Saudi Arabia

Joint attacks by the United States and Israel have severely reduced Iran’s capacity to fire missiles and drones, experts say, but Iran retains enough capabilities to inflict significant damage.

“Iran’s ballistic missile capacity is functionally destroyed. Their navy assessed combat ineffective. Complete and total aerial dominance over Iran,” the White House said on Saturday. “Operation Epic Fury is yielding massive results,” it said in reference to the war launched by Israel and the US on February 28.

On Sunday, President Donald Trump said US forces had decimated Iran’s drone manufacturing capacity.

Still, on Monday afternoon, Qatar announced it had intercepted the latest in a series of missiles fired from Iran towards the country. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain also issued alerts. A missile landed on a car in Abu Dhabi, killing a person.

So are Iran’s missile capabilities severely reduced? And how is it still firing projectiles at its neighbours and Israel?

Is Iran firing fewer missiles now?

Indeed, the number of retaliatory missiles and drones that Iran has fired towards Gulf countries, Israel and other nations in the region has seen a steep decline since the start of the war.

In the first 24 hours of the conflict, Iran had fired 167 missiles (ballistic and cruise) and 541 drones at the United Arab Emirates, for instance. By contrast, on day 15 of the conflict, it had shot four missiles and six drones, according to a tally compiled by Al Jazeera based on the emirate’s Defence Ministry statements.

The barrage against Israel has also decreased, from nearly 100 projectiles over the first two days to a single-digit number in the past few days, according to Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies.

Last week, the Pentagon said missile launches were down 90 percent from the first day of fighting and drone attacks were down by 86 percent.

How big is Iran’s missile arsenal – and how much has it been hit?

Iran has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the region, the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence assessed in 2022. While there are no official accounts on how many missiles it has, Israeli intelligence reports suggest it counted around 3,000 missiles, a figure that dropped to 2,500 following the 12-day war last June.

Key to the US-Israel strategy has been hunting down Iran’s launchers. Each missile launch generates a signature, such as a large explosion, that can be picked up by a satellite and radar systems.

According to a senior Israeli military official cited by the Institute for the Study of the War, Israel has put up to 290 launchers out of service, out of an estimated 410 to 440 launchers.

But Iran is a vast country, and without boots on the ground, it will be hard to completely eliminate Iran’s capacity to shoot despite the US and Israel having nearly full control of the country’s airspace, said David Des Roches, an associate professor at the National Defense University in Washington, DC.

“It is not obvious to identify launchers,” Des Roches told Al Jazeera. “What we see are missiles that were put in hidden places or places not associated with the military before the war, when there was less observation”.

According to Des Roches, the slowdown in launches is due to Iranian forces having lost the capacity to launch volleys. As a result, Iran has been firing one or two missiles at a time towards civilian and commercial infrastructure, especially in Gulf countries, instead of aiming volleys at military targets. Iran insists that it is targeting only US interests in the region.

“Militarily speaking [Iran’s action] is not significant – this is what is called harassment fire to exhaust alert systems in nearby countries and scare people off,” Des Roches said.

What’s Iran’s strategy?

According to Hamidreza Azizi, an expert on Iran and visiting fellow with the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWB), Tehran’s central calculation is that the Gulf and Israel may run out of their defensive capabilities before Iran runs out of missiles.

“There might be some interest in making this a war of attrition,” he said, pointing at the lower, yet constant, number of weapons launched from Iran each day.

“Although the US and Israel have been successful in taking out some of the launchers and major missile bases, the Iranians have decentralised the missile bases and missile command and they have been increasingly relying on mobile launchers which makes it more difficult for the other side to detect and target,” Azizi said. “This is a race about time.”

And in that race, Iran believes it has a chance, say experts.

“It does not matter how many you launch as long as you maintain a credible threat,” Muhanad Seloom, an assistant professor in critical security studies at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, told Al Jazeera. “It takes one successful drone to shatter a sense of security.”

Iran has long experience in producing cheap yet effective drones. The Shahed 136 can be made quickly and in large numbers in relatively simple factories, and several of them can be fired at once, overwhelming defences. It also doesn’t need complex launchers that can be targeted in air strikes. With a speed of just 185km/h (115mph), Shaheds can be shot down by helicopters. Still, many have managed to get through US and Gulf air defence systems.

Just on Monday, a fire broke out near the UAE’s Dubai International Airport in a drone-related incident that temporarily disrupted flights; another drone attack caused a fire at the Fujairah industrial area, also in the UAE; air sirens sounded in central Israel due to a missile fired from Iran; and in the Strait of Hormuz – a key waterway through which 20 percent of global energy supplies are shipped – hundreds of vessels remain paralysed over fear of being struck despite few attacks on ships. Since the start of the war, a maritime tracker has reported 20 incidents related to vessels.

This, say experts, is part of Iran’s defensive doctrine of asymmetric warfare against militarily superior powers, such as the US and Israel. The weaker party, Iran in this case, turns to unconventional methods of warfare, wearing down the enemy by targeting key infrastructure to inflict economic pain.

Tehran has already pushed oil prices to higher than $100 a barrel and sent global markets into panic mode. The second-biggest exporter of natural gas, Qatar, continues to keep shut its production; Bahrain’s state oil company has declared force majeure on its shipments, and oil production from Iraq’s main southern ⁠oilfields has plunged 70 percent.

If Iran can keep raising global oil prices, “it will inflict equal or more damage to the US than American bombs in Iran,” said Vali Nasr, a professor of international affairs and Middle East studies at Johns Hopkins University.

Alireza Enayati says relations with Saudi Arabia are ‘progressing naturally’ and he’s in direct contact with Saudi officials.

Iran’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia denied Tehran is responsible for attacks on Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure, saying if it was behind the strikes, it would have announced it.

Alireza Enayati did not suggest who carried out the attacks, but added Iran is only attacking United States and Israeli military targets and interests during the ongoing war, Reuters news agency quoted him as saying on Sunday.

After the US and Israel launched attacks on Iran at the end of February, Tehran retaliated against US and Israeli military assets, including in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Last week, the Ras Tanura oil refinery was forced to stop operations after debris from a drone caused a small fire. Attempted attacks were also reported on the Shaybah oilfield in the desert near the border with the UAE.

So far, Saudi Arabia’s Defence Ministry has not blamed anyone for the attacks.

Enayati said he’s in direct contact with Saudi officials, explaining that relations are “progressing naturally” in many areas.

Talks included Saudi Arabia’s publicly stated position that its land, sea, and air would not be used to target Iran. He didn’t elaborate.

Iran and Saudi Arabia re-established diplomatic relations in 2023, in a deal brokered by China, that saw the two sides, which backed rival groups across the region, agree on a new chapter in bilateral relations.

‘Reliance on external powers’

Enayati reiterated to the Gulf states that the war “has been imposed on us and the region” following coordinated US and Israeli attacks.

Asked about the attacks on Gulf nations, Enayati replied: “We are neighbours, and we cannot do without each other; we will need a serious review.”

“What the region has witnessed over the past five decades is the result of an exclusionary approach and an excessive reliance on external powers,” he said, calling for deeper ties between the Gulf Cooperation Council’s six members along with Iraq and Iran.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi also denied his country is targeting civilian or residential areas in the Middle East, and said Tehran is ready to form a committee with its neighbours to investigate the responsibility for such strikes.

So far, the UAE, which normalised relations with Israel in 2020, has faced the brunt of Iran’s attacks, with US bases and oil refineries heavily targeted.

While all countries targeted have strongly condemned Iran’s missile and drone strikes, regional sources say there remains growing frustration at the United States for dragging them into a war they did not sign up for but are now paying the heaviest price for, Reuters reported.

Enayati said to resolve the conflict, the US and Israel need to stop their attacks, and international security guarantees to prevent future “aggression” must be given.

Paul Musgrave, associate professor at Georgetown University in Qatar, said the administration of US President Donald Trump has lost much of its leverage in the region, and the US engaged in the wrong conflict at the wrong moment, without proper planning.

Iran’s strategy, meanwhile, now seems to be “not who has a bigger bomb or bigger munitions, but who has the highest threshold for pain”, Musgrave told Al Jazeera.

Heavy Israeli strikes have hit Tehran, Iran, as its allies launch attacks across Gulf states, and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has been severely disrupted, sending global oil prices soaring.

Meanwhile, political pressure is mounting in Washington as the conflict spreads across the region.

Here is what we know about what has been happening in the past 24 hours:

In Iran

Supreme leader speaks: Appointed last week following the assassination of his father, Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has issued his first statement, warning that attacks on Israel and US military assets and infrastructure in the Middle East will continue unless bases hosting US forces in the region are closed.

Heavy strikes on Tehran: The Israeli military has launched a new “extensive wave” of air attacks on Iran’s capital, Tehran, leaving the city covered in thick smoke on Friday morning.

Strait of Hormuz closure and surging oil prices: The Strait of Hormuz, which connects the Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, is closed, causing Brent crude oil prices to surge past $100 per barrel. The strait, which falls into the territorial waters of Iran and Oman, is the only waterway to the open sea available to oil and gas producers in the Gulf. Iran has stated that the strait is under Iranian control and US-and Israel-linked ships are banned. Other vessels must receive Iranian permission to pass.

Civilian casualties: Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations, Amir Saeid Iravani, said at least 1,348 civilians have been killed, with victims ranging in age from eight months to 88 years old.

In Gulf countries

Regional retaliation and attacks: Iran has launched waves of drones and missiles towards Gulf countries that host US military assets and troops, and has targeted oil tankers and facilities.

Bahrain: The nation has reported intercepting 114 missiles and 190 drones since the war began on February 28.

Saudi Arabia: The country intercepted 10 drones over its eastern region and later destroyed an additional 28 drones that breached its airspace.

Attacks on the UAE: The country has strongly condemned Iranian strikes on the region, and said they have hit Dubai International Airport and some hotels.

Evacuations: Australia has ordered all “non-essential” officials to leave the United Arab Emirates and Israel, and urged its citizens to evacuate the Middle East while it is still safe to do so

Qatar’s response: Qatar’s airspace is officially closed, but Qatar Airways has scheduled more than 140 special flights to help repatriate stranded residents and citizens.

Qatar has strongly rejected Israeli media claims that it intentionally paused liquefied natural gas (LNG) production to manipulate US energy prices; officials clarified that the suspension was actually forced by an Iranian drone attack.

In the US

Trump claims war moving ‘rapidly’: US President Donald Trump told reporters the war against Iran was moving “very rapidly”.

“It’s doing very well, our military is unsurpassed,” he said at the White House, not directly responding to the latest comments from Iran’s new supreme leader.

Domestic opposition: More than 250 US organisations have signed a letter calling on Congress to halt funding for the war. They argue the $11.3bn spent in the first six days of the conflict is diverting crucial funds from urgent domestic needs, such as food benefits.

No ‘need’ for ground troops in Iran: US Senator Lindsey Graham has played down the possibility of US troops being deployed to Iran, but suggested the war could continue for some time. “I don’t see this conflict ending today,” the Republican senator told reporters in Washington, DC.

