Today

During a Test against South Africa, Smith admitted Australia’s “leadership group” devised a plan to tamper with the ball.

Former opener David Warner taught batter Cameron Bancroft how to use sandpaper to rough up the ball, and Bancroft was then caught doing so by TV cameras during play. Both men were also banned along with Smith.

Smith made his comeback after the ball-tampering episode in the 2019 Ashes Test at Edgbaston and has been booed repeatedly since.

England fans also base taunts on his tearful news conference in 2018.

“We did the wrong thing, accept it and move on,” Lehmann said.

“You try to move on the best you can. You get reminded every day and that is part and parcel.

“Steve Smith can hold his head high with how he handles everything.

“The Barmy Army should be better than that. Most of them are and are very supportive of what goes on in the game.”

When Mariam* first started thinking of deserting Boko Haram’s settlement at Sambisa Forest, where she had been living for a decade, she was not entirely sure that it was the best idea. She still believed in the cause, for starters. But there was the matter of her body starting to fail her. 

Her husband had just died of HIV/AIDS, and she had unfortunately contracted the disease from him before he passed. Although the doctor in the forest tried to provide her with medication, it was not consistent. In addition, she had kids she feared infecting. Then, she started to hear that access to antiretroviral drugs was free in Maiduguri, the Borno State capital in northeastern Nigeria. So, she began to tinker with the idea, for the first time, of leaving the group behind. 

The group was all she had known for the past decade. She had even been prepared, at some point, to give her life for the cause by volunteering for a suicide bombing. She had been approved for it and had begun to undergo training and preparations when she realised she was pregnant. Her husband, previously supportive of what they collectively thought of as her noble martyrdom, then decided she could not blow herself up while carrying their child. She was heavily disappointed. That’s how far she was willing to go for the Boko Haram cause.

And so to leave it all behind seemed impossible. 

She had joined when the group first declared war on the Nigerian state over a decade ago, leaving state-controlled territories for the Sambisa Forest. They sought to establish what they believed to be an Islamic state, declaring formal education, democracy, and elections forbidden. Their campaign has killed over 35,000 people violently, displaced over two million others, and caused over 25,000 others to go missing. Mariam had been attending their sermons right from the early, non-violent days. 

Eventually, after nearly a decade, she left with her children in 2017. Since coming back to Maiduguri, she has had uninterrupted access to free medications for her condition, reducing her viral load and making her no longer infectious. And so, even though she considered the economic prospects and living conditions in Maiduguri to be worse than in Sambisa, she stayed because she could remain alive.

She keeps the truth of her condition from her children and everyone she knows. 

Earlier this year, however, the United States President Donald Trump announced the suspension of USAID, which was primarily responsible for the accessibility of antiretroviral drugs for people like Mariam. Without the USAID subsidy, the drugs are estimated to be unaffordably expensive for low-income earners like Mariam.

Word started to go around that the availability of the drugs would falter. When Mariam ran out of her six-month stash of medications, she returned to the Borno State Specialist Hospital to get a refill, as she has done for years now. There, she met a surprise that scared her. 

“They only gave me one small can of pills, not the usual two. They seemed to have changed the ratio. They didn’t say why, only that they had changed the ratio. The bottle will only last me three months,” she recounted.

It worried her. When she got home from the hospital, she poured the pills into a thin white plastic bag and hid it, as usual. That way, it is inconspicuous, and anyone who knew the kind of bottles the drugs came in would not be able to recognise hers. This is so that she would avoid stigma.

“Nobody knows I have HIV to date. Even my children. And they are HIV-free. I had them tested at the hospital. Even the eldest among them doesn’t know.”

Around the same time, NGO-run health facilities were also starting to shut down in many rural communities in Borno. For example, in Konduga, a primary healthcare centre run by Family Health International (FHI360) was shut down. The facility had been receiving hundreds of patients daily until its abrupt suspension, leaving many in need and others unemployed. 

For Mariam, this has made her begin to consider going back to the terror group, especially after she lost everything during the tragic Maiduguri floods last year. She and her children barely escaped with their lives. The flood had swept through Maiduguri and neighbouring areas, affecting over one million people in total. Her daughter had initially been swept away until a neighbour dove into the waves and rescued her.

“It was a young man who came to help. I was at the verge of diving into the water myself when he came and said not to worry, that he would get her back, and he did. We could not salvage anything else from the flood. We were displaced to the Bakassi IDP camp.” 

When Mariam ran out of the three-month stash and went back to the hospital for a refill, she was only handed a one-month stash this time. The two times she has gone back for more refills after she had exhausted each, she only received one month’s stash, further scaring her.

Though she is no longer as committed to the Boko Haram ideology as she used to be, the realisation that she and her children’s lives are not safe has made her seriously reconsider the prospect of returning

A medical doctor working in Borno State, who pleaded anonymity, confirmed that the drugs had become difficult to access after the USAID suspension. “Patients who showed up at the hospitals were being told that the drugs were not available,” the doctor told HumAngle. “But if you knew your way around and gave some pharmacists some money, they would then give you the drugs, but keep in mind that the drugs are meant to be free. The situation has mildly improved.”

The availability of healthcare among terror groups is traceable to many sources. They are notorious for abducting healthcare workers and forcing them to work for them. But they also took medical training very seriously during the early days when the group first started to tactically come together over a decade ago, according to a former member of the group. 

Now, as many people are coming back to state-controlled territories, the rewards for recidivism have reportedly become higher, as the groups struggle to maintain their followers. Mariam hears these whispers from many of her associates.

“In addition to the drugs they were giving me in Sambisa, they would also give me a litre of honey and some black seed,” she said, adding that the honey and black seed were to help build her immune system.

In northwestern Nigeria, children who escaped or were rescued from terror groups have reported similar experiences. Some boys told HumAngle in an investigation that they joined the groups for things like food and healthcare. They said these were some of the incentives that made staying easy, and why they were not so keen on returning to state-controlled territories.

