A young girl in southern Lebanon joined hundreds mourning her father, one of three paramedics killed in an Israeli “double-tap” strike during the US-brokered ceasefire. At least 95 emergency responders have been killed in Lebanon, a pattern the UN says may amount to a war crime.
Published On 30 Apr 202630 Apr 2026
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The move comes as part of a larger prisoner pardon tied to a Buddhist religious holiday.
By Reuters and The Associated Press
Published On 30 Apr 202630 Apr 2026
Myanmar’s former leader Aung San Suu Kyi has been moved to house arrest, state media report, more than five years after the military toppled the civilian government that the Nobel laureate had led and jailed her.
President Min Aung Hlaing, who ordered the coup in 2021, said in a statement on Thursday that he “commuted the remaining sentence to be served at the designated residence”.
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State media broadcast a photograph of Suu Kyi seated on a wooden bench and flanked by two uniformed personnel – the first public image of the democracy campaigner in years.
Translation: Change the location where Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is serving her sentence (change her remaining sentences to continue serving at her designated residence).
Earlier on Thursday, authorities had announced her prison sentence was being reduced as part of a larger prisoner pardon tied to a Buddhist religious holiday. State media said in addition to the amnesty granted to 1,519 prisoners, including 11 foreigners, the sentences of remaining convicted prisoners were cut by a sixth.
Suu Kyi was originally sentenced to 33 years in prison in late 2022 for several offences that her supporters and rights groups described as attempts to discredit her and legitimise the army takeover that removed her from office and to prevent her return to politics.
Thursday’s amnesty, the second applied to her in recent weeks, would bring her sentence down to 18 years with more than 13 years left to serve, according to the calculation.
The decision to move the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize winner to house arrest was welcomed as a “meaningful step” towards a “credible political process”, a spokesman for United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said.
“We appreciate the commutation of Aung San Suu Kyi to a so-called house arrest in a designated residence. It is a meaningful step towards conditions conducive to a credible political process,” Stephane Dujarric told reporters.
He reiterated the UN’s call for the “swift release” of all political prisoners in Myanmar.
“It is good to hear that the house arrest has been confirmed, but we haven’t received any direct notification,” a member of Suu Kyi’s legal team told the Reuters news agency.
“We only found out about it from the news announcement.”
The amnesty is the second in two weeks after one on April 17 when more than 4,500 prisoners were granted amnesty.
The amnesties come after Min Aung Hlaing was sworn into office as president on April 10 after an election that critics said was neither free nor fair and was orchestrated to maintain the military’s tight grip on power.
In his inauguration speech, he said his government would grant amnesties aimed at promoting social reconciliation, justice and peace.
Suu Kyi, who is now 80 years old, has been serving her prison term at an undisclosed location in the capital, Naypyitaw.
Information about her condition has remained tightly controlled. Reports in 2024 and 2025 indicated declining health, including low blood pressure, dizziness and heart problems, but these claims could not be independently verified. Her legal team has not been allowed to meet her in person since December 2022.
The 2021 army takeover triggered enormous public resistance that was brutally suppressed, triggering a bloody civil war that has killed thousands of people.
According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, a rights monitoring organisation, 22,047 people have been in detention in Myanmar since the army takeover.
Suu Kyi spent almost 15 years as a political prisoner under house arrest between 1989 and 2010. Her tough stand against military rule in Myanmar turned her into a symbol of nonviolent struggle for democracy.
The United States has fallen to a “historic low” in the Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF), or Reporters Without Borders, annual press freedom tracker, continuing a decade-long decline, the organisation has said.
The report on Thursday recorded a global drop in press freedom indicators in 2025, with, for the first time, more than half of the world’s countries labelled as “difficult” or “very serious”.
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While the US, during the first year of US President Donald Trump’s second term, remained in the “problematic” category, it dropped seven spaces from 57th in the world to 64th. Norway led the list, with Eritrea ranked lowest among 180 countries.
In a statement, Clayton Weimers, executive director of RSF’s North America office, said the US was experiencing a “press freedom crisis”.
“Trump and his administration have carried out a coordinated war on press freedom since the day he took office, and we will live with the consequences for years to come,” he said in a statement.
“Our message is clear: Protect legal rights, ensure accountability for attacks on media professionals, and support independent media to restore American press freedom.”
The report pointed to both Trump administration policies and the wider consolidation of media companies in the US, which critics say opens the door to stifling certain points of view.
That has included Skydance Media’s acquisition of Paramount Global, which includes CBS News. Skydance is owned by David Ellison, whose father, Larry Ellison, is a confidant of Trump’s.
Paramount Skydance is also currently acquiring Warner Bros, which owns CNN.
All told, just six companies control most US media: Comcast, Walt Disney, Warner Bros Discovery, Paramount Skydance, Sony, and Amazon.
While Trump has long had an adversarial relationship with journalists, press freedom observers say the head of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has accelerated pressure on media figures and journalists during the president’s second term.
In March, FCC chair Brendan Carr said he would revoke the licences of broadcasters that are “running hoaxes and news distortions”, and that do not “operate in the public interest” in their reporting on the US-Israel war with Iran. Trump said he was “thrilled” by Carr’s statements.
Carr has also threatened to revoke the licenses of broadcasters for their coverage of Trump’s immigration policies, which critics say can have a chilling effect on local news organisations.
The effort has extended to television talk show hosts, who have been threatened by the FCC over jokes.
Most recently, Carr announced an investigation into several ABC channels.
That came days after the network’s flagship late-night host, Jimmy Kimmel, made a joke about the White House Correspondents Dinner (WHCD).
Kimmel had quipped that First Lady Melania Trump had the “glow of an expectant widow” before the event.
Days later, a gunman attempted to storm the WHCD in Washington, DC, which Trump was attending for the first time. The Trumps later connected Kimmel’s joke to the attack, calling for Kimmel’s firing.
Kimmel has said the joke was about the 79-year-old president and the 56-year-old first lady’s “age difference” and not a call for violence.
Critics of the FCC’s move included Republican Senator Ted Cruz, who said he does “not believe the FCC should operate as the speech police”.
The White House has repeatedly called Trump the most “transparent” president in US history, pointing to his regular news conferences.
Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood says the issue is being treated as an “absolute priority” but does not agree it constitutes a national emergency.
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The visit of King Charles III to the United States comes at a time of visible tension between Washington and London. His meetings with Donald Trump and symbolic engagements linked to the anniversary of the United States Declaration of Independence highlight Britain’s effort to preserve a relationship that has faced increasing political strain. Rather than seeking immediate policy breakthroughs, the visit underscores a broader diplomatic strategy focused on long term stability.
Worst tensions in decades
Relations between the US and the United Kingdom are being described by analysts as the most difficult since the Suez Crisis. Disagreements over global conflicts, defence commitments, and rhetoric from Washington have created friction not only with Britain but also with other European allies.
Political differences driving the strain
Tensions have been sharpened by clashes between President Trump and Keir Starmer, particularly over foreign policy decisions such as Britain’s stance on the Iran conflict. Criticism from Washington, alongside broader disagreements within alliances like NATO, has added to the sense of divergence.
Role of royal soft power
King Charles III’s visit is less about direct political negotiation and more about reinforcing deeper ties. Through speeches, public appearances, and outreach beyond government circles, the monarch is aiming to remind Americans of the longstanding cultural, security, and historical links between the two nations. His address to Congress and symbolic messaging emphasise shared values while subtly encouraging cooperation and openness.
Beyond politics to public diplomacy
The visit targets not just policymakers but the American public. By engaging across different states and institutions, the British monarchy is working to sustain goodwill that can outlast any single administration. This reflects a strategy of insulating the broader relationship from short term political tensions.
Questioning the special relationship
The idea of a “special relationship,” first popularised by Winston Churchill, is increasingly being reassessed. Some British officials argue the term feels outdated in a changing global order, where alliances are more transactional and expectations around defence and economic contributions are rising.
Analysis
The UK’s approach reveals a calculated reliance on continuity rather than confrontation. With limited leverage over US policy decisions, London is using soft power to maintain influence and access. The monarchy provides a unique diplomatic channel that operates above partisan politics, allowing Britain to keep communication lines open even during periods of disagreement.
However, this strategy has limits. Symbolism cannot fully offset structural tensions such as defence spending gaps, diverging foreign policy priorities, or shifting global power dynamics. While royal diplomacy can ease atmospherics, it cannot substitute for alignment at the governmental level.
In the longer term, the visit illustrates Britain’s recognition that its global role depends heavily on sustaining strong ties with Washington, even in less favourable political conditions. By playing a long game, the UK is attempting to ensure that current strains do not permanently weaken one of its most important strategic partnerships.
With information from Reuters.
World leaders condemn the interception of the boats bound for Gaza as violating international law.
Published On 30 Apr 202630 Apr 2026
Israel has intercepted 22 out of the 58 aid ships travelling through international waters and bound for the besieged Gaza Strip.
The ships make up part of a second Global Sumud Flotilla to try in recent months to break an Israeli blockade by carrying humanitarian aid to Palestinians in Gaza. They sailed from the Spanish port of Barcelona on April 12.
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The vessels were seized by Israel late on Wednesday in international waters off Greece’s Peloponnese peninsula, hundreds of miles from Gaza, the flotilla’s organisers said on Thursday.
Israel “kidnapped” 211 of the 400 activists taking part in the flotilla, including a Paris city councillor, according to the flotilla’s organisers. Israel’s Foreign Ministry had earlier put the number of those detained at 175.
Here’s how world leaders have reacted to the news:
Italy called for the immediate release of Italian nationals on board the flotilla.
Italy “condemns the seizure of the Global Sumud Flotilla vessels… and calls on Israel to immediately release all the unlawfully detained Italians”, the government said in a statement.
Italy’s ANSA news agency cited sources among the organisers saying 24 Italians had been detained.
In its statement, the government also called for the “full respect of international law and guarantees on the physical safety of the people on board”.
It said it was “committed to continue supplying humanitarian aid to Gaza in the framework of our cooperation and in respect of international law”.
In a joint statement with Italy, Germany said it was following developments regarding the flotilla with “great concern” and called for international law to be respected and for “restraint from irresponsible actions.”
Spain’s Foreign Ministry said it “energetically condemns” Israel’s seizure of the flotilla, which is carrying Spanish nationals.
Madrid has summoned Israel’s charge d’affaires to convey its protest over the detention of the vessels, the ministry added in a statement.
Turkiye’s Foreign Ministry condemned Israel’s seizure of the boats in the flotilla as “an act of piracy.”
“By targeting the Global Sumud Flotilla, whose mission is to draw attention to the humanitarian catastrophe faced by the innocent people of Gaza, Israel has also violated humanitarian principles and international law,” the ministry said in a statement.
In a post on Telegram, the Palestinian group Hamas condemned the interception, accusing Israel of committing a crime without accountability and calling for the release of those detained.
The flotilla’s organisers condemned Israel’s seizure of its vessels.
“This is piracy,” they said in a statement. “This is the unlawful seizure of human beings on the open sea near Crete, an assertion that Israel can operate with total impunity, far beyond its own borders, with no consequences.”
“No state has the right to claim, police, or occupy international waters, but Israel has done that, extending its control outward to occupy the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Europe,” the statement said.
