Neocolonial

A devastating double earthquake hit Venezuela on June 24, leaving a trail of destruction and thousands dead. Dozens of buildings collapsed in coastal La Guaira State, the worst affected in the South American country.

The natural disaster followed two unnatural catastrophes: a decade-plus of US-led economic sanctions, and the January 3 US bombing attack and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro.

But rather than sympathize with the beleaguered country, the Western media establishment seized the opportunity to continue demonizing the Bolivarian Revolution—while whitewashing Washington’s economic terrorism and its present efforts to tighten its semi-colonial stranglehold on the country (FAIR.org, 2/27/26).

An assault on public housing

The ground had barely stopped shaking when corporate media oligopolies took aim at one of the most visible pillars of Hugo Chávez’s legacy: Venezuela’s Great Housing Mission (GMVV).

A Washington Post headline (6/27/26) declared: “These Homes Rose out of Venezuela’s Socialist Revolution. Now They’re Rubble.”

An architect was quoted claiming that the damaged apartments had been “constructed hastily” to “meet a political deadline.” Though the Post claimed Chávez launched the housing program to secure votes for the 2012 election, the only beneficiary the paper could find received her home in 2014.

AFP (6/29/26) singled out damage to a GMVV complex—“once touted as part of former strongman leader Hugo Chavez’s flagship housing program”—arguing that it “symbolize[d] the country’s dire situation.” Dozens of buildings geared toward tourism, including hotels and high-rises built for short-term rentals, in this neighborhood of Catia La Mar, were also flattened by the devastating tremors, but AFP made no effort to provide that context.

The New York Times (7/5/26) likewise attempted to besmirch what is one of the most ambitious public housing projects worldwide by repeating the unfounded claim that homes were assigned as a “reward for loyalty to Mr. Chávez.” However, the paper of record at least admitted that “Misión Vivienda buildings are far from the only apartments to have fallen.”

The Wall Street Journal (6/28/26) could not hide its elitism in describing how Chávez “rushed to provide apartments to the poor” in a town “beloved by the rich,” with a golf course and a “marina for yachts.” It went further by promoting a social media hoax that styrofoam found in damaged buildings meant that the housing mission used absurdly unsuitable materials in its construction. In reality, expanded polystyrene (EPS) foam is widely used to lighten the load on structures and for thermal insulation, a key factor in such a hot climate.

Venezuelan officials have called for a review of the collapsed structures and building codes, though they have claimed that the public housing buildings fared better than their privately constructed neighbors.

There is little evidence to suggest that GMVV buildings suffered a worse fate than their private sector counterparts. According to the open-source tool Terremoto Venezuela, only 11 out of 258 buildings reported as collapsed (“daño total”) belong to the housing mission.

The definitive figures will need to be put in perspective to see whether affected buildings and non-complicity with existing codes were prevalent in the GMVV developments or the recent tourist-driven real estate boom in La Guaira. But the media establishment immediately jumped to its politically motivated verdict before any thorough investigation had been conducted.

Whitewashing sanctions

While multiple outlets stressed that it is necessary to scrutinize whether authorities enforced the appropriate regulations in what is known to be vulnerable terrain (France 24, 6/29/26; Reuters, 6/29/26), no evaluation of the Venezuelan state’s record is accurate if it ignores the wide-reaching sanctions regime imposed by Washington.

Yet many Western journalists completely overlooked sanctions in their coverage of the earthquakes and the Venezuelan state’s capacity to respond to a natural catastrophe.

Corporate outlets like the Financial Times (6/28/26) wasted no time in proclaiming that the “legacy of ‘Chavismo’ hinder[ed] Venezuela’s earthquake response,” while AP (7/3/26) decreed that the government’s response was “slow” and the BBC (6/29/26) claimed survivors were “left to fend for themselves.”

None saw fit to even mention that Venezuela has been under economic coercive measures for years. NBC (6/25/26) avoided the kneejerk verdicts and offered lots of testimony on the natural disaster, but when concluding that “Venezuela already faced economic challenges and poverty,” chose not to name sanctions as a key economic challenge and poverty factor.

