Venezuelan

A United States judge has said that he will not dismiss the drug-trafficking and weapons possession charges brought against former Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores.

But in a Thursday court hearing, Judge Alvin Hellerstein questioned whether the US government has the right to bar Venezuela from funding Maduro’s legal expenses.

The hearing was the first for Maduro and his wife since a brief January arraignment, where they pleaded not guilty.

Maduro and Flores have sought to have the charges against them thrown out. Hellerstein declined to do so, but he pressed the prosecution on some of the issues Maduro’s legal team raised in its petition to dismiss the case.

Among them was a decision by the administration of US President Donald Trump to prevent the Venezuelan government from financing Maduro’s defence.

Federal prosecutors argued that national security reasons prevented the US from allowing such payments. They also pointed to ongoing sanctions against the Venezuelan government.

But Hellerstein pushed back against that argument, noting that Trump had eased sanctions against Venezuela since Maduro’s abduction on January 3. He also questioned how Maduro might pose a security threat while imprisoned in New York.

“The defendant is here. Flores is here. They present no further national security threat,” said Hellerstein. “I see no abiding interest of national security on the right to defend themselves.”

Hellerstein emphasised that, in the US, all criminal defendants have the right to a vigorous defence, as part of the Constitution’s Sixth Amendment.

“The right that’s implicated, paramount over other rights, is the right to constitutional counsel,” he said.

Maduro, who led Venezuela from 2013 to 2026, has been charged with four criminal counts, including narco-terrorism conspiracy, conspiracy to import cocaine, the possession of machine guns and the conspiracy to possess machine guns and other destructive devices.

He and his wife were taken into US custody on January 3, after Trump launched an attack on Venezuela.

The Trump administration has framed the military operation as a “law enforcement function”, but experts say it was widely considered illegal under international law, which protects local sovereignty.

Maduro has cited his status as the leader of a foreign country as part of his push to see the case dismissed.

When he last appeared in court, on January 5, he told the judge, “I’m still the president of my country.”

In a February hearing, his defence team sought to dismiss the charges on the basis that preventing Venezuela from paying his legal fees was “interfering with Mr Maduro’s ability to retain counsel and, therefore, his right under the Sixth Amendment to counsel of his choice”.

In an interview with the news agency AFP on Thursday, Maduro’s son, Venezuelan lawmaker Nicolas Maduro Guerra, said that he trusts the US legal system but believes that his father’s trial has been mishandled.

“This trial has vestiges of illegitimacy from the start, because of the capture, the kidnapping, of an elected president in a military operation,” Maduro Guerra said in Caracas.

Protests and counter-protests took place in front of the New York City courthouse on Thursday, with some condemning the US’s actions and others holding signs in support of the trial with slogans like, “Maduro rot in prison.”

Trump himself weighed in on the proceedings during a Thursday cabinet meeting, hinting that further charges could be brought against Maduro.

“He emptied his prisons in Venezuela, emptied his prisons into our country,” Trump said of Maduro, reiterating an unsubstantiated claim.

“And I hope that charge will be brought at some point. Because that was a big charge that hasn’t been brought yet. It should be brought.”

Trump has had an adversarial relationship with Maduro since his first term in office, when he issued a bounty for the Venezuelan leader’s arrest. He has frequently repeated baseless claims that Maduro intentionally sent immigrants and drugs to the US in a bid to destabilise the country.

Those claims have served as a pretext for Trump claiming emergency powers in realms such as immigration and national security. On Thursday, Trump emphasised that, while he expected a “fair trial”, he expected more legal action to be taken against Maduro.

“I would imagine there are other trials coming because they’ve really sued him just at a fraction of the kind of things that he’s done,” Trump said. “Other cases are going to be brought, as you probably know.”

The “so hot right now” meme from Zoolander has found an unlikely avatar in Cashea. As Venezuela’s preeminent Buy-Now-Pay-Later (BNPL) solution, Cashea isn’t just a startup. It is a macroeconomic bellwether. By some estimates, its transaction volume accounts for roughly 4% of Venezuela’s GDP, a staggering concentration of financial flow for a single private entity.

But being “hot” attracts different kinds of heat.

Recently, a “robotic-like” user, @VecertRadar, reported a massive data breach at Cashea. The leak was forensic in its damage, exposing 29 million store records, 15,227 partner business details, and a complete history of 79 million transactions. Shortly after, the “catch-up arc” of Venezuelan tech hit another snag: Yummy, the nation’s super-app pioneer, suffered a targeted strike on its Yummy Rides vertical, compromising rider data. When tourism wholesalers like BT Travel Solutions are also hit, a pattern emerges.

Venezuela is returning to the world stage, but it is entering through a side door left unlocked. These incidents are the canaries in the coal mine for an ecosystem that has focused heavily on consumer-facing solutions, like FinTech, Crypto and Ride-Hailing, while neglecting the unglamorous, high-margin infrastructure required to protect it.

In the big leagues of global business, cybersecurity is often viewed as a vitamin (a nice-to-have) until a breach turns it into a painkiller (a necessity). For Venezuela, the transition (not THAT one) from vitamin to painkiller is happening overnight.

While the regional Latin American cybersecurity market is projected to reach between $14 billion and $23 billion, these figures often omit the Venezuela factor: a market ripe for the taking because it is basically uncontested. This is a classic innovation’s Blue Ocean business opportunity. While some local entrepreneurial efforts remains obsessively focused on crypto-wallets and payment gateways, a massive structural deficit in data protection has created an opening for sustainable, high-margin business models.

Consider the EBITDA margins (a proxy for operational cash generation). In the software-as-a-service (SaaS) cybersecurity sector, operational health is robust, with margins often hovering around 40% (good). In a country where traditional industries grapple with heavy physical overhead and regulatory friction, these light-CAPEX models offer a much cleaner path to profitability.

