PDVSA

Carlos Mendoza Potellá is an economist and university professor with vast experience and expertise regarding the Venezuelan oil industry. In this exclusive interview with Venezuelanalysis, Mendoza Potellá offers his analysis on the recent reform of the Hydrocarbon Law, the longstanding influence of Western conglomerates over Venezuela’s energy sector, and the struggle for sovereignty.

In late January, the Venezuelan National Assembly approved a reform of the Hydrocarbon Law. What are your views on the new law?

In broad terms, it is the relinquishing of our condition as a sovereign nation, plain and simple. We are not a nation anymore. We are a territory with some delegate administrators implementing decisions made abroad. Who decides? Emperor Trump, who has his proconsul Marco Rubio.

The approved law meets the maximum demands that the Venezuelan right and the oil conglomerates have been making for at least the last 25 years. The 2002 coup against Chávez was to impose something like this, the return to the old concession model. It is the fulfillment of all the dreams of the old “meritocratic” leadership of [state oil company PDVSA], the people who did everything to minimize the fiscal contributions to the country, whether that meant buying 37 refineries abroad or other disasters that wrecked the country.

The reform is a victory for international oil capital, alongside a discourse that hands over the destiny of the industry to major corporations and diminishes national participation as some unproductive “rentierism.”

The Venezuelan oil industry has gone through various stages, with varying degrees of influence from major transnational corporations, whether that is the period prior to the formal nationalization in 1976 or the Oil Liberalization (Apertura Petrolera) of the 1990s. How do we situate the new law within that context?

I believe this is a step backward beyond the apertura or the pre-nationalization period –perhaps it’s a return to 1832! In 1829, Simón Bolívar issued a decree transferring the Spanish crown’s mining rights to Gran Colombia. This, in turn, was based on old medieval law, essentially establishing that mines were the property of the sovereign, the king. In fact, that is where the term “royalty” comes from –as a tribute to the king. And in 1832, when Venezuela separated from Gran Colombia, that decree ratified the nation’s ownership of its mines. 

Obviously, oil didn’t emerge until 30 or 40 years later, but by 1866 concessions were already being granted. For a time, people spoke of “material that comes from the subsoil,” even though everyone already knew it was oil.

Our first boom was with asphalt. In 1883, Guzmán Blanco granted the Lago Guanoco concession to his buddy Horacio Hamilton, who later transferred it to the New York & Bermúdez Company, a subsidiary of the US firm General Asphalt. The asphalt boom lasted 50 years, and with it, streets and highways were built all over the United States.

But the example of New York & Bermúdez is significant because when Cipriano Castro came to power in 1899, he found out that the company had not paid taxes and attempted to collect them. What did the corporation do? It financed the so-called Revolución Libertadora led by Manuel Antonio Matos, a banker from La Victoria, which was ultimately defeated after two bloody battles. It was the first instance of foreign hydrocarbon interests seeking to control national politics. And it was always linked to the United States.

In the 1920s, then-dictator Juan Vicente Gómez tasked his minister, Gumersindo Torres, with drafting a hydrocarbons law, but the foreign companies did not like it. And Gómez told them, “Well, then, write the law yourselves!” Later, in 1936, the López Contreras administration drafted a very good law, but since it wasn’t retroactive, the companies did not mind because they already had their concessions granted.

When do we start seeing the first steps toward Venezuelan oil nationalism?

It was precisely in 1941 that Medina Angarita took office and commissioned a massive dossier on all the concessions in the country, informing the US government that Venezuela was aware of the importance of its oil. This was during World War II, and the oil companies were haunted by the specter of the 1938 Mexican nationalization under the government of Lázaro Cárdenas.

What was [Franklin D.] Roosevelt’s response? He sent a delegation from the State Department, not to intercede on behalf of the oil companies, but to convince them to accept Medina’s reform, because Venezuelan oil was vital to the war effort. The law passed in 1943 was quite progressive. Its first article stated that hydrocarbons are a matter of national public interest, and as such, concessions were granted for a maximum term of 40 years. Eighty percent of the concessions were granted at that time, to expire in 1983.

Venezuelan production grew through the 1970s, but as the end of the concessions approached, the transnational corporations began implementing policies to somewhat ease the hostility toward foreign investment.