In Israel

New missile wave launched at Israel: The Israeli military said early on Friday that Iran had fired a new barrage of missiles towards Israel, and instructed people in affected areas to head to shelters.

Israel strikes Basij force: Israel’s military said it had struck checkpoints set up in Tehran by the Basij force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards as part of efforts to undermine control by the authorities.

Regime change: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel can create conditions for regime change, but it is up to Iran’s people to take to the streets. He also said Israel is aiming to stop Iran from moving nuclear and ballistic projects underground.

In Lebanon, Iraq

Downed US aircraft: A US KC-135 refuelling aircraft crashed in western Iraq. While the Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed it shot the aircraft down using air defence systems, US Central Command (CENTCOM) stated the aircraft went down in “friendly airspace” and was not the result of hostile fire.

Iraqi port closures: Iraq has shut its port operations after an Indian crew member was killed during an attack on a US-owned oil tanker in Iraqi waters.

Six French soldiers hurt: A drone attack wounded six French soldiers in Erbil, in Iraq’s autonomous Kurdish region, President Emmanuel Macron said on Thursday.

Deadly attacks in southern Lebanon: Israeli bombardments continue on southern towns and villages. A strike on the village of Arki, near Sidon, killed nine people, including five children.

Mounting death toll and mass displacement: Lebanese officials have reported that at least 687 people have been killed in Israeli attacks on Lebanon since last Monday, including 98 children. The intense bombardments have displaced an estimated 700,000 to 750,000 people from their homes.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has laid out terms for ending the war with the United States and Israel in what analysts say is a possible sign of de-escalation from Tehran as the US-Israel war on Iran entered its 13th day on Thursday.

In a post on Wednesday on social site X, Pezeshkian said he had spoken to his counterparts in Russia and Pakistan, and that he had confirmed “Iran’s commitment to peace”.

“The only way to end this war – ignited by the Zionist regime & US – is recognizing Iran’s legitimate rights, payment of reparations, and firm int’l guarantees against future aggression,” Pezeshkian wrote.

This is a rare posture from Tehran, which has maintained a defiant stance and initially rejected any possibility of negotiations or a ceasefire when war broke out nearly two weeks ago.

Pezeshkian’s statement comes as pressure mounts on the US to halt what has become a very costly mission. Analysts say speculation from Washington that Iran would quickly submit after the killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei were misguided.

Tehran is likely going to determine the end of this war, not the US or Israel, because of its ability to inflict economic pain broadly, they say.

Amid a military pummelling by the US and Israel, Iran has launched heavy retaliatory strikes at US assets and other critical infrastructure in Gulf countries, upsetting global supplies. It has also adopted what analysts call “asymmetric” tactics – such as disrupting the critical Strait of Hormuz and threatening US banking-linked entities – to inflict as much economic pain on the region and wider world as it can.

This is what we know about Pezeshkian’s stance and what the pressures are on both sides to draw the conflict to a close, quickly.

What has the war cost so far?

Economically, both sides have weaponised energy. Israel first targeted Iran’s oil facilities in Tehran on March 8, prompting an outcry from global health experts over the potential risk of air and water pollution.

Iran has, meanwhile, tightened its chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz shipping route – the only route to open sea for oil producers in the Gulf – with its military promising on Wednesday that it has the capabilities to wage a long war that could “destroy” the world economy.

Attacks on ships in the strait, through which about 20 percent of global oil and gas traffic normally passes, have effectively closed the route.

Oil prices rocketed above $100 per barrel late last week, up from around $65 before the war, with ordinary buyers feeling the increases at pumps in the US, Europe and parts of Africa.

On Wednesday, Iran upped the ante, saying it would not allow “a litre of oil” to pass through the strait and warned the world to expect a $200-per-barrel price tag.

“We don’t know how quickly it’ll revert back,” Freya Beamish, chief economist at GlobalData TS Lombard, told Al Jazeera. “We do think it’ll revert back to $80 in due course, but the ball is to some degree in Iran’s court,” she said, adding that because Iran needs oil revenue, the price hikes are expected to be time-limited.

The International Energy Agency agreed on Wednesday to release 400 million barrels from the emergency reserves of several member states but it is not yet clear what impact that will have, nor how quickly this quantity of oil can be released.

Tehran has also been accused of directly attacking oil facilities in neighbouring countries this week. Iraq shut all its oil port operations on Thursday after explosive-laden Iranian “drone” boats appeared to have attacked two fuel tankers in Iraqi waters, setting them ablaze and killing one crew member.

A drone was filmed striking Oman’s Salalah oil port on Wednesday, although Tehran has denied involvement.

What are Iranian officials saying about ending the war?

There has been conflicting messaging from the Iranian leadership.

Iran’s elite army unit and parallel armed force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), continues to show defiance, issuing threats and launching attacks on Israel and US military assets and infrastructure in neighbouring Gulf countries.

However, the political leadership has appeared more inclined towards diplomacy, analysts say. On Wednesday, President Pezeshkian said that ending the war would take the US and Israel recognising Iran’s rights, paying Iran reparations – although it’s unclear how much is being asked for – and providing strong guarantees that a future war will not be waged.

In a video recording last week, he also apologised to neighbouring countries for the strikes and promised that Iran would stop hitting its neighbours as long as they do not allow the US to launch attacks from their territory.

“I personally apologise to the neighbouring countries that were affected by Iran’s actions,” the president said, adding that Tehran was not looking for confrontations with its neighbours.

However, it is not known how much sway the political leadership has over the IRGC. Hours after the president’s apology last week, air defence sirens went off in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE and Bahrain, as strikes continued on the Gulf.

So, what is Iran’s actual position?

“Iran wants to go to the end to make sure that the United States and Israel never attack Iran again … so this has to be the final battle,” Al Jazeera’s Resul Serdar Atas explained.

Indeed, the IRGC sees this as an existential war, but the timing of Pezeshkian’s statement about ending the conflict also shows Tehran is pressured economically, politically and militarily, Zeidon Alkinani of Qatar’s Georgetown University told Al Jazeera.

“These differences and divisions [between IRGC and political leaders] always existed even prior to this war but we may notice it now more, given the fact that the IRGC believes that it has the right to take the front seat in leading this regional war, which is why a lot of the statements and positions are contradicting with the official ones from Pezeshkian,” he said.

The IRGC reports directly to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and not to the country’s political leadership. That council is led by Ali Larijani, a top politician and close aide to the late supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, who analysts describe as a “hardliner”.

In a post on X on Tuesday, Larijani responded to threats from Trump about attacks on the Strait of Hormuz, saying: “Iranian people do not fear your hollow threats; for those greater than you have failed to erase it … So beware lest you be the ones to vanish.”

The newly elected supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, was once in the IRGC and was put forward by the unit as the next ayatollah after his father was killed on the first day of the war, analysts say. He is thus not expected to follow the reformist, diplomatic ideals of President Pezeshkian and other political leaders which his father managed to marry with the IRGC militarised stance, they say.

What do the US and Israel say about ending the war?

There have also been conflicting messages from the Trump administration and Israel regarding when the war mission on Iran, codenamed Operation Epic Fury, is likely to end.

Trump told US publication Axios on Wednesday that the war on Iran would end “soon” because there’s “practically nothing left to target”.

“Anytime I want it to end, it will end,” he added. He had said earlier on Monday that “we’re way ahead of our schedule” and that the US had achieved its goals, even as speculation mounts about a possible US ground mission.

On the other hand, Israel’s Defence Minister Israel Katz said on Wednesday that the war would go on “without any time limit, for as long as necessary, until we achieve all the objectives and decisively win the campaign”.

Analysts say Trump’s stance that the conflict will be quick reflects increasing pressure on his administration ahead of upcoming mid-term elections in November.

Trump’s advisers privately told him this week to find a quick end to the war and avoid political backlash, according to reporting by The Wall Street Journal. That came as polls from Quinnipiac University and The Washington Post suggested that most Americans are opposed to the war in Iran.

In his 2024 presidential campaign, Trump promised to lower prices, and inflation had stabilised at 2.4 percent ahead of the war, according to government data released on Wednesday. Analysts speculate the conflict will likely push it back up.

The US spent more than $11.3bn in the first six days of the war, Pentagon officials told lawmakers in a classified briefing on Tuesday, Reuters reported this week – nearly $2bn a day.

The Washington-based think tank, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), estimated that the war cost Washington $3.7bn in its first 100 hours alone, or nearly $900m a day, largely due to its expenditure on costly munitions.

“It’s quite ironic that [Trump] chose a war that would make affordability worse, not better,” Rebecca Christie, a senior fellow at the Bruegel think tank, told Al Jazeera’s Counting the Cost.

“Every time the US loses even one object, air defence or a plane or something like that, that represents an awful lot of money that could have been used on some of these issues that have an impact on people’s day-to-day lives in the United States.”

EXPLAINER

More than half of the 62 million people in the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are foreign workers.

Nearly 62 million people living in the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have been caught in the crossfire of the latest US-Israel war on Iran.

Known for their economic opportunities, these countries, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), collectively host nearly 35 million foreign workers from around the world, predominantly from South Asia.

With the exception of Saudi Arabia and Oman, foreign workers make up the bulk of the populations of people living in the remaining four GCC countries.

The map below illustrates the national and non-national populations in each of the GCC countries.

Where do GCC foreign workers come from?

Generations of foreign workers in the GCC countries have significantly contributed to the workforce, including labourers, construction workers, household staff, security personnel, and cleaners, all vital to building the modern infrastructures that Gulf nations are known for.

Millions consider the Gulf their home, despite holding nationalities from other countries.

Additionally, highly skilled foreign workers have a long history in industries such as banking, finance, technology, engineering, aviation, medicine and the media.

According to Global Media Insight, a digital marketing agency based out of the UAE,  the 10 largest groups of non-nationals living across the six GCC countries are from:

• India: 9.1 million
• Bangladesh: 5 million
• Pakistan: 4.9 million
• Egypt: 3.3 million
• Philippines: 2.2 million
• Yemen: 2.2 million
• Sudan: 1.1 million
• Nepal: 1.2 million
• Syria: 694,000
• Sri Lanka: 650,000

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is the largest of the six GCC countries, with a population of nearly 37 million.

The oil-rich country has a local population of about 20.5 million and an additional 16.4 million foreign residents.

The five largest groups of non-nationals living in Saudi Arabia are people from:

• Bangladesh: 2,590,000
• India: 2,310,000
• Pakistan: 2,230,000
• Yemen: 2,210,000
• Egypt: 1,800,000
• Sudan: 1,000,000

The UAE

The United Arab Emirates has the second-largest population in the GCC, totaling some 11.3 million people.

It consists of seven emirates, including the capital Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Ras Al Khaimah, and Fujairah.

Emiratis make up nearly 12 percent of the population, with foreigners at almost 88 percent.

The five largest groups of non-nationals living in the UAE are from:

• India: 4,360,000
• Pakistan: 1,900,000
• Bangladesh: 840,000
• Philippines: 780,000
• Iran: 540,000
• Egypt: 480,000

Kuwait

With a population of 4.8 million, Kuwait has the third-largest population in the GCC.

