United Arab Emirates

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has unveiled an updated national security doctrine and displayed a map of rival regional alignments, signalling a security approach that prioritises preemptive military action, the expansion of buffer zones, and the pursuit of new regional partnerships.

The document was developed with the assistance of Israel’s National Security Council and published by the Prime Minister’s Office on Sunday, just nine days before Israel’s parliamentary elections that could spell the end of Netanyahu’s time in office. It outlines a formal policy of preventing perceived threats through military action rather than containment – a policy that has already been seen in action over the past few years, as Israel pursues multiple wars and attacks on its neighbours.

Electoral survival strategy

The timing of the map’s release carries particular political significance, with Netanyahu fighting to retain power amid criticism of his conduct in power, the ongoing corruption trial he faces and his handling of the October 7, 2023, attacks, as well as the wars that followed.

As the October 27 election day draws closer, Netanyahu is attempting to bolster his credentials as Israel’s ‘Mr Security’, hoping to get the votes of Israelis who may not like some of his other policies or behaviour, but still view him as the most likely leader to defend the country.

Netanyahu, who did get the endorsement of US President Donald Trump on Sunday, said during the briefing that Israel could face the possibility of a far less supportive administration in Washington in two years, after the end of the Trump presidency.

“In two years, a president… who is extremely hostile to Israel could come to power [in the United States],” Netanyahu warned.

He therefore argued that Israel must “expand our network of alliances and develop capabilities that make us a valuable asset” to other countries as a way of protecting itself if US policy towards it changed.

The comments, according to analysts, suggest that Netanyahu is seeking to portray his leadership as essential to navigating both Israel’s regional military challenges and its diplomatic isolation, all while keeping a fearful electorate reassured.

Mohanad Hage Ali, deputy director for research at the Malcolm H Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, explained that the strategic presentation centred on competing regional blocs and buffer zones.

That framework “incubates and nurtures existential fears, which would lead Israeli voters to feel the need for a decisive leader”, Hage Ali noted.

In his assessment, Netanyahu stands to benefit from the Israeli public’s fear of regional threats by presenting himself as a familiar leader capable of managing them, making him “the devil you know”, as the analyst put it, to voters reluctant to embrace political change at a sensitive time.

Netanyahu’s political opponents have been quick to push back against that narrative.

Gadi Eisenkot, one of the prime minister’s main challengers in the upcoming election, said that the published doctrine was “two hollow pages, full of slogans that have nothing to do with a security concept”.

Another, former Prime Minister Yair Lapid, described the document as “superficial”.

Expanding security zones

The map displayed during Netanyahu’s briefing was originally published in May by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, a German political foundation. It divides the Middle East and parts of Africa into competing blocs, highlighting the region’s complex network of alliances and rivalries.

Those networks include states, unrecognised entities and non-state actors.

The map identifies an Israel-United Arab Emirates alignment, described as the “Hexagon Alliance”, alongside a separate grouping of Egypt, Turkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia – the latter three of which signed the Mecca mutual defence pact in August – labelled the “Sunni Diamond Alliance”. It also depicts Iran and its regional allies as a separate axis.

The map serves to illustrate the issues outlined in the published security doctrine, presenting a region where Israel faces multiple threats, the alliance that Israel is seeking to cultivate across the wider region, and the perceived need for “buffer zones” – the occupation of territory in other countries.

Israel’s existing illegal occupation of territory in Gaza and southern Lebanon illustrates the potential consequences of expanding the buffer zone approach.

Hage Ali warned that continuing to pursue an approach built around expanding military control could lead to “more conflict and more ethnic cleansing” under the guise of security buffers.

Embracing regional factions

A striking element of the map displayed by Netanyahu is its explicit designation of non-state actors as friendly entities.

The map highlights territories controlled by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in Sudan and Khalifa Haftar’s self-styled Libyan National Army within an alignment deemed cooperative to Israel and the United Arab Emirates.

Israel views these actors as pragmatic partners or at least cooperative entities in a broader strategic grid, Hage Ali explained. However, the public association of these groups with Israel threatens to damage their domestic standing across the Arab world.

That reflects Netanyahu’s immediate priorities, where “what Israelis think matters more than the reputation of your allies and the viability of these alliances”, Hage Ali added.

The portrayal of the Middle East as a region divided into competing alliances also carries risks for Netanyahu’s broader diplomatic ambitions.