“I collected the last batch exactly a week ago today,” Mariam said of her access to the drugs. “The flow has never stopped. They always give me on schedule; it is just that I now only get one-month refills.” 

“The life over there is way better,” she said of Sambisa. “If I were there, I would have received a lot of support, especially with my husband dead. Here, who will help me? Everyone is focused on themselves. There is peace of mind there.”

When asked how there could be peace of mind there, with the threat of military bombardment ever present, she said the military would not harm women and children, and so she still would have been safe. “They will only ‘rescue’ us and bring us back to Borno… Even recently, I said to myself that life over there would be better for me. There were so many things weighing down on me at that time. It was even before the flood.”

On whether her children’s lives would be better in Maiduguri, she said it would only be so if her children had access to formal education here, which they don’t. Now, they spend all their time either at home with her or roaming the streets.

When we first spoke in June 2023, she had told me that her children were opposed to the Nigerian army and would throw rocks at them on the road, chanting war songs. When I asked her if things had improved now, she said yes.

“They don’t do that anymore,” she laughed. “They have forgotten. They don’t even want to hear anything related to Boko Haram anymore.”

If she could make an appeal for help to the government, it would be for three things. “Healthcare, school for my children, and a means of livelihood.”

This work was produced as a result of a grant provided by the Wits Centre for Journalism’s African Investigative Journalism Conference.

*Mariam is a pseudonym used to protect her anonymity. 

Russian officials claim that a prototype of the Sukhoi Su-75 Checkmate fighter could be in flight testing by early next year. Development of the single-engine aircraft, which first broke cover four years ago, is otherwise said to be ongoing with a heavy emphasis on potential export sales. There also continues to at least be plans, which currently look to be aspirational, for further variations on the design, including an uncrewed derivative.

Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) officially unveiled a Su-75, also known as the Light Tactical Aircraft (LTA), or LTS in Russian, at the 2021 Dubai Airshow. A full-scale mockup of the jet was shown at that event. Later that year, UAC said that work on an actual flying prototype was underway.

We’re “still working on development of this aircraft,” Sergey Chemezov, head of Russia’s state-run defense conglomerate Rostec, told TWZ and other outlets at this year’s Dubai Airshow on Tuesday, according to a translator. “We need some time to get the real prototype for the test flights.”

“Basically, we are almost at the stage of the testing flights, and in the near future, we will be launching it into production,” Chemezov added, again per the translator.

“I think this is the beginning of 2026,” Sergey Bogdan, Sukhoi’s chief test pilot, also said about the expected timeframe for the start of Su-75 flight testing in a separate interview with Russia’s state-run Channel One television station on Tuesday. “The aircraft is already on the shop floor, it is already being finalized, and there are already certain time plans. Therefore, with God’s help, it should take place soon enough.”

Specifications for the Su-75 that UAC has provided at this year’s Dubai Airshow say the design, at least in its present form, has a maximum takeoff weight of some 57,320 pounds (26,000 kilograms). The jet is said to be able to carry up to 16,314 pounds (7,400 kilograms) worth of air-to-air and/or air-to-ground munitions on an array of underwing hardpoints, as well as one inside three internal bays. UAC has stated the aircraft’s top speed to be between Mach 1.8 and Mach 2 with an engine in the 32,000 to 36,000-pound-thrust-class (14,500 to 16,500 kilogram-force). Size-wise, the design, as it was shown in 2021, is approximately 57 feet long and has a wingspan of 39 feet.

As TWZ has noted in the past, despite its LTA moniker, the Su-75 is really more of a middle-weight design. As a comparison, Lockheed Martin’s single-engine F-35A is 51 feet long and has a wingspan of 35 feet, and has a stated maximum takeoff weight in the “70,000 pound class.” As another reference point, Russia’s twin-engine Su-57 Felon, a heavyweight fighter design, measures 66 feet in length with a 46-foot wingspan, and has a stated maximum takeoff weight of 74,957 pounds.

Based on models and renderings that UAC has shown, the Su-75’s design has evolved since 2021. This includes the enlargement of the rear edges of both wings, with flaperons that now stretch all the way down both sides of the tail, and the extension of the wing roots at the nose end of the jet. The shaping of the wing tips, as well as parts of the nose and tail ends of the jet, has also changed. The cockpit canopy now has sawtooth edges at the front and back, as well.

There have also been changes observed to what is easily one of the Su-75’s most striking visual features, its highly angular air intake that wraps around the underside of the nose section. The mock-up that was unveiled in 2021 had a divider in the middle of the intake, which has since disappeared in renders and models of the design. The underside of the intake has also gotten flatter. It still has a diverterless supersonic inlet (DSI) style of design, the benefits of which you can read about in more detail here. Lockheed pioneered DSI technology in the 1990s, with this becoming a key aspect of the F-35’s design. It has now appeared in various forms on a number of other crewed and uncrewed aircraft, especially ones developed in China.

Overall, like the Su-57, the Su-75’s design does look to have some low-observable characteristics, but appears to be mostly focused on reducing the radar signature from the frontal hemisphere, rather than any kind of all-aspect stealth. UAC claims that Checkmate will be effective in areas “protected by air defense systems” and “in a complex jamming environment” thanks to its sensor suite, including an active electronically scanned array radar and an infrared search and track (IRST) system, and other features.

As noted, since the Su-75 was first unveiled, UAC has talked about plans for an entire family of designs based on the single-seat LTA configuration. Models of a two-seat crewed version, as well as the aforementioned uncrewed derivative, have been shown over the years.

Evidence is growing that Russia’s Su-75 Checkmate may appear not only as a single-seater, but also an unmanned wingman and a two-seat version — the latter eyed by Middle Eastern buyers. Commercial models with “Iran” and “UAE” markings hint at export plans. https://t.co/YFNxsirvHL pic.twitter.com/nZgDwlzHpr

— Mohammad Hassan Sangtarash (@MHSangtarash) November 15, 2025

There is notably a more refined model of the uncrewed Checkmate design on display at this year’s Dubai Airshow. It shows an overall configuration in line with the revisions to the single-seat design.