Thus, a policy of “Venezuelanization” of the industry’s management was put into effect. That is why, when the so-called nationalization took place (1976), companies such as Shell and Creole, a subsidiary of Standard Oil-Exxon, had Venezuelans serving as president or vice president. These executives later assumed leadership of the newly created national companies. Their passports were Venezuelan, but their hearts belonged to foreign corporations!

Historically, how was the relationship between foreign corporations and Venezuelan authorities? And how did they respond to the 1976 nationalization?

The corporations grew accustomed to the idea of an industry tailored to their interests. I mentioned how they were the ones who drafted the first Hydrocarbons Law. Oversight bodies, such as the Technical Office of Hydrocarbons, were constantly undermined in their efforts to regulate oil activities. And so the companies could extract oil without paying royalties, violate technical standards for field exploitation, or export gasoline instead of fuel oil.

The 1970s were a turbulent time for the oil sector, marked by geopolitical tensions and the 1973 crisis in the Arab countries. In 1973, James Akins, the Nixon administration’s Director of Energy at the State Department, wrote an article in Foreign Affairs titled “The Oil Crisis; This Time the Wolf Is Here.” He argued that Venezuela could be key to reducing dependence on the Middle East, and that in the face of growing oil nationalism, it was necessary to cede some ground and consider other models of participation, while maintaining control over critical areas such as refining and commercialization.

Put differently, it was possible to offer some token concessions to the nationalist aspirations of oil-producing countries like Venezuela. And that rhetoric spread to the transnational corporations. The president of Shell said at the time, “Venezuela is going to have to take action regarding its oil industry,” while the head of Creole spoke of “the Venezuelans’ oil”!

There were growing signs of how the nationalization would take shape and how the transnationals were restructuring. A good example is the Venezuelan Petroleum Corporation (CVP), created in 1960. Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo, whom I consider a visionary and a deeply nationalist figure, had conceived it as a company that would develop until the time came for the state to take over production. But the governments did not let it grow; they did not assign concessions it was entitled to, and by the time of nationalization, the CVP was simply one more operator among 13 or 14. 

In contrast, [Petróleos de Venezuela, SA] PDVSA, created with the nationalization, did have a very clear vision from the start. I remember hearing senior PDVSA executives talking among themselves, discussing how one came from the “Exxon culture,” which was more vertical, and the other from the “Shell culture,” which was more horizontal. And these were the managers! They were the leaders of the Venezuelan oil industry, which had very little “Venezuelan” about it. What we are seeing now is the reconstitution of all these things.

Circling back to the current reform, we have seen that sovereignty is a central issue. How is it affected on different fronts?

For me, a fundamental issue is the return of concessions. Because that means going back decades, handing control back to transnational conglomerates. With taxes and royalties, the problem is not whether the rate is 30% or 15%; that flexibility existed in the past. But now it is the transnational corporations that tell the government what their operating costs are and how much goes to the Venezuelan state. There is no oversight body to verify this; instead, the company says, “I need you to lower royalties to this level” for the project to be profitable.

The return of international arbitration is also a brutal setback, because it means that disputes are not settled in Venezuelan courts, but in other bodies that have a history of defending corporate interests. There is no role left for the Public Solicitor’s Office (Procuradoría General), which is essentially the nation’s attorney. 

For months we were told we were ready to confront imperialism, but the truth is that everything is being imposed on us. Even the National Assembly is castrating itself. It has enacted a law stating that oil projects no longer require the parliament’s approval; they need only be notified. And on top of all that, there is also the constitutional issue. The reform conflicts with Articles 1, 12, 150, 151, and several others of the Constitution. But this is not merely a constitutional violation; it is a total surrender. A surrender of sovereignty that calls into question our status as a republic.

One of the issues under debate is the distinction between a country that owns oil and a country that produces oil. How should we understand the difference?

Of course, that’s fundamental. A country that owns oil simply collects royalties, and it does so according to its political capabilities. At the moment, Venezuela’s capabilities are limited, because the military cannot confront the enemy, and allies like Russia and China have not shown themselves willing to take any risks. So, there is little room to impose conditions on the US.

But this is a country that has grown used to the multinational corporations having free rein over its oil sector. Unfortunately, there are many people, within the industry itself, who believe that “the foreign conglomerates developed this and therefore have a right to these privileges.” Curiously, that is the same rhetoric Trump uses! 

