oil

Washington is attempting something remarkable in Venezuela. After spending more than two decades confronting the geopolitical ambitions of chavismo, the US is now helping to rebuild the industry that made those ambitions possible. 

Through a combination of military pressure and the promise of renewed oil production, foreign investment, and access to international markets, the Trump administration is seeking to secure the cooperation of Delcy Rodríguez’s interim government. But there is a paradox at the heart of that strategy: if it succeeds, Washington could end up restoring the very instrument of geopolitical power that Hugo Chávez once used against it.

The danger is not that Rodríguez is preparing to revive Chávez’s revolutionary foreign policy tomorrow. It is that the economic recovery of a government does not necessarily entail its political transformation. A regime that cooperates with Washington under military pressure and out of economic necessity may behave quite differently once those constraints diminish.

Understanding this risk requires revisiting a frequently misunderstood aspect of Chávez’s legacy. His oil diplomacy was not simply a collection of expensive ideological adventures, but a part of a coherent grand strategy that achieved much of what it set out to accomplish, even as it undermined the economic foundations of the Venezuelan state.

Revolutionary oil

That is the central argument of Petróleo y revolución: La geopolítica de Venezuela bajo Hugo Chávez y su desafío a Estados Unidos, a new book by Venezuelan political analyst Martín Rodríguez Rodríguez. Drawing on diplomatic documents, petroleum industry intelligence, and historical research, Rodríguez reconstructs how Chávez transformed Venezuela’s oil wealth into the principal instrument of an ambitious strategy to challenge American influence in the hemisphere.

Chávez did not invent petroleum diplomacy. Venezuelan governments had long understood that the country’s position in international energy markets provided diplomatic leverage beyond what its economic or military weight might otherwise suggest. But while previous governments generally employed that leverage to advance Venezuela’s commercial interests and international standing, Chávez subordinated it to the objectives of his revolution.

Rodríguez traces the development of this grand strategy through Chávez’s consolidation of power, the political takeover of PDVSA, the revitalization of OPEC, and the construction of an international network designed to diminish Washington’s influence.

New relationships with China, Russia and Iran allowed Chávez to position himself as a participant in an emerging multipolar order.

The Caracas-Havana alliance formed the backbone of this strategy. Cuba provided political experience, ideological affinity, and a regional partner with its own long history of confrontation with Washington. Venezuela supplied the resources that allowed the relationship to acquire a significance neither country could have achieved on its own. ALBA and Petrocaribe extended that logic across the Caribbean and Central America. By providing oil under preferential financing arrangements, Chávez cultivated governments whose diplomatic support helped complicate American efforts to isolate Caracas, while he established relationships that continued to provide diplomatic support to his successors even as Washington intensified its pressure.

The strategy extended beyond the hemisphere. China offered financing and an alternative market for Venezuelan crude. Russia provided military equipment and diplomatic backing. Iran became an ideologically compatible partner in Chávez’s confrontation with the United States. Together, these relationships allowed Venezuela to position itself as a participant in an emerging multipolar order.

Rodríguez’s contribution is to examine these initiatives not as disconnected episodes of revolutionary diplomacy but as instruments of a larger grand strategy. Chávez understood that control over petroleum resources could compensate, at least partially, for Venezuela’s limited military and economic weight. 

Rodríguez documents how repeated threats to interrupt oil shipments to the United States collided with transportation costs, refinery infrastructure, and commercial interdependence. In 2004, roughly two-thirds of Venezuela’s crude exports still went to the American market. Redirecting those shipments was neither as simple nor as economical as Chávez suggested.

Chávez succeeded in expanding the international influence of his revolution while weakening Venezuela’s capacity to sustain that influence. 

The relationship with China was similarly contradictory. Diversification reduced Venezuela’s exclusive dependence on the American market, but oil-backed financing arrangements created new obligations and dependencies. In attempting to escape one relationship, Chávez risked exchanging it for another.

More consequentially, the politicization of PDVSA, the deterioration of its technical capacity, and the subordination of commercial decisions to revolutionary priorities progressively undermined the industry that financed the strategy.

Chávez succeeded in expanding the international influence of his revolution while weakening Venezuela’s capacity to sustain that influence. His geopolitical accomplishments were real, even if their durability was limited. The success of a revolutionary project, Rodríguez demonstrates, should not be confused with the success of the state whose resources made it possible.

The 2026 irony

The Trump administration’s approach to Venezuela rests, at least in part, on a plausible proposition: a government facing American military pressure while benefiting from economic cooperation will have strong incentives to preserve its accommodation with Washington. Restoring oil production can create jobs, attract investment, increase revenues, and provide the economic stability necessary for a political transition.

There is nothing inherently misguided about pursuing economic recovery. Venezuela desperately needs to rebuild its petroleum industry, and a recovery that excludes American capital, technology, and markets would be considerably more difficult. Military coercion and economic incentives can secure compliance without necessarily producing lasting political change, but economic cooperation and political transformation are not interchangeable.

The administration is dealing with a government whose leading figures emerged from the same political movement that Chávez built. Delcy Rodríguez is not Chávez. She lacks his charisma, his popular mandate, and the extraordinary international circumstances that made his ambitions possible. Yet the institutions and networks of power through which chavismo governs have not necessarily changed simply because its relationship with Washington has.

The distinction becomes especially important when considering what a successful recovery would accomplish. Increased production would not merely strengthen Venezuela’s economy. It would increase the resources available to the government, expand its international commercial relationships, and potentially reduce its dependence on American support.

A weakened chavismo has good reasons to accommodate Washington. A revitalized chavismo might have more options.

These developments could support a democratic transition. But without corresponding institutional and political changes, they could also strengthen the governing establishment and give it greater room to maneuver. A weakened chavismo has good reasons to accommodate Washington. A revitalized chavismo might have more options. 

Of course, the circumstances are not those of the early 2000s. The United States possesses considerable military and economic leverage, as well as influence over Venezuela’s access to investment, technology, financial services, and energy markets. Chávez’s successors also face constraints that he never encountered. A return to his confrontational foreign policy is neither inevitable nor necessarily desirable to the current leadership.

But those differences do not eliminate the underlying question. What political and institutional changes must accompany Venezuela’s economic recovery to ensure that the resources generated by its petroleum industry serve the country rather than the preservation of a particular governing movement?

Chávez’s grand strategy demonstrated that Venezuela’s oil wealth could be used to challenge American influence, even without the economic or military power to confront Washington directly. His successors inherited the alliances, institutions, and political networks that strategy helped establish, although the deterioration of the petroleum industry progressively deprived them of the resources needed to sustain it.

None of this means that a recovered Venezuelan oil industry would inevitably produce a renewed confrontation with the United States. It does mean that Washington should be careful not to mistake cooperation obtained through coercion and economic necessity for a lasting change in the interests of those governing Venezuela.

Lawmakers from California are poised to lead two of Congress’ most consequential energy and environment committees, putting the Golden State at the forefront of efforts to scrutinize the Trump administration’s sweeping changes to federal climate policy.

Reps. Zoe Lofgren (D-San José) and Jared Huffman (D-San Rafael) have served as the top Democrats on the House Committee on Science, Space and Technology and the House Natural Resources Committee, respectively, since Republicans took control of the chamber in January 2023. With Democrats now set to control the next Congress, both are the likely choice for chair.

The committees oversee major areas of federal science and energy research, public lands, water, wildlife and natural resources policy. While neither directly controls federal agencies, their leaders hold significant authority over oversight and legislation.

Both committees have advanced bipartisan legislation under Republican leadership, such as the Fix Our Forests Act from Natural Resources chair Bruce Westerman (R-Ark.) and Calif. Rep. Scott Peters (D-San Diego). But they have also pursued efforts to reverse Biden-era environmental priorities — such as narrowing the Endangered Species Act — and advance President Trump’s domestic energy agenda, which favors oil and gas production.

Lofgren said the change represents a real opportunity to restore faith in science after two years of policies that have undermined it. The committee under Republican leadership launched a probe into the National Academies of Sciences over a report reaffirming the evidence for climate change.

“We’re not confused that climate change is going on. Neither are most Americans,” Lofgren said. “Ask any farmer in my district, and they’ll tell you climate change is going on.”

It’s also a chance to put California’s embattled environmental ambitions back in the congressional spotlight. The White House has challenged the state’s climate goals, slashing $1.2 billion in funding for its nascent hydrogen hub, moving to restart oil drilling off the coast and striking deals with offshore wind developers to abandon their projects and invest instead in fossil fuels.

“Much of what the administration has done the past two years has moved forward simply because there was no congressional check and balance,” Huffman said, pointing to a long list of executive orders, no-bid contracts and spontaneous announcements from the president. “I think you’re going to see a dramatic shift when we begin to have a check in the form of Congress that does its job.”

Though committees cannot prevent the president from issuing executive orders, they can hold hearings, subpoena documents, investigate whether agencies are complying with existing laws, and draft legislation to protect specific programs or funding.

This might not have prevented some of the administration’s most consequential actions — such as the payouts to offshore wind developers, which effectively killed three of the five projects off the coast of California — but would have brought greater public scrutiny and accountability to the process.

The same is true of the administration’s use of the Defense Production Act to restart oil pumping operations at the Sable Platform off the coast of Santa Barbara, which the White House said is a matter of national security.

“We are awash in oil and gas production,” Huffman said, adding that the president has “relied on fake emergency declarations that no one has questioned or challenged.”

Lofgren said she would look into the administration’s dismantling of scientific agencies and cancellation of research grants. The U.S. Department of Energy — whose research and development programs fall under the Science Committee’s purview — recently acknowledged in court documents that the termination of $7.6 billion in funding for clean energy projects was targeted at blue states.

On the legislative side, Huffman said he would pursue a Democratic permitting reform proposal aimed at addressing soaring energy costs. Lofgren said she would push to reauthorize the Energy Act of 2020 and renew federal programs established by the CHIPS and Science Act, which together boosted spending for emerging technologies, clean energy and supply chains.

