Sanctions

Caracas, April 2, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The US Treasury Department removed Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) “Specially Designated Nationals” list on Wednesday, April 1.

Rodríguez had been on the list since 2018. The sanctioned individuals are barred from any sort of economic or financial relationship with US entities and have any US-based assets frozen.

The Venezuelan acting head of state reacted to the decision with a message on her X account, calling it “a step in the direction of normalizing and strengthening relations between our countries.”

Rodríguez added that she is confident this step will lead to the lifting of all sanctions currently in place against Venezuela “in order to guarantee an effective binational cooperation agenda” that benefits both Washington and Caracas. In recent weeks, the Trump administration has issued licenses allowing Western corporations to engage with the Venezuelan energy and mining sectors, but wide-reaching coercive measures remain in place.

The US government targeted Rodríguez in September 2018, Trump’s first presidential term, alleging that the then–vice president was part of a group that contributed “to the destruction of democracy.” The same round of sanctions targeted First Lady and Deputy Cilia Flores, as well as Vladimir Padrino López and Jorge Rodríguez, who respectively served as defense and communications ministers at the time.

Delcy Rodríguez denounced the 2018 measures as “illegal” and “unjust,” arguing that they were part of an “economic blockade” that undermined her country’s right to food, health, and sovereignty.

The Venezuelan leader’s sanctions removal opens the door for direct engagement with US entities and multilateral organizations such as the IMF. Creditors have likewise expressed intentions to launch renegotiation efforts surrounding Venezuela’s sizable foreign debt.

The Trump administration’s move comes on the heels of a fast-tracked rapprochement with Washington that Rodríguez has spearheaded since the January 3 attacks and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro. Rodríguez, who took over the acting presidency, has hosted a number of high‑ranking US officials, among them Trump Energy Secretary Chris Wright.

Similarly, last week Rodríguez took part via videoconference in a business gathering in Miami organized by Saudi Arabia’s Future Investment Initiative Institute. During her address, she touted the country’s recent pro-business reforms and urged investors to come to Venezuela.

Caracas and Washington formally reestablished diplomatic ties on March 5, with the Trump administration recognizing the acting president as Venezuela’s “sole” leader days later.

Regaining control of CITGO

The lifting of coercive measures against the Venezuelan acting president raised the possibility of the Rodríguez acting government retaking control of US-based assets that had been frozen and placed under the control of the hardline opposition. According to Reuters, Venezuelan authorities are preparing to take control of the boards of directors of the US subsidiaries of state oil company PDVSA, including refiner CITGO. However, the US State Department must also sign off on the appointments.

This past March, PDVSA’s board ratified Asdrúbal Chávez, cousin of the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, as director of all its US subsidiaries. Nonetheless, Chávez, who was previously denied a US visa to run Houston-based CITGO, has been unable to manage the companies for more than seven years.

CITGO has been administered since 2019 by boards of directors appointed by a defunct Venezuelan opposition‑led National Assembly whose term expired in January 2021. The company, which is Venezuela’s most valuable foreign asset, underwent a long and protracted court-mandated auction to satisfy creditor demands which concluded with a winning bid from vulture fund Elliott Management.

The CITGO sale requires a US Treasury license in order to conclude. The Trump administration has not publicly disclosed whether it will greenlight or halt the ownership transfer.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Caracas, March 30, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The US Treasury Department has published three sanctions waivers related to the Venezuelan mining sector.

On Friday, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued general licenses 51A (GL51A), 54 (GL54) and 55 (GL55) to authorize Western conglomerates’ dealings with Venezuelan minerals.

GL51A allows US entities to engage in operations to purchase, transport, and sell “Venezuelan-origin minerals, including gold.” However, it does not permit extraction or refining activities. The waiver replaced General License 51, which established conditions only for gold-related operations.

GL54 allows US entities to provide “goods, technology, software, or services” connected to mining activities in Venezuela. Finally, GL55 grants corporations permission to engage with Venezuelan state entities to negotiate contracts, but requires them to apply for a specific license before the contracts are enacted.

The latest US Treasury sanctions exemptions mirror recent licenses related to the Venezuelan energy industry, blocking transactions with entities from Cuba, China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. They likewise mandate that all Venezuela-bound payments be made to a US Treasury-run account. Since January, the Trump administration has imposed control over Venezuelan oil exports, collecting revenues before disbursing a portion at its discretion to Caracas. 

On Friday, Canadian conglomerate Roland Mineral Enterprises announced plans to “aggressively seek out and acquire interests in Venezuelan mineral properties.”

“Recent material events in Venezuela, including the new Draft Mining Law, make Venezuelan gold, silver and copper deposits and resources especially attractive for pioneering, transformative and rapidly adaptable resource companies like Roland Mineral Enterprises,” a press statement read.

Roland went on to disclose deals to access information on Venezuelan natural resource deposits and declare interest in gold projects such as Las Cristinas, estimated to contain over 14 million ounces of gold.

Western interest in Venezuelan minerals was boosted by a recent visit from US Interior Secretary Doug Burgum, who holds the natural resource portfolio. Burgum, accompanied by over 20 US and Canadian mining executives, held a meeting with Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez and trumpeted the lucrative opportunities in the sector.

Burgum’s visit also saw US $100 million worth of gold bars shipped to the US in a deal involving Trafigura.

The negotiation of mining contracts remains contingent on an ongoing process to introduce new legislation. On March 9, the Venezuelan National Assembly preliminarily approved a new Organic Mining Law establishing favorable conditions and incentives for foreign capital.

Legislators have advanced in debating a second and updated version of the law, approving the first 55 of its 130 articles on Thursday. A final session is expected in early April. According to a draft of the latest version of the law seen by Venezuelanalysis, the bill establishes a new regulatory framework for mining at different scales, while also allowing private companies to take disputes to international arbitration.

The law expands conditions for private mining concessions, which can last up to twenty years and be renewed for two additional ten-year periods, and do not require National Assembly approval. Additionally, the executive can lower fiscal responsibilities for mining firms at its discretion. The law establishes 13 and 6 percent caps for royalties and a mining tax.

The law’s approval will repeal the current mining law, approved by the Hugo Chávez government in 1999, as well as a 2015 decree imposing state control over mining activities. Since 2015, the Nicolás Maduro administration looked to mining as a potential revenue source, particularly in the 112,000 square-kilometer Orinoco Mining Arc. Nevertheless, the sector was targeted by US sanctions, while the proliferation of irregular mining groups has generated environmental and human rights concerns.

Venezuela possesses vast proven reserves of gold, iron, and bauxite, as well as lesser quantities of copper and nickel. Analysts have also drawn attention to Venezuela’s significant reserves of coltan.

Venezuela’s mining reform follows a pro-business overhaul of the country’s Hydrocarbon Law. In recent weeks, Western energy giants Chevron, Eni, Repsol, and Shell have signed agreements for oil and gas exploration under the improved conditions of the new law. Acting President Rodríguez has touted the country’s reforms in lobbying foreign investors.

In parallel to oil and mining, Venezuelan authorities are also preparing to open the state-run electric sector to private capital. Acting President Rodríguez announced legislative reform plans, while a spokesman for the FEDECÁMARAS business lobby reported that Siemens and General Electric recently sent delegations to evaluate Venezuela’s electrical infrastructure.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Fusagasugá, Colombia.

Carlos Mendoza Potellá is an economist and university professor with vast experience and expertise regarding the Venezuelan oil industry. In this exclusive interview with Venezuelanalysis, Mendoza Potellá offers his analysis on the recent reform of the Hydrocarbon Law, the longstanding influence of Western conglomerates over Venezuela’s energy sector, and the struggle for sovereignty.

In late January, the Venezuelan National Assembly approved a reform of the Hydrocarbon Law. What are your views on the new law?

In broad terms, it is the relinquishing of our condition as a sovereign nation, plain and simple. We are not a nation anymore. We are a territory with some delegate administrators implementing decisions made abroad. Who decides? Emperor Trump, who has his proconsul Marco Rubio.

The approved law meets the maximum demands that the Venezuelan right and the oil conglomerates have been making for at least the last 25 years. The 2002 coup against Chávez was to impose something like this, the return to the old concession model. It is the fulfillment of all the dreams of the old “meritocratic” leadership of [state oil company PDVSA], the people who did everything to minimize the fiscal contributions to the country, whether that meant buying 37 refineries abroad or other disasters that wrecked the country.

The reform is a victory for international oil capital, alongside a discourse that hands over the destiny of the industry to major corporations and diminishes national participation as some unproductive “rentierism.”

The Venezuelan oil industry has gone through various stages, with varying degrees of influence from major transnational corporations, whether that is the period prior to the formal nationalization in 1976 or the Oil Liberalization (Apertura Petrolera) of the 1990s. How do we situate the new law within that context?

I believe this is a step backward beyond the apertura or the pre-nationalization period –perhaps it’s a return to 1832! In 1829, Simón Bolívar issued a decree transferring the Spanish crown’s mining rights to Gran Colombia. This, in turn, was based on old medieval law, essentially establishing that mines were the property of the sovereign, the king. In fact, that is where the term “royalty” comes from –as a tribute to the king. And in 1832, when Venezuela separated from Gran Colombia, that decree ratified the nation’s ownership of its mines. 

