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Islamabad, Pakistan – A wooden panelled bookshelf behind him, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif signed the memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the United States and Iran, aimed at extending their ceasefire by creating a pathway towards long-term peace.

Sharif then held up the document for the cameras. That was June 17, the high point of a frenzied diplomatic effort led by Pakistan spanning weeks, which had culminated in the MoU that Sharif signed as a mediator.

Yet less than four weeks later, Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has, in just the past few days, issued two statements expressing “deep concern” over renewed US-Iran hostilities, with the MoU Islamabad had helped pull together seemingly in shreds.

On Monday morning, the US launched the latest in a series of attacks on Iran, which responded by firing missiles and drones at multiple Gulf and Arab nations that it blamed for hosting US military bases.

Hours later, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei told reporters that mediators, including Pakistan, Qatar and Oman, remained engaged and were continuing their efforts, even as he warned that Iran would continue responding to what it viewed as US non-compliance with the MoU.

So far, those efforts have failed to slow down the fighting, even as Pakistan has pressed on with diplomatic outreach.

On Sunday, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar spoke by phone with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, telling him that dialogue and diplomacy remained “the only viable path” to resolving the crisis.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif also spoke to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on Friday, warning that “hard-earned” peace gains were at risk, while Dar held a separate call on Saturday with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud.

To many analysts, one question, above all, now stares at Pakistan and other mediators like Qatar: With the deep distrust between the US and Iran only further expanding following the new bout of fighting, can Islamabad or any other capital once again bring Washington and Tehran back to the negotiating table?

Repeated breakdowns

The renewed fighting marks at least the third occasion since the US-Iran ceasefire signed on April 8 appeared to have collapsed.

Days after that truce was agreed on, the breakdown of the first round of Islamabad talks led to the US imposing a naval blockade on Iranian ships in the Strait of Hormuz. The US and Iran both attacked ships in the days that followed.

Then, after the MoU was signed on June 17, Iran attacked several ships that it claimed were passing through the Strait of Hormuz without its permission, prompting another escalation with Washington.

But the Iranian tanker strikes last week appear to have raised tensions to new heights.

US attacks on Iran since then have hit at least 10 provinces, killing a soldier, several fishermen in the southern province of Hormozgan, and a firefighter in Sistan and Baluchestan, according to Iranian authorities.

A railway bridge on a trade corridor linking Iran with Central Asia and China was also struck, along with a bridge near Mashhad used by mourners travelling to former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s funeral.

The renewed hostilities have also pulled Qatar, a fellow mediator alongside Pakistan, more directly into the conflict. On Sunday, Iranian missiles and drones hit the Gulf state, with debris from interceptions injuring three people, including a child, according to Qatar’s Ministry of Interior.

Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has accused Washington of violating “nearly all parts” of the June agreement within 25 days of its signing, citing attacks on transport infrastructure and fishing vessels.

Baghaei said on Monday that Iran had “acted in good faith” throughout, but that “each time the other party has failed to meet its obligations, we did not uphold ours, and we will continue to act in this manner.”

Since the war began on February 28, Islamabad has played the role of mediator.

It hosted talks in April, the first time in four decades that US and Iranian officials sat in a room together.

Its army chief and interior minister have travelled to Tehran several times. In late March, Pakistan also helped secure a Chinese-backed peace framework alongside its own diplomatic efforts.

In June, it helped produce the MoU signed by Pezeshkian and US President Donald Trump, along with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, which was then discussed at the Burgenstock summit in Switzerland.

Yet analysts say Pakistan lacks the means to enforce the agreements it helps broker.

Javad Heiran-Nia, director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Tehran, said the MoU was never intended to resolve the underlying dispute.

“The MoU deferred key and substantive issues to future negotiations and functioned primarily as a tactical instrument to halt hostilities and reopen the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping,” he told Al Jazeera.

Iran, he said, sees control of the waterway as “a strategic asset; not merely a coercive lever, but a deterrent tool”, and appears “prepared to accept the risk of war to preserve this strategic advantage”.

Mediators, he added, lack the instruments to resolve the dispute “unless a shift in the balance of power between Iran and the United States emerges as a result of limited military engagements”, pointing to a potential US naval blockade as one of the few developments that could alter the strategic calculus.

Dania Thafer, executive director of the Gulf International Forum in Doha, said Pakistan’s room for manoeuvre had narrowed as both sides hardened their positions over the strait.

“Pakistan is in a situation where it is highly dependent on both parties, as it always has been, but right now, Iran is bent on establishing its control over the Strait of Hormuz,” she told Al Jazeera.

According to Thafer, there is little Pakistan can do to de-escalate while both Washington and Tehran remain in “an escalatory phase”.

“Once they feel they have reached a point where the balance tips in favour of one side or the other, then perhaps they will return to the negotiating table,” she added.

But Qamar Cheema, head of the Islamabad-based Sanober Institute, pushed back on the idea that Pakistan is operating without real tools.

He pointed to US Vice President JD Vance’s recent remarks, where he credited Pakistani Field Marshal Asim Munir’s role in the process, as evidence that Islamabad’s military-diplomatic channel carries real weight in Washington.

Access itself, he argued, is the instrument.

“Pakistan enjoys trust, and that’s why both sides pick up the phone and call Pakistani leadership any time to remove a stumbling block,” Cheema told Al Jazeera.

Crowded diplomacy, narrowing options

But Pakistan has not been the only diplomatic channel, and according to Heiran-Nia, the dispute over the strait was never really Islamabad’s to mediate.

“Iran had previously removed the Strait of Hormuz issue from Pakistan’s mediation agenda, as the matter was essentially bilateral between Tehran and Muscat,” he said.

Tehran, he explained, did not want the issue to be “defined within a broader negotiation package under Pakistani auspices, which would have afforded Washington room for political manoeuvre”.

Direct Iran-Oman talks followed, but “US military pressure and economic sanctions threats against Oman have placed Muscat under considerable strain, preventing meaningful progress,” according to the Tehran-based analyst.

Meanwhile, he cautioned that Sunday’s attacks on Qatar “could have adverse effects on Qatar’s mediatory role”, although Doha “does not currently appear inclined to withdraw”, adding that “Iran should not assume that Doha’s patience is limitless.”

Mustafa Hyder Sayed, executive director of the Pakistan-China Institute in Islamabad, described the GCC states as caught in an uncomfortable position.

