Taliban

Islamabad, Pakistan – As Pakistan remained embroiled in a war of words with its archrival India – following a dramatic exchange of missiles and drones nearly two weeks ago – it this week advanced diplomatic efforts with two other neighbors: China and Afghanistan, which could lead to the formal resumption of diplomatic ties between Islamabad and Kabul after nearly four years.

In an “informal” trilateral meeting held in Beijing on May 21, the foreign ministers of China, Pakistan and Afghanistan convened under a forum first launched in 2017, and which last met in May 2023.

This time, a key outcome from the meeting, according to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, was a renewed willingness by both Pakistan and Afghanistan to restore diplomatic relations after heightened tensions in recent years.

“Afghanistan and Pakistan expressed clear willingness to elevate diplomatic relations and agreed in principle to exchange ambassadors as soon as possible. China welcomed this and will continue to provideassistance for the improvement of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations,” Wang said.

He added that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) – a $62bn mega project under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – will now be extended into Afghanistan.

A Pakistani diplomat with direct knowledge of the talks told Al Jazeera that the next round of the trilateral meetings will be held “very soon”, within a few weeks, to build on the momentum from the Beijing conclave.

“I am reasonably optimistic about the outcomes. It was a great confidence- and trust-building exercise between the three countries,” said the official, speaking on condition of anonymity about the Beijing meeting.

Trilateral diplomacy amid Indo-Pakistan tensions

The meeting came after a four-day standoff between Pakistan and India, with both countries claiming “victory” and launching diplomatic offensives to assert dominance.

The conflict, from May 7 to May 10, followed Indian strikes on what it called “terrorist infrastructure” in Pakistan, in retaliation for the Pahalgam attack in Indian-administered Kashmir last month that left 26 civilians dead. India blamed the attack on Pakistan-based armed groups, an allegation Islamabad denies.

While China urged restraint on both sides, its support for Pakistan was evident on the front lines of the conflict, with the Pakistani military using Chinese fighter jets, missiles, and air defence systems.

On the other hand, Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar said on May 15 that he appreciated Afghan acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi’s “condemnation” of the Pahalgam attack, in a conversation between the two. Indian media also reported a visit to New Delhi by senior Taliban figure and deputy interior minister, Ibrahim Sadr, in early May.

Mustafa Hyder Sayed, executive director of the Islamabad-based Pakistan-China Institute, called the Beijing meeting “very significant”, given Afghanistan’s geopolitical sensitivity.

For Pakistan and China, the “conflict with India has reinforced strategic clarity” on the need to work closely with Afghanistan,  Sayed said.

Kabul-based political analyst Tameem Bahiss agreed.

“This [the call between Muttaqi and Jaishankar] signals a major shift in India-Afghanistan relations, one that could raise concerns in Islamabad amid an already volatile regional climate,” he said. “The timing of this trilateral meeting, not just its content, reflects an urgent need for coordination among these three countries as new geopolitical dynamics take shape in South and Central Asia.”

Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister, Senator Mohammad Ishaq Dar @MIshaqDar50, Member of the CPC Political Bureau & Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China, Wang Yi, and Acting Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, Amir Khan Muttaqi, held an informal trilateral meeting in… pic.twitter.com/xbVcmUDijD

— Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Pakistan (@ForeignOfficePk) May 21, 2025

A rocky relationship

When the Afghan Taliban returned to power in August 2021, many saw it as a win for Pakistan, given its historical ties to the group. From 1996 through 2021, Pakistan was one of the Taliban’s key allies. India, meanwhile, viewed the Taliban as a proxy of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies and refused to engage with it.

However, relations between Pakistan and the Taliban have deteriorated.

Pakistan has accused the Afghan Taliban of allowing groups like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to launch attacks across the border, an allegation the Taliban vehemently deny. The TTP, formed in 2007, shares ideological roots with the Afghan Taliban but operates independently.

According to the Pak Institute for Peace Studies, Pakistan suffered 521 attacks in 2024 – a 70 percent increase from the previous year – resulting in nearly 1,000 civilian and security personnel deaths.

