Venezuela

The move is in line with a new law, giving hope to throngs of others jailed over alleged plots to oust the government.

Venezuelan authorities have granted amnesty to 379 political prisoners, according to a lawmaker, after a new law was enacted by interim authorities following the United States’ abduction of President Nicolas Maduro.

Venezuela’s National Assembly unanimously adopted the law on Thursday, providing hope that hundreds of political prisoners may soon be released.

National Assembly deputy Jorge Arreaza, the lawmaker overseeing the amnesty process, said in a televised interview on Friday that the 379 prisoners “must be released, granted amnesty, between tonight and tomorrow morning”.

“Requests have been submitted by the Public Prosecutor’s Office to the competent courts to grant amnesty measures,” he said.

Opposition figures have criticised the new legislation, which appears to include carve-outs for some offences previously used by authorities to target Maduro’s political opponents.

It explicitly does not apply to those prosecuted for “promoting” or “facilitating … armed or forceful actions” against Venezuela’s sovereignty by foreign actors.

Interim President Delcy Rodriguez has levelled such accusations against opposition leader Maria Corina Machado, who hopes to return to Venezuela at some point from the US.

The law also excludes members of the security forces convicted of “terrorism”-related activities.

Arreaza said earlier that “the military justice system will handle” relevant cases for members of the armed forces, “and grant benefits where appropriate”.

Hundreds have already been granted conditional release by President Rodriguez’s government since the deadly US raid that seized Maduro.

‘Amnesty is not automatic’

The NGO Foro Penal had said before the announcement that about 650 were detained, a toll that has not been updated since.

Foro Penal director Alfredo Romero said on Friday that receiving “amnesty is not automatic”, but would require a process in the courts, viewed by many as an arm of Maduro’s repression.

Opposition politician Juan Pablo Guanipa, a Machado ally, announced his release from detention shortly after the bill was passed.

Earlier this month, he had been freed from prison but then quickly re-detained and kept under house arrest.

“I am now completely free,” Guanipa wrote on social media. He called for all other political prisoners to be freed and exiles to be allowed to return.

Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Venezuelans have been jailed in recent years over plots, real or imagined, to overthrow the government of Maduro – who was taken to New York to stand trial on drug trafficking and other charges.

Rodriguez was formerly Maduro’s vice president and took his place as the South American country’s leader with the consent of US President Donald Trump, if she toed Washington’s line.

The US has taken over control of Venezuela’s oil sales, with Trump promising a share for Washington in the profits.

More than 1,5000 political prisoners in Venezuela have applied for amnesty under a new law that came into effect just a few days ago, according to the head of the country’s legislature.

“A total of 1,557 cases are being addressed immediately, and hundreds of people deprived of their freedom are already being released under the amnesty law”, National Assembly chief Jorge Rodriguez told a news conference on Saturday.

Rodriguez’s announcement comes two days after the country’s legislature unanimously adopted a landmark amnesty law.

Amnesty is not automatic under the law: petitioners must ask the court handling their cases.

On Friday, the lawmaker overseeing the amnesty process, Jorge Arreaza, announced that prosecutors had asked courts to free 379 prisoners. They include opposition members, activists, human rights defenders, journalists and many others detained for months or even years.

So far, 80 prisoners have been freed, Rodriguez told the AFP news agency on Saturday. All of those released had been detained in the capital, Caracas, he said, without offering further details.

Further releases could be granted within 15 days, said Arreaza.

Venezuela’s interim president, Delcy Rodriguez, the sister of the top lawmaker, pushed for the United States-backed legislation after she rose to power following the US’s abduction of leftist leader Nicolas Maduro during a military raid on January 3.

The legislation’s approval marked a reversal for Venezuelan authorities, who have for decades denied holding political prisoners and say those jailed have committed crimes.

During its signing, Rodriguez said the law showed that the country’s political leaders were “letting go of a little intolerance and opening new avenues for politics in Venezuela”.

However, opposition figures have criticised the new legislation, which appears to include carve-outs for some offences previously used by authorities to target Maduro’s political opponents.

Human rights organisations are also calling for the law to be applied to all prisoners held for political reasons, even if they are not listed among the beneficiaries.

“It is discriminatory and unconstitutional to exclude imprisoned military personnel and persecuted political figures,” Alfredo Romero, president of rights group Foro Penal, said on X Saturday. Without this, “there can be no talk of national coexistence”.

The law explicitly does not apply to those prosecuted for “promoting” or “facilitating… armed or forceful actions” against Venezuela’s sovereignty by foreign actors.

Delcy Rodriguez has levelled such accusations against opposition leader and Nobel peace laureate Maria Corina Machado, who hopes, at some point, to return to Venezuela from the US.

Opposition politician Juan Pablo Guanipa, a close ally of Machado, had a house arrest order against him lifted, his brother, lawmaker Tomas Guanipa, told the Reuters news agency late on Thursday.

The law also excludes members of the security forces convicted of “terrorism”-related activities.

But the amnesty extends to 11,000 political prisoners who, over nearly three decades, were paroled or placed under house arrest.

“The law provides for those substitute measures to be lifted so that these people can enjoy full freedom”, Rodriguez told reporters.

Outside a national police facility in Caracas known as Zone 7, relatives – some of whom have been on site for weeks – waited patiently.

“Let’s hope it’s true,” Genesis Rojas told AFP.

A group of relatives who have been camped out for days chanted: “We want to go home!”

Hundreds have already been granted conditional release by Rodriguez’s government since the deadly US raid that resulted in Maduro’s capture.

Maduro and his wife are in US custody awaiting trial. He has pleaded not guilty to drug trafficking charges and declared that he was a “prisoner of war.”

Brazil’s President Lula says fate of Venezuelan president should be determined by the ‘people of Venezuela’ and ‘not by foreign interference’.

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has said that Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro should face trial, but that it should take place in a Venezuelan court, rather than in the United States, where he is currently being held after his abduction by the US military.

“I believe that if Maduro has to be trialled, he has to be trialled in his country, not trialled abroad,” Lula said in an interview, emphasising that “what matters now is to re-establish democracy in Venezuela”.

“It has to be solved by the people of Venezuela, and not by foreign interference,” said Lula, citing a history of US-backed dictatorships in Latin America, including Chile, Argentina and Uruguay.

“We cannot accept that a head of state of one country could invade another country and capture the president,” the Brazilian leader added.

Lula’s comments come as Venezuela’s acting president, Delcy Rodriguez, has been working to release hundreds of politicians, activists and lawyers jailed during Maduro’s residency, which began in 2013.

The Brazilian has openly criticised the abduction of ⁠Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, in a military operation ordered by US President Donald Trump on January 3.

Maduro was flown to New York after his abduction in a bloody night raid on Caracas. He has since been accused by US authorities of planning to transport drugs to the US alongside other charges.

The US government’s own data shows that Venezuela is not among the world’s major drug producers; however, Trump administration officials have accused Maduro and others of working with the region’s largest drug trafficking groups, including in Colombia and Mexico.

While the Trump administration has claimed that its military buildup near Venezuela and maritime blockade of the country were focused on combating drug trafficking, Trump has laid claim to Venezuelan oil reserves since removing Maduro.

Trump has also invited US oil companies to exploit Venezuela’s oil and said he wants proceeds from the sale of Venezuelan oil “to benefit the people of Venezuela and the United States”.

More than 600 people may be in custody for political reasons, one Venezuelan rights group estimates.

Venezuela’s acting president has signed into law an amnesty bill that could see hundreds of politicians, activists and lawyers released soon, while tacitly acknowledging what the country has denied for years – that it has political detainees in jail.

The law, signed on Thursday, in effect reverses decades of denials in the government’s latest about-face since the United States military’s January 3 attack in the country’s capital, Caracas, and the abduction of President Nicolas Maduro.

Opposition members, activists, human rights defenders, journalists and others who were targeted by the governing party over the past 27 years could benefit from the new law.

But families hoping for the release of relatives say acting President Delcy Rodriguez has failed to deliver on earlier promises to release prisoners. Some of them have been gathered outside detention centres for weeks.

Venezuela-based prisoners’ rights group Foro Penal has tallied 448 releases since January 8 and estimates that more than 600 people are still in custody for political reasons.

The new law provides amnesty for involvement in political protests and “violent actions” which took place during a brief coup in 2002 and during demonstrations or elections in certain months going back to 2004.

It does not detail the exact crimes which would be eligible for amnesty, though a previous draft laid out several, including instigation of illegal activity, resistance to authorities, rebellion and treason.

People convicted of “military rebellion” for involvement in events in 2019 are excluded. The law also does not return assets of those detained, revoke public office bans given for political reasons or cancel sanctions against media outlets.

Opposition divided

“It’s not perfect, but it is undoubtedly a great step forward for the reconciliation of Venezuela,” opposition politician Nora Bracho said during a debate on the bill in the legislature on Thursday.

But the law was criticised by other members of the opposition, including Pedro Urruchurtu, international relations director for opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Maria Corina Machado.

“A true amnesty doesn’t require laws, but rather will, something that is lacking in this discussion,” he said on X on Thursday. “It is not only an invalid and illegitimate law, but also a trap to buy time and revictimize those persecuted.”

Since Madura’s abduction, US President Donald Trump has praised Rodriguez, Maduro’s former deputy, while downplaying the prospect of supporting the opposition.

For her part, Rodriguez has overseen several concessions to the US, including freezing oil shipments to Cuba and supporting a law to open the state-controlled oil industry to foreign companies.

The US has said it will control the proceeds ⁠from Venezuela’s oil sales until a “representative government” is established.

Caracas, February 19, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez met with US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) chief General Francis Donovan in Miraflores Palace on Wednesday.

According to the presidential press, the previously unannounced high-level talks also included Venezuela’s interior and defense ministers, Diosdado Cabello and Vladimir Padrino López, respectively.

“During the meeting, both countries agreed to work on a bilateral cooperation agenda to fight against drug trafficking in our region, as well as on terrorism and migration,” a statement released on social media read.

The Venezuelan government argued that the meeting showed that “diplomacy” is the mechanism to address “differences and issues of regional interest.”

Donovan is the latest US high-ranking official to visit Caracas and meet with Rodríguez since the January 3 US military attacks that killed over 100 people and saw special operations forces kidnap Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores.

The acting president held talks with CIA Director John Ratcliffe on January 15 and hosted Energy Secretary Chris Wright last week at the presidential palace. US Chargé d’Affaires Laura Dogu has been in the country since late January, and Rodríguez has recently reported regular “respectful and courteous” communication with Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

SOUTHCOM confirmed the visit in a press release, disclosing that Donovan was accompanied by Acting Assistant Secretary of War Joseph Humire and stating that the officials expressed the US’ “commitment to a free, safe and prosperous Venezuela.”

The US military command added that discussions focused on “shared security across the Western Hemisphere,” and the Trump administration’s stated “three-phase plan” for the Caribbean nation: “stabilization, economic recovery and reconciliation, and transition.” For her part, Dogu reported Donovan’s visit on social media, calling it a “historic day” to “advance in the objective of having Venezuela aligned with the United States.”

Donovan took over the SOUTHCOM leadership in February after the resignation of Admiral Alvin Holsey over reported disagreements with US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth on the legality of US lethal strikes against boats suspected of carrying drugs.