“The GCC countries are caught between the devil and the deep blue sea. They want a functional relationship with Iran while not openly declining the use of their bases and territory by the United States, because they understand they cannot choose their neighbours,” he told Al Jazeera.

Meanwhile, Israel, which is not a party to the MoU, has continued military operations in Lebanon, which Tehran cites as an ongoing violation of the agreement.

Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz said on Saturday that southern Lebanon “would become Gaza”, raising the prospect of further regional escalation.

Who blinks first?

Despite a week of escalating attacks, the core dispute remains unchanged.

Washington and Tehran remain divided over the same issue that stalled negotiations even before the latest round of fighting: Who controls passage through the Strait of Hormuz, and under what conditions?

Iran insists the MoU gave it authority over transit through the waterway. The US disputes that.

On Monday, Trump announced that the US was reinstating a naval blockade of Iranian ships and would charge a 20 percent tariff on all other ships trying to pass through the strait.

Yet, earlier, a possible compromise had briefly emerged.

Heiran-Nia said the parties explored a formula under which commercial vessels would coordinate passage with both Iran and a designated Arab Gulf state, allowing “both parties [to] claim a degree of victory”.

The talks stalled before reaching a conclusion, however, interrupted by the funeral of Iran’s former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, who was killed on the first day of the war in joint US-Israeli air strikes.

The conflict has since moved in the opposite direction, with military action aimed at shifting the balance of power rather than reviving negotiations.

“The prevailing trajectory now is the continuation of military strikes in an effort to shift the balance of power. Yet, there remains a risk that strategic calculations on either side could spiral beyond control,” Heiran-Nia said.

Thafer believes that, despite the violence, neither side has formally abandoned the MoU.

“Iran is framing this current round of escalation as a violation of the MoU rather than a reason to exit it, which means there could still be light at the end of the tunnel,” she said.

In her assessment, both sides bear responsibility for violating the agreement, from Iran’s attacks on shipping to Washington’s revocation of Iran’s oil sale licence and the military attacks. Yet the agreement remains, at least formally, in place.

Its future, she said, depends on which side ultimately gives ground over the strait. Iran retains what Thafer described as a “snapback capability” to disrupt shipping whenever it chooses.

“It is, militarily, very difficult to fully neutralise that Iranian capability. We will have to wait and see where the leverage finally sits,” she said.

Cheema, for his part, argued that Iran’s own conduct, more than any mediator’s diplomacy, is what will decide how this settles.

“Iranian authorities seem ambitious and aggressive, and are looking to take risks to project power, which makes it less likely that any agreement will reach a final conclusion. That means interventions from mediators will keep coming.”

Retired US General Mark Kimmitt warns renewed attacks in the Strait of Hormuz could push the US and Iran back towards wider conflict.

Regional mediators are stepping up efforts to prevent further escalation between Iran and the US. Qatar held talks in Tehran, while Oman is proposing a plan to manage shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Al Jazeera’s Resul Serdar explains.

The memorandum of understanding (MoU) the United States and Iran have signed is not a peace treaty. It is not even a credible framework for one. A vocal chorus of critics has rushed to portray it as a humiliation – evidence that President Donald Trump was manoeuvred into negotiations and extracted a poor deal from a regime that outplayed him.

That reading mistakes a mirage for reality. The Trump administration entered these talks with a precise understanding of what the Iranian regime is, what it wants and what any agreement with it is actually worth. No one in that negotiating team harbours the illusion that Tehran intends to honour commitments that constrain its core ambitions. The MоU is not a peace settlement. It is a mutually understood pause – a tactical intermission chosen by both sides for reasons that have nothing to do with trust and everything to do with time.

To grasp why, one needs only consult Iran’s unbroken record. That record is not a matter of interpretation or political dispute. It is a documented history of agreements made, commitments given and obligations systematically abandoned whenever honouring them conflicted with the regime’s objectives.

The pattern is consistent enough to constitute a doctrine: Iran negotiates under pressure, signs what is necessary to relieve that pressure and resumes its course once the immediate threat has passed.

The deeply flawed 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was the most prominent recent demonstration of this cycle. Presented as a landmark of multilateral diplomacy, it was in practice a subsidised intermission – a breathing space Iran used to consolidate resources, sustain its proxy networks and continue advancing its strategic programme. The JCPOA did not change Iranian behaviour. It funded and protected it.

The Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign was a direct response to that lesson: A regime of this kind cannot be managed through diplomatic lifelines. It can only be constrained by pressure severe enough to leave it no viable alternative to compliance.

The new MoU does not signal that Iran has changed. Its calculus remains what it has always been – survival and expansion, pursued through whatever tactical posture the moment requires. When pressure mounts, Iran negotiates. When pressure eases, Iran advances. Its negotiators are, by all available evidence, prepared to offer assurances they have no intention of keeping. This is not a failure of diplomatic craftsmanship. This is simply the nature of any negotiation with a regime like Iran’s.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Iranian nuclear programme. As a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran has repeatedly committed to transparent cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. It has repeatedly broken those commitments, blocking inspections, constructing clandestine enrichment facilities, destroying evidence and systematically deceiving the international community. The pattern is not one of occasional noncompliance. It is deliberate, sustained deception in pursuit of a single unwavering objective: the acquisition of a nuclear weapon.

A state genuinely committed to civilian nuclear energy has no need for a vast and enormously expensive domestic enrichment programme. Nuclear fuel can be purchased – from Russia, among others – at a fraction of the cost and without the international confrontation such a programme inevitably provokes.

Iran has chosen the far more costly and dangerous path for one reason: Enrichment is not a means to an end, but the end itself. Its rulers are committed to a nuclear weapon, and that commitment has survived changes in personnel, shifts in rhetoric and decades of pressure.

It will not be bargained away – and here lies the critical point that no amount of diplomatic optimism can paper over. Iran’s rulers are not pragmatic actors engaged in a conventional cost-benefit calculation. Their goals are theological and strategic in a way that places them beyond the reach of ordinary negotiation.

They do not govern in the interests of the Iranian people. The sanctions they have endured have devastated ordinary Iranians – driven up poverty, hollowed out the middle class, denied the population access to medicines and opportunity. None of that has moved the regime one degree from its course.