Israel’s Foreign Ministry called the flotilla organisers “professional provocateurs” and said that its forces acted lawfully.
“Due to the large numbers of vessels participating in the flotilla and the risk of escalation, and the need to prevent the breach of a lawful blockade, an early action was required in accordance with international law,” the ministry said in a statement.
The conflict involving Iran and the disruption of the Strait of Hormuz have shaken global energy markets. Supply constraints and extreme volatility have driven oil prices sharply higher, exposing a growing structural divide in how major oil companies operate across the Atlantic.
European majors profit from trading strength
Companies such as BP, Shell, and TotalEnergies have benefited from strong oil trading performance. Their global trading networks allow them to move crude and refined products across regions, taking advantage of price differences created by supply disruptions.
These firms trade volumes far exceeding their own production, turning volatility into profit. In the current crisis, trading has significantly boosted earnings, offsetting weaker performance in other segments.
Volatility creates both gains and exposure
The sharp rise in Brent crude prices and market instability has created lucrative arbitrage opportunities. Companies have rerouted fuel shipments across longer and unusual routes to capture higher margins.
However, these strategies come with risks. Trading at such scale requires large amounts of capital, and holding cargoes for extended periods increases financial exposure if market conditions shift.
Trading as a shock absorber
For European majors, trading divisions have acted as a buffer during the crisis. Losses from disrupted production or regional exposure have been partially offset by gains in trading, highlighting the strategic importance of these operations in volatile markets.
US majors rely on production strength
In contrast, Exxon Mobil and Chevron focus primarily on large scale oil and gas production. Their output significantly exceeds that of European rivals, giving them a strong advantage when prices rise.
While they have more limited trading operations, their upstream strength allows them to generate substantial cash flow in high price environments without relying heavily on market arbitrage.
Structural differences in strategy
The divergence reflects long term strategic choices. European companies invested more heavily in renewables and diversified energy portfolios, which limited growth in their upstream production. US firms, by contrast, maintained a strong focus on expanding oil and gas output.
As a result, European majors depend more on trading to drive returns, while US majors depend on production scale.
Analysis
The Iran war has highlighted a clear split in the global energy industry between trading focused and production focused business models. European majors have shown that strong trading capabilities can generate significant profits during periods of disruption, effectively turning volatility into an advantage.
However, this model is inherently unpredictable. Trading gains depend on market conditions and may not be sustainable if volatility declines. In contrast, the US model offers more stable returns tied directly to production levels and commodity prices.
In the long term, this divide could shape investor perceptions and valuations. If European companies continue to rely heavily on trading while lagging in production, the gap between them and US rivals may widen. The industry is increasingly defined by a fundamental question: whether it is more profitable to move oil around the world or to produce it at scale.
With information from Reuters.
The TWZ Newsletter
Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
Driven by a race to get ahead of quickly evolving enemy capabilities, the U.S. Navy is now aiming to enter the next step of contracting for its 6th-generation crewed fighter – known as F/A-XX – by August. Despite intervention from Congress, the next-generation carrier-based fighter has remained in limbo since the Pentagon moved to effectively shelve the program last year.
That’s according to Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Daryl Caudle, who spoke with reporters Monday at the Sea-Air-Space 2026 exposition near Washington, D.C. In response to a question from TWZ, Caudle acknowledged the uncertainty that has kept F/A-XX in a holding pattern, even as the Air Force’s future fighter, dubbed the F-47, has forged ahead. The current competitors for the F/A-XX are Boeing, which is also the F-47’s prime contractor, and Northrop Grumman.
“One of the challenges we’re seeing is, not only [are] our peer competitors improving their capability for anti-air, either air-to-air or surface-to-air, but the lower cost of entry of very capable weapons is also making more players on the field in which that level of stealth and technology is required,” Caudle, the Navy’s top officer, said. “So this is not about the need for a peer adversary. This is just having an aircraft that can operate with a level of uncertainty and with the acceptable level of risk.”
This is in line with arguments Caudle made in favor of moving ahead of F/A-XX in January, where he cited growing threats posed by smaller nation-state adversaries, including Iran, as well as non-state actors.
Today, Caudle again emphasized that he nevertheless had been “very vocal” on the need for a carrier-based next-generation fighter, and had expressed “many times” to Deputy Secretary of War Steve Feinberg that the service had to secure the aircraft. It’s important, Caudle said, for both the future carrier air wing and collaboration and planning with the MQ-25 Stingray, the Boeing-made carrier refueling drone set to reach initial operational capability later this year.
“It ties to our MQ-25 for stealth refueling. It ties to our reach. It ties to the work we’re doing for making the carrier air wing something that remains very effective into the future based on the range in which you can operate safely,” Caudle said. “So the need’s clearly there.”
MQ-25A Stingray first taxi test
While it was recently reported that the Navy, bolstered by funding from Congress for the new F/A-XX, planned to award a contract for the program by year end, Caudle said August was now the likely timeframe.
As noted, the Pentagon had moved to essentially shelve F/A-XX in its Fiscal Year 2026 budget request, with the Navy only requesting a relatively meager $74 million for the program. U.S. officials said at the time this decision had been driven largely by concerns about the ability of the U.S. industrial base to support work on two sixth-generation fighters, the other being the F-47, simultaneously.
Congress subsequently interceded, appropriating $1.69 billion for F/A-XX through a combination of regular spending bills and the One Big Beautiful Bill Act. From a budgetary perspective, the Navy’s next-generation fighter program remains well behind the F-47, which has already received billions in funding and could be in line to get approximately $5 billion more in Fiscal Year 2027. The Navy only appears to be requesting an additional $140 million for its new carrier-based combat jet in the $1.5 trillion proposed defense budget for the next fiscal cycle.
“We’ve got a lot of airframes out there. We’ve got an F-35 program. We’ve got a F-47 program. You know, we’re still building the [F/A-18 Super Hornet] … there’s a lot of airplanes being built,” Adm. Caudle said today. “The Air Force has got a lot of demand on the system. The Navy’s got a lot of demand … One of the contractors who would make this plane for us is in a place where they really can’t deliver in the timeframe we need it. So there was, you know, a check twice, cut once, kind of mentality here on this decision. And now there, I think we’re all on the same page on the reason why the hard look needed to be done. I’m good with it.”
As noted, Boeing and Northrop Grumman are in competition to produce the F/A-XX, a program that first took shape as a Navy request for information in 2012. An earlier down-select reportedly eliminated Lockheed Martin in March 2025. Last August, Northrop Grumman released a rendering of its concept for the aircraft, showing a streamlined nose and landing gear on the front of a carrier with the tagline, “Project Power Anywhere.” Boeing’s concept, released the same month, drew visual comparisons to its F-47 Next-Generation Air Dominance fighter for the Air Force.
Citing classification, Adm. Caudle said today he couldn’t provide any information on design or payload details that give the Navy confidence in pursuing F/A-XX despite the adversary threats he mentioned. However, he suggested speed was increasingly essential to having a chance at maintaining overmatch.
“We monitor very closely, red-team that very hard, and assess that threat with a predicted trajectory of whether or not the existing designs we’ve seen will still overmatch that,” he said. “So I think we’re okay there, but we do know that our existing airframes could become vulnerable to some of those threats by the time [it’s fielded] … because it takes time to deliver that, that our existing airframes could be vulnerable to some of those threats, and we want to make sure the air wing of the future can still participate.”
Despite Caudle’s comments today, it should be remembered that this is not the first time that major progress on the Navy’s next-gen fighter has supposedly been imminent. Last October, Reuters reported the program had been greenlighted by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, with a contract expected to follow in short order.
Aside from funding moves from Congress to ensure the survival of the F/A-XX program, no public steps have been taken to advance the program since.
Contact the editor: Tyler@twz.com
WASHINGTON — If agony in high places is any measure, the war in Bosnia is already President Clinton’s Vietnam.
The President says that it is the issue he cannot stop worrying about at the end of the day; he takes the problem home at night and hashes it over with his wife, Hillary Rodham Clinton. The tragedy in the Balkans is “not only heartbreaking,” he said this week, “it’s infuriating.”
And Secretary of State Warren Christopher, a notably unemotional man, throws up his hands at the subject. “This is a problem from hell,” he declared. On Wednesday, Christopher met privately with author and Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel to discuss the issue’s moral implications.
Clinton’s advisers have huddled for hours over the last three weeks to thresh out options for diplomatic and military action–and still have not reached a decision.
Like Lyndon B. Johnson, whose presidency was wrecked by the American military intervention in Vietnam, Bill Clinton faces an agonizing conflict between his international ideals and the potential cost of achieving them.
Beginning in last year’s presidential campaign, Clinton declared that the United States had a responsibility to stop the onslaught of Bosnia’s Serbs against the republic’s other ethnic groups, the Croats and Muslims. “We have an interest in standing up against the principle of ‘ethnic cleansing’ . . ,” he said earlier this month. “If you look at the other places where this could play itself out in other parts of the world, this is not just about Bosnia.”
Yet the President’s attempt to stop the Serbs through diplomatic pressure has failed. So Clinton, only three months into his presidency, faces an unpalatable choice between escalation and retreat–that, and a swelling national debate over the limits of American responsibility.
Since the fall of Saigon in 1975, Americans have argued over every potential military intervention in terms of Vietnam, whether the battlefield was Lebanon, Central America, the Balkans and even Desert Storm in its early days. Is Bosnia another quagmire, a war America should not enter because its price in blood will inevitably run too high? Or is it, as Christopher has asked, another Holocaust–a tragedy America must stop because the cost in innocent lives–and to America’s moral conscience–is too great to ignore?
All historical analogies are inexact, of course. But Vietnam and the Holocaust are the twin phantoms that haunt the Clinton Administration’s debate over what to do in the Bosnian highlands.
Last week, at the opening of Washington’s new Holocaust Memorial Museum, Clinton found himself confronted directly with one of history’s unwelcome ghosts, when Wiesel appealed to him to stop the war in Bosnia: “Something, anything must be done,” Wiesel pleaded.
At the same time, members of Congress and senior military officers are increasingly warning of the other pitfall. “All of us want to stop the tragedy in Bosnia,” said Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), a former pilot who spent five years as a prisoner of war in North Vietnam. “But . . . I’m not willing to risk another Vietnam.”
Clinton has tried to defuse such fears by promising that he is only considering the use of air power in Bosnia, not the introduction of ground troops. Responds McCain, “The fact is, militarily, if you want to affect the situation, you have to inject massive (numbers of) ground troops.”
The President and his advisers do not like the Vietnam analogy but they cannot escape it. Their own careers, their ways of thinking, were forged in the crucible of the nation’s longest war.
White House National Security Adviser Anthony Lake resigned his first White House job–under Richard M. Nixon, in 1970–to protest the relentless escalation of the war. Defense Secretary Les Aspin served as a young Army lieutenant on the Pentagon staff that planned the conflict. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, then a Justice Department official, was assigned to quell the sometimes-violent protests that followed.
And Clinton spent his college years struggling with the issue of the war–whether to volunteer, to resist the draft or, as he finally chose, to maneuver his way out of military service.
On the ground, diplomats and military experts say, Bosnia is not much like Vietnam at all–except, perhaps, for its mountains. In Vietnam, the United States faced a well-armed guerrilla army hardened by years of war against the colonial French. In Bosnia, the Serb militias are said to be ill-trained and ill-disciplined, and their weapons, while effective against their lightly armed Muslim foes, would have little effect against U.S. air power.