Earlier this year, Netanyahu proposed a “hexagon of alliances”, envisaging cooperation between Israel, India, Greece, Cyprus and unnamed Arab, African and Asian partners, against what he described as “radical” regional alliances.

The proposed grouping has not been established as a formal alliance, and commentators in Israel and the international press have described the project as a branding exercise rather than a binding military pact, noting that countries like India prioritise non-alignment and pragmatic trade over ideologically rigid blocs.

For Tehran and its regional partners, the map also offers potent political leverage.

Hage Ali emphasised that the visual layout “will certainly help their propaganda machine”, providing Hezbollah and other Iranian allies with evidence to reinforce the narrative that Israel seeks to expand and dominate the region.

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – As renewed fighting in Ethiopia’s Tigray region threatens to destabilise the Horn of Africa, public backing by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of Ethiopia’s federal government and Saudi Arabia’s record of regional diplomacy are drawing scrutiny.

Both Gulf powers have strategic interests in the Horn of Africa, but their roles differ. The UAE has publicly backed Ethiopia’s government while Saudi Arabia has previously helped broker an Ethiopia-Eritrea rapprochement and was reported to have offered to mediate between the two countries in 2025.

The renewed fighting threatens to unravel the November 2022 Pretoria peace agreement, which ended a war between Ethiopia’s federal government and Tigrayan forces. As tensions with Eritrea add to the risks of a wider confrontation, the positions of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh offer a window into the interests of external powers in the crisis.

The UAE: Clear alignment, unproven leverage

On September 25, the UAE condemned attacks by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and its allied armed groups against Ethiopian federal forces, the seizure of airports in Tigray and the escalation in the neighbouring regions of Afar and Amhara.

Sheikh Shakhboot bin Nahyan Al Nahyan, the UAE minister of state, expressed solidarity with Ethiopia’s government and people, reaffirmed support for the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and called for an end to hostilities, the protection of civilians and adherence to the Pretoria Agreement.

The statement made Abu Dhabi’s public position clear: It backs Ethiopia’s federal government while calling for de-escalation and dialogue. It did not establish whether the UAE was providing military assistance or had secured commitments from the parties to end the fighting.

The UAE also has commercial interests across the Horn of Africa. Dubai Ports World (DP World) operates Berbera port in Somaliland, and a shipping route launched in 2025 connects the port with Jebel Ali in the UAE, providing an additional corridor for cargo serving inland destinations, such as Ethiopia. Landlocked since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia relies heavily on Djibouti for access to international trade.

These commercial links help explain Abu Dhabi’s interest in regional stability and its relationship with Addis Ababa. However, they do not establish that the UAE can influence the TPLF, persuade Eritrea to de-escalate or change Ethiopia’s military calculations.

The extent to which Abu Dhabi can use its relationship with the federal government to encourage a political response to the conflict remains unclear.

Saudi Arabia: Diplomatic experience, uncertain engagement

Saudi Arabia has yet to publicly announce its position on the latest fighting in Tigray.

The kingdom has not publicly commented on the renewed war, according to an October 1 analysis by Critical Threats, although it undertook diplomatic efforts earlier this year to reduce tensions between Ethiopia’s federal government and the TPLF.

Saudi Arabia has previously sought to mediate between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In November 2025, Chatham House reported that sources said Riyadh had offered to mediate between the two countries amid rising tensions over maritime access and regional security.

A June 2026 analysis by Germany’s SWP think tank said previous Saudi mediation efforts had failed, partly because negotiations did not address Ethiopia’s interest in the Eritrean port of Assab.

The kingdom’s broader regional alignment also matters. An August 2026 analysis by the Soufan Center described Saudi Arabia and Egypt as backing Eritrea in opposition to Ethiopia’s ambitions for Red Sea access.

This is an assessment of regional alignment, however, not evidence that Saudi Arabia is directly providing military support to Eritrea or the TPLF in the current fighting.

Saudi Arabia has a strong interest in Red Sea security, a vital corridor for international shipping and its own oil exports. Whether Riyadh will take a more public diplomatic role as tensions escalate remains unclear.

Egypt’s rivalry with Ethiopia adds to regional tensions

Egypt’s role in the crisis is shaped by its longstanding dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and its growing ties with Eritrea.