Approximately 1.56 million are Kuwaiti citizens, and 2.16 million are foreign workers.

The five largest groups of non-nationals living in Kuwait are from:

• India: 1,000,000
• Egypt: 700,000
• Bangladesh: 350,000
• Philippines: 250,000
• Pakistan: 200,000
• Nepal: 120,000

Oman

Oman’s population stands at approximately 4.7 million people. Oman’s 2.5 million citizens account for nearly 59 percent of the population, while the remaining 2.05 million (or 41 percent) are foreign workers.

The five largest groups of non-nationals living in Oman are from:

• India: 766,735
• Bangladesh: 718,856
• Pakistan: 268,868
• Egypt: 46,970
• Philippines: 45,213
• Uganda: 20,886

Qatar

Qatar has a population of some 3.2 million people, with 2.87 million foreign workers accounting for about 88 percent of them. Qatari citizens number around 330,000, making up 12 percent.

The five largest groups of non-nationals living in Qatar are from:

• India: 700,000
• Bangladesh: 400,000
• Nepal: 400,000
• Egypt: 300,000
• Philippines: 236,000
• Pakistan: 180,000

Bahrain

With a total population of 1.58 million, Bahrain has the smallest population in the GCC. Bahraini citizens make up just under half of the population.

The five largest groups of non-nationals living in Bahrain are from:

• India: 350,000
• Bangladesh: 150,000
• Pakistan: 120,000
• Philippines: 80,000
• Egypt: 60,000
• Nepal: 35,000

Tom Brady‘s return to the football field will take place on U.S. soil.

Right here in Los Angeles, to be specific.

The Fanatics Flag Football Classic, featuring Brady and a slew of other NFL stars and athletes, will take place March 21 at BMO Stadium, the venue that is also slated to host flag football during the 2028 Summer Olympics.

The event was originally scheduled to take place on the same date, but at a location more than 8,000 miles away at Kingdom Arena in Riyadh, Saudia Arabia.

No official reason for the relocation has been given, although the move was made amid increased tensions in the Middle East after the United States and Israel began military strikes against Iran this month. Last week, Iran used two drones to strike the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia’s capital city.

The event will feature three 12-player teams. Brady, the retired seven-time Super Bowl champion and minority owner of the Las Vegas Raiders, and Philadelphia Eagles quarterback Jalen Hurts will co-captain the Founders FFC team, which will be coached by Denver Broncos’ Sean Payton.

A second team, Wildcats FFC, will be co-captained by Cincinnati Bengals quarterback Joe Burrow and Washington Commanders quarterback Jayden Daniels, with San Francisco 49ers’ Kyle Shanahan coaching. During a March 18 draft, the two teams will be built from a pool of athletes that include Philadelphia Eagles running back Saquon Barkley, Cleveland Browns defensive end Myles Garrett, former Rams receiver Odell Beckham Jr., four-time Super Bowl-winning tight end Rob Gronkowski and WWE star Logan Paul.

The third team in the event is the U.S. national flag football team, the reigning IFAF flag football world champion coached by Jorge Cascudo and captained by Aamir Brown and Darrell “Housh” Doucette.

Iran’s IRGC had earlier said they targeted radar systems in locations including Al-Kharj, home to Prince Sultan base.

At least two people have been killed after a projectile fell on a residential location in Saudi Arabia‘s Al-Kharj city, Saudi authorities reported, as Iranian counterattacks on Gulf nations hosting US military assets entered a second week.

The Saudi civil defence said in a post on X on Sunday, without mentioning Iran, that an unspecified “military projectile” had hit a residential area in Al-Kharj, killing two foreign nationals – one Indian and one Bangladeshi – and injuring 12 people.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had said earlier that it had targeted radar systems in locations including Al-Kharj governorate, which is home to the Prince Sultan airbase used by United States forces, and has come under repeated attack over the past week in the US and Israeli war against Iran.

Reporting from Doha, Al Jazeera’s Laura Khan said the projectile had landed on a residential site belonging to a maintenance and cleaning company.

“This is getting very volatile and dangerous for people across the Gulf,” she said. “It’s really important to emphasise that over 200 nationalities live and work across the Gulf nations. Many of these could be labourers.”

On Sunday, the Saudi Defence Ministry reported intercepting 15 drones, including an attempted attack in the diplomatic quarter of the capital Riyadh.

Kuwait, meanwhile, said an attack hit fuel tanks at its international airport, and Bahrain reported a water desalination plant had been damaged.

Sunday’s attacks came after Israeli warplanes hit five oil facilities around the Iranian capital, killing several people, according to a state oil executive, and blanketing the city in acrid smoke.

A spokesperson for the IRGC said Iran would retaliate if US-Israel attacks on its energy infrastructure did not let up.

“If you can tolerate oil at more than $200 per barrel, continue this game,” said the spokesperson.

As the war extended into its ninth day, the IRGC said it had enough supplies to continue drone and missile attacks across the Middle East for up to six months.

Ahmed Aboul Gheit, secretary-general of the Arab League, said Iran’s attacks on several member states were “reckless”, urging Tehran to reverse what he called a “massive strategic mistake”.

Iran’s Health Ministry said Sunday that at least 1,200 civilians had been killed and around 10,000 wounded since the US and Israel launched their war on Iran on February 28.

The United States-Israeli war on Iran could leave consumers and businesses worldwide facing weeks or months of higher fuel prices even if the conflict, which is now in its eighth day, ends quickly, as suppliers grapple with damaged facilities, disrupted logistics, and elevated risks to shipping.

The outlook poses a global economic threat and a political vulnerability for US President Donald Trump leading into the midterm elections, with voters sensitive to energy bills and unfavourable to foreign entanglements.

Global oil prices have surged by more than 25 percent since the start of the war, driving up fuel prices for consumers worldwide.

The national average petrol price reached $3.41 per gallon ($0.9 a litre) on Saturday, according to the American Automobile Association (AAA), rising by $0.43 over the past week. Goldman Sachs warned oil prices could climb above $100 per barrel if shipping disruptions continue.

The US crude oil settled at just below $91 per barrel on Friday – its largest weekly gain on record in data dating back to 1983, indicating prices could continue to rise.

“The market is shifting from pricing pure geopolitical risk to grappling with tangible operational disruption, as refinery shutdowns and export constraints begin to impair crude processing and regional supply flows,” JP Morgan analysts said earlier this week, according to the Reuters news agency.

The conflict has already led to the suspension of about a fifth of global crude and natural gas supply, as Tehran targets ships in the vital Strait of Hormuz between its shores and Oman, and attacks energy infrastructure across the region.

A nearly complete shutdown of the strait means the region’s top oil producers – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq and Kuwait – have had to suspend shipments of as much as 140 million barrels of oil – equal to about 1.4 days of global demand – to global refiners.

More than 80 percent of global trade moves by sea, according to the World Bank, meaning disruptions in the waterway could increase freight costs and delay deliveries of goods.

Storages in the Gulf filling

As a result, oil and gas storage at facilities in the Gulf is rapidly filling, forcing oilfields in Iraq and Kuwait to cut oil production, with the UAE likely to cut next, analysts, traders and sources told Reuters.

“At some point soon, everyone will also shut in if vessels do not come,” a ⁠source with a state oil company in the region, who asked not to be named, told Reuters.

Oilfields forced to shut in across the Middle East as a result of the shipping disruptions could take a while to return to normal, said Amir Zaman, head of the Americas commercial team at Rystad Energy.

“The conflict could be ended, but it could take days or weeks or months, depending on the types of fields, age of the field, the type of shut-in that they’ve had to do before you can get production back up to what it once was,” he said.

Iranian forces, meanwhile, are targeting regional energy infrastructure, including refineries and terminals, forcing them to shut down too, with some of those operations badly damaged by attacks and in need of repairs.

Qatar declared force majeure on its huge volumes of gas exports on Wednesday after Iranian drone attacks, and it may take at least a month to return to normal production ‌levels, sources told Reuters. Qatar supplies 20 percent of global liquefied natural gas (LNG).

Saudi Aramco’s mammoth Ras Tanura refinery and crude export terminal, meanwhile, has also closed due to attacks, with no details on damage.

Economists warn that the situation could create a combination of higher prices and slower growth.

Islamabad, Pakistan – The reverberations of a war in which US-Israel attacks have killed more than a thousand people in Iran, including the country’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei, and Iranian missiles and drones have fallen on Israel in retaliation, are being felt deeply in Pakistan.

Six Gulf countries have also come under Iranian missile and drone attacks, putting Pakistan in a tough position.

The country shares a 900-kilometre (559 miles) border with Iran in its southwest, and millions of its workers are residents in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations.

Since September last year, Islamabad has also reinforced its decades-long ties with Riyadh by signing a formal mutual defence agreement that commits each side to treat aggression against the other as aggression against both.

As Iranian drones and ballistic missiles continue to target Gulf states, the question being asked with increasing urgency in Pakistan is what Islamabad will do next if it finds itself pulled into the war.

Islamabad’s answer so far has been to work the phones furiously, engaging regional leaders, including Iran and Saudi Arabia.

When US-Israeli strikes killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on February 28, Pakistan condemned the attacks as “unwarranted”. Within hours, it also condemned Iran’s retaliatory strikes on Gulf states as “blatant violations of sovereignty”.

Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, who was attending an Organisation of Islamic Cooperation meeting in Riyadh when the conflict began last week, launched what he later described as “shuttle communication” between Tehran and Riyadh.

Speaking in the Senate on March 3, and at a news conference later the same day, Dar disclosed that he had personally reminded Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi of Pakistan’s defence obligations to Saudi Arabia.

“We have a defence pact with Saudi Arabia, and the whole world knows about it,” Dar said. “I told the Iranian leadership to take care of our pact with Saudi Arabia.”

Araghchi, he said, asked for guarantees that Saudi soil would not be used to attack Iran. Dar said he obtained those assurances from Riyadh and credited the back-channel exchange with limiting the scale of Iranian strikes on the kingdom.

On March 5, Iran’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Alireza Enayati, said his country welcomed Saudi Arabia’s pledge not to allow its airspace or territory to be used during the ongoing war with the US and Israel.

“We appreciate what we have repeatedly heard from Saudi Arabia – that it does not allow its airspace, waters, or territory to be used against the Islamic Republic of Iran,” he said in an interview.

But only a day later, during early hours of March 6, Saudi Arabia’s defence ministry confirmed it intercepted three ballistic missiles targeting the kingdom’s Prince Sultan Air Base. And hours later, Pakistan’s Field Marshal Asim Munir was in Riyadh, meeting Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, where they “discussed Iranian attacks on the Kingdom and the measures needed to halt them within the framework” of their mutual defence pact, the Saudi minister said in a post on X.

As the war escalates, analysts say that Pakistan’s tightrope walk between two close partners could become harder and harder.

A defence pact under pressure

The Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, signed on September 17, 2025, in Riyadh by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif alongside army chief Asim Munir, was the most significant formal defence commitment Pakistan had entered into in decades.

Its central clause states that any aggression against either country shall be considered aggression against both. The wording was modelled on collective defence principles similar to NATO’s Article 5, though analysts have cautioned against interpreting it as an automatic trigger for military intervention.

