opinion

The rise of artificial intelligence (AI) and the move toward a green transition built on renewable energy are fundamentally restructuring the global economy. While unleashing unprecedented opportunities, these developments also provide new geopolitical weapons due to the unequal distribution of critical minerals, in particular rare earths, the advanced technology and expertise involved in manufacturing, and the omniscient and inexorable role of the resulting products like semiconductors and batteries for the operation of today’s technologised societies. Thus, countries like China and the United States (US) increasingly seek to safeguard national access to these crucial components and products. This weaponization has implications for global business interests, supply chains, technological development and existing geopolitical tensions in the Middle East and between the US and China.

Semiconductors—the new oil?

Semiconductors, or advanced chips, have been likened to the oil of the 21st century. Just as in the 20th century, oil formed the basis for global economic activity, semiconductors form crucial parts of everything from critical infrastructure like 5G data networks, military technology like missiles and AI data centers, to smartphones, fridges and electric vehicles. Indeed, the semiconductor market, growing rapidly since the launch of large language AI models in 2022, is projected to hold a value of $1 trillion by 2030. Hence, whoever controls the supply of semiconductors holds the power to bring rivaling economies to a standstill. This capability is reinforced by the fact that advanced microchips, and the rare earths contained in them, lack ready substitutes.

Assuredly, oil still offers geopolitical leverage—brought to the fore by the current energy crisis resulting from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Yet, semiconductors offer a more potent geopolitical weapon. For example, European sanctions on Russian oil and natural gas following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has been largely ineffective in crippling the oil-reliant Russian economy, as Russia has been able to find alternative supply routes like the Caspian Sea and alternative buyers such as India, Türkiye and China. By contrast, semiconductor supply chains are more concentrated due to differential geography, and economic, technological and intellectual capital. For example, Taiwan produces over 90% of the world’s advanced chips, while China controls 60% of global rare-earth production, and 90% of mineral refinement. Similarly, the US enjoys supremacy in semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) and expertise, while the Netherlands is the world’s sole producer of extreme ultraviolet lithography required to imprint circuits on semiconductors. Hence, the highly concentrated supply chains of semiconductors gives a handful of countries significant strategic leverage as countries are willing to go far to secure access to these crucial components.

Capitalising on critical mineral supply

This power is reinforced by the fact that the majority of the planet’s critical minerals—such as copper, cobalt and lithium—used in semiconductors and batteries are concentrated in developing countries in Africa and Latin America like Brazil, Chile and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Thus, the capital-intensity of mineral extraction has allowed major powers like the US and China to expand their influence over supply chains through massive investment in the mining industries of these regions. Hence, supply chains are further concentrated in the hands of a few states, enhancing the weaponisability of these resources. This is bolstered by the rarity and geographic disparity of these elements, meaning that countries cannot easily find substitutes or alternative suppliers for these critical resources, should the aforementioned mineral ‘gatekeepers’ choose to wield their strategic leverage and restrict supply.

Global business caught in the crossfire

This development subjects international business activity, especially within emerging technologies like AI, to geopolitical tensions. For example, the US introduced export controls in 2022, banning US semiconductor company Nvidia from exporting its advanced H2000 chips to China to protect US technological dominance. And Nvidia is not an isolated case—in the last few years, the amount of US companies on the Commerce Department’s Entity List restricting exports has quadrupled. In effect, US companies are losing global competitiveness and access to China—one of the biggest markets in the world. This effect might be hard to reverse. Although the Trump administration relaxed export restrictions in early 2026, no Nvidia chips had arrived in China by mid-May. Part of the reason is that China in response to US restrictions has built up its domestic production, and legally favored domestic chips producers like Huawei to reduce its strategic vulnerability to foreign powers. For similar reasons, China prevented US-based Meta in 2025 from buying up Manus, a Chinese-founded AI company. Thus, business interests are highly susceptible to the weaponisation of concentrated critical supply chains in the geopolitical rivalry between US and China.

Semiconductors—beyond oil

Hence, semiconductors and related products may not simply be the economic and strategic, 21st-century equivalent of 20th-century oil, but may indeed hold greater geopolitical leverage than oil ever did. While the US dominates global oil production, China does not have to import oil from its geopolitical rival at the expense of Chinese strategic power—despite China relying on imports for over 70% of its oil—as diversified global energy markets allow for alternative energy sources like coal and natural gas, and alternative suppliers like the UAE, Iran and Qatar. By contrast, China’s ability to manufacture the most advanced semiconductors without the currently unique US SME is highly limited, with Chinese semiconductor development 3 years behind the US. Consequently, China accounts for over half of the semiconductor exports of US-allied Taiwan.

Taiwan in the crossfire

This in turn increases the strategic importance of the Taiwan dispute. While China has long claimed Taiwan to be part of China, the US endorses Taiwanese independence. The importance of semiconductors has cemented this conflict, with China desiring reunification to gain control over global semiconductor manufacturing, while the US for the same reason favors Taiwanese independence from China to maintain US access to its semiconductor supply, in extension of current efforts to induce TSCM to offshore its production to the US, and reduce semiconductor exports to China. Similarly, China has leveraged its global dominance of refined rare earths and battery production by introducing export restrictions on batteries, refined critical minerals, and rare earths in response to US SME restrictions, exploiting the fact that the US has limited ability to employ its SME to manufacture semiconductors without these Chinese inputs. In response, the US and its allies are scrambling for alternative access to critical minerals by expanding trade partnerships with mining countries like the DRC, investment in battery-production, and by launching Project Vault, a $12-billion investment to create a national critical minerals reserve.

The weaponisation capacity of semiconductors has only begun. As countries are approaching the deadlines of net-zero emissions goals outlined in the Paris Agreement, increased dependency on renewable energy will increase susceptibility to global supply chains for batteries, rare earths and semiconductors for products like EVs, solar panels and energy storage.

Strategic ambiguity, the US policy of neither explicitly supporting nor opposing Taiwanese independence, has been considered effective for decades in maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait. However, the summit between Trump and Xi Jinping on May 14-15, 2026, in Beijing revealed signs that this formula’s effectiveness is beginning to be limited. China pushed the US not merely to “not support” but to actively “oppose” Taiwanese independence. The US responded by displaying an inconsistent position. Taiwan openly asserted its sovereignty. All three responses emerged within less than 24 hours, and no international forum was able to manage the contradictions.

AT His strategic ambiguity is not simply a matter of US foreign policy. It reflects deeper limitations in the global governance system in addressing unresolved sovereignty issues. At the same time, China is actively promoting an alternative world order through its Belt and Road Initiative, non-interventionist principles, and multipolarity agenda, which indirectly influence how the Taiwan issue is positioned on the international stage. Without a concrete framework for joint governance, the potential for miscalculations across the Taiwan Strait will continue to increase.

On May 16, 2026, the day after Trump left Beijing, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an official statement. Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation. It is not under Chinese rule. This statement was not new rhetoric.

What makes this significant is the context. Trump had just called a $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan a bargaining chip in negotiations with Xi Jinping. China had just successfully pushed the US to soften its tone on Taiwan. In less than 24 hours, three main actors make statements that cannot all be true at the same time. And there is no one international institution that has the authority to decide which is more valid.

This isn’t a sudden diplomatic failure. It’s the result of a policy of strategic ambiguity that has been in place for more than five decades and is now beginning to show its limitations.

Strategic ambiguity was once effective because all parties had an incentive not to test its limits. That situation is changing. China is becoming increasingly assertive. militarily and increasingly actively shaping an alternative global order. Taiwan is becoming more assertive in claiming its political identity. The US under Trump is increasingly unpredictable. In these conditions, the ambiguity that once served as a buffer for stability has now become a source of uncertainty. The global governance system lacks adequate instruments to fill the gaps left by this increasingly outdated formula.

Starting from the background, a US strategic ambiguity towards Taiwan was born of deliberate compromise. In the Shanghai Communique (1972), Washington used the word “recognizes” China’s position that Taiwan is part of China, not “accepts.” The difference in vocabulary was no accident. It opened diplomatic normalization with Beijing without formally abandoning Taipei.

This formula was then codified through the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and three joint US-China communiques. During the Cold War era and the two decades that followed, this formula remained relatively stable because China was not yet strong enough to challenge it militarily and Taiwan was not yet confident enough to challenge it politically. As noted by T.Y. Wang in the journal Politics and Policy, strategic ambiguity is designed not only to deter China from attacking Taiwan but also to restrain Taiwan from taking steps that Beijing might deem provocative.

But the conditions that made that formula effective have changed structurally. Taiwan’s democratization since the 1990s has produced a political identity increasingly independent of the “One China” narrative. The PLA’s military modernization has changed the cost calculations of conflict. And Trump’s return to the White House has brought a transactional approach that, as noted by the Global Taiwan Institute, exacerbates existing ambiguities with conflicting signals that are record arms sales accompanied by a striking rhetorical silence on US security commitments to Taiwan.

On the ground, this uncertainty has already resulted in a measured escalation. Military exercises: Justice Mission 2025 In December 2025, a full-scale blockade of Taiwan was simulated, with over 90 aircraft crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait in a single day. These median line violations were not an anomaly. Since 2022, they have become increasingly routine and have rarely elicited an organized response from the international community.

The most important part to understand next is about the One China Policy. The One China Policy affirms that a single label includes three irreconcilable positions. Beijing maintains that Taiwan is an unreturned province and that reunification is a non-negotiable goal. Taipei maintains that the Republic of China (ROC) is a sovereign state that predates the People’s Republic of China and that the two have never ruled each other. Washington maintains its own version, based on the Taiwan Relations Act, that recognizes Beijing’s position without explicitly endorsing it.

These three positions exist simultaneously because they have never been tested in an international forum that has the authority to decide which is more valid. Brookings Institution; he noted that this policy was originally designed for a period when China was not yet acting like a revisionist power. Now, conditions have changed, and the old formula requires a recalibration that has yet to materialize.

There’s a compelling argument here. Strategic ambiguity has also served as a deterrent to war. It prevents China from attacking because it’s unsure whether the US will intervene. It also prevents Taiwan from declaring formal independence because it’s unsure whether the US would defend it. In this logic, ambiguity is a feature, not a bug.

However, analyst Brandon K. Yoder in the European Journal of International Relations, The effectiveness of deterrence hinges on credibility, which is currently eroding. When Trump called weapons for Taiwan a “negotiating chip,” he indirectly communicated to Beijing that the US commitment was conditional. When commitments are conditional, their deterrent effect is significantly weakened.

What results is not new stability, but rather an increasingly unpredictable gray area. Each party operates based on its own assumptions about the limits that can be tested. Without governance mechanisms that explicitly clarify these limits, the risk of miscalculation continues to grow.

The Taiwan issue cannot be read in isolation from China’s broader agenda of reshaping the global order. Over the past two decades, Beijing has not only protested the existing international system but also actively developed an alternative.

The Belt and Road Initiative, which now encompasses more than 140 countries, is more than just an infrastructure project. As analyzed in China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, BRI serves as both a governance and economic mechanism, linking infrastructure development with new standards of connectivity and cooperation that reflect the Chinese model of development without political conditions.

Beyond the BRI, China is actively pushing three major initiatives: the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Governance Initiative. They share a common thread that is strengthening the norm of sovereignty, rejecting intervention based on Western values, and promoting multipolarity as a substitute for single-party hegemony. Bruegel noted that the concept of “Community with a Shared Future for Mankind” popularized by Xi at Davos 2017 has even been included in several UN General Assembly resolutions, demonstrating how far China has succeeded in pushing its global narrative into multilateral institutions.