Cairo has also stressed that responsibility for the governance and security of the Red Sea rests with countries bordering the waterway, a position shared by Asmara. The issue has added to regional tensions as Ethiopia seeks reliable access to the sea.

In September, Ethiopia’s army chief, Field Marshal Birhanu Jula, accused Egypt and Sudan of supporting armed groups fighting the federal government, including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

His remarks, reported by Al Jazeera on September 28, did not provide evidence substantiating the accusation. Egypt’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Nader Zaki, subsequently reaffirmed Cairo’s commitment to state sovereignty and non-interference, rejecting suggestions that it had departed from those principles.

He did not directly address the specific allegation of Egyptian support for the TPLF.

Egypt’s relationship with Eritrea has nevertheless become an important part of the regional picture. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi met Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki in Cairo on June 8, 2026.

According to Egypt’s presidency, the talks covered bilateral cooperation, developments in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea security.

The two leaders also stressed the importance of coordination to maintain regional stability. The meeting highlighted closer cooperation between Cairo and Asmara, but did not establish that either country was involved in the renewed fighting in Tigray.

For Cairo, the dispute with Ethiopia extends beyond Tigray to the Nile and the balance of power in the Horn of Africa.

Its relations with Eritrea and its disagreements with Addis Ababa form part of the wider regional context, but they are not evidence of direct Egyptian involvement in the renewed conflict. Whether these regional relationships will affect the course of the fighting remains uncertain.

From Tigray to a wider regional crisis

The risks extend beyond Tigray. Ethiopia’s pursuit of maritime access has become a source of tension with Eritrea, whose Red Sea coastline includes the port of Assab. Addis Ababa argues that reliable access to the sea is a national priority while Asmara rejects any threat to its sovereignty.

Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of sending troops across the border and supporting armed groups. Eritrea denies the allegations and has called on the United Nations Security Council to intervene. The allegations remain contested, but deteriorating relations have raised the stakes of renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia.

A wider confrontation could put more civilians at risk, complicate humanitarian access and disrupt regional trade and security. It would also test whether external partners could encourage restraint without appearing to endorse either side’s military objectives.

The UAE’s close ties with Addis Ababa could provide a channel for diplomatic engagement while Saudi Arabia’s record of regional diplomacy offers a possible opening for renewed talks. However, the available public evidence does not establish that either country is currently leading an initiative to contain the crisis.

Influence must be measured by outcomes

The UAE and Saudi Arabia should not be cast as pursuing opposing strategies simply because one has publicly backed Ethiopia’s federal government while the other’s current position is less visible. Their interests and diplomatic approaches differ, but the evidence does not show that either has decisive influence over the fighting.

Their contribution should be assessed by whether they can help secure concrete steps towards de-escalation, renewed political dialogue and a reduction in tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Public statements, commercial interests and past diplomatic achievements may create opportunities for engagement, but they are not substitutes for progress on the ground.

The Pretoria Agreement remains the framework for a political settlement in Tigray, yet renewed fighting underscores the difficulty of sustaining peace while underlying disputes persist. A durable settlement will depend primarily on the parties themselves. External partners could contribute by encouraging restraint and supporting credible negotiations.

For now, the UAE’s public alignment with Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic record offer different potential channels for engagement. Whether either country can turn those relationships into a meaningful contribution towards de-escalation remains unresolved.

Tehran, Iran – Iranian authorities have signalled they intend to disrupt an Arab-operated and United States-assisted shuttle system that has enabled more energy exports through the Strait of Hormuz during the US-Israel war on Iran.

With the US naval blockade of Iran’s southern ports in place and sanctions tightening, Tehran has said it will pursue military and diplomatic efforts to put pressure on Washington to submit to its demands regarding reopening the Strait of Hormuz.

This strategic waterway, through which roughly a fifth of global oil and gas flowed before the war, has been largely closed to shipping following Iranian attacks since the US and Israel launched strikes on Iran on February 28.

But the US Navy has reportedly opened up a route so Gulf states can export oil and other commodities amid an energy crisis.

Iran’s security chief Mohsen Rezaei responded on Sunday night, saying the shuttle system is now an explicit target for Tehran.

Rezaei claimed that the US Central Command, with the assistance of the United Arab Emirates military, was using smaller vessels to transfer oil to larger tankers. He claimed Iran had been striking five or six participating vessels nightly for weeks.

