Mission

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has retired the last of its P-3 Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft. The AEW version is instantly recognizable from the saucer-like radar dome on top, as seen on other AEW types like the E-2 Hawkeye and the E-3 Sentry. CBP was the only operator of this variant of the P-3 Orion and is said to have been the only law enforcement agency to fly any kind of dedicated AEW plane. The retirement of these aircraft comes at a time when American AEW assets, in general, are under heavy strain by demands globally.

CBP officially retired its final P-3 AEW on September 30, 2026, after a final flight from National Air Security Operations Center Jacksonville (NASOC Jacksonville), in Jacksonville, Florida. CBP has also flown Long Range Tracker (LRT) variants of the P-3, configured for more traditional maritime surveillance missions. The current plans for the LRT aircraft, and whether their sunset may also be on the horizon, are not immediately clear, and TWZ has reached out for more information. Orions of all types have been steadily disappearing from service with the U.S. military and elsewhere across the U.S. government as the aging aircraft become more difficult to operate and maintain.

“Our Jacksonville-based P-3 AEW fleet has served as a cornerstone of America’s outer-layer border security,” according to a brief announcement from CBP about the retirement on social media. “Its crews flew far beyond our borders, providing wide-area surveillance across the Caribbean, Gulf of America [Gulf of Mexico], and the transit zones of Central and South America, helping detect and track threats before they could reach the United States.”

By all indications, including official CBP sources, the P-3 AEW fleet consisted of eight aircraft at its peak. There is a confusingly worded 2014 CBP press release that mentions an “11th and final Lockheed Martin P-3 Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft overhaul,” but that figure looks to also include three of the six LRT versions. The same release says that CBP only had 14 P-3s of all types at that time.

What was then known as the U.S. Customs Service (USCS) first began operating the P-3 AEW version in the late 1980s. The aircraft were converted from second-hand maritime patrol variants of the Orion. The first example had started life as a P-3B for the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). Ex-U.S. Navy P-3s were also converted.

The initial three P-3 AEWs were equipped with the AN/APS-138 radar. The same radar was used on early E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning and control aircraft operated by the U.S. Navy, as well as several other armed forces internationally.

“The Customs Service had previously borrowed U.S. Navy E-2Cs to meet its antinarcotics surveillance requirements, but required an aircraft with longer range and on-station time,” according to a 2006 report from Forecast International. “In June 1989, the U.S. General Accounting Office issued a report on the drug interdiction P-3B AEW aircraft. The findings indicated that the radar performance was as specified, but the P-3B (when compared to the E-2C) was less costly to operate per square mile of area covered because of the higher cruising speed and longer endurance. The P-3B had at least twice the in-flight endurance of the E-2C.”

Starting in the 1990s, USCS began the process of acquiring additional P-3 AEWs with newer AN/APS-145 radars, as also used on later model E-2Cs. The original AEW Orions were eventually refitted with APS-145s, as well. It’s worth noting here that the U.S. Coast Guard separately moved to acquire an AEW version of the C-130H, designated the EC-130V, in the 1990s, which used the AN/APS-125 radar, also used on older E-2s. Budget cuts led to the end of that program. The EC-130V that had been built was redesignated as an NC-130H and subsequently used for test purposes.

The P-3 AEWs were also equipped with a sensor turret containing electro-optical and infrared (EO/IR) video cameras, allowing the aircraft to more closely investigate targets spotted on radar. CBP regularly conducted P-3 operations that paired AEWs with LRT variants to provide an even broader array of sensor capabilities on missions. The LRTs have EO/IR sensor turrets, as well as AN/APG-66 and SeaVue radars. The pulse-doppler AN/APG-66 is primarily designed for spotting and tracking aerial targets, and was originally used on early variants of the F-16 fighter. SeaVue is a multi-function type with surface search and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery modes. Images produced via SAR are highly detailed maps of the surface below, and can be captured day or night, and regardless of any cloud cover, smoke, or dust. 

Beyond radars and other sensors, the P-3 AEWs also had a robust communications suite consisting of VHF and UHF radios, as well as satellite communications links by the end of their career. CBP’s entire P-3 fleet, including the AEWs and LRTs, has received various updates over the years, including new ‘glass cockpits’ starting in the early 2000s.

CBP Air and Marine Operations: Extended Border Operations

Though primarily employed in support of counter-narcotics interdiction operations, the airborne radar and command and control capabilities were also applied to other missions, including disaster relief and humanitarian assistance efforts at home and abroad. As an example, CBP’s P-3 AEWs helped with air traffic coordination, as well as provided other support, during relief efforts in Texas in the wake of Hurricane Harvey in 2017.

At the same time, CBP’s entire P-3 fleet, including both the AEW and LRT versions, has only been getting increasingly older and difficult to sustain. The P-3B variant first entered U.S. Navy service in the 1960s. CBP did put its P-3s through a Service Life Extension Program overhaul in the 2010s, which included “new wings and tail for each aircraft and completely strips down the aircraft to its bare metal for an inspection,” according to a 2014 press release.

As mentioned, the P-3 family has been in steadily dwindling service in the United States, overall, in recent years. The U.S. Navy has completely retired the Orion as a maritime patrol platform, and the service has also fully divested its more specialized EP-3 intelligence-gathering variants. The Navy had retained a small number of P-3s for research and development and test and evaluation activities, but growing sustainment challenges have been prompting the retirement of those planes, as well. The last NP-3C assigned to the Navy’s Scientific Development Squadron One (VXS-1), the “Warlocks,” was also retired last month. VXS-1 previously operated a ‘domed’ NP-3D, similar to, but distinct from, CBP’s P-3 AEWs, as well. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is also in the process of replacing its pair of P-3s, configured as civilian hurricane hunter aircraft, with new C-130J Hercules-based platforms. The shrinking U.S. Orion operator base can only have a knock-on impact on CBP P-3 operations.

A key question now is how CBP will fill any gaps left by the retirement of the final AEW version. The agency does continue to operate a mix of other crewed fixed-wing aircraft with mixtures of radars and other sensors, as well as MQ-9 drones, but none of these platforms are equipped with a sensor like the AN/APS-145. CBP also has a network of tethered aerostats with radars at fixed sites around the Caribbean. As an aside, General Atomics, together with Saab, is now working on an AEW configuration for the MQ-9B drone, but there are no known U.S. orders for that capability at the time of writing. That platform will not offer the same level of flexibility and look-down capability as modern crewed AEW aircraft, either. Look-down AEW capability is only growing in importance today amid expanding and evolving drone threats, including to the U.S. homeland.

High demand for AEW support, in general, means that the U.S. military regularly steps in to provide additional coverage with U.S. Navy E-2s and U.S. Air Force E-3s to aid in U.S. counter-drug operations around Latin America. Newer E-2D Advanced Hawkeyes notably have far more powerful radars than the E-2C