Since September, through “Operation Southern Spear,” SOUTHCOM has coordinated over 40 bombings of small vessels that have killed more than 130 civilians. The latest strikes, on February 16, targeted two boats in the Eastern Pacific and one in the Caribbean, killing 11 people in total. Neither Donovan nor Rodríguez mentioned the ongoing attacks in their public readouts following the meeting.

SOUTHCOM has also participated in the seizure of oil tankers accused of violating US sanctions by transporting Venezuelan crude. After seizing seven ships in the Caribbean between December and January, US forces have boarded two tankers in the Indian Ocean this month.

In the months leading up to the January 3 operation, Maduro and other Venezuelan officials consistently denounced the US’ military buildup in the Caribbean Sea and the subsequent naval blockade against oil exports.

Venezuelan authorities likewise blasted Washington’s “narcoterrorism” accusations against Caracas, pointing to specialized reports, including from the DEA, that placed Venezuela as a marginal country for global narcotics flows. Venezuelan officials also recalled the history of US agencies’ involvement in drug trafficking.

However, in the weeks after the January 3 strikes, Washington and Caracas have fast-tracked a diplomatic rapprochement with a view toward reopening embassies. President Donald Trump has publicly recognized the acting government but the official change in policy has yet to be confirmed.

The acting Rodríguez administration also prioritized economic reforms to attract foreign investment, including a pro-business overhaul of the country’s Hydrocarbon Law. National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez said that the government is “adapting” legislation to attract US corporations and aiming for a “free market economy.”

Natalia Burdynska Schuurman defended her MsC thesis at the University of Edinburgh on Venezuela’s struggle for food security and food sovereignty amid wide-reaching US-led unilateral sanctions.

See below for the abstract, research questions, and the full text.

Abstract

As global development actors grapple with mounting pressures to feed the world population, growing enforcement of unilateral coercive measures jeopardizes efforts to advance Sustainable Development Goal 2 (SDG-2, “Zero Hunger”). This dissertation examines efforts to achieve food security in Venezuela, a state currently targeted by over 1,000 unilateral coercive measures, since its incorporation as a constitutional right in 1999 and how such processes have been shaped by economic sanctions targeting its oil industry introduced by the United States in 2015. It employs a literature review, secondary data analysis and archival research, adopting a political economy and world systems lens as well as a historical, relational and interactive approach to food sovereignty research, centering the perspectives and experiences of Venezuelan communities. This dissertation argues that unilateral sanctions targeting Venezuela’s oil industry triggered the collapse of a political economy of food security structurally dependent on Venezuela’s macroeconomic stability within a dollarized international trade and financial system, catalyzing efforts to rebuild Venezuela’s food and agricultural system that transformed the landscape of national food sovereignty construction. It is hoped that this dissertation yields new insights into challenges and prospects facing national efforts to construct food sovereignty and global efforts to achieve food security today.

[…]

Research questions

This dissertation answers the primary question: How have unilateral sanctions
targeting Venezuela’s oil industry shaped efforts to achieve food security in
Venezuela?

It addresses the following contributory questions: What was the state of affairs characterizing Venezuela’s food and agricultural system prior to 2015? What advances and setbacks have been identified concerning the national goal to achieve food security, as enshrined in Venezuela’s Constitution of 1999? How have financial and trade sanctions targeting Venezuela’s oil industry introduced by the United States in 2015 correlated with macroeconomic and food security trends in Venezuela? How have financial and trade sanctions targeting Venezuela’s oil industry impacted food production, distribution and access in Venezuela? How have state and societal actors engaged in efforts to achieve food security in Venezuela responded to these consequences?

Mérida, February 18, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan government commemorated the 60th anniversary of the Geneva Agreement and urged Guyana to engage in “good faith negotiations” to settle the longstanding dispute over the Essequibo Strip.

In a statement published on Tuesday, Caracas celebrated six decades of the agreement and reiterated that the treaty is “the only valid legal instrument for reaching a mutually acceptable solution to the dispute” over the 160,000 square-kilometer territory.

The 1966 accord, signed by Venezuela, the United Kingdom, and British Guiana, a British colony at the time, saw the different parties pledge to find an agreeable solution to the border issue.

The Venezuelan government’s communique noted that the treaty was submitted to the United Nations, arguing that it overruled the controversial 1899 arbitration ruling which awarded the territory to the United Kingdom.

The text also reaffirmed Venezuela’s sovereignty claim over the resource-rich territory and referenced the popular mandate from the December 3, 2023, referendum that saw over 90 percent of respondents back the country’s rights over the Essequibo Strip.

“The only possible solution to the territorial controversy is to engage in good faith negotiations, to achieve a satisfactory arrangement for the two parties that signed the Geneva Agreement,” the declaration concluded.

The Guyanese government responded on Wednesday with its own statement, arguing that the Geneva Agreement did not annul the 1899 Arbitral Award but rather established a framework for resolving the dispute that arose when Venezuela questioned the border’s validity in 1962.

Georgetown likewise noted that, in January 2018, the Secretary-General of the United Nations determined that the “good offices” mechanism had been unsuccessful in resolving the dispute. 

“In accordance with Article IV (2) of the Geneva Agreement, the Secretary-General decided to submit the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as the final means of resolution. Both Guyana and Venezuela were bound by that decision.”

Hours later, the Venezuelan government issued a second statement accusing Guyana of attempting to distort the spirit of the Geneva Agreement and reiterating Caracas’ position rejecting the ICJ’s jurisdiction over the border controversy.

“Venezuela will not recognize any decision emanating from the International Court of Justice on the territorial dispute surrounding Guayana Esequiba,” the document read.

Despite rejecting the Hague-based court’s authority on the matter, the Venezuelan government participated in a documentation-gathering process before the ICJ during 2023 and 2024. Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, then vice president, led the country’s legal efforts.

In August 2025, Caracas submitted further evidence backing its Essequibo sovereignty claim and challenging Georgetown’s historical and legal arguments. The case will advance to the oral hearings phase in May 2026.

In January, the Guyanese Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Hugh Todd, claimed that the ICJ’s ruling would be binding for both nations and that the case was now in the hands of “the highest and most respected judicial authority in the world.”

The longstanding territorial controversy flared up in 2015 after ExxonMobil discovered and began exploiting massive offshore oil reserves. Venezuelan authorities have raised their sovereignty claims and criticized Guyanese counterparts for giving drilling permits to multinational corporations in undelimited waters.

Caracas has also criticized the US’ interference in the issue, with successive administrations offering their full backing to Georgetown. Venezuelan authorities have accused Washington of stoking regional tensions amid plans to establish military bases in Guyana.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Feb. 18 (UPI) — Human Rights Watch urged Venezuela’s government led by Delcy Rodriguez to dismantle what it described as the country’s repressive state apparatus and implement deep judicial and electoral reform.

The group noted that recent political prisoner releases have not dismantled mechanisms used to suppress dissent.

The rights group said the releases mark progress, but warned that institutions responsible for arbitrary detentions and political persecution remain active amid what Venezuelan authorities call a process of “national pacification.”

The organization called for the removal of Attorney General Tarek William Saab, saying he “led the state action that resulted in human rights violations” after the 2024 presidential election and describing him as part of “the government’s repressive machinery.”

The statement follows the Jan. 3 capture of former President Nicolas Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, during a U.S. military operation and the subsequent release of hundreds of detainees held for political reasons.

The Trump administration has continued working with former Vice President Delcy Rodriguez in what it describes as a plan with phases of “stabilization, recovery and transition,” focused largely on reforms in Venezuela’s oil sector, the organization said.

“The release of political prisoners is an important relief, but the repressive apparatus used to detain them remains in place,” said Juanita Goebertus, Americas director at Human Rights Watch.

“Venezuelan authorities must carry out real reforms of their laws and judicial and electoral institutions,” she said. “Anything else would amount to a simulated transition that may serve the interests of the governments of Venezuela and the United States, but will not vindicate the rights of the Venezuelan people.”

Human Rights Watch said some 600 people remain imprisoned for political reasons, and that an amnesty bill under debate in Venezuela’s National Assembly, the country’s legislature, does not guarantee unconditional release for all those arbitrarily detained for political events dating to 1999.

“Its discussion should not be used as an excuse to delay the unconditional release of political prisoners or the structural reforms needed to restore democracy in Venezuela,” Goebertus said.

The organization said many people released from prison remain under criminal investigation and face restrictions on free expression and political participation. Some have been placed under house arrest, including opposition leader Juan Pablo Guanipa, who was freed Feb. 9 and detained again hours later after calling for protests.

Human Rights Watch also called for measures to restore judicial independence, which it said was weakened after a 2004 reform under then-President Hugo Chavez, and reiterated its demand for Saab’s removal, saying his continued tenure is incompatible with meaningful reform.

The group further urged steps to ensure free and fair elections, including a review of the National Electoral Council, the body responsible for organizing elections, whose members backed Maduro’s reelection and blocked opposition candidacies such as Maria Corina Machado.

Human Rights Watch said only sustained structural reforms will allow a credible political transition and full restoration of human rights in Venezuela.

The information cycle in Venezuela following Maduro’s capture by the US on January 3rd has moved at a stunning pace. In just weeks, the discussion of an amnesty law, the release of political prisoners, including high-profile figures such as Juan Pablo Guanipa, or the closure of El Helicoide have generated a steady stream of headlines that suggest plenty of movement.

Yet in Venezuela’s political history, first glances rarely tell the full story. A closer look reveals the traps embedded within those headlines: “liberations” that are in fact conditional releases, an amnesty bill that excludes many political prisoners and leaves key demands unmet, and the looming threat of new detentions, materialized in Guanipa’s re-arrest less than twelve hours after his release.

These gestures are not improvised. Since January 3rd, the leadership now headed by Delcy Rodríguez has invested heavily in projecting moderation and pragmatism abroad, positioning itself as the most viable partner for stability.

In that effort, the regime has often benefited, sometimes unintentionally, from the structure of international reporting itself. Part of this dynamic stems from the regime’s tight control over access, including restrictions on foreign correspondents and selective granting of exclusive interviews to chosen outlets. But it is also structural. In a polarized and fast-paced media environment, initial announcements often receive more attention than their aftermath, making it harder to trace how events unfold within the broader structure of power.

The regime understands this dynamic, and operates within it.

Confuse and conquer

What connects these episodes is not coincidence, but method. The regime frequently generates overlapping announcements, partial concessions, and selective gestures that make it difficult to follow the full sequence of events.

Over time, the regime’s leadership has learned that generating visible actions works. These actions do not need to be structural or transformative, they simply need to be striking enough to become discrete headline events. Once reported, the action itself becomes the story, while the broader context and sequencing often fade from view.

This dynamic is particularly visible in the management of the opposition. The regime has fostered divisions through multiple mechanisms, weakening cohesive action while presenting itself as conciliatory. The current National Assembly, for instance, includes figures labeled as opposition lawmakers despite significant opacity surrounding the electoral processes that brought them there, allowing the regime to project pluralism.

Shortened contextual memory, where events are reported but patterns are not continuously revisited, ultimately works to the regime’s advantage.

