opposition

In the last few days, in marked contrast to an election campaign defined by its bitterness and the closeness of its personal attacks, Israel’s current prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has spoken of national unity and coming together with the opposition bloc that edged out his ruling coalition in October’s election.

On Saturday, the same day that Israeli President Isaac Herzog tasked former Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot with forming a government capable of commanding the Knesset, Netanyahu published a video on his social media account claiming Israel to be facing the genuine risk of civil war if a government were established with the support of Arab parties which he accused of wanting to “eliminate the State of Israel”.

Two days later, Netanyahu returned to the theme of existential threat in a further video, calling upon the leaders of the more successful bloc to recognise the “needs of the hour” and join, under his leadership, a single unified government that would also include the ultra-Orthodox parties, at least one of which is understood to be in talks with Eisenkot, as well as the prime minister’s controversial allies on the far right, Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir.

“It’s all a game at the moment. It’s leverage, it’s one-upmanship, it’s psyops, it’s spin, it’s counter-spin,” former Israeli government adviser Daniel Levy said of the invariably long and complex negotiations that take place ahead of establishing a government,

Currently, with the new Knesset being sworn in on Tuesday, speculation is focussing on the role of the Ultra Orthodox, or haredim, parties, which have traditionally offered support to Netanyahu in return for measures shielding their young male yeshiva students from the military draft in defiance off a Super Court ruling of June 2024.

Strategy

Nevertheless, irrespective of the past political cover offered to their members by Netanyahu, there are suggestions that one of the Ultra Orthodox parties United Torah Judaism (UTJ) – which refused to endorse Netanyahu’s selection to build a government by the President – is preparing to throw in behind Eisenkot, with the objections of one of the opposition’s principal figures Avigdor Lieberman said to be quieted in the face of either partnering with one of the Arab parties or the continued rule of Lieberman’s nemesis, Netanyahu and the prospect of further elections.

“‘It’s political strategy, that’s all,” Netanyahu’s former aide, Israeli pollster Mitchell Barak said from Jerusalem. ‘But he’s negotiating from a weakened position. With the UTJ, Eisenkot’s got 67 seats,’ he said of the numbers needed to gain a working majority in the 120 seat Knesset, “so, of course, Netanyahu’s going to do all he can to reinforce his bloc; Barak said of negotiations regarded by many as critical to Netanyahu’s personal future.

Netanyahu faces a number of challenges that speak directly to both his political legacy and personal freedom that he will lose all influence over should Eisenkot succeed him.

Foremost are like to be the multiple corruption charges that is is presently on trial for and, despite his claims of innocence that he has already preemptively petitioned the country’s President and his former political rival, Isaac Herzog for. Secondly, and more pressingly is the question of his and his government’s culpability for the alleged failings ahead of the October 7 Hamas led attack that triggered the genocide unleashed upon Gaza by Israel and the multiple strikes and attacks launched by Israel non regional neighbors in the years since.

New Knesset, new danger

Many of the new MKs being sworn in on Tuesday, including bereaved family members, reservists, advocates for the 250 or so Israelis taken captive that day and Eisenkot himself, who lost a son and two nephews in the genocide that followed, are all tied directly to October 7 and the wars that followed together creating a chamber where feelings over the October 7 attack and where culpability for its lies are said to run close to the surface.

In particular, attention is likely to focus sharply on Netanyahu himself, whose supposed miscalculations ahead of the attack, stories of numerous missed warnings and who was subsequently accused of dragging out the war, or sacrificing the welfare off the captives for his own political ends. Key among the opposition’s aims for the first day of parliamentary business is set to be the installation of Matan Kahana, a member of Eisenkot’s Yashar (“straight”) party and a keen advocate of a state inquiry into Netanyahu and the government’s failings ahead of the Hamas led attack.

“Having so many people connected so directly to October 7 is going to increase the temperature, but it’s become so politicized that a win for one side automatically becomes a loss for the other, so the bereaved family on the right can say we need to increase our militarism in honor of my son, and the bereaved family in the center says we need to enlist more people.

“Netanyahu can try to influence that but for the first time in a long time, he seems a bit lost,” Israeli political analyst Nimrod Flaschenberg said.

However, how lost Netanyahu may be, or how grounded his claims of pending civil war or destruction at the hands of regional adversaries may be, ultimately, his political and potentially personal fate now lies with an opposition that outstrips his own numerically and a volatile Knesset eager to comb over the mistakes of the past.

“There’s no appetite on the other side to go in with Netanyahu for a unity government,” Levy said,

“The only real circumstances under which that happen is if he can create a security emergency,” he said following a weekend where the UK press had reported daily phone calls from Netanyahu to the Trump administration urging renewed war on Iran.

Claudio Fermín is a university professor and veteran political leader in Venezuela. Cutting his political teeth with Acción Democrática (AD) party, he became Caracas’s first elected mayor (1990-93). He went on to become a member of the 1999 Constituent Assembly as well as a perennial presidential candidate. Within the Venezuelan opposition, he has been known for his commitment to dialogue and opposing US sanctions.

In this exclusive interview, Fermín reflects on his role in the Venezuelan opposition, the consequences of the blockade against the Caribbean nation, the US “theft” of natural resources following the January 3 attack, and the challenge of recovering sovereignty.

Going back more than two decades, what was your relationship with former President Hugo Chávez like?

Chávez had a sharp tongue that spared no one. Yet whenever he referred to me, he always did so with respect and affection. I am grateful for his generosity.

In the early years, Chavismo was not just a vast popular movement but almost a religion. Since President Chávez spoke of me with such consideration, I think that filtered down to the base as well, and grassroots Chavistas have always been very warm toward me. I have never stopped going anywhere in my life, not even to the Esquina Caliente [a Chavista spot in downtown Caracas’ Plaza Bolívar]. Chavistas or Adecos [AD supporters], I greet them all the same. I have been fortunate in that regard.

My relationship with Chávez was always one of respect and consideration. As a conciliator, what people call a moderate, someone who doesn’t get carried away by extremes, I have always demanded respect for President Chávez and have always acknowledged the positive things his government did. Sometimes journalists are surprised and ask me for an example. I talk about Misión Vivienda [the public housing program], about the people who live much better there than in the shack where they used to live. And that is just one example; I could give you 30 more Chavista achievements that I defend, just as I could give you as many things I object to.

Chavismo knows that my criticisms are honest and sincere. We have had a good relationship. I deeply regret that it is, in my view, a very closed-off movement. Beyond its record in government, from a political standpoint my criticism would be its lack of self-criticism.

What is your assessment of the Maduro government?

President Maduro faced a very difficult period, much more difficult than President Chávez’s, in my opinion. These were years of an infamous [US] blockade and terrible conspiracies. I think he was very brave when he lifted currency and price controls, and when he proposed the special economic zones, which practically amounted to a wholesale critique of the Chavista economic model.

That is very easy to propose when you are in the opposition. But to take those measures from within a Chavista government… It was very hard to survive that storm for 14 straight years. Oil revenues, which had topped $50 billion a year, fell to less than $1 billion.

In recent years you have tried to build spaces for unity within the opposition, for example in Henri Falcón’s 2018 presidential campaign. However, those attempts ended up fractured by extremist figures such as María Corina Machado. Why has it been so hard for the opposition to build a coherent alternative?