This is a regime that could, if it chose, transform its position entirely. It could make peace with its neighbours, normalise relations with the international community, shed the sanctions that have devastated its economy and dramatically improve the lives of Iranians. The price is not beyond reach: abandon the nuclear weapons programme, cease development of offensive ballistic missiles and end the sponsorship of terrorist proxies. Iran’s rulers have refused that bargain consistently and completely.

That is the essential context for understanding what the Trump administration is actually doing. It would be a serious misjudgement to read this MoU as evidence of American weakness or strategic confusion. The team that designed and executed the most effective pressure campaign against Iran in recent memory is not naive about this adversary.

Trump enters this pause knowing that Iran will not honour commitments that genuinely constrain it. He is not expecting otherwise. Neither side, in all likelihood, operates under any such illusion – which is precisely what makes the critics’ alarm about a “bad deal” somewhat beside the point.

You cannot be cheated by an agreement you never expected the other party to keep.

What this MoU represents is a mutually understood strategic pause, a breathing space both parties have chosen, for entirely different reasons, over immediate confrontation. Iran needs economic relief. A regime facing internal decay and a depleted treasury has strong incentives to buy time, replenish its resources and wait out what it calculates to be a finite window.

Tehran is acutely aware that Trump has roughly two and a half years remaining in office. From its perspective, survival through that period is itself a form of victory.

Washington’s calculus is different in kind. Keeping the Strait of Hormuz open is an immediate, non-negotiable goal – a choked strait means an energy price shock with global consequences. Beyond that, the US has its own repositioning to accomplish. Military inventories drawn down through recent operations are being restocked. Strategic options are being preserved and expanded.

A pause that enables that rebuilding, while avoiding a premature confrontation on unfavourable terms, is not a concession. It is preparation.

Trump has never wavered in his commitment to eliminating Iran as a strategic threat – not through wishful diplomacy, but through the kind of pressure that forecloses options. That commitment did not expire with the signing of this MoU. The question for Tehran is not whether American resolve exists but whether it can be outlasted. That is a wager the Iranian regime has made before and lost.

The international community will, as usual, observe from a careful distance. Many nations will urge Iran to be stopped while taking few steps to stop it, criticising US action and inaction with equal facility.

Trump understands this dynamic. It is the foundation of his approach to alliances – the insistence that partners bear proportionate burdens rather than simply drawing on American resolve while contributing little of their own.

The MoU will not resolve the Iranian problem. It was not designed to. When its terms expire or when Iran decides it has served its purpose, the nuclear programme will resume its advance, the proxies will be better resourced, and the Strait of Hormuz will once again become a flashpoint.

That outcome is not a possibility. Given Iran’s record, it is a near-certainty. The only consequential variable is whether the US and those willing to stand alongside it will be better positioned to act decisively when that moment arrives. Far from a mirage, the evidence suggests that is precisely what this administration is working to ensure.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.

Doha, Qatar – Gulf states have welcomed a breakthrough agreement between the United States and Iran to end a war they never wanted.

Six countries – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman – form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which was created in 1981 following fears of the perceived expansionist ambitions of the new Iranian government.

Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, Israel has attempted to isolate Iran and its wide network of regional proxy groups. But in a twist of irony, Israeli aggression in this pursuit has pushed some Gulf states closer to Tehran.

When Israel and the US launched strikes on Iran on February 28 – and Tehran responded by attacking Gulf states – they were again forced to reassess their relationship with their neighbour.

Gulf relations with Iran, at present, appear more shaped by realism than reconciliation, but this approach could help them navigate the uncertain road ahead.

“The ongoing conflict … compelled the Gulf states to pursue a more pragmatic relationship with Tehran, one that will include enhanced dialogue to deter conflict,” Farah al-Qawasmi, a researcher at the Gulf Studies Center at Qatar University, told Al Jazeera.

Embracing de-escalation – not Iran

All six GCC member states have welcomed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed by Iran and the US last week. But this is shaped more by the Gulf states wanting the war to end rather than a newfound trust of Iran.

“An agreement between the two parties is being [highly] advocated by the Gulf states in [an] attempt to prevent and contain regional conflicts,” al-Qawasmi said.

Shortly after the US and Iran agreed in 2015 to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – putting guardrails on Tehran’s nuclear programme – Gulf states remained sceptical about their neighbour.

The current war has only heightened these suspicions, but it has also seen regional states seek diplomacy with Tehran rather than military confrontation, despite Iran directly attacking Gulf cities.

“The Gulf states still feel like diplomacy is better than using force to get a deal … to change Iran’s behaviour and to insulate them from Iran’s destabilising actions,” Rob Geist Pinfold, a lecturer on security studies at King’s College London, told Al Jazeera.

Pinfold points out that Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz via drones and missiles, not nuclear weapons, making dealing with that threat a priority for Gulf states rather than Tehran’s nuclear programme.

Gulf states will want a more comprehensive agreement between Iran and the US, rather than the nuclear-focused JCPOA, said Pinfold.

“If you talk to people in Gulf capitals, they will tell you that the nuclear programme is a tomorrow problem for them,” he said.

“The today problem is Iran’s use of drones and proxies to destabilise and undermine the sovereignty of Gulf states, but also states throughout the region.”

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s three-day tour of the Gulf, which ends Thursday, is seen as a way of allaying these fears and assuring the GCC that Tehran will not be strengthened by the agreement.

Seat at the table

Mehran Haghirian, the director of research and programmes at the Bourse & Bazaar Foundation, believes Gulf states are in a better position to guide the outcome of the current US-Iran talks than in 2015.

“They are at the heart of the negotiations,” Haghirian said regarding the Gulf states’ role in the current talks.

In its role as a co-mediator, Qatar is essentially representing the GCC and their interests during the talks, while articles five and six of the Iran-US MoU place Gulf states at the centre of the agreement.

Among the biggest concerns for the GCC are the future of the Strait of Hormuz, with Tehran demanding tolls on shipping, and calls for the creation of a regional investment fund for Iran.

“There really cannot be any new Hormuz authority by Iran that would not include other GCC countries,” Haghirian told Al Jazeera.

US Vice President JD Vance claimed last week that the investment fund would be financed by the Gulf coalition, but Rubio said this week that regional allies would not be asked to contribute to any reconstruction fund for Iran.

Qatar’s Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani has described the reported $300bn figure as “aspirational” in an interview with the Financial Times, while no Gulf state has yet said if it will contribute to the fund.