In other reports, the whitewashing of sanctions was more subtle. The Guardian (7/3/26) attributed the government’s “sluggish response” to “years of corruption, economic mismanagement and investment in political repression and domestic security rather than emergency services and healthcare.” As almost an afterthought, it added that sanctions “have further enfeebled the Venezuelan state.” The Washington Post‘s anti-public housing article (6/27/26) called Venezuela’s economic collapse “the result of mismanagement by the socialist government exacerbated by US-imposed economic sanctions.”

The New York Times (7/4/26) wrote that “Venezuela’s fragile infrastructure—including rail, electricity and healthcare systems that have suffered from years of corruption and mismanagement.” In a later section it added, “Venezuela is reeling from years of economic turmoil and crippling US sanctions.”

Over the years, Western media have pulled all the stops to legitimize Washington’s hybrid war on Caracas and conceal the murderous impact of sanctions (FAIR.org, 6/4/21, 6/13/22). There is no shortage of documentation on how these coercive measures represented collective punishment (CEPR, 4/25/19). In an extensive 2021 report, UN rapporteur Alena Douhan thoroughly discussed the impact of sanctions on Venezuelan public services and infrastructure.

The current framing  of earthquake coverage aims to separate US sanctions as much as possible from their direct consequences. Rail, electricity and healthcare systems became much more “fragile” because sanctions blocked the Venezuelan government from servicing equipment and importing spare parts, not to mention brain drain resulting from mass migration of qualified personnel largely trained in public universities. Similarly, the “economic turmoil” is a result of US sanctions, not a parallel phenomenon.

Indeed, economist Francisco Rodríguez, senior research fellow at the Center for Economic and Policy Research, dismisses arguments that the bulk of Venezuela’s economic decline preceded sanctions (CEPR, 5/19/26). Instead, the rate of GDP contraction nearly quadrupled following the US imposition of unilateral coercive measures in 2017.

And the need to conjure elaborate intermediation schemes in order to circumvent sanctions opened more avenues for corruption. To present the latter as an issue that uniquely and disproportionately plagues a government facing an economic blockade is disingenuous, to say the least.

Ignoring the semi-colonial straitjacket

In their recent coverage, most corporate media sources were quick to decree that the Venezuelan government’s response was “slow” (Financial Times, 6/27/26; Guardian, 6/29/26), “inadequate” (Reuters, 7/5/26), “faltering” (AP, 7/1/26) or “completely ineffective” (PBS, 7/2/26).

It is understandable that ordinary people would not sing the government’s praises after losing a relative or while looking for one trapped under rubble. But journalists have a responsibility to add context. In this case, a significant mitigating circumstance is that the tremors heavily hit the local authorities, which run civil protection and other services.

Acting President Delcy Rodríguez stated that nearly all the directors from the La Guaira regional government were lost in the tragedy. Coupled with a collapse of communications, this added more hurdles for response efforts.

Another overlooked element is just how rare and deadly this double earthquake was. The New York Times was a notable exception, with a thorough piece (7/3/26) explaining how the disaster unfolded and why it caused so much destruction.

But the most relevant element to understand Venezuela’s present constraints is, once again, the role played by the US government. Just like with sanctions, corporate news outlets whitewashed Washington’s current semi-colonial impositions on the South American nation.

Since the January 3 attacks, the Trump administration has seized control of Venezuelan export revenues, particularly from oil sales (Venezuelanalysis, 2/20/26). Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that the Venezuelan government would need to submit a “budget request” to access its own funds held by the US Treasury (Venezuelanalysis, 1/29/26). Neither US nor Venezuelan authorities have offered any transparent information on the amounts collected and disbursed, including Washington’s intermediation fees.