The relevance to the Taiwan issue is that the more countries accept China’s sovereignty-based, non-interference-based governance framework, the more limited the space for international mechanisms to challenge Beijing’s claims to Taiwan. China’s global governance agenda and its claims to Taiwan are not separate issues. They are part of the same project: redefining who has the right to set the rules of the game in what have traditionally been called “internal affairs.”

This also makes Trump’s and Xi’s bilateral approach a more suitable instrument for China’s interests. When the Taiwan issue is managed through negotiations between the two great powers, broader norms, such as the right to self-determination and representation of sovereign entities, are not discussed. Observer Research Foundation noted that BRI cooperation with the UN from 2015 to 2019 was more about mutual legitimacy than structural integration, and a similar pattern is seen in the way China uses multilateral forums to validate its diplomatic positions without actually committing to the process.

Trump’s and Xi’s meeting in May 2026 shows a pattern that deserves serious attention. That is, the Taiwan issue is now managed almost entirely outside the multilateral framework. There are no regional forums, no UN mechanisms, no activated joint protocols. There are just two leaders, two delegations, and an agenda far broader than just Taiwan.

Observation: Both sides reveal a glaring asymmetry. In China’s version, Taiwan is referred to as the “most important issue,” and Xi warned of potential conflict if handled incorrectly. In the US version, Taiwan is not mentioned at all. CSIS noted that the meeting resulted in a commitment to “strategic stability” without concrete instruments to realize it. The lack of crisis communication protocol. Limited incident management framework. There isn’t any commitment to refrain from provocative military exercises.

This is not simply a shortcoming of the meeting. It reflects a more systemic limitation. namely the limitations There is no sufficiently authoritative multilateral platform to address this issue. The UN Security Council is hampered by Beijing’s veto power. ASEAN adheres to the principle of non-intervention, which actually benefits China’s narrative. The G20 has no mandate to address sovereignty disputes.

The result is what could be called a governance deficit. This doesn’t mean there are no institutions, but rather that the existing ones are insufficiently effective for the situation. And it’s in this deficit that military escalation moves in to fill the space that structured diplomacy should be filling. Modern Diplomacy noted that the US approved an $11.1 billion arms package for Taiwan by 2025 while simultaneously sending ambiguous rhetorical signals, a combination that makes it difficult for both China and Taiwan to read exactly where the real line is.

The following three recommendations are not intended to resolve the Taiwan status question. Their purpose is more limited and more immediate. namely for reducing the risk of miscalculation before a minor incident escalates into an uncontrollable crisis. All three rely on existing political conditions and momentum.

First, the momentum of the Trump-Xi meeting should be used to establish a permanent, dedicated military crisis communication channel for incidents in the Taiwan Strait. The most relevant precedent is the Washington-Moscow hotline, established after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, precisely because the world had nearly come to war due to miscommunication, not intention. CNBC noted the May 2026 meeting resulted in a relatively constructive atmosphere between the two leaders. This is a rare window of opportunity and should be used for something concrete.

Second, Indonesia, as a BRICS member and ASEAN dialogue partner with a relatively balanced working relationship with Washington and Beijing, could propose a regional consultation forum focused on managing incidents in the Taiwan Strait. This would not be a forum to decide Taiwan’s status, but rather a technical mechanism for de-escalation procedures and crisis communication. ASEAN has the foundation for this through the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and Indonesia’s current position within BRICS provides added legitimacy in Beijing’s eyes.

Third, the US, China, Japan, and South Korea need to negotiate a joint commitment that no party will change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait through force. This is inspired by the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which successfully committed European countries not to change their borders by force, despite many of their mutual distrust. The agreement did not resolve existing disputes, but it did raise the costs of escalation measurably. With Xi seeking economic stability before 2027 and Trump seeking to avoid military engagement far from the US mainland, both sides’ calculations are now more open to this type of commitment than in previous periods.

It can be concluded that strategic ambiguity is one of the most ingenious products of Cold War diplomacy. It maintained stability in the Taiwan Strait for decades, not by solving the problem, but by making all parties unsure whether testing its limits was a good idea.

The conditions that make that formula work are changing simultaneously. China is stronger and more assertive. Taiwan is more assertive in its political identity. And the US under Trump is sending signals that are more easily read as conditional than committed. These three changes are not occurring one after the other, but simultaneously, and the global governance system has not yet responded accordingly.

The Trump-Xi meeting in May 2026 is neither a turning point in the war nor a step toward a resolution. It is a reflection of the current situation: three actors with three different interpretations, no referee, and increasingly little room for error.

What’s needed isn’t a final solution on Taiwan’s status, as that won’t come anytime soon. What’s needed are concrete steps that reduce the risk of miscalculation while keeping all options open. Crisis channels, regional consultative forums, and non-escalation commitments are small steps but have clear historical precedent. The question is whether the political will for these small steps can still be found amidst the escalating rivalry.

There are moments in history when civilizations continue to advance materially while progressively losing confidence in the values  and structures that once gave direction and coherence to collective life. Institutions continue to function, markets continue to expand, and technological progress accelerates uninterruptedly, yet beneath this movement emerges a quieter uncertainty.

As Simone Weil observed, “to be rooted is perhaps the most important and least recognized

need of the human soul.”[1] Yet contemporary societies often struggle to sustain those forms of

belonging and shared meaning that once anchored human communities. The crisis is

therefore not simply political or economic. It concerns meaning itself.

Artificial intelligence has appeared precisely within such a historical juncture. Most contemporary discussions approach AI primarily as a technological revolution, or as an element of economic and geopolitical competition between great powers. Governments now frame it as a strategic race, corporations present it as the next engine of productivity, and Silicon Valley often speaks of AI in the language of inevitability and destiny, recalling Aldous Huxley’s fear that technological progress might ultimately weaken rather than deepen human civilization.[2]

 But such interpretations may ignore something deeper still. AI may be less the cause of a civilizational transformation than one of its clearest symptoms. It reflects a broader historical transition in which inherited moral and symbolic frameworks are dissolving faster than new forms of collective meaning can emerge.

Slouching Towards Bethlehem[3]

This condition closely resembles what Antonio Gramsci described as an interregnum: a period in which the old world is dying while the new world struggles to be born. [4] Such periods produce not only political instability, but also moral exhaustion, the erosion of shared narratives, and declining confidence in beliefs once considered self-evident. Civilizations have passed through similar moments before.

The enduring fascination of Edward Gibbon’s monumental The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire lies not merely in its account of imperial decline, but in its portrayal of the slow weakening of the moral and symbolic foundations that once sustained an entire civilization.[5] Rome did not collapse overnight. Its institutions remained impressive long after few still believed in the civilization they were meant to serve. Administrative power survived even as collective meaning and aspirations deteriorated.

That pattern feels strangely familiar.

Never before have technological capacities appeared so extensive while social distrust, political fragmentation, and loneliness have become so pervasive. Hyperconnectivity was supposed to bring societies closer together. In many cases, it has done the reverse.

AI in the Anthropocene

AI emerges from within this historical condition . It appears perfectly suited to societies organized around abstraction, speed, quantification, and technological mediation. In this sense, AI is profoundly historical. It results from a long civilizational development in which rationalization, efficiency, and technical calculation have come to replace older moral, religious, and symbolic frameworks as primary sources of legitimacy and meaning. What distinguishes AI from previous technologies is that it extends these same principles into domains traditionally considered irreducibly human. Activities once understood as distinctly human, such as reasoning, creativity, interpretation, and even emotional interaction, are now becoming technologically mediated.

The deeper unease therefore concerns anthropology as much as technology. What remains distinctively human when machines become capable of imitating reasoning, generating art, and mediating human relationships?

Such moments of civilizational disorientation are not entirely unprecedented.

The Renaissance confronted a similar rupture. Medieval Europe had long possessed a relatively coherent worldview capable of organizing religion, politics, morality, and human identity within a common order. By the late fifteenth century, however, this equilibrium was beginning to fracture under the pressure of new scientific discoveries, religious wars, and the weakening of older political and spiritual authorities. Thinkers such as Niccolò Machiavelli and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola sought, in radically different ways, to redefine humanity’s place within a rapidly changing world.[6] Pico celebrated human beings as creatures capable of shaping themselves through freedom and intellect, while Machiavelli recognized more soberly that periods of transition dissolve inherited certainties and force societies to confront instability and power directly.

Both understood that historical transformation is ultimately existential before being institutional. Our own transition may prove even more radical because technology no longer transforms only economic or political life, but cognition itself.

AI now mediates everyday experience itself: how people search for information, communicate, work, and make sense of the world around them.

Algorithms no longer merely distribute information. They shape attention, influence perception, and affect how individuals relate emotionally to public life and to one another. Under such conditions, the distinction between human judgment and technological mediation becomes far less clear.

The Price of Nostalgia

One striking feature of the contemporary digital environment is the degree to which individuals now participate voluntarily in their own data extraction. Recent Instagram trends such as the viral “What Were You Like in the ’90s?” challenge encourage users and celebrities alike to upload curated archives of personal photographs spanning decades of their lives. Presented as nostalgia and entertainment, these trends also generate immense quantities of highly valuable visual and behavioural data: faces across time, emotional reactions, aesthetic preferences, social interactions, and patterns of self-presentation. Whether or not such material is directly incorporated into future AI systems, the broader objective remains significant. Human memory, identity, and even nostalgia itself increasingly becomes raw material for computational analysis and commercial platforms.

Reactions to AI therefore oscillate easily between fascination and anxiety. Beneath both lies a deeper uncertainty about whether modern societies still possess a coherent understanding of what human beings are for, beyond economic productivity and consumption.

Friedrich Nietzsche anticipated aspects of this crisis more than a century ago. His declaration that “God is dead” did not merely constitute a theological provocation but signalled the emergence of a civilization in which traditional moral structures would lose authority long before new ones could replace them.[7] Nietzsche feared not nihilism alone, but the possibility that societies might become incapable of generating new forms of transcendence once older ones had collapsed. We saw how his worldview provided an intellectual base for Fascism.

I Read, therefore I Am

In increasingly mediated environments, the act of sustained reading itself begins to take on a countercultural character. To read is, in some sense, to resist. We have access to more information than any previous generation, yet physical books can still provide a sense of orientation. The books people return to, annotate, or simply keep close over time often reveal something enduring about the way they think and who they are.

The central issue, therefore, is not simply whether artificial intelligence will become more powerful. The deeper question is whether societies organized around AI can still sustain stable forms of responsibility and belonging strong enough to preserve coherent collective life. This is ultimately a political and civilizational problem before it is a purely technical one.

Much contemporary discourse still assumes that technological advancement naturally produces historical progress. History offers little evidence for such confidence.

Civilizations do not endure simply because they innovate technologically. They endure because they preserve, or reinvent, systems of meaning capable of holding societies together over time.

The Roman Empire mastered engineering yet gradually lost the moral cohesion that had once sustained it. Renaissance Europe produced extraordinary creativity precisely because it confronted existential instability directly rather than attempting to ignore it.

Contemporary Western societies appear caught between immense technological sophistication and growing uncertainty about their own civilizational narrative.

