negotiations

Iranian officials have been speaking with Qatari mediators about a two-day plan to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, according to Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, in the latest effort to find a diplomatic path out of the US-Israel war on Iran that has caused a serious global energy crisis.

But even amid signs of diplomatic progress, officials from both sides say they are ready for renewed military escalation.

President Donald Trump, who has repeatedly suggested the United States could attack Iran after the November 3 midterm elections, said the latest negotiations were “going fine”, but added that the US still had several Iranian targets to “take care of”.

Meanwhile, Araghchi has also said Iran’s military was more prepared than ever for renewed war, while the country’s security chief, Mohsen Rezaei, threatened Iran would use “new weaponry” in response to any future attack.

Here’s what we know about the latest diplomatic efforts and the sharp rhetoric from both sides, and what it could mean for what lies ahead:

What is the status of talks?

Araghchi said on Saturday that an Iranian delegation, including one of his aides, travelled to Doha to meet Qatari mediators. Earlier, Qatari officials also travelled to Tehran for consultations.

The latest discussions in Doha centred on a plan that would reopen the Strait of Hormuz, a global energy chokepoint, within two days and restart peace talks with the US, provided Washington meets a set of demands from Tehran, Araghchi told Al Jazeera.

Those demands include the lifting of recently imposed US sanctions, the reinstatement of oil waivers granted in June, a reduction in the US military presence in the region, recognition of new shipping routes in the Strait of Hormuz designated by Iran and Oman, and an end to the conflict on all fronts, including Israel’s attacks on Lebanon, said Araghchi.

Qatari and Pakistani mediators were “continuing consultations regarding our conditions”, said the top Iranian diplomat.

Pakistan has been mediating between the US and Iran, with its army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, visiting Tehran several times as part of the diplomatic efforts to end the war. Doha and Islamabad played key roles in the signing of the June memorandum of understanding (MoU) that collapsed in August.

Iran’s Rezaei said the US had “indicated its readiness” to accept its conditions, although Washington has not confirmed this.

On the US side, Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed Qatar-led talks were ongoing, but said he was not aware of a timeframe for them.

“There are multiple talks. Talks have actually never stopped,” said Rubio. “If there is a diplomatic solution, we would be open to it.”

Why has Iran noted a change in the US’s ‘tone’?

The renewed diplomatic activity comes after US Vice President JD Vance sent a letter earlier this week to Rezaei, reportedly seeking to gauge the prospects of restarting negotiations and averting another round of military escalation.

Rezaei confirmed on Saturday that he had read the letter, whose tone he said had “completely changed” compared with earlier correspondence from Trump.

Araghchi also said he had studied Vance’s letter, which he described positively.

“The American side’s attempt to open the door to dialogue and understanding more broadly is a positive step,” Araghchi told Al Jazeera.

However, he warned, “If Washington’s goal in sending this letter is to stir up discord, it would be yet another mistake to add to its previous ones.”

What has Iran said about prospects for peace and war?

Iranian officials have said they are open to new peace talks if the US meets their conditions, but also ready to act more aggressively in any new military confrontation.

“I know that our armed forces are more prepared for war than any time before, and we are ready for any scenario,” Araghchi told Al Jazeera.

In the event of any new military threat from the US or Israel, Iran’s response would be “immediate” and “without geographical limitations”, according to a statement by Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.

Khamenei ordered commanders to update Iran’s target list to include “all types of tangible and intangible assets belonging to the American-Zionist enemy”.

Rezaei told Al Jazeera that Iran would use “new weaponry” in its response to any future attacks. He also said Iran’s government was weighing a change to its “nuclear doctrine”, which currently includes a ban on nuclear weapons.

Iran’s nuclear programme has been a major point of contention in the conflict with the US, and Trump has repeatedly said Iran must never be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon. Tehran insists its nuclear programme is for civilian purposes.

What is the latest from Trump?

The US president has sent mixed signals about the status of peace talks. On Saturday, he said negotiations were “going fine” but added that they were “not very reliable”.

He also said the US military still needed to “take care of” several Iranian sites, singling out a suspected underground nuclear complex known as Pickaxe Mountain.

Trump added that the US could achieve its military objectives “very quickly” and was not in a hurry.

Previously, he threatened to renew attacks that would “finish off” Iran, while the US has reportedly warned its Gulf allies to prepare for a short, high-intensity round of conflict after the midterm elections.

Rubio said Trump had not yet decided on whether to carry out new strikes, but warned the US “can achieve military objectives if we seek to”.

How could Israel play into the calculation?

Israel, which joined the US in initiating the war against Iran in February, is preparing for another round of potential conflict right after the US midterm elections, according to a senior Israeli official cited by Israel’s Ynet News site.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said Israel has a “historic, one-time opportunity … to remove the Iranian threat once and for all”. While Netanyahu’s coalition lost its parliamentary majority in recent legislative elections, the 77-year-old leader remains in office as caretaker until a new government is formed.

Andreas Krieg, an associate professor of security studies at King’s College London, told Al Jazeera that Netanyahu’s threats complicate Iran’s calculus because Tehran fears “even a nuclear agreement with Washington may not end the threat of another Israeli attack”.

Brigadier-General Yadollah Javani, the deputy for political affairs of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, said Iranian forces are operating on the assumption that the US or Israel could strike at any moment.

What explains the parallel diplomatic efforts and war rhetoric?

Hamidreza Azizi, a senior Iran analyst with the Crisis Group, said Tehran is pursuing diplomacy while also “attempting to redefine” the military implications of another potential conflict.

“For now, diplomacy and military preparations are proceeding simultaneously,” he wrote in a post on X. “The emerging Iranian position seems to be that an agreement remains possible, but another war would be fought under different rules and on a much wider battlefield.”

He added, “Whether Washington takes these warnings as credible deterrence or further escalatory threats could significantly influence what happens next.”

Krieg said the November 3 elections give Iran an incentive to delay concessions to deny Trump a diplomatic victory. But that calculus could change afterwards when he has fewer domestic political restraints on military action.

“We could therefore reach a situation where Iran becomes more willing to compromise precisely when Washington becomes more willing to strike,” said Krieg.

US President Donald Trump has said his decision to suspend several Russian sanctions is an effort to keep Moscow at the negotiating table.

“I am in the process of negotiating Peace in the war between Russia and Ukraine,” Trump said on his Truth Social messaging platform, adding that he didn’t want to “do anything that will drive, foolishly, Russia away from the bargaining table”.

Trump blocked numerous sanctions on Russia on Friday night, two days before they were due to take effect, as a row with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky deepened.

Zelensky told NBC News on Sunday that siding with Russian President Vladimir Putin would be a “historic mistake”.

Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev has responded to Trump’s order by calling it “an important and truly historic moment”. He said the sanctions, which were passed by the US Congress and signed into law by the US president in September, would have inflicted “serious damage” on the US and global market.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has described the suspension of the sanctions as a 60-day pause during which their potential impact on the US and global economies would be analysed.

In his Truth Social post, Trump also said Zelensky “doesn’t want to end this war, and probably never did”, adding “he could have made a better deal two years ago than he can now”.

Zelensky has pushed for an end to fighting, and has repeatedly said that Putin doesn’t want peace, since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Relations between Washington and Kyiv frayed after the US struck a controversial deal to import Russian diesel last week.

Despite the international sanctions, Russia has still been able to export oil, much of it to China and India – often at attractive discounts. According to the think-tank Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), China has taken about half of Russia’s crude exports, with India accounting for about 37%.

In remarks to a European Union summit, after Trump announced the deal to buy diesel from Russia and said Zelensky was “more difficult to deal with” than Putin, Zelensky said it was nice to be among “real leaders”.

Since the start of the war, there have been several negotiation initiatives between the United States and Iran. Only one – the memorandum of understanding signed in Islamabad on June 18 – was concluded, but it collapsed within days.

While prevailing analyses tend to explain this failure through the details of the provisions, this article proceeds from a different premise: that the diplomatic stalemate between the two sides is shaped by a syndrome that has governed US-Iranian relations for years.

In international relations, psychological syndromes can arise as a result of deep crises that leave their mark on political consciousness and memory, potentially obstructing efforts at rapprochement and negotiation between countries.

In the case of Iran and the US, the syndrome is comprised of two complexes: the complex Washington developed as a result of the 1979 siege of the US embassy in Tehran and the complex Tehran developed as a result of historical US hostility and its withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018.

The roots of the rupture between the two countries go as far back as August 1953 when US and British intelligence agencies helped overthrow the nationalist government of Mohammad Mosaddegh after it nationalised the oil industry in 1951. Since then, a perception has become entrenched in Iranian consciousness: that Washington does not accept an independent government in Tehran and it is prepared to sabotage it if it goes against its interests.

From this perspective, Washington’s decision to host Shah Reza Pahlavi, who had just been overthrown by his people, for medical treatment in October 1979 was read in revolutionary Tehran as a prelude to a second coup.

Iranian students stormed the US embassy on November 4 that year and held 52 Americans for 444 days. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed and have not been restored to this day.

While the incident is portrayed in the Iranian narrative as a defence of the revolution, in American consciousness, it established the image of Iran as a state that does not respect international norms, whose word cannot be relied upon and whose behaviour should not be rewarded.

That is the embassy siege complex. It is not about the incident itself so much as the informal rule it produced in US decision-making: that Iran must concede first and its concession must be verified before it receives anything in return.

The Iranian complex was shaped by this history as well, but it reached its peak in May 2018 when US President Donald Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) despite the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) confirmation that Tehran was complying with it.

Just two weeks later, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced 12 demands for a new deal, only four of which were related to the nuclear file. Seven of them were related to Iran’s regional behaviour in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan and the Gulf. In other words, Washington did not merely revoke an existing agreement; it also raised the ceiling of its conditions for any future agreement.

The knot then deepened in June 2025 when the US took part in the Twelve-Day War and struck the nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan at a time when a new round of indirect negotiations was scheduled in Muscat. It then reached its furthest point with Washington’s participation alongside Israel in the current war.

Accordingly, a conviction became entrenched in the Iranian consciousness that an American signature guarantees nothing, that any agreement can be overturned with a change of administration and indeed that negotiation itself may be a cover for war rather than an alternative to it.

The informal rule this has produced in Iranian decision-making is that there will be no step taken before binding guarantees and no concession before pressure is lifted.

Thus, the two complexes stand at opposite ends: The first requires Iranian action before an American quid pro quo while the second requires an American guarantee before Iranian action.

A reading of the recent negotiation initiatives shows that every US initiative bears the imprint of the embassy siege complex. The 15-point plan put forward in March demanded the dismantling of the Natanz, Isfahan and Fordow facilities; an end to uranium enrichment; the suspension of Iran’s missile programme; and the abandonment of its allies in exchange for promises to lift sanctions later.

The May draft by White House envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner linked the release of Iran’s frozen funds to the suspension of enrichment first. The American response in September also stipulated the freezing of enrichment and the entry of inspectors throughout the negotiation period.

What remains constant in the American initiatives is that Iranian action precedes the quid pro quo and verification precedes trust.

The imprint of the JCPOA withdrawal complex in the Iranian initiatives is also a constant. The five-point response in late March demanded guarantees that war would not be repeated. The 10 points put forward in April demanded a binding UN Security Council resolution shielding any agreement from being overturned. And the 14 points in May demanded a nonaggression pledge that includes Israel.

Meanwhile, the seven-day plan proposed by Tehran last month stipulated the lifting of sanctions and the US naval blockade on Iran before the opening of the Strait of Hormuz on the sixth day and the start of nuclear negotiations on the seventh. What remains constant in the Iranian initiatives is that guarantees precede action and the lifting of pressure precedes Iranian concessions.

All these initiatives were dialogue between two complexes with each side drafting its text to protect itself from a repetition of its historical experience with the other, rather than to meet the other halfway. This may explain why the gap in substance has narrowed, but the gap in trust has not.

The Islamabad memorandum represents the exception that proves the rule as it was the closest moment to a settlement because it was formulated to reassure both sides over their core concerns. To reassure Washington, it stipulated the dilution of Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium and made the lifting of sanctions and unfreezing of funds conditional on Iranian implementation.

To reassure Tehran, it provided for an end to hostilities, respect for mutual sovereignty, a mechanism to monitor implementation and UN Security Council approval of the final agreement. Ballistic missiles were also entirely absent from the text.

But this agreement did not hold. Tehran suspended its participation in the Geneva round of talks because of the absence of a ceasefire in Lebanon, which had been a consistent demand in every Iranian initiative since March. In the Iranian reading, Washington’s inability to rein in Israel confirmed that an American signature was not enough. The JCPOA withdrawal complex immediately kicked in, and the two sides returned to square one.

By late September, the dispute appeared to have shifted definitively from substance to sequencing. Informed sources indicated that it now revolves around the order of steps rather than their content and the stated goal has become a return to an enhanced version of the June memorandum.

Here the two complexes appear in their clearest form: Washington wants the Strait of Hormuz opened and enrichment frozen first because it does not trust Iran while Tehran wants the naval blockade lifted first because it does not trust the US.

A comparison between Pompeo’s 2018 conditions and the June 2026 memorandum shows that US demands have retreated from redefining Iran’s regional role to focusing on the nuclear file and the Strait of Hormuz while Iranian demands have shifted from compensation to be paid by Washington to a conditional investment fund financed by other parties.

In other words, the substantive gap between the two sides has narrowed considerably – something that would have been unimaginable eight years ago.

However, the two complexes have not diminished; indeed, they may have deepened because of the war. Each complex feeds the other until together they have become a single syndrome, and diplomatic deadlock has turned from a passing condition into a stable structure.

Accordingly, any new formula for sequencing the steps, however precise, will remain unable to break this deadlock unless it addresses both complexes at once – something that requires a third party capable of guaranteeing both the action and the reciprocal action simultaneously.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.