Pragmatic

Washington does not have a single policy toward Venezuela. On the contrary, since January 3, it has shown two distinct tracks that, for now, avoid colliding. The first is executed by the White House—a pragmatic, gradual strategy willing to bring opposition figures beyond María Corina Machado and Edmundo González to the negotiating table. The second has been maintained by Congress since the removal of Nicolás Maduro, most recently taking the form of a bipartisan Senate resolution that insists both remain the legitimate leaders of the opposition. The real question here is not which of these two faces will prevail, but why it serves US interests for both to exist simultaneously.

The past week showed how the board is functioning. On August 1, Jorge Rodríguez and Dinorah Figuera initiated dialogue over the phone between Delcy Rodríguez’s “government” and the remnants of the 2015 National Assembly, with the Trump administration acting as sponsor. Four days later, the Senate resolution reaffirmed González as president-elect, aligned with the administration’s stated goal of free elections while recognizing the electoral illegitimacy of Delcy Rodríguez. Caught between these two approaches, Marco Rubio asked Venezuelans for patience (“months, not years”) regarding elections, while Democratic Representative Jonathan Jackson (who had traveled to Caracas in July with the House delegation) revealed that even within Congress, there is no single consensus on what the US should be doing in Venezuela. Still, the simple fact that a Democrat secured permission to travel with the delegation speaks volumes.

Two paths, one destination?

For the White House, Venezuela has ceased to be—if it ever fully was—a matter of democratic principles, morphing instead into an equation of stabilization: energy, migration, and hemispheric security. Secretary Rubio’s three phases lay this out frankly: economic stabilization, recovery and reconciliation, and transition. This sequence shifts US priorities from democratic ideals to transactional metrics.

The IMF mission making headway in Caracas, Energy Secretary Chris Wright’s focus on the oil sector, and Rubio’s comparisons to transitions that took “nearly three and a half years” in countries like Paraguay and Spain confirm that the White House is prepared to manage Venezuela’s political timeline in a gradual, controlled manner, avoiding disruptions that could impact oil prices. Congress, on the other hand, bears no such executive burden. It can afford to speak the language of principles because it doesn’t have to sit down and negotiate barrels or deadlines.

Shielding that stance in a bipartisan manner is, at its core, a way to ensure US tutelage over Venezuela survives beyond Trump.

The Trump administration excluded Machado and Edmundo González from the process launched on August 1, a fact both publicly confirmed while clarifying that they would not stand in its way. Their seats at the table were filled by Dinorah Figuera and a delegation from the 2015 National Assembly. While this group does not answer directly to Machado’s party, it comprises members of Primero Justicia and Voluntad Popular, two parties that have consistently backed Machado and González throughout.

Meanwhile, the Senate resolution does the exact opposite: it explicitly names Machado and González as the legitimate leaders, describing Delcy Rodríguez as someone lacking an electoral mandate who would be unlikely to win a free election. It is a text that leaves no room for the ambiguity the White House grants itself.

Why this shift in signal? My first response would be that Congress—and particularly the Foreign Affairs committees in both chambers—operates under an institutional incentive distinct from Trump’s: surviving electoral cycles and administrative turnover. A resolution that anchors the recognition of legitimacy to Machado and González does not depend on who occupies the White House in 2029. Shielding that stance in a bipartisan manner is, at its core, a way to ensure US tutelage over Venezuela survives beyond Trump, even if the next occupant of the Oval Office chooses to change course.

Who are the players and what are their interests?

On the congressional chessboard, it is worth examining who the key players are—a crucial detail with the November midterm elections fast approaching.

In the Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee is chaired by Jim Risch (R), with Jeanne Shaheen (D) as ranking member. The Western Hemisphere Subcommittee is chaired by John Curtis (R) alongside Tim Kaine (D). Here lies the first key detail: Shaheen, the prominent Democratic voice who co-led the August 4 resolution with Ted Cruz (R), announced she will not seek reelection in 2026. She is retiring from Congress, but leaving this text as a legacy, which deprives Trump of a critical Democratic counterpart willing to apply public pressure.

Committee Chair Risch is on the ballot this November, while John Cornyn (a Republican who has been critical of Trump) is retiring, allowing him to adopt a harder line on foreign policy even when it diverges from the administration’s stance. Cruz, by contrast, does not face voters again until 2030, insulating him from immediate electoral pressures—making it no coincidence that he is leading the toughest resolution against the Delcy regime.

In the House, the Foreign Affairs Committee consists of over fifty members. It is chaired by Brian Mast (R), who led the July delegation to Caracas, with Gregory Meeks (D) as ranking member. The Western Hemisphere Subcommittee (which has served as the key House venue shaping the tone toward Venezuela) is chaired by María Elvira Salazar (R) with Joaquín Castro (D) as ranking member, alongside 13 other members (six Republicans and five Democrats).