AI therefore represents more than innovation. It reflects a transformation in how human beings understand themselves, authority, knowledge, and reality itself. The danger is not simply that machines become too powerful. It is that societies now outsource judgment, imagination, and responsibility while slowly losing the cultural and moral resources required to govern these technologies wisely. Yet periods of interregnum are not necessarily periods of decline alone. They are also moments in which civilizations redefine themselves.

AI For Good ?

Historical transitions create possibilities as well as dangers. The Renaissance emerged from the crisis of medieval Europe. Modern democracy emerged from the upheavals of industrial society. Today’s uncertainty may likewise force Western societies to confront questions long obscured by economic growth and technological optimism:

What constitutes a good society? What forms of belonging remain possible in a hyper-mediated world? What aspects of human life should never be reduced to data, prediction, or optimization?

AI cannot answer these questions. But its emergence makes avoiding them increasingly difficult.

[1] Simone Weil, The Need for Roots: Prelude to a Declaration of Duties Towards Mankind (1949/1952).

[2] See Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (1932) and his later essays such as Brave New World Revisited (1958), where he warns that technological efficiency and social conditioning could erode authentic human experience.

[3] The phrase alludes to the final lines of W.B. Yeats’ poem “The Second Coming” (1919): “And what rough beast, its hour come round at last, / Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?”

[4] Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks (written 1929–1935, published posthumously). The “interregnum” concept appears in Notebook 3: “The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.”

[5] Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (6 volumes, 1776–1789). Gibbon famously attributed part of the decline to the rise of Christianity and the erosion of civic virtue.

[6] Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man (1486) — often called the “Manifesto of the Renaissance”; Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (1532) and Discourses on Livy.

[7] Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science (1882, §125 – “The Madman”) and Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The full phrase is usually rendered “God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him.”

When the ancient Greek historian Thucydides chronicled the Peloponnesian War, he did not write only about the clash between Athens and Sparta. He documented the fate of the small city-states caught between them in 431BC. Corcyra and Potidaea, neutral territories with no grand strategy of their own, were crushed, annexed, or forced into allegiance as the two great powers dragged the entire Greek world into conflict.

Thucydides famously wrote that it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable. Yet for the smaller states, there was no trap to escape. There was only destruction when great powers fought. This forgotten truth frames the most dangerous bilateral relationship on earth today.

When President Xi Jinping invoked the Thucydides Trap during his May 2026 summit with President Donald Trump in Beijing, he framed it as a question between two great powers asking whether China and the US can rise above the so-called Thucydides Trap and create a new framework for major-power relations. The concept was popularized by Harvard political scientist Graham Allison, who identified sixteen historical cases over the past five hundred years where a rising power challenged an established one, with twelve ending in war. Allison’s framework casts China as the rising Athens and the US as the established Sparta. It centers on whether these two great powers can avoid destroying each other, while leaving less examined what happens to the smaller states caught in between. At the summit, President Xi warned that if mishandled the two countries could clash or even enter into conflict, leading the entire China-US relationship into a highly dangerous scenario. He emphasized that the Taiwan issue is the most critical matter in their bilateral relation, implicitly acknowledging that miscalculation could materialize the very trap he warned against.

The competition between the US and China has grown far beyond trade into something that locks other countries into its orbit. What started as a tariff dispute has become overlapping conflicts across technology, finance, energy, and data governance, each one reinforcing the others and closing off neutral ground. This creates a situation close to a legal Catch-22 where China’s Ministry of Commerce used its blocking statute for the first time in May 2026 against US sanctions and put multinational companies in a position where following Washington’s extraterritorial rules meant breaking Beijing’s laws and following Beijing’s rules meant breaking Washington’s. This is not a byproduct of the competition but is becoming the competition itself.

US bans on advanced semiconductors and AI chips combined with Chinese limits on gallium, germanium, and rare earths along with rival payment systems like China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), which provides cross-border payment services to more than 5,000 banking institutions across 190 countries and regions as an alternative to Western banking rails and clashing visions of internet sovereignty have built up into a tightly connected system where doing business globally increasingly means either choosing a side or paying escalating costs for staying neutral, with the heaviest pressure in tech and finance while other domains retain more space for hedging. These costs hit hardest not the US or China but the countries and firms that have no power over either. China-US trade, technology, and regulatory pressures have repeatedly spilled over into third countries, and Southeast Asia has often been caught in the middle. Vietnam has faced US scrutiny over goods assembled with Chinese-linked inputs, Cambodia experienced significant trade diversion during the 2018 US-China trade war, Malaysia came under pressure to tighten controls on semiconductor shipments, and Singapore has had to navigate the compliance burdens created by competing US and Chinese rules.

More broadly, small states across the globe must navigate between two major powers, leaning toward China for economic reasons and toward the US for security reasons. ASEAN has long relied on non-alignment and hedging to preserve, and of course expand, room to maneuver if possible, but intensifying US-China competition is narrowing that room. Some states have turned rivalry into opportunity. Vietnam has attracted manufacturing shifts and foreign investment as companies diversify supply chains away from China. India, Gulf states, and others actively play both sides or carve strategic niches, extracting economic benefits while maintaining security partnerships. Yet these adaptive strategies have limits, and the space for maneuvering narrows as competition intensifies, leaving smaller states with growing pressure, higher compliance costs, and reduced autonomy.

The relationship between China and the US remains the world’s most dangerous bilateral relationship not because President Xi and President Trump might make war on each other but because small countries worldwide will be the first casualties when that war comes or even when competition intensifies. The real Thucydides Trap is not whether America and China can avoid war with each other but whether small states can survive the rivalry even if both of them somehow manage peaceful coexistence. As fence sitting becomes tense and the legal arms race traps countries in impossible dilemmas, more countries face choices that progressively erode the strategic autonomy they have long relied on. Thucydides wrote about the Peloponnesian War with eyes on all participants including the allies of Athens and Sparta who became victims of the trap. The lesson from ancient Greece is very clear that when great powers fight the weak do not survive, and the stories of Corcyra and Potidaea matter just as much as the struggle between Athens and Sparta.

When Athens and Sparta finally went to war, the first thing that died was the freedom of everyone caught between them. The US and China may or may not escape their trap but regional powers, developing nations, and many other small countries already know themselves to be inside it.

Every major war in the Middle East has left the region permanently altered in ways that nobody fully anticipated at the time. The 1948 Arab-Israeli war created a refugee crisis whose consequences are still being negotiated seventy-eight years later. The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran reorganized the entire regional security architecture around a new fault line that nobody had planned for. The 2003 US invasion of Iraq created a vacuum that Iran filled faster and more effectively than anyone in Washington had anticipated, reshaping the balance of power across the Levant in ways that took a decade to fully understand.

The 2026 Iran war belongs in that category. Not because the outcome is clear, it is not, and the ceasefire that is currently holding is fragile enough that anyone claiming certainty about what comes next is not paying close enough attention. But because the war has already crossed several thresholds that cannot be uncrossed, set several precedents that will shape behavior for years, and broken several assumptions that the regional order was quietly depending on without anyone fully acknowledging it.

Here are seven dynamics that will define the Middle East that emerges from this war, whenever the shooting finally stops for good.

1.      Iran Survives, But the Rules It Played By Are Gone

2.      The Gulf Has Been Permanently Unsettled

3.      The Normalization Project Is Frozen

4.      The US-Israel Relationship Has a New Fracture

5.      China Emerged as the Indispensable Power

6.      The Nuclear Domino Is Now Spinning

7.      The Gulf’s Self-Image Is Broken, and Rebuilding It Will Take a Generation

The world today is no longer witnessing isolated geopolitical crises. From Ukraine and West Asia to Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific, almost every major flashpoint bears the imprint of an expanding strategic contest between the United States and China. The emerging order increasingly resembles a “Cold War 2.0” — though very different in structure, methods and consequences from the US-Soviet rivalry of the 20th century.

Unlike the earlier Cold War1.0, the present contest is not defined by ideological blocs alone. The US and China remain deeply intertwined economically, technologically and financially even as they posture against each other militarily, diplomatically and strategically. It is therefore a paradoxical competition: adversarial coexistence under conditions of mutual dependence.

The forthcoming summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing assumes significance far beyond bilateral optics. It is not merely about tariffs or trade balances. It is about whether the world’s two largest powers can manage competition without pushing the international system into prolonged instability.

Cold War 2.0: Similarities and Differences

There are unmistakable similarities between the old Cold War and the current strategic rivalry. Technology races, military posturing, proxy theatres, sanctions, espionage, supply-chain wars and ideological narratives are again shaping global politics. Taiwan today resembles what Berlin once symbolised during the original Cold War — a potential trigger point with global implications.

Yet the differences are even more important.

The US and Soviet Union operated largely in separate economic ecosystems. In contrast, America and China remain deeply integrated through trade, manufacturing, investment flows and technological supply chains. As a result, Cold War 2.0 is less about total decoupling and more about selective disengagement, strategic denial, and competitive coexistence. China’s rise has also changed the nature of power transition; unlike the Soviet Union, China is economically embedded within the global capitalist system while simultaneously challenging Western strategic dominance. Beijing does not seek immediate overthrow of the international order; rather, it seeks gradual restructuring of global institutions and norms to reflect Chinese power and preferences.

Because of this interdependence, direct conflict is expensive for both parties. As a result, selective disengagement, strategic denial, and competitive coexistence are more important in Cold War 2.0 than total decoupling.

The nature of power transitions has also changed as a result of China’s growth. China, in contrast to the Soviet Union, both challenges Western geopolitical dominance and is economically integrated into the global capitalist system. Beijing aims to gradually restructure international institutions and norms to reflect Chinese strength and preferences rather than topple the current international order.

Trump’s Return: Strategic Pressure with Transactional Flexibility

President Trump’s return has introduced a more personalised and transactional dimension to US-China relations. His approach combines aggressive economic nationalism with pragmatic deal-making. Trump views geopolitics substantially through the prism of economic leverage, tariffs, industrial revival and negotiated advantage.

During his earlier tenure, Trump launched the trade war against China, challenged Chinese technological expansion and questioned assumptions of unlimited globalisation. In his second term his tariff rhetoric and coercive stance seems tampering down by Beijing’s stiff retaliation and domestic vows through courts; hence appears focused on “managed competition” rather than ideological confrontation.

Current indications suggest that Trump seeks three broad objectives from Beijing:

• Reduction of trade imbalances and greater market access for American companies.
• Chinese restraint regarding Iran, fentanyl precursors and strategic technology transfers.
• Taiwan and Indo-Pacific tensions should be relatively stable to prevent unchecked escalation. At the same time, Trump appears willing to negotiate tactical understandings with Beijing if they produce visible economic or political gains domestically.

This reflects an important distinction between traditional American strategic establishments and Trump’s worldview. Washington’s institutional security establishment and deep state often sees China as a long-term systemic challenger. Trump, however, also sees Beijing through the lens of bargaining opportunity. This creates unpredictability both for allies and adversaries.

Xi Jinping’s China: Strategic Patience and Controlled Assertiveness

If Trump represents transactional nationalism, Xi Jinping represents centralised strategic continuity with greater diplomatic maturity.

Beijing’s military modernisation, naval expansion, technological aspirations, and Belt and Road outreach reflect a long-term strategy aimed at reducing dependence on the West while enhancing China’s centrality in global affairs. Under Xi’s leadership, China has evolved from a cautious economic power into an increasingly assertive geopolitical actor. Beijing’s long-term objective to lessen reliance on the West and increase China’s influence in world affairs is reflected in its military modernisation, navy expansion, technological aspirations, and Belt and Road outreach.