But in a trip that was seen as a potential breakthrough in strained ties, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar visited Kabul on April 19, just days before the Pahalgam attack.

Ihsanullah Tipu, an Islamabad-based security analyst, says Pakistan’s renewed diplomatic outreach to Afghanistan prioritises key concerns, with security taking precedence over trade, border disputes, and border closures, a sentiment he said China also shares.

“To foster meaningful trade ties, Pakistan’s security concerns must be addressed first,” Tipu told Al Jazeera, warning that failure to do so could escalate tensions to armed conflict.

“But given China’s global influence and close ties with both Pakistan and Afghanistan, Beijing can play a pivotal role as a guarantor of any commitments made,” added Tipu, who co-founded the security research portal The Khorasan Diary.

Common security threats

While Pakistan continues to accuse the Afghan Taliban of harbouring fighters who attack targets in Pakistan, many of these assaults have been directed at Chinese nationals working on CPEC projects.

Pakistani government figures estimate that about 20,000 Chinese nationals live in the country. At least 20 have been killed in attacks since 2021 in provinces like Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Groups including the TTP have claimed responsibility.

China has also expressed concern over the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), alleging that its fighters use Afghan territory to stage attacks against China.

Sayed of PCI stressed that both Pakistan and China see security as their “core interest” in Afghanistan.

“This is a shared threat, and in the past the ETIM has also had a significance presence in Afghanistan. And these militant networks are connected with each other as well. So that is a pre-requisite for any cooperation to move forward, to first neutralise these terrorist outfits, which seem to be operating freely and comfortably in Afghanistan,” he said.

However, Bahiss noted that since the Taliban’s return to power, most regional countries, including China, have found the security situation inside Afghanistan acceptable, enabling ongoing economic engagement.

“The key exception is Pakistan, which continues to face serious threats from Afghan soil. While Pakistan prioritises eliminating or containing the TTP, Kabul is focused on trade, transit, and regional integration,” he said.

This is where China’s pivotal role could come into the picture, the Kabul-based analyst said, adding that the country is uniquely positioned to mediate by encouraging security cooperation while also advancing trade and transit initiatives that benefit all three countries.

India-Afghanistan ties and Pakistan’s concerns

During the civilian governments in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021, India and Afghanistan developed close ties, despite several attacks on Indian diplomatic missions by the Taliban and its allies.

In recent months, there has been increased interaction between officials from New Delhi and Kabul, including the recent Jaishankar-Muttaqi conversation.

Does this warming of ties raise alarm in Islamabad? Sayed doesn’t think so.

“Pakistan doesn’t mistrust Kabul. But Pakistan has asked for action. The rulers there need to walk the talk regarding TTP and other terrorist outfits. I don’t think either Beijing or Islamabad opposes Kabul having positive relations with India, as long as it doesn’t compromise the interests of Pakistan and China,” he said.

However, Bahis said New Delhi’s rapprochement with the Taliban could lead to worries in Pakistan and China, both of which have historically had tense ties with India.

“While recent India-Afghanistan contacts are still in early stages, their timing may raise concerns in Islamabad,” he said.

“Afghanistan has the sovereign right to engage with any country, including India. But it must tread carefully. Clear messaging is essential to ensure that its growing ties with New Delhi aren’t misinterpreted as threats by other regional players,” Bahiss said. “Balancing these complex relationships will require diplomacy, transparency, and mutual respect.”

For a country whose government is not recognised by any nation, Afghanistan’s acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi has had an unusually busy calendar in recent weeks.

He has hosted his counterpart from Pakistan, spoken on the phone with India’s foreign minister, and jetted to Iran and China. In Beijing, he also met the Pakistani foreign minister again. On Wednesday, he joined trilateral talks with delegations from Pakistan and China.

This, even though the ruling Taliban have historically had tense relations with most of these countries, and currently have taut ties with Pakistan, a one-time ally with whom trust is at an all-time low.

While neither the United Nations nor any of its member states formally recognise the Taliban, analysts say that this diplomatic overdrive suggests that the movement is far from a pariah on the global stage.

So why are multiple countries in Afghanistan’s neighbourhood queueing up to engage diplomatically with the Taliban, while avoiding formal recognition?