The agreement followed Israel’s September 2025 strikes on Hamas officials in Doha, an event that shook confidence in US security guarantees across the six Gulf Cooperation Council states: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Nuclear-armed Pakistan has maintained a military relationship with Saudi Arabia for decades, according to which an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 Pakistani troops remain stationed in the kingdom.

Now the pact is being tested under conditions neither side anticipated.

Umer Karim, an associate fellow at the Riyadh-based King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, called Pakistan’s current predicament the outcome of a miscalculation.

Islamabad, he argued, likely never expected to find itself caught between Tehran and Riyadh, particularly after the China-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023.

“Pakistani leaders were always careful not to take an official plunge vis-a-vis Saudi defence. It was done for the first time by the current army chief, and though the potential dividends are big, so are the costs,” Karim told Al Jazeera.

“Perhaps this is the last time the Saudis will test Pakistan, and if Pakistan doesn’t fulfil its commitments now, the relationship will be irreversibly damaged,” he added.

In 2015, it declined a direct Saudi request to join the military coalition fighting in Yemen, following a parliamentary resolution that the country must remain neutral.

Aziz Alghashian, senior non-resident fellow at the Gulf International Forum in Riyadh, pointed to that episode. “The limitation of the Saudi-Pakistan treaty is clear. Treaties are only as strong as the political calculations and political will behind them,” Alghashian told Al Jazeera.

But Ilhan Niaz, a professor of history at Islamabad’s Quaid-e-Azam University, said that if Saudi Arabia feels sufficiently threatened by Iran to formally request Pakistani military assistance, “Pakistan will come to Saudi Arabia’s aid.”

“To do otherwise would undermine Pakistan’s credibility,” he told Al Jazeera.

The Iran constraint

The complicating factor for Pakistan is that it cannot afford to treat Iran simply as an adversary if Riyadh calls for military assistance.

The two countries share a long and porous border, maintain significant trade ties, and have recently stepped up diplomatic engagement. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian visited Islamabad in August 2025, and the two governments maintain a range of formal and backchannel contacts.

Niaz acknowledged that Tehran has also been “a difficult neighbour”, pointing to the January 2024 exchange of cross-border strikes initiated by Iran as evidence of the relationship’s unpredictability.

Even so, he said Pakistan had “vital national interests” in ensuring Iran’s stability and territorial integrity.

“The collapse of Iran into civil war, its fragmentation into warring states, and the extension of Israeli influence to Pakistan’s western borders are all developments that greatly, and rightly, worry Islamabad,” he said.

The domestic fallout from the US-Israel strikes and Iran’s response has already been immediate.

The army was deployed and a three-day curfew imposed in Gilgit-Baltistan after at least 23 people were killed in protests across Pakistan following Khamenei’s assassination. The protests were driven largely by Pakistan’s Shia community, estimated to make up between 15 and 20 percent of the 250 million population, which has historically mobilised around developments involving Iran.

Pakistan’s violent sectarian history adds another layer of risk.

The Zainabiyoun Brigade, a Pakistan-origin Shia militia trained, funded and commanded by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, has recruited thousands of fighters from Pakistan over the past decade. While many fought in Syria against ISIL (ISIS), many Syrians activists accuse them of committing sectarian violence.

Two years ago, Pakistan’s northwestern Kurram district, the Zainabiyoun’s primary recruitment ground, saw more than 130 people killed in sectarian clashes in the final weeks of 2024 alone.

Pakistan formally banned the group in 2024, but many believe the designation has done little to dismantle its networks.

Analysts warn that fighters hardened in Syria’s civil war could, if Iran’s conflict with Pakistan’s Gulf partners deepens, shift from a defensive to an offensive posture on Pakistani soil.

“Iran has significant influence over Shia organisations in Pakistan,” Islamabad-based security analyst Amir Rana, executive director of the Pak Institute of Peace Studies, told Al Jazeera. “And then you have Balochistan, which is already a highly volatile area. If there is any confrontation, the fallout for Pakistan would be severe.”

Pakistan’s Balochistan province borders Iran, and has been ground-zero for a decades-long separatist movement. “That reality cannot be ignored,” Muhammad Khatibi, a political analyst based in Tehran, said, pointing out that geography itself constrains Islamabad’s choices.

“Any perception that Islamabad is siding militarily against Tehran could inflame domestic sectarian divisions in ways that a full-scale regional war would make very difficult to contain,” Khatibi told Al Jazeera.

What are Pakistan’s options?

Analysts say direct offensive military action against Iran, such as deploying combat aircraft or conducting strikes on Iranian territory, is not a realistic option for Pakistan, given its domestic constraints.

Rana describes Islamabad’s current posture as an attempt to placate both sides.

“Iran’s primary threat is through air strikes using drones and missiles, and that is an area where Pakistan can help and provide assistance to Saudi Arabia. But that would mean Pakistan becoming a party to the war, and that is a major question mark,” he said.

He added that the most viable option for Pakistan could be to provide covert operational support to Saudi Arabia while maintaining diplomatic engagement with Iran.

Alghashian also agreed; he identified air defence cooperation as the most concrete role Pakistan could play — it would be both “militarily meaningful and politically defensible”

“They could help create more air defence capacity,” he said. “This is tangible, it is defensive, and it is in Pakistan’s interest that Saudi Arabia becomes more stable and prosperous.”

Karim, however, warned that the window for Pakistan’s balancing act may be closing faster than Islamabad realises.

“As the situation reaches a tipping point and as Saudi energy installations and infrastructure are hit, it is only a matter of time that Saudi Arabia will ask Pakistan to contribute towards its defence,” he said.

He added that if Pakistan deploys air defence assets to Saudi Arabia, doing so could leave its own air defences dangerously exposed, while deeper involvement could carry political costs at home.

For now, Islamabad’s strongest card remains diplomacy, using its access to both Riyadh and Tehran and the trust it has accumulated. Khatibi said Pakistan should protect that position “at all costs”.

“Pakistan’s most realistic positioning is as a mediator and leveraging its relationships with both sides. It is highly unlikely that Pakistan deploys forces into an anti-Iran coalition. The risks would outweigh the benefits,” he said.

The stakes for Pakistan

The scenario least favourable to Islamabad would be a collective Gulf Cooperation Council decision to enter the war directly, and the warning signs are mounting.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have both declared that Iranian attacks “crossed a red line”.

A joint statement issued on March 1 by the United States, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE said they “reaffirm the right to self-defense in the face of these attacks.”

For Pakistan, such an escalation could carry serious consequences.

Economically, with millions of Pakistani workers living and earning their wages in Gulf states, remittances from the region provide crucial foreign exchange for an economy still recovering from a balance of payments crisis.

Khatibi said any prolonged regional war that disrupts Gulf economies would directly affect Pakistan’s financial position.

“Energy prices could also spike, adding further strain,” he said, noting Pakistan’s heavy dependence on Gulf states for its energy needs.

Pakistan is also simultaneously managing its own military confrontation with the Afghan Taliban which began two days before the US-Israel strikes.

Karim warned that deeper involvement in the regional conflict could trigger internal instability.

“Sectarian conflict,” he said, “can reignite, taking the country back to the bloody 1990s. The government already has lean political legitimacy, and such an occurrence will make it even more unpopular.”

Alghashian also highlighted Pakistan’s reluctance to be drawn into the conflict.

“Saudi Arabia does not want to be in this war and is getting dragged into it. Pakistan will also certainly not want to be dragged into somebody else’s war that they didn’t want to be dragged into. It just wouldn’t make any sense,” he says.

But Niaz said that if the crisis eventually forces Islamabad to choose, the calculus may become unavoidable.

“If Tehran forces Pakistan to choose between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the choice would unquestionably be in favour of the Saudis.”

The Gulf states have spent years trying to broker peace between Iran and the West: Qatar brokered nuclear talks, Oman provided back-channel diplomacy, and Saudi Arabia maintained direct dialogue with Iran through 2024 and into 2025. Iran attacked them anyway. The idea that the Gulf states have a responsibility, a moral one, to protect Iran from the consequences of its actions because of good neighbourliness is now grotesque in context. Iran did not return good neighbourliness. Iran returned ballistic missiles.

Iran’s position is based on three propositions. First, that Iran acted in lawful self-defence pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter; that host countries relinquished territorial sovereignty by allowing US military bases on their territory; and that the definition of aggression in Resolution 3314 justifies the attack on those bases as lawful military objectives. Each of these propositions is legally flawed, factually skewed, and tactically wrong. Collectively, they add up to a legal argument that, if accepted, would ensure that the Gulf is permanently destabilised, the basic principles of international law are destroyed, and, in a curious twist, the very security threats that Iran is reacting to are reinforced.

The self-defence claim does not meet the required legal threshold

The UN Charter, in Article 51, permits the use of force only in self-defence against an “armed attack”, and this term is not defined by reference to the state invoking it. The International Court of Justice, in cases such as Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States) (1986) and Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States) (2003), has interpreted the requirement of an “armed attack” under Article 51 of the UN Charter restrictively. The Court distinguished between the most grave forms of the use of force, which qualify as armed attacks triggering the right of self-defence, and less grave uses of force that do not. Accordingly, not every use of force, such as minor incidents or limited military activities, amounts to an armed attack. In this light, the mere presence of foreign military bases in Gulf states, maintained for decades under defence agreements with host governments, would not in itself constitute an armed attack against Iran.

Necessity and proportionality are also part of customary international law, requiring that self-defence be necessary and proportional. Iran has not demonstrated either. Targeting the territory of other sovereign Arab states in response to the policy decisions of the United States is neither necessary, since diplomatic and United Nations avenues are still available, nor proportional, since it imposes military consequences on states that are not a party to any conflict with Iran.

Critically, Article 51 also has a mandatory procedural element, in that any state employing self-defence is immediately required to notify the Security Council. Iran has consistently evaded this requirement in each of its escalatory actions. While this may seem to be a minor element, it is in fact the means by which the international community is able to verify and check self-defence claims. A state that evades this requirement is not employing Article 51. It is exploiting the language of Article 51.

Iran’s reading of Resolution 3314 is a fundamental distortion

The provision of Article 3(f) of the Annex to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) (1974) states that an act of aggression includes the “action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State”. Iran could rely on this provision to hold the Gulf states that host United States military bases liable for any act of aggression committed from their territories against Iran. Nevertheless, the mere presence of military bases is not sufficient to hold them to be lawful military objectives; this will depend on their actual contribution to military activities against Iran based on the rules of international humanitarian law.

Thus, such an Iranian reading would be wrong on three distinct legal grounds.

First, Resolution 3314 is definitional in nature. The resolution was adopted to assist the Security Council in determining when aggression has taken place, not to confer upon states the unilateral power to punish states deemed to have committed aggression through the use of force. The resolution itself, in Article 2, asserts the power of the Security Council to make the determination of what constitutes aggression. The self-application of Article 3(f) of the resolution is therefore bypassed altogether.