In Vietnam, the Communists had an important strategic ally in the Soviet Union. “That had a restraining influence on Johnson, who didn’t want to risk a nuclear confrontation with Moscow,” noted Patrick Glynn of the American Enterprise Institute. “The Serbs don’t have a big brother with nuclear weapons.”
Where the Vietnam analogy is most telling, officials said, is not in the hills of Bosnia but in the corridors of official Washington. Once again, an Administration is thinking about intervention in a tangled civil war–and hoping to find a low-cost way to do it.
“Are we looking at a pattern of decision-making that looks like Vietnam?” asked Glynn, who has advocated military intervention in Bosnia. “I worry that the Administration is falling into an old pattern–a gradualist approach that commits us to action but takes only small steps that don’t solve the problem.”
“The idea of taking only intermediate steps is very dangerous,” agreed John Steinbruner of the Brookings Institution.
“I really do sympathize with Clinton’s dilemma,” he added. “This could blow him out of the water. But I don’t think he can stay out and get away with it. And I don’t think he can do it the easy way. I’m afraid he’s going to have to organize an international coalition and intervene in a big way.”
So far, no one in the Administration has publicly called for that kind of massive intervention, which would presumably include the use of U.S. and allied ground troops. Instead, Clinton and his Cabinet appear closely divided over more limited options–principally, lifting a U.N. embargo to allow the Bosnian Muslims to import weapons and launching air strikes against the Serbs to stop their offensive and force them back to peace talks.
Clinton himself initially tried to stay away from the issue, aides said, hoping he could avoid being diverted from his ambitious domestic agenda. But in recent weeks, he has reluctantly concluded that he cannot escape. “I think it is a challenge to all of us . . . to take further initiatives in Bosnia,” he declared at the Holocaust museum last week. “I accept it.”
And Clinton has accepted the argument that a small, symbolic military action would be worse than none at all. “That shouldn’t be done just to say that people . . . will feel better that we did something,” he said in an interview with the Boston Globe earlier this week.
But he has not worked out how to enforce those high principles in practice. “The essence of the matter isn’t just punishing the Serbs. It’s establishing a principle that this is a breakdown in the world’s civil order and the world has to respond,” said Steinbruner.
Clinton, Christopher and others like to note that the dilemma in Bosnia is one that they inherited from the previous Administration of President George Bush.
But that is becoming cold comfort, as the problem rapidly becomes theirs as well.
“If Bush were in power, he’d be facing the same problems,” Steinbruner noted. “But Bush ignored the problem. The Democrats are reacting the way they do because they have a harder time writing these things off. They’re less ruthless about it. They worry more about the moral questions in foreign policy . . . and so they fall into the natural trap of trying to do something, but not too much.”
Fourteen passengers reported feeling unwell on an Elizabeth Line platform at Farringdon station.
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Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
The U.S. Marine Corps wants to field its first conventional takeoff and landing Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) drones in 2029, and is also looking at the possibility of fielding similar drones with short takeoff and landing capabilities. The news comes soon after the service outlined its plans for Kratos’ XQ-58 Valkyrie, and potentially other CCAs, to be paired with its F-35s as a “bridge” to an entire family of next-generation air combat capabilities, which could include a sixth-generation crewed fighter. You can read more about the implications of that in our previous coverage.
Updates on the latest developments within the Marine Corps’ CCA program were provided by Col. Scott Shadforth, a program manager for the Expeditionary and Maritime Aviation Advanced Development Team (XMA-ADT), at the annual Modern Day Marine conference in Washington, D.C., at which TWZ is in attendance.
The Corps’ CCA efforts currently fall under a program called Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Uncrewed Expeditionary Tactical Aircraft (MUX TACAIR). The MAGTF is the primary organizing concept around which the service deploys air and ground forces.
Shadforth defines the CCA program as “how the Marine Corps is going after increasing the lethality of existing and future tactical aircraft in a high-threat environment.”
The MUX TACAIR effort emerged out of a previous effort that the Marine Corps War Fighting Lab sponsored as part of a Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve (RDER) with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). This earlier program was known as the Penetrating Affordable Autonomous Collaborative Killer — Portfolio (PAACK-P).
The Marine Corps is kicking off its CCA efforts with a landing gear-equipped version of the XQ-58. In contrast, the previous PAACK-P program involved the rocket-assisted takeoff (RATO) variant of the XQ-58. Meanwhile, the MQ-58 designation refers to Marine-specific variants of Kratos’ Valkyrie now in development, although it remains unclear how official this is.
As Shadforth explained, under MUX TACAIR, the Marine Corps is attempting to answer the question: “How do we take that essential [XQ-58] airframe itself and turn it into a conventional takeoff and landing [CTOL] platform so that it’s reusable at a higher rate?”
The OSD effort involved four flights of the XQ-58, culminating in the fall of 2024. At the beginning of this month, the Marine Corps completed a risk-reduction flight involving XQ-58 payloads and integration at China Lake.
Up to this point, the tests have all involved RATO variants of the XQ-58, but the Marines are targeting a first flight using conventional takeoff and landing sometime in the mid- to late summer of this year.
Shadforth confirmed that the “ultimate goal” for the MQ-58 effort is to get its hands on “deliverable prototypes” in the summer of 2029. In an ideal case, he added, these would be delivered to VMX-1 in Yuma, “so the Marine Corps can actually get their hands on the aircraft and fly the aircraft in a tactical environment and develop the CONOPS for how they’re actually going to employ those.”
VMX-1, or Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron One, has multiple aircraft types in its inventory and is responsible for tests and evaluations of all types of Marine aircraft and associated systems, while assisting in the creation of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). You can read more about its work here.
MUX TACAIR doesn’t start and end with the MQ-58, however.
Shadforth said that the Marine Corps is currently exploring further MUX TACAIR options with “several vendors,” including General Atomics and Anduril. Meanwhile, the branch is also working with Northrop Grumman as part of the MQ-58 effort.
As to how the CTOL MQ-58 will be best integrated with the fleet of Marine Corps F-35Bs, which feature short takeoff and landing (STOVL) at the heart of their capabilities, this is something the service is still weighing up.
According to Shadforth, the Marine Corps “is always going to be interested” in finding ways for fixed-wing aircraft to operate from shorter runways, suggesting that a STOVL-type CCA could well be part of its future plans. Of course, a return to the RATO-capable MQ-58 could be one way of achieving this.
For now, the Marine CCA effort is squarely focused on the CTOL variant of the Valkyrie, but Shadforth said that it’s also looking toward the future, including “other vendor offerings, whether they exist in reality or not, that remove the need for landing gear.” CCAs that offer either runway independence or that are able to operate from shorter or improvised airstrips represent a capability “the Marine Corps will be interested in exploring,” Shadforth added. One obvious candidate here would be the X-BAT, the jet-powered autonomous stealth ‘fighter’ drone designed to take off vertically and land the same way, tail first, after completing its mission.
At this point, it should be recalled that Kratos said earlier this year that the CTOL version of the Valkyrie being developed for the Marines will still be able to make rocket-assisted takeoffs from static launchers. This means the drone will retain a valuable degree of runway independence, though it will have to touch down on a runway at the end of its sortie.
Before that, Kratos also unveiled a special launch trolley that allows variants of the XQ-58 without landing gear to take off from traditional runways, though not land back on them, as seen in the video below.
Kratos Valkyrie Trolley Launch System
An aircraft with some kind of STOVL capabilities “just kind of opens up the world to us, where we don’t need 7,000-, 8,000-, 9,000-, or 10,000-foot paved runways. Those are always capabilities that we’re interested in,” Shadforth said.
Overall, this is a somewhat surprising route, considering that the XQ-58 in its basic form is already runway independent. This would suggest the Marines, in the future, are looking specifically for something that combines STOVL performance with faster sortie rates. After all, the XQ-58 also requires some infrastructure for that and requires a reset time. A STOVL or VTOL type of CCA would also be able to deploy and operate alongside the F-35B more seamlessly.
“As far as how CCA is envisioned integrating with existing STOVL-type platforms, the Marine Corps is kind of on the front end right now of getting CCA out to the operational forces. A lot of that’s going to come through experimentation and evaluation. As we target the 2029 timeframe to get prototypes out to VMX-1, part of their mission set is going to be: now we’ve physically got these things, how are we actually going to employ them with the various tactical aircraft we have available?” he continued.
As well as the STOVL F-35Bs, these tactical aircraft include CTOL/carrier-capable F-35Cs and potentially legacy F/A-18 Hornets, as well as other Joint Force capabilities.
Shadforth continued: “Those are issues that are going to have to be explored and experimented with for how we’re going to see how those CCAs are going to operate. The point being there’s no set solution at the moment.”
In terms of missions, the Marine Corps is initially focusing MUX TACAIR on an “electronic warfare type platform,” Shadforth said. “Those are the payloads we’re interested in looking at at the moment.”
XQ-58A Valkyrie Demonstrator Inaugural Flight
But Shadforth confirmed that other efforts with different vendors are exploring how to use the space within the Valkyrie air vehicle to see what other payloads and capabilities are available to the Marine Corps. Not only usefulness but timeliness are important factors here, Shadforth added.
Kratos is known to be working on a miniature cruise missile called Ragnarok, which the XQ-58 can carry in its internal bay and externally under its wings, and you can read more about it here. Renderings have also shown Valkyries with AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) under their wings. The drone can carry Small Diameter Bombs (SDB) internally, and has demonstrated drone launch — launched effects are therefore almost certain to be included for the electronic warfare mission.
Within all this, it is important to remember that, at this point, the Marine CCA effort is still very much in the prototyping phase, led by the MQ-58. As Shadforth noted, the service has “not entered into a specific acquisition-type construct yet,” beyond developing these prototypes. Nevertheless, with a timeline now in place to get the first MQ-58s to Yuma, and with conventional takeoff and landing trials expected in the next few months, MUX TACAIR reflects the overall acceleration of the Corps’ CCA program.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
From Broderick Turner: An hour before tip-off of Game 5 of the first-round playoff series against the Houston Rockets, the word came down that Austin Reaves was available to play for the Lakers, his wait over, his time away with a Grade 2 left oblique strain no longer an issue for him.
Reaves missed the first four games of the series against Houston and the last five regular-season games after sustaining the injury in Oklahoma
City on April 2. He checked into the game off the bench with 5 minutes and 39 seconds left in the first quarter to a standing ovation.
Reaves proceeded to give the Lakers a lift, but the Rockets received even more elevated play , their five starters scoring in double figures and their defense on point during Houston’s 99-93 win over Los Angeles on Wednesday night at Crypto.com Arena.
Even with Reaves scoring 22 points and handing out six assists and LeBron James producing 25 points and seven assists, the Lakers couldn’t close out this best-of-seven series they once had total command of just a few days ago.
The Lakers have lost the last two games and their once 3-0 lead heading to Houston with their lead down to 3-2.
“I mean, we don’t have a lot of time to dwell on it,” James said. “I mean, you can give yourself tonight, a little bit tomorrow. But … once we get on that plane and head down to Houston we got to forget about it and understand what we are going for and it’s going to be even harder.
