Venezuelan

Aldo Torres is a longtime trade union leader in the electricity sector and currently serves as executive secretary of the Venezuelan Federation of Electricity Industry Workers (FETRAELEC). In this interview, he discusses the current crisis in Venezuela’s electricity system, its causes and possible solutions, as well as the impact of opening the sector to private capital.

Based on your experience in the electricity sector, what is the current assessment of the National Electricity System (SEN), and what factors are behind its crisis?

The National Electric System (SEN) has been deteriorating significantly over time. This crisis with recurrent blackouts all over the country is not a recent phenomenon. Without ignoring the impact of the blockade, the main factors, in my view, are the authorities’ incompetence, ineptitude, and lack of will to address a sector of vital importance to the life and development of the nation.

Management corruption has been a determining factor in the degradation of the electricity sector, and this has been publicly evident. In fact, many financial resources allocated for investment and improvement – at a time when there were still no economic or political sanctions – were diverted into the pockets of unscrupulous contractors.

Then, with the blockade, in addition to all its direct consequences, there was a massive exodus of professionals, technicians, and skilled workers. Faced with low wages, dangerous working conditions, and cases of political persecution, many migrated or simply left to find work elsewhere.

How did the working class respond to this deterioration you describe?

The workers constantly raised the alarm and denounced the situation. But the response was to ignore their warnings or criminalize them. For example, in 2010, [intelligence agency] SEBIN arrested 11 workers following the explosion of a turbine at the Planta Centro thermoelectric plant in Carabobo State, even though we had warned that the equipment had already reached the end of its useful life.

It is unacceptable that every time there were problems of this nature, management assumed the workers were to blame. All of this also affected the quality of the electricity service.

In short, we have been warning about the possibility of this crisis for many years. In 2008, we issued this warning to the country – and even to President Hugo Chávez – in a report that also included our proposals. After that, between 2009 and 2010, he declared an electricity emergency. 

2011 marked a critical turning point. At that time, workers in the sector, organized in federations such as FETRAELEC, and [state electricity company] CORPOELEC technicians formally warned of an imminent technical and financial collapse of the industry. But after President Nicolás Maduro appointed Jesse Chacón in 2013 and later Luis Motta Domínguez to take charge of the Ministry of Electricity and CORPOELEC, the electricity problem only worsened, leading to the disaster we face today. This crisis has been negatively affecting the lives of millions of Venezuelans on all fronts. Without electricity, water supply, transportation, industries, hospitals, and more come to a standstill.

What might be the possible solutions to the crisis we are facing?

Since January 3, following the US military attack on Venezuela and the tutelage regime imposed afterward, rationing and power outages have increased. Previously, there were 3- or 4-hour blackout periods, sometimes every other day. Now they last 6 or 8 hours, or even longer, every day, with Caracas being the exception.

This worsening situation is directly linked to the increase in oil production. There’s a saying that’s becoming popular: for every barrel of oil extracted, a household is left in the dark. Independent electricity generation for the oil industry would provide some relief from the power rationing that has left Venezuelans overwhelmed and anguished, but it is not the definitive solution to the national electricity crisis.

We, as organized workers, proposed a project for “reactive power compensation” in the electricity grid. This would essentially reduce transmission losses and stabilize the voltage along the lines. It would allow for an immediate increase in the electrical power available to meet demand by optimizing the efficiency of the grid, without requiring an increase in electricity generation. This proposal would apply to high-voltage lines of 765, 400, 230, 138, and 115 kV, and, according to our estimates, we would recover approximately 2,000 MVAr of reactive power that is currently lost due to the grid’s inefficiency. In addition to this, we would be saving hundreds of millions of liters of diesel annually that are used in power plants or independent generators, a significant expense in the national budget. In fact, in 2011, this project was approved in its entirety by CORPOELEC, beginning with Caracas, and a national study was conducted to gradually expand it throughout the country, establishing an order of priority. However, due to administrative changes, it was not carried out.

Workers in the electricity sector have demanded that the sector’s collective bargaining agreement be honored and that the persecution cease. Could you explain these labor demands in more detail? What is the situation for retirees?

As is the case throughout Venezuela, collective bargaining agreements in the public sector have been paralyzed since the government issued and approved the illegal and unconstitutional Memorandum 2792 on October 11, 2018. This memorandum authorized employers to review, modify, or suspend clauses in collective bargaining agreements that they considered “burdensome” or that “jeopardized jobs.” That is why all workers are now facing precarious conditions, and the situation is even more dire for retirees and pensioners.

Furthermore, the imposed guidelines used the minimum wage as the basis for calculating pay scales, eliminating or reducing multiplier factors, professionalization bonuses, seniority pay, and other socioeconomic benefits that were hard-won through working-class struggles. And now the minimum wage is practically zero. Our main demand is that the rule of law be respected, that negotiations on our collective bargaining agreement be restored, and that our basic labor rights be upheld. This is a struggle for the entire Venezuelan working class; it is not limited to the electricity sector, of course.

How do workers view the current opening of the electricity sector to transnational private capital? What will this reform mean for service quality and access, especially for working families?

We have been debating the opening of the electricity sector to private capital in union meetings and open forums. Unfortunately, this is nothing new in the country. This was the case even before Hugo Chávez came to power and the sector was subsequently managed by military personnel who were anything but qualified to do so.

We also face a very difficult situation regarding national sovereignty, stemming from the Trump administration’s effective control over Venezuelan affairs. That is why, now, under these terrible conditions, US capital will come with its respective corporations to take over our natural resources and strategic sectors. It is absolutely outrageous.

The historical precedents of privatized electricity show us that it leads to a profound inequality in access. And the argument of corruption and poor public administration may once again be used to justify privatization. In the 1970s, the Compañía Anónima de Administración y Fomento Eléctrico (CADAFE) and its subsidiaries were victims of severe meddling and sabotage by economic groups and traditional political parties, which turned the company into the poster child of corruption and inefficiency. Then, in the 1990s, they used this as a pretext to carry out a restructuring aimed at privatizing CADAFE. This had a devastating impact on workers, whose ranks were reduced from 3,500 to fewer than 900. With this new opening to private capital, all these risks are repeating themselves.

The report seeks to address concerns about the Trump administration’s handling of revenue held in trust for Venezuela.

The United States Department of State has released a report detailing what it says the US has done with more than $12bn in revenue from Venezuelan oil and mineral resources, nearly a year after it abducted the country’s leader, Nicolas Maduro.

The disclosure is part of an effort to “promote transparency and accountability in the management of these funds”, says the 53-page report, released on Thursday.

In January, US forces conducted a raid on the Venezuelan capital of Caracas, capturing Maduro and his wife and bringing them to New York City, where they are currently facing charges related to drug trafficking and torture.

Venezuela’s then-vice president, Delcy Rodriguez, took over after Maduro’s abduction and has since made agreements with Washington that saw the US take a direct stake in profits earned from the export of oil and other mineral resources from the South American country.

Since removing Maduro from power, the Trump administration has sought to directly control who buys natural resources from Venezuela and who earns profits from those sales.

US President Donald Trump issued an executive order in January establishing special bank accounts that would hold revenue from those transactions, to be eventually distributed back to Venezuela in a controlled manner.

Trump has made Venezuela a central part of his political narrative, touting the revenue he said the US would receive from sales of the country’s oil during election campaigning in the run-up to the midterm elections that were held earlier this month. Venezuelan rights activists have expressed concern that Washington may give outsized importance to oil revenues and take little interest in backing democratic reforms after the removal of Maduro.

The report released on Thursday covers flows into and out of US-controlled accounts between January 3, 2026 and September 30, 2026. The State Department has also contracted private Washington, DC-based auditing firm KPMG to examine the transactions.