We unpack the Taliban’s latest high-level regional engagements and look at why India, Pakistan and Iran are all trying to befriend Afghanistan’s rulers, four years after they marched on Kabul and grabbed power.

Who did Muttaqi meet or speak to in recent weeks?

A timeline of Afghanistan’s recent diplomatic engagements:

• April 19: Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar travels with a high-level delegation to Kabul to meet Muttaqi and other Afghan officials. The two sides discussed an ongoing spat over Pakistan’s repatriation of Afghan refugees, bilateral trade and economic cooperation, the Afghanistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a statement.
• May 6: Dar and Muttaqi spoke again on what turned out to be the eve of India’s attack on Pakistan, leading to four days of missile and drone attacks between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. The exchange of fire took place after India accused Pakistan of being involved in the April 22 Pahalgam attack in Indian-administered Kashmir, which left 26 people dead.
• May 15: India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar holds a phone conversation with Muttaqi to express his gratitude for the Taliban’s condemnation of the Pahalgam attacks.
• May 17: Muttaqi arrives in the Iranian capital Tehran to attend the Tehran Dialogue Forum, where he also holds meetings with Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and President Massoud Pazeshkian.
• May 21: Muttaqi visits Beijing. Trilateral talks between Afghanistan, Pakistan and China take place aimed at boosting trade and security between the three countries.

Head of the Taliban’s political office in Doha, Qatar, Suhail Shaheen said the group is a “reality of today’s Afghanistan” as it “controls all territory and borders of the country”.

“The regional countries know this fact and, as such, they engage with the Islamic Emirate at various levels, which is a pragmatic and rational approach in my view,” he told Al Jazeera, referring to the name by which the Taliban refers to the current Afghan state.

“We believe it is through engagement that we can find solutions to issues,” he added, arguing that formal recognition of the Taliban government “not be delayed furthermore”.

“Our region has its own interests and goals that we should adhere to.”

Why is India warming up to the Taliban?

It’s an unlikely partnership. During the Taliban’s initial rule between 1996 and  2001, the Indian government refused to engage with the Afghan group and did not recognise their rule, which at the time was only recognised by Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

India, which had supported the earlier Soviet-backed government of Mohammad Najibullah, shut down its embassy in Kabul once the Taliban came to power: It viewed the Taliban as a proxy of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies, which had supported the mujahideen against Moscow.

Instead, New Delhi supported the anti-Taliban opposition group, the Northern Alliance.

Following the United States-led ousting of the Taliban in 2001, India reopened its Kabul embassy and became a significant development partner for Afghanistan, investing more than $3bn in infrastructure, health, education and water projects, according to its Ministry of External Affairs.

But its embassy and consulates came under repeated, deadly attacks from the Taliban and its allies, including the Haqqani group.

After the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, New Delhi evacuated its embassy and once again refused to recognise the group. However, unlike during the Taliban’s first stint in power, India built diplomatic contacts with the group – first behind closed doors, then, increasingly, publicly.

The logic was simple, say analysts: India realised that by refusing to engage with the Taliban earlier, it had ceded influence in Afghanistan to Pakistan, its regional rival.

In June 2022, less than a year after the Taliban’s return to power, India reopened its embassy in Kabul by deploying a team of “technical experts” to run it. In November 2024, the Taliban appointed an acting consul at the Afghan consulate in Mumbai.

Then, last January, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri and Muttaqi both flew to Dubai for a meeting – the highest-level face-to-face interaction between New Delhi and the Taliban to date.

Kabir Taneja, a deputy director at the New Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation, says not dealing with “whatever political reality sets in in Kabul was never an option” for India.

“No one is pleased per se that the reality is the Taliban,” Taneja told Al Jazeera. However, while India’s “decades-long” efforts to foster goodwill with the Afghan people have faced challenges since the Taliban takeover, they have not been entirely undone.

“Even the Taliban’s ideological stronghold, the Darul Uloom Deoband seminary, is in India,” he added. “These are ties with the country and its actors that cannot be vanquished, and have to be dealt with realistically and practically,” he added.

