news

Naegohyang FC will play the South’s Suwon FC on May 20 in the semifinal of the Women’s Asian Champions League.

A North Korean women’s football club will become the first sports team from the country to play in South Korea since 2018 when they visit this month, Seoul’s Ministry of Unification has confirmed.

The neighbours remain technically at war after their 1950-53 conflict ended in an armistice rather than a peace treaty, and sporting and cultural exchanges between them are very rare.

Naegohyang Women’s FC will play the South’s Suwon FC Women on May 20 in the semifinals of the Asian Champions League.

The visiting delegation will include 27 players and 12 club staff, the ministry said on Monday. South Korea’s football association told the AFP news agency that the team would arrive on May 17.

They will fly into Incheon airport on an Air China flight from Beijing, a Unification Ministry official said.

The winner of the match at Suwon Sports Complex, south of the capital Seoul, will play the final of Asia’s top women’s club competition against either Australia’s Melbourne City or Japan’s Tokyo Verdy Beleza on May 23.

“The losing team in the semifinal will return home on Thursday, May 21, with no third-place playoff scheduled,” the ministry statement added.

The match will be the first time a North Korean sports team has played in the South since shooting, youth football and table tennis delegations travelled there in 2018.

The last time Pyongyang sent a women’s football team to the South was in 2014, when the North Korean national team took part in the Asian Games in Incheon.

Founded in 2012 and based in the North Korean capital, much of Naegohyang’s squad is “made up of national team-level players”, the ministry said.

North Korea’s national team is one of the dominant forces in Asian women’s football, winning multiple international titles in recent years, especially at the youth level.

The most recent one came in November last year, when they defeated the Netherlands 3-0 in the final of the U-17 Women’s World Cup.

Aaron Hardie’s brilliant all-round performance ensured Peshawar Zalmi clinched their second Pakistan Super League cricket title with a five-wicket win over newcomers Hyderabad Kingsmen, despite an early wobble in the run chase in the final.

Hardie grabbed 4-27 to bowl out Hyderabad for a below-par 129 all out in 18 overs and then hit a fluent 56 not out off 39 balls to anchor Peshawar to 130-5 in 15.2 overs, in front of a packed crowd at the Gaddafi Stadium in Lahore on Sunday.

It completed a redemption arc for Peshawar’s captain Babar Azam, who finished the franchise-based T20 tournament as its leading run-scorer after finding himself in and out of Pakistan’s T20 squad in recent years.

“It’s a very big achievement for me, for Peshawar Zalmi and all the fans,” Babar said after winning his first PSL title as skipper.

“Throughout the tournament, we’ve performed really well as a team … Every player executed the plans they were given in batting, bowling, and fielding. Our plan was to go match by match.”

The crowd at the Gaddafi Stadium in Babar’s hometown chanted his name and erupted in joy when Hardie scored the winning runs for the team in yellow and pink kits.

Peshawar, who won the toss and chose to chase, had slumped to 40-4 inside the first five overs after losing Babar for a golden duck, while Mohammad Haris, Kusal Mendis, and Michael Bracewell also fell for single-digit scores.

But Hardie, who smashed nine fours, then combined in a match-winning stand of 85 runs with Abdul Samad (48), who missed out on his half-century before holing out in the deep when Peshawar needed only five runs for victory.

“It was just a great game of cricket,” Hardie said. “Kingsmen came out of the blocks really hard. They’ve certainly had a lot of momentum from the last couple of games and they carried that in, but I’m really proud of the way the boys were able to fight back.”

Peshawar were favourites for the title after losing only one game in the tournament, with Babar, who scored two centuries, equalling Fakhar Zaman’s PSL record of 588 runs in one edition of the tournament.

Earlier, Saim Ayub (54) scored a fighting half-century to help Hyderabad post 129.

Hyderabad had a productive power play of 69-2, despite Hardie having captain Marnus Labuschagne (20) caught behind off a rising delivery, and Maaz Sadaqat’s early aggression was cut short to just 11 runs when he half-heartedly pulled pace bowler Mohammad Basit to deep backward square leg in the first over.

However, Hyderabad lost momentum and crashed to 73-6 in the space of nine balls after the power play for just two runs.

The slide began when Usman Khan, coming into the final with half-centuries in the last three successive games, was trapped leg before wicket by the tournament’s leading wicket-taker Sufyan Moqim (1-23).

Irfan Khan and Kusal Perera were run out due to some sharp fielding by Bracewell, and between those dismissals, Glenn Maxwell was undone by Nahid Rana’s (2-22) pace and got caught first ball while going for a pull against the Bangladesh fast bowler.

Ayub stretched the total beyond the 100-run mark with a knock of 54 off 50 balls before he fell in Hardie’s last over as he top-edged a pull to mid-on, before the fast bowler wrapped up the innings by having No 11 batter Akif Javed caught behind.

The Australian batter, who was visibly moved to tears after leading Hyderabad into the final in a dramatic last-over win over Islamabad United in the second qualifier on Friday, admitted that his team did not post an imposing target.

“As a batting group, we probably left a few runs out there,” Labuschagne said. “We showed once again that belief in the side and what we can do, putting them four for 40, but just not enough runs on the board tonight.”