The US took in more than $12.26bn from “verified and approved entities engaging in authorized activities” in Venezuela during that time, according to the report. Most of that flow came from crude oil and petroleum-based revenue, but it also included deposits stemming from transactions involving gold, minerals, and fertilisers.

More than $12bn of that revenue has been disbursed as of September 30, with some $169m remaining in the account, according to the report.

The US initially set up an account in the Qatar National Bank in January to take in funds from entities looking to buy authorised oil and other minerals from Venezuela. Approximately $500m was initially deposited into that account, with almost all of it distributed back to Venezuelan entities by late January, when a separate, dedicated US Treasury-controlled account was set up to handle future transactions.

The current account, controlled directly by the US Department of the Treasury, has taken in more than $12bn in funds, from about 20 depositors, whose identities are redacted in the State Department’s report. Approximately 99 percent of those funds were related to the purchase of oil, according to the report.

By the end of September, the State Department report says, nearly all of those funds had been distributed to a set of Venezuelan banks, to be used in foreign exchange interventions, transactions where banks sell those dollars to reduce the amount of local currency floating around and prop up the currency’s value, in this case the Venezuelan bolivar.

The report is heavily redacted and does not provide details about the final recipients of the more than $12bn in funds that was distributed in Venezuela, although it does note that approximately $9.4bn went to “legal entities” and $2.9bn to “individuals”.

Caracas, November 11, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The acting Delcy Rodríguez government and ExxonMobil signed a memorandum of understanding on Monday as the oil giant prepares to return to Venezuela nearly two decades after having its assets nationalized.

“We welcome [ExxonMobil] back, hoping that synergy will develop and produce benefits for Venezuela and the United States,” she said in a televised broadcast.

Rodríguez stated that the “very important” agreement followed “months of negotiations.”

“This return takes place under very favorable conditions, in a context of legal guarantees for foreign investments,” she added. The acting president also saluted US Chargé d’Affaires John Barrett, who attended the ceremony

For his part, Dan Ammann, president of ExxonMobil Upstream Company, expressed confidence that the firm’s “unique capabilities” and Venezuela’s “extraordinary results” would yield “significant benefits for all parties involved.”

ExxonMobil CEO Darren Woods had previously called Venezuela “uninvestable” and demanded industry reforms before the talks leading to the company’s imminent return.

ExxonMobil left Venezuela in the late 2000s after refusing to comply with reforms introduced by the Hugo Chávez government to assert state sovereignty over the oil industry. The Texas-based multinational refused compensation offers and pursued international arbitration after its assets were nationalized. The company received a US $908 million arbitration award from the International Chamber of Commerce, significantly below its demands. It is likewise attempting to enforce a separate $985 million award.

Caracas had likewise denounced ExxonMobil after it spearheaded offshore drilling projects in the territorial waters of the disputed Essequibo Strip.

The Venezuelan government and ExxonMobil have not disclosed the projects under consideration. But reports suggest the company will take over its former projects, light and medium-crude La Ceiba in the Maracaibo Lake Basin and extra-heavy-crude Cerro Negro in the Orinoco Oil Belt, later relaunched as Petromonagas. The oil giant is also linked to Carabobo block oilfields adjacent to the latter. 

According to Petroguía, ExxonMobil is eyeing concession-type “Productive Participation Contracts” and has engaged in negotiations with Russian state-owned company Roszarubezhneft to acquire its 40 percent stake in the Petromonagas joint venture.

Since the January 3 US attacks and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, Venezuelan authorities have enacted a pro-business overhaul of the energy industry in consultation with Washington, while signing dozens of agreements with Western corporations. Chevron, Repsol, and Shell are among the companies to have struck new deals or renegotiated old ones to expand their foothold in the country.

Rodríguez has also radically shifted Caracas’ foreign policy, including reestablishing ties with Israel.

Recent reports have revealed that NewMed Energy, a subsidiary of the multi-billion Delek Group conglomerate and one of Israel’s largest energy firms, is negotiating a 60 per stake in an unnamed Venezuelan “oil-producing company.”

NewMed has an exclusivity window to negotiate with the Venezuelan counterpart until January 1, 2027. The undisclosed firm is said to hold “onshore oil rights” as well as additional “onshore and offshore oil and gas assets.”

Venezuelan legislation imposes a state-owned majority in any joint ventures. However, the recent reforms allow foreign corporations to take over operations and sales in concession-type agreements despite being minority shareholders.

Notwithstanding the opening of the industry to foreign capital under exceedingly favorable conditions, Venezuela’s oil output has stagnated in recent months. The latest monthly OPEC report placed October’s production at 1.158 million barrels per day (bpd) according to secondary sources. The figure is on a par with the previous month’s 1.147 million bpd output.

Venezuelan authorities had pledged to reach 1.3 million bpd before the end of the year.

In addition to overseeing legislative changes and mediating oil agreements, the US has taken control of Venezuela’s export revenues, with Trump officials deciding when and how much of the funds to return to Caracas.

A New York Times article published on Tuesday claimed that, according to a report from auditing firm KPMG, the Trump administration has managed $12 billion of Venezuelan export revenues through the end of September, with nearly all the funds returned to Caracas to be supplied to the private sector via commercial banks.

Traders Vitol and Trafigura, which secure Venezuelan crude below market price before reselling it, have been the biggest depositors into the US Treasury account at Citibank.

However, the total figure contradicts a previous Financial Times investigation that estimated $13 billion of US-controlled Venezuelan funds in the first half of the year alone. Additionally, Venezuelan government advisor Luigi Pisella stated that the Trump administration deducted around $4.7 billion from the revenues to cover the costs of its January 3 military operation.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia, USA.

Caracas, November 10, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan National Assembly approved on Tuesday a reform of the Organic Law of the Electrical System and Service to open the electrical grid to the private sector amid a crisis of rising demand and recurring blackouts.

The new legislation stipulates that power generation, transmission, distribution, and commercialization can now “be carried out by the state-owned operating company, as well as by mixed-ownership and private companies holding the corresponding authorization.”

“The reform will allow private entities to provide electricity services,” National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez told reporters after the legislative session. “It will make self-generation possible, allowing private companies to generate and supply electricity to businesses, industries, shopping centers, etc. This will help increase supply.”

The Venezuelan parliament had preliminarily approved the reform in June. A commission incorporated adjustments to the text, which deputies reviewed across several parliamentary debates before Tuesday’s final vote. The final text, seen by Venezuelanalysis, will be published in the National Gazette in the coming days.

The updated law puts an end to the state monopoly over electricity established by former President Hugo Chávez. A 2007 law identified the sector as “strategic for the nation” and merged several companies into the National Electric Corporation (CORPOELEC). 

Under the new rules, private companies can set up new power plants, build transmission infrastructure and charge a fixed toll, or receive distribution and commercialization rights in specific areas.

In addition, they can also receive concessions of state assets for a maximum of 25 years, with the responsibility of returning them to CORPOELEC or another designated state entity at the end of the period. The state will retain exclusive control over all hydroelectric generation in the Caroní basin as well as transmission and distribution responsibilities in “strategic” areas.

The law also provides that disputes or disagreements of any kind that cannot be settled amicably by the parties may be brought before Venezuelan courts or resolved “through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.” US licenses allowing Western corporations to deal with Venezuela have demanded that disputes be settled in the US, the UK, France, or Singapore.

Regarding oil companies, the law stipulates that they must “ensure a reliable and stable supply of electricity for the execution of primary activities” through self-generation, cogeneration, or third-party contracts designed to secure operational autonomy. Oil and independent power generation firms will also not require state authorization to generate electricity for their internal networks, unless they connect to the national grid.

Rodríguez stressed that the changes do not to amount to privatizing electricity services but rather constitute an “expansion.”