‘Maximum pressure era’

The analysts stress that the GCC is not a monolith – with Gulf states having contrasting and changing approaches towards Iran.

Oman, Qatar and Kuwait were broadly supportive of the JCPOA. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain were more sceptical, but even these states publicly backed the agreement, said Haghirian.

When Trump pulled the US out of the JCPOA in 2018, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain believed they had “found a partner in DC”.

That led to a “maximum pressure era” that brought a period of brinkmanship in the region, said Haghirian.

Suspected Iran-linked attacks on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq-Khurais oil facilities and vessels off the coast of Fujairah in 2019 were “the initial reaction by the Iranians to that maximum pressure” campaign, he added, but paradoxically, this also triggered a recalibration of relations.

The UAE and Iran restored ties in 2022, and a China-brokered Saudi-Iran agreement took place in 2023.

“That was enough of a reason for Saudi Arabia [and] the UAE, particularly, to basically restructure their approach towards Iran,” Haghirian said.

The war and accelerated pragmatic rapprochement

While Israel has used war to attempt to increase its presence in the Gulf region – reportedly sending an Iron Dome battery to the UAE – other Gulf states view both Iran and Israel as unsettling forces in the region.

“Israel started the war, which was a destabilising act, and then Iran escalated by targeting the Gulf states, which was in turn a destabilising act,” Pinfold said.

Despite this, the Gulf states targeted by Iran still demonstrated patience and pragmatism in dealing with their neighbour.

Qatar, for example, has played a leading role in mediating between the US and Iran, even after being on the receiving end of Iranian drone and missile attacks.

“All six got attacked, and that’s really a level of foreign policy decision-making that is very difficult for any state to be able to really undertake, considering the fact that it was a military attack,” Haghirian said.

“But again, this pragmatism came out within this context to engage Iran and to actually speak for themselves at these negotiations. This war has really initiated a complete rebalancing of the entire region.”

Thousands gathered in Tehran on the eve of Ashura, the first since the killing of Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei. Mourners carried flags, banners and images of Khamenei as Iran prepared to commemorate one of the most significant events in the Shia calendar.

Qatar’s PM Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani told Al Jazeera that safeguards have been put in place to prevent US-Iran negotiations from regional escalation, including tensions in Lebanon and the Strait of Hormuz, stressing diplomacy and respect for agreements.

US Vice President JD Vance has touted significant progress in talks with Iran over its nuclear programme and Israel’s war on Lebanon, while refusing to commit to an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory. He said Trump is trying to bring ‘permanent peace’ to a region that’s been ‘a basket case for a long time’.

Thomas Warrick, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, says the 60-day US-Iran talks face hurdles with regards to nuclear issues and sanctions, and will require time, willingness, and patience to achieve lasting results.

Published on
22/06/2026 – 8:15 GMT+2

At the time of writing, Brent crude was down 0.91% at $79.12 a barrel, while US West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude had fallen 0.70% to $75.32 a barrel.

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Lower crude prices reflected broader investor sentiment in early trading after Qatari and Pakistani mediators said the first round of negotiations between the US and Iran aimed at securing a final agreement to end the conflict had concluded with “encouraging progress”.

A memorandum of understanding signed last week includes a commitment to reach a final agreement within 60 days, an end to fighting on “all fronts” – including in Lebanon – and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

Markets mixed as analysts monitor US-Iran negotiations

Meanwhile, Asian stocks were mixed on Monday, with markets in Japan and South Korea trading higher, while US futures traded lower.

Tokyo’s Nikkei 225 jumped 1.6% to 72,364.82 after reaching a new all-time high of 72,831.73 during intraday trading, helped by technology stocks fuelled by enthusiasm over the global artificial intelligence boom.

Japan’s SoftBank Group, the multinational investment holding company with a strong AI focus, rose 2.4%, while chip equipment maker Tokyo Electron gained 2.3%.

South Korea’s Kospi added 0.4% to 9,084.37 and was trading near record highs, led by AI-related shares. Memory chip maker SK Hynix surged 4.7%.

“We’re seeing another strong market today,” Neil Newman, managing director and head of strategy at Astris Advisory Japan, said. He cautioned that the Japanese market was “probably getting a little stretched” from an investor’s point of view, “especially with what’s going on in the Middle East”.

Hong Kong’s Hang Seng fell 1% to 23,690.86, while the Shanghai Composite Index edged 0.2% higher to 4,098.01.

Additional sources • AP

The first round of US-Iran talks has ended with both sides agreeing on a roadmap towards a final deal to be reached ‘within 60 days’. Iran said the negotiations resulted in waivers for oil exports and the release of some frozen assets. The parties have also agreed to a ‘de-confliction cell’ to monitor the ceasefire in Lebanon.

US and Iranian delegations have arrived for high-level talks at a hotel in Switzerland. JD Vance, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner met Pakistani mediators, while Iranian officials including Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi and chief negotiator Bagher Ghalibaf met their Swiss hosts.

However, after Iran’s statement, US Central Command (Centcom) spokesperson Tim Hawkins said “traffic continues to flow”. He said US forces were “monitoring the situation to ensure this remains the case”, adding that “Iran does not control the Strait of Hormuz”.

Pakistan says talks between the United States and Iran which were postponed on Friday will begin in Switzerland on Sunday, as Tehran announced it was again closing the Strait of Hormuz because of continued Israeli attacks in Lebanon.

Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman, Esmail Baghaei, confirmed on Saturday that an Iranian delegation, including Parliament Speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi and other senior officials, was heading to Switzerland.

In Washington, Vice President JD Vance confirmed that the top US negotiators Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff were already in Switzerland working through technical details of anticipated negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme.

Vance told Fox News that he expects to leave for Switzerland “sometime in the next couple of days” but acknowledged that “it’s always a delicate coordination dance.”

The planned meeting on Sunday will start technical-level negotiations towards a final US-Iran deal. That is after both sides signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) earlier in the week declaring a permanent end to “military operations on all fronts”, including in Lebanon.

The MoU stipulates that a final deal should be reached within 60 days, “extendable with mutual consent”.

But even getting to the negotiating table following the MoU proved difficult. A round of talks originally planned for Friday was pushed back after Iran failed to send its delegation, as deadly Israeli strikes persisted in Lebanon.