Obviously, oil didn’t emerge until 30 or 40 years later, but by 1866 concessions were already being granted. For a time, people spoke of “material that comes from the subsoil,” even though everyone already knew it was oil.

Our first boom was with asphalt. In 1883, Guzmán Blanco granted the Lago Guanoco concession to his buddy Horacio Hamilton, who later transferred it to the New York & Bermúdez Company, a subsidiary of the US firm General Asphalt. The asphalt boom lasted 50 years, and with it, streets and highways were built all over the United States.

But the example of New York & Bermúdez is significant because when Cipriano Castro came to power in 1899, he found out that the company had not paid taxes and attempted to collect them. What did the corporation do? It financed the so-called Revolución Libertadora led by Manuel Antonio Matos, a banker from La Victoria, which was ultimately defeated after two bloody battles. It was the first instance of foreign hydrocarbon interests seeking to control national politics. And it was always linked to the United States.

In the 1920s, then-dictator Juan Vicente Gómez tasked his minister, Gumersindo Torres, with drafting a hydrocarbons law, but the foreign companies did not like it. And Gómez told them, “Well, then, write the law yourselves!” Later, in 1936, the López Contreras administration drafted a very good law, but since it wasn’t retroactive, the companies did not mind because they already had their concessions granted.

When do we start seeing the first steps toward Venezuelan oil nationalism?

It was precisely in 1941 that Medina Angarita took office and commissioned a massive dossier on all the concessions in the country, informing the US government that Venezuela was aware of the importance of its oil. This was during World War II, and the oil companies were haunted by the specter of the 1938 Mexican nationalization under the government of Lázaro Cárdenas.

What was [Franklin D.] Roosevelt’s response? He sent a delegation from the State Department, not to intercede on behalf of the oil companies, but to convince them to accept Medina’s reform, because Venezuelan oil was vital to the war effort. The law passed in 1943 was quite progressive. Its first article stated that hydrocarbons are a matter of national public interest, and as such, concessions were granted for a maximum term of 40 years. Eighty percent of the concessions were granted at that time, to expire in 1983.

Venezuelan production grew through the 1970s, but as the end of the concessions approached, the transnational corporations began implementing policies to somewhat ease the hostility toward foreign investment.

Thus, a policy of “Venezuelanization” of the industry’s management was put into effect. That is why, when the so-called nationalization took place (1976), companies such as Shell and Creole, a subsidiary of Standard Oil-Exxon, had Venezuelans serving as president or vice president. These executives later assumed leadership of the newly created national companies. Their passports were Venezuelan, but their hearts belonged to foreign corporations!

Historically, how was the relationship between foreign corporations and Venezuelan authorities? And how did they respond to the 1976 nationalization?

The corporations grew accustomed to the idea of an industry tailored to their interests. I mentioned how they were the ones who drafted the first Hydrocarbons Law. Oversight bodies, such as the Technical Office of Hydrocarbons, were constantly undermined in their efforts to regulate oil activities. And so the companies could extract oil without paying royalties, violate technical standards for field exploitation, or export gasoline instead of fuel oil.

The 1970s were a turbulent time for the oil sector, marked by geopolitical tensions and the 1973 crisis in the Arab countries. In 1973, James Akins, the Nixon administration’s Director of Energy at the State Department, wrote an article in Foreign Affairs titled “The Oil Crisis; This Time the Wolf Is Here.” He argued that Venezuela could be key to reducing dependence on the Middle East, and that in the face of growing oil nationalism, it was necessary to cede some ground and consider other models of participation, while maintaining control over critical areas such as refining and commercialization.

Put differently, it was possible to offer some token concessions to the nationalist aspirations of oil-producing countries like Venezuela. And that rhetoric spread to the transnational corporations. The president of Shell said at the time, “Venezuela is going to have to take action regarding its oil industry,” while the head of Creole spoke of “the Venezuelans’ oil”!

There were growing signs of how the nationalization would take shape and how the transnationals were restructuring. A good example is the Venezuelan Petroleum Corporation (CVP), created in 1960. Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo, whom I consider a visionary and a deeply nationalist figure, had conceived it as a company that would develop until the time came for the state to take over production. But the governments did not let it grow; they did not assign concessions it was entitled to, and by the time of nationalization, the CVP was simply one more operator among 13 or 14. 

In contrast, [Petróleos de Venezuela, SA] PDVSA, created with the nationalization, did have a very clear vision from the start. I remember hearing senior PDVSA executives talking among themselves, discussing how one came from the “Exxon culture,” which was more vertical, and the other from the “Shell culture,” which was more horizontal. And these were the managers! They were the leaders of the Venezuelan oil industry, which had very little “Venezuelan” about it. What we are seeing now is the reconstitution of all these things.

Circling back to the current reform, we have seen that sovereignty is a central issue. How is it affected on different fronts?

For me, a fundamental issue is the return of concessions. Because that means going back decades, handing control back to transnational conglomerates. With taxes and royalties, the problem is not whether the rate is 30% or 15%; that flexibility existed in the past. But now it is the transnational corporations that tell the government what their operating costs are and how much goes to the Venezuelan state. There is no oversight body to verify this; instead, the company says, “I need you to lower royalties to this level” for the project to be profitable.

The return of international arbitration is also a brutal setback, because it means that disputes are not settled in Venezuelan courts, but in other bodies that have a history of defending corporate interests. There is no role left for the Public Solicitor’s Office (Procuradoría General), which is essentially the nation’s attorney. 

For months we were told we were ready to confront imperialism, but the truth is that everything is being imposed on us. Even the National Assembly is castrating itself. It has enacted a law stating that oil projects no longer require the parliament’s approval; they need only be notified. And on top of all that, there is also the constitutional issue. The reform conflicts with Articles 1, 12, 150, 151, and several others of the Constitution. But this is not merely a constitutional violation; it is a total surrender. A surrender of sovereignty that calls into question our status as a republic.

One of the issues under debate is the distinction between a country that owns oil and a country that produces oil. How should we understand the difference?

Of course, that’s fundamental. A country that owns oil simply collects royalties, and it does so according to its political capabilities. At the moment, Venezuela’s capabilities are limited, because the military cannot confront the enemy, and allies like Russia and China have not shown themselves willing to take any risks. So, there is little room to impose conditions on the US.

But this is a country that has grown used to the multinational corporations having free rein over its oil sector. Unfortunately, there are many people, within the industry itself, who believe that “the foreign conglomerates developed this and therefore have a right to these privileges.” Curiously, that is the same rhetoric Trump uses! 

This struggle for sovereignty is fundamental in oil-producing countries. We have seen this with the countries of the Middle East, which try to assert themselves but remain highly dependent on the United States. Obviously, they have the advantage of not being as close as we are. But in my opinion, historically we have lacked nationalism on this issue.

One of the arguments in favor of reforming the Hydrocarbon Law was the need to attract investment to so-called “green fields,” on the grounds that when the previous law was passed in 2001, there were many mature fields ready for development and this is no longer the case. However, major corporations have not shown much enthusiasm. What is your reading on this?

Those are fantasies about oilfields that have always been unviable; it is the obsession with the Orinoco Oil Belt. Humberto Calderón Berti, minister of mines in the 1980s and a major proponent of PDVSA’s internationalization, was already talking about green fields back then. By the way, Calderón Berti is now talking about the possibility of fracking in Lake Maracaibo, which would make the lake’s environmental disaster even worse.

The idea that an avalanche of investment is coming is an illusion, and the oil companies themselves know it. Trump talks about investments of $100 billion, but transnational corporations like ExxonMobil use the word “uninvestable.” With market volatility, no one is thinking about investing in oil with extremely high production costs. There is a study that concludes that increasing production to 2.6 million barrels per day based on the Orinoco Belt would require US $90 billion in investments and $122 billion in operating expenses over the next 10 years to drill 13,000 new wells! In other words, it is completely unfeasible.

On top of that, OPEC’s forecasts for oil demand over the coming decades aren’t particularly ambitious. (1)

So who stands to benefit from this new landscape? On the one hand, small “rogue” companies that can take on a well here and there. But above all, the conglomerates that are already here, like Chevron, which know the lay of the land and can expand their operations or make their current operations more profitable. The same goes for Eni and Repsol, which have some crown jewels, like the offshore Perla natural gas field. The corporations that come will be betting mostly on conventional fields, not the Orinoco Belt.

It is very commonplace to hear about US refineries in the Gulf of Mexico that are built to receive Venezuelan crude. That is true, but it is not oil from the Orinoco Belt! It is oil from the Oriente (East) and Occidente (West) oil-producing regions.

Let us stay for a moment on the Orinoco Oil Belt, since that is where the talk of the “largest oil reserves on the planet” centers, as well as the prospects for a massive increase in production. What are the myths and realities surrounding these deposits?

The Orinoco Belt is a geological miracle. Eighty million years ago, 10–15 percent of all life that existed on the planet was fossilized north of the Orinoco River. It is something to cry out to the heavens. But that is not exploitable oil. It is extra-heavy crude, a sticky mess that needs to be upgraded. First it must be converted into liquid petroleum so it can flow through pipelines, and then taken to be refined and turned into gasoline. 