The Checkmate drone model also notably features what looks to be an electro-optical targeting system (EOTS) underneath its fuselage that sits inside a windowed enclosure broadly akin to the ones seen on the U.S. F-35 and Chinese J-20, as well as other designs globally. There is what appears to be another electro-optical and/or infrared sensor system with a more fixed forward field of view on the underside of the fuselage, as well. A sensor aperture is also present on top of the nose. These latter two systems look to be part of a distributed aperture system (DAS) type arrangement that could also have a more capable IRST capability. Advanced combat drones have a particular need for an array of sensors around the aircraft to provide general situational awareness, especially if they are designed for more independent autonomous operations, as well as to help spot and track targets in the air and down below.

All of this being said, much about the Checkmate effort, especially plans for follow-on variations, crewed and uncrewed, currently look to be highly aspirational.

“Generally, it takes about 10 to 15 years to create the proper aircraft,” Rostec’s Chemezov said in Dubai on Tuesday about ongoing work on the Su-75, according to the translator. “You can have a baby born in nine months, but the aircraft will take a little longer than that.”

Chemezov’s remarks here are, broadly speaking, true. As a point of comparison, the first flight of a pre-production Su-57 prototype occurred in 2010 and it took another decade or so for serial production of that design to officially kick off. At the same time, this then points to UAC reaching a high level of maturity with the baseline Su-75 design, let alone putting it into large-scale production, sometime well into the next decade, at the earliest.

When it comes to the prospective first flight of the Su-75, it should be noted that, to date, there has been no imagery or other hard evidence of a real prototype under construction or any initial testing. This is in marked contrast to how images and other details highlighting progress on other advanced Russian aircraft developments, like the S-70 Okhotnik-B uncrewed combat air vehicle (UCAV), have emerged in the past.

The pressures of the ongoing war in Ukraine make it impossible not to question whether Russia is really willing to dedicate the resources necessary for a new fighter project. Though Rostec’s Chemezov was quick to downplay any concerns in Dubai earlier this week, there are also real questions about Russia’s current ability to produce combat aircraft, crewed or uncrewed, in general, after years of Western sanctions. The Russian defense industry chief also acknowledged the additional demands that conflict has placed on Russia’s defense industry to meet the immediate needs of the country’s armed forces. Deliveries of production Su-57s to the Russian Air Force have been notably sluggish, with the Russian Air Force having received around 18 of the jets between 2022 and 2024. The service has a standing order for 76 of those aircraft, and it is unclear when it might be fulfilled in full.

Earlier this year, authorities in Belarus, a very close Russian ally, announced that they were exploring a joint partnership on the continued development of the Su-75. This could help at least defray the costs of the Checkmate program.

Since 2021, UAC has also been very heavily pitching the Su-75 as a more advanced, but also lower-cost fighter option, especially for smaller air arms in the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, and Africa. In the ensuing years, there have been reports of interest from a host of countries, including India, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iran, Algeria, and Vietnam. To date, however, there have been no confirmed orders.

It is worth noting here that reports earlier said Algeria had become the first export customer for the larger Su-57. UAC also said just this week that it had delivered the first two export Su-57s to an unnamed foreign customer. No visual evidence of Su-57s entering service outside Russia on any level has yet to emerge.

Competition, in general, in the international fighter market only looks set to grow, as well. China has been making particularly pronounced inroads in this space globally, and export variants or derivatives of its J-35 stealth fighter could be on the horizon. The Su-75, which again has yet to even fly, faces additional challenges posed by the fact that any nation that buys Russian weapon systems runs real risks of triggering secondary sanctions, especially from the United States.

Altogether, it very much remains to be seen when a prototype Su-75 might take to the skies for the first time, as well as when, or if, any of the broader ambitions for the Checkmate program, including the drone derivative, become a reality.

Jamie Hunter contributed to this story.

Special thanks to Michael Jerdev, who you can follow on X under the handle @MuxelAero, for sharing additional imagery from the 2025 Dubai Airshow.

Contact the author: [email protected]

In November 2025 a public disagreement between Beijing and Tokyo over Taiwan exposed how the island’s fate now reaches far beyond Taipei, shaping trade, military planning and regional alliances across East Asia and further beyond.

The Taiwan question has recently re-emerged as a tension point between China and Japan. This raises broader questions about East Asian security. Beijing affirms its “One China policy”, treating Taiwan as a breakaway province to be “reunified” by force if necessary and reacts sharply to any foreign involvement. Avoiding rhetoric that might provoke its eastern neighbor until now, the consensus in Tokyo is shifting as many senior Japanese officials say a Chinese assault on Taiwan that threatens Japan’s survival could justify a military response. None of this is new, but the tone is.

China’s Firm Position on Taipei

Beijing’s stance remains absolute: it is Chinese territory, and any formal push or support from foreign actors for its independence is intolerable. Officials frame reunification as inevitable and non-negotiable, part of what state discourse calls the “national rejuvenation” of China. In recent months this posture has been accompanied by more visible coercion: maritime patrols in the South China Sea, large-scale exercises around the island and targeted economic measures against partners perceived to have crossed this line.

Any country that appears to undercut China’s claim through military cooperation with Taipei, public statements of support, or strengthened security ties risks a Chinese response. From Beijing’s point of view, fully controlling the region would extend China’s reach beyond its coast by securing sea lanes and projection space for the People’s Liberation Army. Politically, it would close a chapter Beijing sees as a Cold War remnant after a century of perceived humiliation.