To answer that, I think a brief look back at history is useful. Chávez’s early years were a time of endless promises, when everything seemed possible and there was money to back it up. Everything was in crescendo. Chávez, besides his electric, truly mesmerizing charisma, was also a man who carried a heroic narrative.

The initial opposition to the Chávez government was class-based and bent on confrontation. The Carmonazo [the 2002 coup] and the oil lockout failed because the people saw them as alien initiatives, the exclusive project of a political class. And the honeymoon with Chávez was still ongoing. However, that period gave rise to very confrontational behavior on both sides of Venezuelan politics.

There came a point when showing the greatest aversion, the greatest hostility toward Chavismo, meant being against the system and not participating. That is how María Corina Machado and her [US-funded] NGO Súmate got started, directly or indirectly encouraging abstention. The 2018 elections and those that followed cannot be understood without this induced abstention, which ended up benefiting Chavismo. That is not to take away from Chavismo’s own strengths, such as its organizational capacity and grassroots work.

However, in 2015 there was high turnout and the opposition won a majority in the National Assembly…

The 2015 elections were a very particular moment. It was an important election, now facing Chavismo without Chávez, and the opposition, which had been completely fragmented, came together. I think it has certain parallels with Chávez’s election in 1998, when there was a desire to punish, to make someone pay, which made it possible to bring scattered groups together.

If we look back over the years at the speeches of opposition leaders, Julio Borges, Leopoldo López, Henrique Capriles, Henry Ramos Allup and so on, they spent their time insulting one another. But in 2015 they called a sort of truce and were electorally smart in running on a single ticket, avoiding fragmentation.

But it was an exceptional moment. As soon as they reached the National Assembly the squabbling started again, for instance over who would hold the presidency of the parliament. In 2019 a new fight broke out between Guaidó’s faction and the others, whom they called “alacranes” [scorpions]. Guaidó ended up losing the National Assembly in the middle of his “interim presidency,” which was nothing more than a crude coup attempt.

Although you are an opposition politician, you have firmly denounced US sanctions against Venezuela. Can you tell us a bit about the economic reality of recent years?

Starting in 2015, thanks to President Obama – whom I once admired – a defenseless country was attacked, a country where store shelves were empty and pensioners were begging to survive. It was a country terribly battered by the economic situation, mired in an endless internal conflict. And the last thing it needed was sanctions and an economic blockade.

However, we also have to look further back. Thirty to thirty-five years ago, Venezuela exported aluminum, iron, and cattle. There was at least a minimum of economic diversification. But by 2015 it was a poor, single-product economy, and on top of that a blockade fell on us, which led to the country’s total impoverishment. Sanctions are a serious attack on human rights in Venezuela. Every nation has the right to trade freely.

The intention was to starve Venezuela. I remember some despicable statements by former US Ambassador [William] Brownfield, who said it didn’t matter how many people died as long as the government fell. They had not been able to beat Chávez’s charisma, or Maduro, because of the opposition’s mistakes, so they tried to strangle the country. The blockade has been a criminal act that brought about a total collapse in investment. The impact on pensions, wages, hospitals, and the electrical grid has been terrible. And figures like María Corina Machado or Leopoldo López called for sanctions in the morning and demanded wage increases in the afternoon. That is the level of cynicism and demagoguery they reached.

The plan had the desired consequences: investment dried up, discontent grew, and the quality of life collapsed. But that did not bring down the government; the US had to do it with a military intervention on January 3.

Over the last 10 years, Venezuela only had resources thanks to trade with countries that defied the blockade, such as Russia, China, and Iran. But it was done covertly, on the high seas, through parallel channels, and all of that was fertile ground for corruption.

By the same token, we have to point out what I call administrative mistakes. For example, in the midst of that terrible blockade, how can you justify keeping more than 30 ministries and 6 vice presidencies? Those mistakes have to be pointed out and analyzed, but to me they are of a much smaller magnitude than the impact of the blockade. I am not saying this to back Maduro; one simply has to keep a sense of proportion.

Venezuela went from a blockaded economy before January 3 to one controlled by the US. What is your reading of the present context?

Venezuela has been the victim of an outrageous and barefaced theft. On the one hand, the countries that dared to open a door for Venezuela to bring in foreign currency are now off limits. The United States imposes an iron curtain and says we can only have relations with it. The self-proclaimed champion of the free world prohibits free trade, using terrorist threats against those who do not obey.

On top of that, in an act of piracy, the US seized several Venezuelan oil tankers and then took 40 million barrels that we had in storage because a naval blockade was preventing us from selling crude.

January 3 raised enormous expectations. I admit it myself: I welcome much-needed investment, the investment the blockade kept out. But I don’t want it to come at the expense of our sovereignty. Yet in these months, instead of bringing dollars in, they [the US] have taken them out, stolen them. The Financial Times reported $13 billion in the first six months of the year. They have also taken shipments of gold. The money is deposited in US accounts. Absolutely nothing has been returned.

On top of that theft, our resources are still frozen: the IMF special drawing rights, close to $5 billion, as well as the gold held hostage at the Bank of England. These are resources we badly need, in addition to what the US is taking and to its barring us from relations with certain countries.

You have also focused on the foreign debt and the announced restructuring plans. Can you tell us why this issue matters?

Indeed. A narrative had taken hold that Venezuela owed $150 billion. And overnight that became $240 billion. That is absolutely false. Venezuela does not owe that money to anyone.

Of course Venezuela has to meet its obligations. The country has not paid its foreign debt since 2017. But with the blockade, with what resources were we supposed to pay it? That is why I insist that this debt must be audited.

The debt includes bonds, but people who bought them on the cheap now expect to be paid at face value. Then there are the debts to multilateral organizations, arbitration awards, commercial debts, and so on. All of that has to be audited by professional firms, and there has to be a debt restructuring committee made up of Venezuelans.

It seems that in Venezuela we can’t do arithmetic, and it has to be Marco Rubio who appoints the firm in charge of the restructuring: Centerview Partners. This firm charges $50,000 a month plus 0.1% of the debt. In other words, the fox is guarding the henhouse. It is in its interest for the amount to be as high as possible. It is armed robbery in broad daylight.

Let’s return to January 3, a turning point in Venezuela’s recent history. How do you assess that attack and everything that followed?

The theft I was describing is a consequence of January 3, when a foreign army bombed our country. It was an unforgivable act of aggression by the United States.

They kidnapped the president after fabricating a campaign claiming he was the head of the Cartel de los Soles. Now the CIA and Southern Command have been here for months, and they haven’t investigated a single military officer for drug trafficking. Where is the Cartel de los Soles? It is a monumental lie, like Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.

What we are experiencing is a crude recolonization, by force. By force the US is taking millions of barrels of oil; by force they imposed changes to the Hydrocarbons Law and the Mining Law. Under the supposed pretext of making the sector attractive to investors and giving them security, what was actually done was to hollow out the Venezuelan state. They leave it powerless, reducing royalties and taxes to a bare minimum.