She would also advance laws supporting fusion research, quantum computing, next-generation nuclear and geothermal technologies, along with greater guardrails around artificial intelligence. The Science Committee’s current chair, Republican Rep. Brian Babin of Texas, has also supported some of these emerging technologies, including fusion and quantum research.

In fact, Lofgren was optimistic that cross-party cooperation would prevail. Nearly all of the committee’s bills adopted this year passed unanimously, or close to it, although many never made it to the House floor, she said.

“I’m not going to compromise on oversight, and I know that the Republicans may not agree with us on some of the oversight issues,” she said. “But when it comes to legislation, we have a long history of bipartisan collaboration, which I anticipate would continue.”

In other election news

Energy affordability was top of mind for voters on Tuesday, with soaring electricity bills at the center of many high-profile national races. Residential electric rates in the U.S. are averaging 18.2 cents per kilowatt-hour, up from 15.9 cents when Trump resumed office in January 2025, according to the latest data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Many Californians pay much more than that.

This turned out to be a formidable weapon for Democrats, many of whom made energy costs central to their campaigns. An analysis from the nonprofit advocacy group Climate Power found that more than $475 million was spent on political ads about utility and energy bills in the first 10 months of this year. In the most competitive races, 32% of all recent Democratic ad spending went to ads mentioning energy affordability issues, compared with 12% from Republicans.

Data centers were perhaps the biggest bogeyman of all. In Michigan’s high-stakes Senate race, Democrat Abdul El-Sayed called for a pause on new data centers until stronger federal guidelines are adopted, and argued that they must pay to cover their own energy demand and not pass down costs to ratepayers.

His opponent, Republican Mike Rogers, was criticized for investments into tech companies that could benefit from the data center boom, and subsequently backed a one-year moratorium on new data centers in Michigan and said guardrails should be put in place to protect against utility price hikes.

The candidates did not agree on the reasons for high prices, however. El-Sayed touted 100% renewable energy as the best path forward, while Rogers said renewables are driving up Michigan’s energy and utility costs. El-Sayed won the state race Tuesday night.

In other climate news

Record hot ocean temperatures, higher-than-normal tides and powerful storms could converge amid a potentially historic El Niño. That’s a recipe for more coastal flooding, erosion and large waves in California this winter. My colleagues Rong-Gong Lin II and Sean Greene took a look at how this “worst-case scenario” for El Niño could play out.

But the news isn’t all bad. After a couple with a plot of land above Santa Clarita marketed it as a potential “glamping” site, they decided instead to sell it back to the local tribe that originally lived there. Read Noah Haggerty’s joyful story about how this 51-acre piece of land along the Pacific Crest Trail will go back to the Fernandeño Tataviam Band of Mission Indians.

And finally, the annual United National Climate Change Conference, COP31, will kick off next week in Turkey. It comes only weeks after U.N. officials reported that the world will not be able to limit global warming to 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) above pre-industrial levels — a goal established during the 2015 conference in Paris. This year’s conference is expected to focus on implementing existing climate commitments, reducing emissions and accelerating the clean energy transition, among other topics.

This is the latest edition of Boiling Point, a newsletter about climate change and the environment in the American West. Sign up here to get it in your inbox.

On the Boiling Point Podcast this week, hear how Hollywood’s approach to climate themes is changing.

Hezbollah denies the Syrian accusations, reiterating that it does not have any presence on Syrian territory.

Syrian security forces have said they foiled a plot to target the Homs oil refinery in central Syria, arresting a cell affiliated with Lebanon’s Hezbollah armed group.

Syria’s General Intelligence Service (GIS) said on X that “the preemptive security operation” was carried out in cooperation with the country’s Internal Security Forces.

It identified two arrested individuals with their initials – M S and B Sh – but did not elaborate on the time or the location of the operation, “which resulted in the seizure of explosive devices in their possession that had been prepared to execute the plot”.

Hezbollah denied the Syrian accusations in a statement, reiterating that it does not have any presence on Syrian territory and is not ⁠involved in “any activity that undermines the ⁠security and stability of Syria”.

Hezbollah ⁠fought alongside former President Bashar al-Assad’s forces during Syria’s nearly 14-year civil war, but relations with Damascus have deteriorated sharply since his overthrow in 2024.

Syrian authorities have accused ⁠Hezbollah of involvement in a series of alleged plots, including planned assassinations, ⁠rocket attacks and arms smuggling.

The Homs refinery is one of Syria’s two oil refineries, along with the Baniyas refinery, and plays a key role in securing petroleum products.

ISIL cell

In a similar operation, the GIS said on Sunday that they arrested two members of a suspected ISIL (ISIS) cell in the governorate of Deir Az Zor.

Sunday’s statement added that investigations “showed the detainees’ involvement in carrying out a series of assassinations in the province, the latest of which targeted defence ministry member Ibrahim al-Jassem with a gunshot near the al-Rashid mosque in the city of Mayadin”.

The operation led to the seizure of weapons and ammunition found in the cell’s hideout, the security forces said, adding that authorities were continuing investigations of “the terrorists to uncover their links in preparation for bringing them to justice”.

On September 27, the security forces said they had arrested four members of an ISIL cell involved in planning and carrying out several attacks in different parts of the country.

On September 30, the Syrian Electricity Company said the Deir Ali, Nasiriya and Tishreen power stations had gone out of service after an explosion on a gas line at the Tishreen station in the Damascus countryside, which cut off the gas supply needed to run them.

On October 15, the Syrian Petroleum Company said the pipeline carrying petroleum products from Baniyas to Homs was damaged near the village of Hadida in western Homs countryside, causing a fuel leak, state media reported, in the latest in a series of attacks on Syria’s energy infrastructure.

Last month, Syria’s security forces foiled a plot to target a police patrol in Damascus countryside, saying that an ISIL cell was preparing to carry out the attack, Syrian state television reported. They said the group was responsible for explosions and assassinations in Raqqa, Aleppo, Idlib and Homs.

Damascus joined the US-led international coalition against ISIL last November, which was formed in 2014 and has carried out operations against the group in Syria and Iraq.

United States oil companies have earned more than $130bn in profits during the war on Iran, even as consumers pay much higher prices for key commodities, amid fears that US President Donald Trump may renew fighting after midterm elections.

The estimate, released by The New York Times, is a conservative evaluation based on the performance of 51 large US oil and gas companies in the six months from April through September. By contrast, in the same period in 2025 – when the prices of oil were lower prior to the launch of the US-Israel war on Iran – they collectively earned less than $47bn.

But the gains come as burgeoning living costs are crushing consumers. Americans have spent an extra $150bn on petrol and diesel since the war on Iran began on February 28, according to an analysis by Brown University’s Climate Solutions Lab, which amounts to more than $1,150 per household.

The disparity has fuelled a political debate over who gains and who pays the price for the war. Responding to Trump, Democratic Representative Jim McGovern wrote on X: “We’re not making a ‘freaking fortune,’ we’re PAYING a ‘freaking fortune’.”

US Big Oil in position to profit where others lose

Naser al-Tamimi, a fellow at the Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) in Milan, Italy, said US energy companies have benefitted from the war in different ways. “Crude producers gain from higher oil prices, while refiners capture exceptional margins as diesel and other fuel supplies tighten,” he said.

Additionally, “damage to Middle Eastern and Russian refineries, disrupted Strait of Hormuz shipments, and sanctions-related trade frictions have intensified shortages”, while “relatively secure US facilities and access to discounted crude strengthen these gains”.

ExxonMobil and Chevron, the biggest US oil companies, on Friday reported profits of between $10bn and $15bn. While the gains are considerable, The New York Times found they generally remained below 2022 levels, when Russia’s invasion of Ukraine caused oil prices to soar to roughly $100 a barrel and raised natural gas prices, compared with the current average of $90 from April through September.

American refining companies also reaped greater profits as global fuel supplies tightened and inventories depleted due to heavy damage to infrastructure in the Middle East and Russia. Valero Energy’s third-quarter profit increased more than sixfold, reaching $6.83bn. Phillips 66 announced its highest quarterly profit on record, with net income jumping to $5.62bn from $133m a year earlier.

Geoffrey Miller, geopolitical analyst and editor of the Gulf States Insights newsletter, said the US-Israel war with Iran “created the largest supply-side shock to global oil and refined products markets in years”.

Miller added that the war “created a risk premium that US-based operators are structurally well placed to monetise”. By contrast, Gulf producers were “hit hard by both higher costs and risks, along with physical damage, which makes their ability to benefit from the higher prices much more difficult”.

Tehran retaliated against the US-Israeli attack by launching missiles and drones at the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), a US-registered independent conflict monitor, found Iran and Iran-backed groups in the region have carried out at least 172 attacks on nonmilitary infrastructure across the six GCC member states. Despite claims by Iranian officials that they were targeting US military facilities, they also hit energy infrastructure.

Iran also effectively blocked passage of most vessels through the Strait of Hormuz. In retaliation, the US imposed a naval blockade on Iranian oil and gas – the tit-for-tat steps raising the risks of transporting energy out of the crucial passageway.

Continued pressure over cost of living

Analysts warned of continued volatility until a durable political settlement between the US and Iran is reached. Oil prices dropped briefly in the summer after a memorandum of understanding was signed in June, but prices quickly soared again when talks broke down.

A more recent escalation in fighting between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis has further compounded the crisis: the Bab al-Mandeb strait that connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, which Saudi Arabia uses to export oil, is now also a theatre of war.

“In the short term, windfall profits will only strengthen oil company balance sheets and shareholder returns,” Miller said. “However, the big profits come with a major caveat. That’s because over the longer term, high oil prices risk harming economic growth prospects and could even contribute towards the outbreak of a recession, which would in turn be likely to lead to reduced demand for oil” and accelerate the transition to renewable energy.

Florence Schmit, senior energy strategist at Rabobank’s global economics and markets team in London, said it was likely that the prices of key energy products would remain high given the uncertainty about the duration of the war in Iran.

“Prices in all markets that have an exposure to this global supply shock – which includes the US – will face high prices also next year, and consumers will continue to feel this price pressure unless governments step in,” Schmit told Al Jazeera.