Trump is not known for precision in his statements, but he has not been shy in boasting that the cost of the January 3 military operation has been paid “many times over” from oil profits (New York Times, 6/29/26; Guardian, 6/28/26; Al Jazeera, 6/24/26). While there is no information to verify the claims, economist Francisco Rodríguez, analyzing Venezuelan Central Bank data, concluded that there is at least a significant delay in the US disbursement of Venezuelan funds back to the country (Banca y Negocios, 6/22/26). The suspicious lack of transparency has even drawn questions from traditional foreign policy paladins like the Council on Foreign Relations.

With few exceptions (Reuters, 7/1/26; AP, 7/3/26; New York Times, 7/6/26), this key, semi-colonial constraint on the Venezuelan state is completely overlooked. Even worse, some outlets mistakenly stated that the White House has “lifted” or  authorized “relaxation” of sanctions (PBS, 7/2/26; Financial Times, 6/27/26). Actually it has only issued licenses for select Western corporations, and with the condition that proceeds be deposited in the US Treasury account. Following the recent natural disaster, the Trump administration issued a four-month waiver allowing earthquake relief-related transactions, but left all restrictions and asset freezes in place (Venezuelanalysis, 6/26/26).

Another ominous development has been the US forces’ takeover of operations at the Simón Bolívar International Airport, the country’s main air hub, and the La Guaira port. Despite regular Southern Command press releases, and even photographic evidence, the media establishment has paid little attention to this serious (further) encroachment on Venezuelan sovereignty.

The outlook is bleak for Venezuela, with this tragedy likely to increase dependency and semi-colonial plundering. But there is room for hope. The limits of US power are being exposed all over the world, and resorting to more and more violence will not stem this inevitable decline. Peoples in the Global South, including in Venezuela, will eventually (re)take control of their destinies. But they know that the corporate press barons are no allies in this struggle.

Source: FAIR

Elías Jaua is a Venezuelan intellectual, university professor, and politician who served as vice president under Hugo Chávez in addition to several ministerial roles in the  Chávez and Maduro administrations. He currently heads the Center for the Study of Socialist Democracy (CEDES). In this exclusive interview, Jaua discusses Venezuela’s post-January 3 conjuncture, the anti-imperialist struggle to reclaim sovereignty, and the role to be played by Chavismo.

Venezuela’s reality changed on January 3 with the US strikes and kidnapping of President Maduro. How would you describe the current situation? And regarding the US, there is talk of “conditional sovereignty” and “tutelage,” while officials speak of a “cooperation agenda.” What is your take on this?

Sovereignty is a comprehensive concept. You either have it or you don’t. Sovereignty means not depending on anyone. It is the foundation of a republic. A republic means independence from others, something distinct from liberal, individual freedom. Venezuela today is a state under tutelage, overseen by the Donald Trump administration. This was officially declared by Trump and White House officials such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

This is also clearly reflected in oil production, which must be sold primarily to the US, and the proceeds from those exports do not enter directly into Venezuela’s coffers but instead into a US Treasury account. From there, the Venezuelan government will make requests and have certain amounts necessary for the country’s basic functioning disbursed. That is a complete loss of economic sovereignty. We have also seen how reforms to strategic laws, such as those governing hydrocarbons and mining, have been rushed through. Today, there is immense pressure on labor legislation, both from the Venezuelan business community and from transnational capital, which views labor laws as yet another obstacle to attracting investment.

And finally, we have seen that Venezuela’s foreign policy – which was openly supportive of Palestine, Iran, and Cuba – has been significantly toned down. This is another clear sign that Venezuela is no longer an independent state. Its status as a republic is entirely relative.

In light of all this, how do you feel the government and other national political groups should respond?

I view the decision made on January 3 not to respond to the US military attack as a responsible one, because the enemy clearly had military superiority and the capability to control the entire airspace using high-tech means. A response would have resulted in significant destruction of the country’s infrastructure and armed forces, as well as the killing of thousands of civilians. 

Now, four months later, the Venezuelan government and all political forces should clearly denounce to the international community the coercion to which we are being subjected. On the one hand, as a public denunciation, but also to have it formally recorded before international bodies such as the International Commission on Human Rights. What occurred in January were war crimes, a fact supported by United Nations rapporteurs. Next, a complaint should be filed with the International Court of Justice to restore control over national revenues to the Venezuelan state. 

