target

TA419 hackers used deceptive tactics, impersonating real figures like a former White House AI official

Chinese hackers have been impersonating artificial intelligence (AI) experts in the United States, including a former government official, according to a new report from cybersecurity firm Proofpoint.

The report, released on Thursday, found that in July, a China-aligned hacking group called TA419 targeted a slate of US policy experts by impersonating prominent figures, including Lynne Edwards Parker, the former principal deputy director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.

The hackers, who had been operating since April 2025, first sent otherwise harmless-looking emails intended to engage a target, such as requests to join an “AI Policy Advisory Committee”, and, once they responded, the target would be sent to a fake login page designed to steal their credentials.

The targets included policy experts at think tanks, defence contractors, universities and law firms in both the US and Japan.

The report used a technique that creates a fake browser pop-up window inside a legitimate webpage that mimics an authentic-looking sign-in prompt to deceive victims and make it harder for them to realise they are handing over their information to hackers.

Proofpoint did not specifically name the targets hacked, but the Reuters news agency was able to confirm at least one of them as Alex Engler, a former White House official who now heads the Penn Center on Media, Technology, and Democracy.

Engler told Reuters that he got one of the emails, but after checking with industry colleagues, he discovered that he had received the email from an impersonator.

In February, the same group was behind the impersonation of a “prominent” Anthropic employee in efforts to target AI policy experts. The cybersecurity firm behind the report believes that the group will continue to target think tanks and other policy experts and will continue to use the identity of real-world experts to do it.

Parker did not respond to Al Jazeera’s request for comment.

LAS VEGAS — Susan Gonzalez plans to pay off her credit card now that she no longer needs to pay taxes on the dollar bills that she stashes away at the end of long shifts pouring beers and mixing cocktails in a smoky sports bar.

Thanks to President Trump, “there’s more money in our pockets,” the registered Republican said. The Iran war might have spiked gas prices, but Gonzalez is still confident that the U.S. economy is getting stronger.

The Jackpot Bar & Grill, located about 4 miles from the Las Vegas Strip, is in the heart of Nevada’s 3rd Congressional District, where Democratic Rep. Susie Lee is trying to fend off a challenge from Republican candidate Marty O’Donnell. The state has the highest concentration of tipped workers in the country because its economy is driven by the hospitality and tourism industries, making Trump’s “no tax on tips” policy a critical part of his party’s midterm pitch here.

The question for Nevada voters is whether they’re seeing more benefit from lower taxes or more pain from the country’s economic troubles, such as energy costs and declining tourism.

Lee’s district is a top target for the Republican Party in its fight to maintain control of the House. With a mix of working-class and high-income neighborhoods, it’s the most competitive of Nevada’s four congressional seats. In 2024, both Lee and Trump won the district.

Lee has held the seat since 2019, campaigning as a moderate and highlighting her bipartisan record. O’Donnell, a composer known for his work on the “Halo” video game series, became his party’s nominee this year with help from Trump and a $3 million personal loan.

The race has caught the attention of Trump-aligned super PACs. Safety and Affordability, an offshoot of MAGA Inc., committed this month to spending almost $3.2 million on advertising to help O’Donnell, according to the ad-tracking firm AdImpact. The total effectively matches the $3.1 million O’Donnell’s campaign has already spent on advertising reservations through November.

The heavy commitment puts pro-O’Donnell forces ahead by more than $1 million in the ad spending race in the district, where Lee’s campaign has spent $2.9 million and the Democratic House leadership super PAC House Majority Fund has put in $2.3 million.

Nevada is the birthplace of ‘no tax on tips’

Trump first announced his policy proposal at a June 2024 campaign event in Nevada, and he has repeatedly said that he was inspired by a Las Vegas server who suggested the idea.

“So we’re eating, and this beautiful young lady walks over, and I said, ‘How are you doing, everything good?’” Trump said in August. “‘Sir, they’re taxing me to death.’ I said, ‘Really? What are they taxing?’ ‘They’re taxing my tips. Sir, they should have no tax on tips.’”

The proposal was included in a sweeping package of tax breaks, social-services cuts and immigration enforcement that Trump signed into law last year.

O’Donnell has centered his attack against Lee for her vote against that bill.

“When she had an opportunity to vote for things that would actually help the people of the district, she said no,” O’Donnell told The Associated Press.

Lee attributed her vote to what she says were harmful and unpopular policies in the package. She also noted that the “no tax on tips” part of the legislation expires at the end of 2028.

“More importantly, they came at the cost of cutting Medicaid and SNAP and healthcare,” Lee told the AP at a recent canvassing launch in Las Vegas.

She and other Nevada Democrats support a separate proposal that would make permanent “no tax on tips” while also fixing what they say are issues with the current policy.

Slump in tourism lessens ‘no tax on tips’ impact

Lee said the tax cut isn’t helping because tourism is falling off.

“When people are feeling the pinch at home all across this country, the first thing they cut is their trip to Vegas,” Lee said.

Nevada’s tourism fell 7.5% from 2024 to 2025, according to Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority CEO and President Steve Hill. Las Vegas hosted the Super Bowl and the second annual Formula 1 Grand Prix in 2024.

At a recent economic forum, Hill said high rollers are continuing to visit the city but lower-income visitors are not. The number of international visitors has also dropped significantly, especially Canadians who watched Trump feud with their country over trade and other issues.

O’Donnell said Las Vegas tourism is on the “comeback.” He said Trump’s tariffs served as a necessary way to negotiate with countries “that have been absolutely ripping us off.”

The composer blames the high cost of living on Democrats. He recently told a crowd at the Republican midterm convention in Dallas that one good job used to be enough to raise a family, buy a house and “live a comfortable, fulfilling life while getting ahead.”

“Somewhere along the way, that deal got broken,” he said. “Now many need two incomes just to tread water, and we’re still digging our way out of Biden’s inflation crisis.”

Nevada’s powerful labor unions are backing Lee

While O’Donnell has help from Republicans’ national war chest, Lee has the support of the political powerhouse that is the Culinary Workers Union, representing 60,000 hospitality workers in Nevada.

Secretary-Treasurer Ted Pappageorge said the current “no tax on tips” policy brings some relief but is “deeply flawed.” A married couple filing jointly can deduct only up to $25,000 of their tipped income, Pappageorge said. The policy also does not apply to automatic gratuities that are charged to large parties, he said. Lee and other Nevada Democrats want to fix that, he said.

“There’s a history of our Democrats here fighting for fair taxation,” Pappageorge said.

On a recent weekend in Lee’s district about 50 days before the election, members from the Culinary Union, the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations knocked on voters’ doors, hoping to sway those still undecided.

Paul Peterman, president of the local chapter of the National Association of Letter Carriers, wearing a blue union T-shirt, a lanyard and shorts, walked to union households, carrying flyers supporting Lee and other Democrats. He asked a resident who he planned to vote for. “All Republican,” said the man, hidden behind his screen door. Peterman asked if he could leave a non-Republican flyer, and the man said, “No.”

“Sorry to bother you,” Peterman said as the door closed.

At the next door, the voter identified as an independent but said he’d vote for Lee. A voter at another house said who he plans to vote for was private. Nobody answered at the next few doors.

Peterman has been canvassing these neighborhoods for years, describing it as important union work.