Venezuela’s primary competitive advantage isn’t just its lack of competition, it’s the cost of its potential defensive talent.

Historically, the country was not considered a deep pool of digital labor by companies abroad. As regional talent-pool peers like Argentina outprice themselves and Colombian talent reaches its cost-advantage ceiling, Venezuelan developers and security analysts bring a potential high-value, cost-efficient resource. This creates a price-competitive entry point for local startups to build software that can eventually scale.

Furthermore, Venezuelans have spent a decade experimenting and building solutions to protect wealth in one of the most volatile financial environments on earth. This has fostered a unique brand of technical sophistication. Our talent isn’t just coding, they are battle-testing systems against systemic instability. If this talent can be harnessed to move from protecting personal crypto-wallets to protecting corporate data infrastructure, the exit opportunity for these ventures becomes very attractive for local and international investors alike.

Venezuela does not need to reinvent the wheel. It only needs to be efficient in catching-up. Our regional peers have already proven that Latin American cybersecurity can bring international venture capital to the table:

• Lumu Technologies (Colombia): Recently closed a $30M Series B by focusing on Continuous Compromise Assessment.
• Strike (Uruguay): Uses AI to automate simulated attacks to find holes, proving that small markets can produce global speedboats.
• Metabase Q (Mexico): Their strategic alliance with Google/Mandiant shows that local players can become essential partners for global behemoths.

The message is clear: the market is wide open for “champions” who can protect the data of both governments and the private sector.

The Cashea leak is a flagship reminder: size attracts.

For founders looking to enter this light-CAPEX space, always use the Speedboat approach. Rather than spending two years building a complex digital product in a sandbox, entrepreneurs can start as high-level consultancies. By offering assessments, due diligence, and compliance audits to major corporations or big family businesses first, a team can establish a brand of trust while identifying the exact pain points of the market. Build a custom solution, learn, MVP (minimum viable product) and pivot to a robust software solution. For my mapping of opportunities, I already stumbled with players like Niblion to begin to test these waters, but the ocean remains largely empty.

Regulation also plays a big role in this market. I’m not an expert, nor I want to focus on regulation for I see the business perspective, but doing a quick search, Venezuela does have a law centered in cybersecurity. However it does lack a unified data protection law for consumers and businesses. The current law focuses on defense and cyber-sovereignty. Maybe looking at Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, who have already done the legwork on legislative frameworks, may make our job easier.

The Cashea leak is a flagship reminder: size attracts. As big companies like Zinli (Mercantil’s own digital wallet play) and small players Coco Wallet (facilitating crypto-to-fiat transitions) continue to expand, to name a few, the surface area for attacks grows exponentially.

The typical Venezuelan focus on protecting wealth via crypto and FinTech has been successful, but with its own set of risks. Without a robust cybersecurity layer, these ventures become sitting ducks for maligned players.

For investors, the opportunity lies in light-CAPEX models with high margins and a desperate client base. For founders, the opportunity is to build the champions that will protect the next decade of Venezuelan growth. Sometimes building a startup isn’t about changing the world, but making a good and profitable solution, while making a buck down the road.The catch-up arc will be hard, but for those providing the shields, it will be incredibly profitable.e

Caracas, March 20, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The US Treasury Department has issued a new sanctions waiver as the Trump administration seeks to deepen US control over Venezuela’s oil sector.

General License 52 (GL52), published on Wednesday, authorizes US entities to engage in transactions with Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA under conditions that limit Venezuelan sovereignty.

An updated FAQ from the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control clarified that the exemption allows US companies to engage in activities related to the exportation of Venezuelan-origin oil products, export diluents and inputs to Venezuela as well as enter into new contracts for oil and gas production.

However, in line with recent US licenses, GL52 mandates that all tax, royalty, and dividend payments be made into US Treasury-controlled accounts.

Following the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration has taken control over Venezuelan crude exports while imposing conditions favorable to Western energy conglomerates.

Thus far, Washington has returned US $500 million out of an initial January deal worth $2 billion. US authorities have also confirmed Venezuelan imports of US-manufactured medicines and medical equipment. Trump officials had vowed that US energy revenues could only be used for purchases from US suppliers and that Caracas would need to submit a “budget request” to access its funds.

The White House issued GL52 amid soaring energy prices caused by the US and Israeli war against Iran. Tehran has responded to massive bombings by targeting US military assets in the region and closing the strategic Strait of Hormuz.

Last week, the US Treasury amended licenses to allow US imports of fertilizers from Venezuela, as well as repair works in the South American country’s electric grid. Venezuela’s electrical infrastructure remains in a precarious state after years of US sanctions, and expanded power capacity is a precondition for recovery of the oil industry.

Despite the broadened waivers for corporations hand-picked by the White House to engage with Venezuela, PDVSA and its subsidiaries remain under financial sanctions, while third-country firms risk secondary sanctions should they enter into agreements without a US Treasury special license.

In late January, Venezuelan authorities approved a pro-business overhaul of the country’s Hydrocarbon Law, granting private companies reduced fiscal responsibilities, increased control over production and exports, and the possibility of taking disputes to international arbitration bodies.

Chevron and Shell, with US Treasury approval, were the first companies to take advantage of the new incentives. Chevron’s Petropiar joint venture with PDVSA was granted a new 500 square-kilometer bloc to drill for extra-heavy crude in the Orinoco Oil Belt, while Shell is set to take over light and medium crude and natural gas operations in the eastern state of Monagas.

Last week, European energy giants Eni and Repsol, who were also given the inside track by the White House, announced an agreement with the Venezuelan government for the development of the Cardón IV offshore natural gas project.