Hyderabad had a fairytale run in the tournament when they came back strongly after losing their first four league games, and also knocked out both former champions Multan Sultans and Islamabad United in the playoffs.

“Tonight hurts,” Labuschagne said. “But reflecting on what an amazing tournament we’ve put together, coming from four losses to winning four in a row, getting bowled out for 80 then winning by 100, and then winning two games to get into the final, we’ve made so many great memories and I’m just so proud of the team, it’s been an awesome effort.”

Inter Milan win their 21st Scudetto, edging Napoli, with three matches remaining in the Italian football league season.

Celebrations have erupted across Milan after Inter clinched the Serie A title with a 2-0 victory over Parma, sending thousands of supporters into the streets.

The Piazza del Duomo was filled with fans clad in blue and black on Sunday, moments after the final whistle at the nearby San Siro, as flares and fireworks lit up the night sky.

Marcus Thuram opened the scoring in first-half stoppage time before Henrikh Mkhitaryan sealed the win 10 minutes from time. The winners moved up to 82 points and clinched their 21st Scudetto with three matches remaining in the campaign.

Inter entered the match knowing a point would be enough after second-placed Napoli were held to a 0-0 draw at Como on Saturday, and their own result the next day handed them an unbeatable 12-point lead at the top.

Despite the scarcity of clear-cut chances, Inter controlled much of the first half and established themselves deep in the Parma half.

The hosts came close in the 25th minute when a powerful close-range shot from Nicolo Barella struck the underside of the bar. The rebound then hit Parma goalkeeper Zion Suzuki on the back, but the Japan international reacted quickly to tip the ball away from near the line and out of danger.

Thuram sparked a frenzy among the home supporters in first-half stoppage time, slotting home after being found unmarked by a Piotr Zielinski through ball to put Inter ahead.

The second half followed a similar pattern with Inter remaining in control but failing to capitalise on their dominance as supporters inside the stadium grew increasingly focused on the clock ticking to 90 minutes.

Federico Dimarco delivered a near-perfect cross to Denzel Dumfries in the closing stages, but the defender failed to control his first touch, sending the close-range effort high over the bar and missing the chance to seal the match.

Mkhitaryan sealed the victory 10 minutes from time, tapping in a low cross from Lautaro Martinez to secure the points and spark title celebrations among Inter supporters.

For Inter, the triumph offered redemption after the heartbreak of last season when the club lost the Serie A title on the last match day before a 5-0 thrashing by Paris Saint-Germain in the Champions League final.

“We feel so happy now. It was not easy to start again after a season where we lost all the competitions we were in right at the end, but I am very happy today with this achievement,” Martinez said.

“It was a very important objective for us, perhaps many didn’t see us being favourites considering what happened last term, but we worked so hard on and off the field.”

The atmosphere in the Italian metropolis stood in stark contrast to a year ago when supporters faced the combined heartbreak of losing the league title to Napoli on the final day and suffering defeat in the Champions League final.

“I have no words. In spite of everyone who jinxed us from start to finish. Go Inter, always,” Inter fan Fabio said. “Wonderful. Amazing. And compared to how it ended last year, this year we deserve everything.”

Many supporters were seen in tears at the celebrations.

“It was more than deserved. It was a difficult league season at the start because it was always there, neck and neck,” fellow Inter fan Federico said.

The festivities are expected to continue ahead of the Coppa Italia final on May 13 when Lazio stand in the way of a domestic double for Inter.

Venezuela’s recent Hydrocarbon Law reform has sparked fierce debates about its short- and long-term implications. In this essay, Blas Regnault, an energy policy analyst and researcher, offers an in-depth analysis of the new legislative framework, from the significant changes to the state’s governance over its natural resources to his perspective on a sovereign recovery of the oil industry.

The recent hydrocarbon reform: an overview

It is important to distinguish between two closely connected but analytically separate developments: first, US oversight of Venezuelan oil revenues after Maduro’s kidnapping; and secondly, the new Hydrocarbon Law itself. The first is an externally imposed mechanism that conditions oil sales, revenue collection, transport, and the distribution of oil proceeds to US interests. The second is a domestic legal reform whose constitutionality and political legitimacy have been widely questioned.

It remains unclear whether the new law is fully operative in practice, or whether it is only being applied selectively while its fiscal substance is displaced by the US revenue-control mechanism. ^{But the outcome is largely the same: a loss of fiscal automaticity and a form of fiscal sovereignty under tutelage in relation to Venezuelan oil income.}

In other words, the crisis of governance in the Venezuelan oil sector, together with its chronic lack of transparency since 2017, now culminates in a profound loss of sovereign control over all three dimensions of the business: its rentier dimension, belonging to the nation; its fiscal dimension, belonging to the state; and its shareholder dimension, linked to the role of the state oil company PDVSA as principal participant in extraction and commercialisation.

Therefore, the new law is not simply a technical reform. It is not merely about updating contracts, modernising procedures, or making the sector more attractive to investors. The deeper issue is that the reform changes the way the nation is compensated for the use of the subsoil and therefore alters the very governance of the sector. What is at stake is the relationship between sovereignty, ownership of the subsoil, and public income.

