PDVSA

Caracas, March 20, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The US Treasury Department has issued a new sanctions waiver as the Trump administration seeks to deepen US control over Venezuela’s oil sector.

General License 52 (GL52), published on Wednesday, authorizes US entities to engage in transactions with Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA under conditions that limit Venezuelan sovereignty.

An updated FAQ from the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control clarified that the exemption allows US companies to engage in activities related to the exportation of Venezuelan-origin oil products, export diluents and inputs to Venezuela as well as enter into new contracts for oil and gas production.

However, in line with recent US licenses, GL52 mandates that all tax, royalty, and dividend payments be made into US Treasury-controlled accounts.

Following the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration has taken control over Venezuelan crude exports while imposing conditions favorable to Western energy conglomerates.

Thus far, Washington has returned US $500 million out of an initial January deal worth $2 billion. US authorities have also confirmed Venezuelan imports of US-manufactured medicines and medical equipment. Trump officials had vowed that US energy revenues could only be used for purchases from US suppliers and that Caracas would need to submit a “budget request” to access its funds.

The White House issued GL52 amid soaring energy prices caused by the US and Israeli war against Iran. Tehran has responded to massive bombings by targeting US military assets in the region and closing the strategic Strait of Hormuz.

Last week, the US Treasury amended licenses to allow US imports of fertilizers from Venezuela, as well as repair works in the South American country’s electric grid. Venezuela’s electrical infrastructure remains in a precarious state after years of US sanctions, and expanded power capacity is a precondition for recovery of the oil industry.

Despite the broadened waivers for corporations hand-picked by the White House to engage with Venezuela, PDVSA and its subsidiaries remain under financial sanctions, while third-country firms risk secondary sanctions should they enter into agreements without a US Treasury special license.

In late January, Venezuelan authorities approved a pro-business overhaul of the country’s Hydrocarbon Law, granting private companies reduced fiscal responsibilities, increased control over production and exports, and the possibility of taking disputes to international arbitration bodies.

Chevron and Shell, with US Treasury approval, were the first companies to take advantage of the new incentives. Chevron’s Petropiar joint venture with PDVSA was granted a new 500 square-kilometer bloc to drill for extra-heavy crude in the Orinoco Oil Belt, while Shell is set to take over light and medium crude and natural gas operations in the eastern state of Monagas.

Last week, European energy giants Eni and Repsol, who were also given the inside track by the White House, announced an agreement with the Venezuelan government for the development of the Cardón IV offshore natural gas project.

Eni and Repsol each own 50 percent stakes in Cardón IV, which has been in operation since 2009. Neither firm nor Caracas offered details on the renewed agreement, though both enterprises had lobbied for improved conditions and mechanisms to recoup accumulated debt due to US sanctions.

According to Bloomberg, ONGC Videsh (India), Maha Capital AB (Sweden), and J&F Investimentos (Brazil) are among the companies likely to receive special licenses for involvement in Venezuela’s oil sector as Washington seeks to counter rising crude prices. Nevertheless, analysts stress that the Venezuelan oil industry does not have the capacity to significantly ramp up output in the near future.

On March 11, the Trump administration formally recognized Acting President Delcy Rodríguez as Venezuela’s “sole authority,” days after Venezuela and the US reestablished diplomatic ties following a seven-year hiatus.

On Monday, Rodríguez appointed new executive boards for PDVSA’s US-based affiliates, including refiner CITGO. Asdrúbal Chávez, who held multiple roles in both PDVSA and CITGO since the 2000s, was picked as president of CITGO and its parent company, PDV Holding. At the time of writing, US authorities have not commented on the proposed new leadership for the companies, which had been run by the US-backed opposition since 2019.

CITGO is currently in the closing stages of a court-mandated auction that will see Venezuela lose ownership of its most prized foreign asset to address creditor claims against the country. The sale to Amber Energy, a subsidiary of vulture fund Elliott Management, is pending authorization from the US Treasury Department.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Fusagasugá, Colombia.

