Sea

Global markets rarely reveal their vulnerabilities quietly. They do so when shipping lanes come under threat, energy prices surge, or supply chains fracture. Few regions illustrate this reality more starkly than the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which are now among the world’s most contested maritime corridors. What unfolds along these waters no longer remains local. It shapes economic security across the Arab world and far beyond.

Yet, amid growing attention to this strategic corridor, one factor remains persistently underestimated: Somalia.

For decades, Somalia was viewed primarily through the lens of conflict and fragility. That narrative no longer reflects today’s reality. The country is undergoing a consequential transition, moving away from prolonged instability, rebuilding state institutions, and re-emerging as a sovereign actor with growing regional relevance. Situated at the intersection of the Arab world, Africa, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden, Somalia is not peripheral to regional stability; it is central to it.

Geography alone explains much of this significance. With the longest coastline in mainland Africa, Somalia lies adjacent to the Bab al-Mandeb passage connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean. A substantial share of global maritime trade and energy shipments passes through this corridor. Disruptions along Somalia’s coast, therefore, have immediate implications for shipping reliability, energy markets, and food security — issues of direct concern to Gulf states and Arab economies.

For the Arab world, Somalia should be understood not as distant terrain but as a front-line partner in regional security. Stability along Somalia’s coastline helps contain threats before they reach the Arabian Peninsula, whether in the form of violent extremism, illicit trafficking networks, piracy, or the entrenchment of hostile external military presences along Africa’s eastern flank.

Somalia is not attempting to build stability from scratch. Despite persistent challenges, tangible progress has been made. Federal governance structures are functioning. National security forces are undergoing professionalisation. Public financial management has improved. Diplomatically, Somalia has reasserted itself within the Arab League, the African Union, and multilateral forums. These gains continue to be built on daily and reflect a clear commitment to sovereign statehood, territorial unity, and partnership rather than dependency. Somalia today seeks strategic alignment grounded in mutual interest, not charity.

Somalia’s relevance also extends beyond security. Its membership in the East African Community integrates the country into one of the world’s fastest-growing population and consumer regions. East Africa’s rapid demographic expansion, urbanisation, and economic integration position Somalia as a natural bridge between Gulf capital and African growth markets.

There is a clear opportunity for Somalia to emerge as a logistics and transshipment gateway linking the Gulf, the Red Sea, East Africa and the Indian Ocean. With targeted investments in ports, transport corridors, and maritime security, Somalia can become a critical node in regional supply chains supporting trade diversification, food security, and economic resilience across the Arab world.

At the heart of Somalia’s potential is its dynamic population. More than 70 percent of Somalis are aged below 30. This generation is increasingly urban, digitally connected, and entrepreneurial. Somali traders and business networks already operate across Southern and Eastern Africa, spanning logistics, finance, retail, and services. A large and dynamic diaspora across the Gulf, Europe, North America, and Africa further amplifies this reach through remittances, investment, and transnational expertise.

None of these momentums, however, can be sustained without security. A capable, nationally legitimate Somali security sector is the foundation for durable stability, investment confidence, and regional integration.

For Gulf states and the wider Arab world, supporting Somalia’s security sector is therefore not an act of altruism. It is a strategic investment in a reliable stabilising partner. Effective Somali security institutions contribute directly to safeguarding Red Sea and Gulf of Aden maritime corridors, countering transnational terrorism before it reaches Arab shores, protecting emerging logistics infrastructure, and denying external actors opportunities to exploit governance vacuums. Such support must prioritise institution-building, Somali ownership, and long-term sustainability, not short-term fixes or proxy competition.

The stakes are rising. The Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are entering a period of heightened strategic contestation. Fragmentation along their African coastline poses a direct risk to Arab collective security. Recent developments underscore this urgency.

Israel’s unilateral recognition of the northern Somali region of Somaliland, pursued outside international legal frameworks and without Somali consent, is widely viewed as an attempt to secure a military foothold along these strategic waters, risking the introduction of the Arab-Israeli conflict into the Gulf’s security environment.

Even more troubling are emerging narratives advocating the forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza, with proposals to relocate them to Somaliland against their will. Such ideas, whether formally advanced or not, represent grave violations of international law and human dignity. Exporting the consequences of occupation and war onto African soil would not resolve conflict; it would multiply it.

For the Arab world, this should serve as a wake-up call. Allowing external actors to fragment sovereign states or instrumentalise fragile regions for unresolved conflicts carries long-term consequences. Somalia’s unity and stability, therefore, align squarely with core Arab strategic interests and with longstanding Arab positions on sovereignty, justice and self-determination.

Somalia is ready to be part of the solution. With calibrated strategic support, particularly in security sector development and logistics infrastructure, Somalia can emerge as a cornerstone of Red Sea and Gulf of Aden stability, a gateway to East Africa, and a long-term partner for the Arab world.

The question is no longer whether Somalia matters in the regional and global Red Sea and Gulf of Aden discussions and plans. It is whether the region will act on that reality before others do.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Jan. 30 (Asia Today) — Taiwan’s first domestically built conventional submarine completed its first submerged sea trial Thursday, a milestone for an eight-boat program aimed at strengthening deterrence against China.