“It sends a message that we’re all united, and you also need every hand on deck, too, to be successful in what you want to achieve,” Peterman said.

Hill and Beaumont write for the Associated Press.

Within hours of a Feb. 28 missile attack that hit an Iranian school, some Pentagon personnel knew the U.S. was responsible, according to officials involved in an internal investigation of the incident. That probe found what the officials now describe as a cascade of preventable failures.

Two Tomahawk missiles struck the building and its grounds that Saturday, killing more than 150 people, including at least 123 children. The strikes devastated the two-story school, which was built on land that was part of a military compound in the southern Iranian town of Minab. In terms of child casualties, it’s the deadliest American military targeting error of the 21st century.

United Nations investigators said Thursday that there were reasonable grounds to conclude that the strike on Minab and another U.S. attack that took place on the same day amounted to war crimes. The U.S. has yet to publicly accept responsibility for the school strike, and President Trump has previously suggested it was Tehran’s fault. As recently as July 14, he told Fox News, “I don’t think anybody’s going to ever be able to say what happened there.”

But in interviews, officials with direct involvement in the Pentagon’s internal investigation have offered some of the first accounts of the probe. The strike didn’t result from a single catastrophic decision but an accumulation of smaller ones, they said, and their review has identified a series of missed opportunities to prevent the disaster. The officials, like more than two dozen others who provided descriptions of targeting procedures or background information for this story, asked not to be named to discuss sensitive matters.

In the final days of February, the Trump administration demanded an overwhelming aerial assault. More than 1,000 Iranian targets were hit within the first 24 hours alone. That order compressed the time frame for finalizing targets, the officials said, instilling an urgency that — combined with gaps in underlying information about the site, cuts in civilian protection personnel and an overreliance on artificial intelligence technology — set the stage for the deadly error.

Full details from the investigation remain tightly held. Officials who described it said they faced constraints on the amount of information they could share. Previous news reports have indicated that by early March, a preliminary internal review determined the U.S. was likely responsible for the Minab strike.

A report on the full Pentagon investigation, which commenced in March, hasn’t been released — though the officials said it has been all but complete for several months.

Adm. Brad Cooper, who heads U.S. Central Command and ordered the investigation, told members of Congress in May that he’s committed to providing transparency. Yet it’s not clear how much detail will be included, nor how much of the report ultimately will be released to the general public.

A child runs past a banner strung across the rubble of Shajarah Tayyebeh Elementary School showing portraits of the children and teachers killed there by a U.S. missile strike.

(Vahid Salemi / Associated Press)

A Pentagon spokesperson said the incident remains under investigation and declined to comment further.

In response to questions, including about when the White House was informed that the strike was a mistake, a senior administration official also cited the ongoing probe and added: “The United States does not target civilians.”

Last week, a report from the United Nations’ Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran said that the U.S. had “failed in its obligation to do everything feasible to verify” that the school was a military target and that the failure “went beyond negligence.” The U.S. Department of Defense has declined to comment on the report.

U.S. officials have said that outdated intelligence was a problem. Although the site in Minab had been identified years earlier as a military compound, there was clear evidence that it had been modified and undergone a change of purpose, the officials said. Physical changes reflecting new construction — visible on satellite imagery — dated back almost a decade, they said, and the site operated openly as a school.

Analysis of commercially available satellite images shows construction of walls and entrances that separate the school site from the military base, work that appears to have been completed by 2017. An image from 2018 shows brightly painted walls alongside a soccer pitch, assembly rows and play markings on the ground.

Some U.S. intelligence analysts took notice, the officials said. Bloomberg reported in June that one analyst detected changes to the site as early as 2019, and logged remarks about the modifications in a system that wasn’t connected to the primary military intelligence database, which informs targeting.

Inside Centcom, which conducted the U.S. attack, some personnel relied too much on the artificial intelligence embedded in Maven Smart System, the officials said. Maven, which is made by Palantir Technologies Inc., allows users to view and coordinate complex military operations — from targeting to command and control — using AI-enabled software that fuses more than 150 different data inputs into a coherent set of information to inform commanders’ decisions.

In the past year, the Defense Department has rapidly made Maven a cornerstone of the U.S. military apparatus. Several former senior U.S. military officials now work for Palantir, including some with high-level security clearances in Centcom’s Tampa headquarters. Their role is to keep the software functioning inside secure military environments.

Some Centcom personnel expected Maven to flag stale information or inconsistencies in the underlying intelligence assembled for potential targets, the officials said. It’s not clear why they had such expectations.

A Palantir spokesperson said that the company “is not responsible for the underlying data nor identifying intelligence deficiencies” and that there’s no evidence that its software was at fault in the Minab strike.

Two people familiar with the firm’s Pentagon contracts said the government retains primary responsibility for the quality of the information that’s fed into Maven. But they said it’s not uncommon for personnel who use tools such as Maven to develop operational understandings that differ from contractual terms.

After the Minab strike, Palantir built new capabilities into Maven that “re-review underlying intelligence to identify factors that would disqualify a target and flag inconsistencies and inaccuracies that human review may have missed,” according to a person familiar with the matter. That work has already caught some anomalies, the person said.

The ‘kill chain’

As Feb. 28 approached, Pentagon officials were tasked with identifying strikes they thought would paralyze Iran’s military before Tehran had a chance to respond, the officials said.

High on Centcom’s list: the naval division of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the most powerful force across the country’s military, economy and politics. It’s tasked with defending — and at times, disrupting — the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. The Minab school site — with its uncorrected classification as a Revolutionary Guard facility — was fed into Maven along with other potential targets. It ultimately emerged as one of the recommended Day 1 targets, people involved in the investigation said.

As all targets do, the Minab site moved through a multi-stage assessment process known by the military as the “kill chain.” Steps in that process have traditionally involved intelligence analysts, imagery specialists, targeteers, lawyers, operational commanders and launch crews, according to U.S. military doctrine and interviews with current and former Defense officials. Today, Maven sits at the heart of those operations — between the initial intelligence inputs and the latter review stages, officials said.

In past conflicts, preparing lists of proposed targets — work that includes assessing how they align with an operation’s objectives — had taken hours for staffers to complete. Ahead of the U.S. attack on Iran, much of that work was condensed into several minutes via Maven, people involved in the Pentagon’s internal review said.

Officials involved in the investigation pointed to gaps that they said were left after Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth dismantled most of the Pentagon’s civilian harm mitigation, or CHM, units — cutting headcount across a number of teams by roughly 90% to fewer than 20 staff members, people with direct knowledge of the matter said. Centcom’s team was reduced from 10 to 1.

No CHM team member reviewed the Minab site before the strike, according to officials involved in the internal investigation. That was a consequence of the cuts in staffing but also a decision not to involve the group in planning and operations, the officials said. While not mandatory, that sort of review had become routine in recent years, they added. It’s unclear whether such checks, which include mapping the civilian environment, assessing noncombatant presence and developing lower-risk strike options, would have been enough to raise questions about the Minab site.

The Biden administration had built up civilian-harm-prevention capabilities within the Pentagon after an August 2021 drone strike in Kabul killed 10 civilians — based on the misidentification of an aid worker as a threat. Hegseth has characterized his subsequent cuts to those efforts as a shift away from “Biden-era, non-lethal programs.”

