opinion

The 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, China, reflects a major display of solidarity among the countries of the Global South in the face of US and Western hegemony. Chinese President Xi Jinping called on the leaders and members of the SCO countries participating in the summit in China to play a greater role in protecting regional and global peace and stability, considering his country a stable global power that will support the developing world. Chinese President Xi Jinping urged all SCO members to take advantage of their huge market, and in his opening speech to the leaders participating in the summit, he revealed his ambition to establish a new global security and economic order that poses a direct challenge to the United States. President Xi’s statements during the summit come amid Beijing’s efforts to present itself as a major leader of the developing world, and considering that the summit in Tianjin, China, will provide China with an opportunity to build solidarity with the developing countries of the Global South. The international community, particularly the countries of the Global South, also has high hopes for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to play an important role in global security and economic governance in the face of American hegemonic policies and dictates.

  Chinese President Xi Jinping affirmed in his opening speech at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, China, that “the SCO represents a model for a new type of international relations, and that we must advocate for equal and orderly multipolarity in the world, inclusive economic globalization, and promote the construction of a more just and equitable global governance system.” Many leaders of developing countries in the Global South agreed with and endorsed Chinese President Xi Jinping’s speech, most notably Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Turkey), Min Aung Hlaing (Myanmar), KP Sharma Oli (Nepal), Prabowo Subianto (Indonesia), Anwar Ibrahim (Malaysia), and Mohamed Ma’azo (Maldives), with the participation of UN Secretary-General António Guterres and Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Kaw Kim Horn.

  The 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in China is the most important for the organization since its establishment in 2001. It is being held amid multiple crises that have directly affected its members, from the trade standoff between the United States, China, and India to the Russian war on Ukraine, the Iranian nuclear issue and Israeli and American military strikes on Tehran, the Gaza war, the Taiwan issue, and other burning international issues. This summit is subject to unprecedented and stringent security and military measures compared to previous summits. Armored vehicles have been deployed on many streets, blocking traffic in large parts of the Chinese city of Tianjin, where the summit is being held. Signs in both Mandarin and Russian have been posted on the streets, praising the Tianjin spirit and the mutual trust between Moscow and Beijing.

  It is important to understand China’s commitment this year, during the summit in Tianjin, China, to working diligently on three main tracks to assist developing countries of the Global South and the Third World. On the political front, the Tianjin Declaration and the Ten-Year Development Strategy will be adopted to establish a long-term vision for cooperation. On the security front, cooperation will be strengthened by strengthening joint arrangements to combat terrorism and support regional stability. Economically, cooperation will be advanced in the digital economy, green development, and smart cities, as well as promoting trade and investment as fundamental pillars for strengthening the cohesion of the “Shanghai Family.”

 Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Liu Ping commented that the SCO summit in Tianjin, China, this year will be the largest in the organization’s history, stressing that the rapidly evolving international situation calls for enhanced solidarity and cooperation.With his veiled reference to the United States of America, he said that “the old mentalities of hegemony and power politics are still influential, as some countries try to prioritize their own interests at the expense of others, threatening global peace and stability.”

 It should be noted that Chinese President Xi Jinping’s speech was unanimously approved by all participating leaders, especially with the growing call by Chinese President “Xi” for all SCO partners at the Tianjin Summit to oppose the Cold War mentality and bloc-based confrontation, emphasizing the need to support multilateral trading systems. This message is a clear reference to US President Trump’s tariff war on China, which has disproportionately impacted the economies of developing countries, including India, a recent ally of Washington. UN Secretary-General António Guterres also stated that “China plays a fundamental role in supporting global multilateralism.”

  While Russia has succeeded in attracting the majority of members to its positions, India is attempting to balance its call for peace and maintaining relations with the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, at a time when New Delhi is purchasing large quantities of Russian oil. Ukraine has called on the organization’s members to take a clear stance and reject Russian aggression against it. During the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin described Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi as his dear friend. Putin considered relations between the two countries to be developing dynamically and unprecedentedly. This all reflects a strong solidarity between the policies of developing countries of the Global South, led and supported by China and its close ally, Russia.

   Regarding the United States’ position on the gathering of developing countries of the Global South in the Chinese city of Tianjin, Washington considered the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin unwelcome, given US President Trump’s repeated attacks on the Global South blocs, his threats to paralyze and obstruct the BRICS group through punitive tariffs, and his description of it as anti-American policies.

  Therefore, we understand that the SCO summit in Tianjin, China, in 2025, presents a multilateral model designed by China, distinct from the models dominated by Western powers and the United States. Furthermore, the broad participation in the summit’s events demonstrates China’s growing influence and the SCO’s ability to attract non-Western countries capable of embracing Washington and its policies and monopolizing the West.

China and the United States have once again reached a crossroads in their relationship over bilateral trade issues. On April 2025, the US increased number of tariffs on Chinese imports under its “Liberation Day” policy, imposing duties of up to 145% on various Chinese products. Particularly on electronics, steel-based appliances, and chemicals. China on the other hand put a ban on exporting rare earth metals to the US. These measures disrupted supply chains in the U.S. as the U.S. market is heavily dependent on Chinese imports and the policy on tariffs increased costs for both nations. The US and other developed nations have put in great efforts to promote free trade practices but in recent times protectionist policies seem reversing all those efforts. International trade regimes were created to resolve issues related to trade conflicts but due to America’s unilateral approach, those regimes like WTO seem so fragile that they do not play any significant role in resolving trade related issues.  China is making efforts to implement the Geneva trade consensus. The Geneva trade consensus, which is an agreement to reduce trade barriers and restore supply chain trust, was hailed as a milestone. Nonetheless, the key question on everyone’s mind remains whether the United States will honour its commitments or revert to its conventional backchannel manoeuvres

Following the Geneva talks and subsequent meetings that were held in London on July 4, 2025, China’s Ministry of Commerce confirmed that the nation would accelerate approvals for rare earth exports, along with reviewing applications for other controlled materials that are according to domestic law. Rare earth elements are crucial for many sectors that the US depends upon, such as Electronics, defense, and clean energy. China is not only continuing to export these materials, but they are doing so despite years of tariffs, trade restrictions, and political tensions with Washington.

The United States agreed that it would remove trade restrictions that have been damaging to Chinese companies. However, the United States has not been holding up its end of the bargain. Chinese experts claim that the US continues to “send signals that undermine economic cooperation”. This raises doubts as to whether the United States is willing to honour its deal.

This was made evident when the Chinese Ministry of Commerce announced, following the London meetings, that both parties had reached an agreement to move faster in translating consensus into policy. China did just that almost immediately, speeding up a number of rare earth export applications. The US has been slow on follow-through, taking few steps toward eliminating restraints that were to be removed weeks earlier. For Chinese trade officials, the distance between words and deeds on the American side is growing too glaring to be ignored.

This isn’t new for America. In 2018, the United States introduced tariffs worth billions of dollars on Chinese goods. They justified it with vague claims of trade imbalances and national security. However, in the aftermath, the results were crystal clear. Prices didn’t just go up for American consumers, but businesses on both sides of the Pacific Ocean suffered. The US Bureau of Economic Analysis even reported that the American Economy has shrunk slightly in the first quarter of this year due to US foreign policy towards China.

This economic downturn was not a coincidence. It was caused by built-up tensions, shattered supply lines, and a vicious cycle of sanctions and counter-sanctions. Experts in China consider that if the United States keeps going this way, the repercussions will become even worse for its internal economy. Some American producers who rely on secure access to Chinese rare earths and parts are already experiencing higher costs and delays in production. This became evident when China temporarily restricted rare-earth magnet exports, forcing global manufacturers to seek alternative sources and deal with sharply increased costs.

Nonetheless, China continues to uphold its commitment to cooperation by welcoming American businesses into its country. At the recent Summer Davos forum in Tianjin, US companies showed great interest in the Chinese market. US exhibitors expected at the China International Supply Chain Expo have risen by 15%. These businesses know that trade with China is an opportunity, not a threat.

Chinese authorities claim, US participation is not an accident. Politicians in Washington may be posturing for the press. But American companies know China provides a fertile ground for business ventures. Some companies have gone so far as to say that they feel safer conducting business in China than in other markets due to China’s commitment to consistency, long-term planning, and open-door policy.

Beijing is urging Washington to “meet China halfway”. While China continues to follow through on the Geneva consensus. China isn’t being diplomatic. This is a genuine call for mutually beneficial cooperation. China is a country that bases its actions on international cooperation and being predictable.

Chinese policy experts also pointed out that China has nothing to gain from half-hearted agreements. Their support for the Geneva consensus is driven by practical concerns rather than political motives. They want predictability in trade, reliability in export channels, and fairness in economic ties. All of these require the United States to take initiative.

However, meaningful cooperation requires mutual effort from both parties.

If the United States continues to delay, it will not only risk damaging its relationship with China. They will end up eroding their credibility as a global economic leader. In today’s globalized world, where supply chains cross borders and economies are tied at the waist. Trust goes beyond mere goodwill. It’s strategic capital. And as of right now, China is the one building that capital.

Recent developments support this. Chinese authorities have simplified rare earth licensing and established a transparent application process, welcoming oversight from foreign businesses. Meanwhile, American trade policy continues to operate in grey zones. Many Chinese companies are experiencing unjustified scrutiny or barriers when entering the US market, even in sectors not linked to national security.

China consistently honors its commitments and provides stability to its partners. They are positioning themselves as a more dependable partner in Global trade. The US, in contrast, risks isolating itself through backtracking and hesitating. When trust is lost, partnerships will suffer, investments will slow down, and influence will fade.

There have been reports that last year saw foreign direct investment in China from European and Asian nations hold steady. But here is what is surprising: US investments have been slow-moving, not due to issues with China, but because Washington has been sending out confusing signals. That is costing American businesses their edge in one of the most critical markets in the world.

To keep that from happening, Washington must match China’s seriousness.

The Geneva consensus, as Chinese officials insist, was never an empty headline to start with. It was a structural change in trade relations, one that increases transparency and real outcomes. China is already living by that. The US has to either join this new direction or be left behind.

And there is a larger context here as well. With the world facing economic instability, no country can do it alone. China is indicating that it’s willing to contribute to global recovery and sustainable development. But it won’t do it if the US keeps putting obstacles in its path.

The window of co‑operation is open, but it will not remain open indefinitely. China’s message is unambiguously clear: We are delivering. Now it’s your turn.

Cooperation among leading non-Western countries is increasing. Russia and India will increase the scale of economic cooperation, including in the energy sector. This news has become especially relevant and important in light of recent geopolitical events. It reflects important trends in world politics.

Days before, the United States of America sharply criticized Delhi. Washington said that India should not continue to buy oil from Russia. President Donald Trump sharply criticized the Indian leadership and introduced additional large duties on imported goods. At the same time, the Indian authorities do not intend to take any retaliatory measures in connection with the increase in the size of duties on goods supplied to the United States from India. Earlier, a 25% duty on goods from India, introduced by US President Donald Trump in response to Russian oil purchases, came into force. Thus, goods from India are now subject to a duty of 50%, if we consider the previously introduced tariffs of 25% as part of the US administration’s revision of trade agreements with countries around the world. Tariffs on goods will affect more than half of India’s $87 billion exports. According to Reuters experts, the increase in tariffs by America will lead to a drop in Indian GDP growth by 0.8%. This will be a significant blow to the growing Indian economy and corporations that are actively exporting to the United States.

The cooling of US-Indian relations did not end there. The world press noted that President Donald Trump tried to talk to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the phone four times in recent weeks, but he refused to talk. This was reported by the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, citing sources. In addition, there has been a certain tilt of the Trumpist American administration towards Pakistan, Delhi’s strategic and sworn enemy. The day before, President Trump said that the United States had made a deal with Pakistan on joint oil production. “We just agreed with Pakistan, according to which Pakistan and the United States will work together to develop their vast oil reserves. We are currently selecting an oil company to lead this partnership,” he wrote on his social media. The American leader suggested that Washington would one day sell oil to India. Let me remind you that Trump announced a sharp increase in tariffs on supplies from 185 countries in early April 2025.