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First round
All times Pacific
at Lakers 107, Houston 98 (box score)
at Lakers 101, Houston 94 (box score)
Lakers 112, at Houston 108 (box score)
at Houston 115, Lakers 96 (box score)
Houston 99, at Lakers 93 (box score)
Friday: Lakers at Houston, 6:30 p.m., Prime Video
*Sunday: Houston at Lakers, TBD
*-if necessary
From Kevin Baxter: Wednesday was getaway day for Dodgers, the final game of a six-game homestand ahead of a weeklong trip to St. Louis and Houston. And that’s a good thing, first baseman Freddie Freeman said, because there are a number of players on the team that really could use a getaway, Freeman chief among them.
With Wednesday’s 3-2 matinee loss to the Miami Marlins, the Dodgers (20-11) have lost two in a row at home for the first time this season. In those two games the Dodgers scored just three runs, went four for 18 with men in scoring position and left 16 runners on base.
And the final outs Wednesday came when Freeman, batting with the bases loaded and one out, grounded into a bizarre, unassisted double play with Marlins second baseman Xavier Edwards fielding the ball, tagging Shohei Ohtani as he ran him back to first, then dragging his foot across the bag to retire Freeman.
“I hit it right at the second baseman. He tagged Ohtani and tagged first,” Freeman offered in an accurate, if hardly revelatory explanation.
Rookie Sam Antonacci hit a tying triple with two outs in the ninth inning and Colson Montgomery had a winning single in the 10th, lifting the Chicago White Sox to a 3-2 victory Wednesday for a three-game sweep that extended the Angels’ losing streak to six.
Mike Trout hit his 10th home run of the season for the Angels, who have lost 10 of 11 and dropped to 12-20. Additionally, Angels starter Yusei Kikuchi left after two innings with left shoulder tightness.
Kikuchi gave up no runs on two hits and a walk with one strikeout before exiting. His average fastball velocity dropped from 94.9 mph in the first inning to 92.8 mph in the second.
From Jay Posner: This year’s Kentucky Derby field does not appear to have a true standout. But it could have a star.
If that sounds illogical, trainer Chad Brown, who will start Emerging Market in a bid to win his first Derby, can explain.
“There’s clearly a couple horses that are deserving favorites in the race, but there’s by no means an American Pharoah in here, at least up to this point going into the race,” Brown said, referencing the 2015 Triple Crown champion. “Now, you know, whoever wins the race and goes on, maybe one emerges and turns into one of the best 3-year-olds in the last few years.”
That’s what happened last year, when Sovereignty, the third betting choice in the race, progressed from a Derby win to victories in the Belmont and Travers and was voted Eclipse Award for Horse of the Year.
This year’s field is so deep, Brown said, that an argument could be made “for maybe half the horses in the field, if they ran their very, very best race and had a good trip, could win this race.”
From Marisa Ingemi: The Sparks will retire former player DeLisha Milton-Jones’ No. 8 jersey on July 28 when the team hosts the New York Liberty as a part of the WNBA’s 30th anniversary celebration.
A three-time All-Star, Milton-Jones played 11 years for the Sparks, helping lead them to back-to-back titles in 2001 and 2002.
“It’s like one of those moments where it’s Christmas, and you’re anticipating getting a gift and when the day finally is here, that feeling you can’t even describe is rather euphoric and nostalgic all at the same time, and it brings a peace about you in a way that you can’t explain,” Milton-Jones said. “Because you put so much time, energy and effort into everything that you did in that moment in your life, and now to be rewarded in this manner is just pretty big.”
Milton-Jones will be the fourth Sparks player to have her number retired after Lisa Leslie (No. 9), Penny Toler (No. 11) and Candace Parker (No. 3).
From Steve Henson: Ever-growing power conferences are the driving force behind an impending expansion of the NCAA men’s and women’s basketball tournaments, which ESPN reported could be formalized within weeks and begin next season.
The field would grow from 68 teams to 76 that would include eight additional at-large teams in each tournament. The current First Four — eight teams playing four games — would expand to 12 games played by 24 teams at two sites on the first Tuesday and Wednesday of the tournament. The traditional 64-team bracket would begin Thursday as usual.
Mid-majors likely are tempering any celebration. The change might not mean more invitations to the Big Dance for underdogs because the NCAA and its media partners favor large, established schools with large, established fan bases for viewership and revenue.
All times Pacific
at Edmonton 4, Ducks 3 (summary)
Ducks 6, at Edmonton 4 (summary)
at Ducks 7, Edmonton 4 (summary)
at Ducks 4, Edmonton 3 (OT) (summary)
at Edmonton 4, Ducks 1 (summary)
Thursday: Edmonton at Ducks, 7 p.m., TNT, truTV, HBO Max, KCOP-13
*Saturday: Ducks at Edmonton, TBD
*-if necessary
1961 — LPGA Titleholders Championship Women’s Golf, Augusta CC: Mickey Wright wins her 5th major title by 1 stroke from Patty Berg & Louise Suggs.
1962 — LPGA Titleholders Championship Women’s Golf, Augusta CC: Mickey Wright wins her 8th major title in a playoff with Ruth Jessen.
1971 — The Milwaukee Bucks become the second team to register a four-game sweep in the NBA championship, beating the Baltimore Bullets 118-106.
1975 — Larry O’Brien is named the NBA’s third commissioner, following J. Walter Kennedy (1963-75) and Maurice Podoloff (1946-63). O’Brien holds the position until 1984.
1976 — Muhammad Ali wins a unanimous 15-round decision over Jimmy Young in Landover, Md., to retain his world heavyweight title.
1985 — NFL Draft: Virginia Tech defensive end Bruce Smith first pick by Buffalo Bills.
1987 — NY Islander Mike Bossy plays his final game.
1992 — The Red Wings and Canucks become the ninth and 10th teams in NHL history to rebound from 3-1 deficits to win playoff series. Detroit beats the Minnesota North Stars 5-2 in the Norris Division, while Vancouver defeats the Winnipeg Jets 5-0 in the Smythe Division.
1993 — Top-ranked Monica Seles is stabbed during a changeover in Hamburg, Germany. Guenter Parche, 38, reaches over a courtside railing and knifes Seles in the back. She has an inch-deep slit between her shoulder blades and missed the remainder of the 1993 season.
2005 — James Toney outpoints John Ruiz to win the WBA heavyweight title in New York. Toney, a former champion at three other weights, wins his third heavyweight bout, becoming the third one-time middleweight champion to take boxing’s top crown.
2010 — Tiger Woods matches the worst nine-hole score of his PGA Tour career and winds up with a 7-over 79 to miss the cut at the Quail Hollow Championship. Woods finishes at 9-over 153, the highest 36-hole total of his career. It’s the sixth time in his 14-year career he misses a cut.
2012 — Manchester City defeat Manchester United 1-0 in what is claimed to be the biggest match in the English Premier League’s history.
2014 — Anze Kopitar scores the tiebreaking goal late in the second period and Jonathan Quick makes 39 saves to cap the Kings’ comeback from three games down with a 5-1 victory over the San Jose Sharks in Game 7 of the first round. This is the fourth time an NHL team won a best-of-seven series after losing the first three games.
2015 — For the first time in 51 years, the NFL draft returns to Chicago. Florida State’s Jameis Winston is selected by Tampa Bay as the first selection.
2023 — Seattle Kraken become first NHL franchise to earn its first-ever playoff series win against reigning Stanley Cup champion, eliminating the Colorado Avalanche in seven games.
Compiled by the Associated Press
1903 — The New York Highlanders won their home opener at Hilltop Park, 6-2 over Washington.
1919 — Philadelphia’s Joe Oeschger and Brooklyn’s Burleigh Grimes pitched complete games in a 9-9, 20-inning tie. Both teams scored three runs in the 19th inning. Oeschger gave up 22 hits and walked five, while Grimes allowed 15 hits and walked five.
1922 — Charlie Robertson of the Chicago White Sox pitched a 2-0 perfect game against the Detroit Tigers. Johnny Mostil, playing left field for the only time, made two outstanding catches.
1923 — The New York Yankees sign 20-year-old prospect Lou Gehrig to a contract paying him a salary of $2,000 and a bonus of $1,500.
1940 — James “Tex” Carleton of the Brooklyn Dodgers threw a 3-0 no-hitter at Cincinnati.
1944 — In the first game of a doubleheader split, New York first baseman Phil Weintraub drove in 11 runs and player-manager Mel Ott scored six runs as the Giants beat the Brooklyn Dodgers 26-8. Brooklyn won the nightcap 5-4.
1946 — Bob Feller struck out 11 New York Yankees en route to his second of three career no-hitters, a 1-0 victory at Yankee Stadium.
1952 — Ted Williams plays his final game before leaving for military duty in Korea.
1958 —Ted Williams of the Boston Red Sox became the 10th major leaguer to reach 1,000 extra-base hits in a 10-4 loss to the Kansas City Athletics at Fenway Park.
1961 — Willie Mays of the San Francisco Giants hit four home runs and drove in eight runs in a 14-4 victory over the Braves in Milwaukee. Hank Aaron hit two homers for the Braves.
1967 — Steve Barber and Stu Miller of the Baltimore Orioles combined on a no-hitter in a 2-1 loss to the Detroit Tigers in the first game of a doubleheader.
1969 — Jim Maloney of the Cincinnati Reds struck out 13 en route to a 10-0 no-hitter over the Houston Astros, the third of his career.
1986 — The Seattle Mariners strike out 16 more times in a 9-4 loss to the Boston Red Sox, to set a major league record of 36 strikeouts in two consecutive games.
1988 — New York and Cincinnati hooked up in a wild game at Riverfront Stadium, with the Mets winning 6-5 on a delayed call by first base umpire Dave Pallone. The call resulted in a $10,000 fine and 30-day suspension of Reds manager Pete Rose when Pallone accidentally poked Rose in the cheek and Rose shoved Pallone twice.
1994 — Toronto’s Joe Carter finished April with 31 RBIs to set a major league record for the month. Colorado’s Andres Galarraga finished with 30 to set a National League record.
1996 — Jeff King of the Pittsburgh Pirates becomes the third major leaguer to hit two home runs in one inning twice in his career.
2000 — Randy Johnson of the Arizona Diamondbacks defeats the Chicago Cubs, 6-0, as he becomes only the third pitcher in major league history to win six games in April.
2002 — Al Leiter cruised through seven three-hit innings in the New York Mets’ 10-1 rout of Arizona to become the first pitcher to beat all 30 teams in the majors.
2005 — Major league players are asked by Commissioner Bud Selig to agree to a 50-game suspension for the first offense, a 100-game suspension for the second offense and a lifelong ban after the third offense for the use of steroids.
2008 — Julio Franco announces his retirement as a player at age 49.
2012 — Ryan Braun hit three homers and a two-run triple in Milwaukee’s 8-3 win over San Diego. No player had hit three homers and a triple in a game since Fred Lynn in 1975.
2017 — Anthony Rendon had 10 RBIs, three home runs and six hits, powering the Washington Nationals past the New York Mets 23-5. Rendon went a career-best 6 for 6 and scored five times.
2019 — CC Sabathia becomes the 17th pitcher to reach 3,000 strikeouts.
2020 — The latest event to be cancelled due to the ongoing global coronavirus pandemic is the annual Little League World Series.