Although Israel agreed to a renewed ceasefire with Hezbollah on Friday, its attacks in Lebanon continued into Saturday, killing at least 32 people, according to Lebanon’s civil defence and state media reports.

On Friday, Israeli attacks killed 83 people and wounded 141, Lebanon’s health ministry said.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on Saturday announced it was re-imposing restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz over Israeli “crimes” in Lebanon and what it called a US violation of commitments to establish a ceasefire.

It warned ship crews not to approach the strategic waterway, saying their security would be at risk ⁠if they do.

Mohammad Mokhber, an adviser to Iran’s supreme leader, warned that the flow of energy in the Middle East would halt so long as the US-Iran agreement “remains only on paper”.

The US military said its forces were still operating in the “general area” of the Strait of Hormuz and “remain present and vigilant” to make sure “all aspects of the agreement with Iran are adhered to”. It said 55 commercial vessels had transited the strait on Saturday and that safe passage was still “intact”.

‘Things are moving backwards’

According to Pakistan’s foreign ministry, Pakistani and Qatari mediators will join the US-Iran talks on Sunday in the Swiss mountain resort of Burgenstock.

Reporting from there, Al Jazeera’s Osama bin Javaid said there has been a flurry of behind-the-scenes diplomatic activity ahead of the formal negotiations, with Qatar’s Prime Minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani, already holding meetings. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Ishaq Dar, has been holding talks in Egypt and Pakistan’s Interior Minister, Mohsin Naqvi, travelled to Iran.

Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Baghaei has signalled that progress may be scarce until Iran feels the US is living up to its end of the interim deal.

In comments broadcast by Iran’s IRIB, Baghaei said Iran “must naturally be very firm and serious in demanding fulfilment of obligations” considering the US’s past “failure to honour commitments”.

Al Jazeera’s James Bays, reporting from Burgenstock, said there are indications “things are moving backwards from when the MoU was signed”, citing Israel’s continued bombardment of southern Lebanon.

“The Iranians see this as a serious breach of the MoU,” he said. “Their first sanction was by not coming here. They have now utilised their best weapon by closing the Strait of Hormuz.

“Iran believes this tactic will help get things back on track with regard to southern Lebanon,” added Bays.

The 14-point Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Iran deserves cautious support, not celebration. Its most important promise is immediate and permanent cessation of military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon. That is a serious achievement if it holds. The reported US-Iran text also commits both sides to avoid threats or use of force and to respect sovereignty. But wars do not end because officials announce elegant clauses. They end when armies, proxies, navies, banks, inspectors and political leaders behave differently the next morning.

The reported Versailles signing, with President Macron nearby, gave the accord theatrical weight. The reported confirmation by Iran’s Foreign Ministry gave it visibility in Tehran. Yet the title “Islamabad” may be the most revealing symbol. It suggests that diplomacy around Iran is no longer owned by Washington and Europe alone. Pakistan, Qatar, Oman and Gulf states now matter. That is healthy. But symbolism cannot replace sequencing. A memorandum is useful only if it becomes a disciplined path toward a final settlement.

Hormuz is the pressure point

The Strait of Hormuz is the economic heart of this agreement. The International Energy Agency describes it as one of the world’s critical oil chokepoints, so restoring commercial shipping is a global necessity. The MOU’s promise of safe, toll-free passage for 60 days can calm markets, but it cannot settle maritime governance. Iran’s future talks with the Sultanate of Oman and other littoral states must produce rules on fees, inspections, de-mining, escorts and disputes. Without that, Hormuz remains a bargaining chip, not a secure passage.

The most controversial part is economic. Washington would provide waivers for Iranian oil exports, make frozen assets usable, avoid new sanctions during talks and support a reconstruction plan of at least $300 billion. This could be pragmatic statecraft or a strategic mistake. The OFAC Iran sanctions system affects banks, insurers, traders and shippers. Recent State Department sanctions show how aggressively Iranian petroleum networks had been targeted. Relief must therefore be sequenced with measurable action. If Tehran receives benefits before verification, critics will call it capitulation. If Washington delays relief after compliance, Tehran will call it bad faith.

Nuclear language cannot stay vague

Iran’s renewed pledge not to build nuclear weapons is necessary, but not enough. The decisive issue is the future of enriched material, enrichment activity and inspection access. Any final deal must put IAEA Iran monitoring at the centre. The IAEA’s NPT safeguards framework and the Non-Proliferation Treaty offer the right balance: Iran has civilian nuclear rights, but the world has a right to credible assurance that military pathways are closed. Down-blending enriched material under inspection may be a start. It cannot be the finish line.

Including Lebanon in the ceasefire is wise, but risky. The promise to protect sovereignty echoes the UN Charter. But Lebanon has long suffered from the gap between formal sovereignty and armed reality. If Hezbollah, Israel, Iran or any other actor treats Lebanon as a loophole, the ceasefire will collapse at its weakest seam. The final text must clarify what “all fronts” means, how non-state armed groups are restrained, and what happens if a party violates the ceasefire through an ally.

The final agreement must be public and enforceable

A binding UN Security Council resolution is essential, but it should not rubber-stamp ambiguity. The history of Resolution 2231, wider UN sanctions practice, IAEA reports to the Security Council, and the UN record on Iranian ballistic missiles shows why detail matters. The final agreement must define deadlines, verification triggers, consequences for breach and the exact sanctions schedule. The Guardian’s analysis and Iran International’s reporting underline the same reality: the MOU buys time, but time can be wasted.

The Islamabad MOU is not peace. It is a pause with possibilities. It should be supported because war has already proved disastrous, but it must be judged by performance: ceasefire maintained, Hormuz reopened, sanctions relief sequenced, nuclear material verified, Lebanon protected and the final deal anchored in law. Anything less would turn a promising memorandum into another diplomatic mirage.

Israel and Hezbollah agreed to a ceasefire in Lebanon after escalating violence threatened to derail potential peace talks regarding the ongoing war in Iran. This ceasefire was announced just before 4 p.m. Lebanon time, with a U. S. official confirming that negotiations, facilitated by the U. S. and Qatar with assistance from Iran, had led to this agreement. Both sides indicated they would uphold the ceasefire, with an Israeli official stating that Israel would remain in southern Lebanon but would not engage in conflict unless attacked.