This struggle for sovereignty is fundamental in oil-producing countries. We have seen this with the countries of the Middle East, which try to assert themselves but remain highly dependent on the United States. Obviously, they have the advantage of not being as close as we are. But in my opinion, historically we have lacked nationalism on this issue.

One of the arguments in favor of reforming the Hydrocarbon Law was the need to attract investment to so-called “green fields,” on the grounds that when the previous law was passed in 2001, there were many mature fields ready for development and this is no longer the case. However, major corporations have not shown much enthusiasm. What is your reading on this?

Those are fantasies about oilfields that have always been unviable; it is the obsession with the Orinoco Oil Belt. Humberto Calderón Berti, minister of mines in the 1980s and a major proponent of PDVSA’s internationalization, was already talking about green fields back then. By the way, Calderón Berti is now talking about the possibility of fracking in Lake Maracaibo, which would make the lake’s environmental disaster even worse.

The idea that an avalanche of investment is coming is an illusion, and the oil companies themselves know it. Trump talks about investments of $100 billion, but transnational corporations like ExxonMobil use the word “uninvestable.” With market volatility, no one is thinking about investing in oil with extremely high production costs. There is a study that concludes that increasing production to 2.6 million barrels per day based on the Orinoco Belt would require US $90 billion in investments and $122 billion in operating expenses over the next 10 years to drill 13,000 new wells! In other words, it is completely unfeasible.

On top of that, OPEC’s forecasts for oil demand over the coming decades aren’t particularly ambitious. (1)

So who stands to benefit from this new landscape? On the one hand, small “rogue” companies that can take on a well here and there. But above all, the conglomerates that are already here, like Chevron, which know the lay of the land and can expand their operations or make their current operations more profitable. The same goes for Eni and Repsol, which have some crown jewels, like the offshore Perla natural gas field. The corporations that come will be betting mostly on conventional fields, not the Orinoco Belt.

It is very commonplace to hear about US refineries in the Gulf of Mexico that are built to receive Venezuelan crude. That is true, but it is not oil from the Orinoco Belt! It is oil from the Oriente (East) and Occidente (West) oil-producing regions.

Let us stay for a moment on the Orinoco Oil Belt, since that is where the talk of the “largest oil reserves on the planet” centers, as well as the prospects for a massive increase in production. What are the myths and realities surrounding these deposits?

The Orinoco Belt is a geological miracle. Eighty million years ago, 10–15 percent of all life that existed on the planet was fossilized north of the Orinoco River. It is something to cry out to the heavens. But that is not exploitable oil. It is extra-heavy crude, a sticky mess that needs to be upgraded. First it must be converted into liquid petroleum so it can flow through pipelines, and then taken to be refined and turned into gasoline. 

In the 1970s, the United States saw the energy crisis coming and asked, “When conventional oil runs out, where can we find oil around the world?” In three places: the Soviet Union, Canada, and Venezuela. And where in Venezuela? In the Orinoco Oil Belt. Pérez Alfonzo spoke of the belt as “something for the future,” but the United States wanted to accelerate exploitation and sent a delegation in 1971 to convince President Rafael Caldera to begin the process. In fact, the name was changed from “Tar Belt” to “Oil Belt” to make it more attractive.

The US Geological Survey estimates that there are 513 billion barrels of “technically recoverable” oil. But that is absurd, because there is no capacity. What makes a reserve recoverable has to do with economic ability, the market, and the available technology. Nevertheless, the Orinoco Belt has been at the center of grandiose projections over the past few decades, alongside the highly lucrative business of certifying reserves.

The oil reform took place in a specific context, following years of economic sanctions that have left PDVSA in a very difficult situation. What would be an alternative path? How can the industry recover without surrendering sovereignty?

There are no magic solutions, obviously. We are facing imperialism in the Trump era; we see all its destructive potential. It is a phase where the US, paradoxically, recognizes its weakness and is entrenching itself in its “backyard.” But we must be aware that the industry’s current course is one of total capitulation.

Whether we can recover, whether it is possible or not, we must think about it rigorously, in a sovereign manner. And above all, we must have a serious plan; we cannot be dreaming of 5 or 6 million barrels a day.