Eni and Repsol each own 50 percent stakes in Cardón IV, which has been in operation since 2009. Neither firm nor Caracas offered details on the renewed agreement, though both enterprises had lobbied for improved conditions and mechanisms to recoup accumulated debt due to US sanctions.

According to Bloomberg, ONGC Videsh (India), Maha Capital AB (Sweden), and J&F Investimentos (Brazil) are among the companies likely to receive special licenses for involvement in Venezuela’s oil sector as Washington seeks to counter rising crude prices. Nevertheless, analysts stress that the Venezuelan oil industry does not have the capacity to significantly ramp up output in the near future.

On March 11, the Trump administration formally recognized Acting President Delcy Rodríguez as Venezuela’s “sole authority,” days after Venezuela and the US reestablished diplomatic ties following a seven-year hiatus.

On Monday, Rodríguez appointed new executive boards for PDVSA’s US-based affiliates, including refiner CITGO. Asdrúbal Chávez, who held multiple roles in both PDVSA and CITGO since the 2000s, was picked as president of CITGO and its parent company, PDV Holding. At the time of writing, US authorities have not commented on the proposed new leadership for the companies, which had been run by the US-backed opposition since 2019.

CITGO is currently in the closing stages of a court-mandated auction that will see Venezuela lose ownership of its most prized foreign asset to address creditor claims against the country. The sale to Amber Energy, a subsidiary of vulture fund Elliott Management, is pending authorization from the US Treasury Department.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Fusagasugá, Colombia.

Caracas, March 19, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez tapped Gustavo González López as the country’s new defense minister on Wednesday, replacing Vladimir Padrino López after more than a decade in the post.

“We thank General Vladimir Padrino López for his loyalty and for having been the first soldier in the defense of our country for so many years,” Rodríguez wrote on social media. In response, Padrino thanked the acting president and stated that “serving the Homeland” had been his “highest honor.”

Padrino had served as defense minister since October 2014. The four-star general staved off a number of US-backed coup attempts, including the May 2020 “Operation Gideon” failed mercenary invasion. 

In 2025, the Biden administration announced a $15 million bounty for information leading to Padrino’s capture as part of a “narcoterrorism” indictment against several Venezuelan leaders, including President Nicolás Maduro. However, US officials have not presented evidence tying Venezuelan high-ranking officials to narcotics activities. 

Padrino’s removal follows the January 3 US military strikes against Venezuela that saw special forces kidnap Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores. Despite months of defense exercises in the face of escalating US threats, Venezuelan forces, particularly air defenses, were quickly neutralized by US bombing and electromagnetic warfare on January 3.

The Venezuelan armed forces have yet to offer a complete account of the operation, including a definitive list of casualties that are said to surpass 100. Padrino condemned the US attacks and pointed to Washington’s military superiority, arguing that it would have been “suicidal” for Venezuelan air force jets to take off and engage with the enemy.

The 60-year-old Gustavo González López previously held posts as interior minister and director of intelligence services and has been under US sanctions since 2015. A career military officer, he briefly studied at the School of the Americas in the early 1990s. 

Following the January 3 attacks, González was chosen by Rodríguez to lead the presidential guard. He was pictured alongside the acting president during a visit to Caracas from CIA Director John Ratcliffe on January 16. General Henry Navas will replace González as Commander of the Presidential Guard of Honor.

Rodríguez announced several other cabinet changes on Wednesday. She had previously replaced the industry, oil, tourism, healthcare, communications, and eco-socialism ministers as well.

Jorge Márquez and Rolando Alcalá will take over the housing and electricity portfolios, respectively. Furthermore, Supreme Court magistrate Carlos Alexis Castillo will serve as labor minister amid rising demands for minimum wage increases and labor rights, replacing veteran official Eduardo Piñate.

Former Caracas mayor Jacqueline Faría was likewise appointed as the new transport minister, replacing Aníbal Coronado after two months in the post. Faría’s appointment followed a public transportation strike in Caracas as private bus operators push to increase single-ride fares to 120 bolívars, roughly US $0.25 at the present exchange rate.

Wednesday’s cabinet changes also included Raúl Cazal becoming culture minister, replacing Ernesto Villegas, who had held the post since 2017. Villegas is one of the candidates shortlisted by the Venezuelan National Assembly for the vacant ombudsman post.

Finally, Rodríguez picked academic Ana María Sanjuan as minister of higher education, replacing Ricardo Sánchez. A trained psychologist and professor at the Central University of Venezuela (UCV), Sanjuan had participated in political dialogue initiatives as a representative of moderate opposition sectors.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Fusagasugá, Colombia.

Caracas, March 14, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan workers, activists, and trade union organizers held marches in several cities on Thursday to demand wage increases and respect for labor rights.

A coalition of labor organizations staged protests in Caracas and over 25 other cities across the country. In the Venezuelan capital, around 1,000 demonstrators marched from Plaza Morelos and broke through a police cordon to reach the National Assembly in the city center.

“Mobilizations like the one we had today will continue and grow until the government changes its salary policies,” José Gregorio Afonso, president of the Central University of Venezuela (UCV) professors’ association, stated. “We believe the economic conditions allow for the establishment of a minimum wage as determined by the Constitution and the Labor Law.”

Afonso added that the Constitution mandates the government adjust the minimum wage at least once a year to keep up with inflation, but the last increase was in 2022. He likewise pointed to recent official figures of economic growth and prospects of increased oil revenues.

Thursday’s rally consisted largely of education sector trade unions, as well as public sector retirees. A commission met with a group of legislators at the end of the march to deliver a list of 17 demands signed by over 200 trade unions. 