WASHINGTON — U.S. companies will be allowed to do business with Venezuela’s state-owned oil and gas company after the Treasury Department eased sanctions, with some limitations, on Wednesday as the Trump administration looks for ways to boost world oil supplies during the Iran war.

The Treasury issued a broad authorization allowing Petróleos de Venezuela S.A, or PDVSA, to directly sell Venezuelan oil to U.S. companies and on global markets, a massive shift after Washington for years had largely blocked dealings with Venezuela’s government and its oil sector.

Separately, the White House said President Trump would waive, for 60 days, Jones Act requirements for goods shipped between U.S. ports to be moved on U.S.-flagged vessels. The 1920s law, designed to protect the American shipbuilding sector, is often blamed for making gas more expensive.

The moves highlight the increased pressure that the Republican administration is under to ease soaring oil prices as the United States, along with Israel, wages a war with Iran without a foreseeable end date. Global oil prices have since spiked as Iran halted traffic through the narrow Strait of Hormuz, where one-fifth of the world’s oil typically passes through from the Persian Gulf to customers worldwide.

The Treasury’s license is designed to incentivize new investment in Venezuela’s energy sector and is intended to benefit both the U.S and Venezuela, while increasing the global oil supply, a Treasury official told the Associated Press. The official was not authorized to discuss the matter publicly and spoke on condition of anonymity.

Since the ouster and arrest of Nicolás Maduro as Venezuela’s president during a U.S. military operation in January, Trump has said the U.S. would effectively “run” Venezuela and sell its oil.

The U.S. license provides targeted relief from sanctions, but does not lift the penalties altogether. The license allows companies that existed before Jan. 29, 2025, to buy Venezuelan oil and engage in transactions that would normally be banned under American sanctions, reopening trade for a major oil producer to global markets.

There are some limits.

Payments cannot go directly to sanctioned Venezuelan entities such as PDVSA, but must be sent instead to a special U.S.-controlled account. In other words, the U.S. will allow the oil trade but will control the cash flow.

Additionally, deals involving Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba and some Chinese entities will not be allowed. Transactions involving Venezuelan debt or bonds will not be allowed.

The license is expected to give a massive boost to Venezuela’s oil-dependent economy and help encourage companies that have been apprehensive to invest. The decision is part of the Trump administration’s phased-in plan to turn around Venezuela. But critics of the acting Venezuelan government argue that the move rewards Venezuela’s leadership — all loyal to Maduro and the ruling party — while repression, corruption and human rights abuses continue.

Many public sector workers survive on roughly $160 per month, while the average private sector employee earned about $237 last year, when the annual inflation rate soared to 475%, according to Venezuela’s central bank, and sent the cost of food beyond what many can afford.

Venezuela sits atop the world’s largest oil reserves and used them to power what was once Latin America’s strongest economy. But corruption, mismanagement and U.S. economic sanctions saw production steadily decline from the 3.5 million barrels per day pumped in 1999, when Maduro’s mentor, Hugo Chávez, took power, to less than 400,000 barrels per day in 2020.

A year earlier, the Treasury Department under the first Trump administration locked Venezuela out of world oil markets when it sanctioned PDVSA as part of a policy punishing Maduro’s government for corrupt, anti-democratic and criminal activities. That forced the government to sell its remaining oil output at a discount — about 40% below market prices — to buyers such as China and in other Asian markets. Venezuela even started accepting payments in Russian rubles, bartered goods or cryptocurrency.

The new license does not allow payments in gold or cryptocurrency, including the petro, which was a crypto token issued by the Venezuelan government in 2018.

Meantime, White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said the Jones Act waiver would help “mitigate the short-term disruptions to the oil market” during the Iran war and would “allow vital resources like oil, natural gas, fertilizer, and coal to flow freely to U.S. ports.”