In the 1970s, the United States saw the energy crisis coming and asked, “When conventional oil runs out, where can we find oil around the world?” In three places: the Soviet Union, Canada, and Venezuela. And where in Venezuela? In the Orinoco Oil Belt. Pérez Alfonzo spoke of the belt as “something for the future,” but the United States wanted to accelerate exploitation and sent a delegation in 1971 to convince President Rafael Caldera to begin the process. In fact, the name was changed from “Tar Belt” to “Oil Belt” to make it more attractive.

The US Geological Survey estimates that there are 513 billion barrels of “technically recoverable” oil. But that is absurd, because there is no capacity. What makes a reserve recoverable has to do with economic ability, the market, and the available technology. Nevertheless, the Orinoco Belt has been at the center of grandiose projections over the past few decades, alongside the highly lucrative business of certifying reserves.

The oil reform took place in a specific context, following years of economic sanctions that have left PDVSA in a very difficult situation. What would be an alternative path? How can the industry recover without surrendering sovereignty?

There are no magic solutions, obviously. We are facing imperialism in the Trump era; we see all its destructive potential. It is a phase where the US, paradoxically, recognizes its weakness and is entrenching itself in its “backyard.” But we must be aware that the industry’s current course is one of total capitulation.

Whether we can recover, whether it is possible or not, we must think about it rigorously, in a sovereign manner. And above all, we must have a serious plan; we cannot be dreaming of 5 or 6 million barrels a day.

There are 17,000 conventional oil wells, with the capacity to produce, abandoned around the country. Of the 35,000 wells in Venezuela, only half are currently producing. The others require investment, though not particularly large ones. And what kind of oil will these wells produce? Crude grades ranging from 20 to 30 degrees. But we need a plan, to examine wells one by one. These are wells that will produce 20, 50, or 100 barrels a day, but it is light and medium crude—the “classic” Venezuelan oil.

So, from a nationalist perspective, what does the future hold for Venezuela’s oil industry? 

The future is to build a post-oil Venezuela. This was already being discussed by theorists such as Francisco Mieres and Pérez Alfonzo in the 1970s. Then, in recent years, many began talking about a post-oil or post-rentier country, but mostly to cover up their incompetence and inability to maintain production levels.

There is no magic solution, and the oil industry will have to play an important role. But the current situation is dire. We are in a new phase of absolute political dependence. It’s not just about oil, or that the US controls revenues, imposes concessions, and so on. It is that the country has lost the ability to make its own decisions.

There are also expectations of the people, who to a large extent have become accustomed to the idea that their oil will last forever. That creates the illusion that things can improve very quickly. The path will be slow, but it has to start with regaining sovereignty.

Note

(1) The interview was conducted before the launch of the US-Israeli war against Iran.

In the wake of Washington’s January 3 military attack and then problematic détente with Caracas, corporate media suggest a meaningful shift in Venezuela policy, implying relief for a country long subjected to economic coercion. However, far from dismantling the sanctions regime, the US has merely adjusted its application through licensing mechanisms, leaving the core structure of coercive measures fully intact.

Reuters reported “US lifts some Venezuela sanctions,” followed by news of sanctions being further “eased.” Both NBC News and ABC News likewise reported sanctions “eased,” while the Financial Times wrote that Washington “relaxes sanctions.” Reuters later found that “US waives many of the sanctions,” and the Los Angeles Times noted “targeted relief from sanctions.” The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) described a “huge easing of sanctions.”

Not a single sanction has been rescinded

In fact, there is no evidence of any revocation of executive orders, removal of Venezuela-related sanctions authorities, and certainly no formal termination or suspension of Washington’s sanctions regime.

At a February 21 meeting I attended in Venezuela, Anti-Blockade Vice Minister William Castillo described sanctions as a “policy of extermination.” These measures, “the most cruel aggression against our people,” had been renewed the day before by Trump. To do so, he had to certify the original mistruth first fabricated by Barack Obama in 2015: that Venezuela poses an “extraordinary threat” to US national security.

Castillo cited 1,087 measures imposed by the US and another 916 by its echo, the European Union. These unilateral coercive measures have a corrosive effect on popular support for the government, which is precisely the purpose of this form of collective punishment, illegal under international law.

In 2023, Castillo described Washington’s economic aggression as a means to destroy Venezuela without having to invade. The Bolivarian Revolution’s successful resistance, including positive GDP growth while under siege, suggests why the US felt compelled to escalate with a military incursion on January 3, killing over 100 and kidnapping the country’s lawful head of state and his wife.

In Castillo’s words, the US escalated from “a war without gunpowder…against the civilian population” to an actual one. As grave as the direct US military aggression has been – including 157 fatalities since last September in alleged drug interdictions of small craft in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific – the body count from the coercive economic measures has been far higher. Former UN Special Rapporteur Alfred de Zayas estimated that sanctions have caused over 100,000 excess deaths.

There is even a literal playbook on how to apply sanctions to inflict “pain” on civilians for “maximum effectiveness.” The author of The Art of Sanctions is Richard Nephew, a former US State Department senior official in the Biden administration who was responsible for implementing such policies.

Licenses vs. sanctions

What has happened in practice is a much more limited form of relief under the sanctions regime. The Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) has issued broad licenses allowing certain dealings primarily with Venezuela’s state oil (PDVSA) and gold (Minerven) sectors.

OFAC licenses carve out limited exceptions principally benefitting US and other foreign corporations, not necessarily the Venezuelan people. Activities are authorized that would otherwise be illegal under US law, even though such activities are lawful under international law. They come with conditions, limits, and reporting requirements and can be revoked at any time.

In practical terms, sanctions remain in place, although certain transactions are temporarily allowed under strict licensing rules. “The result is a hybrid scheme in which formal sanctions and operational licenses coexist, enabling limited flows of economic activity,” according to Misión Verdad.

This flexible arrangement of sanctions combined with licenses allows US and other foreign corporations to make a profit off of the coercive system. Under sanctions alone, the targeted people overwhelmingly suffer but, secondarily, US and other corporations are shut out. Under this hybrid system, control is maintained and money is made.

However, most foreign investors are reluctant to make important investment decisions when there is uncertainty, especially given Mr. Trump’s mercurial reputation. A temporary license does not provide the security that corporations normally require. Recuperating the Venezuelan oil industry would necessitate “a gigantic investment.” Such investments will be unlikely if Venezuela is sanctioned, the licenses notwithstanding.

Media framing and blaming

Meanwhile, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and “First Combatant” Cilia Flores remain in a New York City jail, reportedly in solitary confinement.

Regarding what happened on January 3, corporate media sources overwhelmingly use relatively anodyne terms such as “downfall,” “removal,” or “ouster,” rather than the more pointed “kidnapping” or “abduction.” When the legality of this clearly illegal act of war is questioned by either the media or by the Democrats, it is mainly confined to whether President Trump required congressional approval.

Likewise, application of international law regarding the illegality of unilateral coercive measures is largely absent from media coverage. Where legal issues appear, they tend to address mechanics (e.g., the US-controlled fund arrangement), rather than whether sanctions themselves violate international law.

When media outlets express concern about Washington’s restrictions, it is often that easing them would “reward Maduro loyalists.” While the plight of the Venezuelan people may be acknowledged, the blame is mainly attributed to corruption and economic mismanagement, with little if any opprobrium for sanctions.

As former political science professor at the Universidad de Oriente Steve Ellner (pers. comm.), notes, corruption and mismanagement do exist. But the overwhelming factor has been the sanctions regime. The blockade targeted Venezuela’s oil industry – at one point accounting for 99% of foreign-exchange earnings – forcing the country out of normal dollar-denominated markets and into black markets to survive.

What Alfred de Zayas dubs the “human rights industry” similarly exhibits a convenient blind spot regarding sanctions. WOLA, for example, advocates “addressing the complex humanitarian emergency.” Yet the NGO strongly opposes sanctions relief for the people, because the coercive measures are such an effective “pressure” tool on the leadership.

Former WOLA staffer David Smilde is preoccupied with “restoring” American-style democracy by imposing pressure on the “regime.” He argues: “The democratic transition in Venezuela…requires the support of international organizations.”

In contrast, acting President Delcy Rodríguez views ending interference by foreign actors in Venezuela’s internal affairs as a precondition for credible elections. In particular, she calls for the US “blockade and sanctions against Venezuela [to] cease.” With sanctions still in place, the US remains the biggest obstacle to free and fair elections in Venezuela.

Roger D. Harris is with the Venezuela Solidarity Network, Task Force on the Americas, and the US Peace Council. He recently visited Venezuela.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

The early morning of January 3, 2026, marked a turning point in Venezuela’s recent history. An operation carried out by US forces combined airstrikes on Caracas and strategic military areas with a ground incursion that culminated in the abduction of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, and their subsequent rendition to New York. The operation left more than 90 dead, including 32 members of the Cuban special forces who fought to protect Maduro, inflicting some damage on the imperialist forces before being killed.

While it is certainly strange that the United States could carry out the operation to kidnap Maduro and his wife without encountering significant resistance—beyond that offered by the innermost security ring, most of whom were of Cuban origin, like the aforementioned 32 martyrs—perhaps even more surprising are the statements made by Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López. Weeks after Maduro’s kidnapping, Padrino asserted that it was impossible to deploy fighter jets at the time of the attack given the United States’ air superiority, with 150 aircraft. He thus acknowledged that, with the exception of the president’s personal guard and a few soldiers stationed near the residence, the Venezuelan Armed Forces did not respond to the imperialist aggression. 