“An appropriate sanctions framework has been established, along with guarantees for private entities to participate. This is not privatization, but an expansion that allows private companies to provide services, particularly to large consumers,” he stated.

The head of the legislature added that electricity consumption tariffs will be computed in foreign currency and converted using the official exchange rate set by the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV). He also disclosed a policy of subsidies intended to shield vulnerable sectors.

“This will primarily benefit people who, because of their income level, cannot afford the full tariff, unlike industries or major retailers,” he concluded.

The legislation also establishes a National Electric System Superintendency, empowered to establish tariffs, initiate administrative investigations, and impose penalties on those who violate the law. Operators may face fines of up to 2 percent of their gross revenue for failing to comply with regulations governing electrical installations, disregarding instructions issued by competent authorities, refusing to provide requested information, or obstructing inspections.

Consumers, meanwhile, may be fined between US $50 and $10,000 for unauthorized use of electricity, with similar penalties for unauthorized consumption, and ten times larger ones for connecting equipment that causes disturbances. The same range of fines applies to tampering with, damaging, or modifying meters and supplying electricity to third parties without authorization, among other violations.

The new law also allows the Venezuelan government to grant tax breaks to private corporations at its discretion to “promote the expansion, efficiency, or environmental sustainability” of the electric system.

The electricity reform, which follows major legislative pro-business overhauls to the mining and energy sectors, comes amid a persistent electricity crisis that sees most of the country face daily blackouts, sometimes lasting up to 12 hours.

Residents have staged recurring protests. On Monday, a crowd blocked the Argimiro Gabaldón highway connecting Barcelona and Puerto La Cruz in Anzoátegui State for several hours.

The Venezuelan Observatory of Social Conflict (OVCS) registered 531 protests related to electricity services nationwide in September. For her part, Acting President Delcy Rodríguez has criticized the demonstrations, affirming that “burning tires does not add a single megawatt to the electric grid.”

Venezuela currently produces only around 12,000 MW, roughly 40 percent of its installed capacity, and faces a generation deficit of over 4,000 MW. Venezuelan authorities have pledged to add 1,300 MW to the grid before the end of the year and have negotiated agreements with GE Vernova, Siemens, and IMPSA to bring paralyzed power plants back online.

Targeting short-term improvements, CORPOELEC recently signed an agreement with Turkish company Karpowership to lease two power-generating vessels that would add 200 MW to the grid in western Zulia State, one of the states hardest hit by electricity shortages. 

However, Venezuelan officials have not provided additional details on the contract, including its cost, duration, and fuel supply.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Traveling through the Hilario Luna y Luna and Guarico parishes of the Morán municipality in Lara State means connecting with a land full of history, struggle, and resistance. It is also home to thousands of hard-working small-scale coffee-producing families who share a culture of collective work to improve their living conditions. Common problems often call for joint solutions, such as coming together to repair roads, or pooling coffee contributions to rent heavy machinery.

This time of year, everything revolves around the harvest, which holds the key to surviving for another year. For many campesinos, whatever they can get for their quintals [around 46 kilos] of coffee can be their only source of income. It is the basis for planning the daily reproduction needs, including food, clothes, healthcare, and tending to the land, which requires maintenance, fertilizer, fuel, and other inputs for the next sowing cycle.

As such, prices, yields, bean quality, as well as any unforeseen setbacks, will shape campesino lives until the next cycle. Underwhelming revenues can leave producers at the mercy of loans that often entail “paying double.” In other words, for every quintal loaned, or its money equivalent, the campesino must pay back two in the next harvest. This further shrinks the margin of error, in a context where inputs, fertilizers, machinery, etc., in the countryside are fully subjected to the market dictates and the interests of agribusiness corporations.

Therefore, the yearly setting of the quintal price is a matter of life or death for thousands of small and midsize coffee producers, with plots ranging from a few hundred square meters up to 8 hectares.

The prices on paper

On September 12, an agreement on coffee harvest prices by quality was reached at the Land Institute (INTI) headquarters in Caracas. It followed a review of cost structures and several preliminary meetings. The accord was signed by representatives of Venezuelan coffee producers and private processing and roasting companies. The talks were mediated by the Agriculture Ministry and the state-run Venezuelan Coffee Corporation.

As I toured the villages in the aforementioned parishes, there was one common complaint: “the established prices are not being upheld,” in reference to both the coffee-roasting plants and the traditional intermediaries. This has been a recurring issue in recent years.

From October 12 to October 24, prices varied between $205 and $245 per quintal, significantly below the agreed-upon figures. And though there was a slight upward trend, time runs against producers, especially the smaller ones. They must sell in order to settle pending debts or meet other financial commitments from the harvest work. At the same time, according to local sources, buyers are paying $280 or $285 for shipments of 50 quintals or more, volumes that only large-scale producers can meet.

Rural organizations have denounced the low prices in multiple protests in Portuguesa State, another region with a coffee-producing track record and with a concentration of agroindustrial corporations. However, there has been no response from the Venezuelan government. Since mid-October, dozens of producers have demonstrated outside the headquarters of the Botalón and Amanecer corporations, two of the biggest Venezuelan agribusiness corporations. Campesinos hold them directly responsible for disregarding the established prices.

On October 23, Agriculture Minister Vladimir Padrino López visited Guarico, and some expected that he would comment on the price issue. But the only visible outcome of his visit was social media content. There were no meetings with coffee growers, at least no small-scale ones (the videos were recorded in corporate properties), and there were no talks with local authorities.

Thus far, there has been no sign of the set prices being respected. An important factor may be the fact that they were not published in the Official Gazette as usual, which would grant more legal weight to the complaints. In contrast, what was spread on social media and reported on by some private media outlets was just the first of three pages in the document. Unfortunately, neither the Agriculture Ministry nor the Venezuelan Coffee Corporation has issued any press statement on the matter.

Bad harvest

Another recurring theme in conversations with local campesinos was the low yield of this year’s harvest. It is commonly said that good and bad years alternate, that picking the fruits of the good years “hurts the plants,” meaning the next cycle will be used to recover and yield less.

But on this occasion there was a different explanation. Throughout the year, the area has been hit by heavy rain, and coffea plants did not “enjoy summer” in February and March. As a result, flowers did not fully bloom, leading to fewer fruits. Some producers noted that in many cases only half the bean was properly developed.

This phenomenon is more prevalent in varieties that are not robusta, the one that fetches lower prices in the recent agreement. The canephora plants have produced a good harvest. Canephora is a robusta variety, native to central and western sub-Saharan Africa, that has quickly spread throughout this entire region in recent years. In certain ways it resembles the creole coffee that has practically vanished from fields.

It is a plant that carries a big load, with heavy beans. It takes 12 or 13 20-liter cans to reach a quintal, as opposed to as many as 18 for other varieties. It requires little maintenance, though its size makes harvesting more cumbersome. Local families are tempted to ditch all other coffee plants and focus exclusively on canephora, despite the lower price per quintal. But some warn that it would be a mistake. Planting a single variety increases the risk of losing everything to disease.

Between survival and exports

Most debates surrounding coffee identify the need to improve quality, which seems to be a broad consensus. But for small-scale producers, who contribute the bulk of the harvest, doing so requires a comprehensive public policy grounded in their specific circumstances and needs.

One of them, circling back to the original issue, is ensuring that the established prices are adhered to. Failing that, it is impossible for campesinos to sustain their activity and plan long term. If intermediaries and coffee-buying firms simply purchase “in bulk,” with little concern for quality, they reduce the incentive to improve it. If companies are going to mix grade A and grade C washed coffee beans, or mix with robusta, while paying the same low price, then why bother with a better plant?