The US-led war on Iran has raised costs for oil, transport fuels, gas, electricity and food. According to the World Bank Group’s latest Commodity Markets Outlook, commodity prices are set to rise 23 percent this year, as disrupted grain shipments and the El Nino weather phenomenon also threaten harvests and food affordability.

The United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization said on October 2 that world food commodity prices rose a further 1.5 percent in September, after reaching their highest level since late 2022 in August, amid adverse weather and trade disruptions in the Black Sea and Strait of Hormuz.

Trump has sought to blame high global fuel prices on Ukraine and pressured Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to halt strikes on Russian refineries, even as Moscow continued to wage attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. The US president has argued that a deal with Russia reversing years of sanctions would help lower diesel prices.

In the Gulf, analysts said higher oil prices will benefit exporters that can maintain shipments, but prolonged insecurity will continue to threaten supply reliability and investment.

“Gulf producers face years of reconstruction and pressure to diversify export routes,” ISPI’s al-Tamimi said. “A diplomatic settlement could ease prices, whereas renewed US-Israeli attacks on Iran risk triggering another regional war, further disrupting Hormuz and prolonging shortages.”

Oil flows out of the Gulf have increased substantially, easing the huge supply disruption caused by the United States/Israel war on Iran.

Crude exports from the Gulf averaged 24.6 million barrels per day (bpd) in the week to October 18, exceeding the pre-war average, according to market intelligence firm Kpler.

Yet, oil prices continue to rise.

Brent crude, the global benchmark, is trading at its highest prices since April, up more than 60 percent compared with before the war.

On Friday, Brent crude front-month futures – contracts for oil deliveries in December – rose more than 2 percent to briefly top $117 a barrel.

The climbing prices reflect anxiety about the possibility of renewed hostilities in the US war on Iran, dwindling oil stocks, and the increased costs of transporting supplies out of the region, according to market analysts.

“The market is doing exactly what it is supposed to do: It is telling us there is plenty of prompt oil, but there is no end to this war in sight – in fact … escalation is very likely,” Adi Imsirovic, a lecturer in energy systems at the University of Oxford, told Al Jazeera.

“Therefore, futures markets reflect that expectation,” Imsirovic, a veteran oil trader, said.

Oil producers have become increasingly adept at responding to the volatile climate in the Middle East to keep supplies flowing.

Facing the threat of Iranian attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, shipping lines have established a shuttle system involving ship-to-ship transfers off Oman and the United Arab Emirates to reduce the distance any one vessel must travel in perilous waters.

Shuttle boats carry the oil through the strait and load it onto waiting tankers once they are out of the danger zone.

In August, more than 70 percent of the crude that crossed the strait did so via ship-to-ship transfers, according to Kpler.

Oil producers have also ramped up exports that bypass the strait altogether via Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline, which carries oil supplies from its eastern oil fields to its Yanbu port on the Red Sea in the west, and the United Arab Emirates’ Habshan-Fujairah pipeline.

As of September, 40 percent of exports from the Gulf were bypassing the strait, a conduit for one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas supplies during peacetime, compared with 17 percent before the war, according to Kpler data.

The soaring cost of delivery

Such workarounds have nonetheless come at a cost.

Freight costs have reached as much as $40 per barrel in recent weeks, about 10 times the usual rate, according to data from the London Stock Exchange Group, the surge driven by elevated insurance premiums in addition to logistical challenges.

October has been the deadliest month for attacks on commercial vessels since the start of the war, with 32 incidents logged by the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) as of Friday.

“So barrels are moving, but neither smoothly nor reliably. That should not be read as a sign of normalisation,” Isabel Figuerola-Ferretti, an expert in oil markets at Comillas Pontifical University in Madrid, Spain, told Al Jazeera.

“Delivering a barrel has become far more expensive,” Figuerola-Ferretti said.

While market intelligence data has shown exports reaching pre-war levels at various points in recent weeks, the longer-term supply trend is less clear.

Pavel Molchanov, an investment strategist at Raymond James & Associates, expressed scepticism that supply has returned to the pre-conflict trend.

“The IEA’s most recent production data – for September – shows OPEC Gulf production at 15.8 million bpd, which equates to 75 percent of the pre-war baseline,” Molchanov told Al Jazeera, referring to the International Energy Agency’s latest energy outlook.

“That slightly surpassed July’s 74 percent to reach the highest level since the start of the war, but it’s still a considerable distance from 100 percent.”

Meanwhile, oil stockpiles, a buffer during supply disruptions, are waning.

Observed inventories fell by 10 million barrels in September, taking the global stockpile to 509 million barrels below its pre-war level, according to the IEA.

“The market has moved to a chronic squeeze, driven by concrete supply risks: Hormuz transit, shipping and depleted inventories,” Figuerola-Ferretti said.

No reprieve anytime soon

With no permanent end to the Iran war in sight, few analysts see prices returning to normal anytime soon.

Brent futures for delivery in October 2027 stood at more than $90 a barrel on Friday, in a sign that markets see normality as a long way off, still.

“When could prices return to $70? Not soon,” Figuerola-Ferretti said.

“It would need durable de-escalation, a return to normal transit and shipping conditions through Hormuz, rebuilt inventories and freight costs back to normal,” she added.

Molchanov, the investment strategist, said he did not believe supply could realistically exceed 85 percent of pre-war levels without a permanent diplomatic solution to the war.

“Once the political groundwork is in place, the next steps will be logistical: Demining Hormuz, bringing shipping crews back to work, and resuming production at currently shut-in oilfields,” he said.

US president seeks to underscore Latin American military operation, as Iran war causes midterm affordability threat.

United States President Donald Trump has featured a ship he said is carrying Venezuelan oil during a visit to Texas, where he will hold two rallies one after the other in the hopes of boosting Republican chances in a make-or-break Senate race.

Speaking at Corpus Christi on Tuesday on his fourth trip to the state this campaign season, Trump pointed to a ship in the distance.

“It’s got 1 million barrels of oil on it from Venezuela,” he said, adding the cargo was “thanks to our big victory in our recent war with Venezuela”.

The emphasis on the oil comes as US consumers have wrestled with high fossil fuel prices amid the US-Israel war with Iran, a key issue in the upcoming midterm elections.

“We’re celebrating the greatest oil victory in history,” Trump said.

It was not immediately clear under what pretext the oil had been shipped or whether the details Trump gave were correct. The US had received crude oil shipments from Venezuela before the US abduction of Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro on January 3, but those transfers have increased this year.

In August, the Trump administration announced a deal giving the Pentagon a 35 percent stake in North America Blue Energy Partners, a new company overseeing 65 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. The White House said in September that the first shipment from the deal would likely hit US reserves in November, although experts have cast doubt on whether the deal will have any short-term impact.

Speaking to reporters earlier in the day, Trump referred to the shipment as a “gift” from Venezuela. The country’s interim leader, Delcy Rodriguez, has not commented on the specific shipment.

At the rally, Trump also floated making Venezuela the “51st state”.

Key race

Trump’s frequent visits to Texas underscore the state’s significance for Republicans.

Trump endorsed Attorney General Ken Paxton in the Republican primary over incumbent Senator John Cornyn. The scandal-ridden Paxton now faces a punishing contest against Democrat James Talarico, a Presbyterian seminarian.

Polls have regularly shown Talarico leading Paxton, although that lead has largely remained within the margin of error. A RealClearPolitics average of polls had Talarico leading Paxton by 1.7 points.

Talarico’s victory would mark a sea change in a state that has not elected a Democrat to statewide office since 1994.

It would also represent a major rebuke to Trump, whose Republican Party is fighting to maintain its narrow control of the Senate. Democrats are widely projected to take control of the US House of Representatives in the November 3 vote.

Talarico has used the final stretch of the race to focus on years of corruption allegations against Paxton, while drawing a contrast to voters’ affordability concerns.

“Ken Paxton represents everything that’s wrong with this broken, corrupt system,” he said during an event in Houston last week.

Paxton has sought to portray Talarico as too “radical” for Texas, saying his policies would hurt a state known for its pro-business policies.

Trump and other administration officials, notably Vice President JD Vance, have regularly focused on cultural issues, distorting Talarico’s past comments on transgender rights and border security.

Speaking in Corpus Christi, Trump repeated those attacks and urged his supporters to vote as if he were on the ballot.

“If you go out, and if you all vote, we win in a landslide,” Trump said.

Since the January 3, 2026, military strikes and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration has imposed semi-colonial rule over Venezuela, forcing dramatic shifts in the country’s domestic and foreign policies.

The capstone of the new tutelary regime is an oil deal announced in late August that Trump called “the biggest in history.” The agreement turns over 17 prime oilfields, holding over 20% of the country’s reserves, to a Pentagon-controlled corporation tasked with supplying cheap fuel to the US war machine for decades to come.

After spending years manufacturing consent for US-sponsored regime change in Venezuela (e.g., FAIR.org, 6/4/21, 1/11/23, 2/12/25), having a government in Caracas subservient to Washington represented a new scenario for the corporate media. The novel conditions have raised few significant qualms for Western outlets. Tactical objections notwithstanding, there is no fundamental disagreement with the US running the affairs of a Global South country.

Not ‘stealing Venezuela’s oil’

Working hand in glove with the Trump administration, the acting Delcy Rodríguez government has overhauled Venezuela’s hydrocarbon legislation (Venezuelanalysis, 7/13/26) to offer what oil experts consider a business environment more favorable to foreign capital than at any point in the country’s history. The new oil agreement with the White House manages to go even further.

The 17 oilfields in question will be taken over by North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP), a private company in which the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) will get a 35% stake while investing nothing—and wielding veto power over its board.

Furthermore, according to the White House, the US State Department will secure 20% of NABEP’s output at cost, and have a right of first refusal over the remaining 80%. On top of this, Venezuelan officials have already suggested Washington would be given an additional “sales discount”  (Venezuelanalysis, 9/9/26).

In summary, Trump is looking to secure cheap crude supplies at a time when his disastrous Iran debacle has thrown global energy markets into upheaval. The agreement is so blatantly skewed that US Energy Secretary Chris Wright felt he needed to clarify that Washington was not “stealing Venezuela’s oil” (AFP, 9/3/26).

