Bethany Cosentino, the solo artist and co-founder of the rock band Best Coast, posted an open letter castigating her booking agency Wasserman Music over its founder’s connections to Jeffrey Epstein and relationship with convicted child sex trafficker Ghislaine Maxwell.
Agency founder Casey Wasserman — also the head of the 2028 Los Angeles Olympics organizing committee — was included in a recently released tranche of federal documents related to the Jeffrey Epstein investigation. While Wasserman was long known to have have flown with his then-wife Laura on Epstein’s plane with the disgraced financier, these new documents included sexually suggestive messages between Wasserman and Maxwell, Epstein’s consigliere who is serving a lengthy sentence in federal prison for child sex trafficking.
In a statement to the Hollywod Reporter, Wasserman said, “I deeply regret my correspondence with Ghislaine Maxwell which took place over two decades ago, long before her horrific crimes came to light. I never had a personal or business relationship with Jeffrey Epstein. As is well documented, I went on a humanitarian trip as part of a delegation with the Clinton Foundation in 2002 on the Epstein plane. I am terribly sorry for having any association with either of them.”
Meanwhile, Cosentino, a Wasserman client since 2021, wrote in a letter posted to social media that her agency head’s response to the backlash was “not enough… Regret without accountability is just damage control.”
“We are tired of learning, over and over, that men who control access, resources, money and so-called safety in our industry are given endless grace,” Cosentino wrote. “We are tired of being asked to treat proximity to something horrific as an unfortunate situation we should simply move past — especially when the person involved still holds all the power.”
“This letter is my public refusal to accept that this is ‘just how things are,’” she continued.
Cosentino specified that she is “In the Sam Hunt business,” referring to her longtime agent. “I am not in the Wasserman business. I have asked to remove my name and the band’s name from the company site. The position Casey Wasserman has put his agents in is inexcusable. This is a call for him to step down and a change of business name be imminent.”
In the messages between Wasserman and Maxwell, Maxwell said she “thought of [Wasserman] at inappropriate moments,” to which Wasserman answered “I think of you all the time… So what do I have to do to see you in a tight leather outfit? I am in NY tonight, youre not, what am I to do? Xoxo cw”
Later, Wasserman wrote “I thought we would start at that place that you know of, and then continue the massage concept into your bed…and then again in the morning…not sure if or when we would stop.” She responded: “Umm – all that rubbing – are you sure you can take it? The thought frankly is leaving me a little breathless. There are a few spots that apparently drive a man wild -I suppose I could practise them on you and you could let me know if they work or not?”
Wasserman Music is a leading talent agency, representing top acts like Chappell Roan and Kendrick Lamar. Previously, Billie Eilish left Wasserman after reports surfaced of separate incidents of alleged sexual misconduct from Wasserman.
Local politicians have called for Wasserman to back away from the Olympics committee. “I think Casey Wasserman needs to step down,” said L.A. County Supervisor Janice Hahn. “Having him represent us on the world stage distracts focus from our athletes and the enormous effort needed to prepare for 2028.”
The impact the Rodríguez administration could have on the Venezuelan oil industry, even under the new Hydrocarbons Law, would be unsustainable and limited in scope. Structural weakness surrounding the Delcy government and the National Assembly’s lack of legitimacy, commitment to the rule of law, and popular support will restrain the reach of her reforms. Nevertheless, the law will test the willingness of the private sector to run both upstream and downstream operations. These measures could deliver a limited economic boost, that despite American supervision, will be weaponized politically by window-dressing the regime’s legitimacy and stalling further political and economic reforms. It’s precisely this flawed political and legal foundation that undermines the sustainability of the economic gains that the new law could provide.
For Venezuela and PDVSA to reclaim relevance in the international oil market what is required are not incremental improvements but a comprehensive overhaul of the industry, the company, and the constitutional framework that ties them together. The reforms must prioritize transparency, accountability, and insulating the industry and PDVSA from political pressures under strong political coverage that provides long term stability. These measures are something an interim administration, independent of who is in charge, will be unable to provide. Only then would international companies and capitals commit to the long term projects needed.
Once the country finds its political footing under a popularly elected and legitimate government can longlasting and durable reform take place. At this point multiple options may surface. There could be a scenario where we see PDVSA take a back seat while the country creates a competitive fiscal system prioritizing royalty collections while up and downstream operations are run by private enterprises. Remaining PDVSA assets and JV operations would be divested gradually as production capacity is recovered in the hands of private enterprises. However, revitalizing PDVSA as a competitive oil company should remain as a national strategic objective. Venezuelans would greatly benefit from building a company able to compete in and outside of the Venezuelan market.
However, the only way to relaunch PDVSA as a relevant actor in the international market is by allowing it to enter the 21st century oil dynamics and embracing a partial privatization via a minority share offering in international equity markets. Beyond the much needed capital that would be raised in the initial and consequent secondary offerings, plus the potential to tap debt markets along the way, going public will create an additional moat and isolate the company some steps from further political interference. A publicly traded PDVSA would not only need to answer to the government but to energy analysts, independent shareholders, and international compliance and regulatory frameworks alike. It will be the pressure generated by the external scrutiny that will enable PDVSA to be scaled up back into international relevance. Given the precarious financial and operational standing of the holding, a partial privatization is not feasible on day one or two of a political transition and economic recovery phase. But it is a question that will become relevant once the objective becomes long sustainable growth.
PDVSA would need to cut all non-essential personnel and assets, streamlining its operations. Every dollar spent should be evaluated under a return-on-capital framework, making financial discipline central to strategic planning.
The privatization of PDVSA has been a taboo for Venezuelan society despite serious attempts in late 1990s to execute such an operation. However, the devastation that the industry suffered under chavista mismanagement provides a clean slate opportunity to relaunch PDVSA and the oil industry under a modern governance framework. For too long the Venezuelan oil industry has been treated as the cash cow of whoever seats in Miraflores. Historically, this led to the centralization of political and economic power which hindered the development of democratic institutions and left the nation at the will of the administration’s oil revenue distribution policy. Taking control of PDVSA not only meant controlling the oil industry but the state itself. Reforms should aim to break the petro-state monopoly over oil revenue and to make PDVSA part of a dynamic national industry where other participants are allowed to play.
There are multiple precedents to back this move. Lessons from the partial privatizations of Chinese SINOPEC and Norwegian Statoil from the early 2000s could be drawn to prove that these operations are possible under different political systems. A PDVSA offering would be exceptionally complex, but in order to even start considering it there are three basic fundamentals that need to align.
First, the move would need overwhelming support from civil society to sustain the necessary political will. While that looks like a concrete goal in María Corina Machado’s energy proposals, the possibility seems remote under an interim Delcy government that still needs to appease other factions within the ruling coalition. In addition, chavismo’s current leader has not adhered to international transparency standards following her 2020 appointment as acting Minister of Economy and Finance—a role that earned her the title of Venezuela’s economic vice president before taking control of the national oil industry. Her tenure overlapped with the loss of an estimated $21 billion in oil payments, a scandal that ultimately led to the arrest and scapegoating of former Oil Minister Tareck El Aissami.
Second, Petróleos de Venezuela needs a robust rule-of-law framework that can deliver credible guarantees to investors The current interim president is unlikely to provide such assurances, given the deep mistrust surrounding Venezuela’s public institutions—many of which she does not fully control. As Juan Guillermo Blanco points out, her posture may swing from alignment with Washington on this occasion to an anti-imperialist rupture if the circumstances allow it.
Shifting to global best practices
PDVSA cannot move forward without the goodwill of the market. Francisco Monaldi has repeatedly stated that the main risks of Venezuelan oil are above ground. Beyond the politics, sanctions, and the legal framework, PDVSA needs to get its house in order to regain market credibility. For starters, the holding needs to address its debt issue—estimated at $34.5b—through an agreement where debtholders walk away feeling it was a fair deal. Without serious debt restructuring, a share offering roadshow would be impossible.
The company must also cut all non-essential ventures, subsidies, and social project funding from the nucleus. From PDVAL supermarkets to F1 teams, PDVSA bankrolled it all during chavismo. Despite how bizarre the outflows party got, these types of splurges and subsidies have been ingrained in the Venezuelan mindset and will be hard to get rid of. Such measures would represent a comprehensive detachment from century-old beliefs in the magical powers of the Venezuelan petro-state.
Furthermore, PDVSA would need to cut all non-essential personnel and assets, streamlining its operations. Every dollar spent should be evaluated under a return-on-capital framework, making financial discipline central to strategic planning. In addition, investors and banking partners must be able to track every dollar. Auditable records are not only essential for building reliable financial projections but also necessary for protecting stakeholders from anticorruption liability. This underscores the need for a new framework of transparent, efficient contract allocation and fully auditable accounting trails, ensuring that financial statements can withstand market scrutiny and compliance verification.
Making an example out of Petróleos de Venezuela would help generate a spillover effect that could contribute to more transparency, financial discipline, and compliance across the domestic market.
Figures such as the “productive participation contracts” (CPPs) or joint ventures that currently dominate private investments in the industry are compatible with this model as PDVSA should seek alliances in cases where it makes financial sense to do so. However, the secrecy under which these ventures have been working on needs to end.
Finally, PDVSA will need to bring in an independent leadership team and board with enough protection to isolate operational and financial decision-making from politics. Venezuela would be represented in the board as the majority shareholder, but would be restrained from running the day-to-day business operations and resource allocation. Studies that examine initial offerings of National Oil Companies (NOC) suggest that a substantial amount of the efficiency gains are delivered before an IPO is launched, as the company restructures itself to be introduced into the public market. PDVSA has a long way to go before we can consider this scenario. Nevertheless, aiming toward partial privatization would provide a blueprint for rebuilding PDVSA as an operationally, financially, and commercially viable company.
A share offering should consider a dual listing that includes the Caracas Stock Exchange, which is also in need of an extreme makeover (that’s part of a different discussion, however). The overhaul needed is not only about getting barrels out of the ground, but about including the company in the wider economy and making it subject to the highest managerial and corporate governance standards. Making an example out of Petróleos de Venezuela would help generate a spillover effect that could contribute to more transparency, financial discipline, and compliance across the domestic market. Ultimately, this would constrain the government’s ability to overreach into the private sector.
Whichever path is chosen for the future of PDVSA and the Venezuelan oil industry, it should be preceded by an inclusive debate that considers implications beyond the industry itself and sets the country on a sustainable growth path. This debate must happen in public, in conditions of full political and economic freedom, free from coercion by either internal or external powers. It should be the opposite of what occurred prior to the swift approval of the new Hydrocarbons Law, when secrecy prevailed and the legislative body responsible for drafting the statute showed no significant deliberation.
The one-sided vote in the illegitimate 2025 National Assembly should not overshadow the legislature’s failure to comply with its own parliamentary rules during the bill’s passage, as purported opposition lawmakers reportedly received a copy of the draft only hours before the first debate. That episode underscores why the legal and constitutional reforms needed to break the petro-state and refound PDVSA can only follow the renewal of all institutions, including a truly multiparty, independent congress.
The end goal is simple, yet history-changing: to dismantle Miraflores’ total control and discretion over oil-industry revenues.
Photograph by unknown author. “Trabajadores petroleros,” Fernando Irazábal Collection. Compiled by Archivo Fotografía Urbana.
On January 29, Venezuela experienced a legislative tectonic shift regarding the future of its hydrocarbon sector. The National Assembly approved a new petroleum law that effectively breaks with the post-1976 tradition of rigid state control, opening participation across the full value chain to private oil companies.
This is not the first experiment with private participation since nationalization, but it is the clearest attempt since the 1990s Apertura to normalize it as the governing framework of the sector. The legislation, approved with striking speed and opacity, has elicited mixed reactions, ranging from denunciations of lost sovereignty and surrender to foreign interests to support for a first step that still requires major fixes. Despite these divergences, one thing is clear: the return of private companies to Venezuela’s oil sector inevitably revives parallels with the concessionary system under which the industry was born and flourished between 1914 and 1976, a mirror of what Venezuela’s energy sector could become in the twenty-first century.
The 1943 and 2026 hydrocarbons laws
The iconic 1943 bill enacted by President Isaías Medina Angarita (1941–1945) regulated Venezuela’s privately run oil industry until the 1976 nationalization. It became the institutional template of the concessionary era: a rules-and-taxes state overseeing a privately operated industry. Together with related legislation, it established the famous 50/50 profit-sharing arrangement with the state, later tightened by reforms. Yet within the 1943 framework, the rentier state largely confined itself to setting the rules and collecting taxes and rents, while private companies assumed the capital risks. There was no government monopoly over day-to-day operations.
In spirit, the 2026 law reintroduces comparable conditions for private capital. Petroleum companies can now either hold operational control in joint ventures with the state or carry out activities independently through government contracts. The 1943 and 2026 frameworks also embrace flexible royalty schemes that prioritize business viability over rigid tax burdens. Differences, of course, abound. To mention a few, the 2026 version concentrates discretionary power in the executive branch regarding royalties, opens the possibility of international arbitration outside the country, simplifies the tax burden into a 15% integrated hydrocarbons tax, and diminishes the National Assembly’s authority over oil business.
The Venezolanization pioneered by firms like the Creole Petroleum Corporation, Royal Dutch Shell, Mene Grande Oil Company, and many others also became an exercise in social integration.
Divergences aside, both pieces of legislation share the same underlying imperative: attracting capital and technology. The 1976 and 2001 hydrocarbons laws, by contrast, were designed precisely to limit private initiative. But investment alone will not do all the work. Human capital is also desperately needed to lead a reborn hydrocarbon sector, and here the concessions model offers valuable lessons.
The Venezolanization of the industry
An underappreciated dimension of that era was human capital development. Over decades, foreign firms trained Venezuelans across the corporate hierarchy—in technical, managerial, and executive roles—so that by the mid-1970s expatriates were a small fraction of the workforce and Venezuelans increasingly ran the day-to-day business. This created a pipeline of local talent able to inherit operational responsibility and manage the 1976 transition to state control with unusual continuity.
This history is not nostalgia for a bygone era, but a lesson worth highlighting. Venezuela’s oil collapse in this century is inseparable from the degradation of corporate culture and human capital, deepened by the politicization of the industry. It triggered a professional brain drain and the hollowing out of operational efficiency. Multinationals like Chevron, and others that may follow, should explicitly lean on a “Venezolanization 2.0” that engages local talent still in the country and encourages the return of a diaspora of Venezuelan managers and engineers now abroad. Insulating the sector from partisan hiring and purging is essential if these cadres are to operate with full competence.
The Venezolanization pioneered by firms like the Creole Petroleum Corporation, Royal Dutch Shell, Mene Grande Oil Company, and many others also became an exercise in social integration. Many American expatriates, like Creole’s CEO Arthur T. Proudfit, embraced the social milieu of the country that welcomed them, often learning the language and speaking it fluently; his daughter even married a local businessman. In exchange, Venezuelans trained abroad and working for these firms absorbed US professional values and traditions. This cultural exchange helped forge durable bonds between both countries and contributed to the successful presence of foreign capital in Venezuela. And these corporations did not stop at their payrolls. They understood that long-term success in the hydrocarbon sector extended beyond employees to the surrounding communities of the oil fields, and beyond.
Social license
Creole, Shell, and Mene Grande undertook significant investments in the country. In the oilfields, they negotiated lucrative labor contracts with unions. They also financed hospitals, university campuses, and other infrastructure projects. These firms even joined the state in ventures like the Venezuelan Basic Economy Corporation to fund agro-industrial projects aimed at diversifying the economy, while supporting rural communities through initiatives such as the American International Association. They left an indelible imprint on everyday life, from how Venezuelans shopped through market chains like CADA, to culture through documentaries, corporate magazines, and even TV news programs like Observador Creole.
More importantly, they built alliances with domestic capitalists like Eugenio Mendoza to address social problems. Creole and Venezuelan business leaders, for instance, institutionalized private-sector social action through organizations like the Dividendo Voluntario para la Comunidad (DVC), founded in 1964 to mobilize corporate contributions toward community projects. This nonprofit continues to exist today, fulfilling the original goal of social action bequeathed by American and Venezuelan businessmen more than sixty years ago. Creole also created the Creole Development Corporation, a financial arm designed to provide seed capital for local entrepreneurial activity. This was hardly a frictionless era, but it shows how legitimacy was treated as a condition of stability.
Contributions to health, schools, and infrastructure would also ease the state’s burden and allow it to focus on critical nation-building emergencies.
This largesse reached widely, but it was not mere corporate charity. To avoid jeopardizing their operations and invite nationalist backlash, companies engaged with surrounding communities and invested in their future. That is a lesson new capital arriving in Venezuela should pursue. There is even generational memory favorable to the presence of these firms in oil communities.
Leveraging that legacy could open renewed opportunities for local professional growth while strengthening bonds between communities and multinationals. Contributions to health, schools, and infrastructure would also ease the state’s burden and allow it to focus on critical nation-building emergencies: democratizing institutions, reconstructing the economy, and addressing the public services and humanitarian needs the population faces.
A spiritual return to the concessions system?
The new hydrocarbons law pushes Venezuela’s oil industry in a new direction, and it functions as a first step in the right path. However, there is room for significant improvement.
Moreover, key questions remain unanswered. For instance, what will be the fate of PDVSA? Any plan that fails to address the resurrection of its operational capabilities undermines the development of an efficient sector. Only the re-democratization of the country can properly confront the deeper failings reflected in the current legislation. Many industry experts have already proposed an alternative framework that would solve several of the bill’s core problems by establishing clear rules, transparency mechanisms, and a dedicated government agency entrusted with regulating the hydrocarbon sector.
The spirit of the concessionary model walks once more around Venezuela’s refineries, port terminals, and petroleum wells. It is too soon to tell whether foreign capital will return with the same excitement it brought more than a century ago, or whether the scale of investments and engagement with surrounding communities will match that of its predecessors. The sector can either become a platform for institutional rebuilding and professionalization, or another discretionary channel for rents and corruption.
Democracy, check and balances, and clear rules can turn the 2026 hydrocarbons law (and its potential future modifications) into enduring principles for the remainder of the century. If so, the oil industry might unlock a new period of prosperity. Much remains to be done to materialize that future, but what is undeniable is that a new era begins.
Not long after Pacific Palisades and Altadena had burned, Gov. Gavin Newsom summoned reporters and television cameras to Dodger Stadium. Newsom stepped behind a podium dropped within a stadium parking lot, with a commanding view of Los Angeles as the backdrop.
He was there to unveil LA Rises, a signature initiative under which the private sector and philanthropists could unite to help Southern California rebuild and recover.
The most valuable player that day: Mark Walter, the Dodgers’ chairman and controlling owner. The big announcement: Walter and two of his associated charities — his family foundation and the Dodgers’ foundation — would contribute up to $100 million as “an initial commitment” to LA Rises.
“We should clap for that,” Dodgers co-owner Magic Johnson told the assembled media. “A hundred million dollars, that’s an outstanding thing.”
One year later, Newsom’s initiative has struggled to distinguish itself amid a panoply of wildfire relief efforts. LA Rises has delivered $20 million to date, including $7.8 million from Walter’s family foundation, according to Newsom’s office.
“If it’s a number of 20 million after one year, after such a severe occurrence, and with Los Angeles having the giving capacity to meet that goal, I would have expected to hear that there had been more commitments, at a minimum,” said Casey Rogers, founder of Santa Barbara-based Telea Insights, which advises philanthropists and leaders of nonprofit organizations.
“Maybe not all of those commitments would have been paid. Maybe they would have been commitments over a number of years. But it would have been closer to the goal.”
Walter stands by his pledge, Dodgers president Stan Kasten said. A representative of Newsom’s office said Walter’s pledge did not come with a timeline.
“I know we haven’t spent the full 100 yet,” Kasten said, “but this is a long-term commitment.”
Rather than solicit large donations up front and determine how to use the money later, LA Rises prefers to identify “impactful opportunities for investment” as they arise and then “coordinate financial support from a variety of private, public and philanthropic donors, including the Walter Family Foundation,” said Dee Dee Myers, director of Newsom’s office of business and economic development.
Of the Walter foundation contributions, $5 million went toward grants for impacted small business, workers and nonprofits, with $2.8 million to Pasadena City College for modernizing and expanding technical education programs to train workers that can help rebuild their own communities.
LA Rises also funded programs that include day camps and mental health intervention to children affected by the fires; streamlined architectural planning and permits for survivors wishing to rebuild; and support for Habitat for Humanity in building new homes and rebuilding damaged ones.
“The administration is incredibly grateful for any philanthropic dollars that have gone towards the rebuilding efforts in Los Angeles,” Myers said.
The competition for those dollars is fierce. The Milken Institute reported that private giving toward wildfire relief — from individuals, corporations and other entities — hit nearly $1 billion last year.
“I know there has been a lot of money that has been paid to various programs,” Kasten said, “and there has also been some rethinking about how LA Rises is deployed and what foundational money from the Dodgers is used for. We continue to work hard with a lot of groups on that tragedy.
“There are talks ongoing about a variety of programs and a variety of ways of funding things. We are still very involved with this, both with LA Rises and other entities.”
Kasten did not rule out Walter shifting some or all of his remaining funding commitment to an organization outside LA Rises.
“I don’t know exactly what entity we will be formally engaged with — or doing it separately — but we’re absolutely committed to helping out those programs that need that kind of help,” he said. “We’ve done a lot of it already, and we can do a lot more.”
Novo Nordisk shares fell sharply on Wednesday after the company warned that sales and profits will drop in 2026.
The Danish drugmaker’s stock slid about 17% in early trading in Copenhagen, erasing gains made earlier in the year. The fall followed an unexpected pre-release of the company’s outlook for 2026.
Sales and operating profit are both expected to decline by between 5% and 13% this year, far below what analysts had anticipated.
The company had already cut its 2025 guidance in July, citing a difficult US market, triggering a one-day share price drop of more than 20%.
Pressure in the US
Novo Nordisk says it is reducing prices to make its GLP-1 drugs more affordable, even though the move is likely to hurt short-term performance.
The company faces growing competition in the United States from cheaper compounded versions of semaglutide — the active ingredient in Wegovy and diabetes drug Ozempic — as well as from rival Eli Lilly.
There have been some brighter signs. The new oral version of Wegovy has seen strong early demand in the US.
Novo Nordisk endured its worst year on record in 2025, with shares falling nearly 50%.
The company also underwent major leadership changes, appointing its first non-Danish chief executive and bringing former CEO Lars Rebien Sørensen back as chair.
At the same time, it struck a deal with US President Donald Trump for a programme tied to TrumpRx and direct-to-consumer discounts.
The starting price for the new Wegovy pill has been set at $149 (€126), far below the price of the injectable version a year earlier.
Patent expiries in several markets outside the United States are also expected to weigh on sales in 2026.
Meanwhile, the head of Novo’s US business, David Moore, who oversaw the launch of the pill, is leaving the company for personal reasons. He will be replaced by Jamie Miller, formerly of UnitedHealth.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will fly to Australia later this month in a bid to seal a long-delayed trade agreement, sources familiar with the matter told Euronews.
Concluding the deal would mark another trade win for the Commission, following recent deals with Latin America’s Mercosur bloc and India, as geopolitical tensions intensify with the US and China.
One source said von der Leyen could head to Canberra shortly after the Munich Security Conference concludes on 15 February.
Whether the trip goes ahead will depend on progress in negotiations led by EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič, who is due to meet Australian Trade Minister Don Farrell in Brussels next week.
“As always, progress in the sensitive phase of negotiations will depend on substance,” Commission deputy chief spokesperson Olof Gill told Euronews.
Talks on an EU-Australia free-trade agreement collapsed in 2023 after Canberra accused Brussels of failing to offer sufficient market access for beef, sheep, dairy and sugar.
Agriculture remains a perennial flashpoint in EU trade negotiations. The Mercosur agreement has already met furious opposition from European farmers, who fear unfair competition from increased imports coming from Latin America.
Australia, however, is viewed in Brussels as a strategic and like-minded partner as the EU seeks to diversify its trade relationships, expand access to global markets and reduce exposure to a closing US market and China’s increasingly aggressive trade policy.
The free trade agreement between the European Union and Mercosur countries should be implemented without delay, Paraguay’s President Santiago Peña told Euronews. He warned that stalling the agreement would be a “mistake” amid rising geopolitical tensions.
The free trade pact was signed last month by the EU and Mercosur members Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. However, its full ratification by the EU has been frozen after MEPs referred the agreement to the Court of Justice in Luxembourg.
“We already presented the agreement to the Congress of the Paraguayan Nation last week, and we understand that the European Union has the legal tools to implement it temporarily,” Peña said on Euronews’s flagship interview programme The Europe Conversation.
“We are working to make this happen, and we want Paraguay to be the first country to implement it.” The country currently holds the rotating pro tempore presidency of Mercosur.
Despite the judicial review, the European Commission has the prerogative to provisionally apply the deal once one or more Mercosur countries complete national ratification. While Germany, Spain, Portugal and the Nordics are pushing for the next phase, the Commission currently says no decision has yet been made.
‘Opposition rooted in ignorance’
The agreement would create a vast EU–Latin America free-trade zone, slashing tariffs on goods and services. But resistance in Europe remains fierce, with farmers and several capitals, led by Paris, warning of unfair competition from Mercosur imports.
Peña said that European opposition to the deal was rooted in “ignorance” and an outdated and stereotypical view of Latin America.
“Our countries have changed tremendously. They have developed. Human capital has grown,” Peña said. “Europe has to rediscover Latin America.”
In the interview, Peña warned that rejecting the deal would amount to a strategic blunder, as Europe can no longer rely on the United States as its default trade partner due to President Donald Trump’s unpredictable policies.
“If (MEPs) ultimately prefer not to integrate themselves into (new) markets and instead choose to retain their old alliances that today no longer work, it would certainly be a mistake,” he said.
Still, Peña credited Trump with giving the deal “the final push” after 25 years of talks.
“The world was in a state of drowsiness,” he said. “We weren’t moving, and he came along to move us all. He came to challenge what we thought was stable, and that pushed us to leave our comfort zone.”
According to Peña, one of the EU-Mercosur deal’s key advantages is its potential to counter China’s growing presence in the region and dominance of rare earth supplies.
“Europe is losing an enormous opportunity there, because if there is a region that can compete globally, it is Latin America. We have young talent, a predominantly young population, a population (of people who are) already digital natives,” he said.
“We have that tremendous abundance of natural resources, not only food that grows above the ground, but also minerals that are below the earth, which are so critical to this new technological wave. Our region has absolutely everything that Europe and the world need.”
Stephanie Larivière, managing director and global head of Fixed Income, Currencies, and Commodities (FICC) Sales at Scotiabank—which was named the Global winner of Best FX Derivatives Provider—explains how a client-first philosophy and advanced structured solutions enable businesses to proactively manage uncertainty, effectively diversify risk, and maintain agility in fast-moving currency markets.
Global Finance: Last year began with elevated G7 foreign exchange volatility driven by US election results, followed by a spike in volatility tied to the Trump administration’s tariff announcements. Implied volatility eventually subsided. Against this backdrop, how has client demand evolved for structured FX solutions and derivatives that combine FX with interest rate and other exposures?
Stephanie Larivière: Tariffs and the resulting uncertainty around international trade were top of mind for clients throughout 2025. In the first half of the year, the US Dollar Index vaulted back toward the highs we saw during the pandemic, and there were fears that it would be driven even higher as we grappled with the prospect of a global recession, given the US administration’s push for increased global tariffs. We saw increased interest in hedging and the need for structured solutions from clients in these early months as US dollar buyers worried about a sustained surge in the index and the impact on their cash flows.
The outlook for exports to the US remains no less murky moving forward. As a result, client demand for structured FX solutions has only increased. Clients have focused on cost management and have incorporated flexibility into hedging programs via options-based solutions. By protecting existing profit margins while retaining the ability to participate in favorable moves in FX markets, these strategies have allowed clients to remain agile and adapt quickly to changing market conditions.
GF: Have you observed currency diversification strategies or increased activity in non-dollar crosses from your customer base?
Larivière: The uncertain outlook for international trade and dissenting views on the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee have led to increased demand from clients to protect against further potential dollar weakness. As we settle into a lower-volatility regime, we have seen interest in expressing views in non-dollar crosses and some rotation into international and emerging-market equity exposure.
One example was a strengthening Mexican peso as clients returned to expressing views via carry trades. We have also seen a weak Canadian dollar against other majors, driven by uncertainty over Canada’s budget, the size of the Carney government’s deficit, and questions about how the new US and Canadian administrations will work together. That said, the US dollar remains the dominant base currency in most commodities and currency trading.
GF: OTC interest rate derivative volumes have surged, nearly doubling for euro-denominated contracts and rising significantly for yen- and sterling-denominated contracts. How are clients adapting their strategies in response to this increased activity?
Larivière: There are a couple of factors at play here. Greater volatility in rates has caused volumes to surge. Central banks were also more in play over the second half of last year, which further contributed to this phenomenon. Both factors are responses to overexposure to the dollar and a shift to hedge against some of that exposure. We could see this continue to increase as larger institutional names right-size their exposure to the US.
GF: Are clients’ expectations changing around reporting transparency, multi-currency liquidity, and access to customized derivatives products?
Larivière: Clients are seeking bespoke hedging solutions built on a full suite of derivatives products across asset classes. These customized solutions are tailored to their unique company requirements, allowing clients to express market views while hedging underlying exposures. In addition to the increased flexibility these products provide, clients expect proactive advice that leverages expertise from sales, trading, strategy, and structuring teams.
At Scotiabank, we strive to provide thoughtful, well-coordinated ideas that help clients navigate the uncertainty of operating global businesses across borders in an uncertain international trade environment.
GF: What trends do you expect will shape FX and derivatives markets this year, particularly regarding volatility, market structure, and regulation?
Larivière: The Fed has embarked on a cutting cycle, though it remains unclear how deep the cuts will be. If yields continue to decline, we expect increased pressure on the dollar, leading to higher volatility. The FX market typically grows during periods of volatility; the shift away from yield-enhancement strategies toward a pickup in volatility should drive an increase in FX in 2026.
Another theme we are watching is the shifting regulatory landscape for digital assets. Regulatory changes that favor these assets will facilitate more interest and investment in the products.
The world braced for a Washington-made rupture last year. Trade held up, while China flooded many regions with its exports.
The world entered 2025 expecting a trade shock stamped “Made in Washington.” US President Donald Trump vowed to shrink chronic deficits and pledged a tariff-driven reset that would force companies—and trading partners—into new lanes. The shock never fully arrived.
Global commerce kept moving, prices for traded goods didn’t spiral, and exemptions and carve-outs softened the blow. The year still produced a real shift in the trade landscape—just not the one most people were watching for. China’s export engine accelerated, widening its surplus and pushing its cheaper goods deeper into markets in Southeast Asia and Europe, to the concern of those regions.
Meanwhile, the fastest-growing slice of trade wasn’t steel, cars, or containers; it was services. “Trade in services is growing at least twice as fast as trade in goods, and the US is a very important player there,” says Marc Gilbert, who leads the Center for Geopolitics at the Boston Consulting Group (BCG).
The Shock That Wasn’t — And The Shifts Nobody Saw Coming
As the dust begins to settle on a tumultuous 2025, the trade outlook for this year appears calmer. Trump is looking toward the midterm congressional elections, with an electorate fixated on rising prices that his tariffs can only aggravate. Old-fashioned political upheaval could accelerate, though, as the US leader threatens military action in half a dozen countries. “This year should see more economic stability but more geopolitical volatility,” says Cedric Chehab, Singapore-based chief economist at BMI, a subsidiary of Fitch Solutions.
Marc Gilbert, who leads the Center for Geopolitics, Boston Consulting Group
Trump’s 2016 election, followed by the supply chain disruptions of the Covid-19 pandemic, set in motion new megatrends in world trade and international relations: diversification of supply chains to avoid bottlenecks, “China+1” investment—in which companies keep operations in China while expanding production elsewhere—to reduce dependence on Beijing, a US leaning more toward its American neighbors, and South-South trade growing faster than commerce with either of the two superpowers.
All should continue into 2026 unless they don’t: for instance, if Trump decides to tear up the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which is up for review this year; if China decides the time is ripe to force “reunification” with Taiwan; if Trump reinstates the 10% tariff on Europe that he recently shelved amid European opposition to his Greenland acquisition demands; or if the US Supreme Court, in a case now before it, strikes down the legal strategy underpinning his tariff regime, triggering a torrent of lawsuits by companies seeking refunds of tariffs already paid.
“Every executive in the world is thinking about the balance between efficiency and resilience,” says Drew DeLong, global lead of Geopolitical Dynamics at consulting firm Kearney. “The age of corporate statecraft is beginning.”
Trump turned the world on its head with his April 2 announcement of the eye-popping “Liberation Day” tariffs. By year’s end, the globe was back on its feet, largely because Trump lowered many of his announced duties. The US goods trade deficit fell to multiyear lows in the last few months of the year. But that may have reflected importers drawing down inventories that had swelled ahead of expected tariffs.
For the rest of the world, commerce had a bumper year. According to UN Trade and Development, combined goods and services trade surged by 7% to more than $35 trillion. The price of traded goods rose at a tolerable pace despite rising US levies and actually fell in the fourth quarter. “The rhetoric on trade contraction is way ahead of the data,” says Gary Hufbauer, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE).
The US is less important in this picture than it might appear from Washington, accounting for just 16% of global imports, BCG’s Gilbert estimates, although as much as 40% might be “affected” by the No. 1 economy. That includes, for example, components shipped from one Asian country to another for a product ultimately sold in the US.
After US stocks crashed 12% over the week following the April 2 announcement, Trump quickly backpedaled from his Liberation Day targets. Baseline tariffs on major trading partners outside North America—the EU, Japan, and South Korea—settled at 15%-20%. With US manufacturers paying similar rates on imported raw materials or components, the result was something like an even playing field. The Trump administration steadily issued tariff exemptions for irreplaceable imports, including semiconductors and pharmaceuticals as well as coffee and bananas.
China’s Trade Boom
Trump has also made concessions to archrival China, as President Xi Jinping pushed back by threatening to disrupt the flow of essential rare-earth metals. While the US baseline tariff on China remains at 45%, exemptions and carve-outs reduced the effective rate to half that level. “The established trajectory is for the US to end up tariffing other countries as much as China,” says Brad Setser, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in Washington.
While US policy gyrated, China’s trade trajectory was consistently upward last year. Beijing’s global trade surplus surged by 20% to nearly $1.2 trillion. It offset falling US sales with a more than 10% increase in sales to nations in Southeast Asia, collectively China’s biggest market, and a greater than 8% rise in exports to the EU.
This breakout year capped a decade-long shift in global trade from the US to China. That shift has made export-led growth much more difficult for emerging economies, BMI’s Chehab says. “Ten or 20 years ago, most countries’ largest trading partner was the US, which ran trade deficits,” he says. “Now it is China, which runs surpluses.”
Customers everywhere are seeking instruments to stem the Chinese export tsunami. EU President Ursula von der Leyen has announced a policy of “derisking” from China. Japan is offering “China-exit subsidies” to suppliers who relocate elsewhere. Developing Asian markets are considering sectoral tariffs on steel and strategic products.
Success is unclear. A generation of policy and hard work has made China’s comparative advantage in manufacturing all but unassailable. “Energy prices are quite low, and they can produce on a scale that is incredible,” Chehab says.
China is expanding its dominance into key technologies of the future, particularly those essential for the green-energy transition. Shenzhen-based electric-vehicle champion BYD surpassed US-based Tesla as the global sales leader last year. Total clean-energy exports set new records for the first eight months of 2025, driven by a 75% increase in sales to ASEAN customers, according to industry monitor Ember Energy Research.
The world’s No. 2 economy maintains a lock on other, less flashy but no less essential technologies, from copper alloys to legacy microchips that have become too low-margin to interest Silicon Valley. “Synthetic fibers for apparel, lagging-edge chips: these are the kinds of areas where China says, ‘We are going to win,’” Kearney’s DeLong says.
And then there is the chokehold on rare earths that Xi has already effectively wielded against Trump. “China has got the West over a barrel, as things stand right now,” concludes James Kynge, senior research fellow for China and the World with the Asia-Pacific Programme at the UK think tank Chatham House. “It will take a decade or more to recreate viable parts of the Chinese supply chain in different geographies.”
China could rebalance its trade more effectively through internal policy changes that shift wealth to consumers. Increased purchasing power would boost imports and absorb some excess domestic manufacturing capacity. “The puzzle with China is the absence of imports, whether aircraft or European handbags,” CFR’s Setser says.
The most dramatic effect could come from Beijing instituting pensions and other social-welfare transfers on the model of fully developed economies, PIIE’s Hufbauer says. That does not seem to be on Xi’s agenda. “They do not want to build out a social safety net,” Hufbauer says. “They want to direct resources into frontier technology.”
What Will Happen To The USMCA?
In the US sphere, the main event of 2026 is a review of the USMCA, built into the agreement when Trump signed it during his first term in 2018. The president, true to form, has hinted at annulling the pact, which regulates about 30% of US trade. “We don’t need cars made in Canada. We don’t need cars made in Mexico,” he remarked while touring a Ford Motor factory in Dearborn, Michigan, in January.
Brad Setser, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations
But Trump left most USMCA provisions untouched through 2025, and trade watchers are betting the accord will survive with relatively minor changes. US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer struck a more measured tone in congressional testimony in December. “The USMCA has been successful to a certain degree,” he testified. “From the information we have received from interested stakeholders, there is broad support for the agreement.”
“There’s a growing recognition of how important USMCA is,” DeLong says. “The US trade representative received over 1,500 comments from companies. I think it survives with stronger rules of origin and some incentives for specifically US content.”
If so, Mexico could emerge from the current trade upheaval as a big winner, with the North American nearshoring trend accelerating and Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum toning down her predecessor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s, hostility toward business. “This whole story has been great for Mexico,” Hufbauer says. “They’ve improved their position in the US market.”
Over time, the dominance of China and the US in world trade will decline, BCG’s Gilbert predicts. The firm’s 10-year projections show US trade, including services, increasing by 1.5% annually; China’s by 2%; and the rest of the world’s by 2.5%.
One reason is simple arithmetic: India and parts of East Asia are growing faster than China, with explosive potential for both imports and exports. Vietnam’s position as a rising export power seems cemented; its trade volume shrugged off global turmoil, rising nearly 18% last year.
India, so far a domestically focused economy, is the global trade wild card as its economy continues to boom by more than 6% annually and multinational champions like Apple build advanced manufacturing there. “India has improved a lot on infrastructure and the availability of skilled labor,” Gilbert says. “It’s one to watch.”
The EU And Beyond
The world beyond the US and China is also striking back with a wave of diplomacy leaning toward free trade. The EU, sandwiched between Chinese competition and US protectionism, is taking the lead. The EU and India signed a two-way trade agreement on January 27 that slashes tariffs.
Brussels also inked a trade deal with South America’s Mercosur bloc, dominated by Brazil, early this year after a quarter-century of negotiations, although the EU Parliament voted to delay enacting it until it passes a legal review. New Delhi, stung by a 50% tariff Trump imposed as punishment for buying Russian oil, finalized a trade agreement with the UK last year.
London joined the other 11 members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership in late 2024, after Trump’s reelection. The United Arab Emirates, a rising power in the Middle East, is pushing for free trade with almost everyplace except Washington and Beijing. “Trade deals are happening in months that would have taken decades,” DeLong summarizes.
None of that means the world can easily return to the free-trading consensus that reigned in the decades following the Cold War. The supply chain shocks of the pandemic, China’s political assertiveness, and the working-class resentment across the developed world that Trump channels are pushing toward a new paradigm, though its details remain fuzzy at best. “There’s a positioning of economic security as national security,” DeLong says.
On the other hand, no one can repeal the law of comparative advantage in an ever more complex global economy. Experts’ discussions focus on how trade between nations might shift or slow, not reverse. “When you look at the data, you don’t see too much evidence of a global trade shock,” CFR’s Setser notes.
Within the US, Trump did not visibly turn any clocks back during the first year of his second term. Ed Gresser, director for trade and global markets at the Progressive Policy Institute in Washington, points out that both manufacturing employment and manufacturing’s share of GDP dipped in 2025.
Discontent with China’s export juggernaut might take a back seat in the coming years to fears that US-based internet and AI providers will control the global digital high ground, particularly if Washington continues to use it for geopolitical leverage. “The real growth areas in international trade are data and digitization, and it’s not lost on any nation that the US is a leading provider,” BCG’s Gilbert says.
All of the above leaves decision-makers at multinational corporations in an unenviable position: knowing the deck of world politics and trade is being reshuffled yet not knowing what hand they will ultimately be dealt. “C-suites are embedding geopolitics into strategic and capital allocation decisions in a much more formalized way,” Gilbert says. “But large capital outlays are still in the domain of planning and preparation.”
Notable exceptions were the so-called hyperscalers in AI and their suppliers, who are shelling out capital everywhere at once.
Gold and silver prices extended last week’s dramatic sell-off on Monday, as investors continued to digest the implications of President Donald Trump’s announcement of Kevin Warsh as the next chair of the US Federal Reserve.
The move has fuelled expectations of a more government pressure on the Fed and prompted a sharp reassessment of positions across precious metals.
Spot gold fell as much as 10% in early trading, while silver plunged up to 16%, following Friday’s rout that marked the largest intraday decline on record for the white metal.
The scale and speed of the move underscored how vulnerable the market had become after months of aggressive buying driven by geopolitical tension and bets on looser US monetary policy.
“The sharp selloff on Friday followed news that US President Donald Trump intends to nominate Kevin Warsh as the next Federal Reserve chair – a development that boosted the US dollar and reinforced expectations of a more hawkish policy stance,” said Ewa Manthey, commodities strategist at ING, and Warren Patterson, head of commodities strategy.
“While a correction was overdue after the intense rally, the scale of Friday’s decline far exceeded most expectations.”
Why the Fed matters for gold
Gold and silver are particularly sensitive to US interest-rate expectations.
Higher rates increase the opportunity cost of holding non-yielding assets such as precious metals, while a stronger dollar makes them more expensive for overseas buyers.
Warsh, a former Fed governor, has voice sentiments supportive of Trump’s vision for the Fed, including regular rate cuts.
That reassessment has been swift. Investor caution has been evident in exchange-traded funds, with silver holdings falling for a seventh consecutive session to their lowest level since November 2025.
Futures data also show speculators cutting back sharply on bullish bets, signalling a broader retreat from the sector.
“CFTC positioning shows a cooling in speculative interest across precious metals,” the ING report continued.
“Managed money net longs in COMEX gold fell by 17,741 lots last week… Speculators also cut net longs in silver… taking positioning to its lowest since February 2024.”
Margins rise, volatility bites
Market stress has been amplified by mechanical factors.
CME Group is set to raise margin requirements on COMEX gold and silver futures after last week’s historic swings, forcing traders to post more collateral or reduce exposure.
Such moves tend to accelerate sell-offs, particularly in heavily leveraged markets.
Attention is now turning to Asia, where Chinese investors have historically provided support during price dips. However, with volatility elevated and the Lunar New Year approaching, participation may be more cautious than usual.
“With volatility spiking and the Lunar New Year approaching, traders are likely to pare back positions and reduce risk,” the ING analysts said.
“Price direction in the near term will hinge on the extent of dip-buying from Chinese investors following Friday’s retreat.”
Outlook remains fragile
For now, the precious metals market remains at the mercy of macro forces, with little clarity on how quickly sentiment will stabilise.
Investors are watching US data closely for clues on real interest rates and the dollar’s next move, both of which will be shaped by expectations around the Fed’s future direction.
“Overall, volatility across precious metals is likely to remain elevated in the near term,” Manthey and Patterson said.
“For gold and silver, macro uncertainty, real rate expectations, and USD direction will continue to dominate sentiment,” the report concluded.
As the Trump administration ploughs forward with its incendiary policies, European trust in the US government is fading.
Amid tariff threats and pledges to conquer Greenland, citizens and politicians in Europe are unsettled — questioning a long-standing alliance.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann (FDP), chair of the Defence Committee in the EU Parliament, claims to have an answer that is “worth its weight in gold”. In this case, the expression is more literal than figurative.
Around 1,236 tonnes of German gold, worth more than €100bn, are sitting in vaults in the US. Strack-Zimmermann has now announced that, in view of Trump’s recent political manoeuvres, it’s no longer justifiable to leave them be. This has reignited a fierce debate: to retrieve or not to retrieve?
The demand to bring gold back to Germany has been around for a long time, with some surveys suggesting that many citizens are in favour of the move. Similar debates are happening in Italy, which has the third-largest gold reserves in the world after the US and Germany.
Why does Germany hold gold in the US?
Germany’s gold reserves amount to around 3,350 tonnes. About 36.6% of this is in the US, a legacy of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates after World War II.
“At the time, all exchange rates were tied to the dollar, and the dollar was tied to gold,” Dr. Demary, senior economist for Monetary Policy and Financial Markets at the German Economic Institute (IW), told Euronews.
“Germany had large export surpluses with the US, so we accumulated a lot of dollars. To keep exchange rates stable, we exchanged those dollars for gold. That’s how these reserves were built up.”
During the Cold War, it was also practical to store gold abroad, as the US was considered a safe place in case of conflict with the Soviet Union. Over the years, some gold has been repatriated. By 2017, 300 tonnes were brought back from New York, 380 tonnes from Paris, and 900 tonnes from London.
This was part of a Bundesbank plan, unveiled in 2013, to store half of Germany’s gold reserves in Germany from 2020 onwards.
Bringing in the gold treasure: What are the risks?
Strack-Zimmermann and other politicians and economists cite Trump’s unpredictable trade and foreign policy as the reason for moving the gold out of the US.
“Of course, there is always some risk when you keep assets abroad,” said Demary. For example, there is a storage risk if a break-in occurs. But this risk exists whether the gold is stored abroad or in Germany.
“Another possible scenario is that the US government, due to tight currency reserves, could prevent the gold from being transferred,” he explained.
To ensure the safety of gold holdings, the Bundesbank has had to make frequent trips to New York in the past to take an inventory.
“It makes sense to leave this gold in the US in case we have a banking crisis here and need to obtain dollars,” said Demary.
Retrieving the gold could not only be logistically complex, but also risky.
“The gold would have to be transported in armoured vehicles onto a ship, which would also need to be guarded, and then brought back to Frankfurt under security,” added Demary. “There could be robberies, the ship could sink, or the cargo could be seized.”
Is Strack-Zimmermann’s demand pure populism?
Is Strack-Zimmermann’s demand pure symbolic politics? “I think so,” said the economist. “Perhaps it was a political move in response to the tariff threats, saying, ‘We’re bringing our gold back now.’”
According to the economist, it is also possible that Strack-Zimmermann estimated the magnitude of this gold value to be somewhat greater than it really is. In any case, the gold is currently safe in New York, even if Trump wanted to use it to exert pressure on Germany.
“The Federal Reserve is actually independent in its monetary policy. The US government cannot simply intervene. They would have to change laws first,” explained Dr Demary.
Even in the absolute worst case, if the US refused to release the gold, there would still be the option to go to court and enforce its return or receive compensation in dollars, said Demary.
“You have to weigh up the pros and cons and I would say the advantages of leaving the gold in the US outweigh the disadvantages,” he told Euronews.
The Trump administration has provided around $300 million to the Rodriguez government after seizing tankers and selling oil stockpiled in the country. The funds are being managed through accounts in Qatar and will be subject to audits by US agencies, Rubio told the Senate on Wednesday.
The idea that the US can somehow remote-control its way into a coherent audit of Venezuelan public spending defies imagination. Venezuela has never been an easy place to follow money. Road construction in Venezuela was for much of the 20th century a famous form of campaign finance that bankrolled politicians through well-greased kickback systems. Even in the country’s more prosperous days, public hospitals were notorious rat’s nests of corruption that allowed suppliers of everything from aspirin to X-ray machines to mark up prices for illicit gain and political financing.
Chavismo put this on steroids. Because there has been no alternation of power since Chávez’s 1998 election, no one in a position to audit government books has ever had an incentive to. The government comptroller’s office, once an institutional check on the ruling party, has for decades been used primarily to disqualify opposition politicians from holding office on the basis of fabricated accounting discrepancies.
The Chávez era saw the wholesale unraveling of basic parliamentary oversight of spending. State oil company PDVSA went from being an internationally respected company to a piggy bank used for everything from food imports to housing development. Multibillion-dollar slush funds with no rules about spending and no reporting requirements to the general public came to manage more than parliament. Bilateral financing agreements with China, Russia, and Iran led to secretive and inscrutable financing arrangements that made the country’s borrowing a black box.
Rampant corruption and damaged financial accountability do not mean that outsiders cannot be involved there. When the war in Ukraine broke out, international agencies famously relaxed what had been stringent standards around Ukrainian corruption. Aid agencies and nonprofits working in Haiti have had to quietly make concessions to the realities of operating there. As did the organizations that worked to reduce hunger in Venezuela during the crisis years. Expecting to maintain Swiss-level accounting standards in these types of environments is a recipe for making sure nothing gets done.
Which is a bit of what Rubio is promising by putting the US Export-Import Bank in charge of following every last dollar that Venezuela receives from US-brokered oil sales. Nobody was able to fully follow the money in Venezuela even when they were trying. After almost 30 years of systematically undermining public transparency, a remote-controlled, third-party audit conducted by foreigners from thousands of miles away doesn’t stand a ghost of a chance.
The inevitable conclusion is that the United States will simply have to start turning a blind eye to what actually happens with the money. With clear marching orders to get the economy up and running and oil production moving as fast as possible, there simply won’t be time to stand on accounting formalities. Ask too many questions and the progress will start to slow down. It seems like an unexpected consequence of a transition under tutelage: the Trump administration will quietly become part of the chavista machine.
José Antonio Kast of the far-right Republican Party was elected president of Chile last month in a 58%-to-42% rout of rival Jeannette Jara, the Communist Party standard-bearer.
Campaigning on a promise to expel undocumented migrants and crack down on crime, Kast finished second to Jara in the first round of elections but dominated the runoff.
“Here, a person didn’t win, a political party didn’t win,” Kast said in his victory speech. “Chile won. The hope of living without fear won. We are going to face very difficult times, where we will have to make important decisions, and that requires a cohesive team.”
Kast, 59, promised to bring order back to the streets.
A member of the Chamber of Deputies for 16 years, he founded the Republican Party in 2019. He ran for president two years prior, receiving 8% of the vote, and collected 44% in 2021, when he ran against Gabriel Boric.
With his election, Chile joins Ecuador and Bolivia in what appears to be a right-wing shift in Latin American politics. Honduras could add a fourth domino to the pile should Honduras’s Nasry Asfura be confirmed as winner of last month’s disputed election.
Along with expelling undocumented immigrants, Kast has promised to increase police resources and deploy the military to violent areas. Public debt was expected to reach 42.2% of GDP by the end of 2025. To bring down that figure, Kast says he will implement austerity measures that include cutting $6 billion in public spending over 18 months.
Kast has also promised to live in the Palacio de La Moneda, the traditional seat of the president—the first time a president will live there since 1958.
Plans to boost investment with lower taxes and fewer regulations aim to improve Chile’s GDP growth to 4% annually, up from 2.6% in 2024. This will require negotiation with Congress, where the right wing holds a majority, but will still require center-left votes, especially in the Senate. “Chile is going to have real change, which you will begin to perceive soon,” Kast predicted. “There are no magic solutions here. Things don’t change overnight. This requires a lot of unity, dedication, and many sacrifices from everyone.”
Gold has risen more than 20% since the start of the year, surpassing the significant $5,500 milestone this week.
The precious metal’s rally, seen alongside a lift in commodities such as silver and platinum, is driven by a number of interlinking factors — including geopolitical tensions, rising government debt, and an uncertain outlook for interest rates and inflation.
Gold’s appeal is linked to the narrative that it is a safe haven asset, acting as a “hedge against inflation”. It typically increases in value when the dollar declines, it’s easily sold, and it’s also a tangible, finite commodity.
These factors are significant at a time when questions are being raised about the dollar, as well as fiat currencies like the Japanese yen. As government debt rises, so do fears around inflation and fiscal stability.
In the US, incendiary policies from the Trump administration are increasing market jitters around the health of the economy, prompting what some analysts view as a “sell America” trade. In recent weeks, the president has threatened to conquer Greenland, hinted at US intervention in Iran, sought to influence policy at the Federal Reserve, and launched an attack on Venezuela. To top that off, he’s also threatened more tariffs on trading partners, bringing back a well-worn tactic from 2025.
Although analysts argue that the dollar will not be unseated as the world’s reserve currency anytime soon, it seems investors are diversifying away from the greenback. The US’ next moves remain uncertain, and no one wants to be caught in the crosshairs. As an alternative to fiat currencies, gold may seem like a strong portfolio option.
“Investors previously bought US Treasuries as they were viewed as being quite risk-free. But especially because of the way that some wealth has been weaponised, certain countries are becoming more careful about how they allocate their capital,” said Simon Popple, managing director at Brookville Capital. “The dollar debasement helps the gold price,” he told Euronews.
Even so, Popple and other analysts stress that a major factor lifting the bullion price is far less complicated. As gold continues to make headlines, investors are caught up in the momentum, sparking a buying frenzy.
“People are naturally drawn to things they see moving and they’ve seen gold have an astonishing rally,” said Chris Beauchamp, chief market analyst at IG. “It’s bound to lead to an ignition of interest.”
He added that while gold has beneficial investment properties, the metal’s ability to hold its value is overstated, particularly in the short term. Gold’s position in the market notably shifted after former US president Richard Nixon decided to end direct dollar convertibility to gold in 1971. Put simply, countries no longer fixed their currencies to a specified amount of the precious metal.
“The gold standard is still invoked to suggest the metal is some kind of totemic asset we should have because it’s a fixed store of value. It’s not,” concluded Beauchamp.
Kenneth Lamont, a principal in Morningstar’s Manager Research Department, reiterated this message, also drawing comparisons between gold and crypto. While both are limited in supply, they are both “incredibly volatile”, he stressed.
“If you’re using either crypto or gold to buy something, it might be 30% less from one day to the next. It’s not actually a good store of value in the short term.”
While gold is much more established than bitcoin, and it has historically performed well over the long term, analysts stress that the unpredictability of both assets means the death knell is not yet ringing for fiat currencies.
Whether bullion’s price will continue to climb in the immediate future is a guessing game. Even so, given the precarious nature of global politics, it seems the metal may still have further to run.
Los Angeles County will halt some payments from its $4-billion sex abuse settlement, leaving many plaintiffs on edge as prosecutors ramp up an investigation into allegations of fraud.
L.A. County agreed last spring to the record payout to settle a flood of lawsuits from people who said they’d been sexually abused by staff in government-run foster homes and juvenile camps. Many attorneys had told their clients they could expect the first tranche of money to start flowing this month.
But the county’s acting chief executive officer, Joseph M. Nicchitta, said Thursday that the county would “pause all payments” for unvetted claims after a request by Dist. Atty. Nathan Hochman. These are claims that have been flagged as requiring a “higher level of scrutiny,” according to a joint report submitted Thursday by attorneys in the settlement.
The district attorney announced he would investigate the historic settlement after reporting by The Times that found some plaintiffs who said they were paid to sue. Investigators have found “a significant number of cases where we believe there is potential fraud,” according to a spokesperson for the prosecutor’s office. The State Bar is spearheading a separate inquiry into fraud allegations.
On Jan. 9, Hochman formally requested the county pause the distribution of funds for at least six months, which he said would give his office “a reasonable opportunity to complete critical investigative steps.”
“Premature disbursement of settlement funds poses a substantial risk of interfering with the investigation by complicating witness cooperation, obscuring financial trails, and impairing my office’s ability to identify and prosecute fraudulent activity,” Hochman wrote in a letter to Andy Baum, the county’s main outside attorney working on the settlement.
Plaintiff lawyers argued the county was required to turn over money by the end of the month.
The county said it came to an agreement Thursday and plans to turn over $400 million on Friday, which would “cover claims that have already been validated,” according to a statement from Nicchitta. That money will go into a fund where it will be distributed when judges are finished vetting and deciding how much each claim is worth.
“No plaintiff was getting paid until the allocation process is completed,” said the county’s top lawyer, Dawyn Harrison. “The County is not overseeing that intensive process.”
The rest of the payments, Nicchitta said, will be on hold until the claims can “be appropriately investigated.”
“The County takes extremely seriously its obligations to provide just compensation to survivors. Preventing fraud is central to that commitment,” he said. “Fraudulent claims of sexual assault harm survivors by diluting compensation for survivors and casting public doubt over settlements as a whole.”
The uncertainty has sparked a sense of despair among those who spent the last few years wading through the darkest memories of their lives in hopes of a life-changing sum.
Andrea Proctor, 45, said the last few years have been like “digging into a scar that was healed.”
“The whole lawsuit just blew air out of me,” said Proctor, who sued in 2022 over alleged abuse at MacLaren Children’s Center, an El Monte shelter where she says she was drugged and sexually abused by staff as a teenager. “I’m just sitting out here empty.”
Proctor said she desperately needs the money to stabilize her life, the first part of which was spent careening from one crisis to the next — an instability she traces partially to the abuse she suffered as a minor.
Since a 2020 law change that extended the statute of limitations to sue over childhood sexual abuse, thousands have come forward with claims of abuse in county-run facilities dating back decades. The county resolved claims it faced last year through two massive payouts — the first settlement for $4 billion, which includes roughly 11,000 plaintiffs, and a second one last October worth $828 million, which includes about 400 victims.
Now, according to court filings made public Tuesday, the county faces an additional 5,500 claims of the same nature, leaving the prospect of a third hefty payout looming on the horizon.
“They’re telling me the ship has sailed,” said Martin Gould, a partner with Gould Grieco & Hensley, who said he wants this next flood of litigation to focus on pushing for arrests of predatory staff members still on the county’s payroll. “I don’t believe that.”
Gould says his firm, based in Chicago, represents about 70 victims in the new litigation. James Harris Law Firm, a small Seattle-based firm that specializes in big personal injury cases, has about 3,000. The Right Trial Lawyers, a firm that lists a Texas office as its headquarters, has about 700, according to an attorney affiliated with the firm.
These lawyers will be pleading their cases in front of a public — and a Board of Supervisors — at a moment when the conversation has shifted from a reckoning over systemic sexual abuse inside county facilities to concerns about the use of taxpayer money.
A series of Times investigations last fall found nine clients represented by Downtown LA Law Group, or DTLA, who said they were paid by recruiters to sue. Four said they were told to make up their claims.
All the lawsuits filed by the firm, which represents roughly a quarter of the plaintiffs in the $4-billion settlement, are now under review by Daniel Buckley, a former presiding judge of the county’s Superior Court.
DTLA has repeatedly denied any wrongdoing and said in a previous statement that it “categorically does not engage in, nor has it ever condoned, the exchange of money for client retention.”
Several DTLA clients said they were unaware of the probes by the State Bar and the district attorney, though they were told this month to expect delays in payments due, in part, to “a higher-than-expected false claim potential.”
The delays have caused extra anguish for some plaintiffs who have taken out loans against their settlement.
Proctor took out loans worth $15,000 from High Rise Financial, an L.A.-based legal funding company, which collects a larger portion of her payout with each passing year. She now owes more than $34,000, according to loan statements.
Proctor said High Rise Financial recently inquired about buying her out of the settlement payment, which the county is expected to pay out over five years. The loan company told her she could get a percentage of her settlement up front in a lump sum, with the company pocketing the rest as profit. For example, she said, she was told if she received a $300,000 payout, she could get $205,000 up front.
“Conversations were held with consumers to assess their interest in a potential financial arrangement related to a possible settlement,” High Rise said in a statement. “No agreements were sent, nor were any transactions entered into.”
Proctor’s friend Krista Hubbard, who also sued over abuse at MacLaren Children’s Center, borrowed $20,000 to help her through a period of homelessness. She now owes nearly $43,000. She said she, too, got the same offer this month from High Rise of getting bought out of her settlement.
Hubbard, who is crashing at the home of her godfather in Arkansas, said she’s considering it.
“How much longer is it going to take?” she said. “Am I going to be able to not be homeless?”
The $828-million settlement, which includes just three law firms, is running into its own roadblock with lawyers belatedly learning that roughly 30 of their clients were also set to receive money from the $4-billion settlement despite rules barring plaintiffs from receiving money from both.
The overlap has led to a dispute over which pot of money should cover payments to those plaintiffs. Those in the $828-million settlement, which has a much smaller pool of plaintiffs, are expected to get much more.
“It reeks,” said Courtney Thom, an attorney with Manly Stewart & Finaldi, who said she believed the county should have flagged long ago that there were identical clients in both settlements.
“It is not for me to fact-check for the county,” she told Judge Lawrence Riff at a court hearing Wednesday. “It is not for me to cross-reference names.”
Some of these plaintiffs had two different sexual abuse claims against the county — for example, one lawsuit alleged abuse in foster care while a second involved juvenile halls. Other clients had identical claims in both groups and mistakenly believed the two firms that represented them were compiling the information into one claim, Thom said.
Baum, the outside attorney defending the county, told Riff he wanted to ensure the clients didn’t “have their hands in two cookie jars.”
The national debt passed the $36 trillion threshold in November for the first time ever, as the combined debt held by the U.S. public and the federal government grows.
National debt is the total amount of money the U.S. federal government owes its creditors. The American public primarily holds the largest share of federal debt, followed by foreign governments and U.S. banks and investors. The government gathers funds by collecting taxes on personal and corporate income, payroll earnings, and borrowing. The government then spends the money on programs such as Social Security, education, health care, national defense, and more, and takes on debt by borrowing to cover the expenses that accumulate over time.
But which political party has historically added more to the national debt—Democrats or Republicans? The answer depends on how you slice the data.
Key Takeaways
The national debt passed the $36 trillion threshold in November 2024 for the first time ever, as the combined debt held by the U.S. public and the federal government grows.
Republican presidents have added slightly more to the national debt per term than Democratic presidents, according to inflation-adjusted data from the U.S. Treasury Department and the Bureau of Labor Statistics dating back to 1913.
Looking at U.S. presidents since 1913, Republican presidents added about $1.4 trillion per four-year term, compared to $1.2 trillion added by Democrats.
Republican Presidents Have Added More to the National Debt Per Term—But Democratic Presidents Added More Debt Overall
Inflation-adjusted data from the U.S. Treasury Department and the Bureau of Labor Statistics would suggest that per term, Republican presidents have added slightly more debt to the U.S. national debt than Democratic presidents. Looking at U.S. presidents from 1913 through the end of the federal fiscal year 2024, Republican presidents added about $1.4 trillion per four-year term, compared to $1.2 trillion added by Democrats.
However, Democratic presidents added more inflation-adjusted debt overall. That could be because Democratic presidents were in power for nine more years than Republican presidents in the period since 1913. Overall, Democratic presidents have added a total of $18 trillion to the national debt since 1913 (adjusted for inflation), while Republicans have added $17.3 trillion.
How Does a President and Their Administration Affect Debt?
Historically, the way a president has responded to major events has added significantly to the national debt. For example, funding wars and spending on government relief during recessions are some reasons presidents have added to the national debt.
While national debt isn’t entirely in a president’s control, a president and their administration’s fiscal policies do affect it. Federal spending can be out of a president’s control in times of war, natural disasters, or a public health crisis.
During the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, then-President Trump signed the $2.2 trillion CARES Act stimulus bill into law in response to the sharp rise in unemployment during the pandemic. Later, President Biden signed the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan Act to provide more relief to Americans and businesses as they continued to recover from the pandemic.
President Obama signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in 2009 when the economy was experiencing the worst recession since the Great Depression. Former President George W. Bush added significantly to the national debt during his term after launching the invasion of Afghanistan and the War on Terror following the Sept. 11 terror attacks. The Iraq and Afghanistan wars cost an estimated $8 trillion over 20 years, ending in 2021.
How Would the 2024 Election Candidates’ Economic Plans Affect U.S. National Debt?
The national debt was also a leading issue for 2024 presidential election voters. October data from a poll by the Peterson Foundation found that more than nine in 10 voters across seven key swing states said it was important for candidates to have a plan for national debt.
However, a report by the nonpartisan Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (CRFB) found that both candidates were likely to significantly increase the national debt under their current spending plans. High levels of national debt can slow down the economy, increase interest rates, and generally increase the risk of a fiscal crisis.
Tallying what economic proposals the candidates had made, Harris’ spending plan would increase the national debt by about $3.95 trillion through 2035, while President-elect Trump’s plan would increase the debt by $7.75 trillion, according to an estimate by the CRFB.
Which President Added the Most National Debt Per Term?
Former President Trump added the most national debt per term, adding an estimated $7.1 trillion to the national debt during his term from 2016 to 2020.
The Bottom Line
Looking at U.S. presidential terms since 1913, Republican presidents have added slightly more debt to the U.S. national debt than Democratic presidents per four-year term. However, Democratic presidents added more inflation-adjusted debt overall, though there have also been nine more years of Democratic presidents since 1913 compared to Republican presidents.
Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell pushed back against political pressure on the US central bank on Wednesday and defended its independence, urging the next chair to “stay out of elected politics”. Markets, however, appeared unconvinced, accelerating a sell-off in the dollar as gold and silver hit fresh record highs.
“Don’t get pulled into elected politics. Don’t do it,” Powell told reporters.
The reaction followed the Federal Reserve’s latest decision to leave interest rates unchanged in a range between 3.5% and 3.75%.
Asked whether the Fed was drawing any macroeconomic signal from the explosive rally in precious metals, Powell played down its significance.
“We don’t take much message macroeconomically,” Powell said. “The argument that we are losing credibility is simply not the case. If you look at where inflation expectations are, our credibility is right where it needs to be.”
He highlighted that the Fed does not “get spun up over particular asset price changes”, although it continues to monitor markets closely.
Markets react
The market reaction sharply contradicted Powell’s message.
Gold jumped to $5,500 per ounce, setting a new all-time high, while silver climbed above $117 per ounce.
Gold is now up over 20% this month, on track for its strongest monthly performance since January 1980.
Silver’s gains have been even more dramatic, with prices already up around 55% this month — the strongest monthly rise on record.
Meanwhile, the US dollar index, which tracks the greenback against a basket of major currencies, fell to levels last seen four years ago.
“The next couple of days will show whether investors have concluded that the dollar needs to go lower and that today’s bounce is a selling opportunity,” said James Knightley, chief economist at ING.
The dollar is now more than 10% below its 2025 highs, weighed down by persistent macro headwinds, including global central bank diversification away from US assets, widening fiscal deficits, recurring questions over Fed independence, and expectations of further policy easing.
‘Is gold the new bitcoin?’
Veteran Wall Street economist Ed Yardeni linked the rally to politics, suggesting its sustained popularity could make “gold the new bitcoin”.
Yardeni argued that US President Donald Trump, a vocal supporter of cryptocurrencies, appears to be inadvertently fuelling the rise in gold prices.
On Tuesday, Trump said “the dollar is doing great” when asked whether the currency had fallen too much, signalling he is comfortable with a weaker greenback.
“A weaker dollar may put upward pressure on US inflation, which would also boost the price of gold,” Yardeni said.
Commodities surge beyond gold and silver
The rally has spread across the broader commodities market.
Platinum climbed above $2,900 per ounce for the first time on record this week and is already up 33% this month. Palladium, which benefits from stronger industrial demand, rose to a four-year high and is up more than 22% year to date.
Copper also surged, hitting a record $6.30 per pound on Thursday.
Across commodity markets, investors are increasingly positioning for prolonged dollar weakness, amid perceptions that US institutions are willing to tolerate — or quietly accept — the shift.
Euro stronger, equities mixed
In Europe, the euro traded near $1.1950, edging lower after briefly breaking above $1.20 earlier in the week following Trump’s comments.
The single currency has now risen for three consecutive months against the dollar and is up around 15% year on year.
European equities were mixed. France’s CAC 40 and Italy’s FTSE MIB gained around 0.5%, while Germany’s DAX fell over 1%.
Frankfurt’s losses were led by SAP, which slid 16% — its biggest one-day drop since October 2020 — after weaker-than-expected cloud sales and a cut to 2026 revenue guidance outweighed in-line fourth-quarter results.
Many money saving travel hacks are trotted out year after year, but do they really save money? Travel specialists have weighed in on some of the most common tips that are often repeated
Not all ‘money saving hacks’ are worth your time(Image: Getty Images)
January and February are peak times for booking holidays, and at this time of year you’ll often see lists of travel tips that claim you can save money by following certain ‘hacks’.
But do they really work? The travel insurance team at Tiger.co.uk has shed light on five travel hacks that are shared pretty much every year, but may end up being a waste of your time. Luckily, the team has also revealed some practical tips to save money that can actually help holidaymakers slash their travel costs.
1. Using incognito mode when booking
Some money saving sites will tell you to use incognito mode when you make a booking, claiming this can lead to cheaper fares. This is based on the assumption that if you make repeated searches, the airline or travel provider will take your history into account and raise the fares.
However, Tiger explained that flight pricing algorithms are much more sophisticated than that, and while fare prices do change over time, this is based on demand, availability, and pricing, rather than what’s in your search history. An article in Quartz backs up this theory, citing studies that have shown there’s very little effect on the overall cost.
Many airlines offer different fare classes even within economy, and once one type of fare sells out, it’ll automatically move to the next, higher-priced one. This is more likely to explain why a fare has jumped up in price the second time you search.
2. Booking flights during the night
In the early days of internet travel booking, airlines used to update their fares manually overnight. Savvy travellers could set an alarm for first thing in the morning to save money on their flights.
Nowadays, airline websites are much more sophisticated and update prices 24/7, meaning its unlikely to make a difference whether you book during the day or night. However, this outdated travel hack still gets repeated now and again.
3. Booking last-minute gets you the best deals
Travelling at the last minute used to be a great way to bag bargain holidays. If you’re not fussy about your destination and flexible on dates, there are still cheap package holidays to be found, though they seem to be getting harder to find.
However, Tiger says that if you’re looking for cheap flights, planning ahead is a better option. Fares often increase as the departure date approaches and seats become scarcer. Try using Skyscanner or a similar flight comparison site with a price tracker to alert you when fares to your destination drop.
4. Only looking at budget airlines
Budget airlines often appear the cheapest because they offer impressive headline fares, but once priced up, a budget carrier might not be the best option for saving cash.
Once you’ve added the basics, such as baggage and paid to select your seat, you may find the cost is comparable to standard airlines where these extras are included. Always look at the total cost for a true comparison.
5. Always book a return
In the past, travellers were always advised to book return tickets as it worked out cheaper. But nowadays, with flight comparison tools available, it’s easier than ever to compare return fares on the same airline versus buying two singles with different carriers. Mixing and matching could save you money and often makes it more convenient to book a flight time that suits you.
Have a story you want to share? Email us at webtravel@reachplc.com
Oil prices rose on Thursday after US President Donald Trump warned Iran that “time is running out” and said a “massive armada” was heading towards the region if Tehran failed to agree to a nuclear non-proliferation deal.
In a Truth Social post, Trump said a fleet larger than the one sent to Venezuela was ready to “rapidly fulfil its mission, with speed and violence, if necessary” if Iran refused to negotiate a deal guaranteeing “no nuclear weapons”.
Global benchmark Brent rose by about 2.02%, trading at around $68.73 per barrel, while US crude (WTI) hovered around 2.15% higher, at $64.57 per barrel.
Trump previously threatened to attack Iran if it killed protesters during the ongoing protest movement across the country. Estimates of those killed range from around 6,000 to as many as 30,000, according to various reports.
Oil delivery disruptions
If the US were to escalate militarily, it could disrupt oil flows to countries that still trade with Iran.
Iran’s economy is already under heavy pressure from US secondary financial sanctions on its banking and energy sectors, compounded by the reimposition of JCPOA snapback sanctions.
These measures have severely limited Iran’s access to the Western financial system and constrained its ability to trade openly.
As a result, Iranian exports rely heavily on so-called “dark fleets,” ship-to-ship transfers and intermediary routes designed to obscure cargo origins along major maritime corridors.
Yet despite years of sanctions, Iran has retained access to oil markets, underlining the difficulty of fully enforcing restrictions on a high-value global commodity.
“Iran has a number of markets for its oil, despite the Western sanctions regime,” said Dmitry Grozubinski, a senior advisor on international trade policy at Aurora Macro Strategies.
China at centre of enforcement risk
China remains the largest buyer, with reports suggesting Iranian crude is often rebranded as Malaysian or Gulf-origin oil before entering the country.
“Independent refineries are purchasing it using dark fleet vessels, with transactions conducted through small private banks and in renminbi,” Grozubinski said.
Other destinations for Iranian oil and derivatives include Iraq, the UAE and Turkey, further complicating enforcement.
“It’s extremely difficult to maintain comprehensive sanctions on oil,” Grozubinski said, “especially when it requires policing transactions between Iran and states that don’t fully share Western priorities.”
China currently imports an estimated 1.2 to 1.4 million barrels of Iranian oil per day — around 80 to 90% of Iran’s crude exports.
US escalation could provoke Beijing
That dependence makes Beijing the central variable in any escalation. Analysts say China would be the most likely major economy to resist compliance and retaliate.
“Beijing has already signalled it would respond if Trump follows through,” said Dan Alamariu, chief geopolitical strategist at Alpine Macro, warning of renewed US–China trade friction.
One risk raised by analysts is the potential for China to again restrict exports of rare earths — a tool it has previously used during periods of trade tension — although such a move is considered unlikely in the short term.
“It’s not the base case,” Alamariu said, “but it’s not impossible.”
On the Trump administration’s decision to work with Delcy Rodríguez
Forcing Maduro out: “We made multiple attempts to get Maduro to leave voluntarily and to avoid all of this. Because we understood that he was an impediment to progress. You couldn’t make a deal with this guy.”
The first goal wasn’t a rushed attempt at a democratic transition or vote: “You can have elections all day. But if the opposition has no access to the media, if opposition candidates are routinely dismissed and unable to be on the ballot because of the government, then those aren’t free and fair elections. That’s the endstate that we want. Free, fair, prosperous and friendly Venezuela. We are not gonna get there in three weeks. It’s going to take some time. So objective number one was stability.”
Not a quick, straightforward process: “For the first time in over a decade and a half there’s a real possibility of transformation. And a lot of it will depend on them. There are many people living in Florida and across the country who would like to go back and be a part of Venezuela’s economic life. Many of them are eager to do so. And Venezuela is going to need them to go back and rebuild the businesses that were taken (…) This is not a frozen dinner that you put in a microwave and two and a half minutes later it comes out ready to eat. These are complex things. We’ve seen this play out. I use the example of Paraguay and Spain, there are others. When there’s a transition from autocracy to democracy, it’s not linear.”
“At the end of the day, we are dealing with people over there that have spent most their lives living in a gangster paradise … We are certainly better off today in Venezuela than we were four weeks ago, and I think, and hope, and expect that we will be better off in three… pic.twitter.com/JABFkHoBEB
Rubio didn’t want to get involved in the issue of an investigation into Delcy by US prosecutors. She wasn’t arrested because she hasn’t been indicted like Maduro, and they work with her because those who control the weapons and the institutions are regime figures. The US managed to avoid war, millions of people were prevented from fleeing to Colombia, by establishing communication with key regime actors.
To critics of US policy in Venezuela, Rubio put it this way: “You told us you didn’t want any more regime change, and now you criticize us for not changing the regime.”
Rubio said he doesn’t want chavismo to entrench. According to him, the US goal is not to leave “people from this system” in power (who he claims not to trust), but right now it’s necessary to preserve a level of respect and communication maintained so far (since the January 3 military intervention).
On Venezuelan oil
The Secretary of State insisted that the chavista regime was sustained by corruption, something that is no longer sustainable, and that oil money “will not go to the drug cartels.”
Funds from the oil sales will go into a Venezuela-owned account in Qatar that the US will be able to supervise: “They needed money quickly to fund the police officers, the sanitation workers, the daily operations of government. So we’ve been able to create a short-term mechanism. This is not gonna be the permanent mechanism, but this is a mechanism in which the needs of the Venezuelan people can be met through a process that we’ve created where they will submit every month a budget of what needs to be funded. We will provide for them at the front end what that money cannot be used for. And they’ve been very cooperative in this regard. In fact, they have pledged to use a substantial amount of those funds to purchase medicine and equipment directly from the US.”
In probably his most clear acknowledgement as of yet, Marco Rubio states that the end goal for the Americans is a democratic Venezuela 🇻🇪, achieved through free & fair elections.
But Rubio also hints that elections are more of a long-term objective, and won’t be held very soon. pic.twitter.com/xndUGxHwXE
From 0:30, Rubio explains the BCV-owned account in Qatar.
Rubio also said another $300 million might come in, but Delcy & Co. first must allow an audit of the initial funds to ensure they are being used appropriately.
On the other hand, China can buy Venezuelan oil, but at market price. No Maduro-era discounts set as a result of US sanctions. The Secretary of State said the US wants to lift said sanctions to boost economic activity, but he doesn’t expect the recovery to involve US spending.
Rubio celebrated the amendment process of the Hydrocarbons Law, which basically eliminates many of the restrictions on foreign investment in the oil industry. It doesn’t go far enough to attract more investment, but it’s a big step compared to where things were three weeks ago.”
He suggested that companies would invest in Venezuela knowing their money is safe and their assets wouldn’t be taken away. The goal is to create the conditions for a normal, stable and transparent business environment in Venezuela. Their heavy crude isn’t unique, Canada has it too: “It’s not irreplaceable. But we understand that that is the lifeline and their natural resources will allow Venezuela to be stable and prosperous moving forward. what we hope to do is transition to a mechanism that allows that to be sold in a normal way, a normal oil industry, not one dominated by cronies, graft and corruption.”
Threats to the Rodríguez regime
Rubio expressed the regime’s performance is being assessed based on actions, not discourse. Stopping Venezuela from being the backyard of China, Russia and Iran would be a huge step.
“For the first time in 20 years, we are having serious conversations about eroding and eliminating the Iranian presence, the Chinese influence, the Russian presence as well. In fact, I will tell you that there are many elements there in Venezuela that welcome a return to establishing relations with the United States on multiple fronts,” Rubio said.
“The only military presence you will see in Venezuela is our Marine guards at an embassy. That is our goal, that is our expectation, and that is what everything that outlines towards. That said, if an Iranian drone factory pops up and threatens our forces in the region, the… pic.twitter.com/uTh9njjkGU
He acknowledged that political prisoners are being released, though not at the pace he desires, and that US officials would be mindful of how opposition leaders coming out from hiding would be treated (Delsa Solórzano being the last example).
Rubio said the US is generally pleased with how things have evolved in the past three weeks, but “we’ll let them know” if that changes. He does not anticipate any further military action in Venezuela in the short term. He claimed the use of force would depend on the stabilization goals being met, not on helping those goals.
“The only military presence you will see in Venezuela is our Marine guards at an embassy. That is our goal, that is our expectation, and that is what everything that outlines towards. That said, if an Iranian drone factory pops up and threatens our forces in the region, the president retains the option to eliminate that threat.”
On the future
Rubio was reluctant to provide a precise timeline for the current arrangement between Venezuelan authorities and the US. The Trump administration wants to see rapid progress, he suggested. And in five months, the situation must be different to what they currently see.
In the long term, the US wants Venezuela to have a democratically-elected government. But that stage wouldn’t be achieved in a matter of weeks (see quote in sub-section one). Rubio said he wants María Corina to be part of the transition and to be able to participate in an election at some point. He acknowledged they’ve known each other for the past 12 years, and both him and Trump respect the opposition leader.
Finally, Rubio explicitly labeled the Venezuelan opposition as diverse. He said that both opposition figures like Maria Corina who never supported chavismo and chavistas that disliked Maduro (which he called people “committed to chavista ideology) should have representation, and that internal reconciliation would allow those sectors to participate in national politics. The ultimate goal is legitimate democratic elections, and whatever happens, Rubio hopes the next Venezuelan leaders will have cordial relations with the US.