What is Pakistan’s calculus?

One of the Taliban’s foremost backers between 1996 and 2021, Pakistan has seen its relationship with the group plummet in recent years.

Since the Taliban’s takeover in 2021, Pakistan has seen a surge in violent attacks, which Islamabad attributes to armed groups, such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Pakistan insists that the TTP operates from Afghan territory and blames the ruling Taliban for allowing them sanctuary – a claim the Taliban government denies.

Emerging in 2007 amid the US-led so-called “war on terror”, the Pakistan Taliban has long challenged Islamabad’s authority through a violent rebellion. Though distinct from the Afghan Taliban, the two are seen as ideologically aligned.

Dar’s visit to Kabul and subsequent communication with Muttaqi represent a “tactical, ad hoc thaw” rather than a substantial shift in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, says Rabia Akhtar, director at the Centre for Security, Strategy and Policy Research at the University of Lahore.

During the recent India-Pakistan crisis, Islamabad grew increasingly concerned about the possibility of Afghanistan allowing its territory to be used by New Delhi against Pakistan, she suggested. “This has increased Islamabad’s urgency to secure its western border,” Akhtar told Al Jazeera.

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s decision earlier this year to expel Afghan refugees – including many who have spent most of their lives in Pakistan – and frequent border closures disrupting trade are also sources of tension in the relationship.

The refugees question, in particular, could prove to be a key factor that will shape future relations between the two countries, Akhtar said.

“While Pakistan has pushed for repatriation of undocumented Afghans, Kabul views such deportations as punitive,” she said. “If this dialogue is an indication of a recognition on both sides that confrontation is unsustainable, especially amidst shifting regional alignments and economic pressures, then that’s a good sign.”

The Taliban’s Shaheen said while Kabul wanted good relations with Islamabad, they should be “reciprocated” and that a “blame game” is not in anyone’s interest.

“We have taken practical steps as far as it concerns us,” he said, noting that Afghanistan had started building checkpoints “along the line adjacent to Pakistan in order to prevent any one from crossing”.

“However, their internal security is the responsibility of their security forces not ours.”

China, at the trilateral talks in Beijing on Wednesday, said Kabul and Islamabad had agreed in principle to upgrade diplomatic ties and would send their respective ambassadors at the earliest.

Nevertheless, Akhtar does not expect the “core mistrust” between the two neighbours, particularly over alleged TTP sanctuaries, to “go away any time soon”.

“We should look at this shift as part of Pakistan’s broader crisis management post-India-Pak crisis rather than structural reconciliation,” Akhtar asserted.

What does Iran want from its ties with the Taliban?

Like India, Tehran refused to recognise the Taliban when it was first in power, while backing the Northern Alliance, especially after the 1998 killing of Iranian diplomats in Mazar-i-Sharif by Taliban fighters.

Iran amassed thousands of troops on its eastern border, nearly going to war with the Taliban over the incident.

Concerned about the extensive US military footprint in the region post-9/11, Iran was said to be quietly engaging with the Taliban, offering limited support in an effort to counter American influence and protect its own strategic interests.

Since the Taliban took back reins of the country nearly four years ago, Iran again showed willingness to build ties with rulers in Kabul on a number of security, humanitarian and trade-related matters, analysts say.

Shaheen, head of the Taliban’s office in Doha, said that both Iran and India previously thought the group was “under the influence of Pakistan”.

“Now they know it is not the reality. In view of this ground reality, they have adopted a new realistic and pragmatic approach, which is good for everyone,” he said.

Ibraheem Bahiss, analyst at the International Crisis Group, said the meeting between Muttaqi and Iranian President Pezeshkian doesn’t signal an “impending official recognition”. However, he said, “pragmatic considerations” have driven Iran to engage the Taliban, given its “key interests” in Afghanistan.

“Security-wise, Tehran wants allies in containing the ISIS [ISIL] local chapter. Tehran has also been seeking to expand its trade relations with Afghanistan, now being one of its major trading partners,” he told Al Jazeera.