Hussein and Cano write for the Associated Press. Cano reported from Caracas, Venezuela. AP writer Seung Min Kim contributed to this report.

Caracas, March 11, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Energy conglomerates Chevron and Shell are reportedly securing major oil deals in Venezuela following the recent pro-business reform of the country’s Hydrocarbon Law.

According to Reuters, joint venture Petropiar, where Chevron holds a minority stake, will expand its operations into the Ayacucho 8 bloc of Venezuela’s Orinoco Oil Belt. 

Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA completed exploration and appraisal of the 510 square-kilometer area located south of Petropiar’s current operations, but its development has been limited. Under the agreement, Chevron looks to significantly expand its extra-heavy crude output from the Orinoco Oil Belt, which holds three-quarters of Venezuela’s oil reserves.

Chevron is reportedly looking to secure reduced royalties and taxes under the recently reformed Hydrocarbon Law in order to launch operations in the new area. Petropiar currently produces 90,000 barrels per day (bpd) of upgraded Hamaca crude. PDVSA’s joint ventures with Chevron have a total present output of around 250,000 bpd.

In January, Venezuela’s National Assembly approved a legislative overhaul that significantly improved conditions and benefits for private corporations in the oil and natural gas sector. Royalty and income tax levies, previously set at 30 and 50 percent, respectively, can now be slashed at the Venezuelan executive’s discretion.

In addition, joint venture minority partners can directly manage crude operations and sales, while legal disputes can be taken to international arbitration instances. Furthermore, PDVSA can also lease out projects to private operators in exchange for a percentage of the oil output.

Under the latter model, Shell is reportedly set to take over operations in PDVSA’s Punta de Mata division in eastern Monagas state, one of the most historically productive and profitable regions for Venezuela’s oil industry. The division produced over 400,000 bpd of light and medium crude grades in the 2000s but recent production was around 90,000 bpd.

The London-based multinational, which had a strong presence in the Venezuelan energy sector throughout the twentieth century, is likewise interested in capturing and processing natural gas that is currently flared in oil extraction processes. 

Shell is additionally set to lead the Dragon offshore natural gas project alongside Trinidad and Tobago’s National Gas Corporation (NGC) in Venezuelan waters. The Nicolás Maduro government had suspended all joint initiatives with Trinidad due to its administration’s support for Washington’s Caribbean military buildup and threats against Venezuela last year.

Since the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of President Maduro, the acting Venezuelan authorities led by Delcy Rodríguez have fast-tracked a diplomatic rapprochement with the Trump administration while also vowing to “adapt” legislation to attract foreign investment. Following the hydrocarbon reform, a new mining law has also been preliminarily approved by the Venezuelan parliament.

US Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Interior Secretary Doug Burgum have visited Venezuela in recent weeks and hailed the investment opportunities in oil and minerals for US conglomerates.

Since January, the Trump administration has taken control of Venezuelan oil exports, with crude shipments handled by commodity traders Vitol and Trafigura and proceeds deposited in accounts run by the US Treasury. US authorities so far have only returned US $500 million, out of a reported $2 billion agreement, to the Caribbean nation.

The White House has also issued a number of licenses in an effort to boost US involvement in the Venezuelan energy sector, including limited waivers to export inputs and technology. In addition, Washington has allowed several corporations to negotiate agreements with Caracas while mandating that contracts be subject to US jurisdiction and that all royalty, tax and dividend payments be made to US Treasury-run accounts.

Alongside Chevron and Shell, the other companies with early access to the Venezuelan energy sector are BP, Eni, Maurel & Prom, and Repsol. The latter two held meetings with Rodríguez in February to discuss investment opportunities, while ExxonMobil has announced plans to send a delegation to the country in the coming weeks.

Venezuela’s oil production rebounded in February, with OPEC secondary sources registering an output of 903,000 bpd, up from 823,000 bpd in January. A US naval blockade since December had forced PDVSA to cut back production before exports began to flow again under Washington’s control. The oil sector remains under US financial sanctions.