2022 — Clayton Kershaw becomes the Dodgers’ all-time franchise leader for strikeouts when he fans Spencer Torkelson of the Tigers in the 4th inning. With 2,697 strikeouts, he moves past Hall of Famer Don Sutton.
Compiled by the Associated Press
That concludes today’s newsletter. If you have any feedback, ideas for improvement or things you’d like to see, email me at houston.mitchell@latimes.com. To get this newsletter in your inbox, click here.
In international politics, the platforms a country sits on often matter as much as what it says. For decades, Somalia was largely the subject of global security discussions, rarely a decisive participant in them. Today, that reality is changing in ways that carry symbolic weight and practical consequences.
Somalia’s recent election to the African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC), alongside its membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), marks a turning point in its diplomatic trajectory. For quite some time, Somalia was merely being discussed in the world’s most influential security forums. It is now shaping the agenda on the table.
This shift reflects more than a procedural achievement. It signals the maturity of Somalia’s diplomatic and security institutions, and the steady rebuilding of its international credibility after decades of conflict and state fragility.
For much of the past three decades, decisions affecting Somalia’s security were often made in rooms where Somali voices were either absent or marginal. External actors debated intervention strategies, sanctions regimes, peacekeeping mandates, and humanitarian responses, while Somalia struggled with internal instability.
This membership in the UNSC and AU PSC changes that dynamic fundamentally. These bodies are not symbolic; they make binding decisions, adopt resolutions, authorise peacekeeping operations, and shape international legal frameworks. For Somalia, this may seem something simple, but its impact is profound. Somalia is now part of the process that determines policies affecting its own security and development.
That participation strengthens state-building in several ways. It reinforces institutional capacity within Somalia’s foreign policy apparatus, promotes transparency and accountability through engagement with multilateral norms, and aligns Somalia more closely with international legal and diplomatic standards.
Somalia is transitioning from being a recipient of international decisions to becoming a contributor to them. Somalia’s role on these councils also carries representational significance beyond its own borders.
As a member of the UNSC and AU PSC, Somalia now occupies a rare diplomatic position. It simultaneously represents the interests of the African continent, the Arab and Muslim world, and the least developed countries (LDCs). The concerns of these categories of states have often been overshadowed by the priorities of more powerful nations. Somalia now stands for them.
Somalia’s own first experience in rebuilding institutions after conflict, managing complex security transitions, and balancing sovereignty with international cooperation enables it to advocate not only for itself, but also for broader principles: Inclusive peace processes, sustainable development approaches to security, and equitable participation in global decision-making.
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s 2022 political manifesto, “Somalia at peace with itself, and at peace with the world”, is increasingly reflected in these recent memberships. This vision is proving effective, as Somalia’s participation in global peace decision-making demonstrates a growing alignment between its external engagements and internal stabilisation efforts.
The seats at the UNSC and AU PSC will directly reinforce Somalia’s state-building process. Active involvement in shaping international peace also reflects and supports the way peace and security agendas are being handled domestically.
The year 2026 represents a rare convergence of opportunity. Somalia’s simultaneous presence at the AU PSC and UNSC provides a diplomatic platform unmatched in its recent history. This dual role should enable it to act as a bridge between regional and global security frameworks. It can ensure that Somalia’s security priorities are reflected in the AU decision, and forwardly, that African priorities are reflected in global resolutions. It can also translate international commitments into regional actions that qualify for alignment with local contexts.
This not only affects diplomacy and policy discussions but offers an opportunity to advocate for real change that directly affects the daily lives of Somalis. Such issues may include counterterrorism, stabilisation support, humanitarian access, development financing, climate security, and mechanisms for inclusive politics. By shaping the content and direction of relevant resolutions, Somalia can help align international commitments more closely with national priorities.
With greater influence comes greater responsibility. Membership in these councils demands consistency and adherence to international norms. Somalia is now ready to navigate these complex diplomatic landscapes, balancing national interests with collective global security obligations. And it is now capable of maintaining credibility through constructive engagement, principled positions, and reliable partnerships.
With Somalia now seemingly committed to momentum on these fronts, its growing international stance will become self-reinforcing. Each diplomatic success will strengthen national institutions, which in turn will enhance future influence.
Somalia’s presence at the highest levels of global and regional security governance marks a significant milestone in its long journey towards recovery and stability. It reflects years of diplomatic effort, institutional rebuilding, and gradual restoration of international trust. It also signals a future in which Somalia is increasingly defined not by crisis, but by stability.
For a country that once stood on the margins of global decision-making, this transformation is both historic and hopeful. It signals a shift from isolation to engagement, from being acted upon to helping shape outcomes.
For young Somali generations who grew up hearing that Somalia could not advance, these diplomatic achievements offer a different narrative. They inspire pride, restore confidence, and help rebuild trust in the nation’s future.
That challenge lies ahead. But after a period of turmoil, Somalia is well positioned to meet it, not as a passive observer, but as an active shaper of its own destiny. This is also part of the broader Somalia policy on defence diplomacy, founded on global collaboration and mutual interdependency.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
Beirut, Lebanon – On April 8, Ahmad Hamdi, 22, was sitting on his couch at home in Beirut’s Tallet el Khayat neighbourhood, hours after Israel had launched more than 100 attacks in under 10 minutes across Lebanon.
Then he heard the “indescribable sound” of a rocket. Ahmad jumped off the couch as the glass in his building shattered around him before more rockets hit.
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Clouds of dust obscured the view from his apartment on the fourth floor. When they dispersed, he saw the building directly facing his had been reduced to a pile of rubble.
He looked back at the couch he had been sitting on. At some point between the second and fourth explosion, shards of shrapnel had hit the couch exactly where his chest had been when the first rocket struck.
“When you think of Tallet el Khayat, you feel it is safe and secure,” Ahmad told Al Jazeera. “No one would expect something like that would happen.”
April 8 has become known in Lebanon as Black Wednesday. Israel’s attacks on that day killed at least 357 people across the country. Israel claimed it killed 250 Hezbollah operatives. The exact breakdown of civilians and combatants is still not known, but numerous sources looking into the day’s casualties told Al Jazeera that the attacks appeared to be indiscriminate at best and in some cases may have amounted to the direct targeting of civilians. United Nations experts have described Israel’s attacks on April 8 as “indiscriminate”.
“The method in which the attacks happened in the middle of the day with dozens of strikes all at one time without warning and when civilians were present shows recklessness in Israeli military conduct,” Ramzi Kaiss, Lebanon researcher at Human Rights Watch, told Al Jazeera.
On March 2, Israel intensified its war on Lebanon for the second time in under two years. Earlier that day, Hezbollah had responded to near-daily Israeli attacks on Lebanon for the first time since December 2024 in response to the United States and Israel’s assassination of Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Israel also invaded southern Lebanon, where it has gone about systematically destroying towns and villages in what experts – and Israeli officials – said is an effort to create an uninhabitable “buffer zone” along its border.
“Part of [Israel’s] military strategy is to create a buffer zone and no man’s land,” Bassel Doueik, the Lebanon researcher for the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) conflict monitor, told Al Jazeera. “What Israel is doing in southern Lebanon is creating a multilayered buffer zone inside Lebanese territory and that is why they are demolishing houses in towns along the border.”
Israel has not stopped attacking Lebanon since October 2023 and has violated a November 2024 ceasefire more than 10,000 times, according to the UN. Most of its attacks have been in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley in the east.
Israel conducted 100 air strikes and dropped more than 160 bombs across Lebanon on April 8, according to ACLED.
Israel claimed the attacks targeted Hezbollah headquarters, command-and-control sites, military formations and assets of its air force unit and elite Radwan Force.
Hezbollah discontinued the practice of providing the circumstances of its fighters’ deaths in September 2024. The Lebanese group does conduct some public funerals for fighters killed during the battles in southern Lebanon, but it is difficult to ascertain the exact number of those killed, making it hard to prove or disprove Israel’s claims.
But groups investigating the April 8 attacks said the available information casts doubt on the Israeli narrative. Analysts with ACLED said they are still confirming casualties but early indications showed that only a few victims were known Hezbollah members.
“One hundred one women and children were killed on April 8,” Ghida Frangieh, a Lebanese lawyer and researcher with Legal Agenda, a Beirut-based nonprofit research and advocacy organisation, told Al Jazeera. “For this number of 250 to be correct, it means every man killed must have been a Hezbollah combatant. This is not true as we were able to document several civilian men killed during these attacks.”
Lebanese media reported on a number of those killed by Israel on April 8, including employees of local restaurants, teachers, a poet, journalists, Lebanese soldiers and a member of a Druze-majority political party.
In some cases, Israeli attacks wiped out several members of the same family. Seven members of the Nasreddine family were reportedly killed on April 8 in Hermel in northeastern Lebanon. And three generations of the displaced Hawi family, including three children, were killed in the Jnah neighbourhood bordering Beirut.
Even if Hezbollah targets were present at all of the sites struck during the April 8 attacks, researchers said the attacks should still be considered indiscriminate. And while there still may be a discrepancy over the exact numbers of Hezbollah members vs civilians killed, international humanitarian law places the burden of proof on the attacking army.
“International humanitarian law is clear: Armed forces must distinguish at all times between civilians and military objectives,” Reina Wehbi, Amnesty International’s Lebanon campaigner, told Al Jazeera. “Even when there is a legitimate military target and in order to avoid indiscriminate, disproportionate or other unlawful attacks, parties must respect the principle of precaution and do everything feasible to verify that targets are military objectives, to assess the proportionality of attacks and to halt attacks if it becomes apparent they are wrongly directed or disproportionate.”
Over the past two and a half years, Israel has regularly violated the laws of war in Lebanon and in Gaza by indiscriminately attacking civilians, targeting paramedics and journalists, and using white phosphorus. Still, experts said there is little chance Israel will be held accountable.
“For the Israeli military, there is no deterrence to committing violations in Lebanon,” Kaiss of Human Rights Watch said. “After the crimes of humanity against Gaza, countries could have immediately suspended arms sales, the transit of arms through airports, placed targeted sanctions on officials, and the US and others could have suspended arms sales, but none of that happened.”
Kaiss said Lebanon could also give jurisdiction to the International Criminal Court (ICC), of which it is not currently a member, to investigate and prosecute Israel’s crimes in Lebanon. The ICC has already issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza.
Attacks on Beirut have temporarily halted since US President Donald Trump announced a ceasefire in Lebanon on April 16. But the war rages on in southern Lebanon with Israel continuing to kill civilians, including rescue workers. Israel and Lebanon have started to engage in direct negotiations despite Hezbollah’s objections in what the Lebanese state hopes will bring an end to Israel’s attacks and occupation of southern Lebanon.
But on the ground, there has been little deterrence or accountability for Israel’s crimes against civilians.
“This hasn’t happened in the last two years, so the Israeli military on the ground feels emboldened to continue,” Kaiss said.
Freedom of the press around the world has fallen to its lowest level in a quarter of a century, according to the leading Paris-based press freedom NGO, Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF), or Reporters Without Borders.
Every year, RSF publishes a World Press Freedom Index used to compare the level of freedom enjoyed by journalists and media outlets in 180 countries. Its ranking uses a five-point scale to assess a country’s level of press freedom, ranging from “very serious” to “good”.