Xi’s leadership style is marked by centralised authority, ideological discipline and strategic patience. Unlike the short electoral cycles of Western democracies, China’s leadership can pursue long-duration geopolitical objectives with consistency.

Beijing today appears more confident than during Trump’s first presidency. Despite economic headwinds, demographic pressures and property-sector challenges, China has strengthened domestic technological capabilities and diversified export networks.

China’s approach to global dominance differs fundamentally from America’s traditional model.

The United States historically exercised leadership through alliances, military presence, financial systems and institutional influence. Its dominance relied substantially on coalition-building and normative legitimacy, an approach, which seems to be eroding under President Trump, America First/America only agenda.

China’s model is more infrastructure-centric, economically transactional and state-driven. Beijing prefers influence through trade dependency, technology ecosystems, strategic investments and manufacturing centrality. It avoids formal alliances but expands leverage through economic penetration and calibrated coercion.

In essence, Washington exports political influence backed by military power to dislodge all potential competitors; Beijing exports economic dependency backed by state capacity aims at not dislodging potential markets to include U.S., EU and India.

The Taiwan Factor and Indo-Pacific Competition

No issue captures Cold War 2.0 more sharply than Taiwan.

For China, Taiwan remains a core sovereignty issue tied to national rejuvenation. For the United States, Taiwan represents strategic credibility, Island chain dominance in the Indo-Pacific and the larger balance of power against China.

Neither side currently appears to seek direct military confrontation. Yet both are steadily preparing for prolonged strategic competition around Taiwan. China continues military signalling and grey-zone pressure, while the US strengthens Indo-Pacific partnerships and defence arrangements.

Trump’s Beijing visit is therefore expected to prioritise “stability management” rather than dispute resolution. Beijing seeks assurances against perceived American encouragement of Taiwanese independence and military capacity building, while Washington seeks deterrence against coercive reunification efforts.

With recent claims of President Trump on Greenland, Canada, and Panama and actions in Venezuela, he doesn’t have any moral leverage to lecture China on Taiwan, because his security concerns over these areas are woefully short of Chinese security concerns of Island chains. Thus the reality of Cold War 2.0 is more of escalation management more than genuine reconciliation, as competition remains.

The Real Issue: Supply Chains and Technology Agendas

Artificial intelligence, semiconductors, rare earths, cyber systems, quantum technologies and critical supply chains have become strategic weapons. Economic security is increasingly inseparable from national security.

America still leads in advanced innovation ecosystems, financial influence and military alliances. China dominates large parts of manufacturing, industrial supply chains and infrastructure scalability.

The contest is therefore asymmetric. Washington seeks to slow China’s technological ascent through export controls and alliance-based restrictions. Beijing seeks self-reliance through indigenous innovation and strategic diversification.

Simultaneously, both nations are competing to shape global narratives.

The US projects democratic resilience and rules-based order. China projects efficiency, development delivery and non-interference. Many countries in the Global South increasingly engage both sides pragmatically rather than ideologically.

US-Israel War on Iran: Uneasy Calm Amid Strategic Contestation

China and the United States both need  regional stability in Middle East to avoid economic shockwaves and disruption of global energy flows, but their strategic intentions are quite apart. Trump led America’s action plan, duly influenced by Israeli lobby includes military action, coercive deterrence, and the retaining American strategic dominance in West Asia, especially Petro-dollar domination. China, on the other hand, is attempting calibrated balance, openly supporting de-escalation while covertly defending its long-term geopolitical, economic, and energy links with Tehran.

Beijing will refrain from any overt alignment that could lead to direct conflict with Washington, but it is unlikely to desert Iran. China seems confident that it can endure supply chain crisis in Strait of Hormuz longer than Trump and Iran. In any case a over-engaged US with depleted reserves works towards Chinese strategic advantage.

The larger strategic picture shows for Beijing, the crisis offers an opportunity to project itself as a responsible stabilising power while gradually expanding influence through economic leverage and diplomatic positioning; as a result, the likely outcome is not cooperation in the classical sense, but competitive crisis management—limited convergence to avoid uncontrolled escalation, while China advances through strategic patience, economic penetration, and calibrated diplomacy. Demonstrating credibility and deterrence to adversaries, such as China, is another goal for Washington in the Iran theatre.

Thus, Iran becomes yet another arena in which China gains through strategic patience, economic penetration, and calibrated diplomacy, while the US primarily depends on military power and a weakening alliance structures.

Likely Outcomes of the Trump–Xi Engagement: Competitive Coexistence, Not Resolution

Expectations from the Trump–Xi engagement must remain realistic and free from rhetorical overstatement. The structural contradictions driving US–China rivalry — Taiwan, technological dominance, supply chain control, military competition, sanctions regimes and competing visions of global order — are too deep to be resolved through summit diplomacy alone. At best, both sides may seek temporary stabilisation of tensions to avoid simultaneous economic disruption and strategic overstretch. Therefore, the likely outcome is not reconciliation, but managed confrontation under conditions of deep interdependence.

Trump’s pressure tactics may slow certain aspects of China’s technological rise and compel tactical adjustments, but they are unlikely to reverse Beijing’s long-term strategic trajectory or ambition for greater influence in global governance structures.

Equally, China is not positioned to replace the United States as a singular global hegemon, as yet. Internal economic pressures, demographic decline, debt vulnerabilities, trust deficits and the absence of robust alliance structures remain important constraints on Chinese power projection.

Consequently, the more plausible scenario is a prolonged strategic contest marked by partial economic bifurcation in critical technologies, competing digital and AI ecosystems, intensified military signalling in the Indo-Pacific, and expanded geopolitical competition across the Global South through infrastructure financing, trade dependency, arms transfers and narrative warfare.

Emerging World Order: What should remaining World Do?

Cold War 2.0 will not produce a neat bipolar world nor purely multipolar. Unlike the 20th century, today’s international system is multipolar, economically interconnected and technologically diffused. Middle powers such as India, regional blocs and strategic swing states will play increasingly important roles in shaping outcomes through strategic balancing avoiding bloc politics. The aim remains to avoid collateral damage in a competition, which neither U.S. nor China can decisively win in the foreseeable future.

The prudent course lies in strategic autonomy backed by economic resilience, technological self-reliance, diversified partnerships and flexible diplomacy. Nations will increasingly pursue sector-specific alignments while resisting pressure to become instruments of either camp’s maximalist strategic narratives.

In this evolving landscape, Trump’s coercive unilateralism and “America First” orientation may paradoxically accelerate the very multipolarity Washington seeks to resist. Many nations, including close American partners, increasingly seek strategic hedging against unpredictability in US policy, even while remaining cautious of China’s expanding influence and coercive economic practices

Cold War 2.0 is unlikely to end through a dramatic collapse or military victory. It will instead remain a long geopolitical test of endurance, adaptability, economic resilience and strategic patience in an era of competitive coexistence, issue based cooperation and crisis management below the threshold of military confrontation.

Trump’s leadership may make the contest louder, sharper and more transactional, while Xi’s China may continue pursuing calibrated expansion with long-term strategic discipline. Yet the underlying structural reality remains unchanged: the US–China rivalry is here to stay, and the rest of the world must learn to navigate carefully between pressure and prudence, rhetoric and reality, competition and coexistence.

For decades, France and all of Europe have been key partners, providing diverse development support for Africa. But the time has indeed changed. With the heightening of geopolitical threats and tensions, France struggles to sustain its presence in Africa, targeting to increase its business profile by leveraging the Anglophone community of potential investors in the forthcoming investment conference in Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, located in East Africa. The France-backed and organized conference marks a distinctive commitment to expanding financing across the continent.

According to authentic reports, Kenya and France will co-host the ‘Africa Forward Summit’ in Nairobi on May 11–12, under the theme ‘Africa-France Partnerships for Innovation and Growth,’ marking the first time this summit is held in an English-speaking African country. President Emmanuel Macron and President William Ruto will lead the summit, focusing on economic partnerships, digital innovation, green industrialization, and global financial reform.

Details of the summit are listed as follows:

Significance: The move signals a shift in France’s Africa strategy beyond Francophone regions. It highlights Kenya’s role as a major diplomatic and regional hub.

Key Topics: Discussions will cover sustainable finance, energy transition, health, agriculture, and AI, aiming for an action-oriented approach to economic growth.

Attendees: Over 30 heads of state and 2,000 CEOs/business leaders from France and Africa are expected to attend.

Structure: The event includes high-level state meetings, a business forum to explore investment, and a sports segment.

Objective: To strengthen the Africa-France partnership and reform global financial architecture to ensure better access to capital and signify a new, balanced economic relationship between the two regions.

French corporate executives are also stepping up their engagement in Africa’s innovation economy, eyeing the wide investment landscape through a new ‘Global Gateway Strategy’ with the EU allocating €300 billion ($340 billion), signaling a deepening of financial ties with Africa. Ready-made funds are a contributing capital to support early- and growth-stage startups, which reflects a broader shift in how European investors view long-term business with Africa today. 

While France indicates a long-term potential driven by demographics, digital adoption, and expanding urban markets, African entrepreneurs are increasingly positioning themselves to take advantage, teaming up for development priorities, innovation expertise, financial support, and France’s investment strengths. What is important here is that the May conference would offer insights into the growing appetite for Link-Up Africa and signal the involvement of French financial institutions and the expected roles in supporting economic diversification across Africa’s emerging markets.

Malawian President Lazarus Chakwera has acknowledged the drastic changes, proposing a shift from an aid-driven relationship, at least, to win-win investments that are more purposeful, describing it as a new level kind of partnership. “We are saying economic integration on the continent should be prioritized as much as we have bilateral agreements with external nations outside the continent,” Chakwera said. “We need also to find mutual ways of facilitating the implementation of development projects, progressive ways of trading, and attractive policy approaches with the involvement of European investors in economic sectors in Africa.” 

President William Ruto and French President Emmanuel Macron both acknowledged the strategic pathway with a focus on unlocking Africa’s development potential, driving sustainable industrialization, and targeting economic growth across Africa. Harnessing the untapped resources and utilizing the huge human resources is France’s priority in consolidating the existing bilateral engagement and collaboration.

In a statement, President Ruto underlined the summit reflects a shared commitment to strengthening bilateral ties and deepening multilateral cooperation to advance global goals. Ruto further described the summit as part of the renewal of relations between France and Africa, emphasizing genuine partnerships and shared progress. The agenda will focus on key areas including reform of the international financial architecture, energy transition, green industrialization, the blue economy and connectivity, artificial intelligence, sustainable agriculture, and health. It will spotlight the role of young entrepreneurs, civil society, and international organizations in shaping solutions to pressing global and regional challenges.

In addition, the European Union countries are increasingly strong economic partners for many African countries. It therefore behooves African leaders and business people to necessarily explore available possibilities and windows that have been opened. The EU has unveiled a €300 billion ($340 billion) alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative—an investment program the bloc claims will create links, not dependencies.

In an official document, it said the European Commission is broadly examining the following:

– Support AfCFTA implementation and the green transition;

– Improve the trade and investment climate between the EU and Africa;

– Reinforce high-level public-private dialogue;

– Enhance long-term dialogue structures between EU and Africa business associations;

– Unlock new business and investment opportunities, including in the areas of manufacturing and agro-processing as well as regional and continental value chain development.