For its part, PDVSA reported a February output of 1.02 million bpd, up from 924,000 bpd the prior month. The direct and secondary measurements have differed over time due to disagreements over the inclusion of natural gas liquids and condensates.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Fusagasugá, Colombia.

Caracas, March 4, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA emphasized recent agreements to supply crude to the US market and reiterated its commitment to “global energy market stability” amid spiraling volatility caused by the US-Israel war against Iran.

“PDVSA has signed supply contracts with trading companies that deliver oil and derivatives to US markets, thus maintaining a historic trade relationship to guarantee supply,” the company said in a statement on Tuesday.

PDVSA further reaffirmed its stance as a “reliable provider” that will contribute to the “necessary equilibrium” in global energy markets, and called for an end to sanctions against the Venezuelan oil industry.

The communiqué followed a surge in oil prices as a result of the US and Israeli attacks against Iran. On February 28, Washington and Tel Aviv launched a massive bombing campaign against military and civilian targets in the West Asian country. 

Tehran has responded by striking Israel and US bases in the region, including in several oil-producing Gulf states. Iranian forces have likewise shut down the Strait of Hormuz, a critical passageway for oil shipments.

Though Venezuelan popular movements have firmly condemned the US-Israeli aggression and voiced support for Iran, the government headed by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez has yet to take a position. Rodríguez expressed “solidarity” with Qatar following the deletion of a controversial Foreign Ministry statement over the weekend.

Since its January 3 bombing of Venezuela and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration has imposed control over the Venezuelan oil industry. Commodity traders Vitol and Trafigura have been lifting Venezuelan crude before re-selling to final customers, with proceeds deposited in accounts managed by the US Treasury Department.

After an initial arrangement that saw revenues routed through Qatar, US Energy Secretary Chris Wright announced last week that payment for Venezuelan oil is now going directly to US Treasury accounts. Wright visited Venezuela in February. He was hosted by Rodríguez in the presidential palace and toured oil facilities where US energy giant Chevron owns stakes.

Out of an initial deal estimated at around US $2 billion, US authorities confirmed that $500 million have been sent back to Caracas, to be offered by Venezuelan banks to private sector importers in foreign exchange auctions. US officials have also confirmed imports of medical equipment and supplies from US manufacturers. Secretary of State Marco Rubio had vowed that Venezuelan oil revenues would be used for purchases from US companies.

In recent weeks, the Trump administration has issued licenses allowing the export of inputs and software to the Venezuelan oil industry, as well as waivers allowing select corporations to expand crude extraction activities in the South American country.

However, the licenses mandate that all royalty, tax, and dividend payments to the Venezuelan state be deposited in US-managed accounts. Similarly, Washington mandated that contracts be subject to US jurisdiction. Transactions with companies from China, Russia, Iran, Cuba and North Korea remain banned, while PDVSA continues under financial sanctions.

The selective loosening of restrictions followed a pro-business overhaul of Venezuela’s Hydrocarbon Law. The reform, approved in late January, grants private corporations expanded control over operations and sales, a reduced tax burden, and the possibility for disputes to be taken to external arbitration.

Both Venezuelan and US officials, including Trump himself, have urged Western corporations to invest in the Caribbean nation’s energy sector, but executives have expressed reservations given market conditions. ExxonMobil will reportedly send a team to evaluate prospects for a return to Venezuela in the coming weeks. 

The company had its assets nationalized by the Hugo Chávez government in the 2000s after refusing to accept reforms that reinforced Venezuelan state sovereignty over the industry. ExxonMobil pursued international arbitration but ultimately received an award significantly below its compensation demands.

Despite the oil sector opening to US and European interests, Venezuelan crude exports receded in February, according to Reuters, following the wind-down of shipments to China. In 2025, around three-quarters of Venezuelan crude was destined for Chinese refineries. Washington imposed a naval blockade in December and seized several tankers as part of its efforts to exert control over Venezuelan oil exports. Two Chinese-flagged ships turned around while headed to Venezuela in January.