Second, Article 3(f) speaks of the active launching of an attack, not the passive hosting of a military base. The legal distinction is fundamental. A state, in signing a defence treaty with another and hosting the latter’s troops on its soil, is engaging in a measure of sovereignty. A state, actively launching, coordinating, or enabling military strikes against a third party, is engaged in a different matter altogether. Iran has not credibly shown this latter case. The presence of US troops or bases in the Gulf has been a fact for decades, and this has not constituted armed aggression against Iran under any legal standard.

Third, even if Article 3(f) were applicable, the appropriate course would be to bring the matter to the Security Council, not to launch unilateral military strikes. General Assembly resolutions do not override the Charter. Iran cannot rely upon a non-binding resolution defining terms to override the Chapter VII requirements for the use of force or the clear criteria of Article 51.

Sovereignty cannot be dictated by a neighbour’s strategic preferences

Iran, in invoking the principle of good neighbourliness, asks the Arab Gulf states to deny the United States basing rights. Good neighbourliness is a two-way principle, and it does not allow for interference in the internal affairs of other states, certainly not interference in the decisions of other states simply because they are deemed inconvenient to the interfering state. All UN states possess the inherent right to conclude defence treaties with whomever they choose, and this is so regardless of the opinion of their neighbours.

The asymmetry of Iran’s position is striking and self-disqualifying. Iran itself has active military relationships with Russia and China. Iran arms, finances, trains, and supports the activities of non-state military actors in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force operates openly in various states, and this has been extensively documented in United Nations Panels of Experts reports, as well as other international monitoring reports. According to the standards that Iran applies to the Gulf states, any state that hosts the activities of the IRGC, the transfer of Iranian arms, or the coordination of Iranian proxies on its soil would be engaging in aggression against third parties. Iran will not accept this principle when it is applied to itself. A legal principle that is unacceptable to the party to whom it would be applied is not a legal principle at all; it is a political tool.

A doctrine that defeats Iran’s own strategic interests

From the perspective of international relations theory, Iran’s position follows the logic of offensive realism, which seeks to remove the external balancing architecture of regional neighbours by claiming it to be hostile in nature. However, this approach is empirically self-defeating.

Under balance of threat theory, states react to offensive capability, geographic proximity, and aggressive intentions. Iran’s doctrine, in asserting the right to strike any state that hosts forces it perceives as a threat, drives each and every threat variable to maximum levels for each and every state in the region. The obvious consequence, evident in the data, is that the states in the region and external powers are becoming more, rather than less, securely integrated. The Fifth Fleet’s permanent base in Bahrain, the UAE’s negotiations over F-35s, Saudi Arabia’s deployments of THAADs, and Qatar’s expansion of the Al Udeid base are reactions to Iran’s escalation, not causes of it.

From the perspective of constructivism, the legitimacy of a legal argument is also partly based on the normative credibility of the state that presents the argument. The record of Iran’s compliance with IAEA regulations, including the enrichment of uranium to a purity level of 60 percent or more in 2023–2024, interference with inspections, the removal of monitoring cameras, and the overall violation of the non-proliferation regime, has undermined the credibility of the state significantly. A state that is itself a violator of the legal regime cannot claim the role of a law-abiding state seeking protection under the norms of the legal regime.

Iran’s legal rationale was always theoretically wrong. What has occurred since February 28, 2026, has made Iran’s actions morally and politically wrong. Iran did not simply target US military assets. The reality of the situation is now documented and undeniable. Ballistic missiles and drones were launched against Gulf states in the opening days of the conflict. This marked the first time one actor had simultaneously attacked all six GCC states. Iran escalated its attacks in deliberate stages. Day 1: Iranian missiles were fired against military bases. Day 2: Iranian missiles were fired against civilian infrastructure and airports. Day 3: Iranian missiles were fired against the energy sector. Days 3 and 4: The US Embassy in Riyadh was attacked by Iran. International airports in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Kuwait were attacked by Iranian missiles, resulting in the suspension of flights throughout the region. Videos from Bahrain documented an Iranian Shahed drone attacking an apartment building. This is not self-defence. This is the collective punishment of sovereign nations that went to extraordinary lengths to avoid the conflict.

The rationale provided by Iran falls flat when one considers the actions Iran itself took. Its doctrine held that only targets involved in the preparation or launch of an attack against Iran were legitimate targets. Civilian airports are not military bases. Hotels in Palm Jumeirah are not military command centres. An apartment complex in Manama is not a weapons storage facility. By Iran’s own stated legal rationale, none of these targets was legitimate, yet they were attacked. This was not a legal doctrine at all; it was a pretext for coercion, and the conduct of war revealed this to be the case.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

The United States used Precision Strike Missiles (PrSMs) for the first time during its ongoing war with Iran, US Central Command (CENTCOM) said on Wednesday.

The war entered its seventh day on Friday, with attacks continuing across Iran and other countries in the Middle East.

CENTCOM stated in an X post that PrSMs provide an “unrivaled deep strike capability”.

“I just could not be prouder of our men and women in uniform leveraging innovation to create dilemmas for the enemy,” the post quoted Admiral Brad Cooper, head of CENTCOM.

It is unclear where these PrSMs were launched from, or which specific targets they hit in Iran.

So what is the PrSM, and why is it significant that it has been used by the US for the first time?

What are Precision Strike Missiles?

PrSMs are described as long-range precision strike missiles by their developer, the Maryland, US-headquartered defence firm Lockheed Martin, which delivered the first PrSMs to the US Army in December 2023.

PrSMs can hit targets ranging from 60km (37 miles) to more than 499km (310 miles) away, according to Lockheed Martin.

The company’s website adds that PrSMs are compatible with the MLRS M270 and HIMARS family of launchers, both also developed by Lockheed and used by both the United Kingdom and US armies.

MLRS stands for multiple-launch rocket systems, used to launch missiles. The UK sent a number to Ukraine in 2022. HIMARS stands for High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. In 2022, the US sent a number to Ukraine, as well.

M-142 HIMARS is a high-tech, lightweight rocket launcher that is wheel-mounted, giving it more agility and manoeuvrability on the battlefield. Each unit can carry six GPS-guided rockets, or larger missiles like Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMs) and PrSMs, which can be reloaded in about a minute with only a small crew.

Lockheed Martin adds that PrSMs can be rapidly developed. “We are ready to produce and deliver to meet the US Army’s accelerated timeline for this long-range precision fires priority,” the website says.

PrSMs feature “open systems architecture”, which means that it is easier to plug in new components, upgrade parts, or work with equipment from other companies. Similarly, they are “modular and easily adaptable”, enabling components to be switched around.

They also feature “IM energetic payload”, or Insensitive Munitions energetic payload, which makes explosions safer, the producer says. This means the warhead is made from explosives that are less likely to blow up accidentally if hit by fire, shrapnel or by accident, but still explode properly when triggered as intended.

What is different about the PrSMs?

PrSMs will ultimately replace the ATACMs currently being fired from the HIMARS launchers, significantly increasing their range from 300km (186 miles) to more than 499km (310 miles), without changing the vehicle carrying the missile.

PrSMs also offer double the “missile load” of ATACMs. While a HIMARS launcher is able to carry one ATACMS missile in its pod, it can carry two PrSMs per pod.

Does the PrSM give the US a strategic advantage?

CENTCOM confirmed that PrSMs have been used in the US and Israel’s attacks on Iran, codenamed Operation Epic Fury and launched on February 28.

CENTCOM posted a video of the PrSMs being launched from M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems in an open desert terrain.

PrSMs do give the US military a boost for its pre-existing long-range capabilities.

Gulf countries such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman, specifically the Musandam Peninsula, which have military bases hosting US assets and troops, have at least some territory within 400km (250 miles) of Iran.

The US is using PrSMs in conjunction with other long-range missiles such as Low-Cost Unmanned Combat Attack System (LUCAS) one-way drones, MQ-9 Reaper drones, ATACMs and Tomahawk Cruise Missiles.

The range for LUCAS one-way drones is about 800km (500 miles), while the range for ATACMs is about 300km (186 miles) and the range for Tomahawk cruise missiles is about 1,600km (1,000 miles).

Why is the introduction of the PrSM significant?

The range of this missile is significant as it is likely that it would not have been permitted under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia, which the Trump administration withdrew the US from in 2019. This is because it can exceed the maximum 500km (310-mile) range the treaty imposed on certain land-launched missiles.

The treaty was signed in 1987 by US and Soviet Union leaders Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. It sought to eliminate the presence of land-based nuclear missiles and medium-range arsenals between 500km and 5,500km (310 and 3500 miles) from Europe.

The US suspension of the treaty allowed Washington to resume development of its own medium-range, land-based arsenal.

Following the US suspension, Russia invited the US to reciprocate in a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of ground-launched intermediate-range missiles instead. While Washington initially rejected the offer, in 2022, it said it would be willing to discuss this.

In August last year, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced Russia’s withdrawal from this moratorium, however, saying the US had “made significant progress” and “openly declared plans to deploy US ground-launched INF-range missiles in various regions”. INF stands for intermediate-range nuclear forces.

The statement added that such actions by Western countries posed a “direct threat” to Moscow’s security.

Multiple Gulf nations, Arab states, as well as Turkiye and Azerbaijan have been caught in the crosshairs of the war.

Iran’s semi-official Fars News Agency has reported that overnight attacks on Bahrain’s capital, Manama, targeted the Financial Harbour Towers commercial complex, the location of the Israeli embassy in the city.

The first week of the United States-Israel war on Iran and Tehran’s retaliatory strikes on nations hosting US forces and assets has engulfed the region and beyond into a broader conflict.

The Reuters news agency reported Friday that an Iranian drone was intercepted and destroyed in the vicinity of the complex.

Multiple Gulf nations, Arab states, as well as Turkiye and Azerbaijan have been caught in the crosshairs of the war.

The Saudi Ministry of Defense on Friday said a cruise missile was intercepted and destroyed to the east of the country’s central al-Kharj governorate. The ministry provided no additional information.

The ministry also said later it had intercepted three drones to the east of the Riyadh region.

Additionally, the Qatari Ministry of Defence announced overnight that its air defence forces successfully intercepted a drone attack targeting the Al Udeid Air Base in Doha that hosts US assets.

Earlier, authorities issued an alert warning that the security threat level had been elevated, requiring people to remain indoors and to stay away from windows and other exposed areas.

Several explosions rang out in Doha on Thursday.

European Union leaders expressed support for Arab countries in the Gulf as Iran continues to launch missile and drone attacks on targets across the region, in response to attacks by the US and Israel.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas and other European leaders held talks with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) officials on Thursday in Brussels, denouncing what they described as “Iran’s inexcusable attacks against the GCC countries”.

Elsewhere n Friday, air defences shot down several drones in the Jordanian city of Irb, according to an Al Jazeera correspondent on the ground.

Global energy markets remain in a state of high alert after several Gulf states suspended oil and gas production following escalating tensions in the region.

Since Saturday’s attacks by the United States and Israel, Tehran has targeted various sites in Israel and across several Gulf countries.

Initially, these Iranian attacks focused primarily on US military assets, but Gulf states have reported that Iran has since broadened its scope to target civilian infrastructure, including hotels, airports and energy facilities. Iranian officials have publicly denied targeting Gulf energy facilities, however.