In January 2024, twin suicide bombings in Kerman marked one of Iran’s deadliest attacks in decades, killing at least 94 people. The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), an Afghanistan-based offshoot of ISIL, claimed responsibility.

In recent years, ISKP has also emerged as a significant challenge to the Taliban’s rule, having carried out multiple high-profile attacks across Afghanistan.

Bahiss added that Tehran also needed a “willing partner” in addressing the issue of some 780,000 Afghan refugees in Iran, as well as the “transboundary water flowing from Helmand River “.

In May 2023, tensions between the two neighbours flared, leading to border clashes in which two Iranian border guards and one Taliban fighter were killed.

The violence came after former and now deceased Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi warned the Taliban not to violate a 1973 treaty by restricting the flow of water from the Helmand River to Iran’s eastern regions. Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers denied the accusation.

A ‘comprehensive review’ of the US’s chaotic military withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 has also been ordered.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said that the United States is reviewing whether to designate Afghanistan’s rulers, the Taliban, as a “foreign terrorist organization”.

Rubio told the House Foreign Affairs Committee during a hearing on Capitol Hill in Washington on Wednesday, “I believe that classification is now, once again, under review.”

The response came a day after US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered a “comprehensive review” of the United States’s chaotic military withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, an evacuation operation in which 13 US service members and 150 Afghans were killed at Kabul’s airport in an ISIL (ISIS) bombing.

Hegseth said in a memo on Tuesday that after three months of assessing the withdrawal, a comprehensive review was needed to ensure accountability for this event.

“This remains an important step toward regaining faith and trust with the American people and all those who wear the uniform, and is prudent based on the number of casualties and equipment lost during the execution of this withdrawal operation,” Hegseth wrote.

Former President Joe Biden’s administration, which oversaw the pull-out, mostly blamed the resulting chaos on a lack of planning and reductions in troops by the first Donald Trump administration, following its deal with the Taliban to accelerate the withdrawal of US forces.

Trump had signed the deal with the Taliban in Doha in February 2020 aimed at ending its 18-year war in Afghanistan, beginning with the withdrawal of about 4,000 troops “within months”.

The then-Trump administration had agreed it would withdraw from the country by May 2021 if the Taliban negotiated a peace agreement with the Afghan government and promised to prevent internationally designated terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda and ISIL, from gaining a foothold in the country.

After assuming office in January 2021, Biden said he had to respect the agreement or risk new conflicts with the Taliban, which could have required additional troops in Afghanistan.

On the 2024 campaign trail, Trump frequently criticised Biden and his administration for the withdrawal, saying that the manner in which it was done “was the most embarrassing day in the history of our country’s life.” Trump said that the withdrawal should have been done with “dignity, with strength, with power.”

Senior US military officials, including then-Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and the then-top US general, Mark Milley, have already appeared before lawmakers to give their testimonies regarding the withdrawal.

The war in Afghanistan from 2001-2021 was the US’s longest war, surpassing Vietnam.

It remains unclear how Hegseth’s review would differ from the many previous reviews carried out by the US military, Department of State and Trump’s fellow Republicans in the House of Representatives.

US Central Command, which oversees operations in the Middle East, has also carried out an investigation into the ISIL attack on Kabul during the last few days of the withdrawal.

The digital battleground has become an increasingly critical theatre for modern geopolitical conflicts, and the Taliban’s recent social media campaign targeting the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia (KSA) underscores this shift. Following the UAE’s warm reception of former U.S. President Donald Trump, a surge of hostile online activity emerged, orchestrated by Taliban-linked accounts under the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI). This campaign, executed through human-operated parody profiles, blends religious rhetoric, violent threats, and geopolitical grievances to undermine Gulf states’ legitimacy while reinforcing the Taliban’s ideological stance. The sophistication of this operation reveals not just a localized grievance but a broader strategy of asymmetric warfare, leveraging digital tools to exert influence beyond Afghanistan’s borders.