Nevertheless, Western media outlets were largely unfazed by such an obvious oil grab, euphemistically referring to the deal as “highly unusual” (New York Times, 8/29/26) or “remarkable” (BBC, 9/1/26), at most as “contentious” (Guardian, 9/1/26).

Corporate journalists did raise objections over the central role played by NABEP owner Alejandro Betancourt, a shady Venezuelan businessman who faced multiple money-laundering probes before the Trump administration intervened, and pressured judicial authorities at home and abroad to drop the investigations (BBC, 9/2/26; CNN, 9/4/26; New York Times, 9/4/26).

But media seemed satisfied with Trump’s state and energy secretaries Marco Rubio and Chris Wright pledging that US oversight will keep proceedings honest (Reuters, 9/2/26; New York Times, 9/4/26), despite the fact that billions in Venezuelan oil revenues, controlled by the US Treasury Department since January, are unaccounted for (Council on Foreign Relations, 6/3/26; Financial Times, 7/22/26).

Procedurally transparent plunder

Objections to the Venezuela/NABEP/Pentagon venture were mostly procedural and out of concern for appearances, not driven by any principled opposition to US imperialist predation. Faced with outright colonial plunder of Venezuela, the political and media establishment only demands “accountability” and “transparency” (New York Times, 5/5/26; Financial Times, 9/18/26).

For months, the White House has controlled Venezuelan oil export revenues, with Trump officials openly calling them “one of the largest assets ever to go on the US balance sheet,” and a source of “leverage” over Caracas. Yet Trump’s Democratic opponents have found no issue with seizing another country’s income, raising only questions about the allocation of the funds in reference to alleged corruption on the part of Caracas and Trump insiders (The Hill, 9/30/26; Washington Post, 9/17/26). This despite the fact that the Venezuelan government has to submit a “monthly budget” to access its own funds (New York Times, 1/28/26) and is subjected to US-imposed auditors (Reuters, 4/27/26).

The other source of disappointment with Trump stomping all over Venezuelan sovereignty, but prioritizing oil over regime change, is impatience for the restoration/recovery/return of “democracy” to Venezuela (Politico, 9/2/26; Guardian, 8/30/26; CBC, 9/3/26). Despite  widely acknowledgement that Trump is eroding democracy at home (New York Times, 8/20/26, 10/14/26; Guardian, 10/8/26), somehow pundits expected him to prioritize it in an oil-rich foreign country.

In the establishment’s consensus, “democracy” does not mean a political system that meaningfully reflects the Venezuelan people’s collective will, but simply one that empowers opposition figures that have been groomed for years, like far-right María Corina Machado, their undemocratic credentials notwithstanding (FAIR.org, 10/23/25).

Eager to stay in power, Rodríguez has over-complied with every US demand, going as far as adopting language about Venezuela undergoing a “democratic transformation.” Her pliancy has earned her favorable corporate media profiles that completely contrast with the demonization of Maduro.

After securing an exclusive interview, Time (7/30/26) described the acting leader as a “disciplined operator” who “advocate[s] for greater economic openness,” in contrast to the “authoritarian” Maduro, who oversaw “economic collapse.” Along the same lines, the Guardian (9/12/26) presented Rodríguez as a “a pragmatic, witty and intelligent workaholic,” unlike her “authoritarian” and “incompetent” predecessor in the presidential palace.

Nevertheless, given the broad Beltway consensus for comprehensive regime change, it is unlikely that the Rodríguez administration’s subservience to Trump will secure any leeway in determining its political path forward, free from outside meddling—especially if, as is anticipated, the GOP lawmakers most likely to be impressed by such obsequiousness lose power in the US’s upcoming midterm elections (Axios, 9/23/26; Financial Times, 10/9/26).

Please think of the corporations!

Alongside their exceptionalist expectations about “democracy,” legacy outlets also focus on those they consider the true victims of Trump’s neocolonial offensive in Venezuela: multinational oil corporations.

According to Reuters (9/1/26), the recent oil deal “raises red flags for major producers,” who fear having their reputation sullied by being “seated at the same table with Betancourt,” as well as the prospect of the US government becoming a “competitor.”

Bloomberg (8/30/26) raised concerns that the agreement “reprises [the] neocolonial past” of Venezuela’s oil industry. The warning stems not from apprehension that the Venezuelan people’s future is being determined by a foreign nation, but from fear that the US’s “out-sized power” might lead to “popular unrest.” This could create conditions for what the business mouthpiece views as a catastrophic outcome: the nationalization of foreign-owned oil assets.

“The troubled history of Venezuela’s oil offers a cautionary tale,” Bloomberg’s Kevin Crowley and Patricia Garip wrote:

The country was once dominated by US and European operators and was among the world’s largest producers. But assets owned by ExxonMobil Holdings Corps. and ConocoPhillips were seized and nationalized during political upheaval in the 2000s.

Corporate media present companies that made massive profits in Venezuela for decades as victims, because the Chávez government wanted them to comply with new laws and accept minority stakes in joint ventures.

The New York Times (9/1/26) complains that the two corporations “have spent years trying to get the country to repay them for their seized assets, with little success.” The statement conceals the fact that the Venezuelan government, when it enacted the 2007 decree imposing state majority in all Orinoco Oil Belt projects, offered to compensate ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips for their transition to minority partners, or to buy out their assets altogether. However, both corporations rejected the offers in order to pursue international arbitration. The former has already recouped most of what it was granted, while the latter will eventually collect on a significant award.

Despite the fact that Chevron, BP, Shell and other energy giants have signed deals in recent months taking advantage of the reformed hydrocarbon law (Venezuelanalysis, 9/3/26), pundits complain that ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips remain “hesitant” (CBS, 8/31/26) and need to be “lured” (Reuters, 9/1/26). Still, the Western corporations are likely to return to the country with favorable deals (Reuters, 9/16/26).

The victor and his spoils

Faced with strategic defeat in West Asia, Trump has clung to his Venezuela success, stating on multiple occasions that “to the victor belong the spoils,” in reference to the US hijacking the Venezuelan oil industry following the January 3 attacks and presidential kidnapping (Al Jazeera, 9/24/26; Guardian, 9/26/26).

Furthermore, Trump has not been shy in boasting about the US winning a “war” against Venezuela (Financial Times, 9/18/26; New York Times, 6/26/26). Corporate journalists have rarely pointed out that this stance directly contradicts the administration’s official position that the kidnapping of Maduro and Flores was a “law enforcement” operation (New York Times, 1/6/26; PBS, 1/8/26) in order to justify bypassing congressional approval.

The US president has likewise claimed to have recovered the costs of the military operation “many times over” (Al Jazeera, 3/3/26; Guardian, 6/28/26), a fact confirmed by Luigi Pisella, a business sector spokesperson with close ties to the acting Rodríguez administration (Venezuelanalysis, 8/10/26). Pisella stated that the US has retained $4.7 billion from the Venezuelan export revenues it controls to cover the costs of its military operation.

In spite of their ostensible hostility to Trump, corporate outlets have historically been complicit with his Venezuela policies, from whitewashing a deadly sanctions program (FAIR.org, 6/13/22) to endorsing a military buildup over debunked “narcoterrorism” accusations (FAIR.org, 11/19/25). The New York Times and Washington Post went as far as to withhold information in order to not jeopardize the January 3 operation (FAIR.org, 1/13/26).

Now, with a semi-colonial regime in place, the only concerns are about procedural transparency, democratic appearances and the well-being of multinational corporations. The Venezuelan people always get the short end of the stick.

Source: FAIR

September 2: Chris Wright, Delcy Rodríguez and Paula Henao at the contract-signing ceremony for new deals with Chevron, Eni, and GE Vernova.

The lights could come back on in Maracaibo without Venezuelans gaining the capacity to change their government. More unsettlingly, restoring power to their homes could help keep those governing them in place.

This is the possibility taking shape in Venezuela. Chavismo’s relationship with Washington has changed under the pressure of American intervention; new investment could improve services while giving both the government and its foreign partners a growing interest in preserving the arrangement that delivers those improvements.

The issue goes beyond whether chavismo has abandoned its ideology: the infrastructure sustaining its power is being rebuilt around different relationships. Democratic demands now confront a governing system whose continuity may serve interests extending well beyond Venezuela.

A different foundation for continuity

Maduro remained after July 28, 2024, but maintaining control of the State could not repair the gap between holding office and having a credible electoral mandate. When US forces captured him in January 2026, that legitimacy deficit shaped the international response. Although there were international condemnations of the operation, opposing the use of force and defending Maduro’s right to govern were different positions. Some governments rejected his claim to the presidency while still questioning the intervention. 

Nevertheless, Maduro’s removal left much of the chavista governing apparatus in place. Under Delcy Rodríguez, that apparatus faces a powerful external actor that can influence its room to manoeuvre. Pragmatism is therefore more than an ideological preference: cooperation with Washington has become a condition of political survival.

Tension arises when immediate commercial stability becomes tied to particular officeholders and agreements whose terms a democratic government might review.

For Washington, the authorities in Caracas can authorize contracts and implement agreements. For those authorities, cooperation offers resources and international acceptance. Their interests are different, but they can converge around continuity.

That convergence is acquiring a material basis. On October 17, Rodríguez announced expectations of almost $76 billion in oil investment over five years. These are anticipated investments, rather than money already spent. As contracts, payments and operations develop, however, businesses may become increasingly dependent on the officials and arrangements enabling them.

This does not make democracy incompatible with American investment. Accountable institutions could offer stronger guarantees over time. Tension arises when immediate commercial stability becomes tied to particular officeholders and agreements whose terms a democratic government might review. Political change can then appear as a risk to be postponed.

What changes behind the light switch

In my earlier article on infrastructure after the earthquakes, I argued that relationships, trust and coordination are as necessary to a response as machinery. Electricity works the same way. A power station depends on engineers, maintenance routines, payments and decisions about where resources go.

In my sociotechnical research, a cultural infrastructure framework helps distinguish three connected levels. The first is what people experience. The second is how work is organized to provide it. The third concerns who has authority, whose expertise counts and what makes their decisions acceptable or open to challenge.