There are 17,000 conventional oil wells, with the capacity to produce, abandoned around the country. Of the 35,000 wells in Venezuela, only half are currently producing. The others require investment, though not particularly large ones. And what kind of oil will these wells produce? Crude grades ranging from 20 to 30 degrees. But we need a plan, to examine wells one by one. These are wells that will produce 20, 50, or 100 barrels a day, but it is light and medium crude—the “classic” Venezuelan oil.

So, from a nationalist perspective, what does the future hold for Venezuela’s oil industry? 

The future is to build a post-oil Venezuela. This was already being discussed by theorists such as Francisco Mieres and Pérez Alfonzo in the 1970s. Then, in recent years, many began talking about a post-oil or post-rentier country, but mostly to cover up their incompetence and inability to maintain production levels.

There is no magic solution, and the oil industry will have to play an important role. But the current situation is dire. We are in a new phase of absolute political dependence. It’s not just about oil, or that the US controls revenues, imposes concessions, and so on. It is that the country has lost the ability to make its own decisions.

There are also expectations of the people, who to a large extent have become accustomed to the idea that their oil will last forever. That creates the illusion that things can improve very quickly. The path will be slow, but it has to start with regaining sovereignty.

Note

(1) The interview was conducted before the launch of the US-Israeli war against Iran.

Caracas, March 20, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The US Treasury Department has issued a new sanctions waiver as the Trump administration seeks to deepen US control over Venezuela’s oil sector.

General License 52 (GL52), published on Wednesday, authorizes US entities to engage in transactions with Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA under conditions that limit Venezuelan sovereignty.

An updated FAQ from the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control clarified that the exemption allows US companies to engage in activities related to the exportation of Venezuelan-origin oil products, export diluents and inputs to Venezuela as well as enter into new contracts for oil and gas production.

However, in line with recent US licenses, GL52 mandates that all tax, royalty, and dividend payments be made into US Treasury-controlled accounts.

Following the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration has taken control over Venezuelan crude exports while imposing conditions favorable to Western energy conglomerates.

Thus far, Washington has returned US $500 million out of an initial January deal worth $2 billion. US authorities have also confirmed Venezuelan imports of US-manufactured medicines and medical equipment. Trump officials had vowed that US energy revenues could only be used for purchases from US suppliers and that Caracas would need to submit a “budget request” to access its funds.

The White House issued GL52 amid soaring energy prices caused by the US and Israeli war against Iran. Tehran has responded to massive bombings by targeting US military assets in the region and closing the strategic Strait of Hormuz.

Last week, the US Treasury amended licenses to allow US imports of fertilizers from Venezuela, as well as repair works in the South American country’s electric grid. Venezuela’s electrical infrastructure remains in a precarious state after years of US sanctions, and expanded power capacity is a precondition for recovery of the oil industry.

Despite the broadened waivers for corporations hand-picked by the White House to engage with Venezuela, PDVSA and its subsidiaries remain under financial sanctions, while third-country firms risk secondary sanctions should they enter into agreements without a US Treasury special license.

In late January, Venezuelan authorities approved a pro-business overhaul of the country’s Hydrocarbon Law, granting private companies reduced fiscal responsibilities, increased control over production and exports, and the possibility of taking disputes to international arbitration bodies.

Chevron and Shell, with US Treasury approval, were the first companies to take advantage of the new incentives. Chevron’s Petropiar joint venture with PDVSA was granted a new 500 square-kilometer bloc to drill for extra-heavy crude in the Orinoco Oil Belt, while Shell is set to take over light and medium crude and natural gas operations in the eastern state of Monagas.

Last week, European energy giants Eni and Repsol, who were also given the inside track by the White House, announced an agreement with the Venezuelan government for the development of the Cardón IV offshore natural gas project.

Eni and Repsol each own 50 percent stakes in Cardón IV, which has been in operation since 2009. Neither firm nor Caracas offered details on the renewed agreement, though both enterprises had lobbied for improved conditions and mechanisms to recoup accumulated debt due to US sanctions.

According to Bloomberg, ONGC Videsh (India), Maha Capital AB (Sweden), and J&F Investimentos (Brazil) are among the companies likely to receive special licenses for involvement in Venezuela’s oil sector as Washington seeks to counter rising crude prices. Nevertheless, analysts stress that the Venezuelan oil industry does not have the capacity to significantly ramp up output in the near future.