Japan’s Stakes in Taiwan

Tokyo’s formal policy remains rooted in the One China framework as it does not recognise Taiwan as a sovereign state and officially supports a peaceful cross-Strait resolution. Security considerations and proximity to Taiwan have forced Japanese leaders into increasing their attention to the island in recent years. Hard-line conservative Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s public remarks this month, that a Chinese assault on Taiwan which threatens Japanese survival could trigger a full military response, marked a break with decades of deliberate ambiguity.

It is likely that pending targets have been moved forward and planning for collective self-defence has become more explicit, while defence cooperation with partners particularly the United States under U.S. President Donald Trump has grown more visible. Taipei sits near Japan’s western islands; Yonaguni, the closest island of the Okinawa prefecture is roughly 100 km from Taiwan’s eastern coast and the sea lanes that run here carry a large share of Japan’s energy imports. The presence of substantial U.S. forces in Japan ties Tokyo’s security to Washington’s responses, making it politically and militarily difficult for Tokyo to ignore developments in the Strait.

Reactions, Responses and Confrontation

Responding with strong diplomatic protests and a suite of retaliatory measures to Prime Minister Takaichi’s parliamentary remarks on November 7, Chinese commerce authorities re-imposed bans on Japanese seafood and warned consumers against Japanese products urging its citizens to avoid travel to Japan. Diplomatically, China demanded a retraction and summoned Japan’s ambassador in Beijing to issue a formal protest. This was widely seen as an unusually public move given the recent history of cautious diplomacy in the area.

Japan has issued strong protests over the consul’s remarks and dispatched a senior envoy to Beijing to calm the situation but the talks produced little immediate de-escalation. Japanese fighters were set on high alert after a surveillance drone was detected between Taiwan and Yonaguni, underlining how geographically close this theatre is to Japanese territory. Such moves are not isolated acts but are part of a larger pattern meant to act as a “show of strength” while stopping short of starting a full-scale war.

Why This Small Island is Significant to Both Countries

For Beijing, the island is a core territorial claim bolstered by narratives about sovereignty and historical rectification. Losing the island, or allowing it to consolidate international backing as a separate political entity, would be depicted by Chinese leaders as an unacceptable erosion of national integrity. Its location is also a matter of strategy: full control over the island would make it harder for outside powers to operate in China’s seas.

For Tokyo, the calculus is concrete and immediate. Taiwan’s proximity means that military operations in the straits could quickly affect Japanese airspace and waters. Japanese industry is also deeply integrated with Taiwanese firms notably in fields such as semiconductors and electronics, so instability would hit the stock markets and raise costs for manufacturers.

Possible Future Scenarios and Regional Impact

The stand-off could begin a prolonged period of low-level confrontation. Both Beijing and Tokyo could double down: China sustaining pressure through patrols and economic sanctions, Japan strengthening its military capabilities and aligning more tightly with the United States and other western partners.

This doesn’t mean that there is no time for pragmatic de-escalation from both sides.  Recognising the mutual costs of prolonged hostility, Tokyo could clarify that its statements were contextual and not a call to aggressive action, while Beijing could temper sanctions once its political point has been made. Diplomacy behind closed doors might restore exchanges and trade, though the underlying policy differences between the two countries would remain unresolved. Therefore, such an outcome would buy more time but not resolve the underlying causes of these issues.

A third way would be one where a deeper realignment could take place. Japan might accelerate defence modernisation and legal reforms to make collective defence more actionable. On its part, China could respond by heavily investing and intensifying military presence in its south or seeking closer security ties with partners that counterbalance U.S. influence.

In the worst case, simple miscalculations could lead to direct clashes for example between Chinese forces operating near Taiwan and Japanese ships or aircraft which could rapidly draw in the United States given treaty commitments and strategic interests.

While full-scale war remains unlikely for now, we can never be 100% sure as the simple probability increases more and more with these incidents that have developed recently.

Implications for the Rest of The World

No matter if the situation escalates further or not, the United States will undoubtebly remain a central factor to any such issue. Washington’s alliance with Tokyo and its historically ambiguous but substantial support for Taipei mean that any serious incident will have trans-Pacific repercussions.

Neighbouring states like South Korea, ASEAN members, Australia, India, etc. would be forced into a difficult diplomatic calculation, by balancing economic ties with Beijing against security concerns and relations with Washington and Tokyo. Economically, prolonged instability would disrupt semiconductor production, shipping routes and regional investment, with global consequences.

Most analysts agree that this issue has shifted from a regional diplomatic concern to a great security risk for the larger world. In the near term, careful diplomacy from both sides may limit the damage, but the issues at hand suggest this will most likely be a long term gap in East Asian security. How both sides manage politics and deterrence will determine whether the next phase is a steady containment or a dangerous step toward direct military confrontation.

With information from Reuters.

Houthi authorities in Yemen want to publicly execute the convicted individuals, and also sentenced two others to prison.

Houthi judges working with prosecutors in Yemen have sentenced 17 people to death by firing squad over alleged espionage on behalf of Israel and its western allies.

The Specialized Criminal Court in the capital Sanaa handed down the sentences on Saturday morning in the cases of “espionage cells within a spy network affiliated with American, Israeli, and Saudi intelligence”, Houthi-run media said.

The court sentenced the 17 men to execution “to be carried out in a public place as a deterrent”, Saba and other outlets said, also publishing a list of names.

A woman and a man were sentenced to 10 years in prison, while another man was acquitted of all charges, bringing the total number of people put on trial in this case to 20.

Houthi-run media said state prosecutors had charged the defendants, who can theoretically appeal the sentences, with “espionage for foreign countries hostile to Yemen” in 2024 and 2025, which also included the United Kingdom.

Israel’s Mossad spying agency reportedly “directed” intelligence officers who were in contact with the accused Yemeni citizens, whose work allegedly “led to the targeting of several military, security, and civilian sites and resulting in the killing of dozens and the destruction of extensive infrastructure”.

The United States and the UK conducted dozens of deadly joint air strikes across Yemen after the start of Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza in October 2023, as the Houthis launched attacks on Israel and international maritime transit through the Red Sea in a stated attempt to support Palestinians under fire.