“America, regardless of what so-called international institutions say, is unleashing the most lethal and precise air power campaign in history,” Hegseth said at a news conference March 2, days after the Minab attack. “All on our terms with maximum authorities. No stupid rules of engagement, no nation-building quagmire, no democracy-building exercise, no politically correct wars.”

Under Hegseth’s leadership, the U.S. military has prioritized speed of delivery. People involved in the Pentagon probe said a rush to finalize targets shortly ahead of Feb. 28 contributed to the tragedy.

“Haste can lead to errors,” said Laurie Blank, who was appointed a special counsel at the Pentagon’s general counsel during the Biden administration from 2022 to 2024. She drew a distinction between planned targets and those that arise in the heat of battle. “A rush to hit pre-planned targets just isn’t the same thing,” she said, “especially when the operations are launched by choice and not in response to an attack where you are responding without time to plan.”

Why Minab?

A little more than 800 miles south of Tehran, the city of Minab sits on the critical Strait of Hormuz, at the crossroads of centuries-old trade routes and the nation’s modern military might. As the U.S. attack on Iran began, it was deemed a high-value target, according to people involved in the investigation.

As the strait’s significance grew in the 1980s, so did the number of military assets devoted to protecting it and projecting power into the Persian Gulf. The Revolutionary Guard’s missile units, naval facilities and logistics compounds operate alongside neighborhoods where fishermen, teachers and civil servants have lived for generations in the city of 76,000.

Shajarah Tayyebeh Elementary School was built almost a decade ago on land originally occupied by a Revolutionary Guard naval unit. The Pentagon had cataloged the site as a military base several years earlier — a determination that wasn’t updated before the February attack. The New York Times reported in June that targeting officials used satellite imagery that hadn’t been updated in seven years and that did not show a school at the site. Investigators have focused on the Defense Intelligence Agency’s failure to reclassify the location, officials involved in the inquiry said.

On Feb. 28, Minab awoke to clear skies. Shopkeepers unlocked their storefronts. Fishing crews unloaded ice chests along the docks. Children in green-plaid uniforms walked through the gates of the 260-student school, before heading into classrooms.

Firsthand descriptions of the events that took place in and around the school that day have been gathered by a group of human rights advocates, lawyers and digital forensics experts who’ve spent months reconstructing the attack. Members of the informal consortium — including some based in the U.S. and Europe — asked not to be named given the sensitivity of their outreach efforts with victims’ families. Their work and an assessment by the U.K.-based watchdog group Airwars — viewed as a highly reliable source by some Pentagon officials — provides the following account:

After the first reports of attacks on Iran emerged that Saturday morning, teachers called parents and asked them to collect their children, saying the school planned to close early. Shortly after 11 a.m., a first missile hit part of the school, triggering an explosion that reverberated across the neighborhood. Panicked shrieks filled the air. Teachers ushered children from the playground back inside to take cover in a prayer room.

Within minutes, a second missile struck, sending metal fragments across the school. Part of the roof collapsed. Only a few children inside the prayer room survived, buried beneath the rubble.

Rescue vehicles rushed to the scene while passersby helped the wounded. Some injured children were pulled from the rubble while dozens more, deceased, were slowly identified. One rescue crew member stumbled upon a child’s hand, detached and laying on the ground. He wept as colleagues continued to hunt through the debris alongside him.

Some parents were left to identify their dead children by fragments of clothing or belongings — a pencil case, bracelet or shoe — as many faces were no longer distinguishable. The father of Arash Gol-Azin didn’t learn the fate of his 7-year-old son until reaching the morgue. Only then did he spot him by identifying his sock.

Payam Akhavan, a Toronto-based lawyer who has practiced before the International Criminal Court and is an expert on civilian protection, said it’s important for investigators to determine what efforts U.S. officials made to try to ensure they were targeting a military installation.

“The Geneva Convention says you must take all feasible measures to determine that this is, in fact, a military objective,” said Akhavan, who spoke before Thursday’s U.N. report was published. “This does not mean that every mistake is a war crime, because mistakes will be made, even if you take all feasible measures.

“But if all feasible measures were not taken,” he added, “then that raises a question of criminal responsibility.”

At least 1,701 civilians were killed in the opening 39 days of the war, according to data compiled by the U.S.-based group Human Rights Activists in Iran. That’s an average of 43 people a day, and the group — viewed by some in the Pentagon as an authoritative source for Iranian casualty figures — said it’s a low estimate.

“We should be asking how so many civilians were killed amid an unprecedented tempo of strikes over just a matter of weeks,” said Skylar Thompson, the group’s deputy director.

More recently, Iranian officials and a United Nations body said the U.S. was responsible for a Sept. 1 strike on Kuhestak — some 20 miles south of Minab — that hit a residential area where a wedding party was underway and killed at least five people with dozens more injured. The U.S. is investigating the incident, Vice President JD Vance said earlier this month.

Target libraries

For decades, American military planners had maintained extensive target libraries in anticipation of potential conflict with Iran, encompassing everything from limited strikes to maritime war and major air campaigns. The list stretched into the thousands and included air bases, missile factories, nuclear facilities and ports, according to current and former U.S. officials familiar with the plans.

Some potential targets had remained on the books for years, accumulating layers of satellite imagery, intelligence reports and legal reviews.

But these catalogs can age quickly, according to people who’ve dealt with them. Buildings appear and disappear. Headquarters switch locations. Where a military barracks once stood, schools, hospitals and mosques may now exist. So the libraries’ contents require close and continual review well before any particular building or site winds up on a target list.

Maintaining the lists is critical but labor-intensive. Officials involved in the internal investigation of the Minab incident described gaps in vetting — or checking whether the underlying information is accurate, reliable and timely — that came well before the school site was selected.

Some of the most sensitive sites, such as Iran’s nuclear facilities — attacked by Israel in its 12-day war with Tehran in June 2025 — faced relentless attention from U.S. intelligence analysts ahead of the 2026 war, according to officials with direct knowledge of the matter. Less prominent locations, such as Minab, went months without receiving another close look, the officials added.

War planners start to think they’ll have time to revisit the less urgent sites, current and former Pentagon officials said.

That assumption evaporated during the final days of February as diplomatic talks between U.S. and Iranian officials in Geneva faltered and then collapsed on Feb. 26.

Work that had unfolded in previous conflicts over weeks or months — matching sites from the library, such as buildings, airfields or bases — was completed in a matter of days, according to officials involved in the inquiry. More than a thousand potential targets had to be reassessed and approved.

By the time the first Tomahawk missile bound for the Minab site left its launcher on a ship operating in the Arabian Sea, roughly three dozen people were involved along the kill chain, the officials said.

Most sat in secure facilities more than 7,000 miles away in Tampa, Fla., studying maps, imagery and databases in preparation for a war that, until 48 hours before the Minab attack, many officials had believed for decades wouldn’t occur.

Typically, part of their work entails refining a list based on satellite imagery and on-the-ground intelligence that’s used to create a pattern-of-life analysis reflecting human movements on the site and changes over time. In Iran, a bitter U.S. adversary for almost half a century, such intelligence was limited, especially in the south of the country, people involved in the probe said.

Additional steps in the kill chain address other types of issues. Lawyers assess whether each proposed target is a lawful military objective. Specialists estimate potential collateral damage. Weapons experts debate not only which missiles to fire but when.

Every stage leaves a record. Analysts sign off on each piece of the chain. They’re told to report any inconsistencies to superiors.

