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WASHINGTON — The Justice Department and FBI are struggling to contain the fallout and appease the demands of far-right conservative personalities and influential members of President Trump’s base after the administration’s decision this week to withhold records from the Jeffrey Epstein sex trafficking investigation.

The move, which included the acknowledgment that one particular sought-after document never existed in the first place, sparked a contentious conversation between Atty. Gen. Pam Bondi and FBI Deputy Director Dan Bongino at the White House earlier this week — threatening to shatter relations between the two law enforcement leaders. It centered in part on a news story by a conservative outlet that described divisions between the FBI and the Justice Department.

The cascade of disappointment and disbelief arising from the refusal to disclose additional, much-hyped records from the Epstein investigation lays bare the struggles of FBI and Justice Department leaders to resolve the conspiracy theories and amped-up expectations that they themselves had stoked with claims of a cover-up and hidden evidence. Infuriated by the failure of officials to unlock, as promised, the secrets of the so-called deep state, Trump supporters on the far right have grown restless and even demanded change at the top.

Tensions that simmered for months boiled over on Monday when the Justice Department and FBI issued a two-page statement saying that they had concluded that Epstein did not possess a “client list,” even though Bondi had intimated in February that such a document was sitting on her desk. The statement also said that they had decided against releasing any additional records from the investigation.

The department did disclose a video meant to prove that Epstein killed himself in jail, but even that raised eyebrows of conspiracy theorists because of a missing minute in the recording.

It was hardly the first time that Trump administration officials have failed to fulfill their pledge to deliver the evidence they expected.

In February, conservative influencers were invited to the White House and provided with binders marked “The Epstein Files: Phase 1” and “Declassified” that contained documents that had largely already been in the public domain.

After the first release fell flat, Bondi said officials were poring over a “truckload” of previously withheld evidence she said had been handed over by the FBI.

But after a months-long review of evidence in the government’s possession, the Justice Department determined in the memo Monday that no “further disclosure would be appropriate or warranted,” the memo says. The department noted that much of the material was placed under seal by a court to protect victims and “only a fraction” of it “would have been aired publicly had Epstein gone to trial.”

The Trump administration had hoped that statement would be the final word on the saga, with Trump chiding a reporter who asked Bondi about the Epstein case at a Cabinet meeting on Tuesday.

But Bondi and Bongino had a contentious exchange the following day at the White House, according to a person familiar with the matter who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss a private conversation.

Part of the clash centered on a story from NewsNation, a right-leaning news organization, that cited a “source close to the White House” as saying the FBI would have released the Epstein files months ago if it could have done so on its own. The story included statements from Bondi, Deputy Atty. Gen. Todd Blanche and FBI Director Kash Patel refuting the premise, but not Bongino.

The news publication Axios was first to describe the conversation.

Blanche sought to stem the fallout Friday with a social media post in which he said he had worked closely with Patel and Bongino on the Epstein matter and the joint memo.

“All of us signed off on the contents of the memo and the conclusions stated in the memo. The suggestion by anyone that there was any daylight between the FBI and DOJ leadership on this memo’s composition and release is patently false,” he wrote on X.

Also on Friday, far-right activist Laura Loomer, who is close to Trump, posted on X that she was told that Bongino was “seriously thinking about resigning” and had taken the day off to contemplate his future. Bongino is normally an active presence on social media but has been silent since Wednesday.

The FBI did not respond to a request seeking comment and the White House sought in a statement to minimize any tensions.

“President Trump has assembled a highly qualified and experienced law-and-order team dedicated to protecting Americans, holding criminals accountable and delivering justice to victims,” said spokesman Harrison Fields. “This work is being carried out seamlessly and with unity. Any attempt to sow division within this team is baseless and distracts from the real progress being made in restoring public safety and pursuing justice for all.”

Tucker writes for the Associated Press. AP writer Michelle L. Price in Washington contributed to this report.

Beijing’s remarks come after Ottawa announced it would cease all Canadian operations of the company.

Canada’s request for Chinese surveillance equipment firm Hikvision to close local operations will “damage” bilateral trade, complicating recent efforts to improve ties between the countries, China’s Ministry of Commerce has said.