Nowadays, many producers are drying their coffee with the shell, without depulping, though it reduces the bean quality, to then hull and sell. Very few dry their harvests in the sun, not only because of recent rainfall, but also to make the process faster. They resort to diesel-powered dryers, which generate a heat-producing flame that then needs to be spread with a wheel and an engine. The process also requires electricity, bringing another recurring complaint: blackouts and surges slow down drying. Beans require 24 to 36 hours, depending on the machine, the amount of coffee, and whether it has been depulped.

The local producers I talked to acknowledged that the government’s diesel distribution has been effective. There is a schedule, with a price of $50 per 200-liter drum, far cheaper than the $120 it costs in gas stations, though there are complaints about diesel being diverted to a black market. But all in all, it is considered a positive policy, though tighter oversight is needed to address vulnerabilities.

The policy is also appreciated because it is adapted to a technology that has become widespread in recent years, but runs counter to quality-improving recommendations. The Venezuelan Coffee Corporation is pushing African raised beds, for instance, for sun drying. This method was visible in Padrino’s social media videos.

This is one of the main avenues to improve coffee quality, but mostly geared toward large-scale producers. These are the ones with an entire chain connecting research centers, processing industries, and public institutions, with the main focus on export. The Venezuelan government has identified coffee as an export staple as it searches for new sources of foreign income. Nevertheless, though the export priority has permeated communal initiatives, this policy is mostly geared toward agribusiness corporations, built on their logic of accumulation and profiting from the effort of small and midsize producers.

This does not mean that small-scale campesinos cannot improve bean quality and export their harvests. There are already positive precedents in that regard. However, there is no comprehensive policy to support their efforts and expand grassroots initiatives.

In contrast, land hoarding is on the rise, with ever more huge plantations. These are presented as necessary to improve productivity and quality, so as to yield foreign currency from exports and contribute to “prosperity.” This trend marks a significant shift in the coffee-producing environment and can put small producers, their production techniques, their livelihoods, and shrinking land at risk. Even more so if the established harvest prices are not upheld.

Gerardo Rojas is a Venezuelan activist and photographer based in Barquisimeto, Lara State. He belongs to communications collective Voces Urgentes and was a founding member of the Ataroa Commune in Barquisimeto. He also served as communal economy vice-minister. Rojas has written extensively about popular power in Venezuela, including the book Chávez y la Democracia Socialista (CEDES, 2025).

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

Caracas, November 2, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan armed forces reportedly attacked a camp belonging to Colombia’s National Liberation Army (ELN) in the Pedro Camejo municipality, Apure State, on Friday.

The military operation relied on US intelligence support, according to Stratfor-owned geopolitical and intelligence platform RANE Worldview.

Local NGO Fundaredes stated the operation involved drones and combat helicopters and left 19 people killed, 10 of whom were identified by the forensic police in the state capital, San Fernando.

Fundaredes’ Apure director Javier García alleged that the ELN uses the area as a drug storage and logistics point. Right-wing news portal Infobae claimed that the attack also targeted camouflaged drug-transporting aircraft belonging to the ELN.

On Sunday, Fundaredes reported “armed clashes” which included drones in the Cedeño municipality of Bolívar State, close to the operations of state-owned bauxite mining and processing company BAUXILUM. According to Fundaredes, local miners were forced to leave the area and operations were temporarily suspended. However, the NGO did not identify who conducted the attacks.

The Venezuelan government and armed forces have not issued statements on the reported altercations in Apure and Bolívar. The Communications Ministry did not reply to a request for comment.

Venezuelan Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello said at a press conference on Monday that the country’s army and security forces had been deployed along the 2,200-kilometer border with Colombia to “prevent” any fallout from increased “conflict” in Colombia.

“We do not want any conflicts that are not ours,” Cabello said. He did not address the reports of an operation against the ELN.

The interior minister additionally rejected any foreign interference in Venezuelan affairs. However, open-access flight radar confirmed the presence of US military assets in Venezuelan territory in recent days, including reconnaissance planes spotted flying over border areas.

Since the January 3 US attack and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, senior US military brass have visited the Caribbean country, including Southern Command Commander General Francis Donovan and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan Caine.

In June, US forces conducted an airstrike in Bolívar State that they claimed to have extrajudicially executed Héctor “Niño” Guerrero, an alleged leader of the Tren de Aragua gang. Washington thanked Caracas for “cooperation,” while the Venezuelan government issued a statement informing of a “joint operation.”

The Trump administration has not commented on the reported strikes against the Colombian armed group. During a September visit to Colombia, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio referred to the presence of the ELN and dissident factions of the demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) as an issue that “needs to be addressed” by Venezuelan authorities.

Since taking office in August, far-right Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella has launched a “total offensive” against the ELN, with multiple airstrikes, security raids, and the militarization of Cúcuta, a major town on the border with Venezuela. It has also joined the Washington-led and funded “Shield of the Americas,” a regional alliance with an express goal of cracking down on transnational crime and migration. 

For its part, the rebel group has vowed to resist and condemned US intervention in the region.

The ELN is the longest active guerrilla group in Colombia, having sustained a decades-long insurgency against the Colombian state. The organization maintained an arms-length relationship with the Bolivarian government under Chávez and Maduro, operating across the vast southwestern border uncontrolled by both nations and at times cooperating with Venezuelan authorities against Colombian paramilitaries and dissident FARC elements. 

The Nicolás Maduro government supported former Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s efforts to negotiate a peace agreement with the ELN, with multiple negotiating rounds held in Caracas. However, hostilities from both sides persisted and the talks broke down.

Venezuelan authorities have repeatedly denied the sustained presence of Colombian armed groups on their side of the border. In 2021, the Venezuelan army launched an operation against dissident FARC elements in Apure State, with weeks of clashes causing dozens of casualties and thousands of displaced civilians. The ELN was widely rumored to have assisted in the operation.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia, USA.

Caracas, October 29, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez has instructed the Foreign Ministry and the Attorney General’s Office to advance diplomatic and legal efforts to recover 31 tonnes of Venezuelan gold held by the Bank of England’s vaults for more than six years.

The freeze on the reserves, currently valued at around US $4 billion, dates back to the United Kingdom’s refusal to recognize Nicolás Maduro’s 2018 reelection. A year later, opposition leader Juan Guaidó formally asked British authorities to prevent the Venezuelan government from accessing the gold.

During a cabinet meeting on Wednesday, Rodríguez described the ongoing freeze as a theft. 

“It is a mockery, but one aimed at illegitimately appropriating Venezuela’s gold reserves. We want no more excuses. Even the irrational lawsuit pursued by opposition factions was withdrawn by the very same people who brought it,” she said.

Rodríguez added that she “will not give up” on the claim and recalled that “there is an agreement among Venezuela’s political sectors” to secure the gold’s return. 

The Venezuelan government and an opposition sector representing the defunct 2015 National Assembly have been engaged in a US-backed dialogue process. On October 21, the delegations agreed to establish a joint commission to engage with London and seek the return of the reserves. The parties announced that the funds would be destined for post-earthquake reconstruction efforts, though Rodríguez has also pledged to use it to bolster public services and the electricity grid.

The acting leader had previously written to King Charles III requesting the release of the gold. In September, London and Caracas likewise began a diplomatic rapprochement and announced plans to appoint ambassadors to their respective missions.

According to reports, the Venezuelan gold is set to be transferred to the US Federal Reserve in New York, where its sale or use as collateral for loans would be contingent on the Trump administration’s approval and subjected to foreign audits.

Wednesday’s cabinet meeting additionally saw Rodríguez announce the arrival of 41 heavy machinery units to southeast Bolívar State to strengthen the Venezuelan Mining Corporation’s (CVM) operations at the Chocó plant.

The acting president said the delivery was part of a comprehensive state plan to acquire 544 pieces of equipment, including surface and underground machinery, drilling equipment, and mobile units. 

