Tactical

The U.S. Navy is envisioning a future force of carrier-based uncrewed aircraft capable of attacking enemy forces at least 1,000 nautical miles away from the ship. They would also have to be able to do this without needing to refuel in mid-air, though tankers could further extend their reach. This, along with other details, offers the first real sense of the combat drone capabilities the Navy wants to add to its future carrier air wings.

The range target was included in a very broad request for information (RFI) contracting notice regarding a future Air Wing of the Future (AWOTF) “family of systems,” which Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) put out this week. NAVAIR is looking for prospective drone designs that could perform any combination of eight distinct missions. These are surface warfare; strike warfare; anti-submarine warfare; air warfare; electronic warfare; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISR&T); mobility; and logistics. A breakdown of how these missions are defined, in general terms, in the RFI is provided below.

It should be noted here that the Navy says the family of AWOTF platforms already includes the MQ-25A Stingray tanker drone, which will have a secondary surveillance and reconnaissance role, as well as future Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA). The Navy is still very early on in the process of defining what it wants its CCA drones to be able to do, even just initially. As TWZ has noted in the past, the MQ-25’s core design and baseline performance, specifically its extreme endurance and low-signature design, also leave open the possibility that it could be adapted to strike, advanced ISR, and other missions in the future.

“For missions involving attacking the enemy, the system must be capable of delivering effects a minimum of 1,000 NM [nautical miles; approximately 1,151 miles statute miles or 1,900 kilometers] from the CVN without refueling,” the RFI NAVAIR issued yesterday says.

The drones must be “fully compatible with both Nimitz class and Ford class CVN launch and recovery systems,” per the RFI. “The system must demonstrate increased combat effectiveness over current 4th generation platforms at a given spot factor.”

Spot factor here is the amount of physical space the platform occupies, which is a very important consideration for carrier-based aircraft, where room on the flight deck and below is at a premium. Though the focus is on prospective carrier-based designs, the RFI also highlights the Navy’s interest in vertical takeoff and landing capable drones that could operate from destroyers or other vessels. This is something the service has openly discussed in the past and that we will come back to later on.

The Navy also wants any potential designs to be “capable of integration into existing U.S. Navy Unmanned Carrier Aviation (UCA) control systems.” Furthermore, the service is asking prospective vendors to explain how their concepts “address flight autonomy (e.g., carrier pattern, taxiing) and mission autonomy (e.g., dynamic tasking / retasking, threat evasion, automated aerial refueling) maturity,” and whether “their solution is single-role, multi-role, or a modular/variant-based approach.”

The video below from Collins Aerospace offers a notional look at what crewed-uncrewed teaming involving carrier and land-based CCA-type drones might look like in the future.

Collaborative Mission Autonomy

The range requirement is particularly interesting. As adversary anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) bubbles continue to expand in scale and scope, carriers and their air wings will be pushed further and further away from target areas. Having aircraft, crewed and uncrewed, that can cover those extended distances will be vital. Having CCA-type drones, in particular, with ranges similar to or greater than that of the crewed fighters they are expected to be paired with, is also key to enabling that particular concept of operations.

Not necessarily needing tanker support to complete those missions will also be a boon. Aerial refueling capacity is always in high demand during sustained conflicts, as underscored by the recent fighting with Iran, and that need will be further magnified in a future high-end fight against a near-peer opponent like China. Those same tankers would, by extension, also be top targets for enemy forces.

The new uncrewed carrier-based aircraft RFI from NAVAIR outlines exactly this reality:

“Aligned with the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS), the 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) issued by the Department of War, and the Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO) Fighting Instructions, the Navy is seeking capability improvements to expedite transition from a 4th-generation-centric Carrier Air Wing (CVW) to a 5th/6th-generation manned-unmanned AWoTF. This transition supports the Golden Fleet initiative and the Navy Warfighting Concept, which is a proactive approach leveraging global maritime maneuver to gain sea control, impose sea denial, and project power independently. Unmanned systems are critical to increasing Carrier Strike Group (CSG) strike capacity, extending CVW operational reach, and introducing advanced methods for executing Naval Aviation missions in a Highly Contested Environment (HCE). The objective is to evaluate the feasibility of fielding platforms with extended range and payload capacity, while minimizing deck footprint and integrating with established CVN infrastructure.”

Currently, the tactical core of the Navy’s carrier air wings remains the fourth-generation F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighter, along with its EA-18G Growler electronic warfare cousin. Fifth-generation F-35C Joint Strike Fighters are starting to be increasingly in the rotation. The service is also still planning to acquire a new sixth-generation combat jet, currently referred to as F/A-XX, and is hoping to settle on a design in the coming months.

A 1,000 nautical mile range target is in line, at least in broad strokes, with what the Navy is looking for in terms of combat radius for F/A-XX. The service has said in the past that the sixth-generation jets will offer a 25 percent increase in range over the existing tactical combat jets. This would be roughly 837.5 nautical miles (just over 1,551 kilometers) based on the stated combat radius of the F-35C (670 nautical miles, or close to 1,241 kilometers). The F-35C has the longest reach, with a relevant payload, of any tactical jet in the Navy’s current inventory. The service has also previously expressed interest in finding new ways to extend the unrefueled range of its F/A-18E/Fs and EA-18Gs.

In addition, the U.S. Air Force has previously said the combat radius of its new sixth-generation F-47 fighter and its initial fleet of CCA drones will be “1,000+” and “700+” nautical miles, respectively. As TWZ has noted in the past, the estimated combat radii of both the F-47 and F/A-XX are significant, but also notably not as drastic an increase as many had been expecting or may think is necessary given the aforementioned evolution of the threat ecosystem.

As an aside, it is interesting to remember that the Navy’s abortive Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) program had been aiming for a platform with a combat radius of up to 2,000 nautical miles when operating in the strike role. There was also a requirement to be able to fly surveillance and reconnaissance orbits in areas 1,200 nautical miles from the deck of a carrier. UCLASS payload requirements fluctuated, but a pair of X-47B stealthy demonstrator drones tested during the program were designed to carry two 2,000-pound-class munitions internally.

UCLASS showed much promise, and the X-47Bs achieved many firsts for carrier-based drones. Despite this, UCLASS was transformed into the radically different Carrier-Based Aerial-Refueling System (CBARS) program in the mid-2010s, which then led to the MQ-25. This was a shift that seemed abrupt to many and was done for reasons that are still not entirely clear, as TWZ has previously explored in detail in a seminal feature readers can find here.

Northrop Grumman’s X47-B Completes 1st Carrier Catapult Launch

Northrop Grumman X-47B | First to Complete Autonomous Aerial Refueling

As mentioned, the Navy is still refining the requirements for its planned carrier-based CCA drones. Anduril, Boeing, General Atomics, and Northrop Grumman are all on contract now to develop conceptual designs. So far, what we have seen are designs intended to operate from carriers in a broadly traditional manner using existing catapults and/or arresting gear. General Atomics has publicly put forward a carrier-based member of its highly modular Gambit family of drones, which are based around the common chassis concept that you can read more about here. Boeing has also previously shown a rendering of a carrier-based version of its MQ-28 Ghost Bat, a drone developed by the company’s Australian subsidiary. The Navy has also expressed specific interest in Ghost Bat.

It is also worth pointing out that the NAVAIR RFI uses the term “combat radius” but also frames the requirement around “delivering effects” out to the desired range without the need for refueling. This might leave the door open to concepts that use stand-off munitions and/or other capabilities to extend the functional reach of the drone, even if its actual combat radius is under 1,000 nautical miles.

As mentioned earlier, the RFI also discusses VTOL drone operations for vessels other than carriers. Concepts of operations that involve launches from carriers (or other ships) and recovery at tertiary points at sea (or on land) could also have impacts on the range equation. Depending on their design and performance, drones could be launched from forward locations and then recover aboard carriers further to the rear, too.

Shield AI has notably talked about exactly this kind of flexibility as being a key benefit of its still-in-development X-BAT stealthy jet-powered combat drone. X-BAT is designed to take off and land vertically using nothing more than a trailer-based launch and recovery system. Shield AI is aiming for a maximum range of 2,000 nautical miles for the drone, which you can learn about in far more detail here

X-BAT: Earth Is Our Runway

The Navy, in cooperation with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), has explored other relevant ship-based uncrewed VTOL concepts in the past, as well.

AdvaNced airCraft Infrastructure-Less Launch And RecoverY (ANCILLARY)

There are also drone designs that can be launched and/or recovered in very different ways. The U.S. Marine Corps’ first CCA-type drone will be a version of the Kratos XQ-58 Valkyrie that can operate from traditional runways, as well as make rocket-assisted takeoffs using static launchers. Earlier Valkyrie variants can also be launched using the latter method, and are recovered via parachute. The new MQ-58s for the Marines will still need to touch down on a runway at the end of a sortie, but this mix of capabilities still offers significant additional operational flexibility.

Beyond exploring specific design concepts and capability mixes, NAVAIR’s RFI makes clear that the Navy is very much still refining its overall vision for what the uncrewed complement of future carrier air wings will look like. Senior service officials have said in the past that the goal is for the total makeup of carrier air wings to eventually be 60 percent or more uncrewed.

At the same time, the Navy has acknowledged that it has been moving more slowly than the Air Force and Marines with its plans to develop and field a carrier-based CCA fleet. The NAVAIR RFI also points to efforts now to expand that work, but it remains unclear when operational CCAs, or any other future uncrewed members of the AWOTF, will appear on the decks of U.S. carriers. The Navy has consistently said that it is focused first on fielding the much-delayed MQ-25, which will then help serve as a ‘pathfinder’ for other drones. The service is now targeting next year to finally reach initial operational capability with the Stingray, something that was originally scheduled to happen in 2024.

What we do know now is that the Navy also sees a combat radius of at least 1,000 nautical miles as a key threshold requirement for uncrewed tactical elements of its future carrier air wings.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Collina asked for protocol to be updated so the VAR could step in if a foul occurred before the ball was in play.

There have been several examples, such as a goal scored by England in their 1-1 draw against Uruguay at Wembley in March.

Cole Palmer delivered a corner into the area, but before the ball was kicked Adam Wharton blocked the run of Jose Maria Gimenez.

That allowed the ball to run through to Harvey Barnes, who saw his effort saved by Fernando Muslera, and Ben White tapped in from close range.

VAR protocol did not previously allow a review for a foul before a corner has been taken, but the Italian asked Ifab for permission to change this.

The Ifab has now accepted the request, and says that any foul before the ball is in play that has a direct impact can be reviewed.

This will apply to a goal, penalty kick or disciplinary sanction which happens on a corner or free-kick

The measure will be applied for the World Cup and reassessed after the tournament.

It means that for the England goal, the VAR would be able to suggest a retake of the corner because of the foul by Wharton on Gimenez.

“We think this is very unfair, that the goal is given when the defender is prevented from being able to defend,” Collina said.

“A clear, illegal block made by an attacker. The only objective was to prevent the defender from being able to defend on his opponent.

“We are very confident to receive a clarification from the Ifab before the World Cup, saying that the VAR can intervene just before the ball is in play. We are convinced that nobody can object.”

This will only apply to attacking fouls, and not to defensive fouls for holding or pulling.

Collina also explained the new rule for players who cover their mouth with a hand, arm or shirt in confrontation with an opponent.

This will now be a red card after the controversial incident involving Benfica winger Gianluca Prestianni and Real Madrid’s Vinicius Jr in a Champions League game in February.

Prestianni received a six-game ban from Uefa for homophobic conduct.

“If the conversation is friendly, they can continue to do it without any problem,” Collina said.

“When the conversation is confrontational, covering the mouth means that you are doing something very wrong, potentially, and the sanction is the red card.”

Collina also said his referees would be ready to monitor grappling inside the area, with officials provided with data on the tactical approach of teams.

The war that Donald Trump declared won last month looks rather different from the inside of the Pentagon. The resulting stalemate has drained American military stockpiles, emboldened Iranian commanders, and left the US with far worse options than before the conflict began.

The administration’s triumphalist framing has struck a jarring note among those who have spent careers studying the Iranian military and the limits of American power projection. Declaring victory when the enemy is still standing, still armed, and still controlling the waterway you went to war over is not a strategy. It is a wish dressed up as a press release.

At the heart of the impasse are two demands that Tehran has consistently and categorically rejected. Iran will not surrender what it regards as its sovereign right to develop its uranium program, and it will not yield control of the Strait of Hormuz. Those two positions were Iran’s red lines before the fighting started. They remain Iran’s red lines now. Nothing in between has changed.

What has changed is the arithmetic of munitions. The United States entered this conflict with a military built around expensive, technologically sophisticated weapons systems, precision instruments that take years to design, years more to manufacture, and that have now been expended at a rate the American defense industrial base is poorly positioned to replenish. Iran, by contrast, relies on a dispersed network of robotic small boats, undersea mines, tactical ballistic missiles, and unmanned systems. These weapons are cheap, simple, and easy to produce at scale.

The United States essentially deployed a Ferrari into a demolition derby. The Iranians didn’t need high-end technology; they just needed a relentless volume of cheaper assets to overwhelm the defense.

Trump, for his part, has shown no appetite for nuance. “We have totally obliterated their military capacity, there’s nothing left, believe me, nothing,” he told supporters at a rally in Georgia. Pentagon planners reviewing the same battlefield data have reached a rather different conclusion.

The American strikes produced mixed results. Iran does not maintain a conventional naval fleet or a modern air force in the Western sense. Its control of the strait rests not on destroyers or fighter wings but on a distributed, resilient system of asymmetric capabilities. The Iranian systems that dispersed into the terrain absorbed the strikes and began reconstituting almost immediately. Defense analysts point out that the Iranians have adapted from what they observed, replenished their stocks, and may now be better positioned than when the conflict began.

The strategic picture is further complicated by the political pressures that shaped the original decision to go to war. Analysts describe a decision driven less by tactical opportunity than by commitments made to Israeli leadership and to influential pro-Israel donors whose support was central to Trump’s political coalition. The result was a military campaign calibrated to political timetables rather than operational logic.

READ: Israeli premier expresses concern over US handling of Iran nuclear file in call with Trump: Report

Senator Tim Kaine of Virginia, a member of the Armed Services Committee, called the conduct of the conflict “a case study in how not to use military force.” Representative Thomas Massie of Kentucky, before his defeat in his primary, was more pointed: “We went in without a declaration of war, without a clear objective, without an exit strategy, and now we’re supposed to celebrate because we used up half our missile inventory and the Iranians are still there.”

The regional picture adds further complexity. Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf monarchies are acutely aware of their own exposure. A major Iranian strike on above-ground oil and desalination plants could critically impede the GCC’s government’s ability to maintain economic prosperity. The GCC states have no appetite for an escalation that leaves their vital water infrastructure in ruins. While they favor the containment of Iran, preventing a regional war is a matter of sheer survival.

The broader strategic damage extends well beyond the Gulf.

The conflict has exposed, with uncomfortable clarity, the brittleness of an American military model that prioritized theoretical sophistication over the practical demands of sustained combat. The long-overlooked vulnerability of the missile supply chain has now emerged as the primary constraint on future American options. Restoring that capacity, according to officials, will require years of industrial retooling.

Washington has come to realize that Iran acutely recognized US vulnerabilities, designing asymmetric systems specifically to deplete America’s most expensive capabilities with its cheapest assets. This is not a temporary setback; it is a structural crisis.

For now, President Trump appears caught between the political cost of acknowledging stalemate and the military risk of a second round of strikes that the Pentagon itself doubts would achieve different results. The operational pause is not a logistical necessity. The forces are forward-deployed and ready. The pause is a search for a rationale, a way to resume the fight that does not require the White House to explain why the first attempt failed.

By most accounts, the search has not yet succeeded.

OPINION: The bell tolls in Beijing: Xi’s warning and the shadow of Thucydides

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

Until a couple of seasons ago, it was usually an outfield player who would go to ground to stop play.

It was being used for two distinct reasons.

Either to break up the momentum of the opposition by causing a stoppage in play, or for the coach to give instructions to his players. Sometimes it has been both.

English football attempted to combat this by insisting that any player who receives treatment must leave the field for 30 seconds.

It had some positive results, but managers just switched focus and told the goalkeeper to ask for treatment.

A team cannot play without a goalkeeper, so it became a risk-free method of impacting the opposition, or getting the opportunity to talk to your team.

There is nothing a referee can do about it, as they cannot accuse a player of faking an injury. If it turned out the player was genuinely injured there could be serious repercussions.

So the game has been stuck in a doom loop.

Goalkeepers go down, the other 10 players rush to the technical area for a team talk.

As soon as the coach has delivered his message, the keeper miraculously gets to his feet.

It has been a theme during Leeds‘ season, starting in November when Manchester City goalkeeper Gianluigi Donnarumma went down as the West Yorkshire club were in the ascendancy at Etihad Stadium.

Manager Daniel Farke accused Donnarumma of feigning injury to “bend the rules” and break up play.

But this is not a Leeds issue, it is a football issue. It is happening at all levels of the game and is particularly prevalent in the women’s game.

Former England midfielder and BBC Sport pundit Danny Murphy believes Chelsea utilised “an obvious tactical stoppage” in their FA Cup semi-final win against Leeds United, and proposes rule changes that can prevent it from happening.

MATCH REPORT: FA Cup semi-final – Chelsea 1-0 Leeds United

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