The recent conflict included intense airstrikes that resulted in 18 deaths and injuries to 33 others in Lebanon. Four Israeli soldiers were also killed by Hezbollah. This violence could complicate U. S.-Iran negotiations, as establishing peace in Lebanon is key to a broader agreement. The recent memorandum signed by the presidents of the U. S. and Iran postponed discussions on critical issues like Iran’s nuclear program, granting parties 60 days to agree on a lasting solution or extend the current deal.

Technical talks were planned in Switzerland but were postponed, and officials from both the U. S. and Iran indicated that their respective negotiators would not be attending. Hezbollah lawmakers suggested that further discussions hinge on a complete ceasefire and urged the Lebanese government to reject any negotiations with Israel as long as hostilities continued.

The interim agreement seeks an end to military operations in various regions, including Lebanon, but Israel maintains that it is not a part of these deliberations. The fighting began when Hezbollah fired at Israel, prompting Israeli military responses, including strikes targeting Hezbollah’s positions.

Lebanon’s health ministry confirmed the heavy toll from recent airstrikes, and its President condemned Israel’s actions while emphasizing the commitment to achieve a comprehensive ceasefire. The broader conflict, which originated on February 28 with U. S. and Israeli attacks on Iran, has reportedly resulted in at least 7,000 deaths, primarily in Iran and Lebanon.

Despite the conflict’s impact on oil prices, which had risen due to concerns over regional stability, the signing of the interim deal resulted in a drop in prices as shipping through the Strait of Hormuz resumed. Under the terms of the agreement, Iran will receive economic relief and unfreezing of assets, with negotiators tasked with addressing the status of Iran’s nuclear program and establishing a reconstruction fund within the next 60 days.

In the face of criticism in the U. S., former President Trump defended the deal, arguing that the war had weakened Iran and affirming that the terms would lead to significant concessions from Iran without offering direct financial support.

With information from Reuters

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has signed a US-Iran memorandum of understanding aimed at ending the war between the two countries. US President Donald Trump and Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian signed on Wednesday.

The money-saving expert said earlier in the week that he expected energy prices to drop soon in some rare ‘good news’ for hard-pressed Brits

Martin Lewis says that energy deals are already becoming more affordable following an agreement between the US and Iran. The money-saving expert stated earlier this week that he anticipated prices would fall soon in some rare ‘good news’ for financially stretched British households concerning energy costs.

This followed an announcement of an accord between the US and Iran to cease hostilities and reopen the crucial Strait of Hormuz. The memorandum of understanding, which is now active, was signed on Wednesday by Donald Trump and Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian.

This has seen the cost of oil and natural gas decline, resulting in a reduction in energy prices. At the time of writing, Brent crude has fallen by approximately $7 a barrel and UK natural gas by roughly 14 per cent.

Mr Lewis confirmed that fixed energy deals were already being made available that were around 5 per cent more affordable. He stated: “Energy fixes have started to get cheaper, now 5% below April price cap.”

However, Mr Lewis cautioned earlier this week that people shouldn’t anticipate a substantial reduction in the next price cap, which runs from October to December.

The next price cap is expected to be announced on August 26 by energy regulator Ofgem. Approximately 60 per cent of households in England, Scotland, and Wales remain on a standard variable tariff, meaning their costs are governed by the price cap.

The current energy price cap is due to increase on July 1 by 13 per cent. This means that a home with typical energy consumption paying by direct debit will face charges of £1,862 annually.

That marks a rise of £221 compared to the previous price cap – and Mr Lewis cautioned it could climb even higher, despite the cessation of hostilities.

He stated: “The US and Iran signing a framework deal has pushed natural gas prices down. These wholesale prices are a key driver of UK gas and electricity bills. As the six-month graph shows, though, prices still have a long way to fall before returning to pre-conflict levels.

“The good news is that this could lead to slightly cheaper fixed tariffs being launched in the coming days. However, without substantial further drops the October price cap still looks likely to be significantly higher than it is today.”

He was subsequently questioned about why he believed the price cap would increase from October. He responded: “It’s the same reason the energy Price Cap HASN’T yet risen due to the Middle East crisis. It is time-lagged. So slow to rise, slow to fall.”

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is facing mounting pressure after he was cut out of the US-Iran agreement. Crucially, the Memorandum of Understanding includes Israel’s war on Lebanon. Al Jazeera’s Nour Odeh explains.

Israeli air strikes have continued to target towns in southern Lebanon despite an agreement between the United States and Iran set to be formally signed on Friday to end the war on all fronts.

Israeli drones carried out three attacks in Tyre that resulted in injuries while a drone also targeted the Bint Jbeil district in Nabatieh, Lebanon’s state-run National News Agency said on Wednesday.

The fighting in Lebanon is considered one of the biggest threats to the framework agreement in the US-Israel war on Iran with Tehran warning that new Israeli strikes on Lebanon and continued occupation of its territory would be regarded as a violation of the deal.

Earlier on Wednesday, Al Jazeera Arabic correspondents on the ground reported that Israeli forces carried out an air strike on the outskirts of Kfar Tebnit, also in the Nabatieh district. They also launched raids on the town of Nabatieh al-Fawqa and shelled the Ali al-Taher heights and the outskirts of the town.

Hezbollah fighters, meanwhile, launched at least 10 rockets towards Israeli forces near Kfar Tebnit.

A day earlier, Israeli attacks killed at least four people in Nabatieh, including in drone strikes on several vehicles.

There has been a reduction in violence since the US-Iran agreement was announced, but attacks have not stopped, Al Jazeera’s Zeina Khodr said, reporting from Beirut.

“Security sources believe that the Israeli army is trying to occupy more ground, especially strategic high ground around Nabatieh,” she said.

“Yes, families have started to return to their villages, but people are worried. They say they don’t trust that Israel will abide by the ceasefire.”

United Nations spokesperson Stephane Dujarric said the number of projectiles fired between Israeli forces and Lebanon fell to 174 on Sunday, compared with 705 the previous Sunday.

Of these, 169 were attributed to Israel and five to Hezbollah, he said.

Lebanon ‘most sensitive issue between the sides’

The situation in Lebanon is one of the main pillars of the US-Iran agreement, Al Jazeera’s Almigdad Alruhaid said, reporting from Tehran.

“As we approach the signing of the deal, it is becoming the most sensitive issue between the sides,” Alruhaid said.

Iran said the Israeli military has violated the ceasefire in Lebanon 84 times in the past two days and warned that Israel should expect “a harsh response” if it does not stop its attacks, he reported.