It is true that, on paper, the law formally preserves state ownership over the resource. But the business models it opens weaken the practical substance of that ownership. And that is the crucial point. Ownership is not a decorative legal formula. Ownership means that the state, acting on behalf of the nation, has the right to decide whether the resource remains underground or is extracted; and if it is extracted, under what conditions, with what public charge, and for whose benefit. The recent reform softens the link between ownership and the nation’s participation as owner of the subsoil, turning something that was once grounded in a general rule into something negotiable, adjustable, and highly discretionary.

A useful way of understanding the economic and social significance of the reform is to distinguish the different streams of public income historically associated with oil in Venezuela. Under the former hydrocarbon law, the nation participated in the oil business through three distinct channels: as owner, as tax authority, and as shareholder. The first channel, corresponding to ownership, was royalty. The second was taxation, arising from the state’s fiscal authority over the activity. The third was dividends, arising when the state participated through PDVSA and therefore received income in its capacity as stakeholder rather than as landlord or tax authority.

This distinction matters because the oil business has historically involved different claimants competing over the fruits of extraction. In a sector marked by extraordinary profitability and strategic importance, the owner of the rent, the fiscal authority, and the capitalist operator all seek to maximize their share of the value generated. In the Venezuelan framework that prevailed before 2026, those three roles were clearly present: the nation as owner of the subsoil, the state as fiscal authority, and the operator as capitalist actor. The new law alters the balance between them.

Royalty

The royalty is where the change is most revealing. As already noted, royalty is the clearest expression of ownership. It is paid upfront. It does not depend on profit. It is charged before taxes are assessed and before the remaining income covers the factors of production; that is, wages, interest, profits, and the other claimants on the project. In other words, royalty is not part of the production costs. If the oil price is 100 dollars per barrel and the agreed royalty rate is 30 per cent, the owner receives 30 dollars per barrel straight away. That is the proprietorial logic in its purest form.This has long been a battleground in the global oil industry. The dispute over rent has historically taken place between the operating companies, whether private national oil companies acting as operators, and the owner of the resource, that is, the landlord. Depending on the property-rights regime, that owner may be a private individual, as in parts of Texas, or the state, as in Venezuela and in most oil-exporting countries. Whether in Texas, Alaska, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Norway, the United Kingdom, Nigeria, or Venezuela, the property-rights regime has been the principal legal instrument through which the owner secures a share of the rent. It is a legitimate exercise of sovereignty, recognised by all parties involved in the global oil business.

And yet the new law, in practical terms, empties out that proprietorial logic by turning royalty into a negotiable variable within a range of zero to 30 per cent, something highly unusual in the global oil business. The potential scale of the loss becomes immediately clear once one thinks in terms of export volumes. At an oil price of 86 dollars per barrel, a 1 per cent royalty leaves the nation with less than one dollar per barrel, whereas a 30 per cent royalty yields 25.8 dollars. If Venezuela exports 800,000 barrels per day, that means roughly 688,000 dollars per day under a 1 per cent royalty, compared with 20.64 million dollars per day under a 30 per cent royalty. This is a dramatic compression of the owner’s income. It shows that a high oil price cannot compensate for the hollowing out of the royalty. Put simply, under the new law, higher oil prices will no longer automatically translate into greater income for the nation if royalties are arbitrarily lowered to the benefit of transnational capital. This is not a marginal fiscal concession; it is a radical compression of the nation’s proprietorial income. 

Taxes

Turning to taxes, under the previous legal framework, the fiscal regime included not only taxes on profits, but also local and municipal taxes on oil activity, together with other parafiscal charges and special contributions linked to extraordinary profits. These different channels gave the public side several routes through which to capture value from extraction. Under the new law, much of that architecture is displaced and compressed into an integrated tax on gross income that will also be set in a discretionary fashion up to a fixed ceiling. According to supporters of the reform, this new framework is designed to ensure the project’s “economic equilibrium.” But the political significance of that shift is considerable. What was previously structured through several distinct legal claims can now be more easily absorbed into a flexible package, negotiated project by project. In that sense, this is not simply simplification; it is a substantial thinning of the fiscal claim. Once the fiscal architecture becomes thinner, the public claim over oil value becomes weaker, more flexible, and ultimately more negotiable.

Table 2 illustrates the magnitude of the change using the March 16, 2026, marker Merey 16 price. Under the previous regime, taxes and parafiscal charges alone could amount to about $31 per barrel, or 36 percent of the barrel price. Under the post-reform interim scenario, that could fall to about $17.6 per barrel, or 20.5 percent.

Dividends

Finally, there are dividends arising from state equity participation, and these too must be distinguished from both royalty and taxation. Dividends are not paid because the nation owns the subsoil, nor are they collected because the state exercises fiscal authority over the activity. They arise because the state participates in the business as shareholder and therefore receives part of the profits in its capacity as investor. In other words, dividends represent the state’s participation in the profits of the business itself. But that income is not necessarily available for immediate public use in the same way as royalty or taxation. Part of it may be retained within the company, used for reinvestment, capital expenditure, debt service, or the wider financial needs of the enterprise. So, unlike royalty, which expresses ownership, or tax, which expresses fiscal authority, dividends are tied to the corporate logic of the business. Depending on the ownership structure, this channel of participation may range, illustratively, from zero to 60 per cent of distributable profits.