We cannot speculate on military matters, since we are not experts and do not have all the necessary information on the issue. That falls outside our purview. In any case, Padrino López’s own words and the events that unfolded during the attack indicate that, for some reason or another, the decision was made not to respond militarily to the Delta Force attack in the early hours of January 3 in Caracas. 

To the surprise of many, Maduro’s abduction did not lead to an immediate or complete institutional collapse. Vice President Delcy Rodríguez assumed the interim presidency, backed by the Supreme Court and the National Assembly, headed by Jorge Rodríguez. This “two-pronged approach” allowed for a certain degree of formal stability to be maintained while the administration of the country’s strategic resources was reorganized and the implementation of policies to adapt to the new context was accelerated.

Coordination with Washington was immediate. On January 15, CIA Director John Ratcliffe – who just days earlier had overseen the aggressive operation alongside Donald Trump in Florida – visited Caracas and met with Delcy Rodríguez. A few days later, the reform of the Organic Law on Hydrocarbons was presented and approved. This timeline reveals an almost symbiotic alignment between Venezuelan authorities and the US administration aimed at ensuring that oil wealth flows under the empire’s supervision, while simultaneously safeguarding the interests of large corporations and international creditors. Whether this link is the result of betrayal or capitulation is, for now, irrelevant. However, what is becoming clearer every day is that, if this were a tactical retreat, it seems unlikely that it could be corrected without strategic direction. And the latter appears to be beyond the reach of the country’s new authorities.

The liquidation of oil sovereignty: from Chávez to Delcy Rodríguez

The recent reform of the Organic Law on Hydrocarbons (LOH) is not a minor amendment to the previous law, but rather the culmination of a process of gradual neoliberal regression that finally took shape in the substantial repeal of the 2001 law – a cornerstone of the Chavista social project and a historic achievement in the assertion of Venezuelan sovereignty.

The original 2001 law, enacted by Hugo Chávez as an Enabling Law, alongside subsequent reforms in 2006 and 2007, marked the peak of Venezuela’s oil nationalization. It established exclusive state ownership of hydrocarbons in the subsoil, PDVSA’s monopoly on international marketing, majority state control in all joint ventures, state planning of investment, and the priority allocation of revenue to social development.

Throughout the various phases of Maduro’s administration, and in the face of the economic crisis caused by brutal US-led sanctions, revenue-seeking policies were implemented in an effort to secure liquidity and foreign currency, which gradually eroded the Chavista socioeconomic structure. This laid the groundwork for the gradual privatization of national resources, even though commercial control and ownership of the oil remained formally in the hands of the state.

Furthermore, during the 2019–2024 period, Maduro granted operating licenses to Chevron and other foreign corporations that allowed for direct exploitation and marketing in certain areas, setting precedents for private control over production. These agreements, presented as “temporary exceptions” to revive output and alleviate the social burden of sanctions, established the framework of dependency that the 2026 reform ultimately consolidated legally.

The January 2026 reform promoted by the Delcy Rodríguez administration, designed in accordance with the requirements of January 9 Trump administration Executive Order 14373, completes this process of erosion and represents a substantial rollback of the economic foundations of Chavista social transformation. Many of the changes introduced reflect mechanisms imposed under the Anti-Blockade Law (2020) and the Special Economic Zones Law (2022), which loosened restrictions on the private sector’s role, primarily through broad tax exemptions and trade incentives, while the 2026 LOH eliminates any remaining obstacles to private operational control of that sector. Or, in other words: what under Maduro were exceptions designed to circumvent sanctions – particularly pressing in the context of the pandemic and post-pandemic period – are formalized in Rodríguez’s reform to institute open subordination.

First, the exclusive state ownership of hydrocarbons in the subsoil – which the 1999 Constitution reaffirmed as an inalienable principle and which even Maduro formally upheld – has been rendered meaningless. While Article 5 of the 2001 law stated that “hydrocarbons in the subsoil are the property of the Republic,” the 2026 reform establishes that foreign private operators can acquire property rights over production from the moment of extraction, allowing them to market it directly without the state involvement that characterized the original Chavista model. The qualitative difference from the Maduro era is that this direct commercialization is now generalized across the entire sector, and the geographical and temporal restrictions that maintained a prospect of state control have been eliminated.

Second, the reform permanently eliminates the state monopoly on international commercialization. The 2001 law and subsequent reforms stipulated that PDVSA was the only entity authorized to export. The 2026 reform allows Western conglomerates such as Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell, and Repsol to directly market all or portions of production, thereby undermining the state’s sovereign authority to decide to whom to sell, under what conditions, and at what price. Private companies now determine the destination of shipments, negotiating directly with refiners and distributors, while the Venezuelan state receives only royalties and dividends subject to external control mechanisms.

This commercial subordination is further reinforced by a restrictive framework imposed by Washington: General Licenses 46, 50A, and 52 issued by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) strictly prohibit Venezuelan crude oil from reaching entities based in Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, or Cuba, extending the ban to any company that maintains ties of ownership or control with individuals from those countries. Far from restoring commercial autonomy, the 2026 reform institutionalizes these barriers: while transnational corporations are given carte blanche to negotiate directly with Western refiners, all transactions with Chavismo’s historical partners remain prohibited. The Venezuelan state is reduced to collecting royalties under foreign supervision, with no capacity to direct oil flows toward those markets that for years guaranteed the sustainability of the Bolivarian project. This leads to a situation as deplorable as it is surreal, where the Zionist entity has been able to receive Venezuelan crude without hindrance, while Cuba is left helpless against Washington’s strangulation.

Third, the reform abolishes state control over investment and exploitation. The 2001 law reserved for the state the right to plan investment. The 2026 reform allows private operators to unilaterally determine investment levels, the technology to be used, and reserve policy, eliminating any need for approval from Venezuelan authorities beforehand. Foreign companies acquire the right to import equipment and personnel without restrictions, operating under a regime of fiscal and legal extraterritoriality.

Fourth, the reform dismantles the framework for protecting social investments. The 2001 law stipulated that oil revenues must be allocated primarily to economic and social development. The 2026 reform includes provisions allowing for international arbitration to resolve disputes, prioritizing the protection of private investments over any social claims. Funds derived from oil production are subject to foreign control mechanisms. 

Lastly, the aforementioned OFAC licenses effectively establish an architecture of fiscal subordination that privileges foreign interests, with Venezuelan oil proceeds deposited in US Treasury-run accounts. By accepting these licenses – and with the additional stipulations of the reform – the Delcy Rodríguez administration is effectively subject to mechanisms for external validation of its budgets.

Oil reform and foreign oversight are not isolated processes: they constitute a neocolonial arrangement disguised as economic normalization, which maintains formal sovereignty while relinquishing operational control. In strategic terms, Venezuela has gone from being an actor with a relative capacity to define its energy policy— despite sanctions and threats — to a subordinate whose critical decisions are dictated by the United States. 

Condemning Iran: geopolitical alignment as submission

Structural subordination is also evident in foreign policy. In the face of the recent imperialist aggression against Iran, launched jointly by the United States and the Zionist entity on February 28, 2026, which left more than 200 dead in the first few hours (including 148 girls killed in the bombing of an elementary school in Minab), the Delcy Rodríguez government rushed to abandon its traditional alliance with Tehran. 

In an initial statement, it took a stance condemning both the imperialist aggression and the response of the attacked country, falling into a shameful and ridiculous position of neutrality. This official statement, issued on February 28 stated that the Venezuelan government “condemns and deeply regrets that the military option was taken against Iran” and expressed dismay over the civilian casualties. However, the text then went on to refer to “Iran’s inappropriate and reprehensible military reprisals against targets in various countries in the region.” In doing so, the Delcy Rodríguez administration denied the bombed country the right to self-defense, placing the aggressor and the victim on the same level.

This statement, which Foreign Minister Yván Gil ended up deleting from his social media accounts hours later, marks a definitive break with the anti-imperialist stance that Venezuela had been building for two decades. The condemnation of the response by Tehran – a historic ally of Chavismo and high-level strategic partner since 2022 – shows that alignment with imperialism is now a fait accompli.

The Venezuelan communiqué cannot be understood without considering the context: the complete opening of the oil sector to foreign capital, the aforementioned reception in Caracas of the CIA director, and the subsequent arrival of US Chargé d’Affaires Laura Dogu as a diplomatic representative, along with visits by US Secretary of Energy Chris Wright, US Interior Secretary Doug Bergum, and the head of US Southern Command, General Francis Donovan; all within a few weeks, prior to Trump’s own recognition of Delcy Rodríguez as Venezuela’s president.

The Rodríguez administration not only hands over the oil and refuses to stand up to the empire, but also politically legitimizes US hegemony, breaking with the internationalist and popular legacy that Chavismo had always fostered, defended, and pushed forward. The condemnation of the Iranian resistance – which undoubtedly amounts to a condemnation of the entire anti-Zionist Axis of Resistance and all peoples oppressed by the colonial entity – is presented as “international responsibility” and a “commitment to peace.” The new Venezuelan administration thus disguises its surrender of diplomatic sovereignty and buries the solidarity-driven, internationalist Venezuela that Chavismo led, both during Chávez’s and Maduro’s tenures.