This came after Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said the withdrawal of the Israeli military from Lebanese territory is one of the core demands right now to move forward with the framework agreement Iran has with the US, Alruhaid said: “So the Iranians say the situation in Lebanon, in particular southern Lebanon, is an integral part of the memorandum of understanding.”

Lebanon was among the top priorities for the Iranians when they started negotiations with US President Donald Trump’s administration, according to Mohammad Eslami from Tehran University.

“Once the Iranians not only retaliated against the Israeli attacks on Dahiyeh and Beirut but also pre-emptively attacked Israeli territory, they showed right from the outset they are determined and very serious about supporting Lebanon, the Lebanese people, the Lebanese government and the resistance factions in Lebanon,” Eslami told Al Jazeera.

Israel’s invasion akin to ‘war crimes’

Meanwhile, the human rights group Amnesty International said on Wednesday that the Israeli army’s mass forced displacement orders in Lebanon amount to war crimes under international law.

“In parts of southern Lebanon, the Israeli military’s forced displacement of civilians and prevention of their return amounts to unlawful transfer – which is a war crime,” Amnesty said in a statement.

The Israeli army has “radically expanded” its use of such orders, displacing hundreds of thousands of people across Lebanon, it said.

“Instead of forcibly uprooting communities and designating entire swathes of Lebanese land as ‘no-go zones’ for civilians, Israeli forces must immediately withdraw from Lebanese territory,” said Kristine Beckerle, Amnesty International’s deputy regional director for the Middle East and North Africa.

The Israeli military declared about 4.6 percent of Lebanon as a “no-go zone” on November 28, 2024, a day after a previous ceasefire took effect, Amnesty noted.

This year, just three days after an April 17 ceasefire announcement, the restricted area was expanded to about 6 percent of the country, and residents were ordered not to return to villages previously home to tens of thousands of civilians.

Lebanese officials said Israel, which has been carrying out a large-scale offensive in the country since March 2, has killed more than 3,800 people, wounded 11,850 and displaced more than one million.

Beijing warmly welcomes the peace agreement and memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran, considering it an important step toward de-escalating regional tensions. China supports the diplomatic path to resolving the crisis, based on a clear strategy aimed at protecting its economic and strategic interests. Beijing emphasizes that a permanent ceasefire, the protection of national sovereignty, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and ensuring the safety of international navigation are top priorities. China contributed behind the scenes to shaping the negotiating framework and influencing Tehran to accept the agreement with the United States in order to safeguard its vital interests in the continued flow of Iranian oil. Accordingly, China officially welcomed the memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran, affirming that the agreement represents a crucial step toward de-escalating regional tensions. The Chinese diplomatic welcome focused on the key provisions of the agreement, as stated by the spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry. These provisions guarantee a comprehensive ceasefire, freedom of navigation, energy security, an end to the naval blockade, and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to global trade and energy supplies. China considers this essential for its energy and economic security. This agreement, along with the nuclear framework and negotiations, marks the conclusion of the first phase, followed by a 30-60 day negotiation period to discuss the Iranian nuclear program (uranium enrichment and the lifting of sanctions). This Chinese announcement came in support of international mediation efforts ahead of the official signing ceremony in Geneva.

The most prominent points welcomed by China in the US-Iranian agreement, according to announcements and follow-up by Chinese diplomatic channels and as included in the key provisions of the memorandum of understanding, were a cessation of military operations; an immediate and permanent ceasefire on all fronts, including the Lebanese front; freedom of navigation through a commitment to end the naval blockade and open the Strait of Hormuz to global trade and energy supplies; and the nuclear framework, with the conclusion of a phase one agreement stipulating that negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program (uranium enrichment and sanctions relief) would take place within a specified timeframe of 30 to 60 days following the signing.

China has played a pivotal, often unacknowledged, role as a diplomatic bridge between Tehran and Washington to protect its strategic and economic interests in the Middle East. The dimensions of China’s behind-the-scenes role include ensuring the flow of energy. Beijing seeks to maintain stability in the Gulf region to guarantee the uninterrupted supply of Iranian oil and to protect its interests and investments in the Belt and Road Initiative. Iran represents a crucial geographical and strategic hub in China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. To this end, Beijing has sought to leverage its strong economic ties and strategic partnership with Tehran to persuade it to make flexible concessions during critical times, while offering support to avoid military escalation. Beijing fears that the collapse of diplomatic channels could lead to a regional war that would jeopardize its extensive investments in the region.

On the other hand, Beijing seeks to counterbalance American influence. China prefers a negotiated framework between Tehran and Washington that limits American unilateral hegemony and positions itself as a responsible international player capable of peacemaking. China’s vision for diplomatic balancing between Washington and Tehran is shaped by several key strategic axes, most importantly (establishing the principle of a political settlement). Here, Beijing consistently emphasizes that dialogue is the only solution to the Iranian crisis, rejecting military escalation that harms the security of navigation and global trade. This is coupled with regional and international networking, where China supports parallel diplomatic efforts, such as Pakistani mediation. Beijing maintains continuous communication with the parties to the crisis to ensure the opening of indirect negotiation channels that prevent a full-scale confrontation and safeguard vital interests. China has maintained the flow of Iranian oil while simultaneously strengthening its extensive economic partnerships with the Gulf states, granting it unique diplomatic weight and influence that Western powers lack. Despite this notable progress, Beijing faces ongoing challenges due to US containment policies. China rejects Washington’s classification of its major technology companies as military entities and threatens retaliatory measures, making Beijing’s attempts to create a strategic balance with the United States an extremely delicate and sensitive process.

Based on the preceding understanding and analysis, we can see how successful Beijing has been in transforming escalating tensions in the Middle East into strategic gains. China has played an active mediating role by supporting diplomatic talks and the memorandum of understanding for peace between Washington and Tehran, thus positioning itself as a responsible international power seeking to establish stability and move away from unilateral hegemony.

The US-Iran memorandum of understanding expected to be formally signed in Switzerland on Friday could allow for the establishment of a $300bn investment fund for Iran, as part of a broader settlement to end the war that triggered a global energy crisis and upended markets worldwide.

US Vice President JD Vance told CBS News on Monday that the incentives would be connected to Iran’s “performance” in adhering to the deal, which was digitally signed by both sides on Sunday.

