Transition

Gov.-elect Xavier Becerra names transition team

Xavier Becerra speaks to his supporters during the election night party in Sacramento, CA on November 3, 2026.

Xavier Becerra speaks to his supporters during the election night party in Sacramento, CA on November 3, 2026.

(Andri Tambunan / For The Times)

Gov.-elect Xavier Becerra named the team that will oversee his transition and help build out his administration as he prepares to take office in early January. His transition team includes several of his former advisers, and others who worked for Gov. Gavin Newsom.

“This transition has one job: to ensure my administration is ready to deliver on day one,” Becerra said in a statement. “Together, we aim to make California a place people can afford, with results they can see and feel in their everyday lives. Our work starts now, to build a California we can afford and protect the California we can’t afford to lose.”

Longtime Becerra aide Liz Saldivar will lead the transition. Salvidar advised Becerra’s campaign and worked for him during his time in Congress and as state attorney general.

Serving as senior advisers to the transition will be Lindsey Cobia, a veteran of the Newsom administration who now runs his Campaign for Democracy PAC, and Kyle Layman, a Democratic operative who joined Becerra’s campaign early on.

Another former Becerra aide, Arsenio Mataka, will direct policy for the transition. Mataka advised Becerra on environmental policy at the U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services and the California Department of Justice. Also an alumna of Jerry Brown’s administration, Mataka most recently was a deputy at the Bay Area Air District.

After advising his campaign on policy, Nicole Elliott will serve as agency review director. Elliott advised Newsom on cannabis policy before he appointed her to lead the state Department of Cannabis Control in 2021. She first began working for Newsom in 2009, when he was mayor of San Francisco. Her husband Jason Elliott is a close adviser to Newsom who worked for him both as mayor and governor.

Leading external affairs for the transition are Courtni Pugh, a Democratic strategist close to Newsom, and Kenneth Maxey II, president of the Urban League of San Francisco Bay Area.

Becerra defeated Republican opponent Steve Hilton in the Nov. 3 election and will be sworn in on Jan. 4, 2027.

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US urges Venezuela to follow phased plan for democratic transition | Politics News

This comes as leading opposition leader, Maria Corina Machado, returns to Venezuela and hints at criticism of Trump administration.

The United States has urged Venezuela to continue on a phased plan of economic recovery and political reconciliation before embarking on democratic elections.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio discussed the gradual plan during a meeting on the country’s political future with Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs Oliver Blanco on Monday. The meeting comes nearly a year after US forces abducted former Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro from Caracas and brought him to the US to face drug trafficking and other charges.

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Neither Rubio nor Blanco spoke to the media after the meeting, but in a readout. The State Department said in a readout that Washington had reaffirmed President Donald Trump’s “three-phase plan for Venezuela: stabilization, economic recovery and political reconciliation, and democratic transition”.

Last week, Venezuelan opposition leader Maria Corina Machado returned to her country, thanking the US president and Rubio for their support. Machado, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate who gifted her medal to Trump in 2025, said she had come to organise a movement in preparation for Venezuelan elections.

Rubio “has set out a sequence of events aimed at moving toward a democratic transition that makes clear the holding of presidential elections in 2027”, she said.

Machado is balancing an election campaign with a Trump administration that has sought to extract oil from Venezuela by striking deals with the government of interim President Delcy Rodriguez, who served as Maduro’s vice president and took over after his abduction.

In September, the Trump administration said it had struck a deal with Venezuela that would give Washington a stake in about one-fifth of the country’s oil resources.

The US said it was creating a joint venture with North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP), owned by Venezuelan businessman Alejandro Betancourt, which is the second-largest private oil operator in Venezuela, behind Chevron.

Under the deal, Caracas is giving the company 100-year rights over 17 oilfields with proven reserves of 65 billion barrels. The Pentagon will have a 35 percent stake in NABEP, and the US will be guaranteed the right to buy 20 percent of its oil output at cost, the Trump administration has said.

Shortly before Machado’s statements on Thursday, Rodriguez assured the nation that elections would be held in Venezuela “with the world as witness”, but did not specify a date.

When asked about a possible meeting with Rodriguez, Machado said she had not received any message from the interim president or from Washington.

In remarks after returning Venezuela, Machado seemed sceptical of the oil agreement with the US.

“This agreement does not reflect the levels of transparency that Venezuelan society wants,” Machado said.

