How the failed 2016 coup reshaped Turkiye’s civil-military relations | Turkey Attempted Coup News
Istanbul, Turkiye – At around 19:30 GMT on July 15, 2016, a faction of the Turkish military launched a coordinated attempt to overthrow President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s democratically elected government.
But within hours, the attempted takeover involving tanks and fighter jets had been quashed. Thousands of people poured onto the streets of major cities, joining loyalist members of the army and the police, and much of the chain of command, in defeating the putschists.
The failed coup attempt 10 years ago was not only the bloodiest in Turkiye’s modern history – some 250 were killed and more than 2,200 wounded – but also a watershed moment that fundamentally changed relations between civil and military authorities in the country.
“The failure of July 15 had three pillars,” said retired Colonel Unal Atabay.
“The resistance of the people, the officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers inside the Turkish Armed Forces who resisted the coup, and the institutional reflex of the armed forces themselves.”
Military intervention cast a long shadow over Turkish politics for decades.
The armed forces overthrew governments in 1960 and 1980; intervened through a memorandum in 1971; and forced another elected government from office in what became known as the “post-modern coup” of 1997.
Although civilian rule returned after each intervention, the military remained one of Turkiye’s most influential institutions, seeing itself as the guardian of the republic’s founding principles.
Yet that was not how the republic’s founders had envisioned civil-military relations. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Ismet Inonu, both commanders during the War of Independence of the early 1920s, entered politics only after leaving military service.
“If the military had remained involved in politics, it would most likely have been exploited by various groups in the uncertain and weak conditions of those early years of the republic. They made the most accurate diagnosis and said that the military should stay out of politics.
Political scientist Ali Carkoglu said separation between military command and civilian politics was regarded as one of the republic’s founding principles, calling it “the most accurate diagnosis”.
Over time, however, the armed forces increasingly came to see themselves as guardians of the state, repeatedly invoking that role to justify intervention in politics.
But 10 years since the latest attempt, few experts believe Turkiye faces another conventional coup.
“You never say never,” said Howard Eissenstat, a Turkiye specialist at St Lawrence University in New York. “But to bet on a military coup in Turkiye is to lose money.”
While the military’s political role appears to have receded, the broader consequences of the post-coup transformation remain the subject of debate.
Reducing the military’s influence over politics had already become a central objective of the governing Justice and Development Party, or AK Party, after it came to power in 2002.
Following years of tension with the military establishment, the government steadily expanded civilian oversight – and the failed coup accelerated that process dramatically.
Ankara accused the network of United States-based Muslim scholar Fethullah Gulen, designated by the Turkish government as the Fethullah Terrorist Organisation (FETO), of orchestrating the coup attempt. Tens of thousands of soldiers, judges, police officers, teachers and civil servants were dismissed or arrested. Military academies were replaced by the National Defence University, command structures were overhauled, and civilian oversight of the armed forces expanded.
Atabay said these changes have fundamentally reshaped the relationship between the military, the state and society.
He added the military has strengthened its internal oversight after the coup to prevent another organised infiltration, noting that both the armed forces and wider society are now more alert to attempts to penetrate state institutions.
“External centres of power may always make such attempts,” he said. “The important thing is to detect them early, expose them and build a system that prevents them from infiltrating the state.”
For Carkoglu, however, the military cannot be examined in isolation from the broader health of Turkiye’s democratic institutions.
He said bringing the armed forces firmly under civilian authority was essential. But civilian supremacy alone, he argued, does not necessarily amount to democratic consolidation.
“It is certainly a success that civilian authority has established greater control over the military,” he said. “But if that comes at the expense of democracy, then it is, at the very least, an unfortunate outcome for Turkish politics.”
Carkoglu noted that institutions derive legitimacy not simply from who controls them, but from whether citizens trust them.
“The healthy development of trust in institutions requires competitive politics and the possibility of free expression,” he said. “Otherwise, institutions themselves begin to lose credibility.”
That debate has become increasingly prominent in recent years.
The arrests of several opposition mayors – including Istanbul mayor and presidential candidate for the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) Ekrem Imamoglu, together with investigations into other opposition politicians, have fuelled criticism from political parties and rights groups, who argue judicial processes are increasingly being used against rivals.
The government rejects those accusations, saying the investigations are conducted independently and are based solely on evidence of criminal wrongdoing.
The debate has unfolded during a period of remarkable political continuity. Since coming to power in 2002, the AK Party has won every parliamentary election, most recently in 2023, when the governing People’s Alliance retained its parliamentary majority.
Rights groups, meanwhile, focus on a different legacy of the coup.
Human Rights Watch says emergency powers introduced after the 2016 coup attempt gradually evolved into broader restrictions on civil liberties. It argues the crackdown extended well beyond those responsible for the attempted overthrow, leaving many dismissed public employees unable to rebuild their professional lives even after acquittal.
The government says the measures were necessary to dismantle clandestine networks inside the state and prevent Turkiye from facing a similar threat again.
Ten years on, that effort continues. On Monday, two days before the anniversary, Turkish authorities launched coordinated operations across all 81 provinces targeting nearly 1,000 suspects over alleged links to FETO.
For the government, it was another reminder that the events of July 2016 remain an active national security issue rather than a closed chapter in the country’s history.