Crude exports are expected to pick up in March, with shipments scheduled for Indian buyers.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Fusagasugá, Colombia.

Recently, the United States reached a new historic milestone: it produced over 13.6 million barrels per day, a staggering feat for a country that many thought had peaked in 2008 when production bottomed out at 5 million bpd. This staggering increase was not achieved by a state giant, but by an ecosystem of thousands of independent operators driven by market-based incentives that, in Venezuela, might seem from another planet.

Meanwhile, Venezuela has traveled the opposite path: from a proud peak of 3.7 million bpd in 1970, it has collapsed to a stagnant output below 1 million bpd. 

In Texas, the landowner owns the oil; in Venezuela, it is the State—which claims, all the while, to represent us all.

The hundred-year war

Since the Los Barrosos II blowout in December 1922, our oil history has been defined by a relentless tug-of-war between private capital and the State over the capture of oil rent. This conflict is not unique to Venezuela, but as we enter this “third opening,” the question is unavoidable: how do we prevent a third nationalization?

Having done it twice before (1976 and 2006), Venezuela has established a precedent that alters risk assessment across all investment horizons. How can we guarantee investors that history won’t repeat itself? While often sold as a patriotic triumph, nationalization is a terminal breach of contract and a direct assault on property rights, deterring the very capital profiles that otherwise would be participating. International arbitration, legal reforms, and institutional frameworks are necessary, but they are not sufficient.

Government take and the global race

To put things in perspective: before the 2026 reform, the Venezuelan fiscal system was among the least competitive on the planet. Between royalties on gross income, income tax (ISLR), and “windfall profit” taxes, the State extracted a “Government Take” that often exceeded 80%, with marginal tax rates reaching up to 95% depending on price thresholds. In a scenario where the operator’s net margin was squeezed to a minimum, production became a game of survival and reinvestment became technically impossible.

While the January 2026 reform moves in the right direction, we aren’t just competing against our own past; we are competing against the world. Consider the current margins (Operator Share) in the region:

• Canada (Alberta, Heavy Oil): Private 50%-55% | Government 45%-50%
• Texas (Permian Basin): Private 45%-55% | Government 45%-55%
• Colombia (New Reforms): Private ­40% | Government ­60%
• Brazil (Pre-Salt): Private 39% | Government 61%
• Guyana (2025 Model): Private 25%-35% | Government 65%-75%
• Venezuela (2026 Law): Private 20%-35% | Government 65%-80%

Even with the recent reform, Venezuela is far from being a “bargain” for long-term investment.

The proposal: from State-partner to citizen-owner

To mitigate expropriation risk and attract long-term capital, I propose a model built on four foundational pillars:

• Private Capital-Citizen Partnership: The State is removed from operations. Incentives are aligned directly between citizens—the ultimate owners of the subsoil—and those who risk the capital to extract it.

• Zero Corporate Taxes (Tax Displacement): Eliminate corporate income tax, royalties, and all “shadow” taxes at the source. This slashes the operational break-even to technical average levels of $30 to $40 per barrel, turning “iron cemeteries” into profitable ventures even in low-price environments. This is not a tax holiday, but a redirection of the fiscal take: the operator delivers a major share of the value directly to the citizens, while the State sustains itself by taxing the total income of the citizenry and companies in the rest of the economy.

• The Citizen Dividend (Oil-to-Cash): Instead of paying a traditional tax to a discretionary Treasury, the operator delivers 50% of its net profit—effectively a flat tax paid to the owners—directly into a sovereign trust (or similar non-state mechanism) managed by top-tier international banks. While 50% is a significant share, the absence of any other fiscal burden makes this model one of the most competitive in the region. This trust distributes periodical dividends to every Venezuelan citizen, including those abroad. The State then funds its operations by taxing these dividends as part of the citizens’ total income via personal income tax (ISLR) and other tax sources from a diversified economy. This ensures that the government’s budget depends on the collective prosperity of its people, not on political control over the oil.