A Congress with more elected Democrats, or with Republicans who survived tough races where voters demanded tangible results, will push harder to ensure the process unfolding in Venezuela moves beyond rhetoric.

All thirteen members are seeking reelection in 2026, meaning their moves leading up to November could either preserve Republican control of the committee or shift its leadership to the Democrats. Another detail worth noting is that Michael Lawler (R)—representing one of three Republican districts won by Kamala Harris in 2024—flirted for months with a run for New York governor before deciding in July to stay in his House seat to avoid risking the Republican majority. It is the same logic that kept Castro from running for the Senate in Texas. In a Congress where every seat matters, even figures with national ambitions end up staying put.

Another factor connecting the midterms directly to the Venezuelan community—particularly those in South Florida—is the special election in November to fill the remainder of the Senate term left vacant by Marco Rubio when he became Secretary of State. Given Florida’s demographic makeup, that seat cannot afford to be detached from US policy toward Venezuela. Furthermore, the seat will be up for election again in 2028, requiring anyone competing for it to keep their stance on Venezuela front and center.

Analyzing these congressional actors reveals that the pursuit of bipartisanship on Venezuela—a staple of foreign policy since 2014—appears to be a mechanism for institutionalizing US tutelage, regardless of who occupies the Oval Office. What could change (and likely will after November) is the execution. A Congress with more elected Democrats, or with Republicans who survived tough races where voters demanded tangible results, will push harder to ensure the process unfolding in Venezuela moves beyond rhetoric into a concrete transition.

What this means for Venezuelans

Amid all these tensions are the Venezuelan people, and this is where the gap between Washington and Caracas becomes most uncomfortable. The August 1 dialogue addresses earthquake relief, democratic strengthening, and political guarantees: a modest agenda compared to the demands set by the Senate. Meanwhile, real money is flowing into Venezuela through the IMF mission, energy cooperation, and the capital accompanying the “economic stabilization” phase Rubio outlined. Here, despite its strong resolutions, Congress exercises little actual oversight over how negotiations are conducted or where that money goes, as foreign policy decisions and economic licenses ultimately rest with the Executive branch.

Rather than leaving all these levers to executive discretion, Congress could take a far more active role.

This is why symbolic resolutions fall short. If Congress wants its recognition of Machado and González to be more than a gesture, it possesses concrete tools it has yet to fully deploy, such as: (i) conditioning any sanction relief or oil license on mandatory reporting regarding the destination of funds entering Venezuela; (ii) requiring the State Department to brief Congress periodically on the status of the August 1 dialogue; and (iii) tying the approval of new economic licenses to verifiable negotiation milestones, such as the release of political prisoners, the appointment of Supreme Court (TSJ) magistrates or new National Electoral Council (CNE) rectors, and ultimately the publication of an electoral timetable.

Rather than leaving all these levers to executive discretion, Congress could take a far more active role. None of this requires Congress to act as a negotiator—only to stop being a passive spectator in a process funded partly through money within its jurisdiction. For Venezuelans who have waited more than two decades for a genuine transition, the question is not just whether Machado and González remain recognized by the United States, but whether anyone in Washington will be held accountable for what is being negotiated in their name.

Both sides of this coin prompt us to ask: To what extent is the “transition” an act in which Venezuelans actually hold decision-making power? How far do US interests truly align with improvements for the Venezuelan people? Are we willing to prioritize institutional strength over the leadership of the moment? There will be as many answers as there are Venezuelans. What we can say for certain is that in this process, the United States is playing a role far beyond that of a mere “watchdog.” It is actively building an “institutional” tutelage.

Doha, Qatar – Gulf states have welcomed a breakthrough agreement between the United States and Iran to end a war they never wanted.

Six countries – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman – form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which was created in 1981 following fears of the perceived expansionist ambitions of the new Iranian government.

Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, Israel has attempted to isolate Iran and its wide network of regional proxy groups. But in a twist of irony, Israeli aggression in this pursuit has pushed some Gulf states closer to Tehran.

When Israel and the US launched strikes on Iran on February 28 – and Tehran responded by attacking Gulf states – they were again forced to reassess their relationship with their neighbour.

Gulf relations with Iran, at present, appear more shaped by realism than reconciliation, but this approach could help them navigate the uncertain road ahead.

“The ongoing conflict … compelled the Gulf states to pursue a more pragmatic relationship with Tehran, one that will include enhanced dialogue to deter conflict,” Farah al-Qawasmi, a researcher at the Gulf Studies Center at Qatar University, told Al Jazeera.