In short, there is a serious cooling between the United States and India, which has the potential to significantly reduce the level of trust and contacts between the two countries. This circumstance is interesting from two sides. Firstly, India, located in South Asia, is of great strategic importance for Washington. In view of the global geopolitical and economic confrontation with powerful China, the United States attached great importance to the role of India. Delhi has quite tense relations and territorial disputes with Beijing. The acute phase of the conflict occurred in 2020. In America’s strategy, India must contain the growing power of China. However, Prime Minister Modi’s policy, which is aimed at protecting India’s sovereign interests, turned out to be more complex and multifactorial.

It was then that Indian and Chinese border guards clashed in the disputed Himalayan region, which both sides claim. The conflict had a fairly wide resonance in both countries. After that, both India and China began to increase their military presence in the region, stopped air traffic, and boycotted some goods. However, in 2025, significant changes occurred that began to bring the leaders of the non-Western world closer together. The parties resumed direct flights, agreed to simplify the visa regime, and also returned to border trade. “China and India should be partners, not enemies,” admitted Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Amid the discord with Washington, Prime Minister Modi visited Beijing for the first time in seven years and met with the Chinese leader. And on August 31, a trilateral meeting of the leaders of Russia, China, and India took place.

Secondly, the demonstration of India’s sovereignty became an important signal of the new international system that is just being built, where the United States is no longer the absolute hegemon. The “new countries” of Asia and the East are striving to pursue sovereign and more independent foreign policies. Patriotism, respect for their history, and their nation are growing stronger in these societies. And the political elites are striving to achieve a more respectful attitude towards themselves from the “golden billion.” At the same time, the West has ceased to be an indispensable part of the world economy and politics. Cooperation in trade and finance between the countries of Asia, the East, and Eurasia is strengthening. The economies of Russia, China, and India, enormous and colossal in their resources and potential, can well deepen cooperation with each other and achieve high economic results without deep cooperation with the countries of Europe and the United States. In a word, cooperation among leaders of the BRICS and the SCO is becoming stronger and more active. And this, in its potential, is capable of introducing significant transformations into the international system that is only just forming.

The SCO summit in Tianjin, China, was an important event. This forum with the participation of more than twenty world leaders showed that the world is not only larger than the West. This summit showed that the Non-West countries have the political will and desire to deepen cooperation in order to demonstrate their ambitions and sovereignty to the West. But it is not the number of leaders who took part in the forum that was important. The situation and atmosphere of the summit were important. The leaders of powerful and actively developing Russia, China, and India openly demonstrated colossal political will to change the global balance of power. But it is not only the will of the leaders that leads to global and very profound changes, but also objective factors that are almost impossible to reverse today. The economic, military, and technological power of Russia, India, and China is fascinating.

The fall of unipolarity is accomplished. The world is no longer unipolar. There is reason to believe that it will most likely never be so. Unipolarity is, in essence, a bright and short divergence. It became possible due to the loss of will, self-confidence, and potential of the Soviets. The Soviet Union itself, having laid hands on itself, led to unipolarity. In fact, it was not a victory of the United States in the literal sense of the word. Yes, the Soviets in the last period of their existence turned out to be uncompetitive, but they themselves disintegrated. But over the past quarter century, much has changed in the world. The growth of the West turned out to be much faster and more ambitious than many assumed. In the liberal capitals, it was believed that the development of Asia and the East would lead to rapprochement, democratization, and Westernization of the non-Western world. In reality, it turned out that this is not quite so, and in some cases, it is radically different.

In short, developing countries outside the West are actively developing and deepening cooperation with each other. The world is becoming larger and more diverse.

Israel is rewriting the rules of the game in the Middle East, not through diplomacy, peace treaties, or multilateral negotiations, but by deploying advanced military tools such as drones, guided missiles, cyberattacks, and cross-border intelligence operations. This aggressive approach, often justified under the banner of “self-defense,” goes beyond defense in practice and has resulted in a violent reconfiguration of the region’s political geography. While the United States should strategically focus on containing China, competing in technology, and maintaining dominance in the Asia-Pacific, Israeli policies have dragged Washington into a quagmire of costly and unending conflicts in the Middle East. This situation has not only undermined regional stability but has also jeopardized America’s global standing. Furthermore, this fragmented and chaotic Middle East demands greater energy and resources from the U.S., offering an opportunity for other actors to exploit this disorder to expand their influence.

Israel and the Violent Redesign of Middle Eastern Geography

Over the past decade, Israel has significantly altered its approach to perceived security threats. Rather than relying on diplomatic tools or classical deterrence, it has embraced a strategy that can best be described as a violent redesign of the Middle East’s geography. This strategy includes a combination of targeted assassinations, precision bombings, sophisticated cyberattacks, and deep intelligence operations inside neighboring countries. While the stated objective is to neutralize threats from actors like Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon, resistance groups in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and Palestinian resistance movements, the actual result has gone far beyond defense, raising fundamental questions about the territorial sovereignty of other nations in the region. 

    Israel’s repeated strikes on targets in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, and most recently inside Iran, have not only violated national sovereignty but rendered traditional red lines—defined by international treaties—virtually meaningless. These actions send a clear message to the region: in the new Middle East order, borders are no longer defined through diplomatic agreements but by military power and the flight paths of drones and missiles. What we are witnessing today in the Middle East surpasses traditional conflicts or conventional warfare. Israel is creating a new missile-based order in which the rules of engagement are dictated not by negotiations or international treaties, but by military and technological superiority. In this new order, drones and guided missiles have become tools for rewriting the region’s political and military boundaries. Although this strategy is ostensibly designed to secure Israel, it has in practice contributed to the growing instability across the region.

    The message of this new order to regional actors is unmistakably clear: deterrence is no longer achieved through diplomacy or conventional state armies. In the absence of coordinated responses from regional governments, non-state resistance groups have emerged as the only effective counterforce to these aggressions. Groups like the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Kata’ib Hezbollah in Iraq, and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza—despite their ideological and political differences—share one common goal: resisting Israel’s military and intelligence dominance. This decentralized, networked resistance has posed an unprecedented challenge to Israel. Unlike traditional wars fought in defined battlefields with clear enemies, these confrontations lack both fixed timelines and geographic clarity. Even Israel’s most advanced defense systems, such as the Iron Dome, face limitations in confronting these diffuse and asymmetric threats.

A Geopolitical Challenge for Washington

The strategic and political alignment between the United States and Israel has elevated this from a regional crisis to a global challenge for Washington. At a time when the U.S. should be allocating its resources to compete with China, secure maritime routes in the Asia-Pacific, protect Taiwan, and drive technological innovation, it is now forced to spend a significant share of its time, resources, and international credibility managing the fallout of Israeli policies. America’s unwavering support for Israel, from advanced arms sales to diplomatic cover at the UN Security Council and intelligence cooperation, has made it an active partner in this new missile order. Every Israeli strike on Iranian, Lebanese, Syrian, or Iraqi territory, directly or indirectly, implicates the United States. Israel’s recent attacks on Iran, Syria, Yemen, and deep inside Iraq have compelled Washington to again bolster its military presence in the region. The more America is drawn into managing Middle Eastern crises, the less it can concentrate on global rivalries, especially with China.

    This dynamic is particularly costly at a time when the U.S. is attempting to rebuild its image among countries of the Global South. Across the Islamic world—from North Africa to Central Asia—Israeli actions are viewed not as defensive, but as acts of aggression and occupation. Since the U.S. stands fully behind Israel, this animosity is directly projected onto Washington. Even America’s traditional allies in the Persian Gulf, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are now distancing themselves from U.S. favoritism and moving toward engagement with other powers like China and Russia.

    One of the most consequential outcomes of this new missile order is the shift in regional discourse. Whereas peace and negotiation were once regarded as primary means of conflict resolution, power now defines the regional order. Through its actions, Israel has demonstrated that the rules of engagement are no longer based on international agreements or even traditional diplomatic norms but on military and technological capability. This shift has not only militarized the region further but also placed the United States in a difficult position. While Washington tries to present itself as a mediator for peace and a guardian of global stability, its unconditional support for Israel has severely tarnished that image.

    Some analysts in Washington may still argue that Israel is America’s first line of defense in the Middle East. However, that view—rooted in Cold War logic—no longer aligns with the geopolitical realities of the 21st century. If this “defense” leads to expanded conflict zones, intensified regional hostilities, and a stronger axis of resistance, it can no longer be considered a strategic asset. Israel has become a liability that holds American geopolitics hostage. The costs of this situation are multifaceted: military costs to sustain a regional presence; political costs from losing credibility in international institutions; missed opportunities in competing with China; and the growing influence of other powers in the security vacuum of the Middle East.
    The fundamental question for American policymakers is this: is the United States prepared to sacrifice its 21st-century geopolitical future for unconditional loyalty to a single ally? However strategically important Israel may be, it cannot alone justify America’s deviation from its global priorities. It is time for Washington to redefine its support for Israel—not based on historical habit or domestic pressures, but grounded in long-term national interest. This redefinition could include pressuring Israel to return to diplomacy, scale back aggressive actions, and strengthen regional cooperation. Without such a shift, Israel’s new missile order will not only further destabilize the Middle East but also place the United States on a trajectory where the costs far outweigh the benefits.

Faced with the current turbulent international situation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) countries have deepened security cooperation and implemented global security initiatives. There’s a huge role for China in promoting security cooperation and safeguarding regional peace and tranquility, as China’s presidency of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in 2025 will be a pivotal moment for promoting sustainable development, as preparations for the upcoming Tianjin Summit in China prepare for the upcoming summit. Leaders of more than 20 countries and international organizations will convene to discuss security, economic, and cultural cooperation issues, coinciding with the 80th anniversary of China’s victory over fascist Japan in World War II.

 At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit, China adopts the principle of consensus, ensuring that the interests of all members are taken into account, creating an environment for civilized dialogue and cooperation among countries with diverse political systems and cultures.

 By chairing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit this year, China calls for strict adherence to the norms and principles of international law and the UN Charter regarding the inadmissibility of the use of force in international relations and the infringement of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Through the organization, China is committed to resolving disputes between countries peacefully through dialogue and consultation.

Here, China rejects all Western and American claims that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a military-political bloc. Rather, it is a peaceful bloc that enjoys consensus among its members.

Ensuring peace, security, and stability is a priority for China during its 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) presidency. This issue will receive significant attention at the Tianjin Summit, and the outcomes of the discussions will be reflected in the Tianjin Declaration, the SCO Development Strategy up to 2035, and relevant leaders’ decisions.

China calls on all SCO member states to commit themselves to combating the “three evil forces” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism, as well as drug trafficking, transnational organized crime, and other destructive phenomena.

China’s celebration of the 80th anniversary of its victory in World War II against Japan’s fascist militarist empire carries profound significance, especially as China has directed several heads of state participating in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit to attend the military parade in Beijing on September 3, 2025, to commemorate China’s victory over Japan. China is also keen to issue a statement during the summit affirming its commitment, along with member states, to promoting world peace and supporting the United Nations.

Since assuming the rotating chairmanship of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in July 2024, China has adhered to the theme of “Promoting the Shanghai Spirit: The SCO in Action,” steadily strengthening its chairmanship efforts and achieving positive progress and results. China has carried out more than 100 chairmanship activities covering a wide range of fields, including politics, security, military, economy, trade, investment, energy, education, communication, scientific and technological innovation, green industries, the digital economy, and people-to-people exchanges. These activities have helped SCO countries enhance solidarity and mutual trust, foster learning and mutual benefit, and achieve win-win outcomes.