Today we have a Venezuelan state that depends on a single product. What revenue will it have if it can’t collect anything from its main industry, or from mining? What’s more, if a restructuring of this abusive debt goes ahead, how is it going to be paid? What is being done with Venezuela’s resources is monstrous.

But there is no shortage of people eager to hand the country over, from “activists” who write letters to the US chargé d’affaires asking for supplies for this or that hospital, to fake trade unionists who ask him for wage increases. I find it undignified and humiliating. Even María Corina Machado gave her Nobel Prize to Trump and still can’t get him to give her the time of day.

January 3, and everything that followed, was not an attack on Chavismo. It was an operation to seize Venezuela’s resources. We have to create consciousness against that. And Trump is not going to be there forever. It pains me to see the naivety of certain voices who think Trump is saving the country. Venezuela is living through an hour of infamy, confusion, uncertainty and shame. If we can’t unite even in the face of an aggression as serious as the one we are suffering…

Venezuela has undoubtedly been the great triumph, perhaps the only one, of Trump’s foreign policy. What is your view of Trump’s stance on Venezuela and of current relations between Caracas and Washington?

First of all, it must be said that this so-called dialogue is a mockery of the country. Trump and Rubio pulled out of their pocket, like someone finding something they had forgotten, this National Assembly whose term expired in 2020. And they forced that [defunct] parliament into talks with the current one. So we have two parliaments of “yes men” following the White House’s directives. And it is Mr. Rubio who announces what is going to happen in the country with his three-phase plan.

Trump mocks us, saying people are dancing in the streets and offering to make us the 51st state. A tremendous disrespect, and nobody raises their voice against it. Venezuela needs a strategy to denounce to the world what is happening, this imperialist colonization based on terrorist threats.

Venezuela has lost its sovereignty, and that is very serious. It is painful, but it is an undeniable fact. Venezuela has every interest in having good relations with the United States, as it has had for almost all of our history, but we cannot accept these conditions. We want investment and to trade with the whole world, but not at the cost of losing our sovereignty as a nation. Giving up sovereignty is not a necessary condition.

Having made that diagnosis, what, from your standpoint, is the way forward?

For the last 28 years I have been called a moderate, ambiguous, a “nini” [neither-nor], for defending my views. But I simply don’t agree with the fanatical positions of the extremes, and I denounce what is happening in my country today.

Ever since I started raising my voice about the seriousness of this situation, from January 3 onward, I have hardly ever been invited for an interview. There is a grave silence, and we are talking about the national interest here. Whether you are a Chavista or an Adeco, a businessperson or a street vendor, the national interest calls on all of us. If a nation cannot agree even to defend its sovereignty, it is finished. This is an existential question, not a matter of who wants to carry out Trump’s orders.

I don’t have a recipe, but we have to react. Let’s sit down and talk, look for common ground. But let’s start by admitting that we have a problem. Of course we have to sit down with the Trump administration. But with a minimum of dignity, not with this tone of capitulation, as if nothing had happened here.

I am not calling on us to confront anyone. We also have to be aware of our weaknesses. But I am calling on us to defend what is ours. Let’s build an agenda, a plan to recover our sovereignty, to explain to the United States that, while we are willing to have good relations and receive investment, we are an independent country and we will fight for that.

Israel’s president says he will task opposition leader Gadi Eisenkot with forming a new coalition government.

Isaac Herzog has been holding talks with political parties after neither Eisenkot’s bloc nor that of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu secured a majority in Israel’s parliament, known as the Knesset, following last week’s election.

Eisenkot will now have 28 days to try to form a new administration, with the potential for a 14-day extension.

“Now is the time to form a national emergency government. I will do everything to ensure we are worthy,” the former military chief wrote on X.

No political party in Israel has ever won an outright majority, meaning all governments have been coalitions.

Netanyahu’s right-wing Likud party and its far-right and ultra-Orthodox Jewish allies won 53 seats in the 120-seat Knesset, while Eisenkot’s centrist Yashar party and three other Jewish opposition parties in his bloc won 48.

Two Arab-led alliances, the United Arab List and the Joint List, together won an unprecedented 19 seats following a surge in turnout among Arab voters.

That positions them as potential kingmakers. However, all but one of the Jewish parties pledged before the polls not to work with them to form a government.

Herzog said that, after consulting all parties during the week, he would give Eisenkot the first chance to form a government.

A statement from the president’s office said he had informed both Eisenkot and Netanyahu of the decision.

Following consultations with delegations from the incoming Knesset members, Eisenkot received 67 recommendations for the premiership and Netanyahu 46, the statement said.

The president has broad discretion to pick someone they believe has the best chance of building a coalition and does not have to choose the leader of the party with the most seats.

Israeli opposition politicians have blamed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for eroding support for Israel in the United States after Democrats won control of Congress, and pledged to “strengthen bipartisan” ties if they form the next government.

The comments on Wednesday came after Democrats won majorities in both the Senate and the House on Tuesday in a sharp rebuke to US President Donald Trump, fuelled in part by deep frustration over the US and Israel’s war on Iran.

The vote came a week after Israel’s own election, in which Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition lost its parliamentary majority but did well enough to deny his main rival, Gadi Eisenkot, a clear path to replacing him.

Yair Lapid, a former prime minister whose party is part of the coalition seeking to unseat Netanyahu, said on Wednesday that the US results showed “Israel cannot afford” for Netanyahu to remain in office.

“It endangers our security, it jeopardizes our democracy, and it will ruin our standing on the global stage,” Lapid wrote on social media.

For decades, the US has been Israel’s staunchest ally for generations under presidents of both parties, providing billions of dollars a year in military aid since the 1970s. But unlike previous Israeli leaders, who carefully courted Democrats and Republicans alike, Netanyahu has openly sided with Republicans.

Some Democratic candidates made criticism of military aid to Israel amid its genocidal war on Gaza a central campaign theme. On Tuesday, Trump, who had endorsed Netanyahu in Israel’s election, pledged to halt $4bn in annual funding to Israel, saying the move would take away a “bad talking point” for Democrats.

Promise to restore ties

Lapid said Israel must go “back to the rule that worked for us for seventy years and broke in 2015, when Netanyahu went to speak in Congress” against then-President Barack Obama. He was referring to Netanyahu’s controversial speech to Congress that year, in which he warned against the nuclear deal Obama was negotiating with Iran, aligning himself with the former president’s Republican opponents.

“I said it then, I say it today: Israel doesn’t choose sides in America. We work with everyone,” Lapid wrote on X.

Lapid acknowledged that there was “no question” that the “anti-Israel core” in Congress “has grown,” but said it amounted to less than 10 percent of the Senate. He noted that Democratic lawmakers Hakeem Jeffries would lead the House and Chuck Schumer the Senate .

“Both are my friends; both voted with Israel this year even when the majority of their party caucus voted otherwise,” he said.

Eisenkot said that under his leadership, Israel would restore its bipartisan ties with Washington.

“We will renew and deepen that partnership, strengthen the bipartisan foundations that have long sustained it, and work with our allies to advance a Middle East defined not simply by the absence of conflict, but by the presence of opportunity and cooperation,” he wrote on X.

“Israel will remain one of America’s most reliable and capable strategic partners in the Middle East, a partnership that is mutually beneficial for both peoples, in every aspect,” he added.