During Maduro’s presidency, the drought of 2016 and the blackouts of 2019 exposed failures across all three. Households lost electricity. Behind the outages were maintenance problems, fuel shortages and the loss of experienced staff. An assessment by the Inter-American Development Bank also identified weak planning and the absence of independent regulation. Repairing machinery could not, by itself, correct the arrangements allowing the system to deteriorate.

Venezuelans may receive better electricity without gaining a meaningful say in how the system operates.

Under Delcy, the third level has changed profoundly. Washington now helps shape the conditions for reconstruction, and international suppliers offer access to equipment and expertise. The US Department of Energy describes an agreement with GE Vernova to modernize the grid and expand generation over several years.

That shift could enable changes in the second level, from procurement and contractor payments to maintenance and staffing. Those changes could eventually improve the first level, with fewer outages and more reliable services. However, Reuters reported in May that suppliers still faced uncertainty over payments, project priorities and authorizations. Announcements do not remove accumulated failures.

The important distinction is that changing who authorizes recovery does not necessarily give citizens more authority over it. The third level can be extensively reorganized between governments and companies while remaining closed to the people who depend on the service.

Whose stability, and for how long?

Electricity makes the resulting tension concrete. An oil producer needs reliable power. A household needs it too. Investment serving production could benefit both, but shared need does not ensure equal influence over which installations are repaired first or which communities wait.

If those priorities are negotiated mainly between officials and investors, Venezuelans may receive better electricity without gaining a meaningful say in how the system operates. Successful repairs could strengthen the government’s public standing while making commercial partners more invested in its continuity.

The different timescales matter. As I argued in “Venezuela Isn’t Transitioning. It’s Operating,” daily life follows immediate needs while political change moves on another timetable. A repaired installation may reduce outages before the wider network has dependable maintenance. Sustaining improvements requires organizational capacity. Establishing public accountability requires political decisions that neither repairs nor foreign investment can make automatically.

Venezuelans should not have to choose between functioning services and political rights. Nor should investors have to depend on indefinite chavista rule for contracts to be secure.

Meanwhile, every contract and operational dependency can make the emerging arrangement harder to alter. A process presented as temporary stabilization could acquire beneficiaries with reasons to prolong it. Recovery would then help rebuild the foundations of chavista power before the question of democratic authority is settled.

That is why an electoral timetable matters alongside investment commitments. US-backed talks involving Dinorah Figuera continue while María Corina Machado remains outside the process and no firm election date has been established. The practical question is whether citizens acquire enforceable rights to scrutinize and replace their government while economic arrangements are being consolidated.

Reliable electricity would be a real improvement, but Venezuelans should not have to choose between functioning services and political rights. Nor should investors have to depend on indefinite chavista rule for contracts to be secure.

Chavismo’s pragmatism is rebuilding the relationships through which it can survive. Whether that reconstruction also serves democracy depends on who can challenge its terms. The lights coming back on may show that the system works better; the decisive political test is whether Venezuelans can change the people running it.

Oil prices have climbed towards their highest levels in five months as attacks on tankers in and around the Strait of Hormuz mount and efforts to end the United States-Israel war on Iran are deadlocked.

Brent crude, the international benchmark, rose by more than $2 to $110.85 a barrel on Wednesday, close to a five-month peak.

A day earlier, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said two tankers were “set ablaze” after hitting mines at what it called an illegal crossing point in the strait. Then, on Thursday, the IRGC said it hit seven more tankers although Washington dismissed the claim. In a statement, the IRGC said four of the vessels were transferring oil when they were targeted and caught fire overnight.

In September, the Houthis, an armed group also known as Ansar Allah (Arabic for Supporters of God), seized territory in Yemen close to the Bab al-Mandeb strait, a critical chokepoint into and out of the Red Sea and a gateway to Egypt’s Suez Canal.

The escalation came as the world’s emergency oil stocks, already tapped heavily since the Iran war began on February 28, sit at their lowest levels in decades.

Al Jazeera put a question to analysts: If fighting resumes in full, the Strait of Hormuz is shut off completely and Houthi attacks choke off Bab al-Mandeb, how long could the world’s reserves last?

Here’s what you need to know:

What emergency oil reserves are there?

Strategic oil reserves are stockpiles of crude oil and fuel held by governments or by companies on their behalf for use in a supply emergency.

The International Energy Agency (IEA), which was established in 1974 after the Arab oil embargo, coordinates most of them. Its importing members must hold at least 90 days of net imports. China and India are not members.

How much of the reserves has already been released this year?

A record amount.

On March 11, days after the start of the US-Israel war on Iran, the IEA’s 32 members agreed to make 400 million barrels available from emergency supplies, more than double the volume released after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The US pledged 172.2 million barrels from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) and Japan 79.8 million, according to IEA figures.

The SPR has since fallen to 283 million barrels, its lowest level since October 1982, according to the US Department of Energy.

Much of that oil was lent rather than sold and must be returned with extra barrels, according to the US Energy Information Administration.

How much oil is left?

Far less than before the war began in February, and not all of it can be used.

Aaron Kildow, a senior crude oil analyst at Sparta Commodities, told Al Jazeera that global strategic stocks excluding China and Iran have fallen by nearly 327 million barrels since the end of December 2025 with the US, Europe and Japan accounting for about 95 percent of the draw.

He estimated that leaves only about 400 million barrels of usable reserves worldwide, excluding China’s stockpile, which is unlikely to be exported, and Gulf stocks, which could be cut off by a total closure of Hormuz.

Nearly half of these available stocks are in Japan.

Europe has about 76 million barrels uncommitted, but members such as Germany are holding some back for a local emergency, Kildow said.

“Europe is the real wildcard, both on timing and willingness,” Kildow said.

Meanwhile, China’s onshore crude stocks stand at 1.13 billion barrels, down from 1.23 billion in late February but still enough for about 80 days of refinery intake, Muyu Xu, a senior crude oil analyst at the analytics firm Kpler, told Al Jazeera.

India’s reserves cover just eight days of its imports, the Reuters news agency reported.

What would a full closure of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb mean?

Before the war, about one-fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas supplies, or roughly 20 million barrels of oil a day, passed through the Strait of Hormuz.

Saudi Arabia has increased the amount of crude it transports from its oilfields in the east to its Red Sea port of Yanbu in the west via the East-West Pipeline, thereby bypassing Hormuz.

But there have been strikes on that pipeline, and tankers heading south from Yanbu must pass through Bab a-Mandeb, where the Iran-backed Houthis declared a blockade on Saudi shipping in July.

Only a confirmed 373,000 barrels a day of Saudi crude have transited Bab al-Mandeb so far this month, the lowest level since February, Xu said, with most Yanbu cargoes now heading north via Egypt instead.

If Hormuz were shut and the Houthis blocked all Saudi tankers, Gulf producers could export only through a few pipelines and Yanbu’s northbound route, Xu said.

That would leave about 7.5 million barrels a day of Middle Eastern crude, against 16.8 million now, a shortfall of about 9.3 million barrels a day, she estimated.

“If such attacks occur, the supply disruption could be even more severe and prolonged,” Xu said, referring to strikes on oilfields, terminals and pipelines.

So how long would reserves last?

Not for long – possibly just weeks, according to experts.

If Kpler’s estimated shortfall had to be covered entirely from the roughly 400 million usable barrels that Kildow identified, they could not, in practice, be released that fast. Japanese and South Korean reserves can move quickly, Kildow said, but US barrels are staged over three months, and Europe’s contribution is uncertain.

Chris Beauchamp, chief market analyst at IG Group, said the world was fortunate after the first closure. “The salient feature of March and beyond was how a crisis didn’t actually develop. We got away with it,” he said.

“I don’t think the global economy will be as lucky next time if there is a protracted conflict,” Beauchamp said. “A month or two is all we have.”

The world would not literally run out of oil. Instead, prices would rise until enough demand disappeared. “One hundred fifty dollars [per barrel] becomes a very distinct possibility, which then sees significant demand destruction,” Beauchamp said.

The sharpest squeeze would be on diesel, which is already nearly double the price of crude, the IEA said.

Refiners would compete for crude grades rich in diesel, “a cost that ultimately lands on consumers,” Kildow said.

Who would feel it first?

Asian importers with thin reserves.

Most Gulf exports in September and October went to Asian buyers, and India and Pakistan are among the most exposed, Kildow said, adding that their nearest alternative supply, from West Africa, is 25 to 28 days away by sea, compared with two days from Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates.

“The squeeze won’t hit uniformly. It lands fastest and hardest where reserves are thinnest and substitute supply is farthest away,” Kildow said.

Who would gain?

Oil producers far from the Gulf.

In the second quarter of this year, as the US-Iran war was under way, ExxonMobil reported earnings of $14.5bn, its highest in four years while Chevron posted $12bn, its best in six years and Shell more than doubled its earnings to nearly $10bn. Their profits are largely down to the high oil prices.

A second shock would send refiners scrambling for supplies from the US, Latin America, West Africa and Russia, Xu said.

“This would allow non-Middle Eastern producers to benefit from higher crude prices, potentially alongside lower transportation costs,” she said.

In August, US President Donald Trump said companies such as ExxonMobil and Chevron were “making too much money based on a shortage”.

New Delhi, India — United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio has arrived in India for a two-day visit, during which he is set to tour the Jamnagar refinery complex in Gujarat, owned by billionaire Mukesh Ambani’s Reliance Industries, a major player in global oil markets.

Reliance’s crude refinery in Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s home state is the world’s largest single-site refinery. In many ways, Reliance Industries’ businesses sit at the crossroads of the ongoing global energy crisis.

The conglomerate is central to Washington’s efforts to punish Russian energy buyers, while also trying to contain oil prices amid the war on Iran, on top of rising diesel costs in the US, where a crucial midterm election looms. Reliance has also only recently committed to a major investment in the US, which President Donald Trump’s administration has cited as an example of its successes in luring global capital.

Rubio is skipping the capital, New Delhi, at a time when the US-India bilateral relationship has been rocky, strained by a string of friction points — and an elusive trade deal.