China, along with all member states, is promoting reform and innovation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s mechanisms, cooperation models, and permanent institutions, ensuring the smooth and efficient functioning of the organization. The parties are accelerating discussions on establishing a comprehensive center to address security threats and challenges, an information security center, a center to combat transnational organized crime, and a center to combat drugs, with the aim of strengthening cooperation in law enforcement and security and establishing a new framework for regional security cooperation.

During its chairmanship of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China has strongly expressed its positions on major international and regional issues, upheld the multilateral trading system, strongly condemned the use of force, and issued a strong message of fairness and justice. China has actively participated in exchanges and dialogues with political parties, media outlets, and think tanks in its member states, contributing to the consolidation of the “Shanghai Spirit” and bringing the “SCO family closer.”

  From this, we understand that the measures China will announce during the 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Tianjin will transform the organization into a more interconnected community with a shared future and enhance security and cooperation initiatives. Through these measures, China will present a civilized model of cooperation based on mutual respect and partnership as an alternative to the conflict and unilateralism led by the United States and its allies around the world.

Egypt’s strong support for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) spirit in Tianjin, China, 2025, and its tremendous support for the China-led and supported global development and security initiative, especially with the participation of Egyptian Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly and his meeting with Cai Xi, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and Secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and his affirmation of Egypt’s strong support for the SCO spirit, headed by China, came on the sidelines of his participation on behalf of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Plus Summit hosted by the Chinese city of Tianjin.

  During his meeting with a number of Chinese officials at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit 2025, Egyptian Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly affirmed the success of China’s global development initiatives, which are reflected in China’s development experience, as well as China’s efforts to eradicate poverty. He noted in this regard the Egyptian experience in confronting poverty, starting with the elimination of unsafe slum areas and continuing with the presidential initiative “Decent Life” to develop the Egyptian countryside and other projects.

The SCO countries, through the upcoming summit at Tianjin, China, in 2025, will adhere to the development concept of innovation, coordination, green development, openness, and sharing, and work together to carry out cooperation in the fields of digital economy, green development, and energy, and implement the Global Development Initiative. China and Egypt have extensive cooperation in these areas. They’re a significance of common development and implementing the Global Development Initiative for both China and Egypt within the SCO summit in 2025.

It is worth noting that the Chinese president launched the “Global Development Initiative” in 2021, with the aim of reorienting global development toward a new phase of comprehensive balance and coordination to address global shocks, promote more equitable and balanced global development partnerships, and achieve greater synergy through multilateral cooperation to accelerate the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

The Egyptian government is keen to enhance South-South cooperation efforts and exchange expertise with emerging economies and developing countries. In this regard, the Ministry of International Cooperation in Egypt has relaunched the South-South Cooperation Academy in cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). It has also held numerous sessions and workshops to activate South-South cooperation mechanisms during the Egypt-ICF Forum for International Cooperation and Development Financing. A high-level session was also held in cooperation with the NEPAD Agency as part of the African Development Bank’s annual meetings, with the participation of 50 heads of international institutions and development partners, to discuss strengthening South-South cooperation.

Egypt’s full support for Chinese President Xi Jinping’s global development initiative comes as the vision of the two countries’ leaders, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and President Xi Jinping, is in line with the importance of aligning global development strategies and plans with the national priorities and needs of each country. It also emphasizes the need to apply the concept of financial justice, whether at the level of development financing in general or climate financing in particular, to enhance the ability of developing and emerging countries to implement their ambitions and catch up with the global development initiative.

Egypt’s full support for China’s development initiatives in developing countries of the South also underscores the role of South-South cooperation in promoting global development goals, in parallel with China’s comprehensive development initiative, fostering global economic recovery, and creating development models based on successful experiences in developing countries of the South.

Egypt’s cooperation portfolio with China to achieve sustainable development amounts to approximately $1.7 billion to implement numerous projects in various development sectors, including electricity, health, education, vocational training, and others.

  Accordingly, we understand that Egypt aspires to enhance cooperation with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) countries under China’s leadership, particularly on international issues, including reforming the global order, eliminating double standards, and achieving justice and common development, to promote the “Shanghai Spirit” and all global development initiatives led and supported by China.

The two foreign ministers presented their argument in the letter directed at EU foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas. They contended that the EU should impose carefully planned sanctions on Israeli government ministers and settlers of the West Bank. In addition, they demanded simultaneously new sanctions against the Hamas leadership in Gaza. The letter was dated August 27. It called on the EU to act fast. The ministers emphasized that restrictions should be imposed on those people who will encourage illegal settlement activity. Moreover, they further cautioned that ministers who act against a two-state solution need to be held answerable.

The West Bank, which is left in a state of occupation, has seen Israelis perpetrating recurrent incursions against the Palestinians. Maria Malmer Stenergard, the Swedish Foreign Minister, has been talking about it for months. She has called for sanctions on far-right Israeli cabinet officials since May. A big number of them advocate apparent annexation of Palestinian territory. This was announced by Stenergard on Thursday in Swedish public radio:sanctions need to cause such ministers to face difficulties. Her words emphasize an augmented annoyance of the situation in Europe as Israel continues to advance settlements.

The Dutch standing too has become hard. But action was postponed by internal quibbling. Dutch Foreign Minister Caspar Veldkamp quit last week. He was unable to give national sanctions against Israel through his cabinet. He was recently superseded by Ruben Brekelmans, who co-signed the new letter.

The ministers went further. They insisted on cessation of the commercial part of the EU-Israel association deal. However, free trade in many areas such as agriculture and industry is allowed in this agreement. Falling victim to cutting off this benefit would cost Israel extremely economically. Over the years, opponents have claimed that Israel cannot be provided with preferential trade access as it continues to expand settlements on the occupied territory. Conserving this, the Swedish and Dutch ministers now want to make that argument into policy.

In the letter, the focus is not solely on Israel. The EU foreign services are required to present additional propositions to pressurize Hamas. The organization already managing the Gaza Strip is declared as a terrorist organization by the EU and a few of the Western states.

Nevertheless, the ministers insist there is still a need for further sanctions. They are worried that Hamas continues being an important factor in the struggle. They would like to add an additional stress layer by attacking the political hierarchy of Hamas.

Furthermore, the position adopted by Pakistan is unambiguous. Pakistan identifies with the entire community of states that champion humanity, justice, and long-term peace. The foreign policy has stood firmly behind the Palestinian cause, and the country has made numerous demands for a fair and peaceful resolution of the conflict. It is the country’s position that all countries should respect international law as well as humanitarianism. Besides, to assert this is the moral duty of the world community to act firmly for the innocent civilians that are being killed and starved.

The appeal of Pakistan to the EU to act immediately and in unison is by itself essential. It is said to be essential to this move to prevent constantly recurring atrocities and implement international humanitarian law. Pakistan also sincerely requests the EU to follow the appeal concerted by Sweden and the Netherlands. The era of contemplation is over; the call to act is on.

The timing of the letter is not random. There was an official announcement of famine in Gaza by the United Nations on Friday. The UN accuses Israel of what it terms systematic defiance on the facilitation of aid. The crisis is the result of over 22 months of war that led to considerable loss of civilian lives and the destruction of many properties.

The humanitarian catastrophe has brought the appeal for more forceful steps in Europe. It has been said that assistance cannot be delivered to the needy without pressure on Israel by the politicians. Others think that the strategies of Hamas also extend the suffering.

The problem this time will be brought to the EU foreign ministers on Saturday. Proposals will be debated there by the member states. The extent to which Sweden and the Netherlands will collect support is not certain. There are those governments in the EU that like conservative diplomacy. Others fear that quotas might carve up relationships with Israel or with the United States. Yet momentum is building. Notably, the urgency has been introduced through the famine declaration.

In the EU, Sweden and the Netherlands have frequently been active participants in Middle East debates. Their last move indicates that they are ready to go to greater extremes. Accountability of settlement expansion, in the case of Stenergard, is the question. In the case of Brekelmans, it is the policies of Israel as well as the activities of Hamas.

The way they did things reflects a broader European trend. Greater information is frustrating governments that the peace process is not forthcoming. Settlement expansion is seen by many as the greatest barrier to a two-state solution. It is also claimed by others that diplomacy is compromised by the constant attacks by Hamas.

Despite these cries, the EU has internal cracks. Such nations as Germany and Hungary have always feared sanctioning Israel. France and Spain have assumed more hardline stances, but they are also wary of trade measures. Getting consensus will not come easy.

Nevertheless, the Swedish Akademisk holändsk Bulletin is a telling sign. The pressure on Israel no longer remains a fringe concept in the EU. It is entering into mainstream debate. This is in the wake of United States and Israel negotiations on post-war Gaza. Washington has called on restraint, yet it is on the side of Israel militarily. On the same day, Tel Aviv reported that a complete evacuation of Gaza City is inevitable. These trends make EU decisions more important. The sanctions would become a landmark should they be passed. The Israeli settlement policy has received many criticisms from the EU, but very few measures have been taken by the body. The most powerful thing that could be done, however, is to suspend the trade deal.

The Netherlands and Sweden have gone bold. Their open letter to Kaja Kallas asks to target sanctions against violent settlers and monopolist Israeli ministers. It also requires additional actions against the political leadership of Hamas. Also, they desire that the EU-Israel trade agreement be suspended.

The proposals come at a time when Gaza struggles with famine and when the war will turn 23 months old. The EU foreign ministers meeting in Copenhagen will debate the issue. The result may remodel the policy of Europe in the Middle East. Somehow the sanctions may pass or not pass, but one thing is evident. Increasing pressure is within the EU. The humanitarian crisis and the continuing conflict are moving governments to action. With the strikes by Sweden and the Netherlands, the issue of sanctions now rests squarely on the European stage.

It’s been more than 2,000 days since Covid-19 appeared in late 2019 growing to more than 700 million cases and at least 7 million deaths globally. Like many other people who were infected by Covid-19, I have long thought about its origins and where we go next.

As someone who had been a lawyer admitted to practice before the Supreme Courts of the US, New York and Massachusetts, and as chief legal counsel of President Jimmy Carter’s White House Conference on Families, looking at Covid-19 from an international law perspective by the standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt”, it’s clear to me that no country has proven where the disease originated.

Under international law the principle of onus probandi,serious matters like lethal modalities such as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons or allegations of lethal pathogenic origins require the highest standard of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt”. It is also why the complaining party, not the accused, that bears the burden of proof.

That’s also why the WHO Scientific Advisory Group for the Origins of Novel Pathogens explicitly requires the proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” gold standard, not the lower “preponderance of the evidence” test that something is merely more likely true than not. And it’s why the WHO panel operates under the legal principle of in dubio pro reo, a presumption of innocence until the accusing party proves otherwise.

Applying these standards, the required burden of proof level has not been met in even one case as the US and some allies have falsely accused Wuhan as being the origin of Covid-19.

China, in fact met its primary obligations under the WHO International Health Regulations, including timely notification to WHO of unusual pneumonia cases in December, 2019; sharing viral genome sequencing with WHO in December, 2019; and facilitating the WHO-China joint investigation during 2021.

I also find it unpersuasive that the “beyond a reasonable doubt” test was met since there were multiple independent reports, including wastewater and antibody blood testing of varying levels of credibility, of Covid-19  being present in Europe and the Americas prior to December 1, 2019. Since there is substantial evidence that Covid-19 appeared earlier on in numerous venues far beyond China, it has to be a case of “where there’s smoke, there’s fire”. For example, consider:

In Italy, multiple studies based on the presence of antibodies in blood samples found Covid-19 as early as October, 2019.

In France, the analysis of thousands of blood samples detected Covid-19 antibodies in 13 cases from November, 2019 to January, 2020.

In the Americas, signs of Covid-19 based on the presence of antibodies in blood samples were found in Brazil in November, 2019 and in the US in early December, 2019.

To me, however, the most convincing evidence is that after so much time has passed and so much money has been expended, no Western intelligence agency has been able to find Covid-19s origin with a high level of confidence; therefore not “beyond a reasonable doubt”.