Cabral’s Dilemma: betrayal of the Chavista project or class suicide

To fully understand what has happened in Venezuela, it is quite helpful to examine it in light of the political theory of Amílcar Cabral, the independence leader of Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde and one of the most incisive thinkers of African and Third World liberation. Cabral first formulated the concept of “class suicide” in his 1964 message to Guinean militiamen, later developing it in numerous speeches throughout the 1960s and 1970s, particularly in his address, “The Weapon of Theory,” delivered at the First Tricontinental Conference of the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, held in Havana in January 1966.

In the context of Guinea-Bissau’s liberation struggle, Cabral further developed this theory by applying it to that specific reality in his work Guinea-Bissau: An African Nation Forged in Struggle, posthumously published in 1974. The Guinean petty bourgeoisie, formed under the Portuguese colonial administration, had to choose between joining the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde (PAIGC) and its peasant base, renouncing their privileges as colonial officials, or remaining on the sidelines and eventually collaborating with Portugal. Cabral had no illusions about the difficulties of this choice. The historical dilemma of this petty bourgeoisie, according to Cabral, is strictly binary: “either it betrays the Revolution or it commits suicide as a class.” There is no third way, no middle ground, and no possible compromise. Any attempt to maintain a neutral stance ends, sooner or later, in subordination to imperialism and the betrayal of national interests.

Class suicide did not mean the physical disappearance of individuals, but rather the destruction of their particular class status. It entailed a radical and conscious transformation. As Cabral explained, the petty bourgeoisie had to “renounce the class position it occupies in social life” and “integrate itself with the popular forces – that is, with the workers and the peasants.” In other words: voluntarily abandon their privileges as an intermediate class, cease to be a class separate and distinct from the people, and fully identify with the popular forces as part of a project of national and social liberation. 

The betrayal of the revolution – the other option in this dilemma – occurs when the bourgeoisie preserves its class existence and its intermediary privileges through subordination to imperialism. It does not renounce its position, does not identify with the people, and does not dismantle its networks of privilege. On the contrary, it negotiates its corporate survival with the enemy, becoming a comprador bourgeoisie. This betrayal is not always explicit or conscious. It often presents itself as “realism,” “pragmatism,” or “tacticism.” But its result is always the same: the consolidation of structural dependence and the blocking of any emancipatory project aimed at true sovereign independence, an indispensable requirement for delinking from the imperialist system.

The theory of class suicide has profound methodological implications for political analysis. First, it establishes that national liberation cannot be led by the national bourgeoisie or by the petty bourgeoisie unless they have committed class suicide. Second, it demonstrates that formal independence does not equate to real liberation if the political leadership retains its character as a subordinate intermediary class. Third, it points out that the class struggle continues during the revolutionary process and that the principal contradiction is not always between the people and external colonialism, but also between the people and their own leadership that resists class suicide.

What sets the Venezuelan case apart is that the petty bourgeoisie – whether treacherous or capitulationist – is not the traditional colonial class that Cabral analyzed, but rather a bureaucratic bourgeoisie forged in the very process of revolutionary change. Over two decades of Chavismo, this class has accumulated experience in state administration, built autonomous power networks, developed a distinct corporate identity, and created a social base of support. Class suicide would mean renouncing all this historical accumulation, dissolving into the popular masses, and reconfiguring the project from the ground up by aligning with the proletariat and the communal project. Betrayal, on the other hand, allows for the preservation of bureaucratic and clientelist power structures by adapting them to the new framework of subordination. A bureaucratic bourgeoisie that controls the state and oil revenues has its own material interests that may conflict with a direct confrontation against imperialism.

In the wake of the rapid and radical changes implemented by the Delcy Rodríguez administration that we have described, we can observe with bitterness how the national bourgeoisie has ceased to administer independence – the original purpose of the Chavista project – and has instead come to manage dependence.

All of this is being presented, as one would expect, under the guise of Bolivarian continuity, the preservation of symbols, and rhetoric about historical responsibility, all of which serve to obscure the surrender of oil revenues to imperialist control, demolishing what was once the cornerstone of the Chavista social project. This is accompanied by a rupture or abandonment of historic alliances such as with Iran and Cuba, with national resources destined for the Zionist entity without question, in a shameful capitulation to US interests.

The 2026 oil reform is the key element of this submission: state ownership of oil – a pillar of the sovereign development project – is being dismantled in favor of corporate control and placed at the mercy of the US Treasury. This constitutes a sophisticated form of neocolonial domination because it hinders resistance to the brutal imperial agenda. Indeed, the masses are not facing an enemy in the form of a foreign occupation, but rather an elite that speaks their language, appropriates their symbols and folklore, and maintains a patriotic rhetoric, all while systematically dismantling the core foundations that Chavismo built over decades in its quest for a historic break with dependency.

Conclusion

The history of liberation struggles teaches us that if the revolutionary project is the lighthouse, the revolutionary class must be its operator. As such, its cause must be anchored in a historical strategy capable of guiding even the most difficult tactical retreats. But there can be no tactical retreat without strategy, nor strategy without the material foundations on which to sustain it. Economic independence is not a mere ideological ornament of the revolutionary process: it is its condition of possibility. When a nation’s sources of wealth are handed over to the empire’s management, when the revenue that fueled the social project is subjected to external control, and when the state voluntarily relinquishes the instruments that allowed it to decide on its own development, there is no room left for future strategic maneuvering. What is presented as prudence or realism is nothing more than, at best, the institutionalization of capitulation; at worst, of betrayal. 

Those same processes of national liberation have also shown that no revolution has survived without cadres willing to take on the risks demanded by the confrontation with imperial power. Revolutionary leaders are not called upon merely to manage structures, but to embody a historic will capable of sustaining the conflict to its final consequences. In the early hours of January 3, as the Venezuelan state apparatus sealed its commitment to servile negotiation, those willing to give their lives for that cause were the Venezuelan soldiers and 32 Cuban internationalists who fell defending the presidential residence. And in that event, both brutal and symbolic, lies the essence of the dilemma Cabral articulated decades ago: in the face of imperialism, there is no lasting middle ground between class suicide and betrayal. Everything else – the rhetoric, the symbols, the appeals to tactics – are merely transient ways of naming a decision that, sooner or later, history ultimately reveals.

Joan López and Alejandro Pedregal are members of the Anti-Imperialist Network (AIN), anti-imperialist.net.

The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

Source: El Salto Diario

Note: there have been minor edits to the original version to clarify certain aspects of the oil reform.

Mérida, March 23, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan government announced a 45-day electricity saving plan as extreme temperatures and regional outages impact Venezuela’s power grid. 

The announcement, made by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez on Saturday, comes on the heels of recurring blackouts, particularly in western states. 

“We are entering a period where solar radiation will impact our territory directly, intensifying heat and drought across the country,” Rodríguez stated during a televised cabinet meeting with officials responsible for the electricity and infrastructure portfolios.

She explained that the “perpendicular passage” of solar rays would significantly increase energy demand for cooling. Alongside drought forecasts, officials expect a greater strain on Venezuela’s electricity generation and transmission infrastructure.

As part of the contingency plan, the Ministry of Electric Energy is set to publish a protocol urging reduced air-conditioning use other rationing measures. In addition, the government has authorized the deployment of thermal drones to monitor high-temperature areas and prevent forest fires from compromising transmission lines.

In March 2025, the Nicolás Maduro administration implemented a similar electricity-savings plan and was compelled to reduce public sector work hours to half a day to ease demand. While the 2025 measures were temporary, the recurrence of shortages underscores the systemic vulnerabilities of the electric grid.

Last Friday, residents in Zulia, Táchira, Mérida, and Trujillo experienced widespread power outages lasting several hours. Local media outlets in the Andean region reported that some sectors are facing daily rationing of up to four hours. Nationwide electricity fluctuations were likewise registered on Monday, with parts of Caracas suffering temporary outages.

The origins of Venezuela’s electrical instability extend over a decade, culminating in the 2019 widespread nationwide blackouts that authorities blamed on “cyber-sabotage.” The alleged attacks compounded infrastructure hard-hit by years of economic sanctions, as well as underinvestment, inadequate maintenance, and the departure of skilled personnel.

Venezuela’s electric grid remains heavily dependent on the Simón Bolívar Hydroelectric Plant, also known as the Guri Dam, in southeastern Bolívar state, which provides approximately 80 percent of the nation’s power. 

However, the transmission lines stretching from the southeast to the western border are often unable to handle the load, with thermoelectric plants in the region unable to cover the additional demand. Current estimates indicate that while Venezuela has an installed generation capacity of approximately 34 gigawatts (GW), only around 12 to 14 GW are currently operational.

Sanctions and push for private investment

In her Saturday address, Rodríguez reiterated the damage caused by US-led unilateral coercive measures and called for their removal. The Venezuelan acting president argued that sanctions hampered the state’s capacity to procure essential technology and components from international suppliers.

“The blockade has impeded the full recovery of this essential service,” Rodríguez said. “Though we have recovered capacity through our own efforts, sanctions limit our response to a demand that grows alongside the economy.”

The Venezuelan government has also announced plans to scale back state control over the electricity sector in order to attract private investment. Earlier this month, authorities unveiled a “pilot plan” to promote foreign investment into the electric grid, following similar blueprints from the oil industry.