A similar document was delivered to the Labor Ministry following prior nationwide rallies on February 26. The labor organizations’ demands include raising the minimum wage in accordance with the Constitution and labor legislation, the release of workers and trade unionists allegedly arrested for defending labor rights, and the repeal of statutes such as the 2792 Memorandum that suspended several collective bargaining rights.

Activists have also voiced opposition to plans to implement a pro-business reform of the country’s Organic Law of Labor and Workers (LOTTT) that would cut benefits, social security contributions, and other employer responsibilities. 

The historic 2012 law, approved by former President Hugo Chávez, prohibits unfair dismissal and outsourcing, enshrines the world’s third-longest maternity leave, guarantees the right to work for both women and people with disabilities, and extends retirement pensions to all workers, including full-time mothers and the self-employed.

Later on Thursday, the ruling Socialist Party (PSUV) held its own march in Caracas along the same route, with spokespeople urging the defense of the country’s peace and sovereignty, as well as calling for the release of kidnapped President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores.

Labor Minister Eduardo Piñate told reporters that the rally was in “firm backing” of the Maduro and Rodríguez government’s labor policies.

Gov’t increases bonus amid salary debates

On Friday, unofficial channels reported that the acting Rodríguez administration had raised the monthly “economic war bonus” by 25 percent, from US $120 to $150. Coupled with a $40 food bonus, the move brings the monthly income floor for public sector workers to $190. The amount is paid in bolívars at the official exchange rate.

Venezuelan government officials have not commented on the increase. It is not presently known whether public sector retirees and pensioners, who receive $70 and $50 economic war bonuses, respectively, will benefit from similar hikes.

Venezuela’s monthly minimum wage was set at 130 bolívars (BsD) in March 2022 and has not been adjusted since. At the time, 130 BsD amounted to around US $30, but with the Venezuelan currency’s devaluation, it is now equivalent to $0.29. With the Venezuelan economy heavily battered by US sanctions, the Nicolás Maduro government prioritized non-wage bonuses as the main income source for workers and pensioners.

Trade unions and leftist organizations have criticized the policy for violating the country’s labor laws and favoring business sector interests by reducing labor costs and making dismissals more flexible.

In recent weeks, trade union coalitions have put forward proposals for a minimum wage adjustment. Center-right and right-wing alliances such as the Independent Union Alliance (ASI) and the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV) have urged authorities to set the monthly minimum salary at $200 before pegging it to a cost-of-living index.

For its part, the government-aligned Bolivarian Socialist Union of Workers (CBST) proposed that the minimum wage be raised by $50 each quarter, though it did not specify a time frame. The CBST added that, should the government deem the salary increase unfeasible, it should implement a similar increase in non-wage bonuses.

Liberal economists, including Asdrúbal Oliveros and José Guerra, have argued that minimum wage increases beyond $100 and $150 a month, respectively, might place too high a burden on the state’s budget. At the same time, business sector representatives have called for a flexibilization of labor protections and benefits.

Leftist economists, including former PSUV congressman Tony Boza, Pasqualina Curcio, and Juan Carlos Valdez, have proposed raising wages and pegging them to inflation as is currently done by private banks with interest rates.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Fusagasugá, Colombia.

Caracas, March 10, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan National Assembly preliminarily approved a new mining law on Monday as part of continued efforts to attract foreign investment to the country.

Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez had announced the new legislation last week during a visit from US Interior Secretary Doug Burgum alongside mining executives and urged parliament to act “swiftly.”

“This law will increase all the legal guarantees that can generate confidence and attract national and foreign investment,” said Orlando Camacho, a congressman from the ruling PSUV-led bloc, during the legislative session.

Camacho added that the bill is adapted to the Caribbean nation’s “present needs” and aims to take advantage of the country’s vast mineral riches, mostly located in the country’s Southeast.

Monday’s vote was endorsed by the pro-government legislative majority. Opposition deputies abstained, complaining that they received the draft less than one hour before the parliamentary session. The text will be subject to consultations and proposals before being put to a second and definitive vote in the coming weeks. 

Consisting of 126 articles split into 19 sections, the bill establishes regulations for small, medium, and large-scale mining, as well as the state’s ability to declare certain minerals as strategic and reserve areas for security purposes. It also creates a “social fund” to support mining workers, an oversight superintendency, and a state-run data bank.

Concerning mining activities, the proposed law establishes that joint ventures, private corporations, and small-scale artisanal mining groups are allowed to receive concessions. The new law will replace a 2015 decree that imposed state control over mining exploration, as well as the 1999 Mining Law.

The legislation establishes concessions of up to twenty years that can be renewed for two additional ten-year periods. The issuing of contracts is the responsibility of the Ministry of Ecological Mining Development and will not require National Assembly approval. Corporations are also entitled to several tax breaks, likewise granted at the ministry’s discretion, and can take disputes to international arbitration outside the Venezuelan court system.

The Venezuelan government is also seeking to reorganize the mining sector. A decree published on Friday ordered the Venezuelan General Mining Company (MINERVEN) to be absorbed by the Venezuelan Mining Corporation (CVM).

The mining reform follows a similar pro-business overhaul of Venezuela’s Hydrocarbon Law in January. In an interview, National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez vowed that parliament would “adapt” laws to attract US investors in the wake of the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro

During his visit last week, Burgum touted Venezuela’s mineral riches and potential opportunities for Western conglomerates. On Friday, the Trump official announced the arrival of US $100 million worth of Venezuelan gold as part of a deal involving Trafigura to export up to 100 tons of gold doré bars worth approximately $165 million.

