. However, Magallanes engineered a dramatic comeback that will become one of Venezuela’s most celebrated baseball victories, scoring seven unanswered runs in the eighth inning to overturn the deficit.

The Venezuelan team, representing the host nation for the tournament held from February 5 to 13 in Caracas and La Guaira, stumbled in its opening match against Panama before rallying and stringing together consecutive wins. This included a decisive 9–1 semifinal victory over Cuba to book a place in the final.

The 2026 Serie de las Américas—the second edition of this regional international baseball competition organized by continental baseball league associations—brought together national teams from Cuba and Curaçao, and the winter league champions from Venezuela, Panama, Nicaragua, Colombia, and Argentina. The tournament featured a round-robin phase followed by semifinals and a championship game.

Navegantes del Magallanes secured its place in the tournament after winning the Venezuelan league in early February. 

Venezuela’s participation in the Serie de las Américas became possible after the country opted out of the February 1–7 Serie del Caribe, following decisions by that event’s organizers to relocate the tournament amid claims of “political conflicts” linked to the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro.

The Venezuelan professional league initially suspended its Round Robin phase following the attacks, though play resumed on January 7 and continued through the Serie de las Américas.

On Saturday, the champion Magallanes were welcomed at Miraflores Palace by acting President Delcy Rodríguez, who praised the team’s achievement. 

“When they achieved victory, I felt the joy of seeing a country rise up and demonstrate its winning spirit. The most important jersey we Venezuelans wear is that of Venezuela; you wore it and showed that there is no adversity we cannot overcome,” Rodríguez said.

The Venezuelan leader also formally expressed Venezuela’s desire to once again host the regional tournament in 2027.