The Houthis have stopped their attacks since last month’s Gaza ceasefire deal.

Israel has also unleashed huge air attacks on Yemen and its infrastructure, repeatedly hitting fuel tanks, power stations and a critical port city where desperately needed humanitarian aid flows through, killing political leaders and dozens of civilians.

In August, the Houthis confirmed that an Israeli air raid killed the prime minister of their government in Sanaa.

Ahmed al-Rahawi was killed with “several” other ministers, the Houthis said in a statement at the time.

Houthi authorities, who control Sanaa and parts of Yemen to the north after an armed takeover more than a decade ago, made no mention of any links with the United Nations or other international agencies in the cases announced Saturday.

But they have, over the past year, increasingly raided UN and NGO offices, detaining dozens of mostly local but also international staff and confiscating equipment.

Amid condemnation and calls for the release of staff by the UN and international stakeholders, the Houthis have framed the efforts as necessary to stave off Israeli operations.

Ex-Juventus and France star midfielder made his return to football, suiting up for Monaco in first game in more than two years after drug ban.

Paul Pogba described his emotional Monaco debut as a moment of relief and gratitude on Saturday, after the French midfielder returned to the pitch for the first time in more than two years following a doping ban.

The former Juventus and Manchester United player, who joined the Ligue 1 side on a free transfer in June, had not played a competitive match since September 2023.

Pogba received a four-year ban in February 2024 after testing positive for the banned substance DHEA, which boosts testosterone levels. The suspension was cut to 18 months after an appeal at the Court of Arbitration for Sport.

The 32-year-old, who was nearing a return last month before suffering a right ankle injury, came on in the 85th minute of Monaco’s 4-1 defeat by Rennes at Roazhon Park and was met with a standing ovation.

“Seeing the crowd rise and applaud, I never imagined that would happen,” Pogba told reporters. “I’m relieved to be playing football again, the thing I love most in the world.

“But there’s still work to do to get back to full fitness and be able to play 90 minutes… If I don’t perform well at Monaco, I can forget about the French national team.

“I believe in myself and in my qualities, and since I knew I had done nothing wrong and it was not my fault, I never lost hope.”

Pogba, who has made 91 appearances for France, played a starring role in his nation’s 2018 FIFA World Cup victory. Knee and hamstring injuries, as well as knee surgery, prevented him from playing for France at the 2022 World Cup in Qatar.

Stakeholders are gathering to start negotiations based on a text that the EU believes mostly favours Russian demands.

Senior Ukrainian, European Union, United Kingdom and United States officials will soon start talks in Geneva as ambiguity and deep-seated concerns hover over the fate of the 28-point plan put forward by Washington to end the war with Russia.

At the talks, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio will be the top representative of the administration of President Donald Trump, who has given his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelenskyy until Thursday to take the deal.

Rubio emphasised in a Sunday post on X before flying to Switzerland that the proposal was authored by the US.

“It is offered as a strong framework for ongoing negotiations,” he wrote. “It is based on input from the Russian side. But it is also based on previous and ongoing input from Ukraine.”

The comments came in rejection of a claim made by a bipartisan group of veteran US senators, most focused on foreign policy, who told a panel discussion at the Halifax International Security Forum in Canada that the plan is a Russian “wish list” and not the actual proposal offering Washington’s positions.

“This administration was not responsible for this release in its current form,” said Republican Mike Rounds from South Dakota, adding that “it looked more like it was written in Russian to begin with”.

State Department deputy spokesman Tommy Pigott called the claim “blatantly false”.

The senators earlier Saturday said the plan would only “reward aggression” by Moscow and send a message to other leaders who have threatened their neighbours.

Critics of the plan have said it heavily leans into the Kremlin’s oft-repeated demands and war narrative.

The plan would stress Ukrainian sovereignty and provide a security guarantee that it will not be attacked in the future, but also includes Ukraine ceding territory and making its army smaller.

Russian President Vladimir Putin welcomed the proposal late Friday, saying it “could form the basis of a final peace settlement” if Washington can get Ukraine and its European allies on board.

Ukraine has been careful with its rhetoric, with Zelenskyy saying he will “work calmly” with the US and his Western allies to get through what he called “truly one of the most difficult moments in our history”.

Ukraine’s European allies are not happy with the plan, either, saying the military limitations would leave Ukraine “vulnerable to future attack”, so more talks are necessary.

France, the UK and Germany, also known as the E3, will have national security advisers at the Geneva talks.

The troubled US-led diplomatic efforts are inching forward as intense fighting continues to rage in eastern Ukraine.

Russian forces are pushing to take control of more territory in Zaporizhia and in Donetsk, part of the eastern Donbas region that is seeing fierce fighting and that Russia wants in its entirety, while also fending off Ukrainian air attacks on their oil and fuel infrastructure.

The baggage is unavoidable.

So Clarin, Argentina’s biggest newspaper, steered straight into it instead.

In the first two lines of their preview of Sunday’s match, “history, politics, the Falklands War and England’s persistent imperialist views” were all referenced., external

The story of a teenage Federico Mendez ironing out England second row Paul Ackford with a blindside haymaker 35 years ago was retold.

On Thursday, Franco Molina threw in another piece of the Anglo-Argentine back story.

“It was a goal, the referee gave it, it was a goal!,” the Argentina second row said, recalling Diego Maradona’s contentious ‘Hand of God’ goal in the 1986 quarter-final meeting at the football World Cup.

But it was all with a smile.

If all that history is being brewed up as pep-talk kerosene, Molina, who spent last season playing for Exeter, hid it well.

For him there was too much to get excited about in the 80 minutes to come, without dredging up the past.

“It is a big game, just because of the context of the international game,” he said.

“It is really special playing at Twickenham.

“It is going to be a really physical game and every English team is tidy in what they do, all the kicks from the field, all the play with the ball in hand.