Under the proposed framework, the government aims to update the Organic Law of the Electricity System (LOSSE) to allow private companies to assume control of generation and distribution through joint ventures.

According to the Venezuelan Chamber of Construction (CVC), a preliminary investment of US $1.29 billion could lead to the reincorporation of over 6,300 MW to the grid in two phases. The CVC is specifically promoting a project with the Latin America Development Bank to stabilize 2,000 MW in the central industrial region.

The new electricity management model would allow private actors to take control of specific “industrial nodes,” ensuring a reliable supply for manufacturing while retaining a portion of the proceeds to cover maintenance costs.

However, the immediate focus for the Venezuelan executive remains on electricity rationing. Rodríguez concluded her address by calling for “national consciousness,” urging the public to see energy saving not just as a government mandate, but as a collective necessity to navigate the coming weeks of extreme heat and drought.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Caracas, March 20, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The US Treasury Department has issued a new sanctions waiver as the Trump administration seeks to deepen US control over Venezuela’s oil sector.

General License 52 (GL52), published on Wednesday, authorizes US entities to engage in transactions with Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA under conditions that limit Venezuelan sovereignty.

An updated FAQ from the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control clarified that the exemption allows US companies to engage in activities related to the exportation of Venezuelan-origin oil products, export diluents and inputs to Venezuela as well as enter into new contracts for oil and gas production.

However, in line with recent US licenses, GL52 mandates that all tax, royalty, and dividend payments be made into US Treasury-controlled accounts.

Following the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration has taken control over Venezuelan crude exports while imposing conditions favorable to Western energy conglomerates.

Thus far, Washington has returned US $500 million out of an initial January deal worth $2 billion. US authorities have also confirmed Venezuelan imports of US-manufactured medicines and medical equipment. Trump officials had vowed that US energy revenues could only be used for purchases from US suppliers and that Caracas would need to submit a “budget request” to access its funds.

The White House issued GL52 amid soaring energy prices caused by the US and Israeli war against Iran. Tehran has responded to massive bombings by targeting US military assets in the region and closing the strategic Strait of Hormuz.

Last week, the US Treasury amended licenses to allow US imports of fertilizers from Venezuela, as well as repair works in the South American country’s electric grid. Venezuela’s electrical infrastructure remains in a precarious state after years of US sanctions, and expanded power capacity is a precondition for recovery of the oil industry.

Despite the broadened waivers for corporations hand-picked by the White House to engage with Venezuela, PDVSA and its subsidiaries remain under financial sanctions, while third-country firms risk secondary sanctions should they enter into agreements without a US Treasury special license.

In late January, Venezuelan authorities approved a pro-business overhaul of the country’s Hydrocarbon Law, granting private companies reduced fiscal responsibilities, increased control over production and exports, and the possibility of taking disputes to international arbitration bodies.

Chevron and Shell, with US Treasury approval, were the first companies to take advantage of the new incentives. Chevron’s Petropiar joint venture with PDVSA was granted a new 500 square-kilometer bloc to drill for extra-heavy crude in the Orinoco Oil Belt, while Shell is set to take over light and medium crude and natural gas operations in the eastern state of Monagas.

Last week, European energy giants Eni and Repsol, who were also given the inside track by the White House, announced an agreement with the Venezuelan government for the development of the Cardón IV offshore natural gas project.

Eni and Repsol each own 50 percent stakes in Cardón IV, which has been in operation since 2009. Neither firm nor Caracas offered details on the renewed agreement, though both enterprises had lobbied for improved conditions and mechanisms to recoup accumulated debt due to US sanctions.

According to Bloomberg, ONGC Videsh (India), Maha Capital AB (Sweden), and J&F Investimentos (Brazil) are among the companies likely to receive special licenses for involvement in Venezuela’s oil sector as Washington seeks to counter rising crude prices. Nevertheless, analysts stress that the Venezuelan oil industry does not have the capacity to significantly ramp up output in the near future.

On March 11, the Trump administration formally recognized Acting President Delcy Rodríguez as Venezuela’s “sole authority,” days after Venezuela and the US reestablished diplomatic ties following a seven-year hiatus.

On Monday, Rodríguez appointed new executive boards for PDVSA’s US-based affiliates, including refiner CITGO. Asdrúbal Chávez, who held multiple roles in both PDVSA and CITGO since the 2000s, was picked as president of CITGO and its parent company, PDV Holding. At the time of writing, US authorities have not commented on the proposed new leadership for the companies, which had been run by the US-backed opposition since 2019.

CITGO is currently in the closing stages of a court-mandated auction that will see Venezuela lose ownership of its most prized foreign asset to address creditor claims against the country. The sale to Amber Energy, a subsidiary of vulture fund Elliott Management, is pending authorization from the US Treasury Department.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Fusagasugá, Colombia.

WASHINGTON — U.S. companies will be allowed to do business with Venezuela’s state-owned oil and gas company after the Treasury Department eased sanctions, with some limitations, on Wednesday as the Trump administration looks for ways to boost world oil supplies during the Iran war.

The Treasury issued a broad authorization allowing Petróleos de Venezuela S.A, or PDVSA, to directly sell Venezuelan oil to U.S. companies and on global markets, a massive shift after Washington for years had largely blocked dealings with Venezuela’s government and its oil sector.

Separately, the White House said President Trump would waive, for 60 days, Jones Act requirements for goods shipped between U.S. ports to be moved on U.S.-flagged vessels. The 1920s law, designed to protect the American shipbuilding sector, is often blamed for making gas more expensive.

The moves highlight the increased pressure that the Republican administration is under to ease soaring oil prices as the United States, along with Israel, wages a war with Iran without a foreseeable end date. Global oil prices have since spiked as Iran halted traffic through the narrow Strait of Hormuz, where one-fifth of the world’s oil typically passes through from the Persian Gulf to customers worldwide.

The Treasury’s license is designed to incentivize new investment in Venezuela’s energy sector and is intended to benefit both the U.S and Venezuela, while increasing the global oil supply, a Treasury official told the Associated Press. The official was not authorized to discuss the matter publicly and spoke on condition of anonymity.

Since the ouster and arrest of Nicolás Maduro as Venezuela’s president during a U.S. military operation in January, Trump has said the U.S. would effectively “run” Venezuela and sell its oil.

The U.S. license provides targeted relief from sanctions, but does not lift the penalties altogether. The license allows companies that existed before Jan. 29, 2025, to buy Venezuelan oil and engage in transactions that would normally be banned under American sanctions, reopening trade for a major oil producer to global markets.

There are some limits.

Payments cannot go directly to sanctioned Venezuelan entities such as PDVSA, but must be sent instead to a special U.S.-controlled account. In other words, the U.S. will allow the oil trade but will control the cash flow.

Additionally, deals involving Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba and some Chinese entities will not be allowed. Transactions involving Venezuelan debt or bonds will not be allowed.

The license is expected to give a massive boost to Venezuela’s oil-dependent economy and help encourage companies that have been apprehensive to invest. The decision is part of the Trump administration’s phased-in plan to turn around Venezuela. But critics of the acting Venezuelan government argue that the move rewards Venezuela’s leadership — all loyal to Maduro and the ruling party — while repression, corruption and human rights abuses continue.

Many public sector workers survive on roughly $160 per month, while the average private sector employee earned about $237 last year, when the annual inflation rate soared to 475%, according to Venezuela’s central bank, and sent the cost of food beyond what many can afford.

Venezuela sits atop the world’s largest oil reserves and used them to power what was once Latin America’s strongest economy. But corruption, mismanagement and U.S. economic sanctions saw production steadily decline from the 3.5 million barrels per day pumped in 1999, when Maduro’s mentor, Hugo Chávez, took power, to less than 400,000 barrels per day in 2020.

A year earlier, the Treasury Department under the first Trump administration locked Venezuela out of world oil markets when it sanctioned PDVSA as part of a policy punishing Maduro’s government for corrupt, anti-democratic and criminal activities. That forced the government to sell its remaining oil output at a discount — about 40% below market prices — to buyers such as China and in other Asian markets. Venezuela even started accepting payments in Russian rubles, bartered goods or cryptocurrency.

The new license does not allow payments in gold or cryptocurrency, including the petro, which was a crypto token issued by the Venezuelan government in 2018.

Meantime, White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said the Jones Act waiver would help “mitigate the short-term disruptions to the oil market” during the Iran war and would “allow vital resources like oil, natural gas, fertilizer, and coal to flow freely to U.S. ports.”

Hussein and Cano write for the Associated Press. Cano reported from Caracas, Venezuela. AP writer Seung Min Kim contributed to this report.

EU maintains pressure after slamming US for lifting sanctions on Russian oil exports as Middle East war bites.

The European Union has voted to renew sanctions against individuals and entities supporting Russia’s war on Ukraine, as Russian forces continued to target Ukrainian energy infrastructure, killing six people in the Zaporizhia and Kyiv regions.

The EU Council announced that the bloc’s 27 member states had agreed on Saturday to extend sanctions targeting some 2,600 individuals and entities with measures like travel restrictions and asset freezes until September 15, breaking an earlier deadlock caused by Hungary and Slovakia’s opposition to the move.