So why is the top US diplomat visiting the world’s largest single-site oil refinery?

Where is Rubio visiting?

After meetings in Mumbai, India’s financial hub in the western state of Maharashtra, Rubio will fly to Jamnagar in neighbouring Gujarat, near the Gulf of Kutch. Jamnagar opens into the Arabian Sea and is home to Reliance Industries’ refining complex, a major hub for crude processing and fuel exports, which processes 1.4 million barrels per day (bpd).

Rubio had visited India earlier this year too, but this trip “is a little more business-focused”, the US ambassador to India, Sergio Gor, told reporters last week. A readout from Rubio’s office noted that he would “meet with business leaders to promote opportunities for commercial investment and economic cooperation”.

“[At Jamnagar] he will meet some of the folks at Reliance,” Gor said.

What’s in Jamnagar?

The world’s largest single-site oil-refining complex has a combined crude-processing capacity of 1.4 million bpd. That is nearly 1.5 percent of global refining capacity, according to the company.

The complex comprises two refineries: the original facility, commissioned in 1999 with a capacity of 660,000bpd, and a second, export-oriented refinery commissioned in 2008, adding 580,000bpd, which operates in a special economic zone.

Jamnagar imports crude from international suppliers and exports refined products to global markets. The refinery can process heavy, sulphur-rich crude that many facilities cannot handle efficiently, converting oil into higher-value products.

Reliance said last month that the complex has processed more than 216 crude grades, claiming to be “perhaps the only refinery to achieve this feat”.

The Jamnagar refinery’s capacity is also driving a sharp revival in imports of Venezuelan crude — taken over by the US earlier this year after abducting then-President Nicolas Maduro — as Washington seeks to reshape global oil trade.

Reliance is expected to account for roughly 350,000bpd to 370,000bpd of the October intake, according to estimates from analytics firm Kpler. “We will talk with Reliance about refining more Venezuelan crude,” Rubio told reporters in brief remarks on Tuesday.

Why is the refinery significant for global energy supplies?

Reliance is a central player in keeping global oil markets stable, as one of the world’s biggest suppliers of refined petroleum products. In September, for instance, six of the seven large cargo ships that docked at European Union ports carrying oil products were bearing Reliance goods.

Reliance’s biggest export is diesel, which Trump has been particularly worried about, with prices reaching historic highs in the US ahead of midterm elections early next month.

Though the data on exports by category is not public, an analysis by the Reuters news agency from trade sources noted that Reliance Industries exported 21.66 million tonnes of refined petroleum products in the first half of 2025 from Jamnagar. Diesel accounted for the largest share at 9.81 million tonnes, followed by petrol at 6.14 million tonnes and jet fuel at 2.06 million tonnes.

Europe accounted for the biggest share of the company’s exports, making up 28 percent of Reliance’s refined products during the period. Buyers include BP, ExxonMobil, Glencore, Vitol and Trafigura.

The Jamnagar refinery also shipped about $143m worth of oil products to the US last month, according to data cited by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), a think tank in Finland.

CREA noted in its report that the EU’s ban on importing petroleum products made from Russian crude from January 2026 does not adequately prevent products from refineries in third countries from entering Europe when those refineries also process Russian crude. The Jamnagar refinery is a prime example of that loophole.

Rubio’s visit to the refinery also comes as Trump faces his worst approval ratings amid inflation and rising fuel prices ahead of the midterm election in November. Just about 31 percent of Americans are happy with Trump’s performance – the lowest-ever number in his two terms, according to a Reuters/Ipsos survey.

The Trump administration has also reportedly been pushing Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to stop strikes on Russian energy facilities, which have rattled the global fuel markets.

Why the refinery is important for the Russia-Ukraine war

Reliance is also a critical actor in US efforts to influence how much oil Russia sells.

Since the start of Russia’s full-fledged war on Ukraine in February 2022, India has emerged as the second-largest buyer of Russian oil after China. And Reliance is driving that surge in imports. While only 3 percent of its oil was sourced from Russia before 2022, that share rose to 50 percent by 2025.

So when Trump imposed an additional 25 percent tariff on Indian goods in August 2025 to punish New Delhi for the purchase of Russian oil, Reliance was directly affected. It cut back on Russian crude imports significantly in subsequent months, but it still made up a third of the oil processed by Jamnagar’s refinery during the July-September 2026 quarter.

That was under threat when the Trump administration appeared poised to impose a 100 percent tariff on Indian goods because of continued Russian oil imports, under a new law passed last month.

But Trump has since suspended those proposed tariffs, easing concerns for India and Reliance.

Rubio has said India has been diversifying its import mix away from Russian crude, even as it still buys millions of barrels of Russian oil every day. “You’ve got countries like India, for example, that have voluntarily diversified their energy portfolio, but are still getting a substantial amount of energy from Russia because it’s hard to pivot from one day to the next,” Rubio said on Sunday.

“But they’re also an important ally and partner of the United States.”

Is Reliance also investing in the US?

Yes, India’s richest man, Mukesh Ambani, the chairman and managing director of Reliance Industries, is investing in the US, primarily through energy-related projects.

It is backing America First Refining’s planned oil refinery at the Port of Brownsville in Texas, also the first major US refinery in about 50 years, announced by Trump in March.

The refinery is expected to cost $3bn to $4bn and process about 60 million barrels of US crude annually. Reliance has signed a 20-year agreement to buy a large share of the facility’s output, with operations expected to start around 2029.

In November 2024, Reliance’s US subsidiary also acquired a 21 percent stake in helium explorer Wavetech Helium for $12m as part of its low-carbon energy strategy.

Last month, Trump announced that India’s Essar Group — an oil major with knee-deep ties to Russia — is planning an $18bn integrated steel investment in the US through its subsidiary, Mesabi Metallics.

Didn’t Trump’s ally just lock horns with Ambani?

Despite Reliance’s investments in the US and Rubio’s upcoming visit to the Jamnagar facility, Elon Musk, the world’s richest man who is also a key Trump ally, recently hit out at Ambani.

His Starlink space telecommunications firm has struggled for years to secure a licence to operate in India.

In ⁠a series of X posts recently, Musk accused Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government of stalling Starlink’s entry to ⁠favour market leader Ambani’s telecom firm, Jio. Musk taunted Ambani directly, addressing ‌him as “Prime ‌Minister Ambani” and asking whether he would “consider allowing Starlink to compete”. Starlink, Musk wrote, was being blocked by “oligarchs” protecting their “monopolistic chokehold” on Indians.

In a statement issued on X, Reliance said it has “never feared competition” and has “grown in an India that welcomes investment and innovation, homegrown or international”.

United States President Donald Trump has signed an executive order waiving newly-passed Russia sanctions, claiming the move is in the US’s “national interest”.

Earlier this month, Trump also announced a deal to bring stocks of Russian diesel into global markets, in a bid to drive down energy prices that have spiked during the US-Israel war on Iran. The US Treasury waived sanctions on Russian diesel sales until April 2027.

Trump’s embrace of Russian energy has angered Ukraine, European partners and many US officials, who say the move rewards Moscow while it continues its four-and-a-half-year war against its neighbour.

Ukraine’s President Volodmyr Zelenskyy slammed Trump’s diesel deal as “a gift” to Russia’s President Vladimir Putin that will help fund his war effort.

While European countries have also criticised Trump’s embrace of Russian energy, the US president has accused them of “hypocrisy”, as figures show that European Union countries continue to import Russian gas.

Here’s what we know:

Which sanctions has Trump waived?

In his executive order on Friday, Trump called off numerous planned Russia-related sanctions days before they were due to take effect, including duties on Russian goods and penalties for buying the country’s oil and gas.

The now-blocked measures were part of legislation passed in Congress with bipartisan support last month, named after the late US Senator Lindsay Graham, an outspoken critic of Russia.

They would have included up to 100 percent tariffs on all goods brought into the US from the five top importers of Russian crude oil or gas, including China and India. They could also have imposed equal penalties on countries deemed to have knowingly bought oil or gas from Russia 30 days after the law’s implementation, or to be among the top five countries helping Moscow circumvent sanctions on sales of its oil.

The waiver will hold until the Trump administration believes “further action is appropriate”, according to the executive order.

US Congressman Don Beyer, a Democrat from Virginia, said the sanctions waiver amounts to a “surrender to Putin” that “betrays our Ukrainian partners and defies clear congressional intent”.

Who will benefit from this?

Vasily Astrov, an economist at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, told Al Jazeera that the Russian government will likely be the greatest beneficiary because the easing of sanctions means Russian oil will not have to be further discounted.

He estimated that about 60 cents of every extra dollar in the price of a barrel of Russian oil would “end up in state coffers”.

Russian official Kirill Dmitriev, an envoy for Putin, hailed the US decision to waive the sanctions as “an important and truly historic moment”.

Other beneficiaries include major importers of Russian oil and gas, such as China and India, who are now less exposed to the risk of secondary US penalties.

While Trump hopes the measures will also help bring down oil prices for US consumers before November mid-term elections, experts say that is less certain.

Addressing the US’s recent diesel deal with Russia, EU economy chief Valdis Dombrovskis said it is unlikely to have a significant impact on global prices.

According to Trump, that deal would bring 300,000 tonnes of diesel fuel into US and global markets “immediately”, followed by 500,000 tonnes in November, and 1 million tonnes afterwards.

“If we look at the volumes, they are not of any macroeconomic significance, and frankly, there are strong doubts whether Russia is even able to supply those volumes, and according also to US quality standards, those are big question marks,” Dombrovskis told the AFP news agency.

Which countries still buy oil from Russia?

China and India are the largest buyers of Russian crude oil, purchasing 6 billion euros ($6.74bn) and 3.6 billion euros ($4.04bn) worth respectively in September, according to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), a nonprofit think tank.

Hungary and Slovakia, the landlocked EU members that have exemptions to the bloc’s ban on Russian crude, also remain big customers, buying a combined 290 million euros ($326m) worth of the commodity in September, said CREA. Turkiye imported 172 million euros ($193m) worth of Russian crude oil the same month, the think tank added.