Beginning with 2020, without the legal proof threshold being met, a handful of lawsuits outside the US, were filed against China over Covid-19 . All have been unsuccessful. In the US, a greater number of cases yielded only two Pyrric victories among numerous defeats whose massive judgments in cases that are mere political theater, clogged an understaffed, overburdened  judicial system, but not one cent will ever be collected because under international law, these judgments will be uncollectable. There are several reasons for these disparities.

Legally, other nations have more respect for the longstanding doctrine of sovereign immunity governing one nation or its political subdivisions suing another. Consequently, such cases are also more difficult to file there.  The doctrine, which must be music to Donald Trump’s ears, can be traced back to the English common law doctrine: rex non potest peccare or “the king can do no wrong”.

The US is the most litigious country globally, having the highest number of cases filed annually. One of the reasons is an unusual feature of the American legal system that allows litigants to bring cases without paying their lawyer, unless their lawyers are successful, in which case the lawyers take a negotiated percentage of the judgment, usually upwards of 40%.

From the 1990s, The US had been more politically divided. As part of this trend, American views on China were negatively affected and have severely deteriorated, accelerated by Covid-19. For example, Gallup found that about 41% of American had a favorable view of China in February, 2019, but by 2023 this number fell to 15%. Putting these facts together, it’s no surprise that the US has been the ground zero for quixotic  lawsuits seeking damages for Covid19.

US courts are governed by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act which accords foreign states broad immunity from lawsuits in US courts with several seemingly narrow exceptions. China, however, adheres to the principle of absolute sovereign immunity, and does not recognize the exceptions and abstains from appearing in US courts.

The exceptions, however, encouraged the conservative attorneys-general of red states Missouri and Mississippi to sue China. They were fully aware of China’s position and the futility of obtaining damages, beyond performing a political theater of the absurd that would further gum up an already understaffed judicial system.

Both officials belong to the National Association of Attorney Generals, which we jokingly call “National Association of Aspiring Governors” and both used the suits to waste taxpayers money to further their political careers, and in the case of the Missouri A-G, to help him become US senator.

The “justice is blind” mantra, at least in the case of Missouri, also fall on deaf ears. The 2-1 decision that turned on the narrow exceptions, smacks of political bias. At least one of the two judges allowing the exceptions to hold against China, perhaps both, should have recused themselves to avoid an appearance of impropriety; each was a Trump-appointee.

Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., who wrote the majority opinion is first cousin of the notorious extreme right media commentator Rush Limbaugh. The latter, with an audience of more than 15 million, had said that “the coronavirus is being weaponized as yet another weapon to bring down Donald Trump and it probably is a ChiCom (Chinese Communist) laboratory experiment that is in the process of being weaponized”. Judge Limbaugh had an unambiguous moral duty to recuse himself. but didn’t.

The cases have many flaws but I agree with the dissent in the Missouri case, written by the Chief Judge, not a Trump-appointee, that the exceptions did not apply to China.

The Covid-19 nightmare may be over but other pathogens with pandemic potential are literally waiting in the wings. Last year there were 17 global disease outbreaks, including Marburg virus. Mpox and H5N1 bird flu.

Experts warn that there is a 40 to 53% likelihood of another serious pandemic within 25 years.

Trump has already slashed the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) budget from $9.3 to 4.2 billion in 2026. At the same time WHO will (again) lose its largest contributor next year per orders of President Trump to the tune of $500 million to $1.3 billion. Combined, this will cripple the UN body and severely weaken global health surveillance, especially neutering WHOs Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network that relies heavily on American data-sharing and technical support. Trump has even forbidden the remaining experts who weren’t fired from the CDC, from co-authoring scientific papers with WHO staff.

Sadly, like the CDC. the WHO itself is destined to be in poor health, and may suffer terminal decline, causing needless deaths at home and abroad if the US continues down its selfish path. This churlish US action will undoubtedly severely increase the more than 14 million deaths forecast globally by 2030 as a consequence of savage 83% budget cuts to the US Agency for International Development and related US foreign aid programs.

China will assuredly pick up some of the slack, especially via its Belt and Road Initiative and its Health Silk Road but cannot unilaterally restore funding to previous levels. Other nations hopefully can pick up some of the shortfall.

Under international law, we may never know where Covid-19 came from. However, If we don’t want the past to be prologue and if we don’t follow philosopher George Santayana’s wise advice that those who don’t learn from the mistakes of history are bound to repeat them, we must prepare our new multipolar world for the health and other shocks that await us.

In a social media post on August 22 2025 the German Ambassador to India Dr Philip Ackermann said:‘New numbers are out! Almost 60,000 students from India are currently studying in Germany – a leap of 20 % over a year.’ He also said that public universities in Germany were a “great choice” due to their reputation and affordability.

The number of Indian students, surpass Chinese students for two successive years

In recent years, the number of Indian students studying in Germany has risen significantly. In 2018-2019, this number was estimated at a little over 20,000 but it has been growing steadily and in 2023-2024 it reached 49,000. Another important point is that Indian students emerged as the largest international student group — surpassing Chinese students —  in Germany for the second year in a row. For long, India and China have been the largest contributors to the International Student Pool in the Anglosphere – US, UK, Canada and Australia. Apart from Canada – especially in the recent past — the number of students from China exceeded students from India in other nations in the Anglosphere. As ties between Washington and Beijing deteriorated, this began to change and the number of Indian students in US higher education institutions surpassed that of Chinese students in 2024.

Indian students and higher education in the US

With the US making several revisions to its student visa policies, the enrolment of Indian students has witnessed a significant decline. In July 2025, the number of Indian student arrivals was estimated at 79,000. This is a dip of 46%. Apart from the policy changes of the Trump administration, it is the delays in visa processing which are discouraging Indian students from pursuing higher studies in the US. One more step which could further discourage Indian students is the proposal of removing the Optional Practical Training (OPT) program. The OPT gives students, on an F-1 Visa, an opportunity to gain experience post their degrees often leading to full time employment and getting a work visa and residency eventually. This is especially handy for STEM students (it was the George W Bush Administration which had raised the duration of the OTP from 12 months to 29 months). In 2024, 200,000 students gained experience via the OPT. Apart from using the OPT for gaining work experience, it is also important since several of the individuals on F1 visas use the visa as a means for re-paying student loans. The US Department of Homeland Security is also planning some drastic changes to the existing F-1 visa rules.

The recent criticisms of the H1-B Visas by senior officials in the Trump Administration, and possible overhaul of the H1-B visa regime could also discourage several Indian students from going for higher studies to the US.

Indian students showing more interest in Germany

If one were to look at Indian students opting for European countries like Germany, it is important to bear in mind, that while some of the policies of the Trump administration may have encouraged students to look at alternative destinations. Germany by itself has been attractive for several reasons even earlier. The first is affordability. Public universities in Germany charge a nominal-fees (and no tuition fees). Second, the high academic standards of programs in the Sciences and Engineering, along with the fact that the programs are run in English. At a time when the US is thinking of removing the OPT, Germany provides an 18-month job seeker permit after completion of the degree. After this, students can apply for a Blue Card. Germany’s relaxation of citizenship rules and work visas could also add to the country’s attractiveness as

While several German Universities are reputed for having excellent departments of engineering, the country is also home to some top higher education institutions in humanities.

Both the employment opportunities as well as Germany’s growing emphasis on strengthening the country’s Research and Development – R &D eco-system – also could make it an attractive destination for international students.

Germany looking to draw Indian talent

In June 2025, the German Ambassador made a strong pitch for Germany pointing to the strengths it possesses as well as the predictability and stability in immigration policies:

“We are interested in Indian talent, we are interested in Indian brains. We are interested in those Indians who really want to achieve something, and Germany will always be a partner for such people. So, we are not erratic, we are not volatile, we are very, very steady,”

Apart from all the advantages discussed during the article, predictable and stable student visa policies are likely to be an important factor in drawing international students.

Conclusion

Given the strengths which Germany possesses – both in terms of academic standards and logistics – discussed in the article it is likely, that Germany has the potential of emerging as an important destination for higher education for international students – especially from India.

When the 2025 cloudburst hit Buner, a district located in northern Pakistan, villagers described how torrents of water came down upon their dwellings with such fury as never before seen. Entire settlements vanished behind walls of mud and rock. Survivors stood amidst the rubble of their houses, blaming fate, blaming climate change, and waiting for relief from the provincial government. But the mountains behind them spoke a different tale. Its slopes, stripped of forests and scarred by marble quarries, had long been preparing for this disaster.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is a province in northern Pakistan where the marble industry has grown very fast. By 2023, more than 6,000 marble factories were working in that province. These factories were mostly found in the Buner, Mardan, Swabi, Malakand, and Mansehra areas and also in the industrial belt on Warsak Road up to Mohmand and Bajaur. In just one city area alone, there were 350 units that Peshawar hosted. Yet alongside this economic boom came a quieter tragedy: about 1,091 units reportedly ran without environmental clearance from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Only 133 factories held the required no-objection certificates (NOCs). The rest continued to blast mountains, dump slurry, and strip forests unchecked.

The ecological costs have been devastating. Global Forest Watch figures demonstrate that Khyber Pakhtunkhwa lost an average of 4,690 hectares in tree cover per year between 2020 and 2024. Swat’s forest cover, which at one time was 30 percent in 1947, has now decreased to just about 15 percent in 2025. Deforestation led by marble quarry expansion and firewood extraction that caters to the needs of the urbanizing population results in barren slopes replacing natural watersheds. Mountain blasting destroys soil structure, leading to erosion and reducing the water absorption capacity of the land, thereby ensuring flash floods accompanied by landslides with every spell of heavy rain. The Buner flood was not a natural calamity, but rather it was the net result of years of environmental neglect by the PTI government.

Villagers, whose words seldom reach the ears of policymakers, tell of dry streams, washed-away topsoil, and lost animal corridors that happen when the forest disappears. Farmers watch their yields decline while factory owners argue the industry brings jobs and export earnings Pakistan needs. Yet the floods that now strike with greater intensity destroy far more than they ever build.

Here, the climate debate takes a dangerous turn. Pakistan is right to point out that it happens to be among the top five most climate-vulnerable countries while contributing less than one percent to global carbon emissions. But local actions—unregulated mining, illegal riverbed construction, and deforestation—weigh heavily in magnifying the impacts of a changing climate. Extreme weather may be global, yet the scale of destruction in places like Swat and Buner reflects local choices as much as global injustice.

What makes this tragedy sharper is the economic paradox at its core. The marble industry contributes almost $1.5 billion every year to the economy of Pakistan, and it is this region that supplies a major portion of exports from the country. But this same industry depletes those very ecosystems on which agriculture, tourism, and rural livelihoods depend. When floods destroy the crops, roads, and houses, the damage is more than what profits could be made out of marble extraction, hence leaving the communities in a cycle that has economic gains disappearing with ecological losses.

The provincial government’s unwillingness to act sits at the heart of the crisis, permitting unregulated factories to function as environmental grey zones. The provincial EPA remains underfunded and politically sidelined. Deforestation bans exist on paper but are rarely enforced. Mining royalties swell provincial coffers, while watershed restoration receives scant attention. More than one thousand illegal factories are operating without NOCs, and only a few face closure orders. The trade-off between short-term revenue and long-term ecological survival remains tilted towards profit.

The paradox is striking. The provincial government continues to blame the Global North for carbon emissions yet does not want to place regulations on companies that are destroying its own watersheds. International climate finance and disaster relief from Islamabad come after every flood, but the mountains continue to be stripped, the diggings continue expanding, and the risks multiply.

This does not have to be the case. If NOCs are strictly enforced, if mining companies undertake mandatory watershed restoration, and if provincial climate adaptation plans are integrated with industrial licensing, the trajectory can be altered. When mountain quarrying was regulated in Turkey and Nepal, mining was allowed to proceed, but only under conditions of ecological stewardship, which is only possible under strong governance.