The Middle East remains the world’s dominant source of hydrocarbon reserves and a major driver of crude oil and natural gas output.

How much oil and gas does the Middle East have?

Nearly half of the world’s oil reserves and exports come from the Middle East, which contains five of the seven largest oil reserves in the world.

Once refined, crude oil is used to make various products, including petrol, diesel, jet fuel and a wide range of household items such as cleaning products, plastics and even lotions.

After Venezuela, which has 303 billion barrels, Saudi Arabia holds the world’s second-largest proven crude oil reserves, estimated at 267 billion barrels.

The Middle East’s largest oil reserves:

• Saudi Arabia: 267 billion barrels
• Iran: 209 billion barrels
• Iraq: 145 billion barrels
• UAE: 113 billion barrels
• Kuwait: 102 billion barrels

Saudi Arabia is also the world’s top oil exporter with an estimated $187bn of crude in 2024, according to data from the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC).

The Middle East’s top oil exporters:

• Saudi Arabia: $187bn
• UAE: $114bn
• Iraq: $98bn
• Iran: $47bn – largely sold at a discount due to US sanctions
• Kuwait: 29bn

Other Middle Eastern countries with sizeable oil exports include: Oman ($28.9bn), Kuwait ($28.8bn) and Qatar ($21bn).

In addition to crude oil, the Middle East is a global powerhouse for natural gas, accounting for nearly 18 percent of global production and approximately 40 percent of the world’s proven reserves.

Natural gas is primarily used for electricity generation, industrial heating, and in chemicals and fertilisers.

The heart of Middle Eastern gas is a single, massive underwater reservoir called the South Pars/North Dome field. It is the largest gasfield in the world, and it is shared directly between Qatar and Iran.

Gas is transported either through pipelines or by tankers. When using pipelines, the gas is pressurised and moved through steel networks. When pipelines are not feasible, such as across oceans, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is used.

To create LNG, the gas is cooled to approximately -162C (-260F), shrinking its volume and allowing it to be safely loaded onto specialised tanker ships for global transport.

To transport oil and gas, tankers from various Gulf states must navigate the narrow waterway known as the Strait of Hormuz. Approximately one-fifth of global oil and gas passes through this strait, primarily heading to major markets in Asia, including China, Japan, South Korea and India, as well as to Europe.

Which energy facilities have been attacked?

Here are the facilities which have recorded damage as of Wednesday:

Saudi Arabia – Ras Tanura oil refinery

On Monday, one of the world’s largest oil refining complexes, the Ras Tanura oil refinery owned by Saudi Aramco, was forced to halt operations after debris from intercepted Iranian drones caused a small fire.

Saudi Aramco is one of the world’s largest companies, with a market capitalisation exceeding $1.7 trillion and revenue of $480bn. Headquartered in Dhahran, in eastern Saudi Arabia, Aramco controls 12 percent of global oil production, with a capacity of more than 12 million barrels per day (bpd).

On Wednesday, Saudi defence officials reported a second drone attempt on the facility but this was successfully intercepted with no damage or disruption to operations reported.

Qatar – Ras Laffan Industrial City LNG facilities

On Monday, Qatar’s Ministry of Defence reported that Iranian drones had targeted an energy facility in Ras Laffan belonging to QatarEnergy, the world’s largest LNG producer.

While no casualties were reported, QatarEnergy suspended the production of LNG and other products at the impacted sites.

QatarEnergy’s 81 million metric tonnes of LNG exports are mostly bound for Asian markets, including China, Japan, India, South Korea, Pakistan and other countries in the region. The halt in production hiked global gas prices to a three-year high this week.

Qatar – Mesaieed Industrial City

Qatar’s Defence Ministry said the country was attacked by a second drone launched from Iran on Monday, targeting a water tank belonging to a power plant in Mesaieed, without reporting any casualties.

On Tuesday, QatarEnergy also stopped production of some downstream products like urea, polymers, methanol, aluminium and others.

UAE – Fujairah and Mussafah oil terminals

On Monday, a fire broke out at Mussafah Fuel Terminal in southwest Abu Dhabi after it was struck by a drone.

On Tuesday, falling debris from a drone interception caused a fire at the Fujairah Oil Terminal along the eastern coast of the United Arab Emirates. No injuries were reported.

Oman – ports of Duqm and Salalah

On Tuesday, multiple Iranian drones struck fuel tanks and a tanker at the port of Duqm, with at least one direct hit on a fuel storage tank, causing an explosion.

On the same day, a drone strike was recorded at the Port of Salalah, which handles fuel and industrial minerals.

Athe Nova – oil tanker

On Monday, the Athe Nova, a Honduran-flagged tanker positioned off the coast of Khor Fakkan, UAE, was struck by Iranian drones as it was transiting the Strait of Hormuz, setting it ablaze. Despite the fire, the vessel managed to exit the chokepoint into the Gulf of Oman, and no casualties were reported.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed responsibility for the strike, identifying the Athe Nova as an “ally of the United States”.

On the same day as the attack, Iran declared the Strait of Hormuz closed, warning that any ship attempting to pass would be “set ablaze”.

Since then, several other tankers have been hit.

Other regional energy disruptions

Although not directly targeted, the following energy sites suspended operations in response to Iranian retaliatory attacks:

Israeli offshore gasfields – Major gas production fields such as Leviathan and Tamar were shut down as a precaution following regional drone and missile launches linked to Iran.

Oil fields in semiautonomous Iraqi Kurdistan – Producers including DNO, Gulf Keystone and Dana Gas halted output as a safety measure amid the escalation.

Rumaila oilfield – Operations at Iraq’s largest oilfield – operated by BP – in southern Iraq were halted on Tuesday as a security precaution due to its proximity to the escalation zone.

As conflict in the Middle East enters its fifth day on Wednesday, American and Israeli officials are pushing rhetoric suggesting that the campaign against Iran is a religious war.

On Tuesday, Muslim civil rights organisation, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), condemned the Pentagon’s use of this rhetoric, deeming it “dangerous” and “anti-Muslim”.

The United States and Israel began their attack on Iran on Saturday and have continued to carry out strikes on Iran since then. In retaliation, Iran has hit back at targets in Israel, and US military assets in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq and Cyprus.

A US watchdog has reported that US troops have been told the war is intended to “induce the biblical end of times”. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also recently stated that Iran is run by “religious fanatic lunatics”.

What are American and Israeli leaders saying?

US watchdog Military Religious Freedom Foundation (MRFF) said it has received emailed complaints that US service members were told the war with Iran is meant to “cause Armageddon”, or the biblical “end times”.

An unnamed noncommissioned officer wrote in an email to MRFF that a commander had urged officers “to tell our troops that this was ‘all part of God’s divine plan’ and he specifically referenced numerous citations out of the Book of Revelation referring to Armageddon and the imminent return of Jesus Christ”.

The MRFF is a nonprofit organisation dedicated to upholding religious freedom for US service members.

The officer claimed the commander had told the unit that Trump “has been anointed by Jesus to light the signal fire in Iran to cause Armageddon and mark his return to Earth”.

Israeli and US leaders have also resorted to religious rhetoric in public.

Last month, Mike Huckabee, the US ambassador to Israel, told conservative US commentator Tucker Carlson during an interview that it would be “fine” if Israel took “essentially the entire Middle East” because it was promised the land in the Bible. However, Huckabee added that Israel was not seeking to do so.

Speaking to the media on Tuesday this week, Rubio said: “Iran is run by lunatics – religious fanatic lunatics. They have an ambition to have nuclear weapons.”

And, the previous day in a Pentagon news briefing, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said: “Crazy regimes like Iran, hell-bent on prophetic Islamic delusions, cannot have nuclear weapons.”

In its statement, CAIR claimed that Hegseth’s words are “an apparent reference to Shia beliefs about religious figures arising near the end times”.

On Sunday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu referenced the Torah, comparing Iran with an ancient biblical enemy, the Amalekites. The “Amalek” are known in Jewish tradition as representing “pure evil”.

“We read in this week’s Torah portion, ‘Remember what Amalek did to you.’ We remember – and we act.”

CAIR said: “We are not surprised to see Benjamin Netanyahu once again using the biblical story of Amalek – which claims that God commanded the Israelites to murder every man, woman, child and animal in a pagan nation that attacked them – to justify Israel’s mass murder of civilians in Iran, just as it did in Gaza.”

The statement added that every American should be “deeply disturbed by the ‘holy war’ rhetoric” being spread by the US military, Hegseth and Netanyahu to justify the war on Iran.

“Mr Hegseth’s derisive comment about ‘Islamist prophetic delusions’, an apparent reference to Shia beliefs about religious figures arising near the end times, was unacceptable. So is US military commanders telling troops that war with Iran is a biblical step towards Armageddon.”

Why are US and Israeli leaders framing the conflict with Iran as a religious war?

By attempting to frame the conflict as a holy war, leaders are using theological beliefs to “justify action, mobilise political opinion, and leverage support”, Jolyon Mitchell, a professor at Durham University in the UK, told Al Jazeera.

“Many on both sides of this conflict believe that they have God on their side. God is enlisted in this conflict, as with many others, to support acts of violence. The demonisation and dehumanisation of the enemy, the ‘other’, will inevitably make building peace after the conflict even harder,” Mitchell said.

“There are several overlapping reasons, and they operate at different levels: domestic mobilisation, civilisational framing, and strategic narrative construction,” Ibrahim Abusharif, an associate professor at Northwestern University in Qatar, told Al Jazeera.

Domestic mobilisation refers to rallying a country’s own people. Leaders can frame conflict as religious and hence morally clear and urgent, rallying public support, he said.

In a video circulating on social media this week, Christian Zionist pastor and televangelist John Hagee is seen delivering a sermon promoting the US assault on Iran. Hagee said that Russia, Turkiye, “what’s left of Iran” and “groups of Islamics” will march into Israel. He said that God will “crush” the “adversaries of Israel”.

“Religious language mobilises domestic constituencies,” Abusharif said, explaining that in the US, this connects deeply with many evangelicals and Christian Zionists, because they already see Middle East wars as part of a religious “end times” story.

“References to the ‘end times’, the Book of Revelation, or biblical enemies are not incidental; they activate a cultural script already present in American political theology.”

Civilisational framing refers to the creation of an “us vs them” dichotomy, casting the conflict as a clash between whole ways of life or faiths, not just a dispute over borders or policy, he added. Hence, statements such as Hegseth’s reference to “prophetic Islamic delusions” simplify the terms of the war in the minds of ordinary people.

“Wars are difficult to justify in technical strategic language,” Abusharif said.

“Casting the conflict as a struggle between ‘civilisation and fanaticism’, or between biblical ‘good and evil’, transforms a complicated regional confrontation into a moral drama that ordinary audiences can easily grasp.”

“Israeli leadership has long used biblical referents as political language. We all are familiar with it. The narratives have become globalised. In Israeli political discourse, this language situates contemporary conflict within a long historical narrative of Jewish survival, and it signals existential stakes,” Abusharif said.

Have US or Israeli leaders made religious references before?