Yair Golan, whose party is also part of the anti-Netanyahu coalition, said the US vote showed “just how toxic Netanyahu has become” among Democrats and Republicans alike.

He warned that if Netanyahu and his far-right government stayed in power, Israel would be on “a path toward international sanctions, global isolation, and a confrontation with the United States”.

Netanyahu did not immediately respond to the opposition’s criticism.

The American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the leading pro-Israel lobbying group, struck a similar note to Lapid.

In a post on X, it congratulated “the hundreds of pro-Israel Democrats and Republicans who won their elections last night,” saying that 234 candidates it had backed won.

It singled out Schumer and Jeffries and pledged to “increase its support for Democrats and Republicans who recognize that a strong partnership with Israel helps keep both countries secure”.

The CAS ruled last week to overturn governing body’s exclusion of ‌Russia over its 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

The International ‌Ice Hockey Federation (IIHF) has said it ⁠maintains its ⁠disagreement with a Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) decision to reinstate Russian teams, warning of “significant ⁠practical and sporting challenges”.

The statement on Wednesday follows announcements from Norway, Denmark, Sweden and the Czech Republic that ⁠their national teams will refuse to play against Russia at next year’s men’s World Championships in Germany.

The CAS ruled last week to overturn the governing body’s exclusion of ‌Russia from international competition following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

“As presented to the CAS, the immediate reintegration of Russian teams presents significant practical and sporting challenges, including visa and entry requirements, security provisions, logistical constraints and consequences for competition formats,” ⁠the IIHF said.

The decision has prompted ⁠widespread backlash. Latvia and Finland have also said their teams will not play Russia, while the Finnish city of Turku threatened to ⁠drop hosting duties for the 2028 World Junior Championship.

Canadian Prime Minister Mark ⁠Carney said Russia and Belarus ⁠will be barred from the upcoming World Junior Championship in Alberta. Moscow criticised the move, with Russian ambassador Oleg Stepanov telling state-run news agency TASS that Canada was “bringing politics even into junior hockey”.

The IIHF said it remains in dialogue with ‌national ‌associations, host authorities and organisers to determine the best path forward.

Czech carmaker Skoda Auto, the main sponsor of the ice hockey world championships, said on Wednesday it would “reassess” its sponsorship if Russia takes part in the annual tournament.

“If the Russian national team takes part in the tournament, we will reassess our involvement in the tournament and take further action,” Skoda told the AFP news agency in a statement.

It added that Russia’s return to the tournament was “incompatible with the values we have consistently upheld”.

Skoda Auto, a unit of Germany’s Volkswagen, has been the tournament’s official main sponsor since 1993. It also sponsors the Tour de France.

Its spokeswoman Ivana Povolna refused to specify the amount Skoda spends on the ice hockey world championships annually.

Skoda’s annual report for 2025 says the company lent 45 electric cars to the organisers, while its designers made the crystal trophy for the most valuable player of the tournament.

Thousands have marched through New Delhi demanding the resignation of India’s chief election commissioner over changes to voter lists that opposition parties say favour Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ruling party.

Rahul Gandhi of the Indian National Congress led Sunday’s protest, the latest in more than a month of demonstrations accusing Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar of overseeing a biased revision of electoral rolls.

Opposition leaders say the removal of more than 130 million names disproportionately affected Muslims and other minorities, who are less likely to back Modi’s Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

The Election Commission has denied favouring any party and says voters whose names were wrongly deleted can re-register.

The BJP has accused the opposition of undermining democracy by challenging legitimate procedures.

India’s next general election is scheduled for 2029.

On October 27, 2026, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed that the PDVSA 2020 bonds and the pledge of 50.1% of the shares of CITGO Holding are valid under Venezuelan law.

The decision is Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. v. MUFG Union Bank, N.A., No. 25-2652, slip op. at 51, 60 (2d Cir. Oct. 27, 2026). This is a case that divided Venezuelan public opinion and legal circles. Much of the public debate tracked the nation’s political divide, with defenders of the bonds more commonly associated with the Maduro side and their opponents more commonly associated with the political opposition. Those who challenged the bonds argued that they were invalid because they were not approved by the National Assembly under article 150 of the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution. They were asking the courts to treat the 2020 bonds and the CITGO pledge as void from the start, so the bondholders could not enforce the notes or foreclose on the pledged CITGO shares. But the 2020 bonds did not create a debt out of nothing. They refinanced preexisting PDVSA debt. Paying what is owed should not be controversial; and the law is, or should be, what it is, no matter what political side one supports.

This case was started by a lawsuit brought in the US by PDVSA entities under the ad hoc board appointed by the interim government of Juan Guaidó, and highly promoted by Venezuelan political opponents of Maduro. The problem they faced is that PDVSA had never subjected its past debt transactions to legislative approval, whether under article 126 of the 1961 Venezuelan Constitution or article 150 of the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution. That is a fact, not a matter of opinion.

The 2015 National Assembly rejected the CITGO pledge in September 2016, but did not state that the indenture itself was a national public interest contract under article 150.

There was also no previous case holding that the contracts or indentures governing PDVSA bond issuances were national public interest contracts. The binding decisions of the Constitutional Chamber of the Venezuelan Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ), as the US Court of Appeals read them, pointed in the other direction: national public interest contracts are contracts entered into by the Republic, or competent organs of the National Executive, and do not include contracts entered into by state owned companies in the Decentralized Public Administration, such as PDVSA. There were other TSJ decisions involving the Central Bank and mixed companies (in this case, allowing contracts without the National Assembly’s approval), but none decided that a PDVSA bond issuance or the CITGO pledge was a national public interest contract. 

But the lawyers hired by the interim government of Juan Guaidó argued that these bonds were different because they were secured by 50.1% of the shares of CITGO Holding, an asset of obvious importance to Venezuela. That was the novel step in the argument. There were older cases and legal writings discussing article 150 and public interest contracts, but no preexisting judicial authority had held that a PDVSA debt transaction, or a pledge of CITGO, became a national public interest contract requiring National Assembly approval. The older authorities that PDVSA invoked did not decide that proposition. What was new was not article 150 itself. It was the attempt to apply article 150 to this transaction.

The National Assembly elected in 2015 categorically rejected the CITGO pledge in a September 27, 2016 acuerdo. But that did not state that the indenture itself was a national public interest contract under article 150. That specific conclusion came in October 2019, after the transaction had closed and the controversy had fully developed, when the National Assembly stated that the 2020 Bond indenture violated article 150 because it was a national public interest contract executed with foreign companies without parliamentary authorization. The PDVSA plaintiffs, acting through the ad hoc board recognized in the United States, then submitted expert legal opinions advancing that same position.

There was no preexisting judicial holding applying article 150 to a PDVSA bond issuance or to the CITGO pledge. PDVSA’s historical practice ran the other way, and the courts ultimately rejected that application of article 150 of the Venezuelan Constitution.

The case has been litigated since 2019. The district court in New York initially ruled for the creditors under New York law. After the New York Court of Appeals held in 2024 that Venezuelan law governs the validity of the securities, the Second Circuit vacated that judgment and remanded. On remand, the district court considered additional expert legal submissions and again held that the bonds and collateral were valid, this time under Venezuelan law. The Second Circuit affirmed yesterday.