“We will need to be really connected and precise across the whole 80 minutes to beat them.”

The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) has identified Rwanda as an aggressor towards the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). During its 9th session, held in Kinshasa, the DRC’s capital, the Congolese Minister of Regional Integration announced that the conference officially recognised Rwanda as the aggressor against the DRC.

During a press briefing in Kinshasa on Nov. 17, the Congolese minister said the member states of the ICGLR have urged Rwanda to withdraw its troops from Congolese territory immediately, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2773.

“A considerable advance towards an international recognition of the tragic reality that our populations are victims. In effect, in their final declaration, the heads of state and government meeting in Kinshasa have called, (I quote) ‘demand the withdrawal without delay from Congolese territory of the aggressor nations against the Democratic Republic of Congo in conformity with Resolution 2773 of the United Nations Security Council, as well as condemned the pursuit of hostilities by the M23 and the Allies Democratic Forces (ADF)’,” the minister said.

“This declaration does not refer to an aggressor nation, but to aggressor nations. This nation is clearly identified because it has already been cited in Resolution 2773. In point 4 of the resolution, the Security Council demands that the Rwandan defence forces stop supporting M23 and withdraw from DR Congo territory without preconditions immediately.”

For the members of the Congolese government, the recognition of Rwanda as the aggressor nation by the ICGLR constitutes one of the principal advances of the 9^th summit held in Kinshasa.

“The added value of the final declaration of the 9^th ordinary summit of the ICGLR consists in the precision that this country, Rwanda, to be as clear as possible, is officially and very explicitly recognised as aggressor of the DR Congo,” the minister added.

The summit was held amid persistent tension between the DR Congo and Rwanda, despite announced diplomatic advances. The contrast between the engagements outlined in the accords and the reality on the ground is preoccupying several actors, who are calling for honesty, goodwill, and the rapid implementation of engagements stemming from the various diplomatic initiatives. Considered the sponsor of the M23/AFC rebellion due to its multifaceted support, the Rwanda of Paul Kagame is actually at odds with Kinshasa and was the major absentee at the ICGLR meeting. 

However,  Olivier Nduhungirehe, Rwanda’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, has declared the resolutions of the Kinshasa meeting null and void. The Rwanda government had denied supporting the M23 fighters, but locals and authorities in the DRC have insisted that the country has been actively backing the rebels.

Following the capture of Goma and Bukavu by the M23/AFC and the failure of the Luanda process, the Washington Accord and the Doha process have henceforth become two complementary aspects of diplomatic efforts aimed at ending the conflict between the DR Congo and Rwanda, as well as against armed groups such as M23.

The Washington Accord, signed under American mediation, fixed a bilateral framework between Kinshasa and Kigali. On the other hand, the Doha peace talks focus on the internal dimensions of the conflict, specifically the restoration of state authority and the reintegration of armed groups.

Despite these two diplomatic initiatives, several states and international organisations, including the European Union, have been pleading for increased involvement of regional organisations, and in general, African nations, in solving the conflict between the DR Congo and Rwanda, which is behind the deterioration of the security situation in the Eastern DR Congo.

Because of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s statements in the Diet regarding the Taiwan issue, the already fragile China–Japan relationship has deteriorated rapidly. China has issued travel and study-abroad warnings for Japan, effectively halted imports of Japanese seafood, sent coast guard vessels into the “territorial waters” of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and had three warships transit the Osumi Strait in southern Japan.

At the same time, Beijing took the unusual step of announcing in advance that Premier Li Qiang would not meet the Japanese prime minister at the G20 summit. In just ten days, China launched a strong, multi-domain counterattack—political, diplomatic, economic, and military—with no signs of de-escalation.

If Prime Minister Takaichi does not retract her remarks, Beijing is likely to escalate even further and drag the United States into the dispute.

What actually happened? Is China overreacting? How far will Beijing take this confrontation?

Let us revisit the origin of the incident. In response to questioning in the Diet, Prime Minister Takaichi stated, “If China blockades Taiwan using warships and employing force, then no matter how you look at it, this could become a survival-threatening crisis for Japan.”

Pressed by the opposition, she added, “If China imposes a maritime blockade on Taiwan and U.S. forces intervening in that blockade come under armed attack, a crisis could arise.”

International media paid no attention to Takaichi’s clarification and focused only on the headline question: Will Japan send troops if military conflict breaks out in the Taiwan Strait? Accordingly, France’s Le Monde, Britain’s The Guardian, and the Associated Press all ran titles implying that Japan would dispatch forces if Taiwan were subjected to military action.

Japanese scholars have since written articles in U.S. media explaining that “Japanese military intervention in a Taiwan contingency” presupposes that U.S. forces have already intervened, and only then could Japan exercise the right of collective self-defense. Yet the Japanese government has not actively clarified this prerequisite on the international stage, drawing sharp criticism from well-known Japanese commentator Hiroyuki Nishimura for dereliction of duty.

Nishimura’s criticism exposes a widespread misunderstanding: even if the United States militarily intervenes in the Taiwan Strait, as long as Japanese territory is not under armed threat, Tokyo is legally barred from exercising collective self-defense. In other words, under the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, the United States is obligated to defend Japan, but Japan has no treaty obligation to send troops to support U.S. forces in a war that does not concern Japan.

Therefore, the mitigating explanations offered by Japanese scholars on Takaichi’s behalf do not hold water. The Japanese government’s failure to clarify the issue in international media is naturally out of fear of offending Washington. It remains unclear whether President Trump fully understands the “asymmetric” nature of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, and Tokyo has no desire to remind this shrewd deal-making president that when American soldiers are dying on the battlefield, Japan actually has no treaty obligation to send troops.

Unless, of course, the reason for U.S. intervention in the Taiwan Strait is explicitly “to protect Japan.” Political rhetoric is one thing; the law is another. The fact remains that neither the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty nor Japan’s domestic legislation imposes any legal obligation on Japan to exercise collective self-defense when its ally, the United States, comes under attack.