• The Citizen as “Guardian” and Auditor: This is the ultimate shield. In 1976 and 2006, the State nationalized because it was easy to seize control from a “multinational” and hand it to a bureaucracy. Under this scheme, any government attempting to expropriate would be taking directly from the pockets of 30 million owners. Transparency is embedded: citizens monitor production and distributions through real-time digital platforms, independent audits, and other decentralized oversight mechanisms. The citizen ceases to be a spectator and becomes the industry’s most powerful defender.

Unlike the State, whose lust for oil rent is political and lacks immediate consequences for those in power, the citizen acts with the prudence of an owner—because they become one. Under this model, any attempt to “suffocate” the private partner translates immediately into a drop in personal dividends. Private ownership of the benefit is, in itself, the best guarantee of stability for capital.

Application and reality

Under this model, the direct net profit split for the oil industry would be: Private 50%, Citizens 50%, State 0%.

This “State 0%” applies exclusively to the source to insulate the industry from political rent-seeking. It does not mean a zero-revenue State; the government continues to fund its functions, but through a transparent tax system (ISLR, VAT) derived from a citizen-owned economy.

To illustrate, with oil at $100 and production at 3.5 million bpd, each citizen would have received $1,500 annually ($6,000 for a family of four). At a $60 base price, the dividend would be $640 per person. Today, with production stalled below one million barrels, a citizen would receive a mere $185. It is modest, but it represents the starting point of a virtuous cycle where the State only prospers if its citizens do first.

Herein lies the virtue of the model: the alignment of interests. Under the current system, citizens watch from the sidelines as oil wealth vanishes into the state vortex. With this approach, each Venezuelan has a personal stake: the more their private partner thrives, the more they themselves benefit. Citizens move from passive critics to primary stakeholders in the nation’s industrial growth.

Considerations for a new Venezuela

Under other circumstances, I might not be a proponent of direct “cash” transfers. But given the alternatives, it is the “lesser evil”. The political class will likely claim this is neither feasible nor “patriotic.” For many politicians, the incentive is two-fold: the salivating prospect of managing an immense oil “booty,” and the recurring ideal of “doing good” with other people’s resources.

Still in doubt? Look at our track record: despite having the world’s largest proven reserves and over 20 different administrations of every political stripe since 1922, the State captured and managed over $1.2 trillion in rent between 1920 and 2015. The result? A Guinness world record in squandered booms, the largest migration in the hemisphere without a formal war, and unprecedented institutional destruction.

Isn’t it time to withdraw the State from oil? 

This proposal would achieve:

• Real competitiveness: By matching Texas and Alberta margins (50%+ for the private sector), we compensate for institutional risks with top-tier global profitability.
• A limited State: The State ceases to be an inefficient businessman and becomes an arbiter: providing control, arbitration, and security. Its funding would come from taxing other economic activities, forcing it to foster general prosperity rather than living off the subsoil.
• A path towards a dividend-producing nation: Why not extend this to all extractive activities (gas, gold, iron, rare earths)? Perhaps the gold of the Arco Minero would stop being a black hole and become a direct dividend, shielding resources from looting and opacity.

The January 2026 reform is just a sigh in a prolonged agony. We cannot expect different results by doing the same thing. The “Hundred-Year War” over oil rent has left the State as a jailer rich in promises and a citizenry poor in realities.

Avoiding a third nationalization requires moving the subsoil out of the political arena and into the sphere of economic freedom. The US does not dominate markets by government mandate, but through an ecosystem that rewards risk and efficiency. Venezuela can emulate this success, but only by breaking the State lock and allowing a fabric of investors to flourish in direct alliance with citizens.

True sovereignty is not the State running the wells; it is Venezuelans themselves being the real owners of the benefits. Only through this pact of ownership can we hope that oil becomes, at last, an engine of development and not the tool of our own institutional destruction.