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For the first time since RSF started producing the index in 2002, more than half of the world’s countries fall into the “difficult” or “very serious” categories for press freedom – “a clear sign that journalism is increasingly criminalised worldwide”.
Only seven mostly Nordic countries are ranked with “good” press freedom, with Norway, the Netherlands and Estonia in the top three. France ranks 25th with a “satisfactory” score, while the United States ranks 64th with a “problematic” score, falling seven places since President Donald Trump took office.
RSF reports that Trump “has turned his repeated attacks on the press and journalists into a systematic policy”, citing the detention of Salvadoran journalist Mario Guevara, who was later deported, while he was documenting a protest against immigration raids, as well as the suspension of several notable public media institutions.
In Latin America, RSF highlighted the dramatic fall of Javier Milei’s Argentina (98th, -11) and of El Salvador (143rd), which has dropped 105 places since 2014 following the launch of a war against the Maras criminal gangs.
The press freedom NGO said that “Eastern Europe and the Middle East are the two most dangerous regions for journalists in the world, as they have been for 25 years”, notably putting Russia (172nd) and Iran (177th) in the bottom 10.
It added that wars and restrictions on access to information are some of the driving factors for the decline in press freedom. It cited Israel’s attacks on journalists in Gaza, the occupied West Bank and Lebanon as an example of this, ranking Israel 116th.
“Since October 2023, more than 220 journalists have been killed in Gaza by the Israeli army, including at least 70 who were slain while carrying out their work,” it said.
Broadly speaking, RSF reported that “the criminalisation of journalism, which is rooted in circumventing press law and misusing emergency legislation and common law, is proving to be a global phenomenon”.
It reported that more than 60 percent of countries – 110 out of 180 – have criminalised media workers in various ways, notably citing India (157th), Egypt (169th), Georgia (135th), Turkiye (163rd) and Hong Kong (140th) as prime examples of state-imposed crackdowns.
“Although attacks on the right to information are more diverse and sophisticated, their perpetrators are now operating in plain sight,” Anne Bocande, RSF’s Editorial Director said.
She cited “authoritarian states, complicit or incompetent political powers, predatory economic actors and under-regulated online platforms” as the main causes “for the global decline in press freedom”.
Bocande called on democratic governments and citizens to do more to end this global criminalisation of journalists, particularly through “firm guarantees and meaningful sanctions”.
“Current protection mechanisms are not strong enough; international law is being undermined and impunity is rife,” she said. “Inaction is a form of endorsement,” while concluding that “the spread of authoritarianism isn’t inevitable”.
Islamabad, Pakistan – Pakistan has opened six overland transit routes for goods destined for Iran, formalising a road corridor through its territory as thousands of containers remain stranded at Karachi port because of the United States blockade of Iranian ports and ships trying to pass through the Strait of Hormuz.
The Ministry of Commerce issued the Transit of Goods through Territory of Pakistan Order 2026 on April 25, bringing it into immediate effect. The order allows goods originating from third countries to be transported through Pakistan and delivered to Iran by road.
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The announcement coincided with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s visit to Islamabad for talks with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and army chief Asim Munir, the latest in a series of diplomatic engagements as Pakistan seeks to mediate an end to the two-month war between Washington and Tehran.
Federal Minister for Commerce Jam Kamal Khan described the initiative as “a significant step toward promoting regional trade and enhancing Pakistan’s role as a key trade corridor”.
Iran has not publicly commented on the move, and Al Jazeera’s query to the Iranian embassy in Islamabad went unanswered.
The notification does not extend to Indian-origin goods. A separate Commerce Ministry order issued in May 2025, following the India-Pakistan aerial war that month, bans the transit of goods from India through Pakistan by any mode and remains in force.
The six designated routes link Pakistan’s main ports, Karachi, Port Qasim and Gwadar, with two Iranian border crossings, Gabd and Taftan, passing through Balochistan via Turbat, Panjgur, Khuzdar, Quetta and Dalbandin.
The shortest route, the Gwadar-Gabd corridor, reduces travel time to the Iranian border to between two and three hours, compared with the 16 to 18 hours it takes from Karachi – Pakistan’s biggest port – to the Iranian border. The Gwadar-Gabd route could cut transport costs by 45 to 55 percent compared with costs from Karachi port, according to officials.
But for Iran, firms sending their goods to the country, and transporters, all routes into Iranian territory today are viable options, with the principal maritime passage they have traditionally used – the Strait of Hormuz – blockaded by the US Navy.
The current US-Iran war began on February 28, when US and Israeli forces launched attacks on Iran.
In the weeks that followed, Iran restricted commercial navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil and gas passes during peacetime, disrupting one of the most critical arteries of global trade.
Pakistan brokered a ceasefire on April 8 and hosted the first round of direct US-Iran talks on April 11, in Islamabad. The negotiations lasted nearly a day but ended without a deal. Two days later, Washington imposed a naval blockade on Iranian ports, throttling Tehran’s maritime access.
A second round of talks has since stalled. US President Donald Trump cancelled a planned visit to Islamabad by special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner last weekend.
Iran has ruled out direct negotiations with Washington while the blockade remains in place, though Araghchi told Pakistani officials that Tehran would continue engaging with Islamabad’s mediation efforts “until a result is achieved”.
The transit order appears to be a direct economic response to that impasse.
More than 3,000 containers destined for Iran have been stuck at Karachi port for several days, with vessels unable to collect the cargo. War-risk insurance premiums have surged from about 0.12 percent of a vessel’s value before the conflict to roughly 5 percent, making shipping to the region too expensive for many operators.
The corridor also signals a shift away from Afghanistan, whose relations with Pakistan have deteriorated sharply.
The two sides engaged in clashes in October 2025 and again in February and March this year, with skirmishes continuing along the northwestern and southwestern borders.
The Torkham and Chaman crossings have ceased to function as reliable commercial routes since tensions escalated, limiting Pakistan’s overland access to Central Asian markets.
“This is a paradigmatic shift. Pakistan’s relations with the Afghan Taliban, the de facto rulers in Kabul, have no reset switch,” Iftikhar Firdous, cofounder of The Khorasan Diary, told Al Jazeera.
“Kabul has been diversifying away from Pakistan towards Iran and Central Asia, but this move flips the equation. Pakistan can now bypass Afghanistan entirely for westbound trade. The impact on Kabul’s transit relevance and revenue is strategic, not immediate – but it is real.”
Firdous said the implications extend beyond bilateral ties.
“This corridor also reduces Pakistan’s reliance on longer maritime routes through the Gulf. Geopolitics, security, and infrastructure will ultimately determine which corridors dominate, but it places Pakistan as the main overland gateway for China-backed trade routes into West Asia and beyond,” he said.
Minhas Majeed Marwat, a Peshawar-based academic and geopolitical analyst, urged caution. “A cornered Afghanistan is a destabilised Afghanistan, and Pakistan knows better than most what that costs,” she wrote on X on April 27.
“The opportunity here is real. So is the risk. Security on the northwestern and southwestern borders remains the variable that could unravel everything. Pakistan is positioned well. It is not yet positioned safely. Those are different things.”
A sculpture of a man marching off a plinth in St James’s appears to bear the artist’s name.
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UN experts said Wednesday that reconstruction in the Gaza Strip cannot succeed without ending Israel’s occupation and ensuring rebuilding efforts are rooted in human rights and Palestinian self-determination, Anadolu reports.
“The occupation must end, and the dispossession and discrimination against Palestinians must stop if rebuilding is to have any real chance of success,” the experts said in a statement.
Citing the Gaza Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, they said more than 371,000 housing units have been destroyed or damaged, 1.9 million people displaced, and over 60% of the population remains homeless, with reconstruction needs estimated at more than $71 billion.
“The data confirms a pattern of structural discrimination that reconstruction efforts must urgently correct rather than reproduce,” they said, warning that women, persons with disabilities and older people face disproportionate hardship.
The experts said reconstruction must be inclusive, participatory, transparent and accountable, with Palestinians shaping decisions in line with their right to self-determination under international law.
READ: Former US official accuses Israel of genocide in Gaza, says Washington is complicit
They raised questions about governance of the process, saying the assessment does not address who would oversee reconstruction or whether the proposed “Board of Peace” by US President Donald Trump is consistent with international law.
The experts are also concerned that the assessment does not sufficiently embed human rights principles, warning that an emphasis on financial needs and infrastructure could reduce housing to mere shelter provision rather than ensuring dignity, security and long-term sustainability.
They said reconstruction could become “a race for profits” without safeguards protecting vulnerable groups.
“Reconstruction is not only about rebuilding structures – it is about restoring rights, dignity and equality,” they said.
They urged states and donors to place human rights at the center of Gaza’s reconstruction, warning failure to do so “risks entrenching injustice and prolonging the suffering of Palestinians for generations.”
READ: Israeli court extends detention of Gaza hospital director Abu Safiya ‘without charges’
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Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.
Deliveries of the CH-53K King Stallion to the U.S. Marine Corps are starting to ramp up, with the planned 16-aircraft annual milestone now expected for Fiscal Year 2029. The Marine Corps also says that, for the future, they are open to developing a mine countermeasures version, something that would be able to replace the current MH-53E.
Updates on the latest developments within the Marine Corps’ CH-53K program were today provided by Col. Kate Fleeger, a program manager for the H-53 Helicopters Program, at the annual Modern Day Marine conference in Washington, D.C., at which TWZ is in attendance.
Fleeger confirmed that, while the legacy CH-53E and MH-53E are “both still healthy and viable” and critical components of the Marine Corps fleet, the focus is now very much on the CH-53K as the future of heavy lift.
Currently, four Marine Corps squadrons have CH-53Ks as part of their stable, and Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461 (HMH-461), which was the first fleet squadron, is fully outfitted with Kilos.
“We also have our training squadron, HMHT-302, which has received multiple CH-53Ks and will continue to be a dual type/model series training squadron throughout the transition from the Echo to the Kilo,” Fleeger explained. “We also have the CH-53K in our developmental test squadron, HX-21 at Patuxent River, and with our operational test squadron, VMX-1, in Yuma, Arizona.”
With the CH-53K “rocking and rolling across the board,” the 25th example off the Sikorsky production line in Stratford, Connecticut, was delivered earlier this week. Fleeger said that the service expects to add another eight aircraft for the rest of the year. This is part of a total Marine Corps program of record of 200 aircraft, a figure that has not changed. On top of this figure, Israel has procured 12 CH-53Ks, and Fleeger confirmed that the country is “in conversations” about the potential for additional aircraft.
As part of ongoing training work, HMH-461 has been putting the CH-53K through its paces “in every clime and place in CONUS,” Fleeger said. This has included taking the aircraft on detachments at the Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) school in Yuma, and in exercises out of Twentynine Palms, California.
Fleeger said she is “extremely happy with how the aircraft is performing” with the operational fleet.
Meanwhile, the CH-53K is also still being tested, with the two units covering operational and developmental tests. “We are continuing to expand the envelope of the baseline aircraft that’s been delivered to the fleet, whether it’s expansion of the envelope with the existing equipment, or whether it’s modifications that allow for additional capability moving forward, and ultimately providing those modifications to fleet aircraft,” Fleeger explained.