International jurisdiction of potential oil litigation

There is also an important jurisdictional dimension. By reducing the fiscal share captured by the state and by placing greater weight on contractual flexibility, the reform moves the sector towards a framework that is more exposed to international arbitration. At the same time, the sanctions and licensing regime has become part of a broader architecture of control over the oil business: control over access to the fields, control over marketing channels, and control over financial access to revenues. So, this is not merely a domestic fiscal reform. It is also part of a broader reordering of the legal and financial chain through which Venezuelan oil is governed.

Key takeaways

Supporters of the new law argue that it delivers increased flexibility, greater operability, improved investment prospects, and greater bankability. And that is not a trivial argument. In a country that has experienced production collapse, sanctions, institutional erosion, and a loss of market share, it is understandable that policymakers would seek a framework that appears more attractive to capital. In that sense, the reform may indeed reduce perceived risk and make projects easier to finance. It may also simplify part of the gross take and make negotiations easier. In that sense, the reform should not be caricatured. But it also entails the abandonment of each of the nation’s and the state’s historic roles in the sector, undermining the institutional fabric that once gave the oil economy a degree of stability and rationality.

For that reason, the disadvantages of the reform ultimately outweigh its potential benefits. What is lost is fiscal automaticity. That means the nation is no longer guaranteed a stable share by rule, but must now negotiate it, justify it, or recover it through more uncertain channels. Put differently, the reform replaces payment-by-rule with payment-by-negotiation on a case-by-case basis. In practical terms, each contract will generate its own conditions over each of the principal sources of public income arising from oil activity.

What is also lost is the clarity of a system in which the state charges because it owns the resource, not because the project happens to be commercially convenient. Once royalties become variable and fiscal terms are subordinated to the “economic equilibrium” of the project, the centre of gravity shifts. The guiding principle is no longer the nation as sovereign owner; it becomes the financial viability for the investor/operator. That is a profound political change presented as technical pragmatism.

In summary: the 2026 reform does not abolish formal ownership, but it hollows it out in practice. It replaces a more proprietorial fiscal logic with a more contractualized and discretionary one. That may attract investment, but it also weakens the automatic link between national ownership and national income. Whatever mechanism one chooses to emphasize, the result is much the same: 

• The nation no longer receives royalty by rule, but under externally conditioned arrangements. What is presented as flexibility is a retreat from ownership. 
• The state compresses its fiscal participation at every level. 
• The state oil company weakens its position as an investor. 

Once that happens, the central question is no longer simply, “How much is the state collecting?” but rather “Who decides, under what rules, with what traceability, and with what accountability?”

The historical context of Venezuela’s oil legislation

Venezuela’s oil history is not just a history of contracts or companies; it is a history of how the nation has tried to define its authority over the subsoil. Venezuela did not begin from the same position as many oil-exporting countries in West Asia or North Africa. It was already an independent republic when it developed its mining and hydrocarbons legislation. That matters, because it means Venezuela built a national jurisdictional framework around state ownership of mines and deposits, rather than inheriting a colonial concessionary order imposed from outside. That distinction is central.

From the early twentieth century onwards, successive legal frameworks progressively consolidated the republic’s sovereign claim over oil-bearing land. In other words, Venezuelan oil law was historically moving towards a more explicit assertion of the nation’s right to charge for the extraction of its natural wealth. This is one reason Venezuela mattered so much internationally: not only because it was a major producer, but because it became a reference point for fiscal regimes and sovereign oil governance, including later in the wider OPEC environment. In that sense, Venezuela’s experience was historically complete in a way that few other oil-producing countries were.

Nevertheless, there is a paradox surrounding the 1975-1976 nationalization of the oil industry. On paper, it ought to have marked the culmination of national control, but it did not deepen sovereignty. In practice, it helped produce a shift towards a more internationalized governance structure. The Ministry, as representative of the owner-nation, was gradually displaced by state oil company PDVSA, and PDVSA increasingly operated under a logic of global business rather than one of public sovereign rule. So instead of the owner-state speaking directly, the national oil company became the intermediary, and that had long-term consequences. Put differently, PDVSA, together with international oil capital, gained ground in the long struggle to reduce the landlord’s direct grip over rent.

This is where the historical relationship with Western transnational corporations becomes more nuanced than a simple story of foreign domination versus nationalist resistance. The issue is not merely the presence of Western companies, but the governance structures they operate under. Venezuela moved from a more classic proprietorial regime towards a more cessionary one, and later, especially in the late 1980s and 1990s, towards more liberal or non-proprietorial arrangements. The oil opening (“Apertura Petrolera”) of the 1990s is especially important here, because it reduced the fiscal burden and shifted the framework in a way that centralized the operator’s conditions. That was already a major break.

The Chávez years brought a partial reversal. The restoration of the property right was not merely ideological posturing; it was a restoration of a more classical fiscal logic, in which the sovereign character of the state take was reaffirmed. But that restoration took place amid other contradictions, including the politicization of PDVSA and the accumulation of debt. So even that phase did not resolve the deeper institutional tensions.