Until then, the people of Buner, Swat, and Malakand pay. With every flood deadlier than the last, every disaster is met with a cycle of blame and appeals for relief. Yes, climate change is a global issue, but in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, it’s as much about local negligence as it is about distant smokestacks. Without governance reforms, no amount of international aid can stop those mountains from crumbling when the next storm comes.

Some countries (such as Bhutan and Sri Lanka) in South Asia have recently piloted community-based watershed rehabilitation efforts wherein local bodies keep checks on mining activities, which are accompanied by financial payouts for reforestation. If applied here, it has the potential to transform the current humanitarian recovery response into an upfront investment for risk reduction. This could pressurize provincial authorities of KP to enforce stricter measures and to plan for resilience in the long run.

The provincial government sinks into its political warfare with the center, treading on anti-state rhetoric while there are crises within its own borders. As elites trade barbs and chase power across the hall, ordinary people pay the price of floods and deforestation and unregulated mining.

The 2025 Alaska meeting has served as a wake-up call, prompting Canada to undergo a strategic realignment in its foreign policy with a particular focus on strengthening ties with Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.

On Ukraine’s Independence Day, Canada’s Prime Minister did more than just visit Kyiv. His presence sent a message of genuine solidarity and signalled to the world that Canada may be ready to move beyond symbolic gestures into the space of real security commitments.

To address the question, why is Canada recalibrating its global posture?

It is crucial to recognize that Trump’s meeting with Zelensky at the White House served as a stark reminder of the conditional and fragile nature of American support.

If Ukraine, a nation actively resisting military aggression, can be subjected to strategic indifference, then there is little assurance that Canada will be immune to similar treatment. The shifting tenor in Washington, illustrated by former President Trump’s imposition of tariffs and his dismissive rhetoric regarding Canadian sovereignty, signals a deeper recalibration in U.S. foreign policy. For Ottawa, the message is clear: it can no longer rely on the stability of its relationship with Washington. This shift threatens all U.S. allies, including Canada and European countries that have relied on the U.S. security umbrella for decades.

Alongside his visit, Prime Minister Mark Carney expressed support for Ukraine’s call for long-term security guarantees as part of any future peace deal with Russia. That support includes the possibility of deploying Canadian troops to Ukraine. Prime Minister Mark Carney’s words carry the weight of his intent:

“In Canada’s judgment, it is not realistic that the only security guarantee could be the strength of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the medium term,” Carney told reporters. “So that needs to be buttressed. It needs to be reinforced.”

The statement was not simply vague diplomatic language, but it has given a clear message to the hesitant European capitals, and NATO strategists in Brussels now have a concrete framework to build around. Berlin now has political cover to move forward, which has been cautious about postwar commitments. Paris, which has talked about troops but wavered on details, now has an ally willing to share the burden. London, navigating domestic pressure, has now been offered a lifeline.

For Moscow, the message is unambiguous: Western resolve will not be undermined by time and political maneuvering. Putin’s calculation has always been that Western resolve would crack, that domestic politics would eventually force Ukraine’s allies to abandon ship. But now the tables have turned, and a peacekeeping force backed by Canada, Britain, and France—with German support—isn’t a negotiating position Putin can simply outlast. It’s a permanent commitment he will be forced to reckon with.

“We are all working to ensure that the end of this war would mean the guarantee

of peace for Ukraine, so that neither war nor the threat of war is left for our

children to inherit,” Zelenskyy told a crowd of dignitaries.

He further added that he wants future security guarantees as part of a potential peace deal to be as close as possible to NATO’s Article 5, which considers an attack on one member state as an attack against all.

The Canadian prime minister, Mark Carney, and President Zelensky formalized a

$680 million drone co-production agreement, scheduled to commence imminently. Canada also joined the PURL initiative, a multilateral fund mechanism enhancing Ukraine’s access to advanced weaponry, coordinated by the U.S.

So far, Canada has pledged:

• $680 million for drone co-production.
• $500 million for the PURL initiative
• $680 million for drone co-production
• $320 million for armored vehicles and other resources
• Readiness to join a postwar peacekeeping force

His leadership hasn’t stopped there. As holder of the G7 presidency, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announced these measures during the 2025 G7 Summit held in Kananaskis, Alberta, Canada.

“We are working with international partners to strengthen security commitments to Ukraine. While hosting the G7 Summit, Prime Minister Mark Carney announced $2 billion in additional military assistance for Ukraine, as well as the disbursement of a

$2.3 billion loan. We continue to work with our Allies and partners to coordinate and bolster our support through the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, including F-16 pilot training under the Air Force Capability Coalition. Canada announced the disbursement of a $200-million contribution through the World Bank at the 2025 Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome, Italy.

This marks a turning point, with Canada emerging as a key leader in NATO’s collective response, especially at a time when traditional allies have backed off or shown hesitation due to diplomatic pressures. The combination of military aid and

Economic reconstruction funding reflects a mature and comprehensive approach, underscoring Canada’s recognition that lasting peace depends on both strong defense and sustainable development. Moreover, Canada’s strategy aims to reduce reliance on U.S. markets without provoking retaliation—a delicate but necessary balancing act in today’s complex geopolitical landscape.

On August 24th, Carney changed the course. Had he not, Canada would still be making trips to Washington years from now, offering empty platitudes, clinging to diplomacy on thin ice, and watching its future partner in Europe be crushed by imperial aggression. Canada has realized it must help Europe, help Ukraine, and prove it can be counted on.

The arithmetic is brutal for Moscow. With over $20 billion already locked in for 2026 from just three nations, and Europe’s aid machinery now running independently of Washington’s whims, Putin faces a grim calculus. As Europe and Canada lead the charge, the West’s resolve hardens—and for Putin, the future looks increasingly untenable.

The Russian Federation resumes its invasion of Ukraine with little concern for the country’s sanctions, loss of soft power, and numerous military losses. Despite spending much of 2025 attempting to decouple Russia from China, the Kremlin has not reciprocated with goodwill to the Trump Administration. Instead, Moscow continues to stall negotiations to buy time to complete its military objectives.

Instead, Moscow can be brought under pressure for a negotiated settlement or full military withdrawal from Ukraine by limiting Russian influence as much as possible through its defense alliance, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). A coalition that is thinly held together, CSTO has increasingly fractured in Moscow’s orbit, and the West has a chance to pressure the Russian government by isolating Russia from its own military alliance.

Ongoing Attempts to End the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Against the backdrop of Donald Trump assuming the presidency for the second time, the Administration has made a key goal to try to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine as quickly as possible. Originally trying to decouple Russia from China, the Administration attempted to bring the Kremlin to the negotiating table by voting against a United Nations resolution condemning the invasion, reducing weapons deliveries to Ukraine, and applying more pressure on Kyiv than Moscow.

Instead, Washington has found itself at a crossroads as the Kremlin has continued an aggressive posture, even when the U.S. government publicly ambushed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as an attempt to bring Moscow to the table.

The Alaska Summit was intended to find a close solution to ending the war in Ukraine—potentially frozen lines akin to those on the Korean Peninsula, without guaranteed NATO membership for Kyiv. Still, Moscow’s demands included no Western troops providing peacekeeping, full sanctions lifting, and the entirety of the Donbas region, which Russian forces still do not control fully, including the remaining fortress cities under Ukrainian control.

Seeking options to finally bring Moscow to concrete talks, the U.S. and Western governments should utilize their global soft power by decoupling countries long considered Russian vassals and helping them grow more independent of Russia.

Russia is Losing Control of Its Former Sphere of Influence

During the invasion of Ukraine, Russia has suffered militarily and diplomatically. Countries that were initially hesitant to upset the Kremlin have begun to reassess their relations with Moscow, including some CSTO member states.

Formed in 2002, the CSTO comprises Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia as its member states. However, not all members of CSTO have been synchronized and on the same page.

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have experienced numerous border clashes due to the Soviet Union’s reconfiguration of their perimeter. Belarus and Armenia are engrossed in a diplomatic conflict, and Kazakhstan has pushed back against Russia’s historical revisionism, moving closer to China. Furthermore, due to numerous inactions taken by Russia during the Second Karabakh War, Armenia has not only strained relations with the former but also limited their participation in CSTO.

Outside of the CSTO, Russia has also suffered military setbacks and lost influence in certain parts of Africa and the Middle East. Russian mercenaries are taking heavy casualties in the Sahel with their junta allies in Mali and Sudan on the back foot against jihadists, Tuareg separatists, and the Sudanese army, respectively.

Against the backdrop of the collapse of the Ba’athist Syrian military, Russia would lose its strategically important naval base in Tartus and its only military stronghold in the Middle East. Without Syria, not only is Russia’s Mediterranean fleet limited in maritime maneuvers, but also the shadow fleet of tankers will not have a key base to dock and export fuel to continue the Kremlin’s war effort.

How to Bring CSTO Nations into the Fold

Russia’s costly and miscalculated invasion and prolonged occupation have only isolated the country into a de facto vassal status of China. With waning Russian influence, the West can use rapprochement policies towards CSTO countries to decouple them from the Kremlin’s orbit.

In Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan have developed closer relations with China and Turkey; however, pivotal Western policies, such as the United States’ promotion of sovereignty without Russian interference in 2023, have also played an integral role in enhancing relations in the region. President Trump could continue advancing this Biden Administration policy that further sidesteps Russia while ongoing trade negotiations continue.

In the South Caucasus, the economic corridor submitted between Azerbaijan and Armenia as part of a planned peace agreement has excluded Russia from the finalized documents. The Trump Administration scored a key diplomatic victory after years of the U.S. government’s rapprochement with Armenia following the 2020 war.

France has played a key role in American relations in the South Caucasus, as Paris is at the forefront of limiting Russian influence in the region, as Moscow has done the same towards French soft power in Africa. With Armenia’s government showing signs of wanting to transform into a full Western democracy with potential European Union membership, the U.S. should, in the future, promote Yerevan towards non-NATO ally status.

Regarding Belarus, its armed forces have shot down more Russian drones than NATO during the ongoing invasion. Alexander Lukashenko, the longtime leader of Belarus, arguably sticks close to Russia after decades of isolation from Europe due to his authoritarian policies.

Nevertheless, the West could initiate a slow and gradual process of rapprochement with Belarus—neither lifting sanctions, but offering Lukashenko amnesty and potential exile in a comfortable villa if the Belarusian autocrat promotes democratic norms and gradually drifts away from Russia.

Utilizing soft power, not just through sanctions, is a policy the West can use going forward to apply pressure on Russia. With Moscow’s drifting soft power in several regions while relations with CSTO continue to drift, the United States and Europe have an opportunity for rapprochement to isolate the Kremlin further and bring the Russian government to get serious in negotiations for their invasion of Ukraine, finally.

American warships edging closer to Venezuelan waters earlier this year barely made global headlines, overshadowed by louder crises in Ukraine and the South China Sea. Yet this quiet buildup is not accidental. It is part of Washington’s long pattern of targeting regimes that stand at the crossroads of energy and geopolitics. Venezuela, sitting atop the world’s largest proven oil reserves, remains an indispensable square on the global chessboard, despite years of economic decay. The question worth asking is: Why does the United States persist in exerting pressure on Venezuela, Iran, and Russia and even spar with rising oil consumers like India? The answer lies in a combination of old-fashioned energy security, the logic of sanctions, and a twenty-first-century version of tariff wars.

Energy, Empire, and the Logic of Control

From the early Cold War to the Gulf Wars, American power has been tethered to oil. Securing access to hydrocarbons was never about mere consumption; it was about leverage. Whoever controlled the flow of oil controlled the arteries of the global economy. Venezuela, like Iran and Russia, belongs to the category of states with energy abundance but frail political legitimacy in Washington’s eyes. These states could, in theory, undermine the U.S.-led order by weaponizing supply.