“More than 60 percent of this purchase will have arrived before the end of the year. What does that tell us? More gold production in 2027,” she affirmed. The Venezuelan executive has pushed a pro-business overhaul of mining legislation in recent months in a bid to court foreign investment. In September, New York-based Heeney Capital and commodities trader Mercuria Energy received a 30-year concession of the Chocó 10 mine in Bolívar State.

Rodríguez also promised short-term relief from electricity outages, often lasting up to 12 hours a day in certain parts of the country. However, she criticized the recurrent protests against blackouts

“I have not seen a single megawatt added to the national electricity system, which has been battered by the blockade, as a result of burning a tire (…) Soon, you will see relief in a country that has been hit so hard by the sanctions demanded by radical sectors,” she said.

Venezuelan authorities have pledged to restore 1,300 MW of generation capacity before the end of the year to mitigate a current deficit of around 4,500 MW. The Venezuelan National Assembly is close to approving a reform that will open electrical generation, transmission, distribution, and commercialization to the private sector.

Caracas has also turned to multinational corporations in a bid to recover the electrical grid.

However, GE Vernova CEO Scott Strazik stated that the company had already selected its contractors and completed the planning work but had not begun repairs because it has yet to be paid. “This is not an environment in which we are going to act without receiving payment upfront,” he said.

Meanwhile, popular organizations and trade unions staged demonstrations in Caracas and other cities on Tuesday. Through the newly formed “Blackout Victims Committee,” activists criticized the government for prioritizing the oil industry to satisfy US interests at the expense of rationing electricity throughout the country.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Caracas, October 27, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Trump administration has announced plans to back electoral reforms in Venezuela and push for presidential elections.

In a press briefing with international journalists on Monday, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called Venezuela’s electoral infrastructure “designed to rig elections” and argued it must be replaced quickly to ensure a valid vote.

Rubio, who has been the Trump administration’s chief architect of US policy toward Venezuela, said talks between Acting President Delcy Rodríguez’s government and opposition sectors led by Dinorah Figuera were moving toward the appointment of a new Supreme Court (TSJ) before the end of the year, followed shortly afterward by the renewal of the National Electoral Council (CNE).

“Obviously, we need to use our influence with the interim [Venezuelan] authorities, to ensure that the process moves forward responsibly (…) Our goal is to have an election,” Rubio said. He welcomed what he described as “serious progress in that direction” and warned that “if anyone tries to derail the process, they will seriously harm Venezuela.”

In a separate press briefing, a senior State Department official added that, once both institutions have been reconstituted, the Venezuelan presidency will be declared permanently vacant, triggering a six-month constitutional deadline for presidential elections to be held “under competitive conditions.”

The anonymous official stressed that the process would also require political guarantees and regulations on access to the press. The official also defended the inclusion of pro-government sectors in a “transition,” arguing that peaceful democratic processes often require cooperation from outgoing factions, citing Spain and Portugal as precedents.

Asked about a specific election date, Rubio said the Rodríguez administration had complied with US timetables so far. 

“Are we going to wait two years [for an election]? That’s not going to happen. At best, I have two years and two months left in this position,” he added.

His remarks coincide with statements by Dinorah Figuera, who heads the opposition delegation in talks with government representatives and forecast presidential elections to take place in late 2027 or early 2028.

Meanwhile, the third round of political dialogue in Venezuela agreed to review four laws governing political participation, pluralism, and the autonomy of political organizations, including the Law on Political Parties, Public Meetings, and Demonstrations. The discussions also addressed disqualifications from holding public office and the review of legal frameworks related to political rights.

In parallel, Venezuela’s National Assembly formally launched the process to renew the 32 justices of the Supreme Court (TSJ). Applications from legal professionals seeking to join the court will be accepted from Wednesday, October 28, through Wednesday, November 11. The fourth round of dialogue is scheduled for November 11–15.

Rodríguez and other Venezuelan high-ranking officials have not commented on the State Department announcements.

The White House’s claims relating to Venezuelan reforms and elections coincided with the return of opposition leader María Corina Machado to the country on Sunday. The far-right politician had spent more than a year abroad and her supporters have called for her inclusion in the ongoing negotiations.

Asked about Machado’s return, Rubio said he had told the Rodríguez government “weeks ago” that Machado should be able to come back without obstacles. The secretary of state denied that Washington had obstructed Machado’s return, stating only that she was advised against traveling immediately after the June 24 double earthquake.

Rodríguez, for her part, said the opposition politician could have avoided the “show” of appearing at a church in Lara state before traveling 400 kilometers to Caracas at the head of a motorcade, amid chants of “freedom” and calls for immediate presidential elections.

“The airports are there. Let’s move away from the show (…) Many people who have benefited from the amnesty law and this process, which seeks peaceful coexistence, have been able to enter through the airport’s new transitional structures,” Rodríguez said.

The acting president declined to clarify which route Machado had taken to reenter Venezuela. Machado left the country in December 2024 for Oslo, where she received the Nobel Peace Prize before gifting it to Trump. She and her party maintain that the government prevented her from returning on seven previous occasions, a claim the authorities deny.

Asked whether the justice system would take action against Machado, Rodríguez replied that she hoped there would be “repentance and a change of course” from the opposition figure and that the opposition leader would be able to “contribute something to the country.” In recent years, Machado endorsed economic sanctions and a foreign military attack against Venezuela.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

US president seeks to underscore Latin American military operation, as Iran war causes midterm affordability threat.

United States President Donald Trump has featured a ship he said is carrying Venezuelan oil during a visit to Texas, where he will hold two rallies one after the other in the hopes of boosting Republican chances in a make-or-break Senate race.

Speaking at Corpus Christi on Tuesday on his fourth trip to the state this campaign season, Trump pointed to a ship in the distance.

“It’s got 1 million barrels of oil on it from Venezuela,” he said, adding the cargo was “thanks to our big victory in our recent war with Venezuela”.

The emphasis on the oil comes as US consumers have wrestled with high fossil fuel prices amid the US-Israel war with Iran, a key issue in the upcoming midterm elections.

“We’re celebrating the greatest oil victory in history,” Trump said.

It was not immediately clear under what pretext the oil had been shipped or whether the details Trump gave were correct. The US had received crude oil shipments from Venezuela before the US abduction of Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro on January 3, but those transfers have increased this year.

In August, the Trump administration announced a deal giving the Pentagon a 35 percent stake in North America Blue Energy Partners, a new company overseeing 65 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. The White House said in September that the first shipment from the deal would likely hit US reserves in November, although experts have cast doubt on whether the deal will have any short-term impact.

Speaking to reporters earlier in the day, Trump referred to the shipment as a “gift” from Venezuela. The country’s interim leader, Delcy Rodriguez, has not commented on the specific shipment.

At the rally, Trump also floated making Venezuela the “51st state”.

Key race

Trump’s frequent visits to Texas underscore the state’s significance for Republicans.

Trump endorsed Attorney General Ken Paxton in the Republican primary over incumbent Senator John Cornyn. The scandal-ridden Paxton now faces a punishing contest against Democrat James Talarico, a Presbyterian seminarian.

Polls have regularly shown Talarico leading Paxton, although that lead has largely remained within the margin of error. A RealClearPolitics average of polls had Talarico leading Paxton by 1.7 points.

Talarico’s victory would mark a sea change in a state that has not elected a Democrat to statewide office since 1994.

It would also represent a major rebuke to Trump, whose Republican Party is fighting to maintain its narrow control of the Senate. Democrats are widely projected to take control of the US House of Representatives in the November 3 vote.

Talarico has used the final stretch of the race to focus on years of corruption allegations against Paxton, while drawing a contrast to voters’ affordability concerns.