Caracas, February 20, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Trump administration is forcing all royalty, tax, and dividend payments from Venezuelan oil production be paid into accounts managed by Washington.

The mandate reinforces the White House’s control over Venezuelan crude export revenues in the wake of the January 3 military strikes and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, as well as a naval blockade imposed in December.

The US Treasury Department updated its FAQ section on February 18 to clarify conditions on recently issued sanctions waivers allowing expanded participation in Venezuela’s oil sector to Western corporations.

Under the licenses, only “routine payments of local taxes, permits, and fees” to Venezuelan authorities are permitted.

“Other payments, including royalties, fixed per-barrel production levies, or federal taxes to blocked persons, such as the Venezuelan government or (state oil company) PDVSA, must be made into the Foreign Government Deposit Fund,” the text read.

The acting Rodríguez administration has yet to comment on the new restrictions. 

Since January, Washington has imposed control over Venezuelan crude exports, with proceeds deposited in a US-administered account in Qatar. US Energy Secretary Chris Wright announced recently that funds will now be deposited directly in a US Treasury account. Senior administration officials have stated that the arrangement gives the White House “leverage” to condition Venezuelan government policies, while Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that Caracas must submit a “budget request” to access its own oil revenues.

At least US $500 million, out of an initial deal estimated at $2 billion, have been returned to Venezuela and offered by banks in foreign exchange auctions. Venezuelan authorities have also reported the import of medicines and medical equipment from US manufacturers using “unblocked funds.”

On Thursday, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License 50A allowing select firms to conduct transactions and operations related to hydrocarbon projects with PDVSA or any other Venezuelan public entity. The document mirrors General License 50 issued on February 13 but added French firm Maurel & Prom to a list including BP, Chevron, Eni, Repsol, and Shell.

Maurel & Prom’s main project in the Caribbean nation is a minority stake in the Petroregional del Lago joint venture, which currently produces 21,000 barrels per day (bpd). The company’s executives recently held a meeting with Acting President Delcy Rodríguez as part of Caracas’ efforts to secure foreign investment.

In recent weeks, the Trump administration has issued several licenses to boost US and European involvement in the Venezuelan energy sector, with imports of diluents, inputs and technology now allowed. General License 49, issued on February 13, demands that companies apply for a special license before striking production and investment deals with Venezuela.

The US Treasury issued sanctions waivers while maintaining existing coercive measures against the Venezuelan oil industry in place, including financial sanctions against PDVSA. The licenses likewise block any transactions with companies from Cuba, China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia.

The selective flexibilization of sanctions followed the Venezuelan National Assembly’s approval of a pro-business overhaul of the country’s Hydrocarbon Law. The reform grants private corporations expanded control over operations and sales, while opening the possibility for disputes to be taken to external arbitration.

The reformed law also allows the Venezuelan executive to arbitrarily reduce royalties and a new “integrated tax,” capped at 30 and 15 percent, respectively. The executive is likewise entitled to grant reductions to the 50 percent income tax set for the oil industry if deemed necessary for projects to be “internationally competitive.”

According to US-set conditions and the reformed law, minority partners such as Repsol are authorized to sell crude from Venezuelan joint ventures before depositing the owed royalty and tax amounts, as well as dividends belonging to PDVSA, to US Treasury-designated accounts.

The initial crude sales as part of the Trump-imposed arrangement were conducted via commodity traders Vitol and Trafigura, which lifted cargoes at Venezuelan ports before re-selling them to final customers. However, according to Reuters, US-based refiners including Phillips66 and CITGO are looking to secure crude directly from Venezuela to maximize profits.

CITGO, a subsidiary of PDVSA, is close to being taken over by vulture fund Elliott Management following a court-mandated auction to satisfy creditor claims against the South American country. The company has been managed by boards appointed by the US-backed Venezuelan opposition since 2019.