The extension of sanctions came one day after EU Council chief Antonio Costa slammed the United States for lifting sanctions on Russian oil exports, saying on X that weakening restrictions increased “Russian resources to wage the war of aggression against Ukraine”, with a knock-on impact on European security.

The measure was announced as Russia hammered Ukraine with missiles and drones on Saturday, killing five people and injuring 15 in the Kyiv region surrounding the capital, according to regional military administrator Mykola Kalashnyk.

The city of Zaporizhzhia was also hit by Russian-guided bombs, killing one person and injuring three, said the governor of the southeastern region, Ivan Fedorov. Photos posted online showed parts of buildings reduced to rubble.

Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Russia’s main target was energy infrastructure outside the capital Kyiv, but that the Sumy, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Mykolaiv regions were also targeted in an attack that included about 430 drones and 68 missiles, most of which were downed by air defences.

Russia’s winter attacks on Ukraine have left swaths of major cities without power or heating, as Moscow’s troops continue their offensive amid demands Kyiv cede more territory in the east. Ukraine’s Energy Ministry said on Saturday that consumers in six regions were without electricity.

Ukraine’s forces have targeted Russian strategic infrastructure such as oil refineries, depots and terminals in long-range strikes. On Saturday, Ukraine’s military said that it had struck the Afipsky oil refinery and Port Kavkaz in Russia’s southern Krasnodar region.

Putin ‘exploiting’ Middle East distraction

Saturday’s fighting came as the Iran conflict has distracted international attention from a US-backed peace push in the four-year war, which Kyiv says Moscow has no interest in ending.

Belgium’s Prime Minister Bart De Wever called on Saturday for the EU to be mandated by its member states to negotiate with Russia as it became apparent amid spiking oil prices caused by the Iran war that the US was easing pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin.

“Since we are not capable of threatening Putin by sending weapons to Ukraine, and we cannot choke him economically without the support of the United States, there is only one method left: making a deal,” he told the Belgian newspaper L’Echo.

EU chief diplomat Kaja Kallas has said in the past that the bloc must first reach an agreement on what is expected from Russia before directly approaching Putin, formulating its own “maximalist demands”.

However, the bloc’s inability to reach a common position was highlighted during the EU Council’s recent deliberations on extending sanctions.

Hungary and Slovakia, which have been sparring with Ukraine over blocked Russian oil flows through the Druzhba pipeline, had earlier opposed the extension of the restrictions, reportedly calling for some Russian oligarchs to be removed from the list of offenders.

Reacting earlier this week to soaring oil prices caused by the war in Iran, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban urged the EU to suspend sanctions on Russian energy.

Posting on X, Zelenskyy said, “Russia will try to exploit the war in the Middle East to cause even greater destruction here in Europe, in Ukraine.”

March 12 (UPI) — The International Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor announced Thursday that the United States did not commit crimes against humanity with its sanctions against Venezuela.

The investigation, called Venezuela II by the court, was referred to the court by Venezuela’s government in 2020, alleging that sanctions against the country had caused suffering and hardship.

The referral from now-deposed President Nicolas Maduro alleges the suffering of Venezuelans from “the application of unlawful coercive measures adopted unilaterally by the government of the United States of America against Venezuela, at least since the year 2014.”

Venezuela alleged that “murder, extermination, deportation, persecution and other inhumane acts constituting crimes against humanity” were committed, the OTP said.

The ICC prosecutor determined that the “evidential requirements of causation and intent are not met.”

The evidence “must provide a reasonable basis to believe that sanctions by the United States of America led to murder, displacement or other alleged crimes,” the OTP said.

The decision is unrelated to the January 2026 events in Venezuela, the prosecutor noted.

In January, the United States invaded Venezuela, arrested Maduro and his wife and took them to Manhattan, where they await trial on drug trafficking charges.

The ICC prosecutor said it is still investigating “Venezuela I,” a case that doesn’t involve the United States.

Caracas, March 11, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Energy conglomerates Chevron and Shell are reportedly securing major oil deals in Venezuela following the recent pro-business reform of the country’s Hydrocarbon Law.

According to Reuters, joint venture Petropiar, where Chevron holds a minority stake, will expand its operations into the Ayacucho 8 bloc of Venezuela’s Orinoco Oil Belt. 

Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA completed exploration and appraisal of the 510 square-kilometer area located south of Petropiar’s current operations, but its development has been limited. Under the agreement, Chevron looks to significantly expand its extra-heavy crude output from the Orinoco Oil Belt, which holds three-quarters of Venezuela’s oil reserves.

Chevron is reportedly looking to secure reduced royalties and taxes under the recently reformed Hydrocarbon Law in order to launch operations in the new area. Petropiar currently produces 90,000 barrels per day (bpd) of upgraded Hamaca crude. PDVSA’s joint ventures with Chevron have a total present output of around 250,000 bpd.

In January, Venezuela’s National Assembly approved a legislative overhaul that significantly improved conditions and benefits for private corporations in the oil and natural gas sector. Royalty and income tax levies, previously set at 30 and 50 percent, respectively, can now be slashed at the Venezuelan executive’s discretion.

In addition, joint venture minority partners can directly manage crude operations and sales, while legal disputes can be taken to international arbitration instances. Furthermore, PDVSA can also lease out projects to private operators in exchange for a percentage of the oil output.

Under the latter model, Shell is reportedly set to take over operations in PDVSA’s Punta de Mata division in eastern Monagas state, one of the most historically productive and profitable regions for Venezuela’s oil industry. The division produced over 400,000 bpd of light and medium crude grades in the 2000s but recent production was around 90,000 bpd.

The London-based multinational, which had a strong presence in the Venezuelan energy sector throughout the twentieth century, is likewise interested in capturing and processing natural gas that is currently flared in oil extraction processes. 

Shell is additionally set to lead the Dragon offshore natural gas project alongside Trinidad and Tobago’s National Gas Corporation (NGC) in Venezuelan waters. The Nicolás Maduro government had suspended all joint initiatives with Trinidad due to its administration’s support for Washington’s Caribbean military buildup and threats against Venezuela last year.

Since the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of President Maduro, the acting Venezuelan authorities led by Delcy Rodríguez have fast-tracked a diplomatic rapprochement with the Trump administration while also vowing to “adapt” legislation to attract foreign investment. Following the hydrocarbon reform, a new mining law has also been preliminarily approved by the Venezuelan parliament.

US Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Interior Secretary Doug Burgum have visited Venezuela in recent weeks and hailed the investment opportunities in oil and minerals for US conglomerates.

Since January, the Trump administration has taken control of Venezuelan oil exports, with crude shipments handled by commodity traders Vitol and Trafigura and proceeds deposited in accounts run by the US Treasury. US authorities so far have only returned US $500 million, out of a reported $2 billion agreement, to the Caribbean nation.

The White House has also issued a number of licenses in an effort to boost US involvement in the Venezuelan energy sector, including limited waivers to export inputs and technology. In addition, Washington has allowed several corporations to negotiate agreements with Caracas while mandating that contracts be subject to US jurisdiction and that all royalty, tax and dividend payments be made to US Treasury-run accounts.

Alongside Chevron and Shell, the other companies with early access to the Venezuelan energy sector are BP, Eni, Maurel & Prom, and Repsol. The latter two held meetings with Rodríguez in February to discuss investment opportunities, while ExxonMobil has announced plans to send a delegation to the country in the coming weeks.

Venezuela’s oil production rebounded in February, with OPEC secondary sources registering an output of 903,000 bpd, up from 823,000 bpd in January. A US naval blockade since December had forced PDVSA to cut back production before exports began to flow again under Washington’s control. The oil sector remains under US financial sanctions.

For its part, PDVSA reported a February output of 1.02 million bpd, up from 924,000 bpd the prior month. The direct and secondary measurements have differed over time due to disagreements over the inclusion of natural gas liquids and condensates.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Fusagasugá, Colombia.

Published on
11/03/2026 – 16:15 GMT+1

A probe has been initiated by the US Justice Department into Iran’s use of Binance, the world’s largest crypto platform, to circumvent US sanctions and provide financial backing to terrorist organisations with ties to the IRGC, according to The Wall Street Journal.

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The US DOJ’s examination stems from company documents and accounts provided by individuals familiar with the matter.

Authorities have contacted people with direct knowledge of the Iranian-linked transactions to request interviews and collect evidence, as per the WSJ report.

A monitor appointed by the US Treasury Department has reportedly asked Binance for details on the Iranian transactions, including information about a business partner responsible for a large share of the flows.

At this stage, it remains uncertain whether the investigation targets Binance for any potential misconduct or if it is confined to activity by customers on the platform.

A spokesperson for the company told the WSJ that Binance “categorically did not directly transact with any sanctioned entities”.

This development brings the company back to the centre of US regulatory attention, just months after its founder received a presidential pardon, highlighting persistent challenges in enforcing sanctions within the rapidly evolving crypto and fintech sectors.

Binance founder Changpeng Zhao, widely known as CZ, was pardoned by President Trump back in October.

The investigation reopens scrutiny of the exchange, which pleaded guilty in 2023 to breaching US sanctions and banking laws. That case resulted in a record $4.3bn (€3.7bn) penalty and a requirement for ongoing US oversight.