The 2026 reform, then, does not emerge from nowhere. It is a new chapter of a long historical movement: from national jurisdiction, to nationalization, to cessionary governance, to the oil opening, to partial reassertion, to crisis and collapse, and now to a new form of contractualization from a position of weakness. Venezuela’s oil history has been a struggle not simply over who owns the oil, but over who governs the terms on which ownership is exercised. The present reform is the latest chapter in that struggle, but it is a particularly radical one because it comes after institutional erosion and under a global order that is far more contractual, litigious, and externally structured than the one Venezuela faced in the mid-twentieth century.

Oil in the present geopolitical battle

The current geopolitical context of the US-Israeli aggression against Iran should, in principle, strengthen Venezuela’s bargaining position. When West Asia becomes more unstable, supply security rises as a strategic concern, and oil regains immediate geopolitical urgency, countries with large reserves and an established production history become more valuable. 

Venezuela has occupied that position before. Venezuelan oil played an important strategic role for the Allies during the Second World War, for example. Today, renewed disruption around Iran and the Strait of Hormuz has again tightened the market and raised the geopolitical value of accessible barrels.

That is precisely why the current outcome appears so paradoxical. If global conditions improve Venezuela’s leverage, one would expect the country to negotiate from a stronger position and to demand a larger participation. One would expect a legal framework that captures more rent, not less; that uses geopolitical scarcity to reinforce state take, not to dilute it. But the current reform, alongside the sequence of deals with foreign conglomerates, and combined with US control over revenues, seem to move in the opposite direction.

This leads to the second point: the geopolitical issue is not only price or supply. It is also about control. What is emerging is a form of sovereignty under tutelage. Venezuela may formally remain the owner of the resource, but effective control over commercialization, revenue channels, and external validation appears increasingly conditioned from outside. Whether one calls that tutelage, external supervision, or subordinated reintegration, the takeaway is the same: sovereignty over the resource is no longer identical to sovereignty over the business. Recent US licenses illustrate the point very clearly. Washington has opened the door to renewed oil transactions with PDVSA, but under Treasury oversight and with proceeds channelled into US-administered accounts. That is not normal sovereign control over national oil income.

This is where the distinction between the origin and the destination of rent becomes especially useful. Even before we ask what is done with oil income socially or politically, we first need to know how that income is generated: through what pricing, what discounts, what fiscal structure, and through which payment channels. If that first level is opaque, then both the origin and the destination of rent become politically indeterminate. In other words, the problem is not only that the country may receive less revenue. The problem is that the country may not even be able to clearly verify what it is owed, how, and why. That is a much deeper sovereignty problem.

As a result, a geopolitical context that would, in theory, favor Venezuela, sees the country re-entering global markets with weakened sovereignty, under a framework of greater flexibility for operators and less certainty for the nation. That is why the debate is no longer only about production volumes or export flows. The real debate is about the jurisdictional and political order that now governs Venezuelan oil: who authorizes, who commercializes, who arbitrates disputes, who tracks the proceeds, and who answers to the country.

What does a sovereign recovery look like?

Moving from critique to programme is difficult, and the first honest thing to say is that no one can predict the exact path ahead. Venezuela is emerging from collapse, sanctions, loss of market share, institutional erosion, and a deep social crisis. Any recovery scenario, therefore, is bound to be politically fraught. But one thing is clear: if the country does not rebuild the public intelligibility of oil income, then any so-called recovery may simply reproduce opacity, distrust, inequality, and social tension.

A sovereign recovery does not mean autarky. It does not mean excluding foreign firms, nor does it mean mechanically returning to an earlier model. It means something more precise: restoring the link between ownership, public rule, and accountable income capture. In other words, if the nation owns the resource, then the nation must be able to know, verify, and govern how value is extracted from it. That means transparency over net prices, discounts, taxes, royalties, exemptions, payment channels, and the destination of funds. Without that, there can be no recovery in any meaningful sovereign sense. It would simply be resumed extraction.

A sovereign recovery also requires stripping away some of the ideological confusion that usually surrounds debates on natural resources. As Bernard Mommer argued more than twenty years ago, the governance of natural resources is, in many ways, a more elementary question than the conventional left-right divide suggests. In the case of oil and minerals, the deeper divide is above versus below. It is the tension between those who live and work on the surface (the nation, society, the public realm) and those who make their living from the subsoil.

That is why the question of ownership comes before the question of distribution, that is, before the question of what is done with the income generated by oil activity. Only after establishing the governance over the resource and the rules over its extraction does the familiar left-right question properly arise: how that income is used, whether for social spending, public services, etc., or private accumulation. 

The first step, then, is transparency. Not as a slogan, but as an institutional obligation. Who is selling? At what net price? Under what discounts? With what deductions? Paid where? Audited by whom? These are not minor administrative questions. They are the very mechanics of sovereignty in an extractive economy. If the country cannot answer them, then the state is no longer exercising full command over its principal source of income.

The second step is to move away from excessive discretion and back towards intelligible general rules. Contracts will always matter in oil. But there is a difference between contracts operating within a strong public framework and contracts effectively replacing public rule. Once everything becomes negotiable in the name of investment or “economic equilibrium,” the public realm shrinks and the executive realm expands. That is politically dangerous in any country, but especially in one where oil historically underpinned a broader social pact.