Embracing de-escalation – not Iran

All six GCC member states have welcomed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed by Iran and the US last week. But this is shaped more by the Gulf states wanting the war to end rather than a newfound trust of Iran.

“An agreement between the two parties is being [highly] advocated by the Gulf states in [an] attempt to prevent and contain regional conflicts,” al-Qawasmi said.

Shortly after the US and Iran agreed in 2015 to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – putting guardrails on Tehran’s nuclear programme – Gulf states remained sceptical about their neighbour.

The current war has only heightened these suspicions, but it has also seen regional states seek diplomacy with Tehran rather than military confrontation, despite Iran directly attacking Gulf cities.

“The Gulf states still feel like diplomacy is better than using force to get a deal … to change Iran’s behaviour and to insulate them from Iran’s destabilising actions,” Rob Geist Pinfold, a lecturer on security studies at King’s College London, told Al Jazeera.

Pinfold points out that Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz via drones and missiles, not nuclear weapons, making dealing with that threat a priority for Gulf states rather than Tehran’s nuclear programme.

Gulf states will want a more comprehensive agreement between Iran and the US, rather than the nuclear-focused JCPOA, said Pinfold.

“If you talk to people in Gulf capitals, they will tell you that the nuclear programme is a tomorrow problem for them,” he said.

“The today problem is Iran’s use of drones and proxies to destabilise and undermine the sovereignty of Gulf states, but also states throughout the region.”

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s three-day tour of the Gulf, which ends Thursday, is seen as a way of allaying these fears and assuring the GCC that Tehran will not be strengthened by the agreement.

Seat at the table

Mehran Haghirian, the director of research and programmes at the Bourse & Bazaar Foundation, believes Gulf states are in a better position to guide the outcome of the current US-Iran talks than in 2015.

“They are at the heart of the negotiations,” Haghirian said regarding the Gulf states’ role in the current talks.

In its role as a co-mediator, Qatar is essentially representing the GCC and their interests during the talks, while articles five and six of the Iran-US MoU place Gulf states at the centre of the agreement.

Among the biggest concerns for the GCC are the future of the Strait of Hormuz, with Tehran demanding tolls on shipping, and calls for the creation of a regional investment fund for Iran.

“There really cannot be any new Hormuz authority by Iran that would not include other GCC countries,” Haghirian told Al Jazeera.

US Vice President JD Vance claimed last week that the investment fund would be financed by the Gulf coalition, but Rubio said this week that regional allies would not be asked to contribute to any reconstruction fund for Iran.

Qatar’s Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani has described the reported $300bn figure as “aspirational” in an interview with the Financial Times, while no Gulf state has yet said if it will contribute to the fund.

‘Maximum pressure era’

The analysts stress that the GCC is not a monolith – with Gulf states having contrasting and changing approaches towards Iran.

Oman, Qatar and Kuwait were broadly supportive of the JCPOA. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain were more sceptical, but even these states publicly backed the agreement, said Haghirian.

When Trump pulled the US out of the JCPOA in 2018, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain believed they had “found a partner in DC”.

That led to a “maximum pressure era” that brought a period of brinkmanship in the region, said Haghirian.

Suspected Iran-linked attacks on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq-Khurais oil facilities and vessels off the coast of Fujairah in 2019 were “the initial reaction by the Iranians to that maximum pressure” campaign, he added, but paradoxically, this also triggered a recalibration of relations.

The UAE and Iran restored ties in 2022, and a China-brokered Saudi-Iran agreement took place in 2023.

“That was enough of a reason for Saudi Arabia [and] the UAE, particularly, to basically restructure their approach towards Iran,” Haghirian said.

The war and accelerated pragmatic rapprochement

While Israel has used war to attempt to increase its presence in the Gulf region – reportedly sending an Iron Dome battery to the UAE – other Gulf states view both Iran and Israel as unsettling forces in the region.

“Israel started the war, which was a destabilising act, and then Iran escalated by targeting the Gulf states, which was in turn a destabilising act,” Pinfold said.

Despite this, the Gulf states targeted by Iran still demonstrated patience and pragmatism in dealing with their neighbour.

Qatar, for example, has played a leading role in mediating between the US and Iran, even after being on the receiving end of Iranian drone and missile attacks.

“All six got attacked, and that’s really a level of foreign policy decision-making that is very difficult for any state to be able to really undertake, considering the fact that it was a military attack,” Haghirian said.

“But again, this pragmatism came out within this context to engage Iran and to actually speak for themselves at these negotiations. This war has really initiated a complete rebalancing of the entire region.”