Netanyahu and other Israeli officials have used the term “Amalek” before in reference to Palestinians in Gaza during Israel’s genocidal war in Gaza.

Historically, during wars or military confrontations, US presidents and senior officials have also invoked the Bible or used Christian language.

President George W Bush invoked similar language after the September 11, 2001 attacks.

On September 16, 2001, Bush said: “This crusade, this war on terrorism, is going to take a while.” The Crusades were a series of religiously framed wars, mainly between the 11th and 13th centuries, in which the papacy fought against Muslim rulers for territory.

The White House later tried to distance Bush from the word “crusade” to clarify that Bush was not waging a war against Muslims.

Abusharif said that the war on Iran is about power and politics, but using religious rhetoric energises supporters and “moralises” the conflict.

“The war itself is not theological. It is geopolitical. But the language surrounding it increasingly draws on sacred imagery and civilisational narratives. That rhetoric can mobilise supporters and frame the conflict in morally absolute terms,” Abusharif said.

“Yet it also carries risks: once a war is cast in sacred language, political compromise becomes harder, expectations become higher, and the global perception of the conflict can shift in ways that complicate diplomacy.”

The Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) is constantly updating its advice as the situation changes in the Middle East and has now issued guidance for stranded Brits trying to get home

In the past few days, the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) has had to update its advice several times in the wake of the constantly changing situation in the Middle East.

An estimated 132,000 Brits have registered their presence in the Middle East with the FCDO, and many will be looking to leave the area and return to the UK as soon as its safe.

Last night, the FCDO took to X (formerly Twitter) to issue a travel update for Brits currently in Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, or the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

The updates offer advice to Brits looking to leave the above countries, including which routes to avoid when travelling by road, and the latest situation with commercial air flights. It also updated information on the Taba Border Crossing, with the updated advice page stating: “International borders in Israel and Palestine could close at short notice, including the Taba border crossing between Israel and Egypt. Check with local authorities and read Israel travel advice and Palestine travel advice before trying to cross.”

For Brits in the UAE, including Dubai, the FCDO has updated its advice on leaving the country. Its updated information says: “There are a limited number of commercial options available, including by air from UAE and from Oman. If your presence in UAE is not essential, you may wish to consider departing – if you judge you can access these options safely.

“Check for the latest updates from your airline or tour operator, as well as the instructions from local authorities, and the status of any border crossings before you travel. If you are traveling by air do not travel to the airport unless your airline has confirmed your reservation.

“Make sure you have access to emergency supplies and essential medication. Travel within or out of UAE is at your own risk.

“Keep your departure plans under review and ensure your travel documents are up to date, including any visas required for onward travel.”

Some countries also have a Regional Risks section which includes specific advice on which areas should be avoided and the alternatives. However, the FCDO is careful to state that all travel in or out of these countries is still at the individual’s own risk. Brits should still ensure they follow the advice of local authorities and get up to date information before setting off.

While travel between the UK and the Middle East is still severely disrupted, some flights have been running on limited routes to bring Brits home from Dubai since yesterday (March 3).

Emirates and Etihad have been operating a very limited service, and Virgin Atlantic confirmed it is resuming services from Dubai and Riyadh to London-Heathrow.

READ MORE: TUI gives major update on Cyprus holidays and confirms next flight datesREAD MORE: First Dubai flights as Emirates and Etihad operate very limited routes

Brits who are still in the Middle East should register their presence on the FCDO website as this will ensure they get the latest Foreign Office advice. Only UK passport holders can register for this service.

Have a story you want to share? Email us at webtravel@reachplc.com

Qatar’s state-run energy firm says it has halted liquefied natural gas production after Iranian attacks, sending gas prices soaring in Europe, as Saudi Arabia announced it was temporarily shutting down some units of the Ras Tanura oil refinery located near the country’s eastern region after a fire broke out following a drone attack.

“Due to military attacks on QatarEnergy’s operating facilities in Ras Laffan Industrial City and Mesaieed Industrial City in the State of Qatar, QatarEnergy has ceased production of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and associated products,” the world’s largest LNG producer said in a statement on Monday.

Shortly after the announcement, natural gas prices in Europe soared by almost 50 percent.

Earlier, Qatar’s Defence Ministry said the country was attacked by two drones launched from Iran. “One drone targeted a water tank belonging to a power plant in Mesaieed, and the other targeted an energy facility in Ras Laffan Industrial City, belonging to QatarEnergy, without reporting any human casualties,” it said in a statement.

“All damages and losses resulting from the attack will be assessed by the relevant authorities, and an official statement will be issued later,” it added.

The Saudi Ministry of Defence, in reports carried by the state-run Saudi Press Agency (SPA), said two drones had “attempted to attack” the Ras Tanura refinery on Monday morning, and that a “small” fire had broken out after they were intercepted.

Footage verified by Al Jazeera showed plumes of smoke rising from the oil facility, located on Saudi Arabia’s Gulf coast. The ministry said the refinery “sustained limited damage”, but there were no casualties.

Ras Tanura oil refinery, one of the world’s largest oil processing facilities located near the eastern city of Dammam, has a capacity of 550,000 barrels per day. The facility is home to one of the largest refineries in the Middle East and is considered a cornerstone of the kingdom’s energy sector.

The attacks come as oil tankers have been piling up on either side of the Strait of Hormuz, through which about a fifth of the world’s seaborne oil and the bulk of Qatari gas flows.

The maritime disruptions and fears of a prolonged conflict have led to a sharp rise in global oil prices, which will have a significant impact on the global economy.

Iran has been launching retaliatory strikes, mainly targeting Israel and military facilities of the United States across the Middle East, after the US and Israel launched massive air strikes on the country.

In a statement published by SPA, the Saudi Ministry of Energy said some operations had been halted as a “precautionary measure” and that it did not foresee “any impact on the supply of petroleum products to local markets”.

Saudi Arabia had earlier said it would “take all necessary measures to defend its security and protect its territory, citizens, and residents, including the option of responding to the aggression” after Iran targeted the capital Riyadh and the country’s eastern region with strikes over the weekend.

The US, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates issued a joint statement on Sunday condemning Iranian attacks across the region and affirming their right to self-defence.

Rob Geist Pinfold, lecturer in defence studies at King’s College London, told Al Jazeera that Iran “knows exactly what it’s doing” by attacking the Gulf countries.

“These countries have less of an appetite for a fight because, at the end of the day, this is not their war. So, Iran is banking that they will want a ceasefire as soon as possible, that they will be pressuring the Trump administration. But we have no signs of that whatsoever so far,” he said.

Pinfold added that there seems to be a “show of force” and “of unity” coming from the Gulf states, at least rhetorically.

“They’re trying to get the message across that they are one and that they are united and that they are resilient,” Pinfold said. “But under the surface, there are profound disagreements here about how to engage with Iran and whether to engage with Iran at all.”

Videos show smoke rising from a refinery operated by Saudi Aramco after a fire broke out, which Saudi officials say was caused by debris from an intercepted Iranian missile. Oil prices have surged sharply amid the disruption and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, raising fears over global supply.

President Trump’s decision to strike Iran creates new risks for a significant chunk of the world’s oil supply.

The Islamic Republic itself pumps about 3.3 million barrels a day, or 3% of global output, making it the fourth-largest producer in OPEC. But the nation wields far greater influence over the world’s energy supplies because of its strategic location.

Iran sits on one side of the Strait of Hormuz, the shipping lane for about a fifth of the world’s crude from key suppliers including Saudi Arabia and Iraq. While the waterway remains open, some oil tankers were avoiding sailing through following the attacks and ships were piling up on either side of the entrance, tracking data compiled by Bloomberg show.

Oil markets are closed for the weekend, and there was no initial information on whether the attacks on Iran and the country’s retaliatory strikes across the region Saturday targeted any energy assets.

Here are the pressure points to watch in oil as events unfold.

Iran’s production

Iran produces about 3.3 million barrels of oil a day, up from less than 2 million barrels a day in 2020 despite continued international sanctions. The country has become more adept at skirting these restrictions, sending about 90% of its exports to China.

The largest oil deposits are Ahvaz and Marun and the West Karun cluster, all in Khuzestan province.

Iran’s main refinery, built at Abadan in 1912, can process more than 500,000 barrels a day. Other key plants include the Bandar Abbas and Persian Gulf Star refineries, which handle crude and condensate, a type of ultra-light oil that’s abundant in Iran. The capital, Tehran, has its own refinery.

For Iran’s overseas shipments, the Kharg Island terminal in the northern Persian Gulf is the main logistical hub. There was an explosion on the island Saturday, according to Iran’s semiofficial Mehr news agency, which didn’t provide details or make any reference to the oil terminal.

Kharg Island has numerous loading berths, jetties, remote mooring points and tens of millions of barrels of crude storage capacity. The facilities have handled export volumes exceeding 2 million barrels a day in recent years.

U.S. sanctions discourage most potential buyers of Iran’s crude, but private Chinese refiners have remained willing customers, provided they get steep discounts. For international shipments, Iran relies on a fleet of aging tankers that mostly sail with their transponders deactivated to avoid detection.

Earlier this month, Iran was rapidly filling tankers at Kharg Island, probably in an effort to get as much crude on the water and move vessels out of harm’s way in case the facility was attacked. It was a move similar to last June ahead of Israeli and U.S. attacks.

Any strike on Kharg Island would be a desperate blow for the country’s economy.

Iran’s main natural gas fields are farther to the south along the Persian Gulf coast. Facilities at Assaluyeh and Bandar Abbas process, transport and ship gas and condensate for domestic use in power generation, heating, petrochemicals and other industries.

The area is the main point for Iran’s condensate exports. During the June war, an attack on a local gas plant sparked jitters among traders, but didn’t cause a lasting spike in oil prices because it didn’t affect any export facilities.

Regional Dangers

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned on Feb. 1 of a “regional war” if his country was attacked by the U.S. Tehran has claimed that a full closure of the Strait of Hormuz is within its power.

It would be an extreme step that the country has never taken but remains a nightmare scenario for global markets.

Hormuz is the chokepoint for bulk of the Persian Gulf’s exports of crude and also refined fuels such as diesel and jet fuel. Qatar, one of world’s biggest liquefied natural gas exporters, also relies on the strait. At least three gas tankers going to or from Qatar had paused voyages following the latest attacks in the region, according to ship-tracking data.

A seized South Korean-flagged tanker is escorted by Iranian Revolutionary Guard boats in the Persian Gulf’s Strait of Hormuz in January 2021. If Iran were to close the strait after the U.S.-Israel strikes Saturday, it would likely cause a massive disruption to exports and cause crude prices to spike.

(Tasnim News Agency via AP)

While OPEC members Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have some ability to reroute their shipments via pipelines that avoid Hormuz, closing the strait would still cause a massive disruption to exports and cause crude prices to spike.

There were signs that other Gulf producers were also accelerating shipments in February. Saudi Arabia’s crude shipments averaged about 7.3 million barrels a day in the first 24 days of the month, the most in almost three years. Combined flows from Iraq, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates were set to climb almost 600,000 barrels a day from the same period in January, according to data from Vortexa Ltd.