Since the end of 2022, the largest importers of Russian oil products, which include diesel, have been Turkiye, China, Saudi Arabia, Brazil and Singapore.

Saudi Arabia imported the most Russian oil products in September at 534 million euros ($600m), followed by Turkiye with 321 million euros ($361m), China with 304 million euros ($342m) and India with 161 million euros ($181m).

Is Europe buying increasing amounts of gas from Russia?

“The European Council regrets the United States’ decision to temporarily lift sanctions on Russian diesel,” European leaders said in a joint statement adopted following a two-day European Council meeting in Brussels this week.

But despite its own near-blanket ban on Russian oil, the EU has continued to import large quantities of Russian gas, though it plans to phase out those imports next year.

Urgewald, a Germany-based group that researches coal companies, reported this week that more than 12 million tonnes of Russian Arctic LNG was transported into EU ports from January to September this year, a 9.5 percent jump from the same period last year.

In September, EU countries imported 817 million euros ($918m) of pipeline gas, and 615 million euros ($691m) of liquefied natural gas (LNG), according to CREA.

EU members France and the Netherlands were the largest LNG importers, bringing in 446 million euros ($501m) and 116 million euros ($130m) respectively, according to the think tank. France’s LNG imports represented a 103 percent increase from the previous month, it added.

France’s President Emmanuel Macron has been among the most outspoken about Trump’s diesel deal with Russia, saying on Friday that it “sends a negative message” and would have no impact on global prices.

Hungary imported the most Russian pipeline gas of any EU member by far during the month, with 414 million euros ($465m) worth. Slovakia and Bulgaria brought in 161 million euros ($181m) and 132 million euros ($148m), respectively, according to CREA data.

The “biggest oil deal in history” was announced almost simultaneously by acting Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez and U.S. President Donald Trump on Aug. 28. However, many Venezuelans didn’t find out until the next day because massive blackouts — up to 16 hours a day and partly caused by increased oil production — kept them from scrolling the news.

At the United Nations a month later, Trump bragged that he had taken Venezuela’s “spoils,” while Rodríguez said the deal with the U.S. would contribute to resolving the energy needs of “the hemisphere and the international economy.” Venezuelans then asked: What about our energy needs and economy?

The oil deal, the legal and operational details of which are still unknown, covers the exploitation of 17 fields and 65 billion barrels, which equates to 20% of Venezuela’s total reserves — the world’s largest, at an estimated 303 billion barrels. U.S. companies will invest $100 billion in exploiting the fields, a figure which — according to Venezuelan government projections — would translate into more than $209 billion in tax revenue for Venezuela over the years of the contract.

The announcement sparked questions and criticism from different sectors of the country, with concerns about the lack of information and the impact on sovereignty. In response, Rodríguez tried to explain the deal’s benefits in a nationally televised address, noting, “How much does Venezuela receive? Based on a barrel price of $65 … revenue would reach $209.3 billion for the state. In concrete terms, this means that for every barrel produced and sold, about $19 goes to [Venezuela].”

Oil drives the Venezuelan economy. Currently, it accounts for 71% of the nation’s total exports, but now much of that revenue goes to the U.S. In the first quarter of this year, out of a total of $7.76 billion in exports, $5.5 billion came from oil activity. As the acting president’s address went on, many of us only had more doubts.

A few hours later, Venezuelan economist Francisco Rodríguez summed up some of the nation’s concerns: “Do the projected tax revenues … correspond to nominal amounts, inflation-adjusted amounts, or net present values? A nominal amount of $19 per barrel in 2051, the project’s final year, would correspond to a real value of about $9 today.”

“The $209 billion equates, over 25 years, to about $8.4 billion annually, a relatively low amount compared with the tax revenue Venezuela has collected in the past at similar production levels. The amount would be even lower if it corresponds to a nominal total.” According to Central Bank of Venezuela data, Venezuela took in a record $82.8 billion in 2008 alone from oil sales.

Contradictions

Trump later contradicted Delcy Rodríguez’s 25-year timeline, saying the deal would involve a century of concessions. Francisco Rodríguez, the economist, noted that extracting 65 billion barrels in 25 years would be impossible, due to lack of infrastructure. 

“What rights does the U.S. acquire over these resources after 25 years? Can a future Venezuelan government decide to withdraw from this deal if it doesn’t like it?” he asked.

And why wouldn’t they like it? Trump said on Truth Social that Venezuela will begin supplying the U.S. strategic oil reserve immediately through “a gift.” Nobody knows what that means exactly, but since the military intervention on Jan. 3, the revenue generated by the sale of Venezuelan oil — we don’t know how much that is either — is already “in the custody” of the U.S. Treasury.

“It doesn’t look like Venezuela will benefit broadly in the long term. It’s like being on floor minus-18 and going up to minus-10,” Venezuelan researcher Blas Regnault, who specializes in energy policy and oil governance, told Truthdig from The Hague, Netherlands.

“There could be an indirect reactivation of the economy because of the indirect jobs that may emerge in some regions. But let’s also keep in mind that the country has been 100% blockaded, suffocated, so any door that opens will bring some benefits, but this is not the benefit one would expect for a sovereign country,” he said. 

“That’s the other problem: There’s no sovereignty of any kind over the resource itself, over what’s being sold. On top of that, there’s a lot of opacity — you’re analyzing blind.”

This “opacity” is also illegal. Articles 150 and Article 187, Paragraph 9, of Venezuela’s Constitution state that contracts of national public interest with foreign states or entities require approval from the National Assembly. However, although the Assembly endorsed the announcement of the deal on Sept. 1, its president, Jorge Rodríguez, said it had not yet been “submitted” to the legislature. Then, a month later he said that “according to some legal experts, it doesn’t need to be reviewed.”

It’s clear that Venezuela is once again, as it was for much of the 20th century, a kind of “U.S. oil province,” Regnault says, “Recovering sovereignty won’t be easy because Venezuela is strategic to U.S. interests.”

“On top of that, the other side of the coin is that China has become a key player [globally]. Today the Chinese do what Saudi Arabia used to do when it cut production and pushed prices up. With this Strait of Hormuz crisis, after the naval blockade of Iran, it was discovered that China had more reserves than previously thought, and that kept the crisis from being bigger and the price from reaching $150.”

That is precisely why U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio celebrated the fact that several of the oil fields included in the deal were once “dominated by China and Russia and Iran.” At the same time, the U.S. government has decided to maintain sanctions against Venezuela, thereby preventing any new economic players. In fact, the U.S. Treasury Department, through its Office of Foreign Assets Control, updated its oil licensing policy for Venezuela in late September through Orders 46E, 48D and 49B, which benefit U.S. businesses but maintain an absolute ban on Russia, Iran, Cuba, North Korea and China.

“The [Venezuelan] government has already amended the Hydrocarbons Law to try to create more favorable conditions for investors in the oil and gas sector, but … the [U.S.’] problem isn’t domestic supply. They need to monopolize the world’s energy reserves, markets and prices in order to prevail in the rest of their economic activities,” oil expert David Paravisini explains to Truthdig from Caracas, referring to a legal reform that was passed on Jan. 29 and created the possibility of technical and operational management and direct commercialization by private companies. He believes that for Venezuela, the deal is a diplomatic “quest” to survive. 

Trump is also maintaining some of his domestic support by presenting Venezuela as the great economic and geopolitical victory of his administration, especially after the war against Iran — which was supposed to last “only a couple of weeks” — reached the six-month mark and cost more than $37.5 billion through the end of July. In fact, Trump has claimed again and again that this oil deal will lower fuel costs inside the U.S. and come “at no cost whatsoever to the American taxpayer.””

Does this mean the $100 billion investment will come from private companies? The deal also aims to exploit eight greenfield blocks, areas where crude has been identified but which have not yet been developed. But what happens if that investment does not materialize? Since Jan. 9, Trump has been trying, without success, to persuade U.S. oil companies to invest in Venezuela.

Corruption is fine if the U.S. profits

So far, the only company we’ve heard about is North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP), which was selected on Aug. 31 by the Trump administration to lead oil extraction projects in the 17 Venezuelan fields.

According to the White House, the Department of Defense will hold a 35% equity stake in NABEP and, in addition, the Barbados-registered company will grant Washington the right to buy 20% of the oil it produces at the cost of production.

NABEP, which has only operated in Venezuela for two years, was awarded the deal without a prior bidding process. The company belongs to Venezuelan businessperson Alejandro Betancourt, who was under investigation by federal prosecutors in Florida until January 2026 for allegedly laundering more than $1 billion from the state-owned Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA). The case was then closed suddenly under the orders of U.S. Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche (now the attorney general), after a decade-long investigation. He is still the subject of open investigations in Switzerland and Spain.

Betancourt comes from a middle-class family but studied at the private religious school Instituto Cumbres de Caracas, where he befriended Javier Alvarado Pardi, son of Javier Alvarado Ochoa, who later became president of Electricidad de Caracas, deputy energy minister and a PDVSA executive.

Back in 2009, Alvarado Ochoa presented Betancourt and his engineering firm, Derwick Associates, as the best solution to Venezuela’s power generation crisis. Betancourt went on to receive 12 government contracts, awarded without competitive bidding, worth a total of $5 billion, which were either never completed or were implemented improperly, according to Transparency Venezuela and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (which is funded by the U.S. government, among other countries).

So why Betancourt? Rubio said that he is no longer under investigation by the U.S., has supported the Venezuelan opposition and he has demonstrated his ability to produce oil. In that vein, NABEP claims it produces 200,000 barrels of crude a day, just behind Chevron.

However, Victor Hugo Majano, a Venezuelan investigative journalist and director of the well-known outlet La Tabla, told Truthdig that Betancourt overbilled the Venezuelan state by billions of dollars for power plants that never worked. He cited information from Thor Halvorssen, an anti-Chavista activist and cousin of Venezuelan opposition leader Leopoldo López. With that money, Betancourt bought a Dassault Falcon private jet and the historic Alamíin Castle in Spain.