“Ken Paxton represents everything that’s wrong with this broken, corrupt system,” he said during an event in Houston last week.

Paxton has sought to portray Talarico as too “radical” for Texas, saying his policies would hurt a state known for its pro-business policies.

Trump and other administration officials, notably Vice President JD Vance, have regularly focused on cultural issues, distorting Talarico’s past comments on transgender rights and border security.

Speaking in Corpus Christi, Trump repeated those attacks and urged his supporters to vote as if he were on the ballot.

“If you go out, and if you all vote, we win in a landslide,” Trump said.

Caracas, October 24, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez announced a series of measures aimed at expanding tax collection.

In a televised broadcast on Wednesday, Rodríguez announced the immediate suspension of the mandatory use of fiscal printers. Introduced in 2018, the devices recorded every transaction and reported it in real time to the country’s National Integrated Customs and Tax Administration Service (SENIAT).

The costly equipment posed a significant barrier for entrepreneurs and small business owners, particularly in the country’s interior, where authorized suppliers are scarce.

Superintendent Román Maniglia said the decision is part of SENIAT’s technological modernization that will pave the way for the gradual introduction of digital invoicing, which will soon be available free of charge to all economic sectors. 

“We seek to lower the barriers to formalization across all sectors, particularly for the smallest businesses, entrepreneurs, and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs),” he stressed.

Rodríguez also announced a review of the registry of Special Taxpayers, known as “special contributors,” with the list reduced from 132,000 to around 44,000. These are individuals or legal entities that, because of their high income or assets, are subject to additional tax obligations.

According to the acting president, the review will add those who should have been included in this category and remove those who were classified as special taxpayers without meeting the relevant criteria.

Rodríguez said the changes are intended to improve tax services and expand revenue collection. She added that fiscal revenues rose by 27% in October, although she did not specify the basis for comparison or provide a breakdown of the amount collected. 

“We have been discussing the very low number of people who pay taxes in the country. This is a matter of fairness,” she added.

The latest announcements follow prior measures to facilitate tax collection. Earlier in October, SENIAT and banking superintendency SUDEBAN formalized an agreement to exchange information in real time in order to “strengthen revenue collection” and “facilitate the identification of potential tax discrepancies.”

The tax authority is now also interconnected with the Autonomous Service of Registries and Notaries (SAREN), the Administrative Service for Identification, Migration, and Immigration (SAIME), and the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV).

“We have a very important system for cross-referencing information which, together with a new statistical information system, will allow us to start collecting what is owed,” Rodríguez said in this week’s broadcast. She added that the fiscal revenues will be directed to the Venezuela Renace Foundation, which is responsible for repairing and rebuilding homes damaged by the twin earthquakes of June 24.

The acting government has likewise announced a tax reform to be unveiled before the end of 2026. Its stated goal is to “harmonize the tax burden” so that it supports economic growth and private-sector production. 

In parallel, the Rodríguez administration is also pushing labor reform plans alongside private sector lobbies FEDECAMARAS and FEDEINDUSTRIA. The business representatives are proposing a “Law on Labor and Social Consensus,” also referred to as the Labor Emergency Law, that will reportedly reduce labor costs for employers. 

The proposal is being discussed with select trade unions, including the government-aligned Bolivarian Socialist Workers’ Central of Venezuela (CBST).

According to reports, the draft legislation seeks “transitional and alternative solutions” to the crisis in workers’ incomes and the stagnation of the minimum wage, which has remained frozen since 2022 while authorities prioritized non-wage bonuses. The proposal would not formally overhaul the entire Organic Labor Law, Workers and Employees (LOTTT), enacted under President Hugo Chávez in 2012, but labor activists warn that it would effectively sideline some of its provisions.

The landmark 2012 legislation reinstated the retroactive calculation of social benefits and severance based on a worker’s last salary, a provision that business groups want to eliminate, while trade unions consider it a red line. Workers’ organizations have staged multiple protests in recent months, demanding that the Rodríguez administration convert non-wage bonuses into salaries and reinstate collective bargaining rights.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Since the January 3, 2026, military strikes and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration has imposed semi-colonial rule over Venezuela, forcing dramatic shifts in the country’s domestic and foreign policies.

The capstone of the new tutelary regime is an oil deal announced in late August that Trump called “the biggest in history.” The agreement turns over 17 prime oilfields, holding over 20% of the country’s reserves, to a Pentagon-controlled corporation tasked with supplying cheap fuel to the US war machine for decades to come.

After spending years manufacturing consent for US-sponsored regime change in Venezuela (e.g., FAIR.org, 6/4/21, 1/11/23, 2/12/25), having a government in Caracas subservient to Washington represented a new scenario for the corporate media. The novel conditions have raised few significant qualms for Western outlets. Tactical objections notwithstanding, there is no fundamental disagreement with the US running the affairs of a Global South country.

Not ‘stealing Venezuela’s oil’

Working hand in glove with the Trump administration, the acting Delcy Rodríguez government has overhauled Venezuela’s hydrocarbon legislation (Venezuelanalysis, 7/13/26) to offer what oil experts consider a business environment more favorable to foreign capital than at any point in the country’s history. The new oil agreement with the White House manages to go even further.

The 17 oilfields in question will be taken over by North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP), a private company in which the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) will get a 35% stake while investing nothing—and wielding veto power over its board.

Furthermore, according to the White House, the US State Department will secure 20% of NABEP’s output at cost, and have a right of first refusal over the remaining 80%. On top of this, Venezuelan officials have already suggested Washington would be given an additional “sales discount”  (Venezuelanalysis, 9/9/26).

In summary, Trump is looking to secure cheap crude supplies at a time when his disastrous Iran debacle has thrown global energy markets into upheaval. The agreement is so blatantly skewed that US Energy Secretary Chris Wright felt he needed to clarify that Washington was not “stealing Venezuela’s oil” (AFP, 9/3/26).

Nevertheless, Western media outlets were largely unfazed by such an obvious oil grab, euphemistically referring to the deal as “highly unusual” (New York Times, 8/29/26) or “remarkable” (BBC, 9/1/26), at most as “contentious” (Guardian, 9/1/26).

Corporate journalists did raise objections over the central role played by NABEP owner Alejandro Betancourt, a shady Venezuelan businessman who faced multiple money-laundering probes before the Trump administration intervened, and pressured judicial authorities at home and abroad to drop the investigations (BBC, 9/2/26; CNN, 9/4/26; New York Times, 9/4/26).

But media seemed satisfied with Trump’s state and energy secretaries Marco Rubio and Chris Wright pledging that US oversight will keep proceedings honest (Reuters, 9/2/26; New York Times, 9/4/26), despite the fact that billions in Venezuelan oil revenues, controlled by the US Treasury Department since January, are unaccounted for (Council on Foreign Relations, 6/3/26; Financial Times, 7/22/26).

Procedurally transparent plunder

Objections to the Venezuela/NABEP/Pentagon venture were mostly procedural and out of concern for appearances, not driven by any principled opposition to US imperialist predation. Faced with outright colonial plunder of Venezuela, the political and media establishment only demands “accountability” and “transparency” (New York Times, 5/5/26; Financial Times, 9/18/26).

For months, the White House has controlled Venezuelan oil export revenues, with Trump officials openly calling them “one of the largest assets ever to go on the US balance sheet,” and a source of “leverage” over Caracas. Yet Trump’s Democratic opponents have found no issue with seizing another country’s income, raising only questions about the allocation of the funds in reference to alleged corruption on the part of Caracas and Trump insiders (The Hill, 9/30/26; Washington Post, 9/17/26). This despite the fact that the Venezuelan government has to submit a “monthly budget” to access its own funds (New York Times, 1/28/26) and is subjected to US-imposed auditors (Reuters, 4/27/26).