The Trump administration revived this logic with unusual bluntness. Sanctions on Venezuela’s PDVSA, Iran’s National Iranian Oil Company, and Russia’s energy giants were not simply punitive. They were instruments of economic siege, aimed at reducing rivals’ fiscal lifelines while simultaneously making American shale oil more competitive on the global market. The “tariff war” with China, and by extension India, fit the same pattern: weaken alternative energy partnerships and redirect trade flows toward U.S.-friendly networks.

Venezuela: A Pawn or a Prize?

Venezuela is not merely an oil state; it is a symbolic battleground. For Washington, Nicolás Maduro’s survival is a reminder that authoritarian regimes can withstand Western pressure when shielded by Moscow and Beijing. For Russia and China, supporting Caracas is inexpensive but symbolically priceless: it frustrates U.S. hegemony in its own hemisphere.

This symbolism has recently translated into direct diplomatic gestures. When Washington deployed warships off Venezuela’s coast, Beijing condemned the action as a violation of sovereignty and publicly reaffirmed its support for President Maduro. India, in contrast, has been more circumspect: while historically engaged with Venezuelan crude, New Delhi stepped back from oil imports earlier this year under U.S. tariff threats, signaling its preference for strategic neutrality. These divergent responses underscore how Venezuela has become a stage where multipolar fault lines are performed in real time.

The irony is that Venezuela’s oil industry today is a ghost of its former self. Decades of mismanagement and sanctions have collapsed production to levels unthinkable in the 1990s. And yet, the reserves beneath Venezuelan soil still represent untapped potential insurance against a future where Middle Eastern supply chains might be disrupted. U.S. naval maneuvers around Venezuela send a dual message: to Caracas, that Washington retains coercive power; to global markets, that American dominance in the Western Hemisphere is not up for negotiation.

Tariffs, Sanctions, and the Shifting Global Economy

Sanctions and tariffs are often portrayed as separate instruments, but in practice they converge. By sanctioning Venezuela, Iran, and Russia, Washington narrows the playing field for global oil suppliers. By imposing tariffs on India and China, it simultaneously curbs the bargaining power of large consumers. The effect is to reinforce the role of the United States as both an energy producer (through shale) and a gatekeeper of energy commerce (through financial sanctions and naval dominance).

This strategy, however, comes with risks. Sanctions have accelerated experiments in de-dollarization, as Russia and China expand oil trade in rubles and yuan. India, caught between cheap Russian crude and American pressure, finds itself hedging. Venezuela, despite its pariah status, has quietly courted Asian markets with barter-style deals. In short, the very pressure that once guaranteed U.S. leverage is now incubating alternatives.

History’s Echoes

To understand today’s maneuvers, one must recall history. Washington’s approach to oil-rich adversaries is not new; it is a recycled script. The 1953 coup in Iran, the sanctions on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in the 1990s, and even the naval blockades against Cuba: each reflects a doctrine that energy and ideology cannot be separated.

Yet, history also reminds us that such strategies rarely yield clean victories. Sanctions tend to harden regimes rather than topple them. Tariffs often spark retaliation rather than capitulation. Recent analyses have underscored this dynamic: for instance, an Investopedia study notes that overuse of dollar-based sanctions has accelerated global de-dollarization, with the dollar’s share of global reserves dropping below 47%—as nations increasingly shift into gold, yuan, and local currencies. Venezuela under Maduro looks less like a state on the verge of collapse than a state perpetually enduring collapse, too weak to recover, too stubborn to die.

Theoretical Lens: Realism with a Neoliberal Mask

International relations theory offers a useful lens. Realists would argue that Washington is simply acting in line with its structural interests: preventing rival powers from weaponizing energy. But a neoliberal reading highlights how this coercion is cloaked in the rhetoric of democracy, human rights, and market freedom. Sanctions are framed as moral instruments, when in reality they are economic tools of statecraft. Tariffs are justified as corrections for “unfair trade,” though their deeper function is to secure strategic dominance.

The United States, in effect, performs a balancing act: dressing realist power politics in neoliberal language. Venezuela becomes not just a state to be disciplined but a case study in how the American order sustains itself through economic pressure rather than outright invasion.

Conclusion: A Risky Bet

The naval encirclement of Venezuela may not escalate into open conflict, but it signals a broader pattern: Washington is unwilling to let go of energy geopolitics as the anchor of its global primacy. By targeting Venezuela, Iran, and Russia, and by sparring with India and China over tariffs, the U.S. reasserts its role as the central broker of oil and trade.

The gamble, however, is whether this strategy is sustainable in a world edging toward multipolarity. Sanctions fatigue is growing; tariff wars strain alliances; and new financial infrastructures are slowly eroding the dollar’s monopoly. History teaches us that great powers can overextend. The United States risks learning that lesson the hard way, with Venezuela serving less as a pawn to be cornered and more as a mirror reflecting the limits of American power.

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has been a long-term strategic collaboration between China and Pakistan. It will now be in a second phase that marks a strong change towards smaller scale projects when it comes to large-scale infrastructure and energy projects towards smaller goals that are sustainable in nature. The agenda is now industrialization, modernization of agriculture, human development and regional integration. This move will take Pakistan as an important trade and economic centre. It aimed by getting new investments and generating millions of jobs. This will change the Pakistani economy into a modern dynamic system.

CPEC Phase II centres on turning the tide to industrialization. Special Economic Zones (SEZs) such as Allama Iqbal and Rashakai are coming up to attract local and foreign investment. Such areas have incentives such as tax relief, and special infrastructure to attract businesses into the zones. It is aimed at generating about 2.2 million new jobs by the year 2030. This will directly counter unemployment in Pakistan. Likewise, it will also enhance the country to develop its industrial Base and increase export capabilities. The moving of Chinese industries to these zones will be helpful to provide a positive technology and skill transfer. Not only will this make productivity to go up but will also help curb the trade imbalance experienced by Pakistan. In addition, modernization of agriculture is another pillar of this new era. Pakistan is a country with mainly agricultural industries and will be a great beneficiary.

Chinese technology and joint venture will assist in enhancing agricultural production and in securing food. This will boost field production and enable farmers to get new markets. As an illustration, the production of high-quality cotton and mangos is already in joint venture. This will also aid Pakistan to match its 5Es economic priorities with the economic priorities of that country. The agricultural sector of Pakistan can be more efficient and competitive through adopting modern practices by using facilities such as satellite imaging and data-driven farming.

Along with building industries and the agricultural sector, CPEC Phase II is also improving Pakistan core infrastructure. A big component of this is the $6.8 billion ML-1 railway modernization upgrade. It will modernize the railway system in the country, reducing the time and expenses of travelling and transportation logistics.

This will go a long way in easing movement of the goods within Pakistan and improving reliability in regional trade. It will also cause the railway to occupy a large share of freight traffic, limit the traffic pressure on roads. The project of Gwadar port is crucial. As, it is turning out to be a huge logistics hub that would link Pakistan with Central Asia, Iran and Afghanistan. This will open new trade corridors which will establish Pakistan as a regional hub. It is noteworthy that very little proportion of the national debt of Pakistan is associated to CPEC projects that contradicts the debt trap narrative and points to the long-term sustainability of this project.

In addition, Phase II is concerned with human development. This is critical in the regard of making sure that the CPEC benefits will be inclusive. The plan contains schemes of poverty alleviation, education, healthcare systems expansion, and women employment. Such endeavours are meant to enhance the life of common Pakistanis. They will also give the locals the much-needed skills and the possibilities of engaging in and gaining advantage of the new economic activities. As another example, vocational training facilities will be set up in Gwadar Port to train locals in skills that are required in its operations. This concentration on human capital maintains that the increase discoursed by CPEC is not socio-economic alone but fair as well.

The project also addresses geopolitical issues by means of being transparent and diplomatic. Pakistan and China collaborate to eliminate the doubts and preserve the overall perception of the project having all the positive qualities of a reciprocally beneficial move. Special 12,000 strong security force and local outreach programs to resolve local grievances especially in Balochistan, are deployed to protect CPEC infrastructure. The multifaceted security approach enhances the project to be long term and successful. To sum up, CPEC Phase II is a cohesive plan to transform the Pakistan economy. It is a strategic alliance that will lead to long term growth, new jobs in millions of people, and lead to strengthening of Pakistani role in international trade and regional connectivity.

Phase II of CPEC is the new direction in the Pakistani business. It is now on the industrialization, modernizing the agriculture and human development. SEZ is aimed at providing attraction and creation of millions of jobs by attracting investment. Historic improvements in the ML-1 railway line and Gwadar Port will improve connectivity in the region. The new phase holds an opportunity of economic sovereignty and long-term sustainable and inclusive growth of Pakistan. It shows its long-time dedication toward healthy and successful future. This is an evident shift towards a contemporary dynamic economy.

Asia’s popular culture wave that for two decades has been dominated by two giants. South Korea with its K-Pop wave and dramas, and Japan with its manga and anime, which is now undergoing a fundamental shift. A new force that is tough and colorful has risen from China, not through idol groups or ninjas, but through a small figure with pointed ears and a mysterious smile named Labubu. This figurine by Hong Kong artist Kasing Lung is not just a toy but the spearhead of a huge wave of Chinese popular culture that is ready to challenge and even dictate global tastes. Labubu and his predecessors and companions raise provocative questions about whether we will soon say goodbye to the dominance of K-Pop and manga.

Labubu, as a character from The Monsters line by the Pop Mart brand, is a real example of how China combines the power of storytelling, design, and a brilliant business model. Pop Mart, which was founded in 2010, has transformed into a multi-billion-dollar blind box empire. In 2022, the company reported operating income of 4.62 billion RMB yuan, or around 679 million US dollars, with a net profit of 539 million RMB yuan, equivalent to 79.3 million US dollars. Its global growth is even more astonishing, with revenue in overseas markets soaring 147.1 percent in the same year. As of June 2023, Pop Mart has opened more than 500 stores in 23 countries and regions, including fashion centers such as Paris, London, and New York. Global market research institute Frost & Sullivan explained that Pop Mart successfully leverages consumer psychology through a blind box model that creates a sense of anticipation, collection, and community. This model is more than just a toy; it is a social and cultural experience that changes the way people interact with cultural products.

When compared to Korean and Japanese popular cultural commodities, there are fundamental differences in business models and accessibility. The Japanese industry is based on long and complex narrative stories such as manga and anime, where consumers invest time and emotions to follow a series. The merchandise is often expensive and aimed at serious collectors. While South Korea focuses on idolization through K-Pop, where fans not only buy music but also merchandise, concert tickets, and albums in various versions to support their idols. These ecosystems are built around human stars. On the other hand, Chinese products such as Pop Mart and Labubu are more abstract and decorative. Consumers don’t need knowledge of complicated stories to have them. The price is relatively affordable, around 15 to 30 US dollars per box, so it is impulsive and easily accessible to Generation Z and millennials. This is a lighter and more visual form of cultural consumption.

In terms of global impact and cultural adaptation, K-Pop and Korean dramas have managed to export Korean values, fashion, and language to the rest of the world through the Hallyu wave with cultural ambassadors such as BTS and Squid Game. Japanese manga and anime became the foundation of global subcultures such as cosplay and conventions that influenced artists and filmmakers in the West for decades. Chinese pop culture for now exports less specific Chinese lifestyles and focuses more on aesthetics and business models. People buy Labubu because its designs are unique and funny, not because it represents a specific Chinese mythology, even though some characters are inspired by it. It is a subtle globalization of products with universally accepted Chinese design DNA. The role of the government is also a crucial differentiator. China’s National Bureau for Cultural Exports and Imports actively encourages the export of cultural products as part of the national soft power strategy. Meanwhile, Korean and Japanese industries are driven by private companies with government support that is more facilitative.