The scale of the financial incentives grabbed the headlines due to US President Donald Trump’s longstanding criticism of a 2015 nuclear accord that he claimed delivered economic benefits to Tehran.

In a bid to manage perceptions around this politically sensitive issue, Trump took to his Truth Social platform to claim that “the story that the US is paying Iran 300 million Dollars is Fake News,” while Vance told CBS News that the money would not be a US payout in exchange for Iran’s enriched uranium.

“When people say that billions of dollars of assets will be released, that’s not true,” the vice president told the CBS Morning programme. “What is true is that Iran will have a much better and much more prosperous future if they meet the obligations they make in this agreement.”

What do we know about the $300bn investment fund?

Vance said the deal “fundamentally extends a hand to Iran and says, ‘Look, if you guys are willing to honour your obligations, if you’re willing to allow real inspections of your nuclear programme, then we will welcome you back into the world economy.’

“That’s the sort of thing they could have access to, funded by the Gulf Coast coalition, so long as they honour their end of the obligation,” Vance told CBS. He also claimed that while US money would not be injected, economic opportunities could arise once Iran repositions itself in the global economy.

The New York Times quoted sources saying the fund would not come from governments but be created for companies eager to invest in Iran.

Muhanad Seloom, a non-resident senior fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, said the setup was a no-lose solution for Washington. “If Iran reforms, the administration owns the peace; if it doesn’t, the US loses nothing and the Gulf carries the risk,” he told Al Jazeera.

What about the Iranian frozen assets?

Seloom said the idea of an investment fund was built precisely to escape the optics of releasing Iran’s frozen funds. While the exact amount of Iran’s frozen assets is unclear, official Iranian reports and experts have set the total amount at more than $100bn.

Iran’s economy has been crippled due to years of sanctions imposed on the country by the United States and other nations following the Islamic revolution in 1979, and then amplified over Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missiles programmes. These measures have restricted Tehran’s ability to access its own assets, such as revenues from oil sales, which have been frozen in foreign banks.

Tehran was granted sanctions relief in the wake of the landmark 2015 nuclear deal signed under President Barack Obama, but Trump tore it up in 2018 during his first term. The 2015 deal had put limits on Iran’s nuclear enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief.

Iran’s state-affiliated Mehr News agency reported on Sunday that the 14-point draft memorandum of understanding provided for the release of $24bn in frozen Iranian assets.

Pressed by CBS News on the possibility of releasing frozen funds, Vance said the $24bn figure “just doesn’t appear anywhere in any of the texts that we’ve talked about with the Iranians”.

“What we have said is that we’re willing to talk about unfreezing assets, but a much, much bigger deal is unsanctioning their economy – so long as they make the long-term commitments on the nuclear programme,” the vice president added.

For Iran, where the war inflicted an estimated $29bn damage and the population is struggling with the highest inflation rate since 1942, the investment fund may constitute a much-needed lifeline.

But the optics will not be as favourable, raising a “dignity problem”, Seloom said. “Tehran reads this as supervised, conditional money rather than sovereign relief,” the analyst told Al Jazeera.

Which other contentious issues will be discussed after signing the deal on Friday?

One of the US’s main declared objectives has been to assuage concerns surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme, including a stockpile of more than 440kg (970lbs) of enriched uranium.

The memorandum extends an existing ceasefire arrangement for another 60 days, during which the two sides are expected to hold further negotiations on issues including the disposal of the enriched uranium.

Vance said Tehran had agreed to surrender its stockpile, undergo regular inspections and refrain from producing or buying nuclear weapons, but the full text of the memorandum of understanding has yet to be disclosed.

The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which has been subject to competing blockades by the US and Iran, has also been a point of contention. Trump suggested an agreement to reopen the waterway had been reached when he announced a deal on Sunday with the words: “Let the oil flow!”

Speaking to CNBC, however, Vance acknowledged that not all sticking points surrounding the passageway had been resolved. “Well, our expectation is that the strait is gonna be opened in a toll-free way for the long term, and that’s the sort of thing that we’re gonna figure out in these technical negotiations,” he said.

Israel’s ongoing aggression on Lebanon is also expected to create friction, as Iran has insisted any ceasefire deal must include the allied nation. Israel has so far rejected any arrangement that would limit its ability to strike what it says are Hezbollah targets. Defence Minister Israel Katz on Friday said the military would continue operating in Lebanon regardless of any agreement with Tehran.

Mixed reactions to the agreement

Iranian ⁠⁠Foreign ⁠⁠Minister Abbas Araghchi said the memorandum of understanding would reap economic benefits for Iran but stressed that Tehran would not rely on those benefits for all of its needs.

“We have a history of broken promises, non-compliance, and the tearing up of agreements,” Araghchi said on Monday, according to Press TV. He said discussions about the lifting of US sanctions and Iran’s nuclear programme would be held during a 60-day period of negotiations following the official signature on Friday.

Iran’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has yet to comment. Some Iranian observers objected to the timing of the announcement, which coincided with Trump’s birthday. Referring to the assassination of former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei at the beginning of the US-Iran war, conservative journalist Parisa Nasr wrote on X: “Was giving a birthday gift to the killer of the martyred Leader also one of the unwritten conditions of the deal?”

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said Iran’s Supreme National Security Council had approved the deal so that “America’s genuine commitment to respecting the rights of the Iranian nation could be tested in practice.”

Speaking at the G7 summit in France on Tuesday, Trump described the deal with Iran as “fair”, “good”, and under which Iran “can’t have a nuclear weapon” or “they get blown up.”

Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, who is also attending the summit, said the Iran-US agreement will result in positive outcomes for the region.

“This is a very important deal, there’s still a lot of work to be done, but with this momentum – if we continue like that, Mr President – I think we can achieve and do great things in the region,” Sheikh Tamim said.

US Democratic lawmakers welcomed a deal to halt the war with Iran but stressed that its terms must be made public. Senator Gregory Meeks said “any final agreement must be durable, enforceable, transparent” and more than “vague announcements or political spin”.

US Republican Senator Lindsey Graham on Sunday said he was “pleased” about the deal but also “somewhat concerned that Iran’s view of the agreement seems different than what the American negotiating team is claiming”.

Seloom, at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, said the different narratives underlined that the two sides were “not really talking to each other”. “They’re talking past each other, to domestic audiences,” he said. “Each side has to sell this as a victory it cannot sell honestly.”