The other source of disappointment with Trump stomping all over Venezuelan sovereignty, but prioritizing oil over regime change, is impatience for the restoration/recovery/return of “democracy” to Venezuela (Politico, 9/2/26; Guardian, 8/30/26; CBC, 9/3/26). Despite  widely acknowledgement that Trump is eroding democracy at home (New York Times, 8/20/26, 10/14/26; Guardian, 10/8/26), somehow pundits expected him to prioritize it in an oil-rich foreign country.

In the establishment’s consensus, “democracy” does not mean a political system that meaningfully reflects the Venezuelan people’s collective will, but simply one that empowers opposition figures that have been groomed for years, like far-right María Corina Machado, their undemocratic credentials notwithstanding (FAIR.org, 10/23/25).

Eager to stay in power, Rodríguez has over-complied with every US demand, going as far as adopting language about Venezuela undergoing a “democratic transformation.” Her pliancy has earned her favorable corporate media profiles that completely contrast with the demonization of Maduro.

After securing an exclusive interview, Time (7/30/26) described the acting leader as a “disciplined operator” who “advocate[s] for greater economic openness,” in contrast to the “authoritarian” Maduro, who oversaw “economic collapse.” Along the same lines, the Guardian (9/12/26) presented Rodríguez as a “a pragmatic, witty and intelligent workaholic,” unlike her “authoritarian” and “incompetent” predecessor in the presidential palace.

Nevertheless, given the broad Beltway consensus for comprehensive regime change, it is unlikely that the Rodríguez administration’s subservience to Trump will secure any leeway in determining its political path forward, free from outside meddling—especially if, as is anticipated, the GOP lawmakers most likely to be impressed by such obsequiousness lose power in the US’s upcoming midterm elections (Axios, 9/23/26; Financial Times, 10/9/26).

Please think of the corporations!

Alongside their exceptionalist expectations about “democracy,” legacy outlets also focus on those they consider the true victims of Trump’s neocolonial offensive in Venezuela: multinational oil corporations.

According to Reuters (9/1/26), the recent oil deal “raises red flags for major producers,” who fear having their reputation sullied by being “seated at the same table with Betancourt,” as well as the prospect of the US government becoming a “competitor.”

Bloomberg (8/30/26) raised concerns that the agreement “reprises [the] neocolonial past” of Venezuela’s oil industry. The warning stems not from apprehension that the Venezuelan people’s future is being determined by a foreign nation, but from fear that the US’s “out-sized power” might lead to “popular unrest.” This could create conditions for what the business mouthpiece views as a catastrophic outcome: the nationalization of foreign-owned oil assets.

“The troubled history of Venezuela’s oil offers a cautionary tale,” Bloomberg’s Kevin Crowley and Patricia Garip wrote:

The country was once dominated by US and European operators and was among the world’s largest producers. But assets owned by ExxonMobil Holdings Corps. and ConocoPhillips were seized and nationalized during political upheaval in the 2000s.

Corporate media present companies that made massive profits in Venezuela for decades as victims, because the Chávez government wanted them to comply with new laws and accept minority stakes in joint ventures.

The New York Times (9/1/26) complains that the two corporations “have spent years trying to get the country to repay them for their seized assets, with little success.” The statement conceals the fact that the Venezuelan government, when it enacted the 2007 decree imposing state majority in all Orinoco Oil Belt projects, offered to compensate ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips for their transition to minority partners, or to buy out their assets altogether. However, both corporations rejected the offers in order to pursue international arbitration. The former has already recouped most of what it was granted, while the latter will eventually collect on a significant award.

Despite the fact that Chevron, BP, Shell and other energy giants have signed deals in recent months taking advantage of the reformed hydrocarbon law (Venezuelanalysis, 9/3/26), pundits complain that ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips remain “hesitant” (CBS, 8/31/26) and need to be “lured” (Reuters, 9/1/26). Still, the Western corporations are likely to return to the country with favorable deals (Reuters, 9/16/26).

The victor and his spoils

Faced with strategic defeat in West Asia, Trump has clung to his Venezuela success, stating on multiple occasions that “to the victor belong the spoils,” in reference to the US hijacking the Venezuelan oil industry following the January 3 attacks and presidential kidnapping (Al Jazeera, 9/24/26; Guardian, 9/26/26).

Furthermore, Trump has not been shy in boasting about the US winning a “war” against Venezuela (Financial Times, 9/18/26; New York Times, 6/26/26). Corporate journalists have rarely pointed out that this stance directly contradicts the administration’s official position that the kidnapping of Maduro and Flores was a “law enforcement” operation (New York Times, 1/6/26; PBS, 1/8/26) in order to justify bypassing congressional approval.

The US president has likewise claimed to have recovered the costs of the military operation “many times over” (Al Jazeera, 3/3/26; Guardian, 6/28/26), a fact confirmed by Luigi Pisella, a business sector spokesperson with close ties to the acting Rodríguez administration (Venezuelanalysis, 8/10/26). Pisella stated that the US has retained $4.7 billion from the Venezuelan export revenues it controls to cover the costs of its military operation.

In spite of their ostensible hostility to Trump, corporate outlets have historically been complicit with his Venezuela policies, from whitewashing a deadly sanctions program (FAIR.org, 6/13/22) to endorsing a military buildup over debunked “narcoterrorism” accusations (FAIR.org, 11/19/25). The New York Times and Washington Post went as far as to withhold information in order to not jeopardize the January 3 operation (FAIR.org, 1/13/26).

Now, with a semi-colonial regime in place, the only concerns are about procedural transparency, democratic appearances and the well-being of multinational corporations. The Venezuelan people always get the short end of the stick.

Source: FAIR

Caracas, October 19, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Switzerland’s Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) has lifted “precautionary asset freezes” against Marleny Contreras, wife of Venezuelan Interior, Justice, and Peace Minister Diosdado Cabello, and United Socialist Party (PSUV) lawmaker Jorge Arreaza.

The country’s authorities stated that their inclusion on a list of sanctioned Venezuelan officials was “a mistake” after determining that neither holds assets in Swiss territory nor faces corruption accusations.

The asset freeze was imposed on January 5, two days after US forces bombed Caracas and kidnapped Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Bern claimed the measure was intended to prevent potentially illicit assets from leaving Switzerland amid eventual legal investigations.

The legal measure remains in force until 2030 and includes a formal commitment to return to the Venezuelan people any resources proven to have been illicitly acquired. Over 40 current and former Venezuelan officials, as well as direct relatives and alleged associates, remain on the list.

Alongside the removal of Contreras and Arreaza, the Swiss government added six individuals to the register. New additions include former Venezuelan government envoy and Industry Minister Álex Saab and his business associate Álvaro Pulido. 

Pulido appeared before a Miami court on October 13 after being handed over by Venezuelan authorities to face money laundering charges. Saab was likewise surrendered to US agencies and pleaded guilty to money laundering accusations, pledging to “cooperate” with other US legal investigations.

Saab and Pulido were joined in the Swiss blacklist by José Vicente Amparan Croquer, a lawyer whom US authorities have accused of laundering money from an alleged US $1.2 billion embezzlement scheme at Venezuelan state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), and Mario Enrique Bonilla Vallera, a businessman identified as an alleged front man for Nicolás Maduro’s stepsons.

The list also includes the wife and former wife of two former deputy electricity ministers who were already on the blacklisteed: Milagros Coromoto Torres Morán, wife and business partner of Nervis Villalobos, and María Consuelo Pardi Celis, former wife of Javier Alvarado Ochoa.

The Swiss decision came two days after the US Treasury Department removed Jorge Rodríguez, president of Venezuela’s National Assembly, chief negotiator in a US-backed dialogue process with an opposition faction, and brother of Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, from its own sanctions list. Delcy Rodríguez herself was removed from the Treasury’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) list last April.