Under the terms of the 2023 agreement, Binance must actively screen clients for terrorism financing and sanctions breaches, as well as report suspicious activity promptly to authorities.

US congressional inquiry adds pressure

The developments have also drawn attention from Capitol Hill.

US Senator Richard Blumenthal, a senior Democrat on the Senate Homeland Security Committee, opened a formal inquiry last month into Binance’s handling of the Iranian transactions.

Citing the scale of the unreported flows, approaching nearly $2bn (€1.7bn) to sanctioned entities, and the suspension of internal investigators, Blumenthal questioned whether the exchange had met its obligations under US sanctions and banking laws.

He requested detailed records from Binance, which responded by describing media coverage as inaccurate and highlighting its “best-in-class compliance programme”.

The senator later described that reply as evasive and insufficient to address his concerns.

The timing of the US DOJ’s probe coincides with heightened efforts to disrupt financing networks linked to Iran’s IRGC.

Ahead of joint military actions with Israel against Iran, Washington stepped up measures to cut off revenue streams, particularly those involving crypto assets used to repatriate proceeds from oil sales to China.

In January, the US Treasury Department sanctioned two smaller crypto exchanges for moving large sums to digital wallets connected to the IRGC.

Caracas, March 10, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan National Assembly preliminarily approved a new mining law on Monday as part of continued efforts to attract foreign investment to the country.

Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez had announced the new legislation last week during a visit from US Interior Secretary Doug Burgum alongside mining executives and urged parliament to act “swiftly.”

“This law will increase all the legal guarantees that can generate confidence and attract national and foreign investment,” said Orlando Camacho, a congressman from the ruling PSUV-led bloc, during the legislative session.

Camacho added that the bill is adapted to the Caribbean nation’s “present needs” and aims to take advantage of the country’s vast mineral riches, mostly located in the country’s Southeast.

Monday’s vote was endorsed by the pro-government legislative majority. Opposition deputies abstained, complaining that they received the draft less than one hour before the parliamentary session. The text will be subject to consultations and proposals before being put to a second and definitive vote in the coming weeks. 

Consisting of 126 articles split into 19 sections, the bill establishes regulations for small, medium, and large-scale mining, as well as the state’s ability to declare certain minerals as strategic and reserve areas for security purposes. It also creates a “social fund” to support mining workers, an oversight superintendency, and a state-run data bank.

Concerning mining activities, the proposed law establishes that joint ventures, private corporations, and small-scale artisanal mining groups are allowed to receive concessions. The new law will replace a 2015 decree that imposed state control over mining exploration, as well as the 1999 Mining Law.

The legislation establishes concessions of up to twenty years that can be renewed for two additional ten-year periods. The issuing of contracts is the responsibility of the Ministry of Ecological Mining Development and will not require National Assembly approval. Corporations are also entitled to several tax breaks, likewise granted at the ministry’s discretion, and can take disputes to international arbitration outside the Venezuelan court system.

The Venezuelan government is also seeking to reorganize the mining sector. A decree published on Friday ordered the Venezuelan General Mining Company (MINERVEN) to be absorbed by the Venezuelan Mining Corporation (CVM).

The mining reform follows a similar pro-business overhaul of Venezuela’s Hydrocarbon Law in January. In an interview, National Assembly President Jorge Rodríguez vowed that parliament would “adapt” laws to attract US investors in the wake of the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro

During his visit last week, Burgum touted Venezuela’s mineral riches and potential opportunities for Western conglomerates. On Friday, the Trump official announced the arrival of US $100 million worth of Venezuelan gold as part of a deal involving Trafigura to export up to 100 tons of gold doré bars worth approximately $165 million.

However, Caracas is not expected to immediately receive the revenue. The US Treasury issued General License 51 (GL51) allowing US entities to purchase, transport and resell Venezuelan-sourced gold but mandating that proceeds be deposited in US government-run accounts before being returned to Venezuela under conditions dictated by the White House.

The sanctions waiver additionally blocks transactions with companies from Cuba, Iran, Russia, and North Korea, and bans involvement in exploration and refining activities.

In tandem, the Trump administration reportedly issued a 30-day license allowing select companies, including Canada’s Gold Reserve, to negotiate mining concessions with the Venezuelan government.

Venezuela possesses vast proven reserves of gold, iron, and bauxite, in addition to lesser quantities of copper and nickel. Analysts have also drawn attention to Venezuela’s significant reserves of coltan, which has important military, aerospace, and electronics applications, as well as unproven deposits of rare earth minerals.

Former President Hugo Chávez sought to end foreign mining concessions in the 2000s, pushing instead for the state to play a leading role and link extraction activities to its basic industries in sectors such as steel and aluminum. 

The Chávez government likewise revoked a number of concessions from Western mining companies. Several of them, including Canada’s Crystallex and Gold Reserve, went on to secure compensation via international arbitration bodies.

Since 2015, the Nicolás Maduro administration looked to mining as a potential revenue source amid escalating US sanctions, particularly in the 112,000 square-kilometer Orinoco Mining Arc. Nevertheless, the sector was likewise hit by unilateral coercive measures, while the proliferation of irregular mining groups has generated environmental concerns.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Fusagasugá, Colombia.

Oil prices fell sharply after US President Donald Trump said on Monday that the war against Iran could be short-lived and that Washington was considering waiving oil-related sanctions on certain countries to ease pressure on crude markets.

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“So in some countries, we’re going to take those sanctions off until this straightens out,” Trump told reporters, without naming which countries were under consideration.

The United States currently maintains sanctions affecting oil trade against a small group of countries: Iran, Venezuela, Russia, Syria and North Korea.

Trump also said he spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Monday to discuss the war and other issues.

Oil prices retreated from recent highs, with both WTI crude and Brent futures falling more than 9%. Brent was trading just below $90 during the European morning, while WTI stood at $85.40 a barrel.

Prices had briefly surged to their highest level since 2022, nearing $120 a barrel, a day after Iran’s Assembly of Experts appointed Mojtaba Khamenei as supreme leader in succession to his late father.

Investors read the appointment as a signal that Tehran was digging in, ten days into the war launched by the United States and Israel.

But prices later fell, and US stocks rose on hopes that the war with Iran may not last much longer.

“We took a little excursion” to the Middle East, “to get rid of some evil. And, I think you’ll see it’s going to be a short-term excursion,” Trump told Republican lawmakers at his golf club near Miami.

However, he left open the possibility of an escalation of fighting if global oil supplies are disrupted by the Islamic Republic, which chose a new hardline supreme leader.

Hours later, Trump posted on social media.

“If Iran does anything that stops the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, they will be hit by the United States of America twenty times harder than they have been hit thus far.”

In an apparent response to Trump’s remarks, Iranian state media reported that Ali Mohammad Naini, a spokesperson for the paramilitary Revolutionary Guard, said that “Iran will determine when the war ends”.

Stock markets cheer the news

All major European stock markets opened sharply higher.

The FTSE 100 in London gained more than 1.1%, the CAC 40 in Paris jumped 1.9%, the DAX in Frankfurt rose 2%, benchmark indices in Madrid and Milan were up 2.5%, and the Stoxx 600 gained 1.7%.

Asian shares also rebounded on Tuesday after sharp declines the previous day, as investors wagered the conflict might be short-lived.

Tokyo’s Nikkei 225 added 2.9%, also buoyed by revised government data showing Japan’s economy grew at an annual pace of 1.3% in the final quarter of last year — well above the initial estimate of 0.2%, driven by solid business investment.

South Korea’s Kospi jumped 5.4% and Australia’s S&P/ASX 200 gained 1.1%.

“Today is the rebound — obviously [after] positive comments from President Trump overnight. We’re starting to see the light at the end of the tunnel for the war,” said Neil Newman, head of strategy at Astris Advisory Japan.

“Volatility is going to remain with us, but things are certainly looking a lot brighter today.”

Hong Kong’s Hang Seng added 2.1% and the Shanghai Composite rose 0.6%.

Share prices have been swinging largely in tandem with oil, which has gyrated as the conflict has deepened.

The central uncertainty for markets is how high crude prices will go and how long they will stay there, given ongoing disruptions to Middle Eastern energy infrastructure.

If oil remains very high for an extended period, households already stretched by inflation could come under severe pressure, while companies would face sharply higher bills for fuel and logistics.

The risk is a worst-case scenario for the global economy: stagflation, where growth stagnates and inflation stays elevated.

Attention has focused in particular on the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway off Iran’s coast through which a fifth of the world’s oil passes on a typical day.

Iran has threatened to attack ships sailing through the strait.

If it remains closed for even a few weeks, oil could push to $150 a barrel or higher, according to strategists at Macquarie Research. Trump said separately that he was “thinking about taking it over,” according to CBS.

In bond markets, the yield on the 10-year US Treasury fell to 4.10% from 4.15% late Friday after briefly rising above 4.20% on Monday morning as oil price fears pushed yields higher.

Yields retreated when crude eased later in the day.

In currency markets, the dollar edged up to 157.48 yen from 157.67, while the euro was unchanged at $1.1638.

Gold rose 1.7% to $5,191.8 an ounce. Cryptocurrency markets also gained, with most leading tokens up between 1% and 2%.

Bitcoin outperformed, rising 2.6% to $70,863 according to the CoinDesk Bitcoin Price Index.