“You are smuggling, but the strait is under Iran’s control, and we manage it,” he asserted.

This appeared to be a taunt aimed at US President Donald Trump, who has hailed energy exports at times reaching pre-war levels over recent weeks.

Rezaei appeared to give the impression that Iran wants to have lasting authority over Hormuz, and promised a harsh response if Iran’s energy and civilian infrastructure were attacked again.

His threats appeared aimed at Arab regional states, with a warning that digital infrastructure could be targeted. Rezaei threatened US-linked cables, data centres and artificial intelligence facilities in the UAE and around the Strait of Hormuz.

Rezaei also accused Saudi Arabia of helping the US move oil around Iran’s restrictions. But he did not threaten a direct attack against Riyadh – which is currently being targeted by Yemen’s Tehran-aligned Houthis.

In early September, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) threatened tankers at ports and anchorages in Kuwait and Bahrain, citing US attacks on Iranian tankers. It accused both countries of complicity through hosting US armed forces.

Iran has claimed the US accepted some of Tehran’s seven conditions for the full reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and ending the war. But Tehran insists that a deal will only materialise when all its demands are met.

Hamidreza Azizi, a senior Iran analyst at the Crisis Group, said this reflects Tehran’s apparent assessment that it is under no immediate pressure to reach an agreement with the US since its pressure in the Hormuz has a global impact.

“The question, however, is whether Tehran is overestimating its ability to sustain this pressure, given the growing economic costs of the confrontation for Iran itself,” Azizi wrote on X.

Transfer system

The system involves very large crude carriers (VLCCs) and smaller vessels coordinating with the US military to load crude oil at Arab ports and use southern corridors near the coast of Oman to exit the strait.

Vessels often switch off their transponders and travel at night to minimise the risk of being targeted by the Iranians. After ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman, some of the shuttles come back to load more.

Multiple vessels were targeted overnight Sunday to Monday, including two outbound tankers and one in anchorage near Oman’s port city of Sohar, where ship-to-ship transfers are allegedly being conducted.

Other vessels were targeted by projectiles last week, indicating that attacks have extended beyond the Strait of Hormuz to target the shuttle system.

The IRGC has also increasingly driven a narrative that naval mines, believed to have been planted across the Strait of Hormuz since the start of the war, pose a serious threat to vessels attempting to navigate the waterway without coordinating with Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority.

The IRGC said three tankers suffered major damage over the weekend after being struck by mines. It also released footage of one ship ablaze that is said to have been struck by a mine, although the footage did not appear to show a mine going off.

‘Cascading impact’

The shuttle system has provided Arab national oil companies with a way out of Hormuz via the southern corridor near Oman.

Michelle Wiese Bockmann, a London-based senior maritime intelligence analyst at Windward, said this system has proven highly effective.

“Under international maritime law, which underpins 11 billion tonnes of seaborne trade annually, vessels have what’s called the right of transit passage,” Bockmann told Al Jazeera. “So, what Oman has done is allow vessels to go through under international maritime law, but they have had US military assistance.”

Tehran says shipping will be disrupted so long as the US continues its choking naval blockade against Iran, which has also stepped up its efforts to counter efforts by Arab states to export oil. At least 15 ships are believed to have been targeted in October so far, according to Winward.

“The more effective the route has become in facilitating the transport of oil and gas, the less leverage Iran has over Hormuz, and more attacks we are seeing on vessels that are using that southern corridor,” Bockmann said.

Windward’s data shows 31 ships transited the Strait of Hormuz daily in the final week of September. This was considerably lower than the 138 before the war.

Eighty-seven percent of the 45 ships targeted by Iran during the third quarter of 2026 were tankers.

Around 47 percent belonged to Gulf Arab energy companies’ national shipping fleets, Windward noted, and 93 percent of the strikes took place in the Strait of Hormuz. Most attacks targeted vessels transiting the southern corridor with their transponders turned off.

These attacks have contributed to a massive increase in freight costs. Freight represented 25-30 percent of Gulf crude’s cost, versus just 1 to 3 percent before the war, according to Windward. National oil companies have resorted to offering discounts of up to $35 per barrel below official selling prices.