However, Caracas is not expected to immediately receive the revenue. The US Treasury issued General License 51 (GL51) allowing US entities to purchase, transport and resell Venezuelan-sourced gold but mandating that proceeds be deposited in US government-run accounts before being returned to Venezuela under conditions dictated by the White House.

The sanctions waiver additionally blocks transactions with companies from Cuba, Iran, Russia, and North Korea, and bans involvement in exploration and refining activities.

In tandem, the Trump administration reportedly issued a 30-day license allowing select companies, including Canada’s Gold Reserve, to negotiate mining concessions with the Venezuelan government.

Venezuela possesses vast proven reserves of gold, iron, and bauxite, in addition to lesser quantities of copper and nickel. Analysts have also drawn attention to Venezuela’s significant reserves of coltan, which has important military, aerospace, and electronics applications, as well as unproven deposits of rare earth minerals.

Former President Hugo Chávez sought to end foreign mining concessions in the 2000s, pushing instead for the state to play a leading role and link extraction activities to its basic industries in sectors such as steel and aluminum. 

The Chávez government likewise revoked a number of concessions from Western mining companies. Several of them, including Canada’s Crystallex and Gold Reserve, went on to secure compensation via international arbitration bodies.

Since 2015, the Nicolás Maduro administration looked to mining as a potential revenue source amid escalating US sanctions, particularly in the 112,000 square-kilometer Orinoco Mining Arc. Nevertheless, the sector was likewise hit by unilateral coercive measures, while the proliferation of irregular mining groups has generated environmental concerns.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Fusagasugá, Colombia.

One of the fundamental issues that a Constitution must regulate is what happens when the head of State is absent. The most important scenario is how to proceed when the president’s absence is absolute, that is, when it is known that he will no longer serve as president permanently.

So what should happen in Venezuela when the president of the republic is absent?

The two scenarios of presidential absence: Under the 1999 Constitution, there are two scenarios of presidential absence: temporary absence and absolute absence. The Constitution implicitly categorizes all scenarios of absence into one of these two: either the president is temporarily absent, or the president is absolutely absent. The Constitution assigns different consequences to each scenario.

Constitutional rules regarding temporary absence: If the absence is temporary, the vice president fills the vacancy for a period of 90 days, which may be extended by the National Assembly for up to another 90 days. If the temporary absence extends beyond 90 days, the National Assembly may, by a majority vote, consider the absence to be permanent (Article 234). After these 90 or 180 days have elapsed, depending on whether or not the period is extended, the absence must necessarily be considered permanent. Consequently, in accordance with Article 233 of the Constitution, elections must be held within 30 days of the permanent absence.

Constitutional rules regarding permanent absence

If the absence is permanent and occurs within the first four years of the constitutional term, elections must be held within 30 days of the permanent absence (Article 233). The Constitution lists, in a non-exhaustive manner, the circumstances of absolute absence (that is, there may be other reasons, such as the president’s removal and imprisonment abroad): death, resignation, or removal from office decreed by a TSJ ruling; permanent physical or mental incapacity certified by a medical board appointed by the TSJ and approved by the National Assembly; abandonment of office, declared as such by the National Assembly; and referendum recall of the president.

The Constitution distinguishes how to proceed in the event of the president’s absolute absence depending on the time elapsed since the beginning of the presidential term.

Under the 1999 Constitution, there is no constitutional provision that supports Maduro’s forced absence. His absence is either temporary, to which the rules of temporary absence must be applied, or permanent, to which the Constitution also says what to do.

When the president-elect becomes absolutely absent before taking office, a new universal, direct, and secret election will be held within the following 30 consecutive days. While the new president is being elected and takes office, the president of the National Assembly will assume the presidency (this was the rule used analogously to support then-Speaker Juan Guaidó as interim president in 2019).

If the president’s permanent absence occurs during the first four years of the constitutional term, a new universal, direct, and secret election will be held within the following 30 consecutive days. While the new president is being elected and takes office, the executive vice president will assume the presidency. In the aforementioned cases, the new president will complete the corresponding constitutional term. If the permanent absence occurs during the last two years of the constitutional term, the executive vice president will assume the presidency until the end of that term.

Maduro’s absence occurred within the first four years of the presidential term.

What the Supreme Tribunal of Justice has said

What has been the TSJ’s position on Maduro’s absence and the constitutional consequences of that absence? First, it issued a ruling on January 3rd ordering that Delcy Rodríguez, as executive vice president, assumes and exercises, in an “acting” capacity, all the powers, duties, and faculties inherent to the office of president.

It characterized Maduro’s absence as “forced.” However, it did not specify whether this absence is temporary or permanent.

Therefore, the Constitutional Chamber considers that Maduro is in a forced absence, which must be filled by Delcy Rodríguez.

Under the 1999 Constitution, there is no constitutional provision that supports Maduro’s forced absence. His absence is either temporary, to which the rules of temporary absence must be applied, or permanent, to which the Constitution also says what to do. There’s no situation such as “forced absence”. That “forced absence” of Maduro, from which the “interim” presidency of Delcy Rodríguez derivates, is based only on the sentence issued by the Constitutional Court on January 3.

Furthermore, Rodríguez is simultaneously holding the acting presidency (and therefore cannot be considered executive vice president) and the Ministry of Hydrocarbons. In Venezuela, ministers are appointed by the president. Therefore, the only person who could remove Rodríguez as minister is Rodríguez as President. A constitutional absurdity.

If the extension is declared, it will expire on July 3. From that day, 30 days must elapse within which the presidential election must be held.

There’s an additional peculiarity: in Official Gazette No. 6,963 of January 14, a ruling was announced by which the Constitutional Chamber supposedly had the authority to “determine the applicable legal framework to guarantee the continuity of the State, the administration of government, and the defense of sovereignty in the event of the forced absence of the President of the Republic.” That is, the Constitutional Chamber was or is going to issue a posterior sentence to define the constitutional route after Maduro’s absence.