PDVSA had another argument: even if article 150 did not itself invalidate the bonds, it argued that US courts had to give effect to the National Assembly resolutions under the act of state doctrine, a rule that generally prevents US courts from questioning official sovereign acts carried out by a foreign government within its own territory. The court rejected that argument as well. Even assuming that the resolutions were sovereign acts intended to invalidate the transaction, the relevant transaction and property were outside Venezuela. The bonds, the depository arrangements and the collateral were centered abroad, particularly in New York. The court therefore held that the act of state doctrine did not require a US court to give the resolutions the extraterritorial effect PDVSA sought.

That record also matters when lawyers involved in the case later comment publicly on it. A novel litigation theory should not be described as if it had been settled Venezuelan law all along. It was not. There was no preexisting judicial holding applying article 150 to a PDVSA bond issuance or to the CITGO pledge. PDVSA’s historical practice ran the other way, and the courts ultimately rejected that application of article 150 of the Venezuelan Constitution. That history is relevant to credibility when lawyers or experts later present advocacy developed in litigation as a neutral account of what Venezuelan law clearly required from the beginning. Lawyers who participated in the case or publicly advocated its legal theory should disclose that context when commenting on it. Readers can then decide what weight to give their views.

Creditors may continue trying to collect the CITGO collateral. Whether and when they can actually reach it is a different question.

What does all of this mean in practical terms? It does not mean that the bondholders own CITGO today or can seize it tomorrow. It means that PDVSA lost its central defense to the 2020 bonds and the CITGO pledge. PDVSA cannot avoid those obligations by arguing that the Venezuelan Constitution required prior approval from the National Assembly. The bonds and the collateral are legally valid. The creditors may therefore continue trying to collect. Whether and when they can actually reach the CITGO collateral is a different question involving enforcement proceedings, US sanctions administered by OFAC and the separate Delaware proceedings involving other creditors of Venezuela.

The PDVSA entities may now ask the US Court of Appeals to rehear the case or seek rehearing by the full court, sitting en banc. They may also petition the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari. That would be a request for discretionary review, not another appeal as of right. If the judgment stands, the case will return to the district court and the creditors can continue pursuing their contract and enforcement claims. OFAC may still control whether and when a transfer or sale involving the CITGO collateral can occur, and the separate Delaware creditor proceedings remain important.

The political argument over the PDVSA 2020 bonds may continue, but the legal argument is now much narrower. After seven years of litigation, the district court and the court of appeals, applying Venezuelan law, have concluded that the bonds and the collateral are valid. Politics may still affect when creditors get paid. It no longer supplies a persuasive legal basis for saying that the debt or the pledge never validly existed.

Caracas, October 27, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Trump administration has announced plans to back electoral reforms in Venezuela and push for presidential elections.

In a press briefing with international journalists on Monday, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called Venezuela’s electoral infrastructure “designed to rig elections” and argued it must be replaced quickly to ensure a valid vote.

Rubio, who has been the Trump administration’s chief architect of US policy toward Venezuela, said talks between Acting President Delcy Rodríguez’s government and opposition sectors led by Dinorah Figuera were moving toward the appointment of a new Supreme Court (TSJ) before the end of the year, followed shortly afterward by the renewal of the National Electoral Council (CNE).

“Obviously, we need to use our influence with the interim [Venezuelan] authorities, to ensure that the process moves forward responsibly (…) Our goal is to have an election,” Rubio said. He welcomed what he described as “serious progress in that direction” and warned that “if anyone tries to derail the process, they will seriously harm Venezuela.”

In a separate press briefing, a senior State Department official added that, once both institutions have been reconstituted, the Venezuelan presidency will be declared permanently vacant, triggering a six-month constitutional deadline for presidential elections to be held “under competitive conditions.”

The anonymous official stressed that the process would also require political guarantees and regulations on access to the press. The official also defended the inclusion of pro-government sectors in a “transition,” arguing that peaceful democratic processes often require cooperation from outgoing factions, citing Spain and Portugal as precedents.

Asked about a specific election date, Rubio said the Rodríguez administration had complied with US timetables so far. 

“Are we going to wait two years [for an election]? That’s not going to happen. At best, I have two years and two months left in this position,” he added.

His remarks coincide with statements by Dinorah Figuera, who heads the opposition delegation in talks with government representatives and forecast presidential elections to take place in late 2027 or early 2028.

Meanwhile, the third round of political dialogue in Venezuela agreed to review four laws governing political participation, pluralism, and the autonomy of political organizations, including the Law on Political Parties, Public Meetings, and Demonstrations. The discussions also addressed disqualifications from holding public office and the review of legal frameworks related to political rights.

In parallel, Venezuela’s National Assembly formally launched the process to renew the 32 justices of the Supreme Court (TSJ). Applications from legal professionals seeking to join the court will be accepted from Wednesday, October 28, through Wednesday, November 11. The fourth round of dialogue is scheduled for November 11–15.

Rodríguez and other Venezuelan high-ranking officials have not commented on the State Department announcements.

The White House’s claims relating to Venezuelan reforms and elections coincided with the return of opposition leader María Corina Machado to the country on Sunday. The far-right politician had spent more than a year abroad and her supporters have called for her inclusion in the ongoing negotiations.

Asked about Machado’s return, Rubio said he had told the Rodríguez government “weeks ago” that Machado should be able to come back without obstacles. The secretary of state denied that Washington had obstructed Machado’s return, stating only that she was advised against traveling immediately after the June 24 double earthquake.

Rodríguez, for her part, said the opposition politician could have avoided the “show” of appearing at a church in Lara state before traveling 400 kilometers to Caracas at the head of a motorcade, amid chants of “freedom” and calls for immediate presidential elections.

“The airports are there. Let’s move away from the show (…) Many people who have benefited from the amnesty law and this process, which seeks peaceful coexistence, have been able to enter through the airport’s new transitional structures,” Rodríguez said.

The acting president declined to clarify which route Machado had taken to reenter Venezuela. Machado left the country in December 2024 for Oslo, where she received the Nobel Peace Prize before gifting it to Trump. She and her party maintain that the government prevented her from returning on seven previous occasions, a claim the authorities deny.

Asked whether the justice system would take action against Machado, Rodríguez replied that she hoped there would be “repentance and a change of course” from the opposition figure and that the opposition leader would be able to “contribute something to the country.” In recent years, Machado endorsed economic sanctions and a foreign military attack against Venezuela.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

The Nobel laureate’s homecoming follows national protests demanding free elections.

Venezuela’s opposition leader Maria Corina Machado has successfully returned to the country after more than 10 months in exile.

Machado announced her arrival on social media on Sunday, writing, “I am here. With you.”

The current opposition leader, Edmundo Gonzalez, confirmed the news, writing on X that “our leader, my dear Maria Corina, is on Venezuelan soil”.

The Comando Con Venezuela political organisation shared footage of Machado arriving at a church in Lara, where she was greeted by supporters.

Machado first disappeared from public life after being briefly arrested in January 2025. She re-emerged last December in Norway, where she won the Nobel Peace Prize for her efforts to challenge Venezuela President Nicolas Maduro. Maduro was abducted from Caracas by the United States military in January 2026.