The third step is to reconnect oil income with social legitimacy. This is not an abstract issue. It is whether oil wealth translates to salaries, living standards, public services, social protection, and some minimum sense of collective benefit. If the country enters a new extractive cycle in which more oil is produced but public income remains narrow, opaque, or externally conditioned, then social tensions are likely to intensify rather than diminish. That is why a sovereign recovery cannot be measured by production figures alone. It must be judged by whether the nation regains an intelligible and legitimate claim over the income stream.

In simple terms, the average Venezuelan citizen is aware of fluctuations in crude prices because they know they affect the national budget. Oil income is widely and legitimately perceived as income belonging to the nation, and therefore as something that ought to support public services and collective welfare. Even when that income is later misused (through corruption, clientelism, or mismanagement) the underlying perception remains: oil revenue belongs to all Venezuelans.

That is also why the current situation can be described as one of sovereignty under tutelage. The country may still be sovereign in formal terms, yet it operates under external supervision in practical terms. Unless that gap is closed, the language of recovery will remain politically fragile.

Blas Regnault is an oil market analyst and researcher based in The Hague, whose work explores how oil prices move across time and what they tell us about the global economy. Drawing on years of experience in central banking, energy research, and international consulting, he brings together political economy, business cycles, production costs, and petroleum governance in a way that is both rigorous and accessible.

He has spent much of his career studying the deeper forces behind oil price trends and fluctuations, always with an eye on the institutional and geopolitical realities of the global petroleum market. Later this year, he will publish his book, Political Economy of Oil Prices: Trends and Business Cycles in the Global Petroleum Market, with Routledge.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

US President Donald Trump has announced ‘Project Freedom’, a naval mission to escort stranded ships through the Strait of Hormuz starting Monday, warning any interference will be met “forcefully”. The move comes amid a fragile US-Iran truce, with Tehran warning it would treat US intervention as a breach.

“For the good of Iran, the Middle East, and the United States, we have told these Countries that we will guide their Ships safely out of these restricted Waterways, so that they can freely and ably get on with their business,” he said in a post on social media without specifying which countries.

The 60-day clock for President Trump to seek congressional approval for further military actions against Iran was stopped by the April 7 ceasefire, a senior White House official claimed to The War Zone Friday morning. As we previously noted, the president faced a deadline today under the War Powers Resolution of 1973 to obtain permission from Congress to continue fighting.

The White House decision comes as the now-paused war is at a stalemate, with both sides believing they can outlast the other. Meanwhile, Trump is considering options for a new round of strikes while Iranians say they have presented new plans for working toward a peace deal.

“For War Powers Resolution purposes, the hostilities that began on Saturday, February 28 have terminated,” the official told us, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss the matter. “Both parties agreed to a two-week ceasefire on Tuesday, April 7 that has since been extended. There has been no exchange of fire between U.S. Armed Forces and Iran since Tuesday, April 7.”

The administration’s statement today follows War Secretary Pete Hegseth’s Congressional testimony yesterday that “the 60-day clock pauses or stops in a ceasefire.”

Under the War Powers Resolution, the use of armed forces should be terminated within 60 days unless Congress has declared war or voted to approve a 30-day extension. Since Trump formally notified Congress about the Iran war on March 2, that deadline fell today. Even though several other presidents have simply ignored the War Powers Resolution, the Trump administration is now arguing that the measure doesn’t really apply to their operation just yet.

It remains unclear how or if Congress will react. It adjourned yesterday for a week-long recess. On Thursday, the Senate rejected the latest of many resolutions intended to halt the war, The Washington Post noted. 

Republican lawmakers appear to be deferring to Trump on the issue of the War Powers Resolution. Senate Majority Leader John Thune, R-S.D., told The Associated Press on Thursday that he doesn’t plan on a vote to authorize force in Iran or otherwise weigh in.

“I’m listening carefully to what the members of our conference are saying, and at this point I don’t see that,” Thune said.

Republican Sen. Kevin Cramer of North Dakota said he’d vote for an authorization of war if Trump asked for it. But he questioned if the War Powers Act, passed during the Vietnam War era as a way for Congress to claw back its power, is even constitutional.

“Our founders created a really strong executive, like it or not like it,” Cramer said.

Shield AI revealed a revised planform configuration and new details about its extremely ambitious X-BAT jet-powered autonomous stealth ‘fighter’ drone at April’s Sea-Air-Space 2026 convention, as detailed by TWZ. At the event, I was able to speak at length with Armor Harris, the chief designer of X-BAT, who was keen to discuss the status of the project. You can read TWZ’s original deep dive exclusive interview with Harris that was published when X-BAT first emerged from the shadows last October here.

The tail-sitting X-BAT, designed to take off vertically and land the same way, is planned to start vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) testing before the end of this year. Harris explained how it is designed to fly combat missions under the control of the company’s Hivemind artificial intelligence “pilot” and how Shield AI has designed-in payload bays that are roughly the same size as those found on the F-35, which will enable it to carry many of the same weapons as the stealthy crewed fighter.

The X-BAT concept is aimed to disrupt not just the budding advanced autonomous drone marketplace, but parts of the fighter market too. So much hangs on the VTOL element that the airframe is designed around, so to say that a lot is riding on those tests is an understatement.