On March 11, the Trump administration formally recognized Acting President Delcy Rodríguez as Venezuela’s “sole authority,” days after Venezuela and the US reestablished diplomatic ties following a seven-year hiatus.

On Monday, Rodríguez appointed new executive boards for PDVSA’s US-based affiliates, including refiner CITGO. Asdrúbal Chávez, who held multiple roles in both PDVSA and CITGO since the 2000s, was picked as president of CITGO and its parent company, PDV Holding. At the time of writing, US authorities have not commented on the proposed new leadership for the companies, which had been run by the US-backed opposition since 2019.

CITGO is currently in the closing stages of a court-mandated auction that will see Venezuela lose ownership of its most prized foreign asset to address creditor claims against the country. The sale to Amber Energy, a subsidiary of vulture fund Elliott Management, is pending authorization from the US Treasury Department.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Fusagasugá, Colombia.

WASHINGTON — U.S. companies will be allowed to do business with Venezuela’s state-owned oil and gas company after the Treasury Department eased sanctions, with some limitations, on Wednesday as the Trump administration looks for ways to boost world oil supplies during the Iran war.

The Treasury issued a broad authorization allowing Petróleos de Venezuela S.A, or PDVSA, to directly sell Venezuelan oil to U.S. companies and on global markets, a massive shift after Washington for years had largely blocked dealings with Venezuela’s government and its oil sector.

Separately, the White House said President Trump would waive, for 60 days, Jones Act requirements for goods shipped between U.S. ports to be moved on U.S.-flagged vessels. The 1920s law, designed to protect the American shipbuilding sector, is often blamed for making gas more expensive.

The moves highlight the increased pressure that the Republican administration is under to ease soaring oil prices as the United States, along with Israel, wages a war with Iran without a foreseeable end date. Global oil prices have since spiked as Iran halted traffic through the narrow Strait of Hormuz, where one-fifth of the world’s oil typically passes through from the Persian Gulf to customers worldwide.

The Treasury’s license is designed to incentivize new investment in Venezuela’s energy sector and is intended to benefit both the U.S and Venezuela, while increasing the global oil supply, a Treasury official told the Associated Press. The official was not authorized to discuss the matter publicly and spoke on condition of anonymity.

Since the ouster and arrest of Nicolás Maduro as Venezuela’s president during a U.S. military operation in January, Trump has said the U.S. would effectively “run” Venezuela and sell its oil.

The U.S. license provides targeted relief from sanctions, but does not lift the penalties altogether. The license allows companies that existed before Jan. 29, 2025, to buy Venezuelan oil and engage in transactions that would normally be banned under American sanctions, reopening trade for a major oil producer to global markets.

There are some limits.

Payments cannot go directly to sanctioned Venezuelan entities such as PDVSA, but must be sent instead to a special U.S.-controlled account. In other words, the U.S. will allow the oil trade but will control the cash flow.

Additionally, deals involving Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba and some Chinese entities will not be allowed. Transactions involving Venezuelan debt or bonds will not be allowed.

The license is expected to give a massive boost to Venezuela’s oil-dependent economy and help encourage companies that have been apprehensive to invest. The decision is part of the Trump administration’s phased-in plan to turn around Venezuela. But critics of the acting Venezuelan government argue that the move rewards Venezuela’s leadership — all loyal to Maduro and the ruling party — while repression, corruption and human rights abuses continue.

Many public sector workers survive on roughly $160 per month, while the average private sector employee earned about $237 last year, when the annual inflation rate soared to 475%, according to Venezuela’s central bank, and sent the cost of food beyond what many can afford.

Venezuela sits atop the world’s largest oil reserves and used them to power what was once Latin America’s strongest economy. But corruption, mismanagement and U.S. economic sanctions saw production steadily decline from the 3.5 million barrels per day pumped in 1999, when Maduro’s mentor, Hugo Chávez, took power, to less than 400,000 barrels per day in 2020.

A year earlier, the Treasury Department under the first Trump administration locked Venezuela out of world oil markets when it sanctioned PDVSA as part of a policy punishing Maduro’s government for corrupt, anti-democratic and criminal activities. That forced the government to sell its remaining oil output at a discount — about 40% below market prices — to buyers such as China and in other Asian markets. Venezuela even started accepting payments in Russian rubles, bartered goods or cryptocurrency.