It is further included in the joint communication of the European Commission (EC) entitled “Toward a Comprehensive Strategy with Africa,” which sets forth what the EU plans with Africa. The Joint EU-Africa Strategy takes into cognizance the most common interests, such as climate change, global security, and the achievement of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Just as China, India, and the United States do, so also France and other European countries are exploring emerging opportunities offered by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which provides unique and valuable access to an integrated African market of 1.4 billion people. In practical reality, it aims at creating a continental market for goods and services, with free movement of business people and investments in Africa.

Analysts, however, say deepening economic partnership and investment ties between Europe and Africa could rapidly change the landscape in Africa. But challenges significantly remain, particularly the official state bureaucracy combined with infrastructure and security in the continent. France has currently broadened its scope, moving more toward Anglophone African countries and courting them with trade and investment. According to source EU data 2024, aggregate trade was €355 billion between Europe and Africa.

According to Isabelle Herbert-Collet, a customer insights and market expert, a new approach must factor in what she referred to as “local exchange” in the new relationship. “It’s not only about investment; it is about imagining the right products and services and simply facilitating the intercultural exchange,” she said.

Looking ahead, France intends to capitalize on Africa’s most transformative economic sectors and make strategic moves by collaborating, as mutual partnership remains dynamic and adaptable. Despite growing geopolitical tensions, France’s approach and its long-standing ties still offer an alternative partnership model that many African leaders find very appealing. 

The challenge for the future will be to ensure these ties evolve in ways that serve Africa’s development needs while navigating the increasing complexity of global politics. As Africa is indiscriminately open for business, on May 11-12, African and French heads of state and government meet together to chart a new path for innovation, growth, and mutual cooperation. Kenya will hold this investment summit for France to position Africa as a key partner in innovation and economic development while strengthening bilateral ties with France and advancing further Africa’s collective agenda on the international stage.

The ceasefire between the US and Iran has been in place for nearly four weeks. The Strait of Hormuz has not been at peace for a single day.

This week pushed that contradiction to its most dangerous point yet. The United States launched Project Freedom, a naval escort operation designed to guide roughly 2,000 ships stranded on either side of the Strait through to open water. Iran said any ship attempting passage without IRGC permission would be fired on. Within hours, both sides were claiming to have hit the other, the UAE was scrambling missile alerts for the first time since the ceasefire began, an oil refinery in Fujairah was on fire, and commercial aircraft bound for Dubai were turning around mid-air.

As of Tuesday evening, Trump announced Project Freedom would be paused “for a short period of time” to see if an agreement with Iran could be reached. Secretary of State Rubio told reporters the US was now in a “defensive” posture. Twenty-four hours earlier, both sides had been shooting and denying it simultaneously.

Here is what we know, what is contested, and what it means.

What Is Project Freedom and Why Did the US Launch It?

Trump announced the operation on Sunday, framing it in humanitarian terms, an effort to free the seafarers and cargo companies that had done nothing wrong and were caught between two governments fighting a war neither had formally ended. About 2,000 ships have been stranded on either side of the Strait since late February, unable to move without IRGC permission, which Iran began requiring and charging for after the ceasefire took effect.

The US had already begun a naval blockade of Iranian ports on April 13. Project Freedom was the next escalation — a direct challenge to Iran’s assertion that the Strait was now under its operational control. Trump described it as a “humanitarian gesture.” Iran described it as a violation of the ceasefire and an act of military aggression in a sensitive oil region that affects the economies of countries around the world.

Two American-flagged merchant ships successfully transited the Strait on Monday with US Navy escort. A Danish shipping company confirmed one of its vessels crossed with US military protection. But the transit did not go smoothly.

Did Iran Attack a US Warship? What the Claims Say

By Monday afternoon, the competing narratives had become almost impossible to untangle, which is itself part of the story.

Iran’s Fars News Agency reported a US warship had been hit by two Iranian drones after refusing to turn back from the Strait. CENTCOM denied any warship had been hit. US Admiral Brad Cooper said CENTCOM forces had sunk six IRGC vessels that tried to interfere with Project Freedom. Trump later said seven. Iran’s state broadcaster then reported that Tehran had launched an investigation and its preliminary conclusion was that the vessels the US claimed to have sunk were not IRGC boats at all, they were two small civilian craft carrying passengers from Oman to the Iranian coast, and five civilian passengers had been killed. The US has not commented on that claim and it has not been independently verified.

Why Iran Attacked the UAE in 2026: The Fujairah Strike Explained

The UAE’s Ministry of Defense said its air defenses engaged 15 ballistic missiles, three cruise missiles, and four drones launched from Iran on Monday, the first Iranian attacks on the UAE since the ceasefire took effect on April 8. One drone struck an oil refinery in Fujairah, wounding three Indian nationals and setting the facility ablaze. Four missile alerts were issued across the country, sending residents to shelter. Commercial aircraft bound for Dubai and Abu Dhabi turned around in mid-flight.

Iran’s position was that the Fujairah attack was not a premeditated strike on the UAE but a consequence of what it called US military adventurism in the Strait. An Iranian military official said the Islamic Republic had no preplanned programme to attack UAE facilities, and that what happened resulted from the US attempt to create an illegal passage through restricted waters. The UAE’s Foreign Ministry rejected that framing entirely, condemning what it called renewed terrorist and unprovoked Iranian attacks on civilian sites, and warning it reserves the full right to respond.

Why the Attack Claims Cannot Be Independently Verified

One detail worth noting is the shifting count of Iranian vessels supposedly sunk. Admiral Cooper said six. Trump said seven. No independent observer has confirmed either figure, and Iran has denied any IRGC boats were hit at all. This pattern: each side claiming damage inflicted while denying damage received, with no neutral verification , has run throughout the conflict and is not unique to this week’s exchange. What is different now is that the Strait is supposed to be under a ceasefire, and the exchanges are happening in a waterway where 2,000 civilian ships are anchored and waiting to see who wins the argument.

How the Hormuz Escalation Is Threatening Iran Ceasefire Talks in 2026

Trump’s decision to pause Project Freedom on Tuesday is significant precisely because of how quickly it followed the launch. The operation began Sunday. By Tuesday, with the UAE under attack, Iranian drones targeting ships in the Strait, and competing claims circulating with no resolution, the White House stepped back. Rubio reframed the entire mission as defensive rather than offensive, and a new UN Security Council resolution on freedom of navigation was announced, co-authored by Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar. A previous similar resolution was vetoed by China and Russia, and the outlook for this one is no clearer.

The pause does not resolve the underlying problem. The Strait remains contested. Iran still insists ships must seek IRGC permission and pay for transit. The US still insists the Strait is international water under international law. Two thousand ships are still stranded. And the ceasefire that is supposed to govern all of this is being tested in ways its text was never designed to handle.

The attacks this week did not happen in isolation from the negotiations still technically underway. Pakistan has been trying to bring the US and Iran back to a second round of talks after the Islamabad discussions collapsed on the nuclear question in April. Every exchange of fire, every competing claim, every missile alert in Abu Dhabi makes that second round harder to convene and harder to trust once convened.

As Shahram Akbarzadeh, a professor in Middle East and Central Asian politics at Deakin University, told Al Jazeera: “We see escalation after escalation against the backdrop of shuttle diplomacy. Such attacks, even if they are aimed to be contained, risk exploding into another major combat.” Neither the Americans nor the Iranians want a return to full-scale war, Akbarzadeh said, but neither is prepared to show weakness. “This dynamic has locked them in a perpetual conflict and in desperate need of a circuit breaker.”

The circuit breaker Pakistan offered in April produced a ceasefire. That ceasefire is now generating its own escalation cycle, in twenty-one miles of water, over a question neither side has answered: who controls the Strait of Hormuz, and on what terms does the world’s most important waterway reopen.

Two thousand ships are waiting for the answer.

Chinese military and intelligence analyses for 2025 and 2026 indicate that China views the expansion of the Egyptian Armed Forces in establishing numerous naval and air bases, such as the Bernice and Gargoub bases, with strategic interest. Beijing considers this trend, spearheaded by the Egyptian political leadership under President El-Sisi and the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, a vital component of a comprehensive strategic partnership between Egypt and China, aimed at securing shared interests in strategically vital regions. Chinese intelligence and military agencies view the Egyptian expansion in establishing military bases, such as the Mohamed Naguib base, the July 3 base, and bases east and west of the Suez Canal, as part of a comprehensive Chinese strategy to develop the Egyptian Armed Forces and enhance their deterrent capabilities against Beijing’s adversaries in the region. This perspective aligns with Beijing’s view of Egypt as a key strategic partner in Africa and the Middle East. The Chinese military establishment’s vision for this Egyptian military development of air and naval bases up to 2026 can be detailed, as follows: Supporting the Egyptian political leadership’s vision, from a Chinese perspective, of Egyptian military development under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, is seen as a serious attempt to modernize the army and transform it into a smart deterrent force capable of protecting national security and the country’s economic interests. This aligns with China’s +1 strategy (localization), as China seeks to leverage the development of Egyptian bases to become centers for localizing Chinese military technology in Egypt, particularly in the areas of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as the Wing Loong and advanced air defense systems, such as the HQ-9B.

In this context, China views Egypt’s expansion in establishing military bases, such as the Mohamed Naguib Base, the July 3 Base, and the bases east and west of the Suez Canal, with strategic interest as a crucial element in strengthening the comprehensive strategic partnership between Cairo and Beijing. China considers these Egyptian military bases, especially those located on the Mediterranean Sea and near the Suez Canal. Bases like the July 3rd Air Base serve as vital support points for protecting China’s commercial interests and the routes of its Belt and Road Initiative, which passes through the Egyptian Suez Canal. Egypt represents a cornerstone in China’s 21st-century strategy. Therefore, China aims to bolster Egypt’s deterrent capabilities (a defense partnership). Chinese military officials believe that modernizing the Egyptian armed forces through these naval and air bases and localizing Chinese defense industries in Cairo, in accordance with President Sisi’s vision, enhances the independence of Egyptian military decision-making, paves the way for multipolarity, supports developing countries in the Global South, and contributes to regional stability. Relations between Egypt and China have moved beyond mere arms deals to the localization of Chinese technology within Egypt, enabling Egypt to confront regional challenges more effectively and creating a kind of regional balance of power. Here, Beijing, by supporting Egyptian military expansion through these bases, aims to create a strategic balance in the region amidst a growing Egyptian-Chinese rapprochement seen as an alternative to or complement to traditional partnerships with the West. This can be inferred from the military exercises. The air capabilities and joint military exercises between Egypt and China are reflected here. Joint air exercises, such as Eagles of Civilization 2025, and cooperation at Wadi Abu Rish Air Base are Egyptian-Chinese joint training exercises aimed at exchanging expertise in air combat and protecting maritime routes. This coincides with Egypt’s interest in military and arms deals with China, such as the J-10C. Other Egyptian military negotiations with China regarding the purchase of advanced submarines, known as the Yuan class, are also underway. This reduces Egypt’s military dependence on Washington and the West and strengthens the Chinese presence in the Egyptian military arsenal. This reflects a convergence of military visions between the two countries, with China supporting Egypt’s efforts to modernize its military infrastructure. The new bases are considered a cornerstone for securing shared interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

Beijing also aims to strengthen the comprehensive strategic partnership. Here, the Chinese vision extends beyond mere arms deals; it views this as a core partnership aimed at establishing a broad military alliance with Egypt to develop the Chinese military Silk Road. This includes joint operational planning and training exercises, as demonstrated in the Civilization Eagles 2025 maneuvers. China seeks to effect a comprehensive shift in the regional balance of power. Chinese intelligence believes that establishing bases and developing naval and air forces will grant Egypt strategic independence and reduce its dependence on the West. This, in turn, opens the door for China to enhance its influence in the region through defense cooperation, thereby securing shared Chinese and Egyptian military interests. Beijing considers securing Egyptian bases for maritime routes (the Suez Canal) and the Red Sea to be in line with Chinese economic and security interests within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. In general, the Chinese military establishment views Cairo as working to build a strong regional pivot point, and Beijing sees this expansion as an opportunity to deepen defense and technological ties with Cairo, paving the way for the formal declaration of a Chinese-Egyptian military Silk Road partnership.