However, at the time of writing, this ruling has not been published on the Supreme Court’s website. This is an anomaly, since the general rule is that when a ruling is published in the Official Gazette, it has already been published on the Supreme Court’s website several days prior. Something happened within the regime that led its leaders to decide it would be better not to publish such a sentence.

We can assume that the acting president and the Supreme Tribunal of Justice consider Maduro’s absence to be temporary. Under that scenario, according to the Constitution, on April 3, 2026, the National Assembly could extend Delcy Rodríguez’s acting presidency for another 90 days.

If it does not, the Constitution requires us to assume that Maduro is permanently absent, and elections must be held within the following 30 days.

If the extension is declared, it will expire on July 3. From that day, 30 days must elapse within which the presidential election must be held.

Any other solution has no basis in the 1999 Constitution.

And that is something that should be discussed.

The licence follows a push from US President Donald Trump to open Venezuela’s resource sector to international investment.

The United States government has authorised a limited licence for the export of Venezuelan gold, following a high-level meeting to expand mining in the country.

On Friday, a notice appeared on the US Department of the Treasury’s website announcing the licence.

It allows Venezuela’s state-run mining company Minerven and its subsidiaries to export, transport and sell Venezuelan gold to the US, within the parameters set out under US law.

Under the licence, however, no Venezuelan gold will be permitted to be exchanged with Cuba, North Korea, Iran or Russia.

The licence also requires payments to sanctioned individuals to flow through Treasury accounts known as Foreign Government Deposit Funds, the same system that has been used to store the proceeds from Venezuelan oil sales.

Minerven and other state-owned industries have faced US sanctions for years, as a penalty for the push to nationalise Venezuela’s resources under former President Hugo Chavez.

But the US has been pushing for inroads into Venezuela’s oil and mining sectors since January 3, when it launched an operation to abduct and imprison the country’s then-president, Nicolas Maduro.

The January 3 military operation has been condemned as a violation of international law, and critics argue that US President Donald Trump has since sought to exploit Venezuela’s natural resources for his country’s gain.

Trump and his allies maintain that Venezuela’s oil resources were stolen from the US, citing the expropriation of assets from US businesses in 2007.

But international law guarantees that countries have permanent sovereignty over their own natural resources, which cannot be exploited by foreign powers without consent.

So far, the government of interim Venezuelan President Delcy Rodriguez has complied with Trump’s requests to surrender oil to the US and open the country’s oil and mining sectors to foreign investment.

Just this week, Rodriguez agreed to send a mining reform law to the country’s National Assembly, following a two-day visit from Trump’s Interior Secretary Doug Burgum.

And in late January, Rodriguez signed into law a separate reform that allowed for the expansion of private investment from abroad in Venezuela’s oil sector and lowered taxes on the industry.

Venezuela’s economy has struggled under tightening US sanctions and government mismanagement, forcing millions of citizens from the South American country to flee its borders over the last decade.

Proponents of the reforms say outside investment can help revive Venezuela’s ailing economy and fund upgrades to its outdated mining infrastructure.

On Friday, Venezuela’s central bank released its first inflation statistics since November 2024, showing that inflation skyrocketed to 475 percent in 2025, when the US placed an embargo on Venezuelan oil exports.

Gold production from Venezuela in 2025 amounted to nearly 9.5 tonnes, according to the government, and the country sits on some of the largest oil deposits in the world.

Mérida, March 2, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan popular movements condemned the recent US and Israeli attacks against Iran and expressed support and solidarity with the West Asian nation. 

On Saturday, February 28, the International Platform for Solidarity with the Palestinian Cause and the Alexis Vive Patriotic Force were among the organizations issuing statements rejecting Washington and Tel Aviv’s military actions.

The organizations decried the bombings of Iranian territory, including against civilian targets, and described the operations as serious violations of international law. The International Platform for Solidarity with the Palestinian Cause expressed “deep outrage” over the bombing of a girls’ school in Minab that killed over 175 people.

“This infamous act will not crush the heroic resistance of the Iranian people, in their example of dignity in the face of imperialist and zionist aggression,” the platform’s communiqué read.

For its part, the Alexis Vive Patriotic Force emphasized that the latest attacks are not an isolated incident, but rather “another attempt to impose regime change and undermine Iran’s self-determination.” 

“These actions seek to reconfigure the political map of Western Asia in favor of the strategic interests of Washington and Tel Aviv,” the organization, a driving force in El Panal Commune in Caracas, added in its statement.

The Venezuelan chapter of Alba Movimientos, a continental alliance of social movements, likewise issued a statement declaring “unrestricted solidarity” with Iran and calling on multilateral organizations to deter the US and Israel’s “warmongering.”

Venezuelan grassroots organizations scheduled a rally on Tuesday in front of the Iranian embassy in Caracas to reiterate their support and condemnation of the foreign aggression against the country.

West Asia has been thrown into open conflict after the US and Israel launched operations “Epic Fury” and “Lion’s Roar,” respectively, on Saturday, with widespread bombings against Iran and targeted assassinations against the country’s leadership. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, was killed along with several relatives by an Israeli strike. 

Washington and Tel Aviv justified the systematic bombing of Tehran and other cities as a “preemptive strike,” with officials from both countries claiming without evidence that Iran was working toward nuclear weapons.

In response, Iranian forces launched defensive maneuvers and retaliatory attacks against US military assets in the region, striking bases and other targets in countries including Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Iraq, and Jordan. Iran has also launched multiple waves of missiles against Israel and vowed to implement a strategic blockade in the Strait of Hormuz.