Venezuela’s Vice President Delcy Rodriguez has stood in as acting president since then, with the endorsement of US President Donald Trump, and has cooperated with his administration regarding reforms in the country, as well as a deal to grant the US control of over 65 billion barrels’ worth of Venezuela’s oil reserves.

Calls for elections to be held

Rodriguez’s presidency has extended far beyond the 90-day period she was authorised to serve following Maduro’s removal. But she has yet to call an election despite public demand and despite her promise to do so at the United Nations General Assembly in September. The US maintains that the country is not ready yet.

Earlier this week, thousands of Venezuelans took to the streets to call for elections in the first nationwide opposition protest in nearly two years.

Although the opposition is widely believed to have won Venezuela’s disputed 2024 elections, Trump has cast doubt on Machado’s abilities to lead, claiming in January that she “doesn’t have the support within or the respect within the country”.

Machado presented Trump with her Nobel medal when visiting him in the White House weeks later, in what she said was “a recognition for his unique commitment with our freedom”. The US leader has repeatedly voiced his desire to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize himself.

Machado has made previous unsuccessful attempts to enter Venezuela. In September, her team said she had made seven attempts in the space of a few weeks.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced on X that “the conditions allowing for the safe return of Ms. Machado to Venezuela is the direct result of the U.S. supported reconciliation talks which has already seen hundreds of political prisoners freed and hundreds of political opposition figures return from exile.”

Asked to comment about Machado’s return, Trump told reporters on Sunday, “I don’t know anything about it, but I think she’s a very nice woman.”

“She gave me her Nobel Prize, so how can I say anything else? And I hope she’s safe.”

Nine months after the US’ January 3 military strikes and kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the Venezuelanalysis team got together to take stock of a whirlwind of changes in Caracas’ domestic and foreign policies.

Lead editor Ricardo Vaz was joined by fellow staff members Jessica Dos Santos, Silvana Solano, and Lucas Koerner. They broke down the US’ semi-colonial regime, the gaps between the official discourse and reality, and the prospects for the different political sectors.

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Note: this episode was recorded in Spanish. See the YouTube video above for a subtitled version.

In the rest of the world, the Israeli PM is often blamed for the Iran war. His opponents say he hasn’t been tough enough with Tehran.

When Israel launched a sweeping military assault on Iran with the United States in February, the Israeli government enjoyed overwhelming support from the Jewish Israeli public.

Opposition parties lent their support to the army and backed the audacious step. Enmity towards the government in Iran is an issue mainstream Zionist parties agree on.

Then in June, Israel’s role in the confrontation halted abruptly with an announcement from US President Donald Trump, who said Iran and Israel had agreed to stop attacking each other.

That announcement – and Netanyahu’s decision to abide by it at the time – were unpopular in Israel. According to the Israel Democracy Institute, 65 to 70 percent of Jewish Israelis believe that stopping the war did not serve Israel’s national security interests.

As Israelis prepare to vote in national elections on October 27, Iran remains an important election issue for many. Opposition parties present Iran as an example of what they say are Netanyahu’s many failures. They promise to reset security and foreign policy if they’re elected.

The frontrunner, Gadi Eisenkot, says the conflict is unfinished. While saying that a change in Iran’s government was an unrealistic goal, Eisenkot accuses Netanyahu of doing little to dismantle Iran’s nuclear programme. In September at the inauguration of his new party, Yashar, Eisenkot told supporters: “Ultimately, it must end in the destruction or dismantling of the Iranian nuclear programme, a goal not yet achieved with 440kg [970lb] of highly enriched uranium already there, which could quickly be turned into several nuclear devices.”

Former Prime Minister Yair Lapid, who is now the head of the opposition in the Knesset, accuses Netanyahu of a strategic failure. He recently told the Atlantic Council that toppling the administration in Tehran is a realistic objective that requires a military escalation: “What Israel should do or the alliance should do is bomb all the energy facilities, especially on Kharg Island, but other places as well in order to make sure that the Iranian economy is demolished. And the reason is that it’s the only thing that will overturn the regime.”

Bombing this civilian infrastructure was actually something Netanyahu had lobbied for himself. An international outcry about such bombings likely constituting war crimes and Trump’s refusal to offer backing put the brakes on the plan.

Naftali Bennett, another former prime minister, says Israel must ensure its military dominance over the entire region. For Bennett, toppling the government in Iran and crushing it is a must. But he says that is not enough. The right-wing politician calls Qatar an “enemy” and says Turkiye is “the new Iran”, going as far as saying that military confrontation with the NATO member was inevitable.

“We will build an alliance of moderate forces in the region against the Islamist forces, against Iran, against Qatar, Turkiye and all the radical forces. We will take proactive actions to shape the region,” Bennett recently told supporters.

Eisenkot and other opposition leaders do not rule out renewed confrontations. They focus on their confidence in the military and security establishment in assessing the dangers and dealing with them appropriately.

But opposition leaders have voiced concern that Netanyahu might resort to military escalation before the elections to tilt the balance in his favour or even disrupt them altogether – even though the prime minister said last week that he did not plan to attack Iran before the vote.

Those fears were elevated after Netanyahu posted a video from the Tel Nof Airbase warning that Israel’s enemies might attack before the elections. Other news reports said Netanyahu has shared intelligence on new threats from Iran with the US president.

Netanyahu was quickly rebuked by opposition leaders, who accused him of “political fearmongering”.

Lapid openly questioned Netanyahu’s motives. Lapid also accused him of using the Israeli military and bases as “backdrops” for election campaign videos.

Ultimately, most Israeli opposition parties and leaders aren’t opposed to war with Iran, and many are in fact even more hawkish in their approach towards Tehran than Netanyahu. They just don’t want a new military escalation before the elections.

An alliance of Venezuelan opposition parties has reaffirmed its commitment to exiled Nobel Peace Prize laureate Maria Corina Machado as its leader.

On Sunday, members of the opposition’s Unitary Democratic Platform (PUD) agreed in a meeting in Caracas to “recognise and support the leadership of Maria Corina Machado”.

The coalition also renewed its demand for free elections in Venezuela, following a series of contested presidential votes in 2024 and 2018.

Sunday’s statement included 14 proposals for a democratic transition, including freedom for political parties, the release of all political prisoners and the safe return of those who went into exile.

The announcement also increases pressure on authorities to allow Machado’s return. She has been living in exile since leaving Venezuela last December to receive her Nobel Prize.

“The will of the Venezuelans must once again govern the destiny of our nation,” the opposition’s former presidential candidate Edmundo Gonzalez wrote on social media supporting the proposals.

“We will not accept political prisoners, persecution or a governing power that disregards the mandate of its citizens. Living in freedom and under a genuine constitutional order is a legitimate demand of our society.”

No election set

Venezuela has yet to declare a date for a new presidential vote. Since January 3, the country has been led by interim President Delcy Rodriguez of the long-governing United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV).

PSUV leaders have been accused of carrying out human rights abuses against political dissidents, including arbitrary arrest, imprisonment and torture.

Still, after the United States launched a military operation to abduct and jail former President Nicolas Maduro, the PSUV has remained in power with the support of the White House.