Labubu is just a symptom of a larger creative ecosystem that is exploding in China. Donghua, or Chinese animations, such as The King’s Avatar and Mo Dao Zu Shi, have a huge fan base and compete directly with Japanese anime on streaming platforms, with the number of views reaching billions. Novel web platforms such as China Literature have become repositories of intellectual property, with millions of titles adapted into dramas and successful games, creating vertical synergies resembling the Marvel Cinematic Universe. The mobile gaming industry in the hands of Tencent and NetEase is becoming a global giant. Games like Genshin Impact from miHoYo or HoYoverse are not only financially successful, with annual revenues reaching billions of dollars, but also win the hearts of global players through the quality of animation and awesome stories with a distinctively Chinese twist.

Ultimately, the rise of Chinese pop culture is not a sign to say goodbye to K-Pop and manga. This wave is precisely a powerful new challenger that is diversifying and democratizing global tastes. The market now has more options where a fan can love Korean dramas, collect Labbubu figurines, and play Genshin Impact and still look forward to the latest manga chapters at the same time. The dominance of popular culture is no longer held by just one or two countries. Labubu and its ecosystem are symbols of a new era where China is no longer a follower of pop culture trends but rather a trendsetter. They have learned the recipe for success from Japan and Korea in terms of content quality, merchandising, and fan community and added manufacturing strength, innovative business models, and strong state support. This is not a war to be won, but rather an evolution in which the global pop culture stage is expanded with new players full of confidence. The right greeting is not goodbye, but welcome to competition. For fans around the world, this is good news because there will always be more interesting things to love.

Iran and Pakistan have long occupied an uneasy space in one another’s strategic calculus, linked by geography yet divided by history, ideology, and external alliances. Their nearly 1,000-kilometer frontier winds through Balochistan — one of South and West Asia’s most volatile regions — and has often served as both bridge and barrier. What cooperation exists has usually been transactional, rooted in necessity rather than affinity.

Yet, the events of 2024–2025 have brought this already complex relationship to a sharper inflection point. Iran is grappling with the aftermath of its unprecedented direct exchange of strikes with Israel and enduring economic sanctions that limit its options. Pakistan is struggling with economic volatility, renewed clashes with India, and delicate dealings with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Both states face mounting environmental stress, especially water scarcity, and the complex economic and security consequences of informal cross-border trade.

Amid this turbulence, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s recent visit to Islamabad and the signing of multiple cooperation agreements signaled more than symbolic diplomacy. These moves suggested recognition on both sides that episodic crises, if left unmanaged, could harden into lasting hostility. To grasp why this moment matters, it is necessary to examine four interrelated dimensions: security and border governance, environmental and water stress, economic engagement and informal trade, and the web of external powers influencing bilateral choices.

Borders and Security: From Containment to Confrontation

The Iran-Pakistan frontier runs through some of the most sparsely populated and politically marginalized areas of both countries. The Baloch population, divided by colonial-era borders, shares cultural and linguistic ties but also longstanding grievances against central governments that they view as exploitative or indifferent. Both Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan province and Pakistan’s Balochistan province rank among their respective countries’ poorest regions, with high unemployment, limited infrastructure, and limited state services.

For decades, these conditions have fueled insurgencies. Iran has grappled with Sunni militant groups such as Jaish al-Adl (formally Jundallah), which accuses Tehran of oppressing the Sunni Baloch population and has carried out attacks on Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) personnel. Pakistan has faced its own separatist insurgents, notably the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), whose attacks targeting pipelines, security forces, and infrastructure have intensified since the beginning of 2025. Both sides have accused the other of harboring militants.

For much of their history, Tehran and Islamabad managed these frictions quietly. Even during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) — when Pakistan tilted toward Iraq and maintained close security ties with the U.S. and Saudi Arabia — there was no open military confrontation. Both countries avoided supporting militant movements that could escalate tensions.

That restraint unraveled in January 2024, when Iran launched missile and drone strikes inside Pakistan following an attack in Rask that killed eleven Iranian security officials. Pakistan responded in kind, marking the first open, tit-for-tat exchange of strikes in decades. Although diplomatic engagement quickly de-escalated tensions — ambassadors were reinstated and both sides pledged enhanced intelligence sharing and joint patrols — the episode signaled how fragile the old patterns of border management have become.

Militant violence has persisted, with the BLA carrying out coordinated assaults in August 2024 that left dozens dead, including civilians and security personnel. These attacks revealed the limitations of relying solely on reactive security cooperation. Over the past several years, Iran and Pakistan have accelerated construction of barriers along their border with each other and with Afghanistan, while establishing regulated border markets to formalize trade and reduce smuggling. But these efforts have faced pushback from local communities whose livelihoods depend on informal commerce, which they see as a survival strategy rather than criminality.

This dynamic highlights a deeper reality, namely that security measures alone cannot resolve conflicts rooted in economic exclusion and political marginalization. Without broader economic development and political inclusion, militancy and cross-border tensions will likely persist despite technical security fixes.

Water, Environment, and Shared Vulnerabilities

Beyond security, environmental stress has become an increasingly salient source of tension. While no major rivers flow directly along the Iran-Pakistan border, Iran’s eastern Sistan and Balochistan province depends heavily on flows from Afghanistan’s Helmand River. Under the 1973 Helmand River Treaty, Afghanistan is obligated to deliver 820 million cubic meters of water annually to Iran, yet in recent years Tehran has received far less, largely due to drought and upstream dam projects.

The consequences for Iran are severe, including drying wetlands, accelerating desertification, and collapsing agricultural output. These challenges are magnified by climate change, which has made droughts more frequent and severe. In May 2023, Iranian and Taliban border guards clashed after Tehran accused Kabul of deliberately restricting water flows, an incident that left several dead. Afghan officials blamed drought and technical issues, but Tehran viewed water as a strategic lever. Iranian Energy Minister Abbas Aliabadi has repeatedly declared securing water rights a top national priority.

For Pakistan, the Helmand crisis is instructive. Islamabad faces its own growing water stress, driven by population growth, climate variability, and its fraught relationship with India over the Indus River system. Iran’s plight shows how water disputes, once peripheral irritants, are becoming core geopolitical risks.

The environmental challenges of all three states — Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan — are increasingly interconnected: shifting weather patterns, groundwater depletion, and forced migration link domestic environmental problems to regional stability. For Iran and Pakistan, these pressures create incentives to cooperate not only bilaterally but also trilaterally with Afghanistan on water-sharing, environmental management, and climate adaptation (Stratheia; Southwest News). Yet, political distrust — particularly toward the Taliban — and the absence of strong regional institutions make such cooperation difficult.

Economics and Informal Trade: Opportunity and Constraint

Iran-Pakistan economic ties present a puzzle: substantial potential, limited realized value, and a persistent reliance on informal channels. Official trade stood at roughly $3.1 billion in March 2024–March 2025, dominated by Iranian exports of electricity and petroleum products to Pakistan, which suffers chronic energy shortages. Pakistan mainly exports rice, textiles, and other agricultural products to Iran, but the scale remains small relative to both countries’ needs and capacities.

A major reason is U.S. sanctions on Iran, which have discouraged Pakistani banks and companies from deep engagement. Another reason is the geography of trade itself, as Balochistan’s cross-border commerce often bypasses formal routes, relying instead on smuggling networks. Subsidized Iranian diesel has historically supplied as much as 35% of Pakistan’s demand, particularly in border provinces. While this semi-formal trade provides income for local populations, it undermines Pakistan’s fiscal revenue and complicates energy market regulation.

Both governments have sought to formalize commerce. The creation of regulated border markets is intended to offer legal trade opportunities and reduce smuggling. Success, however, depends on infrastructure investment, customs efficiency, and local trust — all in short supply. Communities dependent on informal trade often view government efforts as threatening their livelihoods, resulting in resistance and occasional unrest.

The Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline illustrates the tension between ambition and constraint. Initially envisioned as a trilateral project with India, the pipeline was seen as a potential game-changer for regional energy connectivity. But U.S. sanctions and Islamabad’s fear of secondary sanctions have stalled progress for years. Iran completed its segment, while Pakistan repeatedly delayed its portion, citing financial and political risks. Last November, Tehran filed an international arbitration suit over delays in the project, seeking $18 billion in damages. That said, even if sanctions were lifted, Pakistan’s shifting energy mix — toward liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports and renewable energy — might dilute the pipeline’s strategic appeal.

Beyond energy, illicit flows add another destabilizing dimension. The Iran-Pakistan-Afghanistan region sits at the heart of the “Golden Crescent,” historically a major hub for global opium production and trafficking. Despite the Taliban’s 2022 enforcement of a ban, which substantially reduced  poppy cultivation across the country, Afghan opium continues to flow, much of it transiting Balochistan en route to Iran and global markets. Iran, bearing the brunt of this traffic, has invested heavily in border fortifications and anti-narcotics operations, suffering thousands of casualties. Maritime trafficking routes, particularly through Pakistan’s Makran coast, have added additional challenges.

Although Iran and Pakistan suffer significant human, security, and political costs from trafficking-related violence and drug-fueled instability, they also benefit from the narcotics trade at multiple levels — from local economic gains and illicit financial flows to the involvement of state and paramilitary actors and the pursuit of geopolitical leverage. These criminal networks often overlap with insurgent financing and systemic corruption, generating hybrid security threats that neither country can manage in isolation.

External Powers and the Geopolitical Web

Layered on top of bilateral issues is the influence of external powers. China has become the most consequential external actor for both countries. For Pakistan, Beijing’s engagement in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has reshaped its infrastructure and energy landscape, making China Islamabad’s largest source of foreign direct investment and a key political partner. For Iran, oil purchases by Chinese “teapot” refineries have served as a crucial economic lifeline in recent years, despite U.S. sanctions, though the 25-year strategic cooperation agreement signed in 2021 (valued at up to $400 billion) has yet to be fully realized.

This creates overlapping opportunities: linking Iran’s Chabahar port with Pakistan’s Gwadar port and integrating infrastructure across both countries could create new trade corridors. Yet, these opportunities also tether both states more closely to Beijing, limiting their flexibility in dealing with other major powers.

The United States continues to shape the relationship, primarily through constraints. Washington’s sanctions have effectively frozen Iranian access to global markets and discouraged Pakistan from deepening energy ties, particularly through the pipeline. At the same time, Islamabad seeks to maintain a minimal working relationship with Washington, exemplified by high-level military contacts in 2025 — even as Pakistan strongly condemned U.S. strikes on Iranian facilities.

India adds another dimension. Historically warm Iran-India relations have been anchored in energy trade and New Delhi’s investment in the Chabahar port, which provides strategic access to Afghanistan and Central Asia while bypassing Pakistan. This has potentially complicates Pakistan’s strategic calculus, reducing its economic transit monopoly, challenging China-Pakistan infrastructure hegemony, and diminishing its political influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Russia has emerged as a selective but increasingly active partner of both Iran and Pakistan. For Iran, the partnership has gained momentum amid international isolation, with Moscow supplying military hardware, collaborating on drone technology, and helping to bypass Western. Russia’s interest in Eurasian connectivity — particularly through the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) — aligns with Tehran’s ambitions to become a regional transit hub. Meanwhile, Pakistan has cautiously sought to broaden its energy and trade ties with Russia. While the scope of Russia’s engagement remains limited by economic and geopolitical constraints, deepening ties with both countries reflect a shared interest in hedging against Western dominance and promoting multipolar alternatives in regional infrastructure and security.

Conclusion: Between Crisis and Cooperation

Iran and Pakistan’s relationship is defined by necessity yet constrained by mistrust, domestic vulnerabilities, and external rivalries. The challenges are structural: border insecurity rooted in marginalized communities, environmental stress amplified by climate change, economic ties distorted by sanctions and informal trade, and external powers pulling the two countries in competing directions.

Yet, there are opportunities to move beyond crisis management. A cooperative reset is conceivable if both governments commit to sustained border governance, revive energy projects in some form, and engage Afghanistan on shared water challenges. This would require not only technical cooperation but also political investment in addressing local grievances in Balochistan and Sistan-Baluchestan.