Part of the recent mission expansion saw one CH-53K lifted by another example of the same type, to broaden options for the Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel, or TRAP mission. The aircraft that was lifted had its gear boxes and engines removed, but this is common practice, Fleeger said. The purpose of the test was not only to set up and document the flight characteristics, but also the rigging procedures. In the test, the aircraft that provided the sling load weighed about 28,000 pounds, which is well below the 36,000 pounds maximum external load for the CH-53K.
“When you talk to the pilots that lift something like that, even something that heavy, there’s very little ‘feel’ in the cockpit that you have a significant load underneath,” she added.
One of the other elements of additional testing has involved aviation ground fuel delivery. This involved a CH-53K landing with fuel and then providing this fuel to a V-22 tiltrotor that landed next to it.
At the same time, the transition to the CH-53K has involved training pilots with four Containerized Flight Training Devices (CFTD) now delivered. “They are state-of-the-art, fully immersive environments that have some of the highest fidelity visual databases and digital acuity that you’ll see in flight simulation today,” Fleeger said.
“The pilots have every opportunity to see exactly what’s going to happen in the aircraft before they even get in the aircraft. The idea here is the first time a pilot sits in that cockpit on the flight line is kind of a non-event, because he’s basically seen everything he needs to see along the way.”
These new CFTDs consist of a mobile box with the “guts of the simulator inside.” As Fleeger explained, “Gone are the days of the big dome, fully motion-based simulators that we’ve had previously. The motion platform is no longer a big portion of what provides the training fidelity. The majority of that fidelity actually comes from the visual systems, the realism of the visual system, and the haptic cueing to the pilots.
Another training aid is the Advanced Aviation Training Device, or AATD, new for the H-53 community, but loosely based on some of the early developmental training systems that arrived with the V-22, with its interactive cockpit learning environment.
“This is a lower fidelity,” Fleeger said, “There’s just screens, computer monitors, if you will, that show the pilot the outside visuals. But the pilot also has a see-through virtual-reality goggle set that he puts on. It’s absolutely amazing technology that really allows you, with very little additional cost, to be able to get that immersive and simulated environment.”
The AATD is designed primarily as a familiarization training device or for refresher-level training. “You got a few minutes, you go spend some time in here,” Fleeger explained. “You brush up on some stuff. It can also be used for some of the more advanced activities, like tactics, techniques, and procedures development. You can get in there and try some things out before you get to the aircraft and do it in the real world.”
The AATD has been so successful at its current location in New River, close to the training squadron, that the Marines expect to expand throughout the rest of the fleet as it works through the CH-53K transition.
Concurrently, Fleeger says the service has been “very forward-leaning with our Marines in the maintenance shed and making sure that they have the training tools that they need in order to prepare for a state-of-the-art, very data-intensive, data-rich aircraft.”
Maintenance of the fleet benefits from a fully condition-based maintenance model, at least for some of the CH-53K’s components.
“We can look at the vibratory signatures, the temperature signatures on gearboxes, for example, and we can understand when that gearbox might be approaching the end of its life.” The result is that the fleet is increasingly able to manage the maintenance rather than having the maintenance manage them. They can decide when they want to change that gearbox, for example, depending on operational commitments, the amount of flight time they may have planned, the criticality of that flight time, the availability of spares, and so on.
All of this training, including shipboard evolutions, is building up toward the first operational deployment, with the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, in Fiscal Year 2027. Last month, the CH-53K fleet hit 10,000 fleet flight hours, a big milestone considering there are currently only 25 aircraft in the fleet.
At this stage, there are 12 aircraft sitting on the production line in Stratford, in various phases of completion.
“The fact that there are 12 aircraft is a big improvement as we move forward in the ramp-up through low-rate initial production,” Fleeger explained.
Once Sikorsky hits the milestone of 16 production aircraft per year, this will trigger the start of the Marine Corps CH-53K transition from East Coast to West Coast, and thus across the entire heavy-lift fleet.
Fleeger said that the line will be “getting up there” toward full-rate production at the end of Fiscal Year 2028, with the milestone to be achieved in FY29.
“The East Coast squadrons will complete transition, and then the transition plan will move out to the West Coast, and we will start transitioning the West Coast squadrons there as well,” Fleeger added. The CH-53E is slated to be retired in 2032.
As for the Navy MH-53E Sea Dragon, it is slated to be withdrawn in 2027. Exactly what will happen with its primary airborne mine countermeasures mission, a general capability set that is increasingly in the spotlight, is unclear. Currently, the Navy is beefing its MH-60 Seahawk mine countermeasures capabilities to help offset the loss. Still, the unique heavy countermeasures sled-towing capability that will be gone when the MH-53E leaves the inventory is likely to be felt, as will the heaviest vertical lift capability organic to the U.S. Navy.
According to Fleeger, “there have not yet been conversations about the Navy procuring the CH-53K or producing a minesweeping variant.” However, she added that “we are certainly open to that in the future, should that need arise.”
Whether or not the CH-53K eventually adopts another new mission, the type is clearly keeping busy for the time being, as the Marine Corps looks forward to taking it on its first operational deployment next year.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
European leaders are seeking to clarify a little-used mutual defence clause in the European Union treaty as questions grow over Washington’s long-term commitment to NATO during a deepening rift with the United States.
NATO, founded in 1949, is a military alliance of North American and European countries built on the principle that an attack on one member is an attack on all. But years of tension between Washington under President Donald Trump and its European allies have pushed European governments to place greater emphasis on their own defence capabilities.
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The shift has come as Trump has repeatedly criticised NATO members over their defence spending. He has also questioned the value of the alliance and clashed with European leaders over Ukraine and Iran while threatening to seize Greenland from NATO ally Denmark. The latest tensions escalated after the US and Israel began their war on Iran when Trump accused allies of failing to support Washington and dismissed NATO as a “paper tiger”.
Media reports have said that the Pentagon has also prepared a memo examining options to punish allies viewed as insufficiently supportive during the Iran war. Those options reportedly include exploring the suspension of Spain, which has been particularly critical of the war, from NATO and reviewing the US position on Britain’s claim to the Falkland Islands. NATO has no formal mechanism to expel a member, but the episode has cast doubt over the alliance’s unity and revived questions about Europe defending itself without Washington.
At the heart of Europe’s bid to look for alternative security arrangements beyond NATO is Article 42.7 of the European Union’s founding treaty.
Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union is the bloc’s mutual defence clause. It says that if an EU member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states are obliged to provide aid and assistance by all means in their power in line with the United Nations Charter.
By comparison, Article 5 in NATO’s North Atlantic Treaty states that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all. It is supported by common planning and joint exercises and is underpinned by the military weight of the US.
Unlike NATO’s Article 5, however, the EU clause is not backed by an integrated military command structure, standing defence plans or a permanent force able to respond automatically and the US has no obligation to intervene.
That means it is often seen as less credible as a military guarantee in practice although it remains an important political commitment.
Cyprus, which is an EU member but not a NATO member, has been especially eager to strengthen the clause after a drone struck a British airbase on the island during the Iran war last month. While such an incident may not have been enough to invoke NATO’s Article 5, it could raise questions about Article 42.7, particularly at a time of growing strain between the US and Europe.
Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides said leaders had agreed it was time to define how the provision would work in practice if it were triggered.
“We agreed last night that the [European] Commission will prepare a blueprint on how we respond in case a member state triggers Article 42.7,” he said on Friday at an EU summit.
French President Emmanuel Macron has also stressed that the clause should be treated as a binding commitment rather than a symbolic gesture. “On Article 42, paragraph 7, it’s not just words,” he said during a weekend visit to Greece. “For us, it is clear, and there is no room for interpretation or ambiguity.”
Antonio Costa, president of the European Council, said the bloc was drawing up a “handbook” for the use of the clause.
And EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said Europe must step up its defence efforts after Trump has “shaken the transatlantic relationship to its foundation”.
“Let me be clear: We want strong transatlantic ties. The US will remain Europe’s partner and ally. But Europe needs to adapt to the new realities. Europe is no longer Washington’s primary centre of gravity,” she said at a defence conference in Brussels.
“This shift has been ongoing for a while. It is structural, not temporary. It means that Europe must step up. No great power in history has outsourced its survival and survived.”
The clause has been used only once before when France invoked it after the 2015 Paris attacks claimed by ISIL (ISIS), in which 130 people were killed and hundreds wounded.
The attacks were the deadliest in France since World War II. After Article 47.2 was invoked, other EU states shared intelligence aimed at helping French authorities unravel the conspiracy that led to the attacks.
NATO’s Article 5 has also been invoked just once – after the September 11, 2001, attacks in the US.
But NATO’s help to the US wasn’t limited to intelligence sharing. Allies contributed tens of thousands of soldiers to the US-led war in Afghanistan. The operations lasted two decades, and more than 46,000 Afghan civilians were killed alongside 2,461 US personnel and about 1,160 non-US coalition soldiers, according to Brown University’s Cost of War project.
Europe’s debate over its defence comes amid a string of disputes inside NATO. The reports that US officials have considered punitive measures against allies have revived questions over the alliance’s future cohesion.
Pablo Calderon Martinez, head of politics and international relations at Northeastern University London and a specialist in European affairs, told Al Jazeera that Spain cannot legally be removed from NATO.
“There is no legal mechanism to remove a member. There is, however, a mechanism through which a member can withdraw itself from the organisation,” he said.
He added that some countries have long fallen short of NATO commitments but that does not provide grounds for expulsion. A more likely scenario, he said, would be the US choosing to leave.
Carne Ross, a former British diplomat and founder of Independent Diplomat, a nonprofit diplomatic advisory group, said the deeper issue is whether Europe and Washington still share common values.
“It is abundantly clear that we do not. Trump is anti-democratic. He tried to subvert democracy, challenged the 2020 election result and whipped up a violent crowd to storm the Capitol,” Ross said.
“What more evidence do we need that the values of Europe are not shared in Washington?”
European countries have pledged to sharply increase their defence budgets with many aiming to spend 5 percent of their gross domestic products each year on their militaries.
Trump cannot withdraw the US from NATO without congressional approval, but doubts over Washington’s commitment have already unsettled many European capitals.
That has created new urgency around strengthening Europe’s own defence capabilities and building a more credible European pillar inside, or alongside, NATO.
Ross said Europe’s major powers should begin planning seriously for greater self-reliance.
“The Europeans themselves, particularly the most powerful countries – Britain, France, Germany and Italy – need to be talking about how to defend themselves without the US,” he said.
Fifty-nine years of membership, ended with a statement on a Tuesday and an effective date of Friday. The United Arab Emirates announced it will exit OPEC and OPEC+ on May 1, citing national interests, its evolving energy profile, and a long-term strategic vision that no longer aligns with the organization’s direction. The Energy Minister did not consult Saudi Arabia before making the announcement. He did not raise the issue with any other member country. He simply said the time had come.
The timing tells the whole story. OPEC was preparing to meet in Vienna on Wednesday when the news landed. The Iran war had already wiped out 7.88 million barrels per day of OPEC’s production in March alone, resulting in the biggest supply collapse for the producers’ group in recent decades, surpassing even the 2020 Covid shock and the 1970s oil crisis. The UAE had been absorbing Iranian drone and missile attacks for weeks. The Strait of Hormuz, through which the UAE ships its own oil, has been functionally closed or severely restricted since early March. And sitting across the OPEC table was Iran, the country that had been targeting UAE infrastructure repeatedly, and Russia, which had been a steadfast partner to Iran throughout the conflict.