Similarly, dialogue initiatives involving individuals described as “moderate” opposition leaders are framed as evidence of a political opening, even when those actors lack a clear or broad mandate. In contrast, María Corina Machado and others who decline to participate are often portrayed as “radical”, not necessarily because of ideological extremism, but because they refuse to legitimize mechanisms that function primarily to buy time and reinforce the regime’s image.

The amnesty bill seems to show the same dynamic: it not only leaves many political prisoners out, but also risks fracturing victims’ groups by rewarding accommodation and penalizing refusal. However, once the “amnesty” headline circulates, the broader exclusions become secondary, and from the regime’s perspective, the immediate narrative gain may already be sufficient.

This tactic operates within a broader structural reality. Venezuela is politically complex and has been in crisis for decades. For international media outlets managing multiple global crises, sustained contextualization is difficult. Shortened contextual memory, where events are reported but patterns are not continuously revisited, ultimately works to the regime’s advantage.

Bias and competing agendas

International coverage has long interpreted Venezuela through familiar frameworks—authoritarianism, sanctions, polarization—rather than through the specific institutional degradation that defines the regime. This does not imply sympathy for the government. It simply flattens the crisis. When Venezuela is treated as another authoritarian state negotiating political transitions, the depth of institutional collapse and the entanglement of state power with coercive and illicit structures often receive less attention.

After January 3rd, this dynamic became more visible. Coverage focused heavily on the legality and geopolitical implications of Maduro’s capture, with comparatively less emphasis on the regime’s documented record of abuses. In a strongly polarized media climate, scrutiny of US actions often eclipsed scrutiny of the regime itself. That asymmetry contributed to a subtle relativization of the regime’s trajectory.

Separately, competing priorities within Washington shaped the policy debate and media coverage around Venezuela. Some actors emphasized engagement and economic opportunity, particularly regarding oil, presenting gestures such as prisoner releases as signs of rapid progress. President Trump echoed that framing, stating that political prisoners were being released at a rapid rate, at a time when Foro Penal had documented roughly 250 releases out of more than 800 detainees, most under restrictive conditions.

Differences in tone do not necessarily create media bias, but contribute to a fragmented narrative environment in which signals of progress and signals of caution circulate simultaneously.

Others adopted a more cautious position. During his deposition before the Senate, Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that Delcy Rodríguez’s leadership would be judged not on rhetoric but on actions, stressing that pace, conditions, and follow-through mattered.

These differences in tone do not necessarily create media bias, but contribute to a fragmented narrative environment in which signals of progress and signals of caution circulate simultaneously. That fragmentation has at times extended to portrayals of opposition figures themselves. Reports citing unnamed US officials have described frustrations with María Corina Machado’s positioning, implicitly framing her stance as complicating broader strategy. When unnamed officials are cited to express frustrations, rather than to disclose substantive policy shifts, the line between reporting and narrative shaping becomes blurred.

Judging by actions, and what follows

Rubio’s standard to judge by actions is reasonable. But in Venezuela, actions cannot be read in isolation. A release, a meeting, or a legislative proposal may be factual. Yet without context, timing, sequencing, and what unfolds around them, tactical adjustments can resemble structural change.

The case of Juan Pablo Guanipa makes this tension visible. His release contributed to the narrative of progress. The quick re-detention that came hours later disrupted it. The regime does not want mass mobilization in the streets, yet it also needs to project moderation abroad. When Guanipa mobilized, he forced the regime to choose between sustaining its international image and reasserting control at home, and it chose control.

Moments like this strip the strategy bare. There is no calibrated messaging capable of reconciling a re-arrest with claims of normalization. No sequencing trick can disguise it. While the regime can often manage headlines through partial gestures, episodes like Guanipa’s expose the underlying logic too clearly to blur.

That is also where the agency of Venezuelans becomes visible. When citizens and opposition figures test the boundaries of controlled concessions, they reveal whether those gestures signal transformation or merely delay. If the regime responds with repression, the narrative of change collapses. In that sense, the limits of the illusion are not determined only by media framing, but by how far Venezuelans are willing to push against it.

In Venezuela, actions do matter, but only when understood within their full context. Without that context, they risk becoming headlines that obscure more than they clarify.

In the streets of Cartagena, Colombia, cumbia musicians beat tambora drums and blow into flautas, women in red, yellow and blue ruffled dresses whisk by, and sweating food vendors push carts, their arepas sizzling.

Among the music and striking color of Cartagena, my dad handed me my first arepa. Arepas are the most essential dish of Colombia and neighboring Venezuela, centered around South America’s most treasured crop: corn.

To prepare an arepa, corn kernels are ground into flour or pre-ground corn flour is used (often the iconic yellow bag of Venezuelan brand P.A.N.), and mixed with water and salt. The soft dough is then fried, grilled or baked into a pancake-like shape. The result is delightfully simple yet endlessly customizable.

“My memory of arepas is eating them morning, afternoon and night,” said Yesika Baker, owner of Chamo’s Venezuelan Cuisine in Pasadena. “In Venezuela, the areperas are open 24/7.”

The arepa has deep roots. Before Colombia and Venezuela came to be known as separate territories, they were unified by Indigenous groups with similar culinary traditions. When the Spanish first arrived in South America, Indigenous women were cooking corn cakes similar to the modern arepa, meaning the tradition likely goes back thousands of years, according to University of Venezuela anthropology professor Ocarina Castillo.

Today, the arepa is popular in both countries. In Colombia, an arepa tends to be simple: topped with cheese by street vendors, filled with egg for a tasty breakfast or, most often, served as a side to a hearty meal. Some say the masa of a Colombian arepa tends on the thinner side as well.

“Growing up in Colombia, the arepa is like the Mexican’s tortilla. Everything comes with an arepita,” said Santiago Restrepo, owner of Sus Arepas in East L.A. “Venezuelans, on the other hand, use it like a pita — stuffed. With Venezuelan-style arepas, you can really have fun with the fillings.”

The Venezuelan arepa “rellena” or stuffed style, is one that you’ll see dominate this list, with an experimental appeal that makes them a favorite for Angelenos. One of Venezuela’s most popular arepas is the Reina Pepiada, which translates to “curvy queen” and is typically filled with shredded chicken, avocado, cilantro and mayonnaise. According to Castillo, the name is in honor of a real beauty queen, Susana Duijm, the first Venezuelan to win Miss World in 1955.

In Colombia and Venezuela, it’s common to eat arepas at least once a day, especially at breakfast. But for a dish so essential to millions of people, for a long time, arepas were underrepresented in L.A.’s food scene.

“When I first moved to L.A. [in the ‘80s], you couldn’t find arepas anywhere,” Restrepo said. “Up until 2020, I wouldn’t have considered them a popular dish here. But just in the past few years, they’ve exploded.”

Restrepo credits their meteoric rise to a photogenic appeal. If you’re an avid consumer of food content online, then you’ve likely seen the arepa rellena — after a typical wait time of 20 minutes, they come layered and overflowing with ingredients like shredded beef, stewed beans, melted cheese or plantains.

“A good arepa rellena is all in the fillings,” said Mercedes Rojas, chef of the Arepa Stand, which pops up at local farmers markets on the weekends.

From creative picks stuffed with mango and cheese to a Koreatown-inspired arepa with bulgogi and plenty of traditional options, this guide features nine standouts in L.A.’s growing arepa scene.

Although, for your sake, don’t try to ask which country created the arepa, or who does it best. “It’s a long fight, amiga,” Baker said. “From Venezuela or Colombia, we defend our arepas.”

WASHINGTON — President Biden is considering a ban on imports of Russian oil while weighing actions that would boost energy production by autocracies in the hopes of mitigating the effects on American consumers and global energy markets, U.S. officials said.

“What the president is most focused on is ensuring we are continuing to take steps to deliver punishing economic consequences on [Russian President Vladimir] Putin while taking all action necessary to limit the impact to prices at the gas pump,” White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki said Monday.

Until now, the economic strangulation of Russia by the West over its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has avoided its robust energy sector, with administration officials suggesting that such a move could weaken the global economy.

But as Russia increases its unrelenting bombardment of Ukrainian cities, political pressure on the West has grown to do more to put pressure on Putin to stop the onslaught. U.S. officials said the Biden administration is considering easing restrictions on imports of oil from Venezuela to alleviate the void left by Russian oil bans, a politically problematic step.

It has also sought to convince Saudi Arabia, which has been under fire from U.S. and European officials over its human rights record, to boost oil production.

Biden spoke Monday for more than an hour with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, although the official White House readout of the conversation did not explicitly state that they discussed a ban on Russian energy.

According to the White House, “the leaders affirmed their determination to continue raising the costs on Russia for its unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine. They also underscored their commitment to continue providing security, economic and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine.”

Psaki said administration officials were also discussing whether the U.S. would send military aircraft to Poland should its leaders provide Soviet-era bombers to support Ukraine, but noted that the White House was not “preventing or blocking or discouraging” officials in Warsaw. “They are a sovereign country. They make their own decisions, but it is not as easy as just moving planes around,” she said.

The U.S. has been reluctant to get ahead of European allies in responding to Putin’s aggression. And while an oil embargo from Washington would have some effect, doing so in concert with Europe would deliver a far greater impact. Europe imports 4 million barrels of Russian oil a day, compared with 700,000 barrels imported daily by the U.S.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken said Sunday during an interview with CNN that the administration was indeed exploring the “prospect” of an energy ban “in a coordinated way” with allies, although he did not rule out the possibility that Washington could act on its own to bar Russian oil.

The administration may not have much of a choice. Members of both political parties have introduced bills in both houses of Congress to block such imports.

“We may have to pay more at the pump because of this attack and our bipartisan response, but it is worth it to ensure that Putin pays the price for his paranoid adventurism and his attack on a peaceful democracy,” Rep. Jimmy Panetta (D-Carmel Valley), who has co-sponsored a bill to ban Russian oil, said in a statement.

Rep. Lou Correa (D-Santa Ana), who supports the measure, said a Russian oil ban may only have limited success if the U.S. cannot persuade other countries to join the effort.

“I don’t believe Europe and some of the other countries are ready to say no to Russian energy, so that’s the challenge right now,” Correa said in an interview. “Not only does Russia have nukes, but also people have to buy their energy from the Russians.”

Congress is weighing an oil ban as it pushes to pass a measure to send Ukraine billions of dollars in emergency assistance. Senate Majority Leader Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.) on Monday called for passage of a $12-billion aid package this week, saying it “will provide both humanitarian and military assistance for Ukraine: funding for refugees, medical supplies, emergency food supplies, as well as funding to support weapons transfers into Ukraine, and help for our eastern flank NATO allies.”

In a letter to House Democrats on Sunday, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-San Francisco) said Congress intended to pass $10 billion in emergency aid for Ukraine as part of a larger government funding measure. The House is also exploring legislation that would “further isolate” Russia from the world economy, Pelosi said.

Banning Russian oil imports would probably lead to higher prices at the pump in the U.S. and globally. Gas is averaging $4 a gallon nationwide, up from $2.77 a year ago, according to AAA. The average price of gas in California during that same period has risen from $3.75 to $5.34.