Another fact: the Philippines is in exactly the same position as Japan. Unless U.S. forces become involved in order to protect the Philippines or Philippine territory is affected by the war, Manila has no obligation to send combat troops to assist the U.S.—it can only provide logistical and base support.

Of course, if the United States does intervene militarily in the Taiwan Strait, it will inevitably claim it is to protect Japan (and the Philippines). But the authority to make that determination lies with Tokyo and Manila, both of which retain a certain right to stay out of the fight. This is precisely why U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby earlier this year demanded that Japan and Australia state clearly what actions they would take to support the United States in the event of a Taiwan contingency. That demand makes it crystal clear that America’s mutual defense treaties do not obligate allies to unconditionally fight alongside U.S. forces.

In short: when their own security is at stake, allies will send troops; otherwise, they will at most offer logistics and bases—no allied soldiers will go to the front lines.

This explains Beijing’s fierce reaction. Even if Takaichi did not mean Japan would intervene unilaterally in the Taiwan Strait, her remarks effectively expanded the “applicability scenarios” of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty. If such moves are not checked, they will only encourage the Philippines, Australia, and other anti-China neighbors to follow suit—using the same logic to blackmail or bleed China.

This is not an overreaction, nor is it making a mountain out of a molehill. Beyond realpolitik necessity, the Chinese people have not forgotten Japan’s history of invading China—especially in this 80th anniversary year of the victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. If Beijing were to let the matter slide, it would face intense domestic backlash.

Therefore, unless Takaichi retracts her remarks, China–Japan relations will continue to worsen, eventually leading to a situation where “Taiwan is fine, but Japan is in crisis.”

Takaichi may well have intentionally provoked Beijing in order to shore up LDP support, rally Japanese nationalism, loosen the “three non-nuclear principles,” and expand conventional military capabilities. But the backlash has likely been far greater than she anticipated. The key still lies in America’s attitude.

Although the U.S. ambassador to Japan publicly expressed support for Tokyo and criticized Beijing, Washington’s overall response has been relatively muted—Trump has zero interest in letting Japan torpedo his scheduled China trip next April.

On the other hand, Beijing may well conclude that Washington is deliberately allowing Japan to interfere in China’s internal affairs in order to gain negotiating leverage. That would only reduce China’s inhibitions about sanctioning Japan and could lead it to directly challenge the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, pushing the situation to the brink of losing control and forcing the U.S. to rein in Japan.

China has many tools to test the treaty—economic and trade measures, cultural exchanges, diplomacy, and even military options are all on the table. The disputed uninhabited Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the Ryukyu Islands, whose sovereignty remains unresolved, are both historical issues left over from World War II. Although both fall within the scope of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, Washington has never recognized Japanese sovereignty over them.

Regarding the Ryukyus, Beijing can wage a protracted legal battle, continually emphasizing that the Potsdam Declaration never returned the islands to Japan. Regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu, Beijing could move directly to military control—land on the islands, demolish Japanese facilities, raise the Chinese flag, and expel foreign vessels—forcing the United States to get involved.

If Beijing is pushed to the point of letting the situation spiral, its price to Washington will be high: it may include, but is not limited to, demanding that the U.S. block Japan from abandoning the three non-nuclear principles, block Japan’s “normalization” (turning the Self-Defense Forces into a full-fledged military), force Japan to pay tangible and intangible reparations for its invasion of China, or even force Takaichi to step down.

Would Trump risk a second Chinese rare-earth embargo over an uninhabited island whose sovereignty does not belong to Japan? The answer is obvious.

Beijing’s current Taiwan strategy has shifted from “opposing independence” to “advancing unification.” Part of that strategy is to make neighboring countries acknowledge—through actual state behavior, not just words—that the Taiwan issue is China’s internal affair. Japan is the poster child for neighboring hypocrisy—talking peace while acting otherwise. It will be shown no mercy for breaking the promises of diplomatic normalization; Beijing is determined to make a chicken of Japan to scare the monkey.

From this perspective, Prime Minister Takaichi may have thought she could achieve a classic boomerang effect (using the Taiwan issue for domestic political gain by first exporting strong rhetoric abroad). Instead, Beijing has been handed a rare opportunity to use Japan as a target and demonstrate to the world how it will reduce obstacles to unification.

The United States wants to avoid direct confrontation with China and prefers to let proxies stand on the front line so it can reap the benefits while remaining in the rear. On the surface this creates trouble for Beijing, but in reality it also creates endless headaches for Washington—because China will not limit itself to dealing with the proxies; it will drag the United States into the fight.

This is the new tactical phase in U.S.–China competition following the Busan meeting, testing the one-year truce both sides agreed to. Whether proxies are an advantage or a liability for Washington depends entirely on how Beijing chooses to handle the dispute—and Tokyo makes the ideal canary in the coal mine.

Six international airlines have suspended flights to Venezuela after the United States warned major carriers about a “potentially hazardous situation” due to “heightened military activity” around the South American country.

Spain’s Iberia, Portugal’s TAP, Chile’s LATAM, Colombia’s Avianca, Brazil’s GOL and Trinidad and Tobago’s Caribbean all halted flights to the country on Saturday, the AFP news agency reported, citing Marisela de Loaiza, the president of the Venezuelan Airlines Association.

TAP said it was cancelling its flights scheduled for Saturday and next Tuesday, while Iberia said it was suspending flights to the Venezuelan capital, Caracas, until further notice.

TAP told the Reuters news agency that its decision was linked to the US notice, which it said “indicates that safety conditions in Venezuelan airspace are not guaranteed”.

According to the AFP news agency, Panama’s Copa Airlines, Spain’s Air Europa and PlusUltra, Turkish Airlines, and Venezuela’s LASER are continuing to operate flights for now.