Then a series of questions is asked by the senior commander: Is the target lawful? Is there sufficient intelligence? And have reasonable precautions been taken to minimize civilian harm? In the early hours of Feb. 28, the answer to each question about the Minab site was yes, according to the officials involved in the probe.

The Pentagon’s internal investigators, who examined the satellite imagery, intelligence databases, targeting materials, operational chat logs and computer records that analysts used, concluded that there was high confidence throughout the kill chain that the Minab site was a Revolutionary Guard facility, according to people involved in the probe.

“Insufficient intel wasn’t really viewed as a concern before the war,” said one Pentagon official involved in the internal probe. “We were confident in our intel. Minab proved you should never be too confident.”

Political pawns

Government researchers and auditors have noted deficiencies in the primary intelligence database that’s used to develop strike targets, and the Pentagon is working to replace it with one that will introduce more automation. And Minab isn’t the first time that flawed intelligence has directed U.S. precision weapons toward the wrong target.

The accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in the Serbian capital Belgrade in 1999 killed three people and injured 27 others. A mistaken 2015 airstrike on a Doctors Without Borders hospital in Kunduz in Afghanistan killed 42 people. More recently, soon after the Pentagon’s civilian-harm-mitigation teams were disbanded, a strike on the Ras Ina port in Yemen in April 2025 resulted in at least 80 civilian deaths.

In the months since the attack, the children of Shajarah Tayyebeh Elementary have become symbols. Their faces were plastered on the backs of the seats of Iranian planes ferrying diplomats to Islamabad for talks with the U.S. in April. They adorn memorials on the streets of Minab. Some families have complained that their injured children haven’t received the treatment they need. Critics accuse Iranian officials of leveraging the school attack to their political advantage.

In the U.S., the disaster has become a different sort of political touchstone. Democratic lawmakers, who are seeking to take control of the Congress in the November election, are asking how the attack could have happened.

Sen. Jack Reed of Rhode Island, the ranking member on the Senate Armed Services Committee, accused the Pentagon of deliberately withholding the results of the investigation, and his Republican counterpart, Thom Tillis of North Carolina, called for congressional briefings on what went wrong.

That call is echoed by Sen. Richard Blumenthal, who also sits on the committee, which helps set spending caps for the Pentagon’s roughly $1-trillion annual budget.

“The administration should have been forthcoming within hours or days, and here we are months later and nothing has been provided,” Blumenthal said.

“It is unforgivable,” he added.

Bartenstein and Karra write for Bloomberg.

KILLER drug fentanyl has long had a vice-like grip on the US, devastating everyone from high profile celebrities to everyday families across the country.

Just today it was revealed that actress Hayden Panettiere, who died last month age 36, had allegedly taken a pill laced with fentanyl before she passed away.

The mum-of-one was found dead of a suspected overdose of oxycodone at a luxury AirBnB in South Carolina on August 17 just days before her 37th birthday.

Cops are said to be “zeroing in” on her alleged long-term dealer from whom she is suspected to have purchased several black-market prescription drugs from.

Toxicology reports are still pending but, according to the US news outlet, the working theory within law enforcement is that it was the suspected fentanyl-laced oxycodone pill killed Hayden.

But she is far from the first celebrity to have succumbed to the drug.

TRUE MONSTER

Questions behind Netflix’s Lizzie Borden drama…’killer cover’ & ‘abuse probe’

WEB OF LIES

I overdosed just to get into hospital – what it’s like living with Munchausen’s

Others include music icon Prince, who died age 57 from an accidental fentanyl overdose in 2016, long before many had even heard of the drug.

Rappers Mac Miller and Coolio, rock star Tom Petty and actors Michael K Williams and Angus Cloud all lost their lives to the drug, while singer Demi Lovato survived but was left with life-changing side effects.

And the fentanyl crisis is showing no signs of going away as dealers use it to lace other drugs to maximise their profits.

A former NYPD chief of detectives James Essig explained: “Fentanyl is relatively cheap while heroin is expensive. 

“You take a kilo of heroin and then add in a tiny bit of fentanyl and stretch it out for more profitability.”

Fentanyl is an opioid 50 times more powerful than heroin and 100 times stronger than morphine.

Opioid addiction became rife in America during the 90s when pharmaceutical companies flooded the market with super-strong painkillers.

But when the government began to crackdown in the 2000s, the Mexican drug cartels spotted a gap in the market and moved in with heroin, and before long they started adding fentanyl to juice up its potency.

Raymond Donovan, former Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) chief of operations, says: “That really started the wave of the opioid crisis that we are in now. 

“Very quickly it went from increasing the strength of heroin to pure fentanyl. You had kilos coming across the south west border.

“The Mexican cartels started buying fentanyl directly from China, pressing it into pills and then selling it as if it was a known opioid, like something that was made by a scientist in a laboratory, but it is not, it is a fake pill.”

It was two years after Prince’s death when investigators finally released their findings.

They had found counterfeit Vicodin pills in his house, laced with fentanyl – but police were unable to establish who had provided the drugs.

Prince’s death put fentanyl in the headlines, but it wasn’t long before another famous name was tragically linked to the drug.

The following year rock n roll legend Tom Petty was found dead – and two forms of illicit fentanyl were found in his system. 

He was also using a medically supplied fentanyl patch for pain caused by a fractured hip.

His family released a statement saying they wanted his death to act as a wake-up call in a bid to save others from suffering their heartbreak.

But the opioid crisis was only just starting. In 2018 more than 30,000 people died of fentanyl overdoses – up by 10 per cent – and in July that year singer Demi Lovato almost lost her life.

The star had been open about her struggles with drug addiction and had been in and out of rehab.

Entertainment journalist Chris Witherspoon explains: “Despite years of sobriety Demi Lovato went out with some friends in Hollywood, ran into a dealer she knew and she got some heroin that was laced with fentanyl.”

Speaking about her ordeal Demi said: “I had three strokes, I had a heart attack. I suffered brain damage from the strokes. I can’t drive any more.

Her survival was down to being given the drug Narcan in hospital which helps to reverse the effects of an opioid overdose.

It was a huge wake-up call with celebrities including Lady Gaga, Justin Timberlake and Ariana Grande sending her public messages of support.

But another celeb was not going to be as lucky as Demi. Just two months later rapper Mac Miller was found dead at the age of just 26.

Like Demi he had been open about his own struggles with addiction, writing about it in his music.

Investigators discovered he had been looking to buy oxycodone, but ended up with something laced with fentanyl.

Miller’s drug dealer and the men who supplied him with the drugs were later jailed.

But it isn’t just celebrities that have fallen victim to the fentanyl crisis sweeping America.

Thousands of ordinary families have been left grieving the deaths of their loved ones, too.

Matt Capelouto lost his college student daughter Alex to the drug in December 2019.

“We didn’t know anything about fentanyl at the time,” he says. “Lots of things were going through my head and this was a period of shock.”

Alex, 20, had contacted a drug dealer on Snapchat looking to buy the prescription painkiller Perocet.

But what he, in fact, delivered to her was counterfeit pills made with lethal doses of fentanyl.

“My daughter took half of one of these pills before going to bed and my wife found her dead in her bed the next morning,” says heartbroken Matt. 

“I wanted to find out who this drug dealer was. Who sold my daughter death?”