The new license does not allow payments in gold or cryptocurrency, including the petro, which was a crypto token issued by the Venezuelan government in 2018.

Meantime, White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said the Jones Act waiver would help “mitigate the short-term disruptions to the oil market” during the Iran war and would “allow vital resources like oil, natural gas, fertilizer, and coal to flow freely to U.S. ports.”

Hussein and Cano write for the Associated Press. Cano reported from Caracas, Venezuela. AP writer Seung Min Kim contributed to this report.

Caracas, March 11, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Energy conglomerates Chevron and Shell are reportedly securing major oil deals in Venezuela following the recent pro-business reform of the country’s Hydrocarbon Law.

According to Reuters, joint venture Petropiar, where Chevron holds a minority stake, will expand its operations into the Ayacucho 8 bloc of Venezuela’s Orinoco Oil Belt. 

Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA completed exploration and appraisal of the 510 square-kilometer area located south of Petropiar’s current operations, but its development has been limited. Under the agreement, Chevron looks to significantly expand its extra-heavy crude output from the Orinoco Oil Belt, which holds three-quarters of Venezuela’s oil reserves.

Chevron is reportedly looking to secure reduced royalties and taxes under the recently reformed Hydrocarbon Law in order to launch operations in the new area. Petropiar currently produces 90,000 barrels per day (bpd) of upgraded Hamaca crude. PDVSA’s joint ventures with Chevron have a total present output of around 250,000 bpd.

In January, Venezuela’s National Assembly approved a legislative overhaul that significantly improved conditions and benefits for private corporations in the oil and natural gas sector. Royalty and income tax levies, previously set at 30 and 50 percent, respectively, can now be slashed at the Venezuelan executive’s discretion.

In addition, joint venture minority partners can directly manage crude operations and sales, while legal disputes can be taken to international arbitration instances. Furthermore, PDVSA can also lease out projects to private operators in exchange for a percentage of the oil output.

Under the latter model, Shell is reportedly set to take over operations in PDVSA’s Punta de Mata division in eastern Monagas state, one of the most historically productive and profitable regions for Venezuela’s oil industry. The division produced over 400,000 bpd of light and medium crude grades in the 2000s but recent production was around 90,000 bpd.

The London-based multinational, which had a strong presence in the Venezuelan energy sector throughout the twentieth century, is likewise interested in capturing and processing natural gas that is currently flared in oil extraction processes. 

Shell is additionally set to lead the Dragon offshore natural gas project alongside Trinidad and Tobago’s National Gas Corporation (NGC) in Venezuelan waters. The Nicolás Maduro government had suspended all joint initiatives with Trinidad due to its administration’s support for Washington’s Caribbean military buildup and threats against Venezuela last year.

Since the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of President Maduro, the acting Venezuelan authorities led by Delcy Rodríguez have fast-tracked a diplomatic rapprochement with the Trump administration while also vowing to “adapt” legislation to attract foreign investment. Following the hydrocarbon reform, a new mining law has also been preliminarily approved by the Venezuelan parliament.

US Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Interior Secretary Doug Burgum have visited Venezuela in recent weeks and hailed the investment opportunities in oil and minerals for US conglomerates.

Since January, the Trump administration has taken control of Venezuelan oil exports, with crude shipments handled by commodity traders Vitol and Trafigura and proceeds deposited in accounts run by the US Treasury. US authorities so far have only returned US $500 million, out of a reported $2 billion agreement, to the Caribbean nation.

The White House has also issued a number of licenses in an effort to boost US involvement in the Venezuelan energy sector, including limited waivers to export inputs and technology. In addition, Washington has allowed several corporations to negotiate agreements with Caracas while mandating that contracts be subject to US jurisdiction and that all royalty, tax and dividend payments be made to US Treasury-run accounts.

Alongside Chevron and Shell, the other companies with early access to the Venezuelan energy sector are BP, Eni, Maurel & Prom, and Repsol. The latter two held meetings with Rodríguez in February to discuss investment opportunities, while ExxonMobil has announced plans to send a delegation to the country in the coming weeks.