In a clear signal of how seriously the Biden administration is considering a Russian oil ban, U.S. officials traveled over the weekend to Caracas, Venezuela, for talks about potentially easing sanctions imposed on the South American nation by the Trump administration in 2019. President Trump took that step after declaring President Nicolas Maduro’s election victory a sham and recognizing another politician, Juan Guaido, as the country’s rightful leader, a position Biden has affirmed.

Those measures built upon similar sanctions imposed by President Obama, signaling the long history of trouble Washington has had with Caracas and its socialist leaders.

The Venezuela economy is reeling, despite sitting on some of the world’s largest oil reserves, and Maduro is likely eager to be free of the sanctions. However, his economy and many of his government agencies are deeply intertwined with Russian assets and advisors. Any lenience by the White House toward Maduro, even if it’s driven by a desire to crack down on Putin, could undercut Biden’s messaging about the existential threat that autocracies present to democracies.

Psaki on Monday batted away questions about a potential rapprochement with Caracas, telling reporters that any easing of sanctions was “leaping several stages ahead” of where talks currently stand.

Complicating matters has been Venezuela’s decision to imprison six executives from the Citgo oil company for the last four years. Five are U.S. citizens and the sixth a U.S. permanent resident. They were convicted in show trials on trumped-up embezzlement charges and other crimes, according to their families and human rights activists.

Psaki said discussions about the release of the men and sanctions relief were taking place “in different channels,” and not tied together.

Republicans, who have seized on the potential energy crisis to call for stepping up domestic fossil fuel production, have already made clear that they will hit the White House hard should it look to offset any ban on Russian oil by looking to foreign suppliers.

Florida Sen. Marco Rubio criticized Biden in a tweet Sunday, saying: “Rather than produce more American oil, he wants to replace the oil we buy from one murderous dictator with oil from another murderous dictator.”

Caracas, February 15, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – US President Donald Trump is considering a visit to Venezuela, though he did not specify when the trip might take place or what agenda it would entail.

“I’m going to make a visit to Venezuela,” Trump told reporters outside the White House on Friday. 

The US President addressed the press ahead of a trip to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to meet soldiers who participated in the January 3 military attacks against Venezuela and the kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores.

Questioned by a journalist, Trump stated that Washington recognizes the Venezuelan government led by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez as the country’s legitimate authority.

“We are dealing with them, and they have done a great job,” he stated. The White House refused comment on whether the recognition was the administration’s official stance.

In 2019, the first Trump administration recognized the self-proclaimed “interim government” headed by Juan Guaidó as the country’s legitimate authority, prompting the Maduro government to sever diplomatic ties. The US later transferred its recognition to the defunct opposition-controlled National Assembly whose term expired in January 2021.

Since the January 3 attacks, Caracas and Washington have fast-tracked a diplomatic rapprochement, with US Chargé d’Affaires Laura Dogu arriving in the Caribbean nation in early February. An official recognition of the Rodríguez acting government could pave the way for the restructuring of Venezuela’s sizable foreign debt.

In his Friday press remarks, Trump further described relations with Venezuelan leaders as being “as good as one could hope for,” and added that “the relationship with Venezuela today is a 10.”

Trump additionally highlighted progress in Venezuela’s oil sector.

“Oil is flowing, and other nations are paying a lot of money for it, and we are handling it. We are refining it,” he said. Since January, the White House has imposed control of Venezuelan oil exports, with proceeds deposited in bank accounts in Qatar before being partly rerouted to Caracas under US-set conditions.

Earlier last week, Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez emphasized in an NBC interview that Maduro remains the country’s legitimate president. She also disclosed that she has spoken twice with Trump and has had “more frequent” contact with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and expressed “gratitude” for the “respectful and courteous” nature of the talks.

Venezuela’s acting president went on to announce that she has likewise been invited to visit the US. “We are considering going once we establish cooperation and can move forward with everything,” she said.

The invitation reportedly arose during a recent visit to Caracas by US Energy Secretary Chris Wright, who was hosted by Rodríguez at Miraflores Palace on Wednesday. 

Wright and Rodríguez later toured the Petroindependencia crude upgrader, a mixed venture between Venezuela’s state-owned PDVSA and Chevron, in the Orinoco Oil Belt.

The Trump administration official announced that Chevron would invest US $100 million to modernize operational facilities, with the goal of “doubling [Petroindependencia’s] productive capacity within 12 to 18 months and quintupling it within five years.” Petroindependencia has a current output of 40,000 barrels per day (bpd).

US issues new oil licenses

Following Wright’s Venezuela visit, the US Treasury Department issued two general licenses, 49 and 50, aimed at boosting conditions for Western multinational corporations to operate in Venezuela’s energy sector.

The first license allows for the negotiation and signing of future investment contracts, contingent upon the potential issuance of a specific license. The second waiver authorizes Chevron, BP, Eni, Shell, and Repsol to conduct transactions and operations related to hydrocarbon projects with PDVSA or any other Venezuelan public entity.

Repsol (Spain) and Eni (Italy), like Chevron, participate in oil and gas joint ventures in the South American country, whereas the UK-headquartered Shell and BP are set to lead offshore natural gas projects alongside Trinidad and Tobago’s National Gas Company (NGC) in Venezuelan waters. 

However, GL50 requires that any contracts fall under US jurisdiction and mandates that all payments to “blocked” entities—as sanctions against PDVSA and Venezuela’s banking system remain in place—be made to accounts designated by the US Treasury.

It also explicitly prohibits transactions involving any person or entity linked to Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, or China, as well as vessels sanctioned by Washington.

The Trump administration has loosened restrictions against the Venezuelan energy sector, including allowing the import of US diluents, inputs and technology, following a recent pro-business overhaul of the country’s Hydrocarbon Law. The reform granted expanded benefits for private corporations, including reduced fiscal responsibilities and expanded control over operations and sales.

Upon leaving Caracas, Energy Secretary Wright claimed that “structural reforms” would continue in Venezuela, with changes to “labor laws, the court system and the banking system.”

Edited and with additional reporting by Ricardo Vaz from Caracas.

Trump did not give a timeline for trip, which would make him the first US president to visit the country since 1997.

Donald Trump has said he plans to become the first sitting United States president to visit Venezuela in nearly three decades.

Trump made the statement to reporters on Friday as he departed White House for the Fort Bragg military base in North Carolina, where he met soldiers involved in the US abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro on January 3.

“I’m going to make a visit to Venezuela,” Trump said. He offered few details on the planned visit, telling reporters “we haven’t decided” on a date.

Still, the trip would make Trump the first sitting US president since Bill Clinton in 1997 to visit the South American country, which Trump had targeted with crippling sanctions from his first term of 2017 to 2021.

Earlier this week, US Energy Secretary Chris Wright became the first member of Trump’s cabinet to visit Venezuela and meet the government led by Maduro’s replacement, Delcy Rodriguez.

Trump has repeatedly praised Rodriguez, Maduro’s former deputy, while downplaying the prospect of supporting an opposition figure in the wake of Maduro’s abduction.

“They’ve done a great job,” Trump again said on Friday. “The oil is coming out, and a lot of money is being paid.”

For her part, Rodriguez has overseen several concessions to the US, including freezing oil shipments to Cuba, supporting a law to open the state-controlled oil industry to foreign companies, and releasing hundreds of political prisoners.

On Thursday, lawmakers in Venezuela’s parliament debated a bill that would grant amnesty to political prisoners, although it had not passed by Friday.

Easing of sanctions

Also on Friday, the US Department of the Treasury announced it was easing some sanctions on Venezuela’s energy sector, the largest reprieve since Maduro’s abduction.

The department issued two general licences, including one that allows Chevron, BP, Eni, Shell, and Repsol to conduct further oil and gas operations in Venezuela. The companies identified already have offices in the country and are among the main partners of state-run oil company PDVSA.

The second licence allows foreign companies to enter new oil and gas investment contracts with PDVSA in Venezuela.

Any contracts would be contingent on separate approval from the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and do not extend to Russia, Iran, China or entities owned by nationals of those countries.

Trump has said he is seeking $100bn in foreign investments in Venezuela, while Energy Secretary Wright said early this week that Venezuelan oil sales since Maduro’s capture had hit $1bn ⁠and would reach $5bn in months.

Wright said the US will control the proceeds ⁠from the sales until a “representative government” in Venezuela is established.

UN experts have criticised US influence over the country’s natural resources as a violation of citizens’ right to self-determination.

Speaking during his address on Fort Bragg, Trump also took time to praise the operation to abduct Maduro.

Legal experts have called it a flagrant violation of international law and Venezuela’s sovereignty, regardless of whether Washington viewed Maduro as the country’s legitimate elected leader following disputed elections in 2024.

“Everybody was running for the hills,” Trump said of the January 3 attack, which killed more than 100 Cuban and Venezuelan security personnel, “and that’s what we have. We have the strongest military in the world by far.”

Caracas, February 12, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez hosted US Energy Secretary Chris Wright at Miraflores Palace in Caracas on Wednesday.

Wright is the highest-ranked US official to be received at the presidential palace in over 25 years. The high-profile visit took place a little over a month after US forces bombed Caracas and kidnapped Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores on January 3.

Rodríguez and Wright, who was accompanied by US Chargé d’Affaires Laura Dogu, held a private meeting before briefly addressing the press.

Venezuela’s acting leader centered her statements on a joint “energy agenda” between Caracas and Washington that could be “mutually beneficial.” The talks reportedly included discussions on oil, natural gas, electricity, and mineral projects.

“The main point in our agenda is the establishment of a long-term productive alliance, with an energy agenda that becomes the engine of our bilateral relations,” Rodríguez told reporters. “This energy agenda should be effective, complementary, and beneficial for both countries.

Defending the recent rapproachment, she pointed to Venezuela and the United States’ energy ties dating back 150 years. 

“Our relationship has had its ups and downs in political terms, but I am confident that through diplomacy we can overcome our differences,” Rodríguez added. She made no mention of Maduro in her public remarks. 

Rodríguez, who served under Maduro as vice president, assumed the presidency on an acting basis on January 5 as directed by the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Chamber. Maduro and Flores have pleaded not guilty to charges including drug trafficking conspiracy.

Venezuelan authorities have fast-tracked a diplomatic reengagement with the Trump administration since the January 3 attacks. In a recent interview, National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez, brother of the acting president, emphasized the prospect of establishing a “win-win” relationship with Washington.

The parliamentary leader stated that Venezuela was “adapting” legislation to attract US investment. The Venezuelan legislature recently overhauled the country’s Hydrocarbon Law to grant increased incentives to foreign corporations. Under the reformed law, private corporations will enjoy reduced taxes and royalties, as well as expanded control over operations and sales and the prerogative to take disputes to external arbitration bodies.

For his part, Wright said that he brought “a message” from Trump, that the US president was committed to a “broader agenda to make the Americas great again.” The Energy Secretary praised a “wonderful and candid dialogue” with Venezuelan leaders and spoke of “tremendous opportunities” in the Caribbean nation’s energy sector.

Wright highlighted the Trump administration’s recent sanctions waivers allowing US companies to return to the Venezuelan oil sector and permitting exports of diluents, other inputs, and technology for oil operations to the South American country.

“We have been working to issue licenses to existing businesses, to new businesses that want to enter Venezuela, for Venezuelan companies to buy [US] products and raise oil production,” he continued. “We want to set the Venezuelan people, and the economy, free.”