The main reason for the rise is a shortage of tankers willing to make the dangerous crossing. Between 15 and 20 percent of very large crude carriers (VLCCs) are tied up with an inefficient logistics system that relies on shuttle transfers, complicated by escalating attacks and exposure at loading ports and anchorages.

“This is having cascading impacts for all vessel classes on freight and values across the world,” Bockmann said.

Australian police and intelligence join the list of those probing the incident.

Authorities have said they are investigating the links of the co-pilot of the Israel-bound Flydubai flight with Australia.

A multi-agency Australian police and intelligence team – the Victorian Joint Counter Terrorism Team – is carrying out the probe, a spokesperson said on Sunday.

Mystery surrounds the co-pilot, who is accused of attacking the captain with an axe and attempting to seize control of Flight FZ1073 from Dubai as it approached Israel, and how he was able to acquire his seat in the plane’s cockpit.

He has been identified in media reports as Omani national Hamam al-Hammami.

He had been barred from flying in his own country because of concerns that he had adopted “extremist” views, The Associated Press news agency cited sources as saying.

While al-Hammami reportedly spent part of his life in the United Arab Emirates, the Reuters news agency, citing sources briefed on the Australian investigation, reported that he studied at a university in the Australian city of Melbourne.

A third unnamed source told the agency that he studied at RMIT University, a public research university in Melbourne, about a decade ago.

The Financial Times also reported al-Hammami’s links to Australia. Citing two sources familiar with the Australian investigation, the FT said al-Hammami had allegedly visited what it described as “radical mosques and extremist websites” while in the country.

Disaster was averted after passengers and crew subdued the co-pilot and a reserve pilot took over its controls and completed an emergency landing in Saudi Arabia.

However, the case has raised questions about security in Israel, which has some of the world’s strictest aviation security measures.

The prosecutor general of the UAE, Hamad Saif al-Shamsi, has labelled the attack an attempted “terrorist act”.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said that Israel has longstanding arrangements with foreign airlines aimed at preventing pilots who are nationals of countries without diplomatic relations with Israel from flying there.

Netanyahu said a “loophole” appears to have allowed the Omani pilot to take part in the Flydubai flight, and that Israel would now strengthen its checks.

The UAE has not yet publicly established a motive or announced whether investigators believe al-Hammami acted alone.

UAE presidential adviser Anwar Gargash said on Saturday that the latest “terrorist” attack is a new warning that the region’s fight against “extremism” is not over.

An attack by the copilot on the pilot during a Flydubai flight has raised many questions regarding aviation security, and some of the official versions of the incident have come under scrutiny from online commentators and aviation enthusiasts.

About two and a half hours after Flight FZ1073 departed from Dubai International Airport on Wednesday, it went into a sharp descent before eventually making an emergency landing in Saudi Arabia.

Media reports said the copilot attacked Captain Smit Machchhar. Passengers were able to overpower the copilot, identified by media as Hamam al-Hammami, after Machchhar managed to open the cockpit door during the attack, which the prosecutor general of the United Arab Emirates said was carried out with the cockpit’s crash axe.

While investigators continue working to establish a motive for the attack, several questions have arisen about the incident more generally across social media.

Here are five questions that are being asked:

Why was al-Hammami allowed to fly despite being flagged over security concerns?

Al-Hammami has been identified as an Omani national, according to media reports.

On Friday, The Wall Street Journal quoted unnamed sources as saying that Omani authorities previously blocked the suspect from flying in the country due to concerns over his ideological views.

On Saturday, CNN reported, quoting a regional diplomatic source, that the copilot had also been removed from flight training over similar concerns and was later reassigned to another position.

It added, quoting two sources familiar with the matter, that the pilot was removed from a job at Oman’s national airline last year over concerns about his views.

It remains unclear how al-Hammami managed to get the Flydubai route despite these security concerns.

The possibility of a plumber stabilising plane before reserve pilots stepped in

Reports have emerged that Machchhar managed to open the cockpit door while covered in blood, allowing passengers to subdue the copilot.

One of those who subdued al-Hammami was Yaniv Hayoun, whom Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described as a plumber.

In a video with Netanyahu, who met him at the airport, Hayoun, 50, was asked how he knew what to do at the plane’s controls before another pilot took control. He said: “I watch Air Crash Investigation, Mr Prime Minister.”

“I jumped back, grabbed the controls and started pulling back the handles” the way he had seen in the Canadian investigation show, in which experts analyse plane crashes.