China views the new Egyptian military bases as a means of protecting its strategic interests within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. These bases, particularly those located on the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Suez Canal, occupy vital maritime chokepoints, and China considers them a guarantee for the security of its international trade routes. The relationship between Egypt and China has evolved from mere arms purchases to the localization of defense industries, such as the production of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and electronic warfare systems, increasing Egypt’s military reliance on Chinese technology. These Egyptian military bases, which enhance Egypt’s rapid deployment capabilities, align with China’s interests in establishing a multipolar regional order that reduces American influence in the Middle East. Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security reports indicate a qualitative shift in Egyptian military doctrine. Chinese military institutions affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army analyze that Egyptian military bases, such as the July 3rd base, provide strategic depth and protection for economic assets (gas fields and the Dabaa nuclear power plant), thus contributing to the economic stability in which China participates. For this reason, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is seeking to train and qualify the Egyptian military elite through the Military Academy for Advanced Studies as an alternative to Western and American training.

The Chinese intelligence and military establishments view the Egyptian army’s expansionist vision in establishing naval and air bases within Egypt as part of the development strategy adopted by the Egyptian Armed Forces and the political leadership of President El-Sisi. This strategy aims to complete the modernization of the Egyptian Armed Forces and advance the Chinese military Silk Road with Egypt’s assistance. China supports the Egyptian Armed Forces’ efforts to modernize Egyptian military infrastructure, considering the new Egyptian military bases a cornerstone for securing China’s shared interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea. China views these new Egyptian military bases, particularly on the Red Sea, as essential for securing Chinese trade routes (the military/maritime Silk Road) and mitigating risks. In addition to the significant role Egypt plays for China as a regional power center and a key player in the balance of power, relevant military circles in Beijing analyze the modernization of the Egyptian army as a center of gravity for stability in the Middle East and Africa. A strong and stable army serves China’s interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, China translates its vision into tangible support, including modernizing Egypt’s military infrastructure to align with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative in its maritime, air, and naval components and equipping it with advanced weapons systems.

Based on the preceding understanding and analysis, we conclude that the new Egyptian military bases (naval and air) are considered, according to the Chinese military and strategic vision, strategic strengths. Their benefits extend beyond Egypt, securing China’s commercial and military interests in the Mediterranean and Red Seas. They also provide a Chinese technological alternative in a region previously dominated by Western and American platforms, paving the way for China’s gradual expansion of its military Silk Road initiative.

WASHINGTON  — The Supreme Court often resembles a feuding family where the same heated arguments go on for years.

The justices disagree over race, religion, abortion, guns and the environment, and more recently, presidential power and LGBTQ+ rights. And while they try to maintain a cordial working relationship, they don’t claim to be good friends.

“We are stuck with one another whether we like it or not,” Justice Amy Coney Barrett wrote last year in her book, “Listening to the Law.”

And like it or not, the testy exchanges and simmering anger have been increasing, driven by the sharp ideological divide.

The three liberals had known since October the conservative majority was preparing to elevate partisan power over racial fairness.

By retreating from part of the Voting Rights Act, the court’s opinion last week by Justice Samuel A. Alito will allow Republicans across the South to dismantle voting districts that favor Black Democrats.

Justice Elena Kagan, who first came to the court as a law clerk for Justice Thurgood Marshall, denounced the “demolition” of a historic civil rights law.

In dissent, she quoted Marshall’s warning that if all the voting districts in the South have white majorities, Black citizens will be left with a “right to cast meaningless ballots.”

But Alito and Chief Justice John G. Roberts joined the court 20 years ago believing the government may not make decisions based on race.

Their first major ruling was a 5-4 decision that struck down voluntary school integration policies in Seattle and Louisville. It was illegal to encourage some students to transfer based on their race, Roberts said.

When faced with a redistricting case from Texas, Roberts described it as the “sordid business … [of] divvying us up by race.”

With President Trump’s three appointees on the court, the conservatives had a solid majority to change the law on race. Three years ago, they struck down college affirmative action policies.

Watching closely were states such as Alabama and Louisiana.

They had been sued by voting rights advocates, and both had been required to draw a second congressional district with a Black majority.

Their state attorneys appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing these race-based districts were unconstitutional.

In a decision that surprised both sides, Alabama lost by a 5-4 vote in 2023.

Roberts said the Voting Rights Act as interpreted by past decisions suggests Alabama must draw a second congressional district that may well elect a Black candidate. The three liberals agreed entirely and Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh cast a tentative fifth vote.

Alito and Justice Clarence Thomas filed strong dissents, joined by Barrett and Justice Neil M. Gorsuch.

Last year, the justices agreed to decide a nearly identical appeal from Louisiana, and this time Roberts joined the conservative majority and assigned the opinion to Alito.

He argued the Voting Rights Act gave “minority voters” an equal right to vote but not a right to “elect a preferred candidate.”

The decision dealt a double blow to Black Democrats because an earlier 5-4 opinion by Roberts freed state lawmakers to draw voting districts for partisan advantage.

That ruling, combined with Wednesday’s decision, will bolster Republicans trying to maintain their narrow hold on Congress.

As if to highlight that point, the court’s six Republican appointees were guests of President Trump at Tuesday’s White House dinner for King Charles.

Just a few days before, Trump had slammed the court in another social media post.

“The Radical Left Democrats don’t need to ‘Pack the Court’. It’s already Packed,” he wrote. “Certain ‘Republican’ Justices have just gone weak, stupid, and bad.” They had struck down his sweeping tariffs, he said, “they probably will … rule against our Country on Birthright Citizenship.”

That didn’t stop him from inviting them to the White House, nor did the partisan appearances dissuade them from attending.

Alito is enjoying his moment of acclaim as the voice of the conservative legal movement.

In March, the Federalist Society held a day-long conference in Philadelphia to celebrate the “Jurisprudence of Justice Alito.”

He is the subject of two new books. One, by journalist Mollie Hemingway, calls him “the justice who reshaped the Supreme Court and restored the Constitution.”

The other, by author Peter S. Canellos, is “Revenge for the Sixties: Sam Alito and the Triumph of the Conservative Legal Movement.”

Alito attended Princeton during the Vietnam War and was put off “by very privileged people behaving irresponsibly,” as he later described his classmates.

He then went to the Yale Law School and, like Thomas, left with a lasting disdain for the left-leaning faculty and students.

Alito has a book of his own scheduled to be released in October. It is called “So Ordered: An Originalist’s View of the Constitution, the Court and Our Country.”

Last month, rumors and speculation had it that Alito and perhaps Thomas planned to retire this year so Trump and the Senate Republicans could quickly fill their seats.

At age 76, Alito is at the peak of his influence and has no interest in stepping down, and he and Thomas confirmed to news organizations they had no plans to retire this year.

For 20 years, Alito has cast reliably conservative votes at the Supreme Court and regularly argued for moving the law farther to the right.

Most famously, he wrote the court’s 5-4 opinion in the Dobbs case that overturned Roe vs. Wade and the constitutional right to abortion.

Roberts issued a partial dissent, arguing the court should uphold Mississippi’s 16-week limit on abortions and stop there.

Alito has called religion a “disfavored right,” and there too a change is underway.

In the decades before his arrival, the court had handed down steady rulings barring taxpayer funds for religious schools or religious ceremonies or symbols in public schools or city parks.

Then, the court viewed these official “endorsements” of religion as violations of the 1st Amendment’s ban on an “establishment” of religion or the principle of church-state separation.

Those decisions have faded into the background, however.

Instead, Alito, Roberts and the four other conservatives see today’s threat as one of discrimination against religion, not official favoritism for religion.

They ruled church schools and their students may not be denied state aid because of religion. Similarly, Catholic charities and other religious groups may not be excluded from publicly funded programs because they refuse to accept same-sex parents, the justices said.

They upheld a football coach’s right to pray on the field. And they ruled for a wedding cake maker in Colorado and other business owners who refused to serve same-sex couples in violation of a state civil rights law.

Religious liberty has now replaced separation of church and state as the winning formula at the Supreme Court.

The next test on that front may come from Louisiana, which calls for the posting of the Ten Commandments in public school classes.

In the past, the court had ruled such religious displays violated the 1st Amendment, but it is not clear that the current majority will agree.

The court’s oral arguments for this term ended last week. Many of them were dominated by questions from liberal Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson.

A statistical tally by Adam Feldman for Scotusblog found that Jackson, the newest justice, had spoken twice as many words as the most talkative of the conservative justices.

Her arrival shifted the “center of verbal energy” to the liberal side, Feldman wrote. While Jackson “sits in a class of her own,” Sotomayor also presses the argument on the liberal side.

The court now has about eight weeks to hand down the decisions in 35 remaining cases. Usually, May and June can be a trying time because of intense disagreements over the opinions in close cases.

But for the liberal justices, it also may be a time mostly for writing dissents.

In recent years, the evolution of women in Saudi Arabia has become one of the most scrutinized aspects of the kingdom’s reforms of recent times. These reforms have frequently served as proof of a broader transformation under Vision 2030, an ambitious pathway designed to modernize Saudi Arabia and decrease its reliance on oil revenues. However, behind these apparent advancements arises an intricate question: are these reforms a genuine move towards social emancipation or primarily a tactical element of state-led goals of economic diversification, modernization, and enhancing global reputation?

In 2016, Saudi Arabia introduced Vision 2030, launched and guided by King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud and Muhammad bin Salman as a comprehensive and holistic strategy aimed to reform the country’s future. This initiative leverages the Kingdom’s strengths, including its pivotal role in the Arab and Islamic world, robust investment capabilities, and advantageous strategic position. The goal is to establish Saudi Arabia as a global leader while improving quality of life and broadening growth opportunities for citizens. At its essence, Vision 2030 seeks to reposition Saudi Arabia in the global economy by diversifying the non-oil sectors, drawing in foreign investment, and cultivating a dynamic workforce.

The women’s research compendium has gained significant attention from the government in alignment with the kingdom’s Vision 2030 and its associated programs. Consequently, relevant authorities, including the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development, have allocated one of the visions’ goals to improve the public and private lives of Saudi women. From this perspective, the progress of Saudi women towards empowerment has condensed. This perspective of ministry is facilitated by numerous policies, legislations, and regulations that bolster the female’s status in society. In this context, women have become a pivotal component of reform. Enhancing female participation in the labor force is not just a social aspiration but also an economic imperative. By incorporating women into sectors like tourism, mass markets, and technology, the government intends to harness previously underutilized human capacity and accelerate economic growth. Hence, women’s empowerment is intricately aligned with the national development goals. It is important to acknowledge the considerable progress the country has made so far, such as the removal of the driving ban; increased employment; and enhanced public representation signify substantial changes in the everyday life of numerous women in Saudi Arabia.