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Machado’s Pending Challenges Before Elections Come

October 29 was a good day for the post-Maduro optimists. María Corina Machado gave her first public address after coming back, in front of an enthusiastic student crowd in the private Andrés Bello Catholic University. Legacy TV network Venevisión broadcasted the event, where she didn’t rule out a meeting with Delcy Rodríguez, said a negotiation was the best shot for the regime and the nation moving forward, and spoke positively of the opposition-chavismo talks.

“We not only refrain from obstructing [the US-sponsored agenda], we are very interested in seeing it succeed and fulfil its mission.”

Becoming Venezuela’s stateswoman-in-waiting starts with building trust with actors with whom tensions have flared in recent years, but with whom she will likely have to work in the near future. 

Talks between the delegations led by Jorge Rodríguez and Dinorah Figuera have both lagged and half-delivered in some important areas. Yet, for Machado, the negotiations revolve around five crown jewels, a political ladder she must climb in the leadup to the next presidential vote, even if addressing each step is far from simple.

The first rung begins with what Rubio envisions as a robust Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ). The nomination process began last week, and according to Rubio, appointments will bypass the Rodríguez-led National Assembly, running through the Judicial Nominations Committee.

A star-spangled TSJ?

The Supreme Court represents a big opportunity for Machado. The US is driving that train, a slower one than the oil and gas train, as economist Asdrúbal Oliveros has said. However, Henry Alviarez, her most senior party aide until she arrived on Sunday, has criticized the talks where TSJ reform is getting its initial shape. The day after Machado’s return, he called the ongoing negotiating table a “stool” that doesn’t listen to the people. 

As hard as it sounds, Machado can’t afford to snub a process whose first landmark was the decision to exclude her. Not because the other parties involved could try to mold the new institutions to her detriment, but because the US might try to build a train custom-made for its interests in Venezuela. The new judges could decide over important commercial deals where foreign powers participate, reverse decisions deemed unconstitutional, rule over key issues concerning transitional justice, among other subjects.

Machado must carefully coordinate her allies from other parties and exert influence over the restitution process if she hopes to secure her next objectives.

In Monday’s off-the-record statement, Secretary Rubio said he views the new Venezuelan Supreme Court as an anchor of the chavista regime, and made it sound like he wants the nascent one to be the backbone of the new republic. 

We don’t need to go too far to understand the practical implications. In neighboring Brazil, the Supreme Court is not shy to twist the arm of politicians, huge companies and fellow institutional actors alike—even in contentious ways, becoming a headache to the Trump administration and the Bolsonaros. Drawing from that example, and the likelihood that our republic won’t be perfect or perfectly balanced straight away, either Machado tries to influence some of these reforms and new appointments, or her future government could be shaped by conflict with a crop of powerful men in robes. Perhaps that sounds alien right now, but it’s the game in the inefficient democracies and hybrid regimes that abound.

Stairway to power

Next comes the National Electoral Council (CNE), which Rubio insists must be purely technical and “nonpolitical.” Here, too, Rubio claims the National Assembly will not participate at all. The State Department has hinted at dismantling the existing electronic voting infrastructure, though that detail was conspicuously absent from the official statement. Whether that State Department post was tied to domestic midterm political posturing—amid Trump’s warnings that he might not recognize results if opponents cheat “like in 2020”—remains an open question. What is clear is that both Machado and Trump share a deep aversion to electronic voting machines, and Machado’s team has been preparing proposals and expertise to help Washington shape a new system for Venezuela.

The restitution of political parties to their legitimate leadership represents a third, critical battleground. This is a common cause for thousands across the country, unless your name is Brito or Bernabé. Some of Machado’s most vital allies lead traditional opposition parties, and she will inevitably need their territorial machinery and clout when the time comes: Juan Pablo Guanipa in Zulia, Andrés Velásquez in Bolívar, Henry Ramos Allup wherever he may be, and so on. Machado must carefully coordinate these allies and exert influence over this process if she hopes to secure her next objectives. The restitution process is delicate because it could require the reshuffling of party leaderships, which could trigger factional unrest. Machado has refrained from committing her support to anyone, though some leaders have become closer to her organization than others.

Then comes the official registration of Vente Venezuela as a recognized political party. Machado’s electoral advisor suggests this could happen simultaneously with the previous step. For Delcy Rodríguez and the remnants of chavismo, the ideal scenario would be to sideline Vente Venezuela and rush regional, municipal, or legislative contests ahead of any presidential election. As Pedro Garmendia has noted, holding sub-national races first could dilute Machado’s momentum and boost the older, “mainstream” party apparatuses. Forcing a breakthrough here hinges on her maneuvering in the “party restitution” stage, ultimately requiring Machado to submit her party’s standing to the newly constituted TSJ and CNE—regardless of how imperfect those institutions prove to be.