People on social media have questioned how a plumber could have handled an aircraft in the air.

No report of mass injuries despite fall of 5,180 metres

According to the flight-tracking website Flightradar24, the Flydubai flight rapidly descended about two and a half hours after takeoff, dropping more than 5,180 metres (17,000ft) in less than two minutes.

While the midair drop caused mass panic among passengers, no one was reportedly harmed, according to the publicly available information about the incident. An Air India flight that dropped 90 metres (300ft) during turbulence in August injured at least 17 passengers.

A flight instructor, who recreated the Flydubai jet’s near-vertical dive in a simulator, said the plane would have exceeded its maximum structural speed and anything unsecured would have flown all over the cabin during the recovery’s negative G-forces.

Why was the copilot allowed to fly despite being an Omani national?

Israel does not have official diplomatic relations with Oman, and Netanyahu has previously said such countries were not generally allowed to operate flights to Israel.

On Friday, Netanyahu said Israel was looking into whether the copilot had acted under anyone’s direction, warning that anyone involved would pay a “heavy price”.

On Saturday, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that government officials had received in advance the list of crew members and passengers who were on the flight, including the Omani copilot.

Security sources told Haaretz that the government bodies responsible for monitoring and checking foreign flight crews landing in Israel are the Ministry of Transport and Road Safety’s Security Department and the security agency Mossad.

Copilot prayed before attack

According to The Times of Israel, Machchhar spoke to Netanyahu on Saturday. He told the prime minister that al-Hammami had asked to pray before the attack. Four or five minutes later, Machchhar was hit with “a big blow” to the back of his head, he said.

The flight departed from the UAE at 7:05am (03:05 GMT). The attack reportedly took place about two and a half hours later (05:35 GMT).

The predawn prayer time in the Emirates on Wednesday was 04:51am (12:51 GMT), which would mean al-Hammami’s prayer did not align with Islamic prayer times.

However, al-Hammami could also have been performing a different personal prayer before the attack.

A Flydubai co-pilot accused of attacking the captain of a flight bound for Israel has been identified as an Omani national previously barred from flying in his home country over concerns about alleged extremist views, according to media reports.

There has been no official confirmation of the pilot’s identity or his beliefs.

The United Arab Emirates on Saturday described Wednesday’s incident on board Flight FZ1073 as an attempted “terrorist operation”, saying the co-pilot attacked Captain Smit Machchhar, an Indian national, with an emergency axe and attempted to take control of the aircraft.

But investigators are still working to establish the motive and whether anyone else was connected to the attack, which has raised concerns about pilot vetting and aviation security.

Here is what we know:

What do we know about the accused pilot?

The co-pilot suspected of attacking the captain of the Dubai-Tel Aviv flight carrying 174 people has been identified as Hamam al-Hammami, an Omani national, three people with knowledge of the situation, including a Gulf diplomat and a Western diplomat, told AP news agency.

All spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorised to speak to the media. The Gulf diplomat said investigations are under way to establish whether he acted as a “lone wolf or had any connection with any extremist groups”.

US media outlet CNN, quoting a source and an Israeli official, reported that al-Hammami is an Omani citizen who was born in the UAE to a Syrian mother and spent several years in the Emirates.

Questions have emerged about his previous aviation career and whether warning signs had been raised before he joined the Dubai-based low-cost carrier.

The Wall Street Journal, quoting unnamed sources, reported on Friday that Omani authorities had previously barred the accused co-pilot from flying in the country because of concerns that he had held extremist views.

Nevertheless, it remains unclear what those alleged views were or whether Oman informed other countries or airlines about its concerns.

CNN separately quoted a regional diplomatic source as saying that al-Hammami had been removed from flight training over similar concerns and was subsequently reassigned to another position.

The US-based network also reported that a LinkedIn profile bearing al-Hammami’s name said he had spent seven years at Oman Air before leaving in February 2025. The profile said he joined Royal Air Maroc in June 2025 and left in January 2026.

What happened on flight FZ1073?

At 7:05am (03:05 GMT) on Wednesday, Flight FZ1073 departed Dubai for Tel Aviv, climbing to 34,000ft (more than 10,000 metres), according to Flightradar24. A little more than two hours later, it suddenly began to descend, plunging before rising and then descending again.