Halvorssen also says Betancourt, who is also linked to 50 companies spread across 15 countries, paid former New York prosecutor Adam S. Kaufmann to halt prosecutions; former Wall Street Journal reporters to discredit whistleblowers; and former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani to bring the U.S. Justice Department over to his side.

“Despite this, the U.S. still doesn’t attack Venezuelan corruption. They want to protect the dollar and the U.S. financial system. They are only worried about securing capital flow, money that is not controlled by the state, the [Venezuelan] government,” Majano said.

More oil for the U.S., less electricity for Venezuela

Meanwhile, Venezuelans are paying the price for both Betancourt’s alleged corruption and the oil deal. So far this year, oil production has increased by 29.9%, going from 924,000 barrels per day (bpd) in January to an average of 1.2 million bpd. The increase has been driven by the need to deliver oil to U.S. companies, and it has directly worsened the nation’s electricity crisis.

Authorities acknowledge this; Venezuela’s interior minister, Diosdado Cabello, said in May the country is seeing higher electricity demand due to the growth in oil production, which “is a very serious problem.” The Ministry of Electrical Energy also noted that demand has reached 15,625 megawatts (MW), “the highest energy consumption figure in the last eight years, an increase of 3.6% compared with the peak reported in 2025.”

However, this statement omits that Venezuela actually has a nominal installed capacity of approximately 35,000 MW, double the country’s peak demand, but stable real generation barely reaches 11,000 MW. This shortfall is a result of both U.S. sanctions and domestic corruption, which together have led to disinvestment, lack of maintenance, fuel shortages (plants designed to run on natural gas have been forced to use low-quality diesel) and transmission problems.

Where does oil production come in? Víctor Poleo, an electrical engineer and former vice minister of Energy and Mines from 1999 to 2001, told Truthdig that “the national oil industry uses up about 1,500 MW, of which about 250 MW is self-generated, but another 1,250 MW is taken from the national interconnected system. This draw is 24/7 and must be continuous in order to carry out crude extraction, transport, pumps and compressors and refining.”

Poleo, who bases his analysis on studies by fellow electrical engineer Nelson Hernández, says light, medium and heavy crudes are estimated to require between 9 kilowatt-hours and 15 kilowatt-hours per barrel to produce. For extra-heavy Orinoco crudes, the estimate is 24 kilowatt-hours per barrel. “As a result, citizens lose their quality of life so that oil can be produced.”

This deterioration is particularly notable in Zulia state, Venezuela’s so-called oil cradle, where production has risen to between 350,000 and 370,000 barrels per day of light and medium crude — far below the historic peak of 1.5 million bpd in 2004, but a figure that, for its residents, has translated into daily blackouts exceeding 12 hours.

From the Isla Dorada residential complex in northern Maracaibo, capital of Zulia, José Javier León tells Truthdig that power failures “have worsened dramatically.” In his area, outages used to last four hours but now exceed seven. 

“In many places there are double rounds, meaning the power goes out in the morning and at night, or at night and then before dawn. All the problems have gotten worse, and we don’t know the real reasons. In the suburb of Cuatricentenario, one of the most working-class areas and where the government had the most electoral support, the cuts are the worst,” he says.

León complains that residents are not alerted when the outages will happen. There is nothing like the electricity rationing schedules of the past, which would at least let them plan better. “In my area, there is no domestic gas, so we have electric stoves. Also, these are apartment buildings, where we have to turn on pumps to get water.” To make matters worse, the temperature in Zulia often reaches 39 degrees Celsius (102 Fahrenheit) because of the humidity.

In the Andes, outages add up to as many as 12 hours a day, and 16 hours in rural or border areas. From La Hechicera, an urban neighborhood in the city of Mérida, Silvana Solano tells Truthdig that the power used to go out for seven to eight hours, once a day, “but for the past two months, it goes out twice a day, the first time for seven hours and the other for around five hours, and we can’t predict the schedule. This also affects phone signals, which keeps us from communicating, making payments, etc.”

Some government institutions, including the Mérida mayor’s office, are open only from 8 a.m. to noon. Solano says she is worried that public schools, which operate until 3 p.m., will also adopt this schedule, in turn affecting parents’ working hours. Throughout September, residents of the towns of Caja Seca (Zulia state) and Nueva Bolivia (Mérida state) blocked the Pan-American Highway to protest the power outages.

To Venezuela’s north, on the famous Margarita Island, Alejandro Pérez tells Truthdig there are areas that have gone seven to eight months without water service. “Here we pay for water trucks, $50 for 10,000 liters of water, sometimes with $60 we get 13,000 liters, but you have to pay in foreign cash or at the parallel rate because the Central Bank of Venezuela exchange rate isn’t accepted here.” The black market or informal exchange rate is worth more, for those with foreign currency, than the official exchange rate.

Unlike other Caribbean islands, Margarita doesn’t have significant natural sources of fresh water. Some 90% of the area’s water comes from the mainland, crossing the sea through underwater pipelines that require gigantic pumping stations.

The contradictory rhetoric and the endless problems we face daily mean that, according to the latest AtlasIntel poll conducted for Bloomberg News, only 10% of Venezuelans believe the country will benefit from the oil pact with the U.S. — data that also aligns with the most recent study by the firm Meganálisis, the same one that after Jan. 3 said 92.2% of Venezuelans loved Trump. Emotions change, social problems persist, and without electricity, no economic improvement will be possible.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

Source: Truthdig

Fuel theft cited in Baniyas-Homs leak as gas export line in Hasakah catches fire.

Two pipelines carrying gas and oil products were damaged in separate incidents in Syria, state media reported, the latest disruptions to the country’s energy infrastructure following a series of suspected sabotage attacks.

The state-owned Syrian Petroleum Company announced the damage on Thursday, according to the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA). The incidents add to a number of attacks on Syria’s oil and gas network in recent months, as the government tries to revive its energy sector.

An explosion struck the Jbessa gas pipeline in southern Hasakah province in the late afternoon, hours after damage to a pipeline transporting oil products from the coastal city of Baniyas to Homs caused a fuel leak.

The company said the gas pipeline had been targeted in a “sabotage attack”, according to SANA.

Neither SANA nor the company named a suspect or group responsible for the attacks.

Repairs under way

Oday al-Satouf, head of the company’s media office, told SANA that a hole was found in the Baniyas-Homs pipeline in the Hadida area, west of Homs. Crews isolated the affected stretch and secured the surrounding area, he said, closing valves on either side of the damaged section. Repairs have begun, while other teams monitor the area for safety. State media said the leak was believed to be linked to an attempted fuel theft.

Al-Satouf said gas would continue to reach power stations through alternative arrangements, and that domestic gas supplies were unaffected, according to SANA.

A string of incidents

More than a week ago, the company said an oil pipeline near Tal Hamis in the northeastern province of Hasakah was damaged in a sabotage attack. It added that authorities had arrested those responsible.

In late September, a fire broke out on a gas pipeline between al-Shoula and Deir Az Zor in the east, halting gas flows from the Jbessa plant to power stations, SANA reported. Hisham al-Saleh, a gas sector official at the company, said gas pressure in the area fell as crews worked to extinguish the blaze.

Syria has been working to restore its energy infrastructure and increase domestic oil production. That includes resuming operations at oil fields in Hasakah to supply refineries in Homs and Baniyas. In January, the petroleum company announced plans to transport crude from recently recovered fields to the two refineries as part of efforts to revive the sector.

Ukraine president earlier said Kyiv was ‘done’ with energy ceasefire and strikes on Russian oil refineries would resume.

Russia says Ukraine has targeted an oil refinery in Ryazan, about 180 kilometres (110 miles) south of Moscow, as President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Kyiv was “done” with an energy ceasefire unilaterally announced by United States President Donald Trump over the weekend.

“The Kyiv regime attempted a large-scale attack on an oil refinery in Ryazan,” Moscow’s defence ministry said in a statement on Thursday, adding that a “fire broke out after drone debris fell onto the refinery site.”

Ukraine’s president earlier told the British newspaper the Financial Times that strikes on Russian oil refineries would resume, and accused the US of weakening Ukraine’s position on the battlefield by allegedly withdrawing crucial intelligence sharing.

Trump on Sunday unilaterally announced an “energy ceasefire” that was not publicly confirmed, and Moscow continued striking Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Ukraine said it suspended attacks on Russian energy sites for several days after Trump’s announcement.

The US has pressured Ukraine to halt strikes on Russian refineries, claiming that a suspension of attacks and a deal to purchase 1.8 million tonnes of diesel from Russia would help reduce soaring fuel prices.

“This politically is not simple [in America], because everybody will want to ask how it can be when some people are surviving, fighting, dying – and you make . . . business with the guys with such aggression,” Zelenskyy told the FT.

Zelenskyy also alleged that Ukraine’s access to SpaceX’s satellite internet service was restricted, potentially leaving it more vulnerable to Russian attacks. The Ukrainian armed forces use SpaceX’s military-grade Starshield system for offensive and defensive operations.

In a post on X on Wednesday evening, SpaceX owner Elon Musk said that only the US military and Trump had the authority to limit Starshield’s usage and speed for clients.

In a separate post, he called for Zelenskyy to “go” as Ukraine’s leader.

“And so the slaughter continues,” Musk wrote in a separate post on X. “Time for Zelensky to go.”

Ukraine is heavily dependent on Western military aid in its fight against Russia, particularly from the US and Germany. However, Kyiv’s relations with Washington have been strained in recent weeks, with Trump calling on Saturday for Zelenskyy to be replaced.

Against this backdrop of tensions, Zelenskyy said he would be willing to pause strikes on Russian energy sites again, but only if the US supplied Ukraine with crucial Patriot interceptors.

Zelenskyy is due to meet European leaders in Brussels on Thursday as he pushes for tougher sanctions on Moscow and faster delivery of support from the European Union.

Dutch Prime Minister Rob Jetten has called on EU leaders to “step up” their game to ensure Ukraine wins the war against Russia.

The EU has already pledged $50 billion in support for Ukraine next year. However, the sum falls far short of the $175 billion Kyiv plans to spend on its defences next year.

Trump has denied that the US has stopped sharing intelligence with Ukraine.