Beijing’s remarks came on Monday after Canadian Industry Minister Melanie Joly announced last week on the social media platform X that Hikvision Canada Inc had been ordered to cease all operations due to concerns their continuation would be “injurious” to the country’s security.

Her statement on Friday did not provide details on the alleged threat posed by Hikvision products, but said departments and agencies would be prohibited from using them, and that the government is “conducting a review of existing properties to ensure that legacy Hikvision products are not used going forward”.

China’s Commerce Ministry responded by accusing Ottawa of “over-generalising national security”, stating: “China is strongly dissatisfied.”

“This not only undermines the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese companies and affects the confidence of companies from both countries in cooperation, but also disrupts and damages the normal economic and trade cooperation between China and Canada,” the statement read.

“China urges Canada to immediately correct its wrong practices,” it added.

Hangzhou-based Hikvision is one of the world’s leading manufacturers of security cameras and other surveillance products, but it has faced scrutiny abroad for its role in Beijing’s alleged rights abuses against the Muslim minority Uighur population.

The United States included Hikvision in a 2019 blacklist of Chinese entities it said were implicated in human rights violations and abuses in the implementation of China’s campaign of repression, mass arbitrary detention, and high-technology surveillance against Uighurs and other Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang.

The latest disagreement represents an early test for China-Canada relations after Prime Minister Mark Carney surged to electoral victory in April.

China said in response to the election result that Beijing was willing to improve ties with Ottawa, a relationship rocked in recent years by a range of thorny issues.

The arrest of a senior Chinese telecom executive on a US warrant in Vancouver in December 2018 and Beijing’s retaliatory detention of two Canadians on espionage charges plunged relations into a deep freeze.

Ties were further strained over allegations of Chinese interference in Canadian elections in 2019 and 2021, charges Beijing has denied.

Joly had said the decision to ban Hikvision had been reached following a “multi-step review” of information provided by the Canadian security and intelligence community.

In the international relations structures in Southeast Asia, “strategic trust” acts as a glue between countries that are diverse in terms of institutions, histories, and national interests. Strategic trust can be understood as the extent to which one country believes that another country will not harm its core interests, even in the absence of strong enforcement mechanisms. This is not blind trust but calculated trust, based on consistent behavior, policy transparency, and commitment to complying with common rules of the game. In Southeast Asia, strategic trust is not only the foundation for bilateral cooperation but also a prerequisite for building the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) according to the roadmap by 2025.

The relationship between Thailand and Cambodia is a case in point, reflecting the complex and fragile nature of strategic trust in the region. There have been periods of serious border conflicts, such as the dispute over the Preah Vihear temple area in 2008–2011, and the two countries have repeatedly been embroiled in military tensions. Although bilateral relations have stabilized under Hun Sen and subsequent civilian governments in Bangkok, underlying factors such as anti-Cambodian sentiment in the Thai military and a lack of transparency in the handling of migrant workers and border issues persist. In this context, the ASEAN institution, with its principles of non-interference and consensus, has shown its limits even more clearly. When tensions flare up, ASEAN often lacks effective tools for coordination and mediation, leading to a situation of “every man for himself” and dependence on personal relationships between leaders.

The leak of an audio recording between Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra and Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen in June 2025 is a typical example of the failure of strategic trust in a loose institutional framework like ASEAN.

What is remarkable about the incident is not only the content of the call but also the nature of the diplomatic form used. The 17-minute exchange was conducted outside official channels and was marked by an excessively intimate tone: Ms. Paetongtarn called Mr. Hun Sen “uncle” and agreed with him to ignore criticism from a Thai military general. This reflects the deeply personal political model in both countries. In Thailand, “Thaksinism” is not just a political phenomenon but also a family-based power structure, where the Shinawatra clan still holds great influence in politics, despite opposition from the military and royalists. In Cambodia, “Hun Senism” is a symbol of decades of personal rule, where Mr. Hun Sen and his family control almost all state power, passing the throne to his son without any real democratic competition.