Flight-tracking data showed the plane plunging more than 17,000 feet in about two minutes, before climbing and descending again.

Meanwhile, a fight had begun in the cockpit between the two pilots. The co-pilot had attacked the Indian captain of the plane, Smit Machchhar, by stabbing him.

Machchhar later described finding himself seriously wounded on the cockpit floor as the aircraft descended.

“When I was down, I could feel that the aircraft was plummeting, and I knew this is the last chance to do something,” he told Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi from a hospital in Abu Dhabi.

“I knew that the aircraft was going down … I had fallen to the ground. I told myself that the door is right there, just open it. I managed to do it and people entered,” he said.

Passengers and crew members entered the cabin and overpowered the co-pilot. The aircraft eventually levelled out at about 15,000 feet. Its transponder was subsequently switched to code 7500, signalling unlawful interference.

Two reserve pilots who were on board took control of the jet and landed it in Tabuk, northwestern Saudi Arabia. The plane landed safely at 9:45am (06:45 GMT) local time. Saudi authorities said both pilots were taken to hospital. They were later transferred to Abu Dhabi after being medically cleared.

What has the UAE said about the attack?

UAE Attorney General Hamad Saif al-Shamsi said on Saturday that investigators had determined that the co-pilot had begun carrying out what he described as a “terrorist act”.

According to al-Shamsi, the co-pilot attacked the captain inside the cockpit using the aircraft’s emergency crash axe and “attempted to take control of the aircraft’s controls”.

A crash axe is a tool kept in a cockpit to help pilots cut through the plane in emergencies.

On Thursday, al-Shamsi had ordered investigators to determine whether the incident was connected to “terrorist activity or intent” or involved prior planning or direction.

The UAE has not yet publicly established a motive or announced whether investigators believe al-Hammami acted alone.

UAE presidential adviser Anwar Gargash on Saturday said that the latest ‘terrorist’ attack is new warning that region’s fight against extremism is not over.

“This underscores the importance of the UAE’s early and firm stance: no tolerance for extremism and no leniency towards its rhetoric. Security begins with confronting hatred and drying up the sources of extremism,” he posted on X

What is the latest in the investigation?

Abu Dhabi is now leading the investigation, with prosecutors examining the circumstances of the attack, its motive and any possible connections to others.

Previously, al-Shamsi said UAE judicial authorities have jurisdiction over the incident because the aircraft is registered in the UAE and flies under its flag, adding that UAE law applies to crimes committed on board “even if they occur outside the country’s territory”.

On Saturday, al-Shamsi said investigators are working “to uncover all the circumstances of the incident, its motives, and related connections, in addition to completing technical examinations and examining physical and digital evidence”.

The final results will be announced as soon as the necessary procedures are completed, he said.

Meanwhile, Flydubai flights to Israel remain ⁠suspended amid the investigations.

Smit Machchhar recalls mid-air disaster after co-pilot’s attack on flydubai flight to Tel Aviv.

Indian pilot Smit Machchhar, who was stabbed by his co-pilot in an alleged attempt to crash a Flydubai flight to Tel Aviv, has shared a public account of how he managed to open the cockpit door and let passengers take control of the plane despite his injuries.

Speaking on Friday from a hospital bed in Abu Dhabi via video call with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Machchhar said that he knew the aircraft was going down as he lay bleeding on the floor.

“I had suffered so many injuries that I had collapsed. At that time, I could feel that the aircraft was going down. I knew this was the last push, that the door was right there,” he said in a nearly 10-minute video released on the prime minister’s social media channels.

He added: “I was being hit even then, but I just opened the door and everyone came in.”

Machchhar, who has 17 years of aviation experience, including 11 as a captain, said that experience helped him grasp what was happening even while wounded.

He told Modi he had recited a Hindu devotional prayer during the ordeal.

“I know God himself saved me,” he said, in an emotional exchange with Modi, who is from the same home state of Gujarat.

Modi praised Machchhar’s bravery, saying his presence of mind had saved lives and the reputation of Indian pilots.

Machchhar said he allowed passengers and crew to overpower the co-pilot and let a second pair of Flydubai pilots take control and land the plane in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia.

The Flydubai flight was carrying 174 people as it briefly plunged around 17,000 feet (5,180 metres) before it was brought back under control.