US President Donald Trump has backed Rodriguez’s leadership, despite her having been Maduro’s vice president.

His administration has maintained an active role in Venezuela, exerting control over its oil resources and pressuring the Rodriguez government for reforms.

But critics point out that Trump has been reluctant to push Rodriguez for new elections, opting instead for a three-phase plan that focuses first on stabilising the country and economic recovery before pursuing a political transition.

Machado, meanwhile, has told The Financial Times she would like to see Venezuela hold elections by July next year.

“The US government and the Venezuelan people all agree ⁠⁠that the only way to make ⁠⁠this sustainable and ⁠⁠a real victory is to turn Venezuela into a stable democracy,” she told the newspaper earlier this month.

A thwarted return

Venezuelan authorities blocked Machado’s repeated attempts to return to the country, according to her party, Vente Venezuela.

Machado has also reportedly attempted to petition the Trump administration for help re-entering Venezuela.

Separately, she gifted Trump her Nobel Peace Prize in January, during a visit to Washington, DC. Media reports, however, have suggested friction between the Trump administration and Machado.

In interviews with Reuters and Axios, US administration officials have anonymously expressed frustration with the opposition leader’s repeated efforts to return home, particularly after a pair of deadly earthquakes in Venezuela last July.

Axios quoted one official as calling Machado’s push “political opportunism”.

Machado, however, remains one of the most popular figures in Venezuela’s opposition.

In October 2023, Machado won the opposition coalition’s presidential primary, but in January 2024, Venezuela’s courts blocked her from running in the upcoming race.

The courts upheld a 15-year ban on her holding public office, reportedly due to her support of US sanctions against the Maduro government.

Gonzalez ultimately replaced Machado as the opposition candidate in the 2024 race. Maduro claimed victory for a third term as Venezuela’s president in that election cycle, despite widespread criticism that the vote did not meet democratic standards.

The opposition released vote tallies that appeared to show Gonzalez had won the race.

The US had recognised Gonzalez as the country’s rightful president-elect and denied the legitimacy of Maduro’s election claims.

Machado was previously removed from the National Assembly in 2014, due to her activism against the Venezuelan government.

A third round of talks between the Rodriguez government and the opposition began in Venezuela this month.

But instead of including Machado, the negotiations have involved members of the 2015 National Assembly, which was led by the opposition and dissolved under Maduro.

Still, in a statement this month, the US State Department praised the talks as aiding the Venezuelan government’s reform.

“Political reconciliation talks between the interim Venezuelan government and 2015 National Assembly representatives are producing tangible reforms in civil liberties and political rights, laying the groundwork for credible elections and a democratic transition,” the State Department said.

In February 2014, Venezuela witnessed one of the most prolonged and violent periods in the past 17 years against the nationally elected government.

What began as violence at some of the country’s more elite universities quickly descended into the violent street barricades, known as the guarimbas. Forty-three people, mostly civilians and security personnel, were killed. Entire communities were walled in, their residents blocked from accessing food, transport, gas and even necessary medical services. Buildings were set alight with people inside, hundreds were injured.

The proponents, the so-called guarimberos, called themselves protesters: a claim echoed many times in the international press. But for the government and a vast number of ordinary citizens, they were terrorists.

The anniversary of these events comes at a critical moment in Venezuelan politics: over the past two weeks, the newly elected right-wing legislators in the country’s national assembly have begun pushing for an Amnesty Law. If passed, this legislation would grant a pardon to the most violent perpetrators of the barricades. 

With the perpetrators of these acts potentially about to be set free, many in Venezuela are asking: could more violence be on the cards? To answer this question we have to understand what the violent barricades were, who took part in them and why they eventually petered out. As usual, there is a whole other story that the mainstream media ignored.

Who Were the Violent Barricaders?

Although the international media portrayed the barricades as a spontaneous youth uprising, testimonies that have emerged in the wake of the barricades tell a very different story.

“There were organized groups from within the universities, which were divided into subgroups. People in charge of the distribution of information, photos, and publishing all that, people in charge of planning the routes, people in charge of security… there was organization amidst the chaos,” Gabriel* — an undercover participant at the protests who wished to remain anonymous — told me.

It’s also clear that the “youthful” barricaders didn’t operate alone — although they might have been the official face of the unrest.

In the barricaders’ stronghold of Altamira and Chacao in Caracas, collaborators from private homes to small businesses facilitated the protesters with a network of internet connections and passwords to aid their communications, as well as with food and drink, places to hold meetings or to hide from police. 

But it was perhaps at night when the most sinister and violent elements of the barricades emerged.

“There was a core violent group, but they weren’t students … They really did want to cause big shit, cause confrontations with police, they even intimidated the other guys (barricaders), they said ‘you’re a bunch of pussies, what are we gonna do with this shit?’,” Gabriel said.

“They knew how to act in these circumstances … (the police) launched gas bombs at them, and they all got out the way, grabbed the bombs and threw them back …There were people who really knew about this stuff,” related Gabriel.

The right-wing MUD coalition was a leader of the violence. In the words of one tight-lipped barricader, who also wished to remain anonymous, in response to why the protests had erupted in the first place, he simply replied, “I think it was more because of the calls from the political parties of the opposition.”

Gabriel also stated that the relationship between the MUD and the barricaders was clear.

“None of the protesters at the universities wore their university t-shirts, they all wore Popular Will or Justice First t-shirts … They might have been student groups, but the student councils are affiliated to the political opposition parties and they are accountable to them … There was a feeling among the universities that they wanted to take to the streets. There wasn’t exactly a violent idea there … but it was clear that some people wanted something transcendental to happen, the death of someone, a policeman getting burned…”

And despite the official narrative that the right wing wasn’t violent, “Men on motorbikes circled the camps — no one could get near, not even the police. But by night these … ultra violent radical groups turned up, and they (those students at the camps) let them in.”

But perhaps the most revealing comment in terms of how far the organized right-wing were involved in the 2014 barricades came when I asked what the majority of the barricaders were doing now. 

“Well if I am totally honest, those guys are legislators now,” Gabriel said.

The mayor of Hatillo, David Smolansky, and legislator Gabriela Arellano “were both up to their necks in it,” according to Gabriel. “Those who aren’t in the opposition rank and file, are in prison,” he concluded. 

Mystery Dollars 

Another question mark which also still hangs over the violent barricades is where the money came from to pay for tents, food and drink, transport, walky-talkies, weapons and a whole cohort of other not so cheap items in Venezuela.

While I was informed that many of the barricaders were paid approximately 600 bolivars a day to take part – especially to dissuade people from going on holiday during carnival – Gabriel also confirmed that he was approached and asked if he wanted to “make a bit of money.”

But the currency circulating among the violent barricaders gives even more pause for thought.

“I would actually go as far as to say that there were more dollars inside the camps than bolivars,” stated Gabriel, who added that the guarimbas coincided with a hike in the black market price of the dollar against the bolivar on website, Dolartoday.

What is clear from all this is that the guarimbas were not “student protests” or the youth in rebellion, as the mainstream media portrayed. While there were some middle class students among the ranks who didn’t intend to harm anyone, it’s also true that there were many others who came from Venezuela’s well seasoned and highly organized right-wing student movement and who were happy to flirt with violence, and even to let other other people do the dirty work on their behalf. Likewise, there were evidently highly violent groups within the protests who received funding and military training.