One might argue that this is ineffective at the moment, that international law is irrelevant and international organizations are incapable of acting – and that is true. But the country must establish a legal precedent because these institutions still exist, and as a result they are a source of rights. These complaints set precedents so that the country can, in the future, claim the rights that have been damaged by the occupying power. 

Finally, it is important to reach out to the international community, and above all to the peoples of the world, so that they know there is a nation that refuses to be placed under tutelage and subjected to these conditions, in order to build international solidarity. An internal political stance must also be established, because this attempt to conceal the gravity of the coercion to which the country is being subjected numbs popular consciousness, undermines patriotic morale, and that is contrary to what is expected of the leadership – not only of the government, but of the entire political leadership of the nation.

But what if that triggers another US military attack?

I don’t think a repeat of the January 3 incident is imminent because it would have repercussions in the US domestic political landscape. The political cost for the Trump administration would no longer be zero, as it practically was on January 3, but there would be greater resistance, especially for attacking a country that has simply exercised its rights before international bodies to claim sovereignty over resources and political self-determination. 

Put another way, the option of not denouncing this, of not activating available mechanisms, is to accept and normalize this situation of neocolonialism, and I believe that is a very dangerous path that could even lead to Venezuela’s annexation by the US. I believe there are moments when peoples, nations, and their leaders must take a firm stand for the sake of history. Here it is no longer a matter of defending a party or a political movement, but rather the existence of a nation that was born free. We have a historic responsibility to ensure it remains that way for future generations.

US officials repeat their “three-phase plan,” which ends with a political “transition,” on a daily basis, while the extremist opposition demands immediate elections to seize power at any cost. From your perspective, what is the path forward, and what should the priorities be?

The priority is to regain independence. If we hold elections, that is with candidates for what? For governor of the colony? Anyone who truly wants to hold the presidency of the Republic of Venezuela must first raise their voice in favor of the immediate restoration of the country’s sovereign rights over its resources and revenues and the assertion of political self-determination. 

In any case, I argue that any eventual electoral process should be the result of a national agreement, renationalizing politics and not waiting for a call from the White House one day announcing that there will be elections in six months. That would be very shameful. I believe that Venezuelan political forces would be obligated, as part of that strategy to reclaim and demand the restoration of Venezuela’s sovereignty, to also commit to the international community and the Venezuelan people to seek a political, democratic, and electoral path forward.

In a recent article, you spoke of an inability to manage the internal political conflict, which paved the way for foreign intervention. Could you elaborate on this idea? How has that situation changed since January 3?

Foreign meddling began on the very first day of the Bolivarian Revolution, and there were agents that facilitated it. The first concrete example was the April 11, 2002 coup d’état, with the open participation of the US and Spanish governments, and from that point on, that interference never ceased. But there was always a degree of autonomy that allowed, especially after 2004, for the democratic resolution of the conflict through national agreements. For instance, the recall referendum that ultimately ratified Chávez’s mandate.

But starting in 2014, after the right-wing insurrectionary attempt known as “La Salida” and its failure, the US began to intervene directly by declaring Venezuela an “unusual and extraordinary threat,” and from that point on, the opposition lost any capacity to make decisions. I was a member of the dialogue delegation in the Dominican Republic in 2018 and saw how an agreement signed by everyone was overturned by a phone call from the US embassy. 

I also believe that later, over the past five years, the Venezuelan government chose to engage in dialogue with the US and bet that the conflict would be resolved directly with Washington. Therefore, everyone put all their eggs in the White House’s basket, and the decision slipped completely out of the control of the country’s internal institutions until the game came to a standstill. And indeed, at the behest of the far-right opposition, Washington intervened and attacked on January 3. That is why I say that reclaiming internal political control in order to resolve the conflict would be an act of dignity and courage on the part of the entire Venezuelan political leadership. Conflict is not going to vanish, because today the calls for a conflict-free Venezuela come alongside a set of measures that deepen it. For example, labor deregulation, social disinvestment, political exclusion, etc.