On Thursday, Rodríguez and Wright visited Petroindependencia, a crude upgrader in the Orinoco Oil Belt. According to reports, Wright is also scheduled to visit Petropiar. Chevron is a minority stakeholder in both joint ventures. The US official will also hold meetings with business executives, and claimed he wants to “improve the management” of PDVSA.

Since January, the Trump administration has exerted control over Venezuelan oil exports. Commodity traders Vitol and Trafigura have lifted Venezuelan crude to resell to other customers, while depositing proceeds in US-run accounts in Qatar. Washington has thus far returned to Caracas US $500 million out of a reported $2 billion initial agreement.

The recent licenses likewise mandate that payments be made to accounts designated by the US Treasury and block transactions with companies from China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Russia. US forces have maintained a naval blockade and seized several tankers for allegedly transporting Venezuelan crude. PDVSA also remains under financial sanctions.

Former President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) had a confrontational relationship with Washington, repeatedly denouncing US interventions abroad, including in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. He likewise promoted several regional integration projects.

Maduro severed diplomatic ties with the US in 2019 after the first Trump administration formally recognized the Juan Guaidó-led self-proclaimed “interim government” as the country’s legitimate authority.

Despite the rapid rapprochement, the White House has yet to recognize the acting government of Delcy Rodríguez. The formal recognition could pave the way for a restructuring of Venezuela’s sizable foreign debt.

Caracas, February 11, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuela’s oil output contracted to a two-year low following  Washington’s month-long naval blockade against the Caribbean nation’s crude exports.

The latest OPEC monthly report placed Venezuela’s January production at 830,000 barrels per day (bpd), down from 917,000 bpd in December, according to secondary sources. The figure is the lowest since May 2024. 

For its part, state oil company PDVSA reported 924,000 bpd produced in January, down from 1.12 million bpd the prior month. The direct and secondary measurements have differed over the years due to disagreements over the inclusion of natural gas liquids and condensates.

The output contraction was a result of the US Navy imposing a blockade on Venezuelan oil exports and seizing several tankers allegedly involved in Venezuelan crude shipments. The exhaustion of storage capacity forced PDVSA and partners to cut back production.

The blockade came on top of draconian sanctions that have stymied the Venezuelan oil industry for years. Since 2017, Washington has levied financial sanctions, an export embargo, secondary sanctions, and a host of other coercive measures aimed at strangling the country’s main source of foreign revenue.

Following the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, Venezuelan oil began to flow once more under an arrangement imposed by the Trump administration. Commodity traders Vitol and Trafigura have been lifting Venezuelan crude, depositing proceeds in White House-administered bank accounts in Qatar, and offering cargoes to customers all over the world.

On Tuesday, the Venezuelan government denied a Bloomberg report that the country had shipped crude to Israel. According to the business outlet, the shipment would be delivered to the Bazan Group, Israel’s largest refiner. Bloomberg did not specify whether the Venezuelan crude cargo was purchased from Vitol, Trafigura, or another source. As part of the new US-imposed arrangement, the sale marks the first time Venezuelan oil will reach Israel since at least 2020, per Bloomberg. 

The Trump administration has sought to leverage its influence over the Venezuelan oil sector to pressure allies such as India to replace imports from US geopolitical rivals, including Russia and Iran. Indian public companies Indian Oil and Hindustan Petroleum are set to join private refiner Reliance Industries in purchasing Venezuelan oil, with 2 million barrels of Merey crude expected to be delivered in the coming weeks. Nevertheless, Venezuelan supplies are not expected to significantly alter global demand given the present output and the extra-heavy nature of Venezuelan crude blends.

US and European firms have likewise acquired Venezuelan cargoes in recent weeks.

For their part, Venezuelan acting authorities have courted foreign investment and enacted a pro-business overhaul of the country’s oil legislation. The reform offers lower taxes and royalties, as well as increased control over operations and sales, to private corporations, reducing the role played by the Venezuelan state.

Trump administration officials praised the oil reform for “eradicating restrictions” on private investment, while the US Treasury Department has issued several sanctions exemptions to boost US corporate involvement in the Venezuelan oil industry.

A January 29 license allowing US companies to purchase and market Venezuelan crude was followed up with a waiver on diluent exports to Venezuela on February 3. On Tuesday, the US Treasury published General License 48 permitting US exports of goods, technology and software for oil exploration to Venezuela.

The sanctions waivers demand that contracts be subjected to US law and forbid any transactions with companies from Russia, Iran, Cuba, North Korea, and China. They also mandate that payments be deposited in accounts determined by the US Treasury.

In early February, US officials confirmed that US $500 million from crude sales had been rerouted to the South American country, to be offered in foreign currency auctions by public and private banks. A further $300 million is expected in the coming days. 

However, the initial deal announced by Trump comprised 30-50 million barrels and an estimated $2 billion. Venezuelan authorities have not disclosed what portion of revenues the country will receive, while Trump has said the US will “keep some” of the income. 

Senior Trump administration officials have vowed to maintain control over Venezuelan oil exports for an “indefinite” period, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio claiming that the Venezuelan acting government headed by Delcy Rodríguez needs to submit a “budget request” before accessing the country’s oil proceeds.

Venezuela’s National Assembly President Jorge Rodriguez has said that the country will not hold presidential elections in the immediate future, emphasising that the government’s current focus is on national stability.

His comments came late on Monday in an interview published with the conservative outlet Newsmax in the United States.

Presidential terms run for six years in Venezuela, and the last election was controversially held in 2024. Newsmax host Rob Schmitt asked if that meant another election would not happen for another five years.

“The only thing I could say is that there will not be an election in this immediate period of time where the stabilisation has to be achieved,” Rodriguez replied.

He explained that the decision is tied to a wider effort to rebuild and strengthen Venezuela’s state institutions.

“What we’re working on at the moment is what we call the re-institutionalisation of the country, so that every single institution of the country can again be brought to full power and full recognition by everybody,” he said.

Rodriguez, who has led the National Assembly since 2021, added that Venezuelans are seeking a return to normalcy following the abduction of President Nicolas Maduro.

“The government of Delcy Rodriguez is actually looking for that, to stabilise the country completely and to make it all good and reconcile everybody, all the population of Venezuela,” he said.

The US abducted Maduro in a military action on January 3. In the weeks since, the Venezuelan Supreme Court has appointed Vice President Delcy Rodriguez, the National Assembly leader’s sister, as acting president.

She was formally sworn in on January 5, with support from both Venezuela’s military and the governing party, as well as the US.

Jorge Rodriguez told Newsmax that the current government would need to “reach an agreement with all sectors of the opposition” to create a “timetable” for new elections.

Amnesty law

Maduro’s abduction had initially inspired hope that a new election would be carried out after the controversy that accompanied the 2024 presidential race.

In that election, Maduro controversially claimed victory for a third straight term, despite the opposition publishing voter tallies that appeared to show its candidate won.

Protests broke out, and Maduro’s government responded with a violent crackdown. An estimated 25 people were killed, according to the US State Department.

In Monday’s interview, Rodriguez rejected the assertion that the 2024 race was not legitimate. Instead, he emphasised his push for national unity, saying, “We have been divided for a very long time.”

He highlighted the legislature’s efforts to pass a mass amnesty law, which would result in the release of all political prisoners and forgive any crimes related to political dissent since 1999.

The bill was approved unanimously in the first of two votes on Thursday and is expected to pass this week.

Still, questions have surrounded the bill. Critics fear that political repression could take other forms after the prisoners’ release.

Schmitt asked whether opposition leader Maria Corina Machado would be able to return to Venezuela and campaign freely in a future election, following the bill’s passage.

“So, allow me not to speak about only one single name, because there are many, many actors abroad that have to be included in this discussion,” Rodriguez responded.

“There is an amnesty law that is being done at the moment that contemplates working with people, but there are sectors of the opposition abroad which have promoted violence.”

He then indicated that the amnesty bill would not apply to the opposition leaders accused of violent crimes.

“Through this amnesty law, we are promoting for all the sections of the opposition who are abroad to comply with the law, so they can come back to the country,” Rodriguez said.

Opposition leaders, however, have long alleged that the government has peddled false accusations of violent crime to arrest and jail them.

Machado herself was accused of conspiring to assassinate Maduro in 2014, leading to her expulsion from the National Assembly.

Rodriguez’s comments also come amid developments in the case of former lawmaker Juan Pablo Guanipa.

The leader was released on Sunday after spending more than eight months in pretrial detention, but he was rearrested less than 12 hours later, after speaking with the media and supporters.

According to his family, he was detained by armed men without identification or a court order. His son, Ramon Guanipa, described the incident as an “abduction”.

Officials later stated that they had requested the revocation of his release order, citing his alleged failure to comply with the conditions imposed upon his release.

In the early hours of Tuesday, Guanipa was transferred to his residence in Maracaibo, where he remains under house arrest.

Machado condemned the actions, stating that Guanipa’s case demonstrates that the releases announced by the government do not guarantee the full exercise of political and civil rights.

“What was Juan Pablo’s crime? Telling the truth. So are these releases, or what are they?” Machado said on Monday.

She proceeded to question whether the released prisoners were truly free from what she described as the repressive machinery of the Venezuelan government.

“Can’t we talk in Venezuela about those who have been in prison? Can’t we recount what they have experienced? Can’t we describe the horror of what is happening in our country today?”

In contexts of war, pacification means a ceasefire achieved through agreements. In its most literal sense, pacification refers to the act of becoming peaceful. In Venezuela, however, pacification cannot be reduced to simply “returning to peace.” The concept acquires a political meaning because violence is neither symmetrical nor bilateral. Pacification in Venezuela means dismantling state violence and opening the political system to all actors.

In this sense, amnesty laws are conceived as a form of special justice for contexts in which pacification is necessary. They are legal instruments that States use exceptionally to close cycles of conflict. Amnesty is not about pardoning isolated acts, but about ending the criminal consequences derived from conflicts in which justice operated selectively and became a tool of political persecution.

In transitional contexts, amnesty has been used repeatedly. Spain, Chile, and Colombia are among the closest examples for Venezuela, and in all of them amnesty served as a bridge between a past of persecution and a future of democratic political competition.

Amnesty must pursue a single goal: preventing the repetition of abuses. For this reason, although amnesties may be decreed, they are not limitless instruments. On the contrary, they must exclude human rights violations and prevent impunity. From this perspective, the draft bill approved in first discussion by the National Assembly is insufficient for the moment the country is facing and for dismantling the regime’s repressive apparatus.

Article 6 does not mention events from 2015, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, and part of 2024. As a result, it excludes cases involving military personnel unjustly imprisoned.

Let us begin with one of the basic principles of the legislative process: transparency. The way the bill was introduced failed to inspire confidence among political actors and civil society. At the time of the debate in the chamber, the text of the bill was not publicly available. Only unofficial versions circulated on social media. It was not until 24 hours later that the approved draft was informally released via X, undermining the principle of publicity that should govern lawmaking.

Deliberate vagueness

Setting aside procedural flaws, we must examine the substance of the law. To begin with, Delcy Rodríguez and the National Assembly do not need an amnesty law to release the more than 600 political prisoners who, as of the morning of February 9, remained detained in Venezuela. An amnesty law should aim to correct structural failures in the justice system, address abuses, and guarantee non-repetition.