UAE presidential adviser Anwar Gargash has called the incident a “terrorist act”, while Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the co-pilot had undergone “Islamist radical indoctrination” and appeared “suicidal”.

US President Donald Trump has warned that Iran would be “hit very hard” if found to be linked to the attack.

The United Arab Emirates has said it will launch an investigation into the incident.

Leaders of the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states are set to meet United States President Donald Trump in New York on Tuesday, as the US-Israel war on Iran nears seven months.

The meeting, to be held on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), brings together countries that have borne much of the fallout from a war they did not start.

Since the war began on February 28, Iran has repeatedly struck US bases across the Middle East as well as airports, energy facilities and hotels. The war has particularly hit the Gulf nations hard, as their oil and gas exports – the mainstay of their economies – have been disrupted, causing a global energy crisis.

A June memorandum of understanding (MoU) briefly raised hopes of an end to the war, but it collapsed last month amid disputes over navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, which remains effectively closed.

These talks come as Trump says he faces a “big decision” on the war, and as Iran’s president and foreign minister are also in New York for the UNGA.

So what is on the table and what might come out of the talks? Here is all you need to know:

What do we know about the GCC-Trump meeting?

Trump is set to meet the leaders from Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which form the GCC, on the sidelines of the UNGA.

Trump told US media outlet Axios on Thursday that he wanted to meet the GCC leaders as he faced a “big decision” on the war and wanted to speak with them directly.

Experts say there are two interconnected issues – the US-Israel war on Iran and the conflict between Houthi rebels and the Saudi-backed government forces in Yemen.

What do the GCC countries want from the meeting?

Broadly, experts say, the GCC nations share a common goal for the meeting.

The GCC has “shared positions on the main principles of regional security and de-escalation”, Luciano Zaccara, a researcher with the New Ground Research think tank in Doha, Qatar, told Al Jazeera.

“With Trump recently threatening to ‘wipe out’ Iran, I expect the six GCC states, or at least most of them, to convey to the US president their grave concerns about the likely consequences of another round of intense US military strikes on Iran,” Giorgio Cafiero, CEO of Gulf State Analytics, told Al Jazeera.

“They will probably seek to underscore their own vulnerabilities to a renewed cycle of all-out fighting between the United States and Iran,” he said, adding that they will try to persuade Trump into making certain concessions to Tehran.

Cafiero said they will look to develop an arrangement that builds on the MoU and which “offers the most viable path toward winding down the crisis”.

Chief among their common concerns is freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, according to Ahmed Helal, managing director for the Gulf region at The Asia Group.

‘Divergent’ goals

Despite common goals, the Gulf states have still experienced “divergent” outcomes from the war and will also look to persuade Trump to address their particular predicaments, Helal said.

The UAE, he explained, has been able to keep exporting oil by pipeline to its port of Fujairah, which bypasses the Strait of Hormuz, although not at the volumes it would like.

But fellow GCC member Qatar, whose gas exports depend on the strait, has seen its LNG shipments severely curtailed and wants to avoid any renewed escalation that could see its energy infrastructure targeted again, Helal said.

Speaking at an event in New York, US, on Sunday, Qatar’s Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani described the economic fallout from the US-Israel war on Iran as an “earthquake”.

Saudi Arabia has another problem, as it is now under “enormous pressure” as the Houthis gain ground in Yemen, and has been “intensifying their lobbying” for US strikes on the group, he said.

What does Trump want from the meeting?

Predicting what the US president plans has been difficult since the outbreak of the US-Israel war on Iran, experts say.

“It could be possible that the US is expecting a more direct GCC engagement against Iran in exchange for a direct US intervention to stop the Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia, but without the GCC leaving the main role in defending themselves”, Zaccara told Al Jazeera.

“Regarding Iran, Trump has not ruled out another major military escalation. At the same time, the administration seems to be open to exploring diplomatic options,” he said, adding there are rumours of a possible indirect US-Iran meeting on the sidelines before Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s speech on Wednesday.

Helal said the administration’s focus is domestic, with the midterm elections weeks away and Trump’s approval ratings at a record low; there is “immense pressure” to lower petrol prices.

While Trump has threatened further military action, he remains politically sensitive to an “escalatory ladder” that could spike oil prices, Helal said.

The talks are unlikely to produce a breakthrough, he added, with the best-case scenario an agreement to return to negotiations potentially brokered by Qatar or Pakistan.