Central to the Taliban’s messaging is the accusation that the UAE has “disgraced Islam and the Ummah” by engaging with Trump, a figure historically criticized in the Muslim world for policies such as the travel ban on several Muslim-majority nations and his administration’s unwavering support for Israel. By framing the UAE’s diplomatic overtures as a betrayal of Islamic solidarity, the Taliban seeks to galvanize conservative Muslim audiences, casting Gulf states as Western collaborators. This narrative is not new, extremist groups have long employed religious rhetoric to isolate moderate Muslim nations, but the Taliban’s institutionalized use of social media amplifies its reach and potency.

Beyond ideological condemnation, the campaign escalates into explicit threats, with multiple accounts referencing the “yellow keg”, a signature Taliban improvised explosive device (IED) used extensively against US forces during the 2001–2021 conflict. The deliberate invocation of this imagery serves a dual purpose: it signals the Taliban’s continued embrace of violent tactics while psychologically intimidating its targets. Such threats, even if symbolic, carry the risk of inspiring lone actors or affiliated militant cells to pursue physical attacks, particularly given the historical precedent of Taliban-linked violence extending beyond Afghanistan’s borders.

While the UAE remains the primary target, the campaign’s inclusion of Saudi Arabia suggests a broader ideological offensive against Gulf monarchies perceived as aligning too closely with Western powers. The use of Pashto and Dari, languages dominant in Afghanistan but also understood among diaspora and regional jihadist circles, ensures localized resonance while maintaining plausible deniability for the Taliban’s central leadership. This linguistic choice, combined with the recycling of accounts historically used to promote Taliban edicts, reinforces the campaign’s authenticity within its intended audience.

The campaign’s timing, thematic coherence, and operational signatures point to centralized coordination, likely emanating from the Taliban’s GDI. Unlike fragmented extremist online activity, this effort displays a clear command structure, mirroring the Taliban’s disciplined approach to information warfare. The reuse of accounts previously associated with official Taliban narratives further underscores institutional involvement, distinguishing it from grassroots anti-UAE sentiment. This digital offensive aligns with the Taliban’s long-standing reliance on psychological operations, extending their influence without direct military confrontation.

The ramifications of this campaign extend far beyond social media vitriol. First, it seeks to erode the UAE’s and KSA’s religious legitimacy, particularly among conservative Muslim populations and transnational jihadist groups still active in Afghanistan. By casting these nations as apostates, the Taliban aims to fracture intra-Islamic solidarity, potentially driving recruitment for anti-Gulf militancy.

Second, the campaign reaffirms the Taliban’s commitment to asymmetric warfare. Despite their formal control of Afghanistan, the group continues to employ hybrid tactics, blending insurgency, propaganda, and diplomacy, to challenge adversaries indirectly. The digital domain offers a low-cost, high-impact arena to sustain pressure without provoking immediate military retaliation.

Most alarmingly, the explicit references to past IED tactics suggest a latent threat of physical escalation. While the Taliban may not directly orchestrate attacks on Gulf soil, the rhetoric could incite sympathizers or affiliate groups, such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), to act. The UAE and KSA, both vocal opponents of Islamist extremism, remain high-value targets for such elements.

To counter this evolving threat, a multi-faceted approach is essential:

• Gulf states should collaborate with international cybersecurity firms to identify and dismantle Taliban-linked networks, focusing on parody accounts and coordinated disinformation campaigns.
• Governments and religious institutions in the UAE and KSA must amplify moderate Islamic voices to delegitimize the Taliban’s extremist framing.
• Strengthening intelligence cooperation among Gulf nations and allies can pre-empt potential offline threats inspired by online incitement.
• Social media companies must enforce stricter verification processes to curb the proliferation of fake accounts disseminating violent propaganda.
• The international community should hold the Taliban accountable for digital incitement, linking sanctions relief to the cessation of hostile online campaigns.

“The internet is the first battlefield of the 21st century.” Wang Huning

The Taliban’s latest campaign exemplifies this reality, proving that in an interconnected world, ideological and physical conflicts are increasingly waged through pixels and propaganda. For the UAE and KSA, the challenge lies not only in defending their digital frontiers but in ensuring that online hostilities do not manifest in tangible violence. As the Taliban refines its hybrid warfare playbook, the global community must adapt, recognizing that the next threat may emerge not from a battlefield, but from a smartphone.