The Fish that Didn’t Want Water: ‘He Who Tires, Loses’

“They lost strength, people came out less and less, maybe we would have achieved something if people had stayed in the streets… Also, because of the places that (the barricades) were carried out, in Altamira, you can’t do anything in Altamira, you have to do this in the center of Caracas,” one barricader, who also preferred to be anonymous, said.

So why did the Guarimbas peter out? From a big protest in Caracas to barricades of main roads in other cities, the right-wing then also set up local barricades in their own communities. 

This was undoubtedly the straw which broke the camel’s back. In fact the barricade slogan, “he who tires, loses,” was meant to inspire people in their local communities to weather the formidable storm.

But the slogans didn’t stop people from getting tired of being barricaded in for months, without access to work, school, health, and food- no matter how disaffected these sectors were from the government.

In fact, the violent barricader I spoke to even admitted that his life in Altamira was “too affected” by the barricades.

Rather than capitalizing on local discontent, the guarimberos managed to alienate their upper and middle class support base by terrorizing them in their own homes. Even their fellow students became sick and tired of the university strike — which meant many were delayed in graduating.

With no desire to engage with the popular sectors in the country’s barrios – who the barricade leaders identified as home to the “Chavista collectives” that were “even more their enemy than the police” — the movement literally had nowhere to go inside of Venezuela. 

“They tried maybe once to bring (the barricades) up here… but the collectives, the organised community, we chased them out,” said community activist Laura from a community radio station in the eastern barrio of Petare, whose local community went head to head with a group of guarimberos, not far from where they had managed to decapitate a motorcyclist in a barbed wire trap. 

“People would do the same again,” she said

2016 = More Guarimbas? 

I was told by another former barricader that “if we have to take to the streets again then we will, but you know that’s not so easy, it involves organization”.

Despite the fact that barricades across main roads and targeted arson attacks continue to take place in Merida and Tachira, as Laura told me, it is unlikely that more barricades on a national scale will erupt this year because the rightwing is focusing its energies on its new found power in the National Assembly, as well as on organizing the recall referendum against president Nicolas Maduro for mid-2016. 

The problem for the right-wing is that the latter requires a much more consolidated level of organization than the violent barricades ever did, and it can’t be pulled off through riding the wave of media lies and discontent.

In order to organize a recall referendum, the opposition will have to collect the signatures of 20 percent of nationally registered voters – that means approximately just under 4 million signatures. And although the opposition won big at the National Assembly elections last December, they only managed to do so because of mass Chavista abstention – not because they substantially increased their vote or political presence. 

In spite of the discontent, says Laura, “the opposition know they still don’t have the people in the street … that’s why more guarimbas would be a last resort.”

And in the meantime, Chavismo is looking to regroup. In the streets, in community media, and in workplaces.

The violent barricades were the result of absolute frustration by the right-wing after having exhausted all options to oust Chavismo. But although the right-wing may have had a short term game plan to deal a series of blows to the government, they have never had an overall long-term political strategy.

While the right-wing National Assembly continues to attempt to weaken the Bolivarian revolution and its gains through legislating and the option of a recall referendum is open, it’s possible that further violence may be kept at bay. 

But if the Supreme Court blocks legislative decisions, or the recall is a failure for the right-wing, “In that scenario, I think it’s possible that all hell will break loose,” states Laura.

Whether it’s 2006 or 2016, violence is always on the opposition’s cards, especially when it has exhausted all other means. 

Caracas, October 12, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – US Secretary of State Marco Rubio hosted Venezuelan opposition lead negotiator Dinorah Figuera on Friday at the State Department in Washington, DC, to express support for ongoing dialogue with the Venezuelan government.

“This is the best opportunity Venezuela has had in almost a generation,” Rubio told reporters, adding that the talks headed by Figuera are “a difficult process” but enjoy “100 percent support from the highest levels” of Donald Trump’s administration.

Rubio stressed that Washington’s goal goes beyond holding elections. “Our desire is not simply for Venezuela to have an election, but also to have a democracy with the institutions necessary to sustain long-term stability, prosperity, and freedom.” The Trump official has insisted on a three-phase plan culminating in a “political transition.”

For her part, Figuera, the president of the defunct 2015 Venezuelan National Assembly, praised the United States for opening a “path of hope for Venezuela” on January 3, when US forces bombed Caracas and abducted President Nicolás Maduro.

“We are committed to restoring the institutional framework of the public powers, the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ), and the National Electoral Council (CNE). We want to bring the country toward a process that guarantees political and civil rights and creates space for reunion and reconciliation,” she said.

The opposition leader also thanked Washington for its investments in the oil sector. “The restoration of institutions and the country’s economic progress will be two fundamental pillars for building institutions and democracy,” she added. Despite its term running out in January 2021, the opposition majority parliament elected in 2015 retained US “recognition” as Venezuela’s legitimate authority.

Both officials announced that the next round of talks is scheduled to begin on October 14. Rubio explicitly called for opposition unity: “We ask all elements of the opposition, and all sectors of society, to participate in and support this process.”

Neither Rubio nor Figuera fielded questions from reporters as they left the room, including about opposition leader María Corina Machado, who continues to insist that presidential elections must be held “as soon as possible.”

This was the first time Rubio received Figuera in Washington. Since August, she has led an opposition bloc engaged in dialogue with the acting government headed by Delcy Rodríguez, a process promoted by the United States in which the far-right Machado is not participating.

So far, government and opposition delegations have completed two rounds of negotiations in Caracas. Rubio claimed that the talks thus far have resulted in the release of hundreds of people allegedly detained for political reasons, the unblocking of several pro-opposition news websites, and progress toward amending the 2017 Law Against Hatred. The agenda for this third round includes continuing the process to renew the Supreme Court.

In this regard, opposition delegation member Juan Miguel Matheus said his team is “working to ensure that the members of the Judicial Nominations Committee are appointed and sworn in by October 15.” The committee will be responsible for evaluating candidates for the 32 Supreme Court justice positions.

Following an amendment to the Organic Law of the Supreme Court of Justice negotiated at the dialogue table, it was agreed that the Judicial Nominations Committee would have a majority of 12 civil society representatives, compared with 11 lawmakers. A total of 127 citizens applied to join the body.

Once the committee has been appointed, the process of receiving applications from candidates for the Supreme Court will begin. “We invite the best men and women in Venezuelan law to apply for positions in the TSJ’s six chambers. Venezuela needs independent, competent justices of recognized integrity,” Matheus stressed.

While some opposition sectors are demanding that a date be set for presidential elections, the delegation participating in the negotiations argues that progress in transforming the justice system is a necessary prior step.

In his press statement, Rubio added that future rounds of discussions “will address reform of the National Electoral Council.”

The Venezuelan government’s delegation has not commented on the Trump administration’s express backing for the opposition negotiators. 

The two sides agreed to demand the release of 31 tonnes of gold held by the Bank of England since 2019 to address post-earthquake reconstruction needs. The gold, worth more than US $4 billion, will reportedly be moved to the New York Federal Reserve, with its spending subject to US approval and international auditing.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.