The flight suspensions come as tensions between the US and Venezuela soar, with Washington deploying troops as well as the world’s largest aircraft carrier to the Caribbean, as part of what it calls an anti-narcotics operation. Caracas, however, describes the operation as a bid to force Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro out of power.

The US military has also carried out at least 21 attacks on alleged drug boats in the Caribbean and the Pacific, killing at least 83 people.

The campaign – which critics say violates both international and US domestic law – began after the administration of President Donald Trump increased its reward for information leading to the arrest or conviction of Maduro to $50m, describing him as the “global terrorist leader of the Cartel de los Soles”.

President Trump, meanwhile, has sent mixed signals about the possibility of intervention in Venezuela, saying in a CBS interview earlier this month that he doesn’t think his country was going to war against Caracas.

But when asked if Maduro’s days as president were numbered, he replied, saying, “I would say yeah.”

Then, on Sunday, he said the US may open talks with Maduro, and on Monday, when asked about the possibility of deploying US troops to the country, he replied: “I don’t rule out that. I don’t rule out anything. We just have to take care of Venezuela.”

Days later, on Friday, the US Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) urged all flights in the area to “exercise caution” due to the threats “at all altitudes, including during overflight, the arrival and departure phases of flight, and/or airports and aircraft on the ground”.

Ties between Washington and Caracas have been dominated by tensions since the rise of Maduro’s left-wing predecessor, Hugo Chavez, in the early 2000s.

The relationship deteriorated further after Maduro came to power following Chavez’s death in 2013.

Successive US administrations have rejected Maduro’s legitimacy and imposed heavy sanctions on the Venezuelan economy, accusing the president of corruption, authoritarianism and election fraud.

The Trump administration has hardened the US stance. Last week, it labelled the Venezuelan drug organisation, dubbed Cartel de los Soles (Cartel of the Suns), a “terrorist” group, and it accused Maduro of leading it, without providing evidence.

In recent weeks, conservative foreign policy hawks in the US have been increasingly calling on Trump to topple the Maduro government.

Maduro has accused the US of inventing “pretexts” for war, repeatedly expressing willingness to engage in dialogue with Washington. But he has warned that his country would push to defend itself.

“No foreign power will impose its will on our sovereign homeland,” he was quoted as saying by the Venezuelan outlet Telesur.

“But if they break peace and persist in their neocolonial intentions, they will face a huge surprise. I pray that does not occur, because – I repeat – they will receive a truly monumental surprise.”

Venezuelan opposition leader Maria Corina Machado, who recently won a Nobel Peace Prize, suggested that overthrowing Maduro would not amount to regime change, arguing the president lost the election last year and rigged the results.

“We’re not asking for regime change. We’re asking for respect of the will of the people and the people will be the one that will take care and protect this transition so that it is orderly, peaceful and irreversible,” she told The Washington Post on Friday.

Machado, 58, has called for privatising Venezuela’s oil sector and opening the country to foreign investments.

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HumAngle Foundation officially commenced the Strengthening Community Journalism and Human Rights Advocacy (SCOJA) Fellowship with workshops in Kaduna and Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria, on Nov. 10, bringing together community journalists and human rights advocates to enhance skills in ethical storytelling and evidence-driven reporting.

The third batch of the training commenced on Monday, Nov. 17, in Maiduguri, Borno State. 

Supported by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Nigeria, the fellowship aims to build the capacity of community journalists and advocates across northern Nigeria.

A total of 90 fellows from nine states — North West (Kaduna and Kano), North Central (Benue, Niger, Plateau, Nasarawa), and North East (Borno, Adamawa, Yobe) — have been selected. 

On the first day of the workshop in Maiduguri, Jos, and Kaduna, the fellows were introduced to HumAngle’s newly developed Standards of Journalism Excellence and Advocacy guide. The guide covers conflict-sensitive reporting, accountability, countering disinformation, digital safety, and solutions journalism. 

According to Abdussamad Ahmad, HumAngle’s Security & Policy Analyst, the manual was designed to support journalists and advocates working in conflict-affected regions where ethical clarity and accuracy are critical. 

The workshops also examined the role of community journalists, who often serve as the first witnesses to social issues and crises within their localities. Their proximity to affected populations positions them to capture realities that shape public understanding. Other sessions focused on data-driven storytelling, mapping community challenges, and identifying collaborative solutions.

Hassana Danyerwa, Founder of the FeelNHeal Initiative, said she found the sessions valuable. “We all need emotional hygiene, not just for our bias but also for our ego,” she said.

Through her initiative, Hassana provides psychosocial support to communities and individuals, and noted that the session reinforced the importance of maintaining emotional balance when reporting sensitive issues.

Building on this, fellows also reflected on the broader difficulties of reporting in environments shaped by insecurity, misinformation, and public mistrust. Facilitators encouraged them to approach their work with precision, empathy, and a strong commitment to verification, particularly when documenting the experiences of vulnerable groups.

As the North East workshop continues, sessions for North Central and North West fellows concluded on Nov. 13, marking the completion of training for these regions.

The inaugural SCOJA Fellowship cohort features participants from a wide range of local media and advocacy organisations, including WikkiTimes, The Middle Belt Reporters, and Voice of Arewa, among others.

Over the next six months, fellows will report on issues within their communities and execute targeted community advocacy projects. They are also expected to share their learnings within their local organisations, further amplifying the impact of the fellowship.

The Dubai Airshow in the United Arab Emirates ended on a tragic note, with the fatal crash of an Indian-made Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mk 1A fighter. As you can read about here, the Mk 1A version of the jet, manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), is set to be built in considerably greater numbers than the initial Mk 1 version, bringing with it a host of new features.

The Tejas Mk 1A was performing a low-altitude maneuver as part of its display at Al Maktoum International Airport. The pilot appears to perform a negative-g ‘push turn’ toward the crowd before attempting to roll out. The jet then descended rapidly and impacted the ground at around 2:00 p.m. local time, in front of onlookers. The Indian Air Force confirmed that the pilot was killed.