Here is the full interview from the show floor at Sea-Air-Space:

Meet The Man Behind The X-BAT Autonomous VTOL Fighter Drone

Iran protests as Trump announces ‘Project Freedom’ to escort stranded ships out of the Strait of Hormuz.

Three of six passengers who fell ill from suspected rodent-transmitted virus have died, and one is in intensive care, the WHO says.

Three people have died on a cruise ship in the Atlantic, with at least one confirmed to have suffered from hantavirus, a rare disease transmitted to humans from rodents.

Health authorities are now investigating a suspected outbreak of the virus on the MV Hondius, which is sailing from Ushuaia in Argentina to Cape Verde.

In a statement on Sunday, the World Health Organization said that one case had been confirmed and at least five other passengers were suspected of being infected.

“Of the six affected individuals, three have died, and one is currently in intensive care in South Africa,” WHO said in a statement.

“Detailed investigations are ongoing, including further laboratory testing and epidemiological investigations. Medical care and support are being provided to passengers and crew. Sequencing of the virus is also ongoing.”

WHO added that it was “facilitating coordination” between countries to evacuate the two other passengers showing symptoms of the infection.

Hantavirus, a rare disease transmitted to humans through the droppings or urine of infected rodents, can be fatal in severe cases and cause hemorrhagic fever.

Infected couple among casualties

South Africa’s National Department of Health said earlier on Sunday that there had been an outbreak of a “severe acute respiratory illness”, which had killed at least two people, and that a third person was in intensive care in Johannesburg, according to the AFP news agency.

The ministry’s spokesperson, Foster Mohale, confirmed that the patient being treated in Johannesburg tested positive for hantavirus.

A 70-year-old was the first to develop symptoms. He died on the ship, with his body now being held on the island of Saint Helena, a British territory in the South Atlantic, the spokesman said.

The patient’s 69-year-old wife also fell sick and was evacuated to South Africa, where she died in a Johannesburg hospital, he added.

Mohale told AFP that authorities have not confirmed the nationalities of the deceased. But the person in intensive care was reported by AFP to be a 69-year-old Briton.

Thousands of protesters gathered in India’s northeastern Manipur state to mark three years since ethnic violence erupted in May 2023 between the majority Meitei and minority Kuki-Zo communities. The conflict, driven by disputes over land and political power has killed nearly 260 people and displaced around 60,000.

After years of high-tempo operations in the Middle East, the Israeli Air Force is set to get two new fighter squadrons, one each of the F-15IA and the stealthy F-35I Adir. This will bring the total of F-35I squadrons to four and will add a second squadron of F-15IAs. While the numbers involved were not stated, the IAF has recently bolstered its fighter inventory in the form of 25-aircraft squadrons. This is almost certain to be the case here, too, which would provide the service with an additional 25 examples of each type, for an eventual inventory total of 100 F-35Is and 50 F-15IAs.

The Israeli Ministry of Defense confirmed on its official social media channels that, over the weekend, the country’s Ministerial Committee on Procurement approved its plan to simultaneously procure two new fighter squadrons.

“The scope of the deals is estimated at tens of billions of shekels and includes the integration of the squadrons into the Air Force, comprehensive support, spare parts, and logistics,” the ministry said.

In a statement today, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu referenced the two new squadrons. He also noted that, as part of Israel’s investment in military independence through domestic production of armaments and defense technology, the country “will develop groundbreaking Israeli-made aircraft.” He provided no further details about this project, although a fighter, along the lines of the failed Lavi, or even more likely, some kind of Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) type drone, is a possibility, as are different types of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. We also know of the existence of at least one secretive Israeli drone, referred to as RA-01 and used for covert missions, and further developments along these lines should not be ruled out. We are trying to get clarity on this aspect of the announcement.

Now that the acquisition has been approved by the Ministerial Committee, the Director General of the Ministry of Defense has authorized its procurement delegation in the United States to proceed with signing the deals with U.S. government and military officials “in the near future.”

Neither a delivery timeline nor the likely costs of the deals have been specified.

In a statement, Israeli Minister of Defense Israel Katz explained that the two-squadron procurement is driven by “operational lessons learned from the campaign against Iran [that] require us to accelerate our force buildup.”

Israel and the United States launched airstrikes on Iran on February 28, but a ceasefire has been in place since April 8. While the U.S. Navy maintains a blockade of ⁠Iranian ports, the IDF remains heavily engaged in fighting in Lebanon.

According to Katz, the Israeli campaign against Iran, Operation Lion’s Roar, “again demonstrated the power of the Air Force and its crucial role in safeguarding the security of the State of Israel. The operational lessons learned from this campaign compel us to continue accelerating our force development to ensure the Air Force’s superiority in the decades to come.”

As well as operations against Iran, Israeli aircraft have also conducted strikes against Iranian-backed Hamas militants in Gaza and Hezbollah militants in Lebanon following the October 7, 2023, attacks on Israel. Long-range strikes have also been flown against targets in Syria and Yemen in recent years.

“The procurement of these squadrons is a central part of the ‘Magen Israel’ program, which is designed to ensure the Israel Defense Forces maintains a sustained qualitative edge,” Katz added. “Our mission is clear: to stay one step ahead of our enemies.”