While her Jorge Rodríguez jeered at the apellidos in public, these pragmatists found a shared dialect with the State.

The final and most contentious hurdle remains the lifting of Machado’s political ban. Unlocking her eligibility will likely demand recognizing Delcy and Jorge Rodríguez as legitimate interlocutors, whatever cognitive dissonance that pill carries. After all, one of them would inevitably hand her the presidential sash in the future, and nobody wants curses and insults inaugurating a new republic. It will require recognizing whoever the PSUV settles on as its candidate. Right now, Delcy looks like an uninspiring choice.

That is the five-step ladder Machado must navigate ahead of the next presidential election, whose actual date remains unknown regardless of what Rubio, Figuera, Axios, or La Divina Pastora seem to suggest. These hurdles represent her greatest challenges, especially since the electoral calendar is not hers to set.

Hovering over all of this is another crucial detail: Rubio’s statement (the most consequential since January 28) made no mention of parliamentary elections. If a presidential vote were to take place between 2027 and 2029, a hypothetical President Machado would face the immediate prospect of governing in direct confrontation with a chavista-dominated parliament within an intensely presidential system, or being forced into uncomfortable compromises. That is a bitter toad she may be watching with caution, one she may have to swallow to govern the country, or one that might compel her to reconsider her current trajectory.

“Business is business”

An effective domestic presence not only requires a positive influence on the Supreme Court and electoral board designations, but also mending ties with a key constituency that was punished (and at times manipulated) by chavismo: the Venezuelan private sector. 

When Machado emerged as the opposition’s undisputed frontrunner, the table was tilted clean: the CNE was an arm of the ruling elite, the Supreme Court was run by thugs or close friends of Cilia Flores, and Parliament was packed with loyalists. In the background, the opposition lost some of its staunchest economic allies as chavismo’s predatory omnipresence exhausted legacy companies and proud family businesses. Some fled abroad. Others opted for quiet, apolitical survival just to break even. A few big shots decided that surviving meant engaging, finding a receptive ear in a rising, ostensibly “more competent” Delcy Rodríguez. Assertions like “Delcy is no Maduro” or “I’d have Delcy over Diosdado” soon became common currency over rounds of Scotch in Caracas country clubs.

While her brother Jorge jeered at the apellidos in public, these pragmatists found a shared dialect with the State: peace, dialogue, cooperation and sanctions relief. If single-party China could pull off the miracle of Deng Xiaoping, they reasoned, so could an oil-rich Venezuela sitting right on America’s doorstep.

Machado must treat Delcy like a lame duck, engaging with the people that,  from outside the government, have helped her to run the country.

Nowadays, the relationship between some business leaders and acting president Delcy Rodríguez doesn’t look as central as it used to be. Sanctions are out of the way, or at least most of them. New investors and foreign companies are considering whether it’s time to come in. Maduro and Cilia are living in Brooklyn. Some of the things I find most refreshing are the groups of pundits, business figures and scholars speaking out over several subjects that were taboo before January 3—no elections and political uncertainty, lacking public services, poor policymaking in PDVSA and the central bank—the same subjects some important people learned not to discuss on the record.

That certain actors are already behaving like this, while retaining direct personal and/or financial stakes in the country, is an encouraging sign that incentives have shifted.

In this sense, Machado should recast her relationship with the Venezuelan private sector, even with those elements that have been associated with Delcy or Maduro before her. Some will be easier to navigate than others.

In my view, Machado must treat Delcy Rodríguez like a lame duck, engaging with the people that,  from outside the government, have helped her to run the country. Rodríguez has done so in the past few years not because she’s a genius technocrat, but because she reached an understanding with a series of actors that allow the country to operate amidst material struggle and daunting economic inefficiencies. 

We expect Machado to do a much better job than Delcy. She has a first-100-days plan, a program, and an experienced set of advisors that have spent years preparing to command energy, education and electoral reforms. Her children, who are having careers in some of the world’s most important technology and financial organizations, could also help her in private. Still, we know governance is more than world-class personnel and projects under your belt. The story of CAP 2 seems to teach that sometimes, not dealing with longstanding power players while pursuing groundbreaking reforms can outweigh having the brightest minds in your cabinet.

The example of 1958 also comes in handy. The private sector had had a beneficial relationship with the military dictatorship, yet backed Wolfgang Larrazábal when incentives shifted. Betancourt, with a radical and ideologically-charged background, learned to embrace them.