Reducing the acts covered by amnesty to “acts of violence for political motives” (Article 1) is overly simplistic for the Venezuelan context. More than twenty years of systematic repression and persecution for dissent require precise typologies. Enumerating historical events does not clearly define what constitutes a “political or related offense.” This lack of specificity grants excessive discretionary power to judges—who, in a country without judicial independence, may reproduce the very arbitrariness the law seeks to correct.

This vagueness also excludes many situations that have been used by the repressive apparatus, since not all unjustly imprisoned individuals were detained for “acts of violence.” The law further establishes the exclusion of “offenses against public property” (Article 7.4), which is particularly dangerous. It places corruption crimes and the use of administrative sanctions as political punishment in the same category. As a result, the bill leaves unprotected those subjected to political disqualifications or public officials persecuted and harassed for ideological reasons. This is not accidental: it prevents the creation of precedents that could support amnesty for figures such as María Corina Machado and other politically disqualified actors.

The bodies authorized to execute it are the courts and the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the same institutions responsible for the abuses the law seeks to remedy.

Beyond typification, the bill also omits important events that deserve amnesty. Although the introductory provisions establish a period “from January 1, 1999 to January 30, 2026,” Article 6 does not mention events from 2015, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, and part of 2024. As a result, it excludes cases involving military personnel unjustly imprisoned, such as Operación Gedeón or the 2018 drone attack against Maduro. The law’s temporal scope remains unclear due to its own internal contradictions.

Another troubling aspect is the interpretative principle set out in Article 5, which states that in case of doubt, the interpretation favoring the protection of human rights shall prevail, leaving out a basic criminal law principle: in dubio pro reo, meaning that doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.

Paying oneself and giving change back

The procedure for implementing the amnesty is not verifiable. The bodies authorized to execute it are the courts and the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the same institutions responsible for the abuses the law seeks to remedy. A clear example of the dangers of this arrangement is the revocation of Juan Pablo Guanipa’s release order, announced by the Public Prosecutor’s Office through social media. Allowing the execution of the law to be controlled solely by those who committed the injustice is akin to cheating oneself.

Moreover, the procedure requires the initiative to come from the Public Prosecutor’s Office or from the person prosecuted or convicted, leaving a gap for those physically unable to file requests themselves, including detainees and people in exile. To remedy this, legal representation in the amnesty process must be explicitly authorized.

The legislative process must be further opened to include citizens, families of those still unjustly detained, and especially those recently released. Their testimonies are essential.

Recognizing these deficiencies, our duty as jurists and as Venezuelans is also to propose solutions. The first recommendation is to guarantee publicity and transparency throughout the legislative process. The National Assembly could turn the process that began on Thursday into a genuine national consultation. Recent invitations extended to law school deans from UCAB, UNIMET, and UCV, as well as to human rights groups such as Provea, Foro Penal, and Acceso a la Justicia, are encouraging signs—provided these voices are genuinely heard and reflected in substantive changes.

Beware of forgetting by design

Still, this effort is not enough. An amnesty law should be the framework for reconciliation and peacebuilding. The legislative process must be further opened to include citizens, families of those still unjustly detained, and especially those recently released. Their testimonies are essential to understanding past abuses and designing guarantees of non-repetition.

The second recommendation concerns the substance of the law. Amnesty cannot be treated as a communications tool of “clemency.” Its purpose must be non-repetition. As Juan Miguel Matheus (2019) aptly put it, reconciliation requires “forgetting enough so that there is no room for revenge or historical resentment, and remembering enough to prevent atrocities from happening again.”

In this regard, the bill’s provision mandating the elimination of files and records related to amnesty beneficiaries is deeply problematic. Rather than promoting truth, it risks enabling impunity for officials who committed human rights violations. Documentation must be preserved to ensure accountability and non-repetition.

Article 12 further establishes that oversight of the law’s implementation would fall to the Executive, through the Ministry of Interior, Justice, and Peace—headed by Diosdado Cabello, who has led repression and state violence for years. This makes genuine oversight impossible. A third recommendation, therefore, is the creation of a Special Commission within the National Assembly, composed of lawmakers and civil society representatives, to monitor compliance.

The bill also lacks transitional provisions and does not repeal existing repressive laws. A fourth recommendation is the repeal of legislation such as the anti-hate law, the so-called anti-NGO, and the asset forfeiture law, as well as the reversal of unjust political bans imposed by the Comptroller General and the reinstatement of officials removed for ideological reasons.

Finally, a call to lawmakers and those invited to participate in this process, from universities, civil society and other sectors. The amnesty bill is not a gift from the regime to the opposition. It is an opportunity to pacify the country and find real pathways toward a transition. This responsibility demands that we act with everyone in mind: those inside and outside the country, and all those who could be covered by the law.

In moments of confusion, we must focus on what matters. An amnesty law is being debated and will be approved. Perfect solutions are difficult to produce in the current circumstances, but the recommendations of civil society and experts must be translated into substantive changes. Reconciliation in Venezuela means healing after years of injustice in order to rebuild a society battered by conflict.

The new law must serve to ensure that the regime acknowledges that, for years, it implemented a policy of repression and persecution. From there, it must enable the reconstruction of the rule of law, the restoration of trust in institutions, and the transition toward a country where all people have real opportunities to live with dignity.

As citizens, we have the task of demanding (even through informal channels, the only ones available to us in the absence of functioning institutions) that institutional norms be respected and that justice and peace be guaranteed. This is a law still under construction. It is not a symbolic gesture by the regime. We must turn it into the starting point for genuine reconciliation.

In October 2001, two years into his presidency, Hugo Chávez made a trip to London to meet with then UK prime minister Tony Blair and other high-level officials.

Official records detail how the Venezuelan president’s proposed Hydrocarbons Law, a major restructuring of Venezuela’s oil industry, was high on the British agenda.

The law aimed to assert sovereignty over Venezuela’s resources by mandating at least 50% state ownership in mixed enterprises and increasing royalties on foreign oil interests.

This was a serious cause for concern for Britain, whose main interests in Venezuela centred on Shell, BP, and BG Group’s investments in the oil and gas industry.

“British companies have over $4bn already invested” in Venezuela, noted one Foreign Office official, with new investments of another $3bn planned for the oil industry.

Blair was thus instructed by advisers to impress on Chávez that the UK government was “following your proposed hydrocarbons legislation very closely”.

In private, Blair’s adviser and future MI6 chief John Sawers wrote that “the only reason for seeing him is to benefit British oil and gas companies”.

Sawers’ note drove at the core issue which had been guiding Britain’s relations with Venezuela for over a century: oil.

Declassified has combed through dozens of files in the National Archives which expose how the UK government has repeatedly sought to thwart the nationalisation of oil in Venezuela since it was first discovered during the early twentieth century.

Working in partnership with Britain’s leading oil corporations, the Foreign Office has resorted to political pressure, propaganda activities, and covert operations to maintain control over Venezuela’s lucrative crude. 

The origins of Britain’s interest in Venezuela’s oil

In 1912, Royal Dutch-Shell began operations in Venezuela and, two years later, the company – alongside US firm General Asphalt – discovered a petroleum field in the small town of Mene Grande.

George Bernard Reynolds, a geologist at Venezuelan Oil Concessions Limited (VOC), a Shell subsidiary, described the supplies as “enough to satisfy the most exacting”.

By 1920, the CIA reported that practically all of Venezuela’s oil production and its most promising concessions were held by Royal Dutch-Shell and two American companies, Jersey Standard (SOCNJ) and Gulf.

Indeed, Venezuelan oil controlled by Royal Dutch-Shell had increased by over 600% from 210,000 barrels in 1917 to 1,584,000 in 1921. 

“Is there any other company more conclusively British than this”, asked Sir Marcus Samuel, chairman of the Shell Transport and Trading Company, in June 1915, “who have proved themselves more willing and able to serve the interests of the Empire?”

But foreign control over oil had serious consequences for Venezuela’s land and people.

In 1936, oil workers in Maracaibo called a general strike in response to low wages, poor living conditions and the association of oil firms with the late dictator, Juan Vicente Gómez. It lasted for 43 days, during which time oil production decreased by 39%.

In response, Venezuelan president General Eleazar López Contreras introduced a series of reforms to improve labour conditions.

This made him unpopular with the British and US oil executives, who were described by US ambassador Meredith Nicholson as belonging to “the old school of ‘imperialists’ who believed that might – in the business sense – was right”.

Venezuela’s oil nonetheless remained central to the British imperial project and, by the outbreak of World War Two, Venezuelan oil “took on particular significance within the British war effort as oil from the Middle East became less accessible following the closure of the Mediterranean in 1940”, according to research by academic Mark Seddon.

Officials therefore became increasingly worried about nationalisation in Latin America, particularly after foreign oil interests – including those of Shell – had been expropriated in Mexico in 1938.

That year, for instance, British diplomat John Balfour wrote: “We should do all we can to show that it is not in the interests of a Latin-American country like Mexico to eliminate British interests from participating in the exploitation of its oil resources”.

A dangerous opponent of capital

Concerns around nationalisation arose once again during the Rómulo Betancourt administration in the 1940s.

He was described by the Foreign Office in 1945 as “by far the most dangerous opponent of capital in Venezuela”, while the oil companies worried about his past support for communism.

These concerns proved overblown as Betancourt developed into a staunch anti-communist. According to a CIA file dated March 1948, Betancourt and his predecessor, Rómulo Gallegos, met to discuss “the proposed outlawing of the Communist Party in Venezuela.”

The first step, according to the document, “was the dismissal from the [oil workers union] Fedepetrol of all Communist Party petroleum syndicate delegates”.

Shell’s directors nonetheless responded positively to the military coup which toppled Betancourt in 1948.

They believed, as UK ambassador John H. Magowan noted in February 1949, that the new administration would “reverse the Betancourt tendency to hostility towards the ‘capitalists’ and ‘colonial’ powers”.

While US-owned SOCNJ had emerged as Venezuela’s main oil producer by this time, Shell remained the second most important player and, by 1950, the company had centralized its operations, building a modernist headquarters in northern Caracas.

The propaganda campaign

During the 1960s, as the shadow of the Cold War cast over Latin America, a propaganda unit within the Foreign Office secretly worked to protect Britain’s oil interests in Venezuela.

That unit, named the Information Research Department (IRD), had been set up in 1948 to collect information about communism and distribute it to contacts worldwide.

The goal was to build resilience against communist and other national liberation movements while cultivating foreign agents of influence such as journalists, politicians, military officers, and businessmen.

By 1961, the IRD viewed Venezuela as the third most important country in Latin America in light of the risk of left-wing “subversion” and Britain’s strategic stake in the country’s oil industry.

That year, the IRD worked with Britain’s intelligence services to promote a boycott of El Nacional, the largest newspaper in Venezuela, with the goal of forcing it “to abandon its campaign in favor of expropriating foreign companies and promoting communist agitation”.

The campaign not only had the backing of powerful conservative and anti-communist groups in Venezuela but also the foreign oil companies, who agreed to suspend their advertising in the newspaper.

By 1962, IRD officer Leslie Boas was able to boast that El Nacional had “changed its tone in a great way”, with the newspaper’s circulation also dropping from 70,000 to 45,000 per day.