They eventually got into Alex’s phone and discovered the identity of the drug dealer.

But the family were told that the dealer was unlikely to face any charges as California does not have a death by dealer statute that holds dealers responsible for users’ deaths.

But the case was taken over for federal prosecution, which has a different burden of proof, and the dealer, Brandon McDowell, was charged with one count of distributing fentanyl resulting in death and jailed for nine years.

Matt says: “Locking up a drug dealer won’t bring my daughter back, but it will save someone else’s child.”

Michael K Williams, star of TV series The Wire and Boardwalk Empire, was the next celeb to lose their life after taking fentanyl-laced heroin in 2021.

He had been open about his battle with addiction, and just five days before his death spoke on a podcast about how acting offered him a road to recovery.

Two weeks after he passed away the New York City Medical Examiner said he died from an unintentional overdose from a deadly mix of drugs including fentanyl.

In April 2023, drug dealer Irvin Cartagena pleaded guilty to selling the mix of heroin and fentanyl to Williams that resulted in his death. He was jailed for 10 years.

In September 2021 comedian and presenter Kate Quigley went to a party in Venice, California, where she and her friends thought they were using cocaine, but it contained fentanyl.

Kate passed out, fell over and was unconscious for 17 hours. She woke up disorientated, unable to move her legs, and then made a harrowing discovery.

Three of her friends were lying dead; comedian Fuquan Johnson, Natalie Williamson and Enrico Colangeli had suffered fatal overdoses.

The dealer was never identified.

Washington Post reporter Nick Miroff says: “One of the many tragedies of the fentanyl epidemic in the United States is this repeat of mass overdose events.

“A group of friends partying together and they think they are buying cocaine or some other drug, and they don’t know that what they are buying is laced with fentanyl and because they don’t have any opioid tolerance, they drop dead. 

“So that’s why we have seen horrible crime scenes with three, four, five adults on the floor at a party where they have literally died in a couple of minutes.”

In July 2022, cops discerned a shocking new twist in the fentanyl story. 

The drug was now being used as a weapon by robbery gangs, and a famous fashion designer was one of their victims.

Katie Gallagher, who had designed for Rita Ora and Lady Gaga, was found dead in her bed.

Police told her parents that Katie had died from an overdose – but she had been murdered.

Detectives had uncovered a robbery crew that was using drugs laced with fentanyl to incapacitate victims before using facial recognition technology to open their phones and empty their bank accounts.

Police believed Katie had been given what she thought was cocaine, but it was laced with fentanyl.

Police arrested and charged Kenwood Allen, 33, in relation to five deaths and a drugging and robbery spree targeting a total of 21 victims. 

He pleaded not guilty and is awaiting trial.

In September 2022, rapper Coolio became the next victim of fentanyl. 

At first it was thought he had died of an asthma attack, but the medical examiner’s report revealed he had died from an accidental overdose of heroin, methamphetamine and fentanyl.

The authorities are struggling to stop the flow of fentanyl from Mexico into the US.

The drug is so compact and so potent that it is easy for the cartels to smuggle it across the border.

In 2023, Homeland Security launched Operation Blue Lotus to try to stop the flood.

And the US targeted the Chinese suppliers that were selling fentanyl to the cartels.

But despite the Government efforts the fentanyl crisis continued to spread across America and claimed the life of yet another of Hollywood’s brightest stars.

Actor Angus Cloud was just 25 when he died at his family home in California.

He shot to fame playing a drug dealer in the hit series Euphoria. But his own struggle with addiction after suffering an ankle injury and losing his dad to cancer made him vulnerable.

He was found to have died of an accidental overdose of a cocktail of drugs, including fentanyl.

Earlier this year, an Iran-linked actor used Anthropic’s Claude artificial intelligence model to scrape and analyze data with the aim of helping target U.S. naval forces in the Middle East. A group in Yemen – very likely Iranian-backed Houthi militants – also used Claude to assist with work on guidance systems for ballistic and hypersonic missiles.

These are just some of the revelations about how adversaries and other malign actors have been using one of the premier pieces of AI software being developed in the United States that were contained in a new report Anthropic released late yesterday. The 154-page document also details instances where Claude was used directly and indirectly to support intelligence gathering and surveillance, cyberattacks, influence operations, and even worrisome biological research over the past eight months. In addition to Iran and Yemen, the human actors behind these activities were based in Russia, China, and a host of other countries.

Anthropic has shared details about what it calls the “misuse” of its models in the past, but describes the new report as its “most detailed” to date. The company has clearly been cataloging these case studies, and has assigned each one a control number. Though the entire contents of the report are cause for concern, the explicit attempt to use Claude to target American forces, as well as to develop new higher-end missiles and other military technology, are particular standouts and signs of what’s to come, as we will highlight below.

GTG-30005: Military reconnaissance

GTG-30005 is the case study dealing with the targeting of U.S. naval forces, and the summary is as follows:

“In another investigation, we identified and disrupted an Iran-nexus threat actor that used Claude to collect and analyze publicly accessible data to develop targeting recommendations against US naval forces in the region. The threat actor used Claude to compile targeting handbooks, through a Python pipeline the threat actor built with Claude’s assistance, to identify and track naval positions based on open-source information. The compiled material included a roster of US personnel scraped from captions on public military photographs; publicly accessible ship and aircraft transponder identifiers; commercial satellite-imagery query scripts; and an inventory of public websites that exposed US naval movements. The threat actor also directed Claude to compile vulnerability research on shipboard systems, cataloging known CVEs in maritime VSAT terminals, Cisco communications equipment, and industrial control products.”

“We banned the actor’s account, developed detections to reduce the risk of future misuse, and shared threat intelligence with government authorities to disrupt the threat.”

How exactly Anthropic defines the term “nexus” here is not immediately clear, and other entries in its new report also use “state-nexus” in addition to country-based variations. However, in this specific case, an addendum is added to the entry that explicitly says that the same account was separately tied to “domestic mass surveillance” software development work “for Iranian state systems,” clearly pointing to an actor directly linked to the regime in Tehran.

Whether or not any of the data collected and analysed here was directly used to subsequently carry out attacks on U.S. forces is unknown. However, there have been media reports just in recent weeks that Iran has been increasingly trying to strike American warships. Those same reports have raised questions about how the country has been prosecuting those operations given its limited capabilities and capacity to track maritime targets far from its shores. The possibility that Russia or China could be supplying targeting data has been put forward.

The use of AI technology by nation-state armed forces to develop target sets and engage them is already known to be growing globally. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have been a pioneer in this regard, but the U.S. military, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and others are also known to be developing and fielding these capabilities.

U.S. military officials have also voiced increasing concern in recent years about the ability to track the movements and disposition of U.S. military assets and personnel using publicly available pictures and other data. There has been much talk, in turn, about how to balance transparency and operational security.

GTG-87001: Disrupting a Yemen-based guided weapons engineering cell using Claude to develop guidance software

Anthropic’s new report details an instance where an individual in Yemen used Claude as part of missile guidance work, which is given the control number GTG-87001.

“We identified a cell of threat actors based in northern Yemen running three weapons development programs: a guided rocket that used a commodity phone-class flight computer with final-phase homing guidance; a multi-stage ballistic missile with a stated range goal above 2,000 km; and a multi-variant missile (referred to as the “R2000” set) that included a hypersonic glide vehicle variant.”