The leaked audio recordings reveal a number of statements that have crossed the line on the military and security. Notably, the Thai military’s disdain for Ms. Paetongtarn’s response to her claim that the generals were just “showing off” is a provocative and insulting statement to the military, which has staged coups to overthrow governments led by her family. In addition, the fact that the prime minister of one country made such a clear statement in favor of another country’s leader on a potentially disputed border issue has touched the limits of domestic and international strategic trust. Not surprisingly, shortly afterwards, the Bhumjaithai Party—the second largest partner in the ruling coalition—announced its withdrawal from the government, citing the serious damage to the honor of the nation and the military.

Hun Sen’s role in releasing the recording has further complicated the situation. While Cambodia has said that Hun Sen simply wanted to “clarify the truth” after the first nine minutes of the recording were leaked earlier, observers have said that the release of the entire transcript was politically calculated. On the one hand, it helped Hun Sen demonstrate his status as a “great friend” of Thailand while sending a message to the Thai military that they should not underestimate his influence. On the other hand, he also unintentionally—or intentionally—put the Thai Prime Minister in a difficult position when Ms. Paetongtarn was forced to apologize publicly, undermining her reputation and legitimacy at home.

The impact of the leaked audio recording between Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra and Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen goes beyond the bilateral level, spreading like a domino effect to many levels of national political structures, international relations, and institutional functioning of ASEAN. At each level, this incident highlights the fragility of strategic trust while exposing the gaps in the ability to control and institutionalize individual power in Southeast Asia.

For Thailand, the political consequences are profound and potentially long-lasting. Internally, Paetongtarn’s government—newly formed with the support of the Shinawatra family—is on the brink of collapse after the Bhumjaithai Party, the second-largest partner in the ruling coalition, announced its withdrawal. This move not only created a parliamentary majority crisis but also cost Paetongtarn her already fragile political legitimacy and credibility as the “political heir” to her father, Thaksin Shinawatra. Polls after the event showed that the government’s approval rating plummeted, while support for the military’s role as a guarantor of national stability increased significantly.

The Thai military—which has traditionally been deeply involved in politics—now has a new justification for acting in the name of “protecting national honor and the face of the military.” The coups of 2006 and 2014 were both carried out in the name of maintaining stability and countering the influence of the Shinawatra family. This time, a civilian leader directly insulting the generals and showing subservience to foreign leaders could be interpreted as a threat to national security. In this context, the possibility of the military intervening, directly or indirectly, is a very real risk. This raises questions about the future of Thailand’s young democratic system, which has been repeatedly disrupted by military coups.

For Cambodia, this event can be seen by Hun Sen as a tactical victory in domestic affairs. The release of the entire recording demonstrates his proactive control of information and public opinion and helps him affirm his role as a powerful regional figure, despite having stepped down from the position of prime minister. In the eyes of the Cambodian public, Hun Sen is praised as someone who maintains his influence in foreign affairs and takes the initiative against a larger country like Thailand. However, on the international level, the release of a private recording between two heads of state may raise doubts about Phnom Penh’s diplomatic credibility. The deliberate release of confidential information will make other partners—both within and outside ASEAN—more cautious in all forms of high-level contact with Cambodian leaders. This, in the long term, may cause Cambodia to be partially isolated in strategic diplomatic channels or at least lose its image as a responsible partner in the region.

In terms of bilateral relations, Hun Sen’s release of the full transcript of the call also puts Thailand in a vulnerable position, forcing the Paetongtarn government to publicly apologize. This is an extremely dangerous diplomatic precedent, especially in the context of the two countries still having unresolved historical disputes. Without a clear and in-depth trust-building strategy from both sides, Thai-Cambodian relations risk taking a major step backward. Any efforts to build trust through defense, border security, and labor cooperation channels could be frozen or shifted to a state of precaution.

Regionally, the impact of this event is systemic for ASEAN. First of all, the incident has seriously undermined strategic trust within the bloc. ASEAN countries, which are already very cautious about sharing information and coordinating security, will now be even more cautious in high-level communications if they are concerned that the content may be leaked or exploited for internal political purposes. The fact that a high-level leader was recorded and then released in full without any official response from ASEAN shows the inability of this organization to handle internal crises. ASEAN does not have any mechanism to investigate, intervene, or mediate in bilateral diplomatic crises, especially when they do not take the form of traditional armed conflicts.