In recent years, you have analyzed and debated the direction of Chavismo amid sanctions and the implementation of orthodox macroeconomic adjustment policies. Since January 3, we have seen a drastic overhaul of key pillars of the Bolivarian project, such as the Hydrocarbons Law, and critical voices growing louder, including Mario Silva and Luis Britto García. What is the current state of Chavismo, in your opinion?

First of all, the revision and change of course regarding fundamental aspects of Chavismo’s historic program did not begin on January 3 but much earlier. It was formalized starting in 2018 with the Program for Economic Recovery, Growth, and Prosperity, aimed at halting the advance of the transition to socialism and restoring the private sector’s hegemony in managing the economy, with clear consequences for social rights and the fight against social inequality. This was also accompanied by increasingly undemocratic mechanisms, from the political leadership, to impose a change of course in economic and social policy. 

However, a fundamental core of Chavismo’s programmatic unity – the struggle for independence and national sovereignty – remained intact, and that kept Chavismo cohesive despite major differences. Today, I believe Chavismo must be situated within different spheres. There is a Chavismo within the United Socialist Party (PSUV) – no one can dispute that  – but I believe there is a broader, and much larger, Chavismo, with a cultural, political, and symbolic identity rooted in a metanarrative that exists outside the PSUV and the Great Patriotic Pole. That sector currently lacks clear leadership and organizational structure, but it retains its values. It may have circumstantial views of the situation, but essentially it continues to uphold the principles that launched this process: sovereignty, participatory and protagonist democracy, democratic pluralism, freedom, political ethics, debate, speaking the truth, and social equality. It also holds a vision of a multipolar world, in solidarity with international struggles. These were, in essence, the core tenets of Chavismo from its inception and remain relevant for a significant portion of the Venezuelan population that is Chavista or was once Chavista.

You have talked about building national unity at this juncture, but also about upholding Chávez and his legacy. Are these two paths compatible?

This is a difficult and painful reflection because the figure and the project of Hugo Chávez have been burdened with a series of deviations. Practices that run completely contrary to the principles and values he defended, and upon which he built the Chavista project. For example, the case of Víctor Hugo Quero and his mother is deeply outrageous (1). It is a truly shameful incident, yet international news outlets report, “Chavismo admits to the disappearance of a detainee,” “Mother of prisoner killed by Chavismo dies.” Is it Chavismo or just a few individuals responsible? What about the men and women who, for over 25 years, laboriously dreamed, built, and dedicated part of their lives to creating well-being and the common good in their communities, to building a national project called “Chavismo”? It is very unfair because Chavismo, as a movement, is being accused of things it did not do. Chavismo is not this or that leader; it is the men and women who gave up the only thing they had – their time, their effort – to build community, a national project, to plant crops, to learn to read and write or to teach others to read and write, to study, and so on. 

I stand by Chavismo as the men and women who dreamed, who continue to dream, and who have given their all to build a more humane society. For me, that will continue to be Chavismo. And those of us who have held leadership posts in this process must assume their responsibilities for the good and the bad. But it is unethical to blame a popular movement, a popular ideal like Chavismo, for the mistakes, deviations, and vile acts that some leaders may have committed. 

I believe that the call for national unity, to paraphrase [revolutionary communist leader Alfredo] Maneiro, will spring from the most authentic Chavismo, but will transcend it. It will converge with other currents of the left that were not Chavista, with social democratic sectors that broke away from the extremist opposition, and with people who never took a stance on the political conflict the country has experienced in recent decades. It will be the plurality of opinions, of people, of organizations, that will provide the foundation for a necessary movement, which I see as unstoppable and already feel in the streets, in this struggle to regain independence and sovereignty.

Note

(1) Victor Quero died in state custody in July 2025 but his family was not notified. His mother, Carmen Navas, continued to search for him until his death was publicly acknowledged in May 2026 after a judge denied an amnesty request. Navas passed away shortly afterward.