Reactionary networks in Venezuela were also being covertly funded by Shell in this period, according to recently declassified files.

In April 1962, Boas wrote to IRD chief Donald Hopson about the Latin American Information Committee (LAIC) which was “now doing quite active work… in Venezuela”.

The first director of LAIC was Enno Hobbing, who divided his work between Time/Life magazine and the CIA and later played a role in Chile’s 1973 coup d’état.

Boas explained that he “had a long talk with Hobbing […] and there do seem to be one or two ways in which we can be of mutual help without either of us burning our fingers”.

Such help would include “an unattributable supply of IRD material to contacts” of LAIC in return for LAIC supplying Boas with access to and information about local anti-communist networks.

Remarkably, Boas disclosed that Shell was “contributing financially to” LAIC alongside US retailer Sears Roebuck and other “International Business Machines”.

He added that “none of the local branches of these companies such as Shell de Venezuela are cooperating either financially or overtly in any way, it is being done through their head offices and LAIC who have their own offices in New York”.

It was during this period that Shell and BP were also providing direct, “handsome” subsidies to the IRD to promote their oil interests across Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa.

Nationalisation rekindled

The IRD continued to promote Britain’s oil interests in Venezuela through the 1960s and 1970s, until the unit was closed down in 1977.

In a country assessment sheet for Venezuela, dated 1969, an IRD official noted how “we have considerable investments in the country, particularly those of Shell, whose fixed installations alone have been conservatively valued at £300 million”.

The official continued: “Shell’s operations in Venezuela play an important role in the company’s very substantial contribution in invisibles [earnings through intangible assets] to our balance of payments”, noting that Britain’s key objective was therefore “to protect our investments”.

Two years later, IRD field officer Ian Knight Smith wrote to London with concerns about how “the emotional issue of economic nationalism, always a potent force in a country whose main natural resources are largely in the hands of foreign companies, was [being] rekindled”.

Worse still, the Venezuelan president, Rafael Caldera, had “made his own contribution to the new nationalism – in the shape of a law nationalising all natural gas deposits”.

The IRD consequently prepared briefings “on communist instigation of charges against the international oil companies” to be shared with contacts across Venezuela.

In addition, the propaganda unit “cast around for material with which to brief IRD contacts who are in a position to influence government policy or legislation affecting foreign investments in Venezuela”.

Officials were particularly interested in commissioning a “well-researched paper on the positive aspects of foreign investment in developing countries, helping to counter the growing assumption, carefully fostered by the extreme left, that all foreign investment is basically suspect”.

It was within this context that the Foreign Office privately advised that “we should protect as far as we are able Shell’s continued access to Venezuelan oil”.

Share of the gravy

For all its efforts, the IRD was not able to turn the tide of nationalisation in Venezuela, with plans developed during the 1970s for the early reversion of foreign oil interests to the state.

Venezuelan oil was officially nationalised in 1976, with foreign companies including Shell being replaced by the state-owned Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA).

But this was by no means the end of the road for Britain’s oil interests in Venezuela.

In a background briefing for a visit by Venezuelan president Carlos Andrés Pérez, dated November 1977, the Foreign Office observed that “Shell is still our largest single interest”.

The official added: “It should not be forgotten that despite nationalisation our largest commercial stake in this country is still Shell, and although they no longer, since nationalisation, produce oil here, they earn millions of dollars from their service and marketing contracts with their former company”.

The company also continued “to off-take very large volumes of Venezuelan oil for sale mostly in the US and Canada”.

Another official remarked upon the “furious activity of all European countries, including ourselves, in trying to get our share of Venezuela’s economic gravy”.

By 1978, the New York Times went so far as to say that Shell was “busier in Venezuela than before the oil industry was nationalized”.

‘Shell has been active‘

Even still, Britain’s oil firms wished to return to Venezuela’s oilfields.

Those hopes were stoked in the early 1990s by the “Oil Opening” of President Carlos Andrés Péres, whose austerity measures led to an explosion of poverty and street protests, but dashed once again by Chávez’ proposed Hydrocarbons Law in 2001.

In the lead-up to Chávez’ visit that year to London, Britain’s leading oil companies were once again in the prime minister’s ear about the projected impact on their interests.

Blair’s briefing noted unambiguously that UK and US companies were “concerned” about the oil reforms and wanted them watered down.

Days before the visit, Shell’s chairman Philip Watts offered suggestions on how Blair might handle Chávez.

“As you may have appreciated, Shell has been active in helping in the preparations for the visit through the Foreign Office”, Watts wrote.

“Considering the importance of the energy sector for both the Venezuelan and UK economies, I thought the PM may appreciate a small briefing on our… plans in Venezuela”, he added.

Those plans involved ameliorating the “uncertain investment climate” and softening the “fiscal and legal framework” in the country.

As part of the charm offensive, Watts also hosted a “farewell” banquet for Chávez, to which foreign secretary Jack Straw and other senior ministers were invited.

BP and BG Group also “registered their interest with No.10 about the visit”, with BP preparing “to put their case… forcefully” in favour of a meeting between the two leaders.

‘The Americans are concerned‘

The US government also weighed in on the matter.

On 18 October, an official in the British embassy in Washington wrote to London that “the Americans are concerned about the impact that the Hydrocarbons Law will have on investment in the energy sector”.

They continued: “The major oil companies, including BP, had all made clear that its tax and restrictive joint venture productions would hinder their operations”.

The US state department “thought it would be particularly useful for Chavez to hear these concerns in London, given his tendency to discount messages from the US”.

To this end, the George Bush administration hoped Blair would “talk sense into [Chávez] on the Hydrocarbons Law, where BP are among those who stand to lose”.

Further pressure was applied by Gustavo Cisneros, a Venezuelan billionaire and media mogul who was introduced to Blair in 2000 by Daily Telegraph owner Conrad Black.

Sawers, Blair’s adviser, noted that Cisneros’ “sole message” for Blair “was that Chávez was a real danger to stability and free markets (and, of course, rich Venezuelans like himself)”.

A briefing document prepared by Cisneros, for instance, warned that “Chavez will likely react” to oil prices dropping “by lashing out at the private sector”.

Sawers viewed Cisneros with suspicion but broadly agreed that Chávez was objectionable. There was, he wrote, “a chance that the picture [with Chávez] at the front door [of Downing Street] would come back to haunt us”.

He continued: “This is one of the World’s tyrants whose hand I won’t have to shake”.

The coup against Chávez

A coup against Chávez broke out in April 2002, orchestrated by dissident military and political figures with support from Washington.

Pedro Carmona, an economist who was unconstitutionally appointed Venezuela’s president, quickly set about dismantling the country’s democracy and reversing Chávez’s oil reforms.

He happened to be in the offices of Cisneros, the mega mogul who had taken the opportunity to “pour poison” into Blair’s ears about Chávez, when the coup broke out.

The declassified files show how Britain quietly hoped the Carmona regime would be more accommodating to foreign interests while noting the unconstitutional nature of the coup.

“The Cabinet is strong on experience and business” and “hopefully its management capability will be much higher”, wrote the British embassy in Caracas.

The embassy was also informed by UK business leaders in Venezuela that “their operations should be back to normal by 15 April”, while Shell’s “production of oil was unaffected”.

At the same time, however, the Foreign Office was disturbed by the fact that “no one” had “ever elected” the Carmona regime.

“Venezuela may or may not have wanted to get rid of Chavez, but not necessarily to lose the other parts of their democratic system”, one official wrote. “The right-wing businessmen seem to have shot themselves in the foot”.

Notably, the UK government seemed to have some knowledge of Washington’s role in the events.

On 14 April, with Chávez imprisoned in a military barracks, the British embassy in Caracas cabled to London that the US ambassador had been spending “some hours in the Presidential Palace”.

“Please protect [the information]”, they instructed.

The opposition

The coup was short-lived.

Chávez was reinstated within 47 hours following a wave of popular mobilisations across Caracas.

With Chávez back at the helm, the Foreign Office quietly hoped that “the events of the last few days” would be seen as “a serious warning to change his ways”.

But the situation remained tense, with UK foreign secretary Jack Straw noting in July 2002 that Chávez’s position “remain[ed] shaky”.

The political opposition in Venezuela was seen by Whitehall as particularly intransigent, with Straw declaring that Chávez looks “positively resplendent compared with [them]”.

The Venezuelan opposition, Straw continued, “appear to be united, indeed motivated, by sheer indignation that someone like Chávez (not one of them and above all not white) should be in charge and have such a popular power base”.

An official in Britain’s embassy in Caracas similarly noted in 2002 that the Venezuela opposition “looks like a train that tried to breach a wall on one track in April and are now seeking to do the same on a slightly different track and at a slightly different angle”.

They added: “The opposition’s self-delusion is growing worse by the day: they claim alternately they are living in either a fascist or communist dictatorship”.

One of the key opposition figures in this period was María Corina Machado, with whom the UK government is currently in talks amid a renewed regime change campaign in Venezuela.

Source: Declassified UK

Machado ally says ‘there’s a lot to talk about regarding the present and future of Venezuela’ after release.

Venezuelan opposition politician Juan Pablo Guanipa has been freed from jail, his family said in a statement.

Guanipa’s release on Sunday is the latest high-profile liberation by the government in Caracas, which is under pressure from the United States to free political prisoners.

Rights group Foro Penal says it has verified 383 liberations of political prisoners since the government announced a new series of releases on January 8.

“Ten months in hiding and almost nine months detained here,” Guanipa said after being released.

“There’s a lot to talk about regarding the present and future of Venezuela, always with the truth front and centre.”

Guanipa, a well-known politician in Venezuela and a close ally of Nobel Peace Prize winner and opposition leader Maria Corina Machado, was arrested in May 2025 after months in hiding for allegedly leading a “terrorist” plot. His family and political movement have strenuously denied the allegations.

Earlier this month, Guanipa’s family said they had also been able to see him in person for the first time in months, and that he was in good physical health.

Machado celebrated Guanipa’s release in a statement on X, calling for all political prisoners to be released.

Exiled Venezuelan opposition figurehead Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia also demanded “the immediate release” of all political prisoners.

“These releases are not synonymous with full and complete freedom,” he posted on X.

“As long as legal proceedings remain open and restrictive measures, threats or surveillance remain, the persecution continues,” he added.

Venezuela’s opposition and human rights groups have said for years that the country’s government uses detentions to stamp out dissent.

The government has, however, denied holding political prisoners and says those jailed have committed crimes.

The country’s interim President Delcy Rodriguez has also announced a proposed “amnesty law” for hundreds of prisoners in the country, and said the infamous Helicoide detention centre in Caracas, which rights groups have long denounced as the site of prisoner abuse, will be converted into a centre for sport and social services in the capital.

The legislation, which would grant immediate clemency to people jailed for participating in political protests or critiquing public figures, return assets of those detained and cancel Interpol and other international measures previously issued by the government – passed in an initial vote at the National Assembly this week. It will, however, need to be approved a second time to become law.

Rodriguez, who took office after the US abducted and deposed Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro last month, has been releasing the political prisoners and complying with US demands on oil deals.

Caracas, February 6, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Luigi Giuliano, attorney for former Venezuelan diplomat and Industry Minister Alex Saab, has denied reports that his client was arrested in Caracas on Wednesday.