Venezuelan businesses face other steep challenges today, including the absence of a functioning banking system, a severe lack of investment, and restrictive labor laws. Delcy is already opening up the economy; Colombian capital, for instance, has secured access to profitable businesses. An avowed proponent of Friedman-style liberalism, a President Machado would also need to navigate the necessities of a dwarfed Venezuelan private sector with the urgent need for foreign investment and fresh competition.

For now, the opposition leader is back home, embracing friends, victims, students, and survivors. She is free to move and embrace almost whomever she pleases. The possibilities, at least on the surface, have never looked brighter than they do today.



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María Corina is Back | Caracas Chronicles

Many of us were running errands, working out, or having breakfast when, in true 2026 Venezuelan fashion, one event we expected happened: María Corina Machado came back to her country.

She reappeared in the middle of a Sunday mass at the Santa Rosa basilica, a church near the city of Barquisimeto, home to the most popular Virgin Mary cult: la Divina Pastora. 

Surrounded by churchgoers and members of her party, Vente Venezuela, Machado joined the mass and embraced people, in a public demonstration of prayer, faith, and hope, in line with her religious persona that made her massively popular in 2023 and 2024, when she crossed the country meeting the communities more affected by mass migration and economic collapse. 

Now, many questions arise. 

How did Machado come back? For the region where she is now, in western Venezuela, we can speculate she took a private plane or a boat from the Dutch islands near the Falcon coast, on a route similar to the one she made during her clandestine trip to Oslo to collect her Nobel Peace Prize in December 2025.  

What will the chavista regime, and their Washington sponsors, do? As we described many times in our Political Risk Report, the chavista regime was preparing for this for months, speaking as if it wasn’t their fault that Machado wasn’t there, as if they would not have persecuted her and charged her with several crimes. Donald Trump just said that she is nice because she gifted him the Nobel Prize, so he hopes she is right. 

What can happen now? Machado will organize pressure to accelerate the complicated roadmap towards rebuilding the institutions and hold elections, including a presidential one where she is finally allowed to compete. At the same time, we expect Machado to channel the public ire about blackouts and inflation, and lead a more coherent and productive campaign towards a true democratic -not only economic- transition. With the appointment of the committee that will choose new justices for the Supreme Court, while the repressive apparatus led by Diosdado Cabello continues to show muscle by harassing activists, we must expect more street action and political negotiation. This is a challenge to both Machado and Delcy Rodríguez, and a shock to the dead calm chavismo was trying to settle. 

More to come. But Venezuela will get frenzied, and be interesting to global media, again. 



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How to Come to Terms With a Venezuelan Transition

The opposition delegation, comprising members of Primero Justicia and Voluntad Popular, sits opposite its regime counterparts during the latest round of talks. Source: Jorge Rodríguez via X. 

In recent days, pressure regarding the timeline for political change has intensified, a sense of urgency that I both understand and share. To the long years of democratic struggle, we must add the dire economic and social conditions that afflict us. The urgency is real, and I share it. 

This is why this sense of urgency is shared. We all want to reach democracy without any further delay. It is in no one’s interest to postpone political change. Whether one is sitting at the negotiating table, viewing it with suspicion, or opposing it entirely, we all want the same thing: to arrive at democracy as soon as possible.

Acknowledging this common ground is essential. To suggest that this shared goal divides us is untrue and undermines future stability; it is a strategic error. Who benefits from fracturing what unites us? Who gains from destroying the common ground we have built over the years?

Therefore, I believe our differences do not lie in our shared destination, but rather in the path that circumstances have allowed us to take toward it. This reflection is precisely what gives this article its title: “It’s a transition, not a revolution.”

The revolution that never was

For years, we worked toward a “clean slate.” Paradoxically, we dreamed of a revolution. We longed for the moment when chavismo would pack up its belongings and relinquish power. Perhaps this shared expectation stemmed from our tradition of seeking radical ruptures. For many reasons, we hoped that Maduro would simply fly away. But that did not happen.

Instead, on July 28, 2024, chavismo stole the election, subjected us to repression, and clung to power. We did everything in our power to defeat them, and it was not enough. We reached the absolute limit of democratic resilience and paid the price for fighting for our country. Then came January 3, 2026. On that day, a foreign military operation took Nicolás Maduro away, but left the Rodríguez faction behind. That is how it happened, and that is how it remains.