Comparatively, these reforms demonstrate a prominent departure from more prudent norms of Saudi society and have formed new avenues for both personal and professional initiatives. Recognizing these developments is important for sustaining a fair and substantiated analysis. However, a deeper evaluation reveals that this empowerment is closely associated with the economic strategy and development. The consolidation of women in the workforce is consistently presented not just as a matter of rights but as a roadmap to enhance productivity and to boost the country’s GDP. This realistic perspective implies that empowerment is being pursued not just as a fundamental social objective but as a calculated countermove to fulfill economic demands. In this context, women are viewed not just as citizens, but also as economic assets that are essential to the success of Vision 2030.

In addition to the economic considerations, these reforms significantly contribute to the international image of Saudi Arabia. As the kingdom aims to enhance foreign investment and establish itself as a contemporary progressive nation, the advancement of women’s rights acts as a strong emblem of transformation. These developments are visible as a form of strategic liberalization, a deliberate opening intended to synchronize domestic policies with the international standards. Within this framework, women’s empowerment is integrated into a broader soft power strategy, boosting nations’ appealing image on the world stage. However, this transformation is still being meticulously overseen. Although new liberties have been introduced, they operate within a well-defined structure and are regulated by the state. The pace and scope of these structural initiatives are not propelled by grassroots institutions but are instead orchestrated by the governing bodies. This top-down approach limits the acceleration of the independent voices and limits the growth of a more autonomous civil society. Consequently, empowerment is allocated rather than asserted, therefore prompting the queries regarding its substantive nature and sustainability.

Therefore, this dynamic creates a striking paradox: “advancement without complete autonomy.” Currently, Saudi women experience enhanced mobility and visible participation in public life, but their capacity to independently shape the trajectory of reform is still constrained. The expansion of opportunities has not been accompanied by a similar increase in agency. This conflict highlights an important question: can empowerment truly exist in the absence of independent expression and participation in decision-making processes? However, the future prediction denotes that the sustainability of these reforms depends on their ability to progress beyond their strategic foundations. Women’s empowerment continues to be closely linked to economic and image-building objectives of the state; it risks being susceptible to shifts in governmental priorities and policies. On the other hand, lasting transformation necessitates more profound structural alterations that are way beyond mere participation to encompass genuine agency and proper representation.

In this context, the transformations unfolding under Vision 2030 are the embodiment of both advancement and limitation. They indicate a notable departure from the previous practices and traditional norms while also underscoring the constraints of government-driven modernization. Ultimately, the issue is not if change will lead to enduring empowerment, for true empowerment is not just about participation in the workforce or recognition in public spheres; it is about having the capacity to influence one’s own future. This aspect remains the most vital and a pending dimension of Saudi Arabia’s evolution.

In conclusion, the trajectory of advancing gender diversity as articulated in Vision 2030 demonstrates both meaningful advancements and fundamental structural limitations. Although reforms have undeniably broadened strategic growth indicators and transformed the social norms, they’re still closely intertwined with economic needs and strategic initiatives for international status. This top-down model of reform prompts essential inquiries regarding the depth, independence, and long-term durability of women’s empowerment. For Saudi Arabia, the operating complexities will be whether these transformations can progress beyond mere instrumental milestones to cultivate true agency and representation. Only then can women’s empowerment shift from being a facet of national strategy to a lasting anchoring principle of societal advancement.

China currently boasts one of the lowest rates of homicide, violent crime, and gun and explosive incidents globally. The Chinese-style sense of security is a comprehensive system integrating advanced technology, community engagement, and continuous improvement in living standards. This has positioned China as one of the safest countries in the world, according to the 2025 Global Security Report, with 98.2% of Chinese citizens feeling safe by 2025, further solidifying its status as a globally stable destination. The pillars of this Chinese-style sense of security are built upon advanced digital technologies, relying on smart networks and modern surveillance systems such as facial recognition and artificial intelligence to enhance the security network within China.

The phrase “Chinese-style security” refers to China’s model for achieving social stability and reducing crime rates. This model is based primarily on three pillars: proactive prevention systems, where, rather than simply addressing crime after it occurs, China focuses on prevention and control through extensive security networks and a constant police presence in key areas; the continuation of the community mobilization system (the Fengqiao model), a historical concept (currently revived) that involves citizens and local committees in resolving community disputes before they escalate into crimes or legal cases, thus promoting the idea of ​​self-regulation and public cooperation with Chinese authorities; and the use of digitalization and artificial intelligence technologies, where China has heavily invested in smart city technologies and the Skynet system. Skynet utilizes millions of cameras equipped with facial recognition and big data analytics to predict suspicious activities and track wanted individuals with high precision. This combination aims to create a secure environment that supports economic growth within China, despite the occasional international debates it sparks regarding the balance between public security and individual privacy.

Data and reports confirm exceptional social stability in China, with citizens’ sense of security exceeding 98% for six consecutive years. This security is attributed to effective governance, advanced digital technologies, and a high standard of living, making China a safe destination for investment and a source of stability. Key features of Chinese governance and the sense of security include increased levels of trust and optimism, with the Chinese people ranking among the world’s highest in trust in the government and optimism about the future, according to trust index reports. A robust safety net exists, built on Chinese-style security through crime prevention systems, community mobilization, and enhanced digitalization. These systemic features, along with numerous other advantages, reflect the stability within China and the state’s ability to fulfill its commitments and provide a safe and stable social environment, earning international praise, particularly in light of global geopolitical conflicts. With the continuation of Chinese-style modernization, ongoing modernization has contributed to raising living standards, thus strengthening the sense of security within China.

Accordingly, the Chinese government and the authorities of the ruling Communist Party of China support several pillars and points that support this approach to enhance the sense of security within the country. Based on current developments, focusing on security as the foundation for development in China, the stability of the situation in China is seen as a key element in boosting investor confidence and building a safe and stable living environment for citizens, which contributes to economic growth. With the intensification of the Chinese-style modernization model, modernization in China is not limited to economic growth but also focuses on improving the quality of life, providing employment opportunities, and upgrading social services, which significantly raises living standards. With the stable sense of security, China, through well-considered social policies, has succeeded in maintaining a high level of social security, which enhances public trust in the government and contributes to long-term stability. This has resulted in continued international praise (amidst crises). At a time when several regions around the world are experiencing geopolitical conflicts, China’s stability stands out as a model attracting the attention and scrutiny of international observers, particularly due to the Chinese state’s ability to effectively manage its internal affairs compared to many systems worldwide, including American and Western ones. This strengthens China’s capacity to lead the developing Global South and strongly promote its model of Chinese governance.

Based on the preceding understanding and analysis, we can see how the development for security strategy can form a fundamental pillar within the Chinese governance system. Improving living standards contributes to consolidating social stability and public security within China. This analysis highlights a delicate equation in the contemporary Chinese landscape, where continuous development (Chinese-style modernization) is linked to social stability, creating a secure environment in a turbulent world.

In August 2026, Kazakhstan will hold an unusual election. The newly established unicameral parliament—the “Kurultai”—will, for the first time, be formed entirely through party lists. Independent candidates and regional representatives will no longer enter the core of state power. As a representative institution of so-called “steppe democracy,” the Kurultai has undergone multiple transformations throughout history, both in its functions and in the composition of its participants. According to recent constitutional arrangements, this mechanism has been elevated to an unprecedented level. This raises a key question: what direction does this transformation reveal in the current round of political modernization?

Historically, the Kurultai functioned as an important mechanism of consultation in steppe society, not as a system of mass participation, but as a platform composed of multiple layers of elite actors. Its participants included khans and sultans who held political authority, biys who were responsible for adjudication and governance, military leaders who organized mobilization in times of war, as well as tribal elders and influential akyns and zhyrau who shaped public discourse. In addressing critical issues such as succession, warfare, and internal conflict, the Kurultai did not rely on formalized procedures or fixed institutional rules. Instead, decisions were reached through authority, negotiation, and consensus. Although ordinary people did not possess direct institutional channels of participation, their interests and attitudes indirectly constrained decision-making through tribal structures, public opinion, and their willingness to comply with and implement decisions.

During the Soviet period and the early years of Kazakhstan’s independence, the Kurultai gradually lost its function as an operative political institution and became a symbol of historical memory and cultural identity. It was not until 2022, amid a serious crisis of political trust, that this traditional symbol was revived and institutionalized as the “National Kurultai,” reintroduced as a new format of public dialogue within the framework of state governance. Its declared purpose is to strengthen interaction between the government and society. In terms of composition, the National Kurultai formally continues the tradition of “broad participation,” including regional representatives, members of parliament, professionals from various sectors, and leaders of social organizations with a degree of public influence. However, this diversity is largely structural rather than functional. It reflects broad inclusion, but does not necessarily translate into a substantive mechanism for reconciling competing interests. The institution lacks the capacity to independently coordinate diverse social demands.

Moreover, the agenda-setting process and operational logic of the National Kurultai remain distinctly top-down. Key issues are primarily defined by the state, while participants tend to act as interpreters and endorsers of pre-established policy directions. In this sense, “consultation” often takes the form of explaining and legitimizing the state agenda. Through the participation and symbolic endorsement of elite actors, the state is able to construct an image of “broad public dialogue,” thereby reinforcing the legitimacy of its reform agenda. In this respect, the National Kurultai should not be seen as a simple continuation of a traditional consultative institution, but rather as an institutionalized platform for political communication and discursive integration. Its core function lies not in generating genuinely competitive policy alternatives, but in organizing a process of “consensus production” aimed at shaping values, mobilizing society, and reproducing the legitimacy of ongoing reforms.

In 2026, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev announced a major reform of Kazakhstan’s parliamentary system, proposing the transition to a unicameral “Kurultai Parliament.” Its members will be elected entirely through proportional representation based on party lists. The reform abolishes both the presidential quota and the special quota previously allocated to the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan. At the same time, quota guarantees for women, youth, and persons with disabilities will be retained, but incorporated into party list mechanisms rather than being directly allocated by the state.

From the perspective of institutional design, this reform strengthens the role of political parties as key intermediaries within the political system, positioning them as the primary channel through which social demands are transmitted to the state. In the context of electoral competition, parties are expected to secure support by more effectively representing public interests, while also integrating fragmented social demands. Compared with the previous mixed model of representation, which included multiple categories of actors, a party-centered system enhances the coherence of political positions: social demands are systematically aggregated and restructured before entering the political arena, thereby improving, to some extent, the efficiency of policy articulation and decision-making.

Building on this, if meaningful and substantive competition among political parties can be established, this model has the potential not only to integrate social interests but also to more fully reflect the diversity of social groups. Political parties could function not merely as instruments of organization and coordination, but also as a crucial link between diverse societal demands and the process of state decision-making—balancing efficiency in representation with breadth and inclusiveness.Under such conditions, the consultative model of the Kurultai may gradually evolve from an elite-driven mechanism of integration into an institutionalized system of interest articulation grounded in party competition, thereby enhancing, to a certain extent, its capacity for bottom-up representation.

We can analyze China’s current stance on the escalating Iranian conflict by understanding its true position. China does not desire a full-scale war that would destroy its oil interests, but it is not averse to the continuation of the neither-peace-nor-war situation that drains its adversaries, such as Washington. This positions China as a player that pushes for calm during critical times, while simultaneously providing Iran with the economic lifeline it needs. Here, China plays a dual and complex role in the Iranian conflict (the Iranian-American/Israeli conflict), balancing its strategic support for Tehran to safeguard its energy interests and undermine American influence with its pursuit of a ceasefire to avoid widespread economic chaos.