“It is simply not true that he has been arrested,” Giuliano told Reuters, adding that Saab hoped to meet with Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez “for clarification.”

Colombian outlet Caracol claimed on Wednesday afternoon that Saab and prominent Venezuelan businessman Raúl Gorrín had been detained by Venezuela’s intelligence agency, the SEBIN.

An anonymous US official confirmed the arrest to Reuters, while other sources alleged that Saab and Gorrín were brought in for questioning concerning US money laundering charges as part of law enforcement cooperation between Caracas and Washington.

The two countries have expedited diplomatic rapprochement in the wake of the US’ January 3 bombings and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro. The Trump White House has sought to coerce the Rodríguez acting administration, including by administering Venezuelan crude exports.

Venezuelan officials have yet to issue any official statement concerning the two high-profile figures, whose whereabouts are presently unknown. 

National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez stated on Wednesday that he had no information about the case. On Thursday, Attorney General Tarek William Saab initially denied the arrest reports before stating instead that he had no knowledge of the matter.

Alex Saab and Gorrín have made no public statements since Wednesday. Saab’s wife, Camilla Fabbri, who heads the government’s “Return to the Homeland” repatriation program, posted on social media about the arrival of a deportation flight from the US on Friday, but offered no comment on her husband’s rumored arrest.

A Colombian-born businessman, Saab became a key ally and diplomatic envoy of the Maduro government for his role in securing imports amid US sanctions. He was arrested in 2020 on US orders during a stop in Cape Verde and was extradited to the US following a long legal battle.

Venezuelan authorities, alongside lawyers and activists, launched a sustained campaign to denounce Saab’s arrest in violation of his diplomatic immunity and demand his release. He spent more than three years in prison, facing money laundering conspiracy charges, before Caracas secured his freedom as part of a prisoner exchange deal with the Biden administration in December 2023.

Saab was appointed industry minister by Maduro in October 2024 and was replaced by Luis Villegas in January under the acting Rodríguez administration.

For his part, Gorrín has been blacklisted by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and charged by the US Justice Department with corruption and money laundering.

Gorrín is the owner of La Vitalicia insurance and the private TV broadcaster Globovisión.

Caracas, February 6, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez held meetings with oil executives from Repsol (Spain) and Maurel & Prom (France) on Wednesday as part of ongoing efforts to secure energy investments amid US pressure and unilateral sanctions.

“We discussed the models established in the reformed Hydrocarbon Law to strengthen production and build solid alliances toward economic growth,” Rodríguez wrote on social media.

State oil company PDVSA, represented at the meetings by its president, Héctor Obregón, touted the prospects of establishing “strategic alliances” and “win-win cooperation” with the foreign multinational corporations. 

The Rodríguez administration recently pushed a sweeping reform of Venezuela’s Hydrocarbon Law. Corporations are set to have increased control over crude extraction and exports, while the Venezuelan executive can discretionally reduce taxes and royalties and lease out oil projects in exchange for a cut of production.

Venezuelan leaders have defended the pro-business reform as a step forward to attract investment for a key industry that has been hard hit by US coercive measures, including financial sanctions and an export embargo, since 2017, as part of efforts to strangle the Venezuelan economy and bring about regime change.

Former President Hugo Chávez had overhauled oil legislation in 2001 to reestablish the state’s primacy over the sector with mandatory majority stakes in joint ventures, increased fiscal contributions, and a leading PDVSA operational role. Increased revenues financed the Bolivarian government’s aggressive social programs of the 2000s, which dramatically reduced poverty and expanded access to healthcare, housing, and education for the popular classes. 

Repsol and Maurel & Prom currently hold stakes in several oil and natural gas joint ventures in the South American country. The two firms, as well as Italy’s Eni, have operated in a stop-start fashion in recent years as a result of US sanctions. 

The European companies have consistently lobbied for increased control and benefits in their projects in the molds now established in the reformed energy legislation.

Since launching military attacks and kidnapping Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on January 3, the Trump administration has vowed to take control of the Venezuelan oil sector and impose favorable conditions for US corporations. Senior US officials have praised Caracas’ oil reform.

According to reports, the White House has dictated that proceeds from Venezuelan crude sales be deposited in US-run accounts in Qatar, with an initial agreement comprising 30-50 million barrels of oil that had built up in Venezuelan storage as a result of a US naval blockade since December.

On Tuesday, the US Treasury Department issued a license allowing Venezuelan imports of US diluents required to upgrade extra-heavy crude into exportable blends. On January 27, Washington issued a sanctions waiver allowing US companies to purchase and market Venezuelan crude. The exemption requires payments to be made to US-controlled accounts and bars dealings with firms from Russia, Iran, Cuba, and North Korea.

The US Treasury is additionally preparing a license to allow US companies to extract Venezuelan oil, according to Bloomberg.

The White House has urged US corporations to invest in the Venezuelan oil sector and promised favorable conditions. However, executives have expressed reservations over significant new investments. According to Reuters, US refiners have likewise not been able to absorb the sudden surge of Venezuelan heavy crude supplies, while Canadian WCS crude remains a competitive alternative. 

Vitol and Trafigura, two commodities traders picked by the White House to lift Venezuelan oil, have offered cargoes to European and Asian customers as well. India’s Reliance Industries is reportedly set to purchase 2 million barrels. In recent years, the refining giant has looked to Venezuela as a potential crude supplier but seen imports repeatedly curtailed by US threats of secondary sanctions.

US authorities have reportedly delivered US $500 million from an initial sale to Venezuelan private banks, which are offering the foreign currency in auctions that are said to prioritize private sector food and healthcare importers. Nevertheless, Venezuelan and US officials have not disclosed details about the remaining funds in a deal estimated at $1.2-2 billion.

Besides controlling crude sales, the Trump administration has also sought to impose conditions on the Venezuelan government’s spending of oil revenues. On Tuesday, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told House Representatives that the flow of oil funds will be subject to outside audits. 

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio had told a Senate committee last week that US authorities would scrutinize Caracas’ public expenditure and claimed that Venezuelan leaders needed to submit a “budget request” in order to access the country’s oil proceeds.

Washington’s attempted takeover of the Venezuelan oil industry also has an expressed goal of reducing the presence of Russian and Chinese companies. On Thursday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told media that the country’s enterprises are being “openly forced out” of the Caribbean nation at the behest of the US.

In mid-January, the US’ naval blockade drove away Chinese-flagged tankers on their way to Venezuela. With crude shipments partly used to offset longterm oil-for-loan agreements, Beijing has reportedly sought assurances of the repayment of debts estimated at $10-20 billion. For their part, independent Chinese refiners have moved to replace Venezuelan supplies with Iranian heavy crude.

An amnesty law that would provide clemency to political prisoners in Venezuela has passed an initial vote unanimously in the National Assembly, stirring hopes among the country’s opposition.

On Thursday, members of both the governing socialist party and the opposition delivered speeches in favour of the new legislation, known as the Amnesty Law for Democratic Coexistence.

“The path of this law is going to be full of obstacles, full of bitter moments,” said Jorge Rodriguez, the head of the National Assembly.

But he added that it would be necessary to “swallow hard” in order to help the country move forward.

“We ask for forgiveness, and we also have to forgive,” Rodriguez said.

But critics nevertheless pointed out that the text of the bill has yet to be made public, and it offers no clemency for individuals accused of serious crimes, including drug trafficking, murder, corruption or human rights violations.

Instead, media reports about the legislation indicate that it focuses on charges often levelled against protesters and opposition leaders.

What does the bill say?

The bill would grant amnesty to individuals accused of crimes like treason, terrorism, rebellion, resisting authorities, instigation of illegal activities, and spreading hate, if those crimes were committed in the context of political activism or protest.

Opposition leaders like Maria Corina Machado would also see bans on their candidacy for public office lifted.

In addition, the legislation specifies certain events that would qualify for amnesty, including the demonstrations that unfolded in 2007, 2014, 2017, 2019 and 2024.

That period stretches from the presidency of the late President Hugo Chavez, founder of the “chavismo” movement, through the presidency of his handpicked successor, Nicolas Maduro.

Both Chavez and Maduro were accused of the violent suppression of dissent, through arbitrary arrest, torture and extrajudicial killings.

But on January 3, the administration of United States President Donald Trump launched a military operation in Venezuela to abduct Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. They have since been transported to New York City, where they await trial on charges related to drug trafficking.

While members of Venezuela’s opposition have cheered the military operation as a long overdue move, experts have argued that the US likely violated international law as well as Venezuela’s sovereignty in removing Maduro from power.

Weighing Maduro’s legacy

Images of Chavez were a common sight during Thursday’s debate at the National Assembly, which has been dominated since 2017 by members of the chavismo movement.

That year, Venezuela’s top court dissolved the opposition-led National Assembly and briefly absorbed its powers, before re-establishing a legislature stacked with Maduro supporters.

In 2018 and again in 2024, Maduro claimed victory in contested elections that critics say were marred by fraud.

In the July 2024 vote, for instance, the government refused to release voter tallies, as was previously standard practice. The opposition, however, obtained copies of nearly 80 percent of the tallies, which contradicted the government’s claims that Maduro had won a third six-year term.

After Maduro’s abduction last month, the remnants of his government remained in power.

Within days, his vice president — Delcy Rodriguez, the sister of the National Assembly leader — was sworn in as interim president.

She used her inaugural speech to denounce the “kidnapping of two heroes who are being held hostage: President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores”.

Rodriguez has nevertheless cooperated with US demands, including by supporting a bill to open Venezuela’s nationalised oil industry to foreign investment.

On the floor of the National Assembly on Thursday, her brother Jorge raised a photo of Chavez holding a crucifix while he spoke. Maduro’s son, National Assembly member Nicolas Maduro Guerra, also presented remarks.

“Venezuela cannot endure any more acts of revenge,” Maduro Guerra said as he appealed for “reconciliation”.

Venezuela’s opposition reacts

Still, opposition members in the National Assembly expressed optimism about the bill.

National Assembly representative Tomas Guanipa, for instance, called it the start of a “new, historic chapter” in Venezuelan history, one where political dissidents would no longer be “afraid to speak their minds for fear of being imprisoned”.

Nearly 7.9 million Venezuelans have left the country in recent decades, fleeing political persecution and economic instability.

But there have been lingering concerns about the human rights situation in Venezuela in the weeks following Maduro’s abduction — and whether it is safe to return home.

President Rodriguez has pledged to release political detainees and close the infamous prison El Helicoide, where reports of torture have emerged. But some experts say the number of people released does not match the number the government has reported.

The human rights group Foro Penal, for instance, has documented 383 releases since January 8.

That figure, however, is lower than the 900 political prisoners the government has claimed to have released. Foro Penal estimates 680 political prisoners remain in detention.

Opposition figures also allege that the government continues to intimidate and harass those who voice sympathy for Maduro’s removal and other opinions that run contrary to the chavismo movement.

Still, the head of Foro Penal, Alfredo Romero, applauded the initial passage of the amnesty law as a step forward.

“Amnesty is the framework that will ensure… that the past does not serve to halt or derail transition processes,” Romero told the news agency AFP.

A second vote is expected to be held on Tuesday next week.