The Trump administration did what we either could not or would not do. Time will allow us to process the weight of that reality, and I do not intend to dwell on it here. For now, I will simply point out the obvious: the United States took risks, opened the door to a new political landscape, and became the most influential actor in the power equation. To put it plainly: they paid for the party, and now they are calling the tune.

The time for this “feast of bitter pills” has arrived, and we are discovering that swallowing them is far more difficult than we had imagined.

Perhaps some reader, channeling an inner Che Guevara, might accuse me of treason. Well, my dear rebellious reader, that is not the case. Acknowledging this reality is entirely compatible with a love for our country; it does not make me a sellout. The United States removed Maduro and opened the door to a transition toward democracy. It may not be the transition we dreamed of or planned for, but it is the one that is actually possible. What followed the dictator’s capture was not a revolution, but the beginning of a transition—a process of gradual, progressive change driven by institutional reforms and political consensus.

Unlike revolutions, which seek a radical break from the previous order, transitions do not start from scratch. Instead, they identify elements from the old regime that can survive and transform them to fit within the new democratic order that is being built. It is a matter of profound change without having to destroy everything, of transforming existing institutions to place them at the service of democracy. And that is what we are working on.

A feasible transition

Given this, the practical question is how to reconcile the genuine sense of urgency—which unites us—with the timeframes required for a transition. I do not have a definitive answer to this question. However, I would like to share three tasks that could contribute to the transition.

First, we must learn to swallow bitter pills. 

For years, we were warned that, when the time came, we would face an extensive menu of pills—a metaphor for the unpopular measures, difficult concessions, and uncomfortable decisions that would inevitably come with a process of political change.

We listened, took note, and pressed on. Well, the time for this “feast of pills” has arrived, and we are discovering that swallowing them is far more difficult than we had imagined. Now, it is urgent that we learn how to do so—and, above all, that we create the conditions to ensure that every sacrifice is worth it.

I have no ready-made formulas for this task. Each person will have to find their own way to confront these contradictions, to process the inconveniences and the costs that must be borne. What is clear to me is that we must learn to do so without losing sight of the causes for which we have fought for so many years.

The nature of the political change now beginning to emerge demands a process of collective healing, one that will require both time and maturity.

Second, we must engage in civic education. 

We need to take the time to speak to the nation and explain what is unfolding. We must also be capable of putting ourselves in the shoes of others, understanding that our distrust runs deep, nurtured by decades of deception, broken promises, and accumulated frustrations.

The leadership required at this moment must be democratic and empathetic, one willing to listen, understand, engage in dialogue, and build. More than thirty years of persecution and repression have left deep wounds in our national soul. The nature of the political change now beginning to emerge demands a process of collective healing, one that will require both time and maturity.

This process will not be resolved through staged photographs or superficial gestures. I am speaking of a profound, human, and authentic effort toward recognition, acceptance, and reparation—a task that allows us to rediscover one another as a society, take ownership of our history, and regain the trust necessary to build a shared future.

Third, we must offer certainty to everyone. Venezuelans do not lack patience; what we lack is the certainty needed to navigate the tunnel that lies ahead. We are capable of enduring sacrifices, but we need to know that these efforts will be worth it. If we can see that light at the end of the tunnel, we will have reason to remain patient and perseverant.

The certainties we can offer today must be built step by step—through actions, commitments, and results

Perhaps this is the most difficult challenge of all. Transitions toward democracy are inevitably marked by uncertainty and a lack of transparency. One need only read the memoirs or listen to the testimonies of those who lived through similar experiences to recognize ourselves in their dilemmas, contradictions, fears, and hopes. There is something profoundly human in those stories that feels familiar to us.

That is why political education, the building of consensus, and the gradual restoration of democratic dynamics are so important. They serve as ways to provide guidance amidst uncertainty, rebuild trust, and give meaning to the sacrifices we are called upon to make. The certainties we can offer today must be built step by step—through actions, commitments, and results that allow Venezuelans to recognize that we are moving toward democracy.

From desirable outcomes to real possibilities

One of our greatest challenges is to accept that the revolution we wanted to bring about for so many years was not to be, and that today we are facing a transition currently in the making. Its success will depend, in large part, on our ability to understand the nature of this process, to embrace reality—with all its possibilities and limitations—and to learn how to navigate the path that has opened up before us.

We will need to do so with intelligence, patience, generosity, and a sense of historical responsibility. Above all, we must act in unity, placing Venezuela above our differences. Because, in the end, that is what it is all about: seizing the opportunity we have to build the democracy for which we have fought so hard.

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