Venezuela’s oil production rebounded in February, with OPEC secondary sources registering an output of 903,000 bpd, up from 823,000 bpd in January. A US naval blockade since December had forced PDVSA to cut back production before exports began to flow again under Washington’s control. The oil sector remains under US financial sanctions.

For its part, PDVSA reported a February output of 1.02 million bpd, up from 924,000 bpd the prior month. The direct and secondary measurements have differed over time due to disagreements over the inclusion of natural gas liquids and condensates.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Fusagasugá, Colombia.

Caracas, March 4, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA emphasized recent agreements to supply crude to the US market and reiterated its commitment to “global energy market stability” amid spiraling volatility caused by the US-Israel war against Iran.

“PDVSA has signed supply contracts with trading companies that deliver oil and derivatives to US markets, thus maintaining a historic trade relationship to guarantee supply,” the company said in a statement on Tuesday.

PDVSA further reaffirmed its stance as a “reliable provider” that will contribute to the “necessary equilibrium” in global energy markets, and called for an end to sanctions against the Venezuelan oil industry.

The communiqué followed a surge in oil prices as a result of the US and Israeli attacks against Iran. On February 28, Washington and Tel Aviv launched a massive bombing campaign against military and civilian targets in the West Asian country. 

Tehran has responded by striking Israel and US bases in the region, including in several oil-producing Gulf states. Iranian forces have likewise shut down the Strait of Hormuz, a critical passageway for oil shipments.

Though Venezuelan popular movements have firmly condemned the US-Israeli aggression and voiced support for Iran, the government headed by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez has yet to take a position. Rodríguez expressed “solidarity” with Qatar following the deletion of a controversial Foreign Ministry statement over the weekend.

Since its January 3 bombing of Venezuela and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration has imposed control over the Venezuelan oil industry. Commodity traders Vitol and Trafigura have been lifting Venezuelan crude before re-selling to final customers, with proceeds deposited in accounts managed by the US Treasury Department.

After an initial arrangement that saw revenues routed through Qatar, US Energy Secretary Chris Wright announced last week that payment for Venezuelan oil is now going directly to US Treasury accounts. Wright visited Venezuela in February. He was hosted by Rodríguez in the presidential palace and toured oil facilities where US energy giant Chevron owns stakes.

Out of an initial deal estimated at around US $2 billion, US authorities confirmed that $500 million have been sent back to Caracas, to be offered by Venezuelan banks to private sector importers in foreign exchange auctions. US officials have also confirmed imports of medical equipment and supplies from US manufacturers. Secretary of State Marco Rubio had vowed that Venezuelan oil revenues would be used for purchases from US companies.

In recent weeks, the Trump administration has issued licenses allowing the export of inputs and software to the Venezuelan oil industry, as well as waivers allowing select corporations to expand crude extraction activities in the South American country.

However, the licenses mandate that all royalty, tax, and dividend payments to the Venezuelan state be deposited in US-managed accounts. Similarly, Washington mandated that contracts be subject to US jurisdiction. Transactions with companies from China, Russia, Iran, Cuba and North Korea remain banned, while PDVSA continues under financial sanctions.

The selective loosening of restrictions followed a pro-business overhaul of Venezuela’s Hydrocarbon Law. The reform, approved in late January, grants private corporations expanded control over operations and sales, a reduced tax burden, and the possibility for disputes to be taken to external arbitration.

Both Venezuelan and US officials, including Trump himself, have urged Western corporations to invest in the Caribbean nation’s energy sector, but executives have expressed reservations given market conditions. ExxonMobil will reportedly send a team to evaluate prospects for a return to Venezuela in the coming weeks. 

The company had its assets nationalized by the Hugo Chávez government in the 2000s after refusing to accept reforms that reinforced Venezuelan state sovereignty over the industry. ExxonMobil pursued international arbitration but ultimately received an award significantly below its compensation demands.

Despite the oil sector opening to US and European interests, Venezuelan crude exports receded in February, according to Reuters, following the wind-down of shipments to China. In 2025, around three-quarters of Venezuelan crude was destined for Chinese refineries. Washington imposed a naval blockade in December and seized several tankers as part of its efforts to exert control over Venezuelan oil exports. Two Chinese-flagged ships turned around while headed to Venezuela in January.

Crude exports are expected to pick up in March, with shipments scheduled for Indian buyers.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Fusagasugá, Colombia.