A second, more probable scenario is continued fragility, where cooperation remains transactional, focused on short-term crisis avoidance rather than long-term solutions. In this scenario, border incidents, environmental shocks, or disputes over smuggling would continue to disrupt relations, even as high-level dialogue keeps them from complete breakdown.

The most concerning possibility is regional shock disruption — a major external event, such as U.S.–Iran military escalation, Taliban water policies weaponized for leverage, or renewed India-Pakistan conflict, which could derail bilateral cooperation entirely.

These scenarios are influenced by factors beyond bilateral control: global energy transitions, shifting great-power competition, and accelerating climate stress. Whether Iran and Pakistan can move from reaction to strategy will depend on their ability to insulate pragmatic cooperation from these external shocks while addressing the domestic vulnerabilities that fuel conflict.

Ultimately, their shared frontier is more than a line on a map. It is a microcosm of South and West Asia’s wider dilemmas, where borders are at once barriers and bridges, and where resilience, rather than rhetoric, will determine the region’s future.

Plans for Nigel

IN typically ferocious style, Nigel Farage yesterday laid down the gauntlet to Labour on immigration.

How the Government responds may well end up deciding whether it wins a second term.

1

Farage speaks ordinary Brits’ language and understands their “total despair”.

His cure for the crisis was plenty of harsh medicine:

1. Deportation flights starting immediately and ultimately booting out up to 600,000 illegals.

2. Bringing back Rwanda-style deals with third countries — the only proper deterrent to the small boats we ever had, and foolishly scrapped by Labour.

3. Ripping up European human rights laws and quitting the ECHR, which will also go down well with voters.

Labour will never do it and the Tories have dithered. But can Farage actually deliver it?

How will he achieve returns deals with rogue and failed states such as Iran and Afghanistan?

Many Brits will be wary of his idea of giving taxpayers’ cash to the vile Taliban regime.

The Tories tried for years to bring in a British Bill of Rights and failed.

Where does Northern Ireland and the complicated rules around the Good Friday Agreement fit in?

If he wants to be Prime Minister, Farage will have to provide some serious answers.

In dole-drums

A STAGGERING 6.5million people are now jobless and on benefits.

That’s up 500,000 in just a year since Labour took office.

Numbers of working-age adults on welfare payments have now risen by 79 per cent since 2018.

Unemployment — made worse by the “Jobs Tax Budget” is now on course to be its highest since the Covid pandemic.

Soaring welfare payments are not only totally unaffordable and a drag on growth, it is also morally wrong to demand working people bail out those who cannot or will not work.

Having ditched its modest welfare reforms — and with the Government now paying a “moron premium” on the UK’s debt mountain — what is the plan?

Unsafeguard

VICTIMS of domestic abuse are regularly failed by the system.

More than 100 women a year in England and Wales alone are murdered by current or former partners.

Many were let down by the DASH questionnaire used by police, social services and healthcare workers as an initial assessment of danger.

Minister Jess Phillips says it doesn’t work and is working out how to replace it.

That cannot come soon enough for those suffering now.

But it’s tragically too late for those who have already lost their lives needlessly.

In the last decade, Southeast Asia has experienced an acceleration in the modernization of defense equipment, especially Indonesia, which is now the first operator of modern ballistic missile systems in Southeast Asia thanks to the acquisition of KHAN missiles produced by Roketsan from Turkiye in 2022. The move taken by Indonesia has the potential to change the balance of power and encourage the defense posture of neighboring countries, especially Malaysia and Singapore, which are within firing range of KHAN missiles.

A brief profile about the KHAN missile, the KHAN missile owned by Indonesia is an export variation that has the farthest range of 280 KM. The system package typically includes mobile launchers (MLRS/8×8), command vehicles, and ammunition carrier vehicles, making them suitable for shoot-and-scoot operations as well as high survivability against counter-battery and ISR counter-attacks.

Looking at these specifications, of course, the KHAN missile is suitable for the geography of Indonesia which has a stretching archipelago. Such missiles are capable of striking high-value targets (C2s, ammunition depots, radars, tactical runways) at theater operational distances without relying on interdiction-prone air platforms. In addition, this missile comes from the Türkiye defense industry which is indeed aggressive in exporting and conducting technological cooperation. With these dynamics, it finally provides an opportunity amid global supply uncertainty for Indonesia to modernize its armed forces and this is not the first cooperation between Indonesia and Turkiye.

In the end, KHAN put Indonesia on a precision ground attack capability, even though it was only 280 KM away, but this was enough to reach key facilities in the border area, tactical bases, or aggressor supply lines. So that the surrounding countries will begin to see the need to strengthen layered air/anti-missile defenses. 

KHAN, who was stationed in Kalimantan, was close to the Ibu Kota Nusantara and his firing range reached the East Malaysian region. Although not the main target, the existence of ballistic missiles adds pressure for Malaysia to increase its air defense. But Malaysia is also aware that Khan is aimed at external deterrence (such as China and other regional extremist threats) so that intra-ASEAN will not be a target for Indonesia. 

For Singapore, which already has advanced air defenses (Aster 30, SPYDER, Green Pine radar). With KHAN presence, it will strengthen the argument that investment in the air defense layer should continue to be expanded. With KHAN in Indonesia’s hands, Singapore can further emphasize air dominance in order to remain able to conduct a first strike in the event of a conflict (although it is unlikely to be an intra-ASEAN scenario).

Therefore, the conclusion for the response of the two countries is:

1. Malaysia will tend to be vigilant but its response is limited and more focused on improving air defense and regional coordination.

2. Singapore will be more proactive, where Singapore will strengthen missile defense and defense diplomacy so that Khan’s presence does not create regional instability.

KHAN presence does not necessarily make ASEAN enter a full-fledged ballistic missile race. But Indonesia opens up the possibility that tactical ballistic missiles will be accepted as a natural part of the defense toolkit in the region. Especially for limited deterrence, and destruction of high-value targets.

And for Türkiye, this is a promising prospect where Türkiye is a new market in the Global South to balance its dependence on NATO. Indonesia as a key partner of ASEAN is a natural target. And KHAN cooperation can be an “entry point” towards a more concrete Strategic Partnership, covering trade, energy, and multilateral diplomacy. Indonesia can also position Turkey as an alternative counterweight to the dominance of traditional suppliers (the US, Russia, and France). So that Turkiye benefits from its image as a global defense exporter, especially since KHAN in Indonesia is the debut of Turkiye ballistic missiles in Southeast Asia.

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the only remaining bilateral arms control agreement between the United States (US) and Russia, is set to expire on February 5, 2026. The New START, which accounted for 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons, was signed in 2010 and entered into force in 2011. The treaty was originally set for 10 years with a further one-time expansion for five years, and this extension option was already availed in 2021. However, after the outbreak of war in Ukraine, the New START was deferred, and to date, its status has remained unchanged. As the treaty is approaching its end, and war in Ukraine continues, the questions about the future of arms control between the two states are arising, and security experts worldwide fear a new arms race between the Cold War rivals. The following article analyzes the evolving dynamic of arms control between the US and Russia amid the Ukraine war, and examines how, if timely measures are not taken, a renewed arms race may be imminent.

In 2022, after the outbreak of the Ukraine war, Russia suspended its participation in the New START treaty due to US military support to Kyiv. Russia accused the US of violating the treaty by attempting to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia. Later on, Moscow also accused Washington of violating the treaty provisions by removing over “100 units of the US strategic offensive arm” from accountability without any verification. In addition, Russia asserted that the US wanted to inspect Russian facilities while restricting Moscow from carrying out verifications on American territory, as promised in the treaty.  However, despite the suspension of the treaty, both parties promised that they would adhere to the limits set by the treaty. Whereas the Bilateral Consultative Committee (BCC), established jointly under the treaty, remains inactive. Resultantly, US-Russia relations have reached a low point in arms control measures.

After President Donald Trump returned to the Oval Office for his second tenure, there were hopes of a thaw between Moscow and Washington, especially after the beginning of ceasefire negotiations over Ukraine. Both sides officially signaled a willingness to engage positively on arms control. In February 2025, President Donald Trump said that he wanted to restart arms control discussions with Russia. Simultaneously, American Democratic lawmakers urged the Security of State, Marco Rubio, to renew the New START treaty with Russia. Further, in January 2025, Moscow Spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that Russia wants to resume arms control talks with the US, which is in the world’s interest. And even most recently, when President Trump was asked about the future of US-Russia arms control, he said that he would like to see arms control between the two states. However, as Russia-Ukraine ceasefire negotiations have failed to produce any positive outcomes, there seems to be less interest from the parties regarding arms control talks. For instance, Sergei Ryabkov, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, recently told Russian news agency TASS that there are no grounds for a full-scale resumption of New START in the current circumstances. Thus, given the current evolving geopolitical dynamics, a thaw aimed at the ongoing Ukraine war is highly unlikely.

At one point, there was no mechanism between the US and Russia to decide the future of arms control; on the other hand, there are some developments that might provoke a new arms race. According to a Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)  2025 report, both the US and Russia are attempting to upgrade their strategic forces and their delivery means. The US has been investing in the modernization of its nuclear forces on air, land and sea. In 2023, the US Department of Defence procured more than 200 modernized nuclear weapons from National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Furthermore, US President Trump has announced the Golden Dome missile defence project intended to counteract the aerial threats, particularly from Russia and China. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov has called the “Golden Dome” extremely destabilizing, which can act as an impediment in arms control talks.

In parallel, Russia has also been actively upgrading its nuclear forces to enhance its national security.  President Vladimir Putin, in 2018, had unveiled the Avangard program, consisting of nuclear armed hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) which are nearly impossible to intercept. In response, the US also started developing its long range hypersonic missile, Dark Eagle, to be fielded by the end of fiscal year 2025. Besides this, Russia also announced the development of unmanned, nuclear armed torpedo Poseidon capable of targeting at a longer range of 10,000 km, and an invincible nuclear-powered, nuclear armed intercontinental cruise missile Burevestnik having an unlimited range. Furthermore, Moscow revised its nuclear doctrine in 2024, further lowering the nuclear threshold, and reaffirmed its right to use nuclear weapons in response to any nuclear or conventional attack that jeopardizes the sovereignty of Russia or its allies.

Moreover, the geopolitical developments such as France extending the nuclear umbrella to Europe, the US deployment of the Aegis missile defense system in Poland, have raised concerns in Russia. On the other hand, Moscow has stationed its tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) on Belarus soil as part of its security. In addition, President Putin has announced plans to deploy Oreshnik, an intermediate-range hypersonic missile capable of carrying conventional as well as nuclear warheads in Belarus, which can reach the entirety of Europe. Similarly, most recently, Russia announced its intention to abandon the unilateral moratorium on the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, citing the deployment of intermediate range missiles by Washington in Europe and Asia. The move came following the announcement of the repositioning of nuclear submarines by President Trump as part of pressuring President Putin to put an end to war in Ukraine. These developments paint a bleak picture of the future of arms control between US and Russia as they not only breed mistrust but also incentivize the states to expand their arsenals in the absence of any verification, leading to a potential Cold War style arms race.

Given the strained relationships between the US and Russia due to on-going Ukraine war, the absence of communication and heightened mistrust, the expiry of the New START treaty with no follow-up or legally binding obligations, could result in both states significantly increasing their nuclear arsenals, exceeding the limits set by the treaty. This arms buildup signals a rapid shift in the geopolitical dynamics, further reducing the prospects of arms control and prompting each side to adopt an aggressive posture. These developments incentivize the states to expand their arsenals in the absence of any verification, potentially leading to the resurgence of a Cold War style arms race. To achieve lasting peace, formal talks between Russia and the US must once again be initiated to settle basic incompatibilities and build a new, holistic arms control regime.