In addition, this incident also sets a dangerous precedent for the entire regional diplomatic culture: when personal relationships can be recorded, edited, disseminated, and exploited for political purposes. This breaks the unwritten norms of ASEAN diplomacy, where friendliness and discretion are considered the foundation. If this trend continues, regional leaders will gradually lose trust in each other, and instead there will be a permanent state of hidden tension. More importantly, strategic rivals outside the region, such as China or the United States, can take advantage of these trust gaps to amplify internal ASEAN conflicts. If any member state feels threatened or betrayed, it can turn to external powers as a strategic counterweight, leading to polarization in regional foreign policy and seriously weakening ASEAN’s neutrality in the Asia-Pacific security architecture.

Recent developments are a wake-up call for Southeast Asia on the need to institutionalize and make transparent strategic diplomatic channels. First, countries need to establish clear standards for high-level contacts between leaders—including confidentiality, recording, and public statements. Calls or personal contacts between leaders should be coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and controlled by an official system to ensure accountability and information security. Second, ASEAN countries need to strengthen the role of professional diplomacy, limiting the use of backroom channels or friendly relationships as tools to resolve crises. In a region where individual leaders can change quickly, betting on personal relationships is a risky strategy.

ASEAN also needs to rethink its operating model. It is necessary to establish an early warning mechanism for intra-bloc diplomatic crises, as well as a code of conduct for senior leaders in bilateral contacts. This is not to control or limit the freedom of leaders but to ensure that individual actions do not undermine the foundation of shared trust. In the long term, a strong ASEAN security community can only be built if member states agree to abandon the mindset of “personal politics” and replace it with institutionalized, accountable, and transparent diplomacy.

Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani called for peace and diplomacy less than 24 hours after Iran attempted strikes on the US’s Al Udeid Air Base located in the country. But he said a “scar” had been inflicted on Qatar’s regional relationship with Iran.

EXPLAINER

Iran remains the US’s adversary in the Middle East since the 1979 Islamic revolution led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

United States-Iran tensions have surged to the highest point in decades after President Donald Trump on Sunday ordered direct strikes that he said “obliterated” key nuclear facilities across the Middle Eastern country.

Iran remains the biggest adversary of the US in the region since the 1979 Islamic revolution led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini toppled pro-Western Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Since then, the two nations have sparred over a multitude of issues, including Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Iran’s backing of proxies in the region, and US political interference.

Israel, which has long considered Iran a threat, launched unprecedented strikes across Iran last week after accusing the country of developing nuclear weapons. Israeli claims have not been backed by any credible proof, but Trump dragged the US into the war following the Israeli strikes.

On Sunday, the US directly hit Iran in what the Trump administration called a highly sophisticated covert attack that involved more than 125 US aircraft and 75 precision bombs. Washington said it “devastated” Iran’s nuclear sites, but Tehran has warned it will retaliate.

Here’s a timeline of US-Iran relations since 1953:

• (1953) US-backed coup and reinstallation of the shah: Tensions initially began brewing over the democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh’s efforts to nationalise the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (now BP). The British colonial power controlled the majority stake in the joint-venture company since oil was discovered in the early 1900s. Mosaddegh’s moves to nationalise the company after his 1951 election angered the British. The US’s Central Intelligence Agency supported the United Kingdom in engineering a coup and backing once-deposed monarch, Pahlavi, back into power as shah.
• (1957) Atoms for Peace: The shah’s ambitions for a nuclear-powered Iran gained support from the US and other Western allies. Both countries signed a nuclear agreement for the civilian use of nuclear power as part of then-US President Dwight D Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace programme. A decade later, the US provided Iran with a nuclear reactor and uranium to fuel it. The nuclear collaboration forms the basis for the current nuclear question.
• (1979) Islamic revolution: While relations between Tehran and Washington flourished, Iranians groaned under the dictatorship of the shah and resisted the perceived overreach of Western influence on their business. Revolutionary protests began rocking the country in late 1978 and forced the shah to flee in January 1979. Exiled Islamic scholar Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned to rule the new Islamic republic.
• (1980) US cuts diplomatic ties: Following the US’s move to admit the shah for cancer treatment after his exile, Iranian students broke into the US embassy in Tehran and kidnapped 52 Americans for 444 days. Washington cut off diplomatic ties and imposed sanctions on the country. The shah died in exile.
• (1980-88) US backs Iraqi invasion: Following Iraq’s invasion of Iran under Saddam Hussein, who was eager to push back against Khomeini’s ideology, the US sided with Iraq, deepening tensions between the two nations. The war lasted till 1988 and saw thousands die on both sides. Iraq also used chemical weapons on Iran.
• (1984) Sponsor of terror designation: President Ronald Reagan officially designated Iran as a “state sponsor of terror” after a series of attacks in Lebanon, where the US had been drawn in after Israel invaded the country. In one attack on a military base in Beirut, 241 US service members were killed. The US blamed Hezbollah, a Lebanese Shia movement backed by Iran. Later, though, Reagan worked with Iran behind the scenes to free American hostages held by Hezbollah. When it came to light, the Iran-Contra affair, as it was termed, was a huge scandal for Reagan.
• (1988) Iran Air flight shot down: Amid war tensions and even direct attacks on each other’s military warships in the Gulf, a US naval ship breached Iranian waters and fired at the civilian Iran Air flight (IR655) headed to Dubai on July 8. All 290 people on board were killed. The US, which claimed it was a mistake, did not formally apologise or claim responsibility but paid families $61.8m as compensation.
• (1995) Tighter sanctions: Between 1995 and 1996, the US imposed more sanctions. Then, President Bill Clinton’s executive orders banned US companies from dealing with Iran, while Congress passed a law penalising foreign entities investing in the country’s energy sector or selling Iran advanced weapons. The US cited nuclear advancement and support of groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
• (2002) 9/11 aftermath: Following the 9/11 attacks on the US, President George W Bush, in a State of the Union address, said Iran was part of an “Axis of Evil” alongside Iraq and North Korea. At the time, Iran had been parlaying with the US behind the scenes to target their mutual foes – the Taliban in Afghanistan and al-Qaeda. The cooperation was soured, and by the end of 2022, international observers noted highly enriched uranium in Iran, inviting more sanctions.
• (2013) Iran nuclear deal: Between 2013 and 2015, US President Barack Obama began high-level talks with Iran. In 2015, Tehran agreed to the nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), that would limit Iran’s nuclear activities in exchange for an easing of sanctions. China, Russia, France, Germany, the UK and the European Union were also party to the deal that capped Iran’s enrichment at 3.67 percent.
• (2018) Trump withdraws from the nuclear deal: Under Trump’s first term, the US unilaterally withdrew from the deal in 2018 and slapped back sanctions against Iran. Trump and Israel had been critical of the deal. Iran also called off its commitments and began producing enriched uranium beyond the limits the deal had imposed.
• (2020) IRGC leader assassinated: During Trump’s first term, the US killed Iranian General Qassem Soleimani, the head of the elite Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), in Baghdad in a drone strike. A year earlier, the administration had named the Quds Force a “terrorist” organisation. Iran responded with strikes on US assets in Iraq.
• (2025) Letter to Tehran: In March, Trump shot off a letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei proposing new negotiations on a nuclear deal with a deadline of 60 days. But Khamenei rejected the offer, saying the US is not seeking negotiations with Iran but rather imposing demands on it. Talks started unofficially in Oman and Italy, with Muscat acting as the mediator. Trump claimed his team was “very close” to a deal after several rounds of talks and warned Israel against strikes. Tehran, too, expressed optimism but insisted on the right to enrich uranium – a sticking point in the talks. Israel launched strikes across Iran a day before the sixth round of the Iran-US talks.
• (2025) US strikes: The US bombed three key nuclear facilities in Iran, citing security concerns and the defence of Israel.