Magen Israel — Israeli Shield in Hebrew — includes other investments, too. As well as the new additional new fighters, it will provide funding for what is described as “a technological leap forward in the development and integration of autonomous flight capabilities, next-generation advanced defense systems, and the establishment of Israeli military superiority — both defensive and offensive — in space.”

The Magen Israel initiative has been approved by Prime Minister Netanyahu and the defense minister and will provide a budget of close to $120 billion over the next 10 years. Some of the funding for the new aircraft will almost certainly come from the United States, which delivers billions of dollars in military funding to Israel each year, largely tied to American weapons. Since October 7, 2023, Washington has surged tens of billions of dollars more, fast-tracking arms to the IDF.

Maj. Gen. (res.) Amir Baram, the director general of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, described the procurement as the “first and central step in implementing […] force buildup for a challenging security decade.”

“In the face of evolving threats in the region and alongside immediate procurement for wartime needs, we are committed to acting now to ensure the IDF’s military superiority even a decade from now and beyond,” Baram continued. “Operation Lion’s Roar has once again demonstrated the crucial importance of the strategic partnership between Israel and the U.S. and the need for advanced air power. The combination of the two squadrons’ distinct capabilities will provide the Air Force with full flexibility to address a wide range of combat scenarios.”

Israel signed a contract, with a ceiling of $8.58 billion, for its first 25 F-15IAs in December last year. These will be the first new Eagles that the country has acquired since 1999, when it received the last of its 25 F-15I Ra’am jets.

That contract covered the design, integration, instrumentation, test, production, and delivery of 25 new F-15IAs, with an option for an additional 25, which Israel will now exercise.

Work on the first batch of F-15IAs is expected to be completed by the end of 2035. The aircraft will almost certainly feature extensive Israeli-specific modifications, as was the case with previous Eagles, especially when it comes to electronic warfare, weapons, and communications systems.

In August 2024, Israel was given U.S. approval to buy as many as 50 F-15IAs, as well as upgrade its existing F-15Is as part of an overall package valued at $18.82 billion that you can read about here.

In the past, the Israeli Ministry of Defense has said that deliveries of the F-15IAs would start in 2031, with between four and six aircraft being supplied annually.

The status of the plan to upgrade the F-15I fleet is unclear, but the additional F-15IAs will likely be earmarked for replacing the older F-15A-to-D Baz, two squadrons of which are still active.

The Baz is used for both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions, but these are mainly very old jets, with the first examples having seen combat as long ago as 1979. These jets have been successively upgraded and also bolstered through transfers from U.S. Air Force stocks. They have also been heavily employed in recent combat operations.

The Baz fleet is highly illustrative of the fact that the IAF has been working at a considerable tempo for the last few years, something that has clearly put immense stress and additional hours on its fighters, some of which are 50 years old.

For Israel, the F-15 in general is prized for its long range and impressive stores-carrying capabilities. As well as significant ‘magazine depth,’ the latest versions of the F-15 also have a notable ability to carry outsize weapons, including hypersonic missiles, another feature of the jet that will be of particular interest to Israel. The IAF is increasingly reliant upon air-launched ballistic missiles and other air-launched standoff weapons, for which the F-15 is an ideal launch platform.

The Baz is used for both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions, but these are mainly very old jets, with the first examples having seen combat as long ago as 1979. Successively upgraded and also bolstered through transfers from U.S. Air Force stocks, these jets remain very valuable to the Israeli Air Force, as demonstrated by their prominent role in recent combat operations.

Meanwhile, the F-35I is increasingly becoming a mainstay of the IAF for a range of combat missions both in close proximity to Israel and over much greater distances.

In 2023, Israel opted to buy a third squadron of F-35Is, covering 25 more jets worth approximately $3 billion, and expand the Adir fleet to 75 aircraft. This batch of jets is scheduled to be delivered starting in 2028.

Israel announced in May 2018 that it had become the first operator to use the jet on offensive operations and, since then, it has also recorded success in aerial combat against Iranian drones.

In recent months, the IAF’s two Adir squadrons have demonstrated the jet’s flexibility by scoring the F-35’s first aerial victory against a crewed aircraft, bringing down an Iranian Yak-130 Mitten combat trainer over Tehran. The type has also been flying strike sorties, including with external ordnance, demonstrating the F-35’s so-called ‘beast mode,’ featuring heavier loads on underwing pylons.

Carrying external stores erodes the F-35’s valuable stealth characteristics in return for providing a considerably larger payload. For many of the kinds of missions that the IAF flies, especially against opposition with little to no meaningful air defense capabilities, such a tradeoff is well worthwhile.

As we have described in the past, there are strong arguments for Israel to pursue a policy of procuring a mix of fighters:

“Buying the F-15IA and F-35I will provide the Israeli Air Force with two complementary platforms, both of which are among the most capable anywhere in the world, especially when it comes to long-range strike. Israeli F-15s, in particular, are also used for forward networking and command and control nodes, vital for managing long-range operations. On the other hand, both the F-15IA and F-35I are also more than efficient for air defense, including against drone threats, as well as air-to-ground operations closer to Israel, such as the ongoing conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon.”