“The actors used Claude Code in place of human software engineers to develop the guidance, navigation, and control (GNC) software that steers and stabilizes a flying vehicle. For example, they used Claude to integrate an open-source autopilot onto a phone-class flight computer, writing the control and position estimation software, tuning the control settings, running a firmware build pipeline, and performing a flight simulation. The actors managed several Claude instances at once, assigning each one a role, much as a lead would delegate work on a small engineering team: the actors tasked one instance with writing the code, another with research, and a third with reviewing the code the first instance produced.”

“Our safeguards blocked many of their requests, but not all of them. The actors used a variety of tactics to evade our safeguards, including hiding their goals and the products the software was meant for, and they split their work across multiple sessions so no single session revealed their full intent.”

“These actors carried out a sustained effort to develop guided weapons, including using Claude to design guidance software. We do not have evidence the actors succeeded in fielding an operational device; but they did test-fire a guided rocket. This field test appears to have failed: within hours, the actors returned to Claude to work out why it failed.”

“We identified this activity as part of our internal investigations into suspected weapons development. We banned accounts associated with the actors and shared threat information with public- and private-sector partners to mitigate risks posed by the actors. Nevertheless, we have evidence that the actors had already built an offline simulation toolkit that does not rely on Claude or other engineering computing environments such as MATLAB.”

As mentioned earlier, the report does not name the Houthis, but that group has historically been based primarily in the northern end of Yemen. It is also the only entity in the country known to have active missile development programs, which are conducted with critical support from Iran.

Whether this particular work directly resulted in any new capabilities is unknown. Anthropic notes that there looked to be at least one failed test launch before the accounts were banned, which would have occurred sometime after the beginning of this year, based on the stated cutoff dates for the report. By the end of 2025, the Houthis had already amassed a wide array of very real ballistic missiles, including types with at least claimed ranges of 2,000 kilometers (approximately 1,242 miles). The group also has a variety of cruise missiles and one-way attack drones that it has employed operationally.

Still, being able to leverage Claude could only have helped any domestic missile development efforts in Yemen, which might help reduce dependency on Iran, at least to a degree. Furthermore, developing functional hypersonic glide vehicles capable of prolonged stable flight has historically been notoriously difficult, even for entities with extensive relevant knowledge bases on an organizational level.

GTG-17001: Disrupting a China-based operation using Claude to draft a fire control specification and acquisition documents for undersea warfare

Use of Claude in foreign military endeavours goes beyond the Middle East, as evidenced by case study GTG-17001. This involved a Chinese actor conducting work related to a naval counter-torpedo defense system.

“We identified a China-based threat actor who used Claude to advance three parallel tracks of work on an anti-torpedo weapons system:”

• “First, the actor used Claude to draft a Chinese-language specification for an anti-torpedo fire control system (the core logic that aims and times an anti-torpedo weapon’s response). The document was written to win approval from a Chinese defense manufacturer, which would move the work on to technical certification and operational testing.”
• “Second, the actor used Claude to produce a Chinese-language technical proposal of more than 200 pages, accompanied by an executive briefing deck.”
• “Third, the actor used Claude to benchmark their own system against specific US anti-torpedo and anti-submarine programs based on publicly accessible information. They then generated a Chinese-language briefing on US Navy systems derived from open-source reporting.”

“The actor presented themselves as an original equipment manufacturer in the US defense sector. We assess the actor was associated with a Chinese defense industry manufacturer aiming to produce a weapons specification and acquisition proposal for the People’s Liberation Army Navy.”

“The actor used Claude to write the acquisition proposal, refining it over many drafts. After each draft, the actor instructed Claude to role-play a hostile expert reviewer to critique the proposal, then used that feedback to sharpen the next version. In parallel, the actor used Claude to build pieces of the anti-torpedo weapons system’s fire control software and a test matrix to validate them.”

“The operational lift the actor achieved was a function of using Claude to automate complex technical outputs. The actor leveraged the model to compress the development timelines for the certification registry, compliance documentation, and automated fire control logic. The actor also accelerated the traditional human review cycle by having Claude critique the acquisition proposal across multiple rounds of review while role-playing a persona.”

“We uncovered this activity as part of our internal investigations into suspected weapons development. We cannot attribute the activity to a specific entity or actor. But we have banned the account for violating our Supported Regions Policy and our Usage Policy, which prohibits weapons design and development, and incorporated our investigative findings into our safeguards to mitigate the risk of future misuse.”

Anthropic’s report does not name the U.S. programs leveraged here, but does note the information in question was publicly available. Anti-torpedo systems for surface warships and submarines have been an area of significant interest for the U.S. Navy for years now. Those developments have also produced compact torpedo designs for use in other applications.

The PLAN’s interest in these same kinds of capabilities is not at all surprising. Underwater threats and countermeasures to them, broadly speaking, would play a central and vital role in any future conflict between the United States and China across the broad expanses of the Pacific.

GTG-27005: Disrupting a Russia-based operation using Claude to engineer an autonomous military drone swarm

Another case study, GTG-27005, details the use of Claude by Russian actors working on drone swarming technology.

“We identified likely freelance Russia-based threat actors who set out to build a full-stack autonomous first-person-view (FPV) kamikaze drone swarm. The actors used Claude Code to write and test the code and save it directly into the actors’ own project files. In addition to Claude Code, the actors used a software-in-the-loop simulation stack and a rented graphics processing host for model training. They called the operation ‘DronDoc’ or ‘Serafim.’”

“The actors used Claude to build the core software system, including the drones’ shared swarm memory and fault-tolerant coordination logic (FTCL); an onboard small language model to govern attack, observe, and return-to-base behaviors; a terminal guidance software system to steer drones to their target (using the onboard camera) and issue the call to detonate; a control-link geolocation module to find opposing drone operators; a passive acoustic detection layer; and low-level logic for the drones’ programmable chips. The actors designed the platform for autonomous lethal engagement; the onboard model could select targets (including a ‘person’ target class) and issue detonation commands without a human in the loop. The actors’ activity—including flashing the low-level firmware to live development boards, provisioning single-board computers, and wiring up a simulation environment over a mesh network—confirmed that they were using real hardware-in-loop testing within their sessions.”

“The actors trained a computer vision classifier on scraped Ukrainian combat footage, splitting the target classes into “enemy” and “friendly,” and allow-listing Russian systems. They also repeatedly used a fixed coordinate in Donetsk Oblast as the demonstration strike point, with front-line cities and corridors in Ukraine as the mission geography.”

“The actors created their accounts between late 2025 and early 2026 and started the operation in mid-May 2026. The actors circumvented our geographic access controls by routing traffic through commercial virtual private servers.”

“We assess the actors were a small, specialized freelance team doing a mix of civilian and military work, not a Russian state entity. We identified nine accounts associated with this group; eight were used only for ordinary freelance work, not weapons-related software development. Based on our investigation, we assess the actors had ties to a regional university with a federal research center associated with the Russian Academy of Sciences. The actors claimed to have received funding from Russia’s Advanced Research Foundation, National Technology Initiative, and Ministry of Defence, though we cannot verify those claims. We identified this activity as part of our internal investigations into suspected weapons development, we banned accounts associated with the actors, and have incorporated our investigative findings into safeguards to reduce the risk of future misuse.”