Jorge Rodríguez was first targeted on September 25, 2018, during Trump’s first term in office. Individual sanctions block any assets the person may have on US soil and bar US individuals and companies from engaging in any transactions. The measures lead to issues of overcompliance.

Spanish daily ABC’s White House correspondent David Alandete argued that the parliamentary leader’s removal from the SDN list was a reward for his “cooperation” in a “new phase of relations between Caracas and the White House.”

The move was announced on the same day that Delcy Rodríguez’s acting government and the opposition delegation led by former lawmaker Dinorah Figuera began a third round of US-endorsed talks in Caracas. The discussions are intended to address the continuation of the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ) renewal process, as well as political rights and guarantees.

Nevertheless, 254 individuals and entities remain on the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions list. The Trump administration also maintains wide-reaching coercive measures against key Venezuelan economic sectors, including oil, mining, and banking.

Since January, Washington has issued sanctions waivers to allow select Western corporations to secure access to Venezuelan oil and mineral resources under favorable conditions. The White House has also greenlit select US companies to export and import products to and from the Caribbean nation. However, revenues from Venezuelan exports are deposited in a US Treasury account, with US officials deciding when and how much to disburse to Caracas.

Last week, the Trump administration issued General License 60A. The license authorizes humanitarian assistance transactions focused on addressing damage caused by Venezuela’s June 24 double earthquake until April 21, 2027.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

The opposition delegation, comprising members of Primero Justicia and Voluntad Popular, sits opposite its regime counterparts during the latest round of talks. Source: Jorge Rodríguez via X. 

In recent days, pressure regarding the timeline for political change has intensified, a sense of urgency that I both understand and share. To the long years of democratic struggle, we must add the dire economic and social conditions that afflict us. The urgency is real, and I share it. 

This is why this sense of urgency is shared. We all want to reach democracy without any further delay. It is in no one’s interest to postpone political change. Whether one is sitting at the negotiating table, viewing it with suspicion, or opposing it entirely, we all want the same thing: to arrive at democracy as soon as possible.

Acknowledging this common ground is essential. To suggest that this shared goal divides us is untrue and undermines future stability; it is a strategic error. Who benefits from fracturing what unites us? Who gains from destroying the common ground we have built over the years?

Therefore, I believe our differences do not lie in our shared destination, but rather in the path that circumstances have allowed us to take toward it. This reflection is precisely what gives this article its title: “It’s a transition, not a revolution.”

The revolution that never was

For years, we worked toward a “clean slate.” Paradoxically, we dreamed of a revolution. We longed for the moment when chavismo would pack up its belongings and relinquish power. Perhaps this shared expectation stemmed from our tradition of seeking radical ruptures. For many reasons, we hoped that Maduro would simply fly away. But that did not happen.

Instead, on July 28, 2024, chavismo stole the election, subjected us to repression, and clung to power. We did everything in our power to defeat them, and it was not enough. We reached the absolute limit of democratic resilience and paid the price for fighting for our country. Then came January 3, 2026. On that day, a foreign military operation took Nicolás Maduro away, but left the Rodríguez faction behind. That is how it happened, and that is how it remains.

The Trump administration did what we either could not or would not do. Time will allow us to process the weight of that reality, and I do not intend to dwell on it here. For now, I will simply point out the obvious: the United States took risks, opened the door to a new political landscape, and became the most influential actor in the power equation. To put it plainly: they paid for the party, and now they are calling the tune.

The time for this “feast of bitter pills” has arrived, and we are discovering that swallowing them is far more difficult than we had imagined.

Perhaps some reader, channeling an inner Che Guevara, might accuse me of treason. Well, my dear rebellious reader, that is not the case. Acknowledging this reality is entirely compatible with a love for our country; it does not make me a sellout. The United States removed Maduro and opened the door to a transition toward democracy. It may not be the transition we dreamed of or planned for, but it is the one that is actually possible. What followed the dictator’s capture was not a revolution, but the beginning of a transition—a process of gradual, progressive change driven by institutional reforms and political consensus.

Unlike revolutions, which seek a radical break from the previous order, transitions do not start from scratch. Instead, they identify elements from the old regime that can survive and transform them to fit within the new democratic order that is being built. It is a matter of profound change without having to destroy everything, of transforming existing institutions to place them at the service of democracy. And that is what we are working on.

A feasible transition

Given this, the practical question is how to reconcile the genuine sense of urgency—which unites us—with the timeframes required for a transition. I do not have a definitive answer to this question. However, I would like to share three tasks that could contribute to the transition.

First, we must learn to swallow bitter pills. 

For years, we were warned that, when the time came, we would face an extensive menu of pills—a metaphor for the unpopular measures, difficult concessions, and uncomfortable decisions that would inevitably come with a process of political change.

We listened, took note, and pressed on. Well, the time for this “feast of pills” has arrived, and we are discovering that swallowing them is far more difficult than we had imagined. Now, it is urgent that we learn how to do so—and, above all, that we create the conditions to ensure that every sacrifice is worth it.

I have no ready-made formulas for this task. Each person will have to find their own way to confront these contradictions, to process the inconveniences and the costs that must be borne. What is clear to me is that we must learn to do so without losing sight of the causes for which we have fought for so many years.

The nature of the political change now beginning to emerge demands a process of collective healing, one that will require both time and maturity.

Second, we must engage in civic education. 

We need to take the time to speak to the nation and explain what is unfolding. We must also be capable of putting ourselves in the shoes of others, understanding that our distrust runs deep, nurtured by decades of deception, broken promises, and accumulated frustrations.

The leadership required at this moment must be democratic and empathetic, one willing to listen, understand, engage in dialogue, and build. More than thirty years of persecution and repression have left deep wounds in our national soul. The nature of the political change now beginning to emerge demands a process of collective healing, one that will require both time and maturity.

This process will not be resolved through staged photographs or superficial gestures. I am speaking of a profound, human, and authentic effort toward recognition, acceptance, and reparation—a task that allows us to rediscover one another as a society, take ownership of our history, and regain the trust necessary to build a shared future.

Third, we must offer certainty to everyone. Venezuelans do not lack patience; what we lack is the certainty needed to navigate the tunnel that lies ahead. We are capable of enduring sacrifices, but we need to know that these efforts will be worth it. If we can see that light at the end of the tunnel, we will have reason to remain patient and perseverant.

The certainties we can offer today must be built step by step—through actions, commitments, and results

Perhaps this is the most difficult challenge of all. Transitions toward democracy are inevitably marked by uncertainty and a lack of transparency. One need only read the memoirs or listen to the testimonies of those who lived through similar experiences to recognize ourselves in their dilemmas, contradictions, fears, and hopes. There is something profoundly human in those stories that feels familiar to us.

That is why political education, the building of consensus, and the gradual restoration of democratic dynamics are so important. They serve as ways to provide guidance amidst uncertainty, rebuild trust, and give meaning to the sacrifices we are called upon to make. The certainties we can offer today must be built step by step—through actions, commitments, and results that allow Venezuelans to recognize that we are moving toward democracy.

From desirable outcomes to real possibilities

One of our greatest challenges is to accept that the revolution we wanted to bring about for so many years was not to be, and that today we are facing a transition currently in the making. Its success will depend, in large part, on our ability to understand the nature of this process, to embrace reality—with all its possibilities and limitations—and to learn how to navigate the path that has opened up before us.

We will need to do so with intelligence, patience, generosity, and a sense of historical responsibility. Above all, we must act in unity, placing Venezuela above our differences. Because, in the end, that is what it is all about: seizing the opportunity we have to build the democracy for which we have fought so hard.