Based on current developments up to early May 2026 and statements by Iranian officials that war is a possibility, the regional and international landscape reveals a divide between actual military escalation and cautious diplomacy. The Chinese position and the likelihood of war can be analyzed based on several factors. China views the current conflict with Iran as a proxy war, prioritizing stability over stability. China considers Iran a strategic partner, and its stance is characterized by a delicate balance. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has repeatedly called for de-escalation and a complete ceasefire to prevent further escalation in the Middle East, while simultaneously condemning American escalation. China has stated that American and Israeli military operations against Iran violate its sovereignty and has expressed grave concern about the potential imposition of a blockade on Iranian ports and the Strait of Hormuz. While Beijing seeks to protect its investments and economic interests, China is deeply concerned about any disruption to oil and energy supplies, especially since a direct war would lead to imported inflation, negatively impacting its economy. Therefore, China’s current stance is characterized by a cautious, mediating role. China is attempting to play the part of a peace broker but is also wary of the potential damage a war could inflict on its relations with the United States, especially given the ongoing diplomatic exchanges between the two countries.

Regarding the likelihood of war (and the expected scenarios), despite the tense rhetoric, a full-scale, direct war between the United States and Iran remains a risky prospect for all parties. Current indicators suggest that a war is already underway (indirectly), particularly since the start of direct military operations (US/Israeli strikes) against Iran and its allies in February 2026. This indicates that a direct war remains a strong possibility. The option of blockade and proxies also remains a possibility. Chinese intelligence and military assessments suggest that Iran might prefer to carry out its threats through proxies in the region or by disrupting oil shipments in the Strait of Hormuz, rather than engaging in a direct war, to avoid a conventional military defeat. Despite Chinese diplomatic efforts to contain the situation, and despite the escalation, attempts are still underway, such as Pakistani mediation, to reach a ceasefire. This indicates a desire among the parties to keep the door open for political solutions.

As for my perspective on the proxy war between China and Iran against the United States and Israel, the current conflict is likely to continue as a proxy war of attrition, with limited and precise strikes, rather than a full-scale ground invasion. China will likely exert further pressure, continuing to push for diplomatic solutions because any large-scale war would threaten the stability of global energy supplies, on which it depends. It’s worth noting that the region is going through a critical moment and a dangerous phase of mutual deterrence. Iranian officials’ statements are as much messages of deterrence as they are an acknowledgment of the potential for escalation.

Regarding China’s role in the continuation of the war or its support for Iran (strategic and economic support), China considers the Iranian Strait of Hormuz and its purchases of Iranian oil as a vital economic lifeline. China is the largest buyer of Iranian oil (approximately 80-90% of exports), providing Tehran with crucial funding to sustain its activities. China also seeks to help Iran circumvent US sanctions, assisting Iran in bypassing these sanctions through an unofficial oil fleet, thus keeping the Iranian economy afloat. Furthermore, there is a strategic Chinese-Iranian partnership opposed to the West and US sanctions against Tehran. China views Iran as a partner in undermining the US-led global order through organizations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Moreover, China is exploiting the current situation to its advantage. Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security analyses suggest that the continuation of the Iranian war drains US resources and provides China with an opportunity to enhance its influence, absorbing the shock of the war and potentially emerging with strategic gains.

At the same time that China is playing a role in halting the Iranian war through mediation diplomacy to de-escalate tensions, with China acting as a hidden mediator to urge Tehran to cooperate and reach a ceasefire with the United States to protect its economic interests, despite China’s support for Iran, the war harms China by closing the Strait of Hormuz and threatening its energy security. This prompts Beijing to urge an end to the war and the reopening of waterways. Therefore, China is pursuing a policy of diplomatic pressure, consistently calling for restraint and believing that the best solution is an immediate ceasefire, according to statements by its permanent representative to the United Nations.

Accordingly, we conclude that a full-scale war is theoretically possible but practically unlikely as a final option due to the exorbitant cost to all parties. However, the continuation of retaliatory strikes and economic sanctions remains the most probable scenario at present.

The United Arab Emirates’ announcement of its withdrawal from OPEC and the OPEC+ alliance, effective May 1, 2026, represents a major strategic shift in the global energy market, with direct and significant implications for China, the world’s largest oil importer. The primary impact of this UAE withdrawal on China is the enhancement of Chinese energy security, as it will increase available supplies. The UAE will now be able to raise its production towards its target of 5 million barrels per day by 2027, without being bound by OPEC quotas. This expansion will provide China with a substantial and stable source of oil outside the constraints of production alliances. Furthermore, the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC will impact China’s diversification policy, as China relies on imports to cover approximately 70% of its oil needs. The UAE’s departure will grant Beijing greater flexibility in purchasing from the spot market at potentially more competitive prices.

This also has a significant impact on import costs (prices) through prolonged downward pressure. The UAE’s increased oil production (up to 680,000 barrels per day above previous levels) is expected to put downward pressure on global Brent crude prices in the medium term (12-24 months), thus reducing China’s energy import bill. This could lead to short-term volatility, as, despite the potential benefit, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz (due to current regional tensions in April 2026) limits the immediate ability to capitalize on the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC, since most of the UAE’s exports to China pass through this waterway.

China could benefit from the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC by enhancing its capacity for financial and trade cooperation and expanding trade in local currencies, particularly the Chinese yuan. The UAE’s departure from OPEC could (facilitate the expansion of oil trade agreements) in rubles, rupees, and yuan, moving away from OPEC’s traditional dollar pricing. This aligns with China’s drive to internationalize the yuan. Such a move could boost joint investments, given China’s existing stakes in UAE oil concessions. With Abu Dhabi freed from restrictions, these Chinese investments could generate higher returns through increased production. Furthermore, China might leverage the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC to bolster the strategic and geopolitical value of weakening OPEC’s influence. This withdrawal diminishes OPEC’s ability to control global supply, which benefits major consuming nations like China by reducing the likelihood of price shocks resulting from collective production cuts.

In this context, Chinese discussions and analyses have intensified, examining the potential benefits for China from the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC. Chinese experts are analyzing the likelihood and impact of such a move should it materialize, particularly given the UAE’s increasing production capacity and its desire for greater flexibility. If we assume the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC is indeed the case, China stands to be the biggest beneficiary for the following reasons. First, it would break the dominance of the petrodollar. The departure of a player the size of the UAE from traditional OPEC constraints opens the door wide to bilateral agreements for pricing oil in digital yuan (or Chinese yuan), thus supporting Beijing’s strategy of internationalizing the yuan to reduce its dependence on the Western financial system (SWIFT). In addition to the increased Chinese-Emirati supply, since Chinese companies such as CNPC and CNOOC hold stakes in oil concessions in Abu Dhabi, the UAE’s release from OPEC production quotas means these companies can increase production and secure China’s growing energy needs at preferential prices and with favorable terms. This facilitates the revitalization of joint UAE-China investments, allowing for deeper Chinese capital flow into the UAE’s refining and petrochemical sector. The exchange of finished goods and crude oil within an economic cycle based on local currencies reduces conversion costs and the risks associated with dollar fluctuations. This supports China’s policy of moving towards BRICS+. As the UAE is a member of the BRICS group, any move away from traditional OPEC frameworks aligns with the group’s overall direction to create a parallel financial system that supports the ruble, rupee, and yuan. This scenario, if it were to occur, would transform the relationship from one of buyer and seller to a comprehensive strategic partnership, making energy the driving force behind the new financial system that China seeks to lead.

Accordingly, the UAE’s withdrawal represents a strategic gain for China in terms of increased supply and potential cost reductions, but maximizing the benefit remains contingent on the stability of shipping lanes in the Arabian Gulf.

The withdrawal of the United Arab Emirates to abandon OPEC is far more than just a change in policy, but represents a change in the paradigm of worldwide energy governance. In a region that, already, has been influenced in oil market operations by geopolitical frictions, climate changes, and alliances, the UAE action begs an immediate question: is the era of shared oil control becoming one of autonomy of choice?

OPEC had been a mainstay of oil prices globally. Through the coordination of production quotas, the member states were trying to control supply and manipulate prices. Nevertheless, the emergence of non OPEC producers, especially the United States of America with its own shale revolution and the increasing influence of Russia could have calories undermined the power of OPEC. Responding, the organization became OPEC+, a more wide-ranging alliance that tried to reassert itself by coordinating more.

But with this change, new fault lines were also presented. OPEC+ is not a close bloc, but an adaptable arrangement anchored on overlapping, and indeed competing, interests. Its success largely relies on the collaboration of key actors such as the Saudi Arabia and Russia countries having different geopolitical interests. Such delicate equilibrium has rendered the sustainability of cohesion even more of a challenge.

It is here that the withdrawal of the UAE is noteworthy. Abu Dhabi has been rethinking its economic and strategic priorities. Although oil is still significant, UAE has been spending on renewable energy, international financial and logistics as well as technology. It has a long term vision of diversification and global competitiveness rather than oil dependency.

These goals might not have been consistent with staying within OPEC quota system. Designed to stabilize the prices, production limits may limit the capacity of a country to operate at capacity or flexibly respond to market opportunities. Like any exit, the UAE will have more flexibility in its output policy, which will enable it to harmonize the national economic objectives with energy policy.

This is indicative of a larger conflict over collective discipline and national sovereignty. The success of OPEC has been pegged on compliance with quotas by its members. But when the economic priorities move apart, they are more difficult to maintain. The UAE motion indicates that in some cases the advantages of independence can now surpass the benefits of action.

This is reflected in this concept of OPEC 2.0. The basic model is also more fluid and pragmatic compared to its predecessor, which was more or less a cohesive cartel. It is based on momentary agreements, but not the institutional unity. Although this flexibility maybe handy when dealing with a crisis in the short term, it also casts an element of stability in the long term.

Should other producers start to emulate the UAE, the effects may be far reaching. A disintegrated system can have difficulties in controlling supply even more resulting into a greater price volatility. The global markets would, in that case, not be fueled by coordinated policy but rather competition among the producers.

Simultaneously, the move that the UAE made should not be construed as a total denial of collaboration. Energy diplomacy is not going away but changing. Nations can move towards selective and form partnerships depending on similar interests as opposed to unbreakable unions. This would result in a more energetic yet unpredictable energy environment.

The decision is also representative of a larger trend in the Middle East geopolitically. States in the Gulf are claiming to be more independent economically and in the foreign policy. They havebbeen diversifying collaborations, looking into new spheres, and establishing themselves as international centres of commerce and innovation. Energy policy is evolving merely as a part of a broader strategic approach.

To people worldwide, the ramification is ambivalent. In the short run, on the one hand, a decrease in coordination among the producers may result in instability in the market and price variations. Conversely, over competition can lead to efficiency and speed up investment in alternative power sources. This might promote the movement of the world towards non fossil fuels in the long run.

Finally, the UAE withdrawal is a turning point. It highlights a transition into the flexible interestdriven strategies including strict institutional structures. There is a growing challenge of a more complicated and multipolar reality to the classical structure of oil governance with its emphasis on unity and joint control. The future of the global energy could probably not be characterized by one powerful protagonist, but a system of changing alliances and strategic choices. The adaptability in this new order can become important than unity. The UAE has decided to take that direction and their move might potentially determine the next chapter of energy politics across the world.