Caracas withdraws statement, expresses solidarity with Qatar

The Venezuelan government issued a statement on Saturday expressing its “condemnation and deep regret” that the “military option was chosen” with attacks against Iran while diplomatic talks were ongoing. However, Caracas did not name the US and Israel as the perpetrators. 

The communiqué went on to condemn Iran’s retaliatory actions as “inappropriate and reprehensible military reprisals against targets in various countries in the region.” The document ended with a call for a return to negotiations between all parties.

The government’s position drew widespread criticism on social media and was removed from the Foreign Ministry’s official accounts, as well as from Foreign Minister Yván Gil’s Telegram and X platforms, on Saturday evening.

Venezuelan leaders, including Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, have offered no explanation for the statement’s publication and deletion. On Monday, Rodríguez reported a phone conversation with Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani in which she expressed “solidarity” amidst the “violence and instability” in the region.

“I expressed my condolences and deep concern over the loss of civilian lives due to the ongoing conflict, reiterating our call to respect international law and preserve peace,” the acting president wrote.

Caracas’ latest stance contrasts with its previous fierce condemnations of US and Israeli actions in West Asia, including the genocide in Gaza, attacks against Lebanon, and the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.

Venezuela had likewise firmly backed Iran, one of its strongest allies in the past quarter century, against foreign attacks, including during the June 2026 war against Israel.

During Hugo Chávez’s presidency (1999-2013), Caracas and Tehran consolidated a multidimensional strategic alliance based on opposition to US expansion and a commitment to building a multipolar world. During this period, more than 270 bilateral agreements were signed in sectors such as energy, housing, agriculture, and technology.

The close ties, described by both governments as a “revolutionary brotherhood,” also provided key lifelines as both countries faced US-led economic sanctions. Venezuela benefited from Iranian technology transfers in areas such as drone manufacturing, cement, and vehicle assembly.

Iran provided key fuel shipments in 2020, defying US threats, as the Venezuelan economy reeled under US coercive measures.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Caracas, February 28, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – A group of trade unions and political organizations protested outside Venezuela’s Labor Ministry headquarters in Caracas on Thursday to urge salary increases and respect for labor rights.

A crowd of around 100 people held banners expressing multiple demands, including pegging wages to a cost-of-living index.

Eduardo Sánchez, president of the Central University of Venezuela (UCV) workers’ union, told reporters that it is urgent to adjust wages and protect working-class rights ahead of announced plans to reform the country’s labor law.

“The workers here today demand an increase in their wages, not through bonuses,” he said. “We are also calling for the repeal of the Onapre and 2792 memoranda,” he added, in reference to policies implemented in 2022 and 2018, respectively, which flattened wage scales and froze a number of collective bargaining rights.

Sánchez also denounced a social media campaign “paid for by the business sector” with the purpose of “demonizing” workers’ benefits and social security.

The groups present at the rally delivered a 17-point petition addressed to Labor Minister Eduardo Piñate.

Venezuela’s monthly minimum wage was set at 130 bolívars (BsD) in March 2022 and has not been adjusted since. At the time, 130 BsD amounted to around US $30 at the time, but with the Venezuelan currency’s devaluation, it is now equivalent to $0.31.

In recent years, with the Venezuelan economy heavily battered by US sanctions, the Nicolás Maduro government has prioritized non-wage bonuses as the main income source for workers and pensioners. Public sector employees have a monthly income floor of $160 from a combined $120 economic war bonus and a $40 food bonus. They are paid in bolívars at the official exchange rate.

Public sector retirees and pensioners receive $70 and $50 economic war bonuses, respectively.

Trade unions have denounced the bonus-over-salary policies for being tailored to private sector interests, since they drastically reduce employer obligations, including social security contributions, vacation pay, severance, and other benefits. 

In 2023, a group of Chavista organizations delivered a constitutional appeal before the Venezuelan Supreme Court, arguing that under Venezuelan labor law bonuses must be considered as salaries with all their implications. However, the petition received no answer from the country’s highest judicial body.

Thursday also saw activists and trade unionists hold demonstrations outside regional Labor Ministry offices in 14 Venezuelan states.

Arvilio Hidalgo, secretary general of the CUTEC trade union in Carabobo state, called on the government to “restore the infringed-upon rights of the working class.”

“Our struggle right now is to restore the minimum wage and social security,” he stated. “We are also calling for the release of workers and trade unionists who were arrested for defending labor rights.”

In recent years, trade unions and human rights groups have denounced dozens of arrests of labor leaders, claiming that they were targeted for upholding collective bargaining rights or opposing corruption in the public sector and state-owned companies. Several trade union representatives have been released in past days following the approval of the Amnesty Law.

The labor organizations that rallied on Thursday announced a new protest on March 12.

In recent months, Venezuelan authorities have announced plans to develop a “new labor model” and engaged in consultation processes with pro-government trade unions.

The country’s main business lobby, FEDECÁMARAS, has openly voiced support for an overhaul of labor legislation reform that cuts down on benefits and other employer responsibilities.

One of the core legacies of the Hugo Chávez administration, Venezuela’s Organic Law of Labor and Workers (LOTTT) was hailed as the “most advanced labour law in the world.” The historic 2012 law prohibits unfair dismissal and outsourcing, enshrines the world’s third longest maternity leave, guarantees the right to work for both women and people with disabilities, and extends retirement pensions to all workers, including full-time mothers and the self-employed.

Feb. 26 (UPI) — The U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control said it will allow certain operations to resell Venezuelan-origin oil destined for Cuba, provided the fuel is used by citizens and private companies on the island.

The island nation relied for years on Venezuela for fuel, but shipments stopped after the United States captured Nicolás Maduro on Jan. 3 and took control of Caracas’ energy industry.