Walking out was not an impulsive decision. It was the logical conclusion of a calculation that had been building for years.
The UAE’s frustration with OPEC production quotas is not new. The quotas have capped UAE output at around 3.2 million barrels per day, while the country has the ambition and the capacity to produce closer to 5 million barrels per day by 2027, suggesting production could almost double without OPEC’s constraints. For a country that has invested heavily in expanding ADNOC’s capacity and has the infrastructure to back it up, being told by a cartel committee how much it can produce has become an increasingly poor trade.
The UAE’s sovereign wealth fund is so large that its economy is now more significantly tied to global economic growth than to the global price of oil. That shift in economic identity matters enormously for understanding why OPEC membership has become structurally uncomfortable. OPEC exists to keep oil prices elevated through production discipline. The UAE increasingly benefits from a growing global economy that demands more energy, more investment, and more trade, all of which are better served by producing at full capacity and building relationships with the countries that need what Abu Dhabi has to sell.
An energy industry source familiar with the decision said the UAE felt it was “the right time to leave” and that “this decision is good for consumers and good for the world,” adding that the UAE would gradually increase production to supply global markets once freedom of navigation is restored in the Strait of Hormuz. The framing is deliberate. The UAE is not positioning itself as a cartel defector but as a responsible producer responding to a global energy emergency, which is a considerably more defensible diplomatic position.
The official UAE statement was carefully worded, full of appreciation for “brothers and friends within the group” and “the highest respect for the Saudis for leading OPEC.” None of that diplomatic courtesy changes the underlying reality, which is that the UAE and Saudi Arabia have been on a collision course for some time and the OPEC exit is the most visible expression of that tension yet.
The two countries had joined a coalition to fight the Houthis in Yemen in 2015, but that coalition broke down into open recriminations in late December when Saudi Arabia bombed what it described as a weapons shipment bound for UAE-backed Yemeni separatists. That incident was the visible rupture of a relationship that had been quietly fraying for years over economic competition, differing visions for regional leadership, and diverging approaches to normalization, China, and the post-war order. Within OPEC, the two countries have clashed repeatedly over quota allocations, with the UAE consistently arguing it deserves a larger share based on its expanded capacity.
The OPEC exit does not resolve any of those tensions. It sidesteps them entirely, which is probably the more elegant solution. By leaving, the UAE removes itself from a framework where Saudi Arabia holds dominant influence and gains the freedom to pursue its own production and partnership strategy without needing Riyadh’s agreement. That is a significant shift in the regional power dynamic, and it happened without a single confrontational statement.
The UAE’s exit could prompt other members to follow suit, with analysts pointing to Kazakhstan as another significant producer that wants to grow beyond its current quota constraints. “If there is a time to leave, now is the time,” one Dubai-based energy consultant told CNN.
The cartel’s power has always rested on a specific mechanism: spare production capacity held back from the market to stabilize prices. That spare capacity is concentrated almost entirely in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, with the other nine member countries possessing little to none. Removing the UAE from that equation means OPEC’s effective spare capacity narrows considerably, and the burden of price stabilization falls almost entirely on Riyadh and Kuwait City. Saudi Arabia will hold an even greater share of the cartel’s remaining leverage, but leverage over a smaller and weaker institution is not the same as leverage over a healthy one.
OPEC has lost members before, but the UAE is a much larger producer than previous departures, and its absence may over time pose an existential risk to the cartel’s sustainability. The organization that has shaped global energy politics since 1960 is now facing its most significant structural test, and it is doing so while simultaneously dealing with a historic supply shock from the Iran war, a closed strait, and a global economy pricing in the possibility that the disruption is not temporary.
Freed from production quotas, the UAE’s most immediate strategic move is likely to deepen its relationship with the countries that need its oil most urgently, and China sits at the top of that list. More production could help the UAE improve ties with oil-importing partners such as China, and given the economic damage caused by the Iran war, the prospect of maximizing energy revenues now is undoubtedly attractive to Abu Dhabi.
The UAE-US relationship also stands to benefit. With the UAE free to leverage its spare capacity in pursuit of its own strategic interests, the move will likely strengthen the UAE-US relationship, particularly in relation to managing the strategic petroleum reserve and responding to the ongoing Hormuz supply shock. Trump has been publicly critical of OPEC for years, accusing the cartel of exploiting American military protection to keep prices artificially high. An OPEC that is smaller and weaker, with a major member now operating independently and aligned with US interests, is a more congenial arrangement from Washington’s perspective.
For the global energy market, the picture is more complicated. Once the Strait reopens fully and UAE production ramps up without quota constraints, additional supply should exert downward pressure on prices that have been elevated since February. Whether that actually happens depends on a sequence of events, including a durable Iran settlement and the restoration of free navigation through Hormuz, that are still very much in progress.
The UAE’s OPEC exit is not primarily an energy story. It is a geopolitical statement about where Abu Dhabi sees itself in the emerging regional order, and the answer is: outside the frameworks that no longer serve its interests, and free to build the bilateral relationships that do. The exit from OPEC follows the same strategic logic as the Abraham Accords, the Huawei contracts, the US base agreement, and the China infrastructure ties. The UAE has been running a multi-alignment strategy for years, positioning itself as indispensable to every major power simultaneously, and OPEC membership was becoming a constraint on that strategy rather than an asset.
What happens to OPEC matters for energy markets in the short term. What the UAE’s departure signals about the fracturing of Gulf institutional solidarity matters considerably more for the regional order that everyone in the Middle East is trying to rebuild in the aftermath of a war that nobody fully planned for and nobody has yet fully ended.
The deeper story is what the UAE’s exit reveals about the post-war Middle East taking shape right now. The institutions that governed the region’s energy politics, security arrangements, and diplomatic alignments for decades were built in a different world, one where the Cold War defined choices, where oil producers had unified interests, and where the US sat at the center of every meaningful regional framework. That world is gone. What the Iran war accelerated, and what the UAE’s OPEC exit makes structurally visible, is that the Gulf’s most capable states are no longer willing to subordinate their individual strategic interests to collective frameworks that were designed for a regional order that no longer exists.
Abu Dhabi did not leave OPEC because of a quota dispute. It left because it has decided that in the world emerging from this war, the countries that move fastest, align most flexibly, and free themselves from inherited institutional constraints are the ones that will define what comes next. Whether that calculation proves correct depends on what the Islamabad talks produce, how quickly the Strait reopens, and whether the ceasefire holds long enough for the region to build something more durable than a pause. But the signal Abu Dhabi sent on Tuesday was unmistakable, and every government in the region heard it.
The Venezuelan acting president hosted energy executives at Miraflores Palace. (Presidential Press)
Caracas, April 29, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan government signed new energy agreements with energy conglomerates British Petroleum (BP) and Eni in separate ceremonies at Miraflores Presidential Palace.
On Wednesday, Acting President Delcy Rodríguez signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to develop the Cocuina-Manakin field, an offshore natural gas project shared between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago.
“The return of BP [to Venezuela] is a clear sign of the future we want to chart for Venezuela and for international energy relations,” she said during a live broadcast. “May we have cooperation grounded in a win-win approach and shared benefits.”
BP was represented by its Trinidad and Tobago director David Campbell. The Cocuina-Manakin field holds an estimated 1 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas, split 34-66 between Caracas and Port of Spain.
Following Wednesday’s agreement, the London-based multinational will additionally explore opportunities in the 7.3 Tcf Loran field, which is also part of a cross-border reserve shared with Trinidad. Both Cocuina and Loran are part of Venezuela’s Deltana Platform, a largely unexplored gas deposit on the country’s eastern maritime border.
Venezuela had suspended all energy projects involving Trinidad and Tobago over its neighbor’s support for the US military escalation in the Caribbean. Following January 3, the acting Rodríguez administration reengaged with Port of Spain, while extending overtures to BP and Shell in an effort to reopen the projects.
The BP agreement came on the heels of another high-profile ceremony at Miraflores on Tuesday that saw Rodríguez extend a “special welcome” to Eni CEO Claudio Descalzi and other executives. In what she called a “milestone in the relations” between Venezuela and the Italian corporation, Rodríguez announced that Eni is planning “one of the largest investments” in the Venezuelan oil sector.
The contract establishes conditions to relaunch the exploration of the 425 square-kilometer Junín-5 block of Venezuela’s Orinoco Oil Belt. The Junín-5 is estimated to contain 35 billion barrels of extra-heavy oil in place, though only a fraction will be recoverable.
For his part, Descalzi indicated that the signed deal created conditions to “accelerate development” of Junín-5 activities and that the company would finalize its investment plan by the end of the year.
The Junín-5 block was assigned in the late 2000s to Petrojunín, a joint venture where Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA and Eni held 60 and 40 percent of shares, respectively. Crude extraction began in 2013 but did not hit the established targets, hovering around 10,000 barrels per day (bpd) by the end of the 2010s.
The BP and Eni agreements were crafted under Venezuela’s recently overhauled Hydrocarbon Law, which introduces a series of pro-business incentives while curtailing state control over the energy sector.
Under the new law, minority partners can directly manage oilfield operations and sales, whereas in the prior framework that was PDVSA’s exclusive prerogative. Additionally, private companies can have royalties, income tax, and other fiscal contributions slashed at the government’s discretion as well as bring eventual disputes to international arbitration bodies.
In March, Eni, alongside Spain’s Repsol, inked a contract to further development of the Cardón IV offshore natural gas project. The European companies each own 50 percent stakes in the venture and recently announced plans to increase output by roughly 10 percent in the short term.
Eni, which has around 30 percent of its shares owned by the Italian state, is also a minority stakeholder in Petrosucre, a joint venture that operates the Corocoro offshore oilfield. In 2025, the ventures with Eni participation produced an average of 64,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day.
Alongside BP, Eni, and Repsol, Chevron and Shell have likewise struck new deals in recent weeks under the favorable conditions of the hydrocarbon reform. Chevron increased its stake in the Petroindependencia joint venture, while its Petropiar project with PDVSA was assigned a new drilling block in the Orinoco Belt. For its part, Shell will take over light and medium crude projects in Eastern Venezuela and several offshore natural gas initiatives. The company had also expressed interest in the Loran field.
The acting Rodríguez administration has actively courted foreign investment into the South American country’s energy and mining sectors, with leaders openly acknowledging the incorporation of “suggestions” and “recommendations” from Western conglomerates into the recent reform.
Alongside multiple delegations of corporate executives, Rodríguez has also hosted Trump officials, including Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Interior Secretary Doug Burgum, ahead of the recent hydrocarbon and mining reforms.
Last week, newly appointed US Chargé d’Affaires John Barrett stated that Washington’s goal is to “place the private sector at the center of Venezuela’s transformation” during a meeting with the Venezuelan-American Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VENAMCHAM).
Since the January 3 military strikes and kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration has issued multiple licenses to facilitate the return of Western conglomerates to the Venezuelan energy and mining sectors.
The licenses mandate that all royalty, tax, and dividend payments be made into accounts run by the US Treasury. Caracas and Washington recently announced the hiring of external auditors to oversee the flow of the US-controlled Venezuelan resources.
Edited by Lucas Koerner in Fusagasugá, Colombia.
Note: The report was amended on Wednesday night to incorporate the BP agreement.