In the past, Tehran has made retaliatory strikes on some of its neighbors’ energy assets. In 2019, Saudi Arabia blamed Tehran for a drone attack on its Abqaiq oil processing facility that halted production equivalent to about 7% of global crude supply.

Many observers say it’s improbable that Iran could keep Hormuz closed for long, making lower-impact actions like harassment of shipping more likely.

During last year’s war on Iran by Israel and the U.S., nearly 1,000 vessels a day were having their GPS signals jammed near Iran’s coast, contributing to one tanker collision. Sea mines are another long-threatened option for deterring shipping.

Market reactions

Oil surged the most in more than three years during the June war, with Brent crude rising above $80 a barrel in London. However, the gains quickly faded once it became clear that key regional oil infrastructure hadn’t been damaged.

Since then, concerns about an oversupply have dominated global markets, with crude in London ending 2025 about 18% lower than where it started.

Despite those fears of a glut, prices have surged 19% this year, partly due to fears of U.S. strikes on Iran.

With the main oil futures closed for the weekend, there’s limited insight into how traders are reacting to the latest attacks. However, a retail trading product, run by IG Group Ltd., was pricing West Texas Intermediate as high as $75.33, a gain of as much as 12% from Friday’s close.

Burkhardt and Di Paola write for Bloomberg. Bloomberg writer Julian Lee contributed to this report.

Days after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proposed forging a network of allied nations, including in the Middle East and Africa, to stand against what he called “radical” adversaries, the country’s president is on an official visit to key ally, Ethiopia.

It is not yet known which Arab and African countries will form part of Netanyahu’s hypothetical “hexagon of alliances”, which he said on Sunday will include Israel, India, Greece, Cyprus and others to stand against their enemies in the Middle East. Chief among those enemies is presumably Iran and its network of resistance groups from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Houthis of Yemen.

Analysts doubt Israel could secure enough influence over nation-states to form a formal security pact.

However, the country is deepening its ongoing charm offensive in Africa, which it began during the genocide in Gaza, as its reputation suffered a decline on the continent, with the African Union (AU) releasing multiple statements condemning Israeli attacks on Palestinian civilians.

In a rare visit, Israeli President Isaac Herzog arrived in Ethiopia on Tuesday. The last presidential trip to the East African country took place in 2018.

“The relationship between our peoples is woven deep into the pages of history and human tradition,” Herzog said in a statement upon his arrival. “At the heart of the story of both our nations lies a clear common thread – the ability to join hands, unite resources of spirit and substance, to innovate, develop, and grow for the benefit of all.”

Herzog, on Wednesday, met with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed who said the two leaders talked about “ways to improve collaboration in areas of mutual interest,” without revealing further details.

But beneath the surface, observers say the visit also represents a battle for influence over Addis Ababa, which has received similar high-level delegations from Turkiye and Saudi Arabia in recent days.

Shared ties and shared anger

Ethiopia and Israel are bound by several links, from shared histories of their people to shared scrutiny over recent political moves in the Horn of Africa that have angered several of the region’s influential nations.

Both countries maintain friendly ties largely due to the Beta Israel community, or Ethiopian Jews, who hail from northern Tigray and Amhara. Historically, Ethiopian Jews suffered religious persecution, and after Israel’s formation, it sought their emigration under its Law of Return policy. Between the late 1970s and mid-1990s, tens of thousands of Ethiopian Jews were covertly transported to Israel – during a time when several African countries, including Ethiopia, had cut off ties with Israel over the 1973 Yom Kippur War and its invasion of Egypt. On the cusp of a civil war in Ethiopia in 1991, Mossad, Israel’s spy agency, launched a daring operation that airlifted 14,000 Ethiopians over the course of just two days.

About 160,000 Ethiopian Jews now live in Israel. Many within the community have struggled to integrate and have complained of discrimination and racism. In 2019, tens of thousands of Ethiopian Jews flooded the streets in protest across Israeli cities after a 19-year-old of Ethiopian origin was shot dead by the police.

Ethiopia-Israel state relations have, meanwhile, remained steady. In 2016, when Netanyahu visited the country in his first prime ministerial visit – Addis Ababa became one of the first African countries to voice support for Israel’s long-sought observer status at the AU. Fierce opposition from South Africa, Algeria and other countries supporting Palestine delayed the process until 2021. Later, in 2023, the AU confirmed it had withdrawn the status.

Mashav, Israel’s aid agency, has, in the past decade, provided aid to Ethiopia in the form of agriculture and water cooperation projects, although Addis Ababa receives much more significant funding from wealthier partners like China. When Israel sponsored several African journalists on media trips to the country last year, Ethiopia was among the countries it invited journalists from.

More recently, both countries are bound by their support for Somaliland, which Somalia claims as part of its territory and which Israel sees as critical to its own national security, Hargeisa-based analyst Moustafa Ahmad told Al Jazeera.

In December, Israel recognised Somaliland’s statehood, becoming the first country to do so. Months before, there were unconfirmed talks about plans to move displaced Palestinians to Somaliland or to South Sudan, another key Israeli ally in the region. Analysts speculate that countries like South Sudan and the United Arab Emirates, another close friend of Israel, may also recognise Somaliland.

Israel’s focus on the Horn of Africa intensified after a late 2024 report from a United Nations expert panel, which found that the Somalia-based armed group, al-Shabab, was actively collaborating with Yemen’s Houthis. Where the Houthis were providing weapons and drone training, al-Shabab was, in return, granting access to a smuggling corridor stretching along the Somali coast and connecting to the Gulf of Aden, where Iranian weapons could be smuggled into Yemen.

The move to recognise Somaliland was therefore meant to disrupt that cooperation by stationing an Israeli naval base in the region, analysts note.

“It’s part of their calculations even if they haven’t said it publicly,” Ahmad said.

Several countries, as well as the AU, have pushed back on Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, calling it a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty. In Somaliland, however, many have celebrated the move.

Addis Ababa under pressure

While neither Israel nor Ethiopia has provided details of topics on the agenda during Herzog’s visit, Somaliland is likely at the top of the list.

Addis Ababa had in 2024 enraged its neighbours after it signed a controversial port deal with Hargeisa that would allow it access to the sea, reportedly in exchange for a future recognition of Somaliland. Although massive and rapidly industrialising, Ethiopia is landlocked, having lost its sea access after Eritrea seceded in 1993. Prime Minister Abiy has often said sea access is critical for his country.

The fall-out between Ethiopia and Somalia was so severe that analysts sounded the alarm over possible armed conflict between the two neighbours until Turkiye, a key development partner for Mogadishu, stepped in to smooth things over by pressuring Addis Ababa to coordinate with Mogadishu instead.

It is likely, analysts say, that Israel is now hoping to push Ethiopia further towards recognising Somaliland, which boasts a 850km (528-mile) coastline. In Hargeisa, many are disappointed after more countries failed to follow Israel’s steps, Ahmad said.

Addis Ababa, though, might not appreciate further pressure at the moment as it faces increasing regional isolation on several fronts.

One key reason is the controversial Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which Egypt and Sudan say is blocking the water supply they need for irrigation.

A source of national pride for Ethiopians, the dam was funded almost entirely through citizens’ donations and government funds. Israeli engineers participated in the project, and Israel reportedly sold weapons to Ethiopia to protect the dam amid tensions with its neighbours, although the Israeli government denies this.

At the same time, Addis Ababa is also facing tensions with Eritrea, which has moved closer to Somalia and Egypt. Both countries have historically feuded, and recently, tensions have again risen over the 2020 Tigray War and Abiy’s repeated statements about his country needing access to the sea.

“Addis Ababa is cautious of making a decision that will cement its regional isolation at this time [because] it is clearly hedging among various actors seeking to influence the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region,” Ahmad said.

Pressure is also mounting on Addis Ababa from countries eager to keep the status quo.

On Sunday, Turkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Ethiopia and said in his speech: “I would like to emphasise that Israel’s recognition of Somaliland does not benefit Somaliland or the Horn of Africa.”

His statement drew a backlash from Hargeisa, which called it “unacceptable interference” aimed at wrecking relations between Somaliland and its partners.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, which is embroiled in an ongoing rift with the United Arab Emirates over how to deal with the conflict in Yemen, also intervened in the fray in February. Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Waleed Elkhereiji was in Addis Ababa this week to discuss “regional peace”, just two weeks after Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud arrived in the city for talks with Abiy.

So far, it is unclear if Riyadh has recorded any success in influencing Addis Ababa.

How Israel will fare in that regard is also still unclear.

Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, denounce US ambassador’s remarks suggesting Israel has right to much of the Middle East.

United States Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee has triggered an avalanche of criticism from Arab and Muslim countries after suggesting Israel has a right to expand its territory across a large swath of the Middle East.

Huckabee delivered the remarks during a sit-down interview with US commentator Tucker Carlson, broadcast on Friday, as he was pressed about the geographical borders of Israel.

Carlson asked Huckabee, a self-professed Christian Zionist and staunch supporter of Israel, to clarify his stance on the Biblical promise of the land spanning the area between the Euphrates River in Iraq and the Nile River in Egypt to the descendants of Abraham, and if the modern Israeli state had the right to claim that lineage.

“It would be fine if they took it all,” said Huckabee.

Such territory would encompass modern-day Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and parts of Saudi Arabia.

The US ambassador later appeared to walk back the claim, saying it was “somewhat of a hyperbolic statement”. He also said Israel was not looking to expand its territory and has a right to security in the land it currently holds.

‘Extremist rhetoric’

Huckabee’s comments sparked immediate backlash from neighbouring Egypt and Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the League of Arab States, which in separate statements called them “extremist”, “provocative” and “not in line with Washington’s official position”.

Saudi Arabia’s foreign ministry described Huckabee’s comments as “extremist rhetoric” and “unacceptable”, and called for the US Department of State to provide clarification.

Egypt’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the remarks a “blatant violation” of international law, adding that “Israel has no sovereignty over the occupied Palestinian territory or other Arab lands.”

Jordan’s foreign ministry dismissed them as “absurd and provocative,” a violation of diplomatic norms and “an infringement on the sovereignty of states in the region”.

“Statements of this nature — extremist and lacking any sound basis — serve only to inflame sentiments and stir religious and national emotions”, the League of Arab States also said in a statement.

Huckabee, whom US President Donald Trump nominated as ambassador in 2024, has long opposed the idea of a two-state solution for Israel and the Palestinian people, and denied the existence of an illegal Israeli occupation of the West Bank. Back in 2008, Huckabee went so far as to question Palestinian identity altogether, saying, “There’s really no such thing as a Palestinian.”

In 2024, the International Court of Justice ruled that Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory is illegal and must cease immediately.

But Israeli law does not clearly demarcate the country’s borders. Israel also occupies the Golan Heights in Syria, which it illegally annexed in 1981.

The US is the only country that recognises Israel’s claimed sovereignty over the Syrian territory, and only since 2019, during Trump’s first term as president.

After its 2024 war with Hezbollah, Israel also set up military outposts in five points inside Lebanon.

Some Israeli politicians, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have openly promoted the idea of a “Greater Israel” with expanded borders.