After the operation, President Donald Trump repeatedly warned that Cuba was on the brink of economic collapse, and he threatened to impose further economic pressure on the country to reach an agreement with the United States. Trump has not publicly defined what kind of agreement he seeks.

The trade measure, published Wednesday, says that the transactions must comply with the conditions of General License 46A for Venezuela. This license is an authorization issued by foreign assets office that allows companies to conduct operations involving Venezuelan oil under specific terms, despite the sanctions in place against that country’s energy sector.

Companies that seek authorization will not need to have an entity established in the United States, and the usual Cuba-related restrictions set out in that license will not apply.

The Treasury Department specified that the policy will cover only exports for commercial or humanitarian purposes that benefit Cuba’s private sector.

Operations involving the Cuban armed forces, intelligence services or other government entities will not be permitted, including those listed on the U.S. Department of State’s Cuba Restricted List.

The Treasury Department recalled that the Commerce Department primarily regulates the export or re-export of U.S.-origin oil to Cuba.

Under the Support for the Cuban People License Exception, certain exports of gas and other petroleum products intended to improve living conditions and support independent economic activity in Cuba do not require separate authorization from foreign assets office provided the applicable terms are met.

The agency referred to its Frequently Asked Question 1226 for the definition of “Venezuelan-origin oil,” which includes petroleum products.

Preliminary data from the Energy Information Administration show that Venezuela exported 339,000 barrels per day of crude to the United States in the third week of February.

At the same time, regional fuel supply to Cuba has been limited. On Jan. 29, the Trump administration declared a national emergency with respect to Cuba, creating a new mechanism to impose tariffs on imports from any country that provides oil to Havana.

On Feb. 17, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum said her government would not send fuel to Cuba “for now” amid the current situation and potential U.S. trade measures.

Cuba faces fuel shortages that have affected electricity supply, transportation and other basic services, and it relies heavily on oil imports.

Separately, the Russian Embassy in Havana confirmed two weeks ago that Russia will send crude oil and refined products to Cuba as humanitarian assistance.

Russia is sending the oil directly, not through intermediaries, and the shipments are considered to be aid, not commercial sales.

US eases oil embargo on Cuba as Caribbean neighbours warn worsening humanitarian crisis could destabilise region.

The United States has said it will allow the resale of some Venezuelan oil to Cuba in a move that could ease the island’s acute fuel shortages, as neighbouring countries raised the alarm over a rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation caused by Washington’s oil blockade.

In a statement on Wednesday, the US Department of the Treasury said it would authorise companies seeking licences to resell Venezuelan oil for “commercial and humanitarian use in Cuba”.

It said the new “favorable licensing policy” would not cover “persons or entities associated with the Cuban military, intelligence services, or other government institutions”.

Venezuela had been the main supplier of crude and fuel ⁠to Cuba for the past 25 years through a bilateral pact mostly based on the barter of products and services. But since the US abducted Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro last month and took control of the country’s oil exports, Caracas’s supply to Cuba has ceased.

Mexico, which had emerged as an alternate supplier, also halted shipments to the Caribbean island after the US threatened tariffs on countries that send oil to Cuba. The US blockade has worsened an energy crisis in Cuba that is hitting power generation and fuel for vehicles, houses and aviation.

The shift in US policy came as Caribbean leaders gathering in Saint Kitts and Nevis expressed alarm at the impacts of the blockade on the island nation of some 10.9 million people. Speaking to Caribbean leaders during a meeting of the regional political group CARICOM on Tuesday, Jamaican Prime Minister Andrew Holness affirmed solidarity with Cuba.

“Humanitarian suffering serves no one,” Holness said at the meeting. “A prolonged crisis in Cuba will not remain confined to Cuba.”

The Caribbean summit’s host, Saint Kitts and Nevis Prime Minister Terrance Drew, who studied in Cuba to be a doctor, said friends have told him of food scarcity and rubbish strewn in the streets.

“A destabilised Cuba will destabilise all of us,” Drew said.

But addressing the meeting in Saint Kitts and Nevis on Wednesday, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio claimed that the humanitarian crisis had been caused by the Cuban government’s policies, not Washington’s blockade.

Rubio, whose parents migrated to the US from Cuba in 1956, warned that the sanctions would be snapped back if the oil winds up going to the government or military.

“Cuba needs to change. It needs to change dramatically because it is the only chance that it has to improve the quality of life for its people,” Rubio told reporters.

It is “a system that’s in collapse, and they need to make dramatic reforms”, he said.

Rubio went on to blame economic mismanagement and the lack of a vibrant private sector for the dire situation in Cuba, which has been under communist rule since Fidel Castro’s 1959 revolution.

“This is the worst economic climate Cuba has faced. And it is the authorities there, and that government, who are responsible for that,” Rubio said.

The US pressure on Venezuela and Cuba ⁠has left several fuel cargoes undelivered since December, according to the Reuters news agency, contributing to the island’s inability to keep the lights on and cars circulating. A Cuba-related vessel that loaded Venezuelan gasoline in early February at a port operated by state-run company PDVSA remained this week anchored in Venezuelan waters waiting for authorisation to set sail.

Mexico and Canada have meanwhile announced they would be sending aid to Cuba, and Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak also said his government was discussing the possibility of providing fuel to the island.

Separately on Wednesday, Cuba’s Ministry of the Interior announced killing four people and wounding six others on board a Florida-registered speedboat that it said entered Cuban waters.

Rubio told reporters it was not a US operation and that no US government personnel were involved.

“Suffice it to say, it is highly unusual to see shootouts in open sea like that,” he said. “ It’s not something that happens every day. It’s something frankly that hasn’t happened with Cuba in a very long time.”