Anthropic’s report included a table, reproduced below, detailing different types of drones and other capabilities that were fed into the model as part of this work.

Also, while Anthropic said it could not confirm any direct ties in this instance to the Russian government, the work described here is fully in line with capabilities that have already been demonstrated to varying degrees in Ukraine in the past few years. TWZ has been very closely tracking developments on both sides of the conflict when it comes to new automated targeting and swarming capabilities for shorter- and longer-ranged kamikaze drones. In 2024, we also published a detailed feature outlining a coming revolution in drone warfare, signs of which were already emerging then, thanks to AI and the ever-lowering barrier to entry for leveraging that technology.

GTG-17002: Disrupting a China-based operation using Claude to build targeting software for electronic warfare and air defense suppression

The last case study in the Conventional Weapons section of Anthropic’s new report, GTG-17002, covers electronic warfare-related work by a Chinese actor, with a particular focus on potential air defense targets in Taiwan.

“We identified a China-based actor who used Claude’s chat, coding, and agentic work tools to design, build, and iterate on a Chinese-language suite of about 16 modules for electronic warfare, using the electromagnetic spectrum to detect, jam, or deceive an opponent’s radar and communications, and for suppressing an opponent’s air defenses.”

“The actor used Claude to build the software system, from the underlying logic to the user interface, and iterated through 12 versions. This included implementing and optimizing the system’s radar detection and jamming physics, generating a vulnerability analysis module, and drafting Chinese-language targeting instructions. The software suite the actor built analyzed an opponent’s radars, surface-to-air missile sites, command posts, and communications nodes, then computed their detection coverage, assessed the effectiveness of jamming, ranked targets by value and vulnerability, including which to suppress first, and determined how best to assign jammer sorties to targets across multi-day campaigns. The suite also ranked which of an opponent’s assets to suppress first, and modeled specific engagement envelopes, including those of Patriot and THAAD-class [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] systems.”

“Mid-project, we observed the actor change the simulation’s default scenario to 12 targets in Taiwan. The targets included a command bunker in Taiwan, an early warning radar site, Patriot and Tien Kung [surface-to-air missile] batteries, major air bases, and a regional combatant command headquarters.”

NCSIST – Tien Kung III Air Defense Missile & Hsiung Feng III Anti-Ship Missile Live Firing [480p]

“The actor also ran a self-hosted model on an internal network alongside Claude and connected the software suite to this model through a tool-use integration.”

“Based on our investigation, we assess the actor is a China-based defense and military-industrial researcher. Account-level metadata and content flagged by our safeguards indicated the actor was linked to PRC research institutions, including the PLA Academy of Military Sciences. We detected this activity as part of our internal investigations into suspected weapons development, we banned accounts linked to the actor, and have incorporated our investigative findings into our safeguards to reduce the risk of future misuse.”

An accompanying table, seen below, mentions several specific types of U.S.-made air defense radars, as well as the Link-16 datalink network, as having come up in the course of this work. Electronic warfare variants of the Chinese Y-8 and Y-9 aircraft, as well as the J-16D electronic warfare jet, and what appears to be a reference to the Golden Eagle drone helicopter, are also mentioned.

China’s J-16D Shows Versatility Across Reconnaissance, Attack, Defense: Designers

The suppression of enemy air defenses is an essential part of any modern air campaign, whether conducted independently or as a part of a larger operation. This would be no less critical in any military intervention against Taiwan from the mainland, or any other larger-scale conflict the PLA might find itself in.

Guardrails and ethics

Beyond the details in any of the specific case studies, Anthropic’s new report underscores growing broader concerns about guardrails for the use of AI and general ethics surrounding the technology. As noted in the instances above, Anthropic has also implemented various safeguards to try to block access to Claude from certain regions and/or to prevent the model from conducting certain types of work. At the same time, what the company has now shared makes clear that those protections can still be circumvented to a significant degree, at least for now.

For its part, Anthropic has been publicly supportive of transparency laws and regulation, at least within the United States. The company also notably made tweaks to certain Claude models earlier this year to address U.S. government cybersecurity concerns.

Starting in December 2025, Anthropic has also been very publicly embroiled in a dispute with the Pentagon over the potential use of Claude to support mass surveillance and fully autonomous weapon systems. This subsequently led to the company being designated a supply chain risk, and limitations being imposed on the use of that model within the U.S. military and elsewhere across the U.S. government. Anthropic is continuing to fight that action in court. However, just yesterday, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Pentagon Chief Technology Officer Emil Michael said the U.S. military had scaled back the use of Anthropic’s products in support of classified work by 90 percent.

The concerns about ‘misuse’ outlined in Anthropic’s new report apply, in general terms, to publicly accessible models being developed by other companies, too. There have already been publicly disclosed instances of AI agents themselves engaging in hacking and other malign behavior in order to complete assigned tasks, raising additional questions about security and public safety, not to mention ethics.

TWZ has noted in the past that America’s adversaries are likely to be less worried about ethics, in general, when it comes to AI. Anthropic’s new report also shows there are few bounds to what state-aligned or even non-state actors might seek to use this technology for, including the development of potential weapons of mass destruction.

At the same time, AI models like Claude are not going away, and developments continue to advance at an ever-quickening pace, opening the door to further proliferation. Developments are rapidly intermingling globally, with companies in China notably leveraging models created in the U.S. to further their own work, which is then released publicly. The technology will increasingly become more integrated and critical to most aspects of military operations and weapons development, alongside its commercial and civilian applications. It is just as much a superweapon as anything else, and the country with the more capable models, and the willingness to deploy them, will have a major edge in future conflicts.

With all this in mind, it seems very plausible, if not probable, that the case studies described in Anthropic’s new report are just the tip of an approaching iceberg that will need a concerted effort to tackle.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The Los Angeles federal public defender’s office on Friday joined a renewed effort to oust Bill Essayli, the top federal prosecutor in Southern California, accusing the government of “playing shadow games with the most consequential powers a government can wield against its population.”

Citing a recent order from the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Jackson, the public defender’s office renewed a motion seeking to disqualify Essayli from participating in or supervising the prosecution of their client, Jaime Ramirez.

The federal appellate court ruled last month that the Department of Justice cannot keep an official who has not been confirmed by the Senate in charge of a U.S. attorney’s office simply by giving that person a different title and the full powers of the job.

In their motion filed Friday, James Anglin Flynn and Ayah A. Sarsour, deputy federal public defenders, accused the government of asking them “to trust that there are some undisclosed limits on Essayli’s authority that render it valid.”

“The buck should stop here, and it should stop now,” they wrote.

The U.S. attorney’s office in L.A. did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

H. Dean Steward, a defense attorney, first kicked off the renewed effort last week, filing a motion asking Senior U.S. District Judge J. Michael Seabright to reconsider his prior ruling. Steward argued that Essayli should not be allowed to continue leading the office.

Seabright previously disqualified Essayli as acting U.S. attorney in October, finding he was “not lawfully serving” in the top role. But Seabright — who was appointed to the bench by President George W. Bush — said the court had “no basis to preclude Essayli from performing the lawful duties” of first assistant U.S. attorney, which left the door open for him to remain in charge.

Seabright scheduled a hearing for Oct. 13 on the latest motion. At a Zoom hearing on Aug. 28, Seabright appeared to signal which way he is leaning.

“I’m not sure if the government is just saying my decision was different from Jackson and therefore it stands. I’m not sure that passes muster given how the 9th Circuit ruled in Jackson,” Seabright said. “I think there’s going to have to be more in-depth briefing than the government has given me to date.”

The federal appellate court ruling stemmed from a challenge to the authority of Nevada’s top federal prosecutor, Sigal Chattah, whom the Justice Department had designated “first assistant” U.S. attorney. With no one above her in the office, Chattah has seemingly been calling the shots on federal prosecutions in the state, handling cases referred by the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration and other law enforcement agencies.

The Justice Department previously said it disagreed with the 9th Circuit’s decision and plans to appeal it to the Supreme Court. The agency did not respond to questions about what effect the ruling could have on Essayli.

The Trump administration has used a similar workaround to keep Essayli running the U.S. attorney’s office in L.A. without going through the Senate confirmation process, where he likely would have faced strong opposition from California’s elected representatives.

Essayli, 40, has continued leading the federal prosecutor’s office in the Central District of California as “first assistant” despite a federal judge’s ruling last year that said he was unlawfully serving as the acting U.S. attorney. The Justice Department did not appeal that ruling.

Instead, Essayli’s office has maintained that he can prosecute and supervise cases as first assistant. He also was appointed as a “special attorney” by the Trump administration, a title similarly held by Chattah in Nevada.

“To be sure, First Assistant Essayli may be the highest-ranking DOJ lawyer in the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and (like many in the office) he supervises others,” Assistant U.S. Atty. Alexander P. Robbins said in a filing last month. “But that cannot make him a “de facto” U.S. Attorney, and he does not purport to exercise “all of the functions of [that] office.”

Flynn and Sarsour pushed back on that claim in their motion, arguing that the government “is asking this Court to accept a theory that the Ninth Circuit rejected, nearly verbatim less than three weeks ago.” The government, they wrote, “appears to be asking this Court to consider and approve a hypothetical delegation to Essayli of some subset of the U.S. Attorney powers.”

“For over a year, this illegal exercise of prosecutorial powers has violated Mr. Ramirez’s constitutional rights and undermined the legitimacy of the criminal justice system in this district,” Flynn and Sarsour wrote. “In line with Jackson, two other Courts of Appeals have now affirmed the common-sense remedy that this illegality should be stopped.”

The deputy federal public defenders said a defense analysis identified invalid service as acting or de facto U.S. Attorneys in at least 16 districts across the country.

A former Republican member of the California state Assembly from Riverside, Essayli has used his position to act as one of Trump’s fiercest legal foot soldiers. He has pursued criminal charges against protesters, activists and immigrants while dropping cases involving administration allies and supporting lawsuits challenging transgender and environmental policies in California.

Essayli was sworn in as interim U.S. attorney in April 2025. Around the time he hit that role’s 120-day limit, he resigned from his interim role and was allowed to continue under his current titles by then-Atty. Gen. Pam Bondi.

Challenges to Essayli’s position were brought in several criminal cases, with defense lawyers arguing that charges filed under his watch are invalid and should be dismissed. The federal public defender’s office in L.A. had asked the judge to disqualify Essayli from participating in and supervising criminal prosecutions.

The U.S. Central Command (Centcom) said that its forces struck three Iranian oil tankers on Saturday after Iran launched ballistic missiles towards two of its Navy warships, signaling the latest retaliatory strikes between the parties this week.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary

Lawrence F. O’Brien, who while serving as Democratic National Committee chairman was the target of the Watergate break-in that spelled the downfall of then-President Richard M. Nixon, has died in New York City. He was 73.

O’Brien, who also was a key strategist for four presidential election campaigns, a former U.S. postmaster general and a commissioner of the National Basketball Assn., died Thursday night of cancer in New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center.

His office was the scene of the June 17, 1972, bungled break-in that eventually led to Nixon’s resignation and the imprisonment of several of his aides. O’Brien believed that the Republican Party, seeking Nixon’s reelection against Democratic contender George McGovern, authorized the burglary in search of information to discredit him and the Democrats.

Nixon’s White House papers released by the National Archives in 1987 revealed that in 1974, Nixon had asked the Internal Revenue Service to search for embarrassing information in the income tax files of McGovern and O’Brien. The IRS refused.

O’Brien called the break-in “an incredible act of political espionage” and urged citizens to reject the claim that the incident and other “tricks” ordered by Nixon were “politics as usual.”

O’Brien also expressed concerns that the Watergate scandal would turn the public against the political process. In 1974, he discussed the implications of Watergate in his critically acclaimed memoir, “No Final Victories: A Life in Politics from John F. Kennedy to Watergate.”

“I’ve been a politician for most of my life and I’ve never dreamed of bugging an opponent’s telephone or breaking into his office,” O’Brien wrote. “If a generation of Americans becomes convinced that burglary and wiretapping are ‘politics as usual,’ then there’s not much hope for our political system.”

Born July 7, 1917, in Springfield, Mass., O’Brien was brought up on politics by his Irish immigrant father. After Army service in World War II and completing night law school at Boston’s Northeastern University, O’Brien worked for Massachusetts Rep. Foster Furcolo, and then, in 1952, took over John F. Kennedy’s campaign for the U.S. Senate.

Lauded for his pragmatic ability to organize and compromise, O’Brien was put in charge of Kennedy’s successful 1960 presidential campaign and later headed the ill-fated campaign by the President’s younger brother, Robert F. Kennedy. O’Brien was with both Kennedys when they were slain.

“I remember standing in the hospital with Ken O’Donnell (another member of President Kennedy’s so-called ‘Kennedy Mafia’) for a half-hour, refusing to tell the world he was dead–because we couldn’t accept it,” O’Brien told the Los Angeles Times 20 years after the Dallas assassination of John F. Kennedy.

“But then, years later, I was with Bobby in Los Angeles when he, too, was shot,” O’Brien added. “My reaction was: ‘That’s it.’ At that moment, I became a fatalist.”

After President Kennedy was assassinated, O’Brien worked for Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, and ran Johnson’s successful 1964 presidential campaign against Barry Goldwater.

Johnson named him postmaster general and, in that position, O’Brien prepared a report that moved the postal department from Cabinet status to a semi-public corporation.

After Robert Kennedy was assassinated in 1968, O’Brien headed the presidential campaign of Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey, who lost to Nixon.

O’Brien served as chairman of the Democratic National Committee from 1970 to 1972, when the party was in shambles because of anti-Vietnam debates. He left politics after McGovern was defeated by Nixon.

O’Brien became commissioner of the NBA in 1975 and served until 1984. He was credited with settling the so-called “Oscar Robertson suit” in 1976, providing free agency in the league, and with supervising a smooth merger between the NBA and the rival American Basketball Assn.

He also avoided a 1983 players’ strike by negotiating a landmark collective bargaining agreement for professional sports. The agreement, which stabilized the troubled league, provided an innovative cap on how much money teams could spend on salaries and benefits in return for giving players 53% of the league’s gross revenues.

Larry Fleisher, head of the Players Assn. and one of O’Brien’s chief adversaries, said O’Brien left the sport of basketball “better off by far” than he had found it.

O’Brien is survived by his wife, Elva Brassard O’Brien; a son, Lawrence F. O’Brien III; a sister, and two grandsons.

Funeral services are planned for Tuesday in Springfield, Mass.

RELATED STORY, C5