The submarine, named Hai Kun and also known as Narwhal, conducted a shallow-water submerged navigation test and returned safely to port near the southern city of Kaohsiung, according to Taiwan’s China Shipbuilding Corp., the state-linked builder leading the project.

The company said the program has faced obstacles because of international constraints and pressure from China but described the trial as a key step before staged sea testing continues.

Beijing has long opposed Taiwan’s submarine program. A Chinese newspaper commentary described the vessel as having performance issues, reflecting Beijing’s criticism of Taipei’s defense buildup.

According to people familiar with the trial, the test focused on basic checks such as watertight integrity and underwater stability at shallow depth, with later trials expected to proceed to deeper dives and stress testing.

The diesel-electric submarine is about 70 meters long with an underwater displacement of about 2,800 tons and a crew of about 60, according to published specifications.

Taiwan launched the first boat in September 2023 and the delivery timeline has slipped from earlier targets. The first vessel is budgeted at NT$49.36 billion (about ₩2.26 trillion, about $1.57 billion), with Taiwan aiming to have at least two of the new submarines operational by 2027.

The program has drawn scrutiny in South Korea after court rulings found contractors linked to Taiwan’s submarine effort guilty of leaking torpedo-launch system design documents, a case that raised concerns about possible technology transfer.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260130010013991

SEOUL, Jan. 27 (UPI) — North Korea launched multiple short-range ballistic missiles toward the sea between the Korean Peninsula and Japan on Tuesday afternoon, Seoul’s military said, marking a fresh provocation ahead of a major ruling party congress.

“Our military detected several short-range ballistic missiles launched from an area north of Pyongyang into the East Sea around 3:50 p.m. today,” South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a text message to reporters.

The missiles flew approximately 217 miles, the JCS said, adding that South Korean and U.S. intelligence authorities are conducting a detailed analysis of their exact specifications.

“Under a robust South Korea-U.S. combined defense posture, the military is closely monitoring North Korea’s various movements and maintaining the capability and readiness to overwhelmingly respond to any provocation,” the JCS said.

Japan’s Defense Ministry said it detected two ballistic missiles, both of which splashed down outside Tokyo’s exclusive economic zone.

The launch marked North Korea’s second missile test of the year, following a Jan. 4 firing of what Pyongyang described as hypersonic weapons.

The test took place ahead of the Ninth Congress of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea, which is widely expected to be convened by early next month. The congress is seen as a forum for the leadership to review policy performance, announce a new five-year economic plan and signal potential shifts in military and foreign policy priorities.

The missile launch also coincided with a three-day visit to South Korea by U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, who traveled on to Japan Tuesday afternoon. During his meetings in Seoul, Colby discussed issues including the security situation on the Korean Peninsula, the transfer of wartime operational control and South Korea’s pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines.

His trip followed the Pentagon’s release of a new National Defense Strategy calling on South Korea to assume primary responsibility for deterring North Korea.

In a statement sent to reporters, U.S. Forces Korea said it was aware of the launch and was consulting with allies and partners.

“Based on current assessments, this event does not pose an immediate threat to U.S. personnel or territory, or to our allies,” the statement said. “The United States remains committed to the defense of the U.S. homeland and our allies in the region.”

Jan. 27 (UPI) — South Korea on Tuesday called China’s decision to remove one of the disputed steel structures from their overlapping waters in the Yellow Sea “meaningful progress” that would help advance bilateral ties.

The foreign ministry made the comment after Being announced that work was in progress to remove part of the three steel structures built in the sea zone where the two countries’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs) overlap.

China built two semi-submersible buoys in 2018 and 2024 and a fixed steel platform in 2022 in the Provisional Maritime Zone (PMZ). The issue has been a source of tensions in bilateral relations, as Seoul has regarded the installations as Beijing laying the potential groundwork for future territorial claims.

“As we have continued talks with China on the matter based on our consistent position that we oppose the unilateral installations of the structures in the PMZ, we assess the latest move as meaningful progress,” Kang Young-shin, director general for Northeast and Central Asia affairs, told reporters.

“The measure can be seen as a change that would help advance South Korea-China relations,” Kang said.

Another ministry official said China would be moving the management platform out of the PMZ, with the operation expected to begin at 7 p.m. Tuesday (local time) and run through Saturday, citing the notice from China’s maritime authorities.

“We have maintained our constructive dialogue with the Chinese side and will continue to seek further progress going forward,” Kang added.

Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said in a briefing that a Chinese company was carrying out the work to remove the management platform, an autonomous operation in progress led by the company in line with its management and development needs.

Seoul and Beijing have agreed to draw the PMZ line as a tentative measure amid the stalled talks over EEZ demarcation in order to allow fishing vessels to operate safely and jointly manage marine resources in the area, while prohibiting activities beyond navigation and fishing.

South Korea has argued that China’s installations of the steel structures run counter to such efforts.

Following the summit talks in Beijing with Chinese President Xi Jinping earlier this month, President Lee Jae Myung said China was expected to remove one of the three steel platforms from the Yellow Sea.

Beijing’s move came after the two countries reportedly reached an understanding that the management platform should first be pulled out of the PMZ, following concerns raised in Seoul over the possibility that the structure could be diverted for other uses.

The platform that China claims to be a management facility for the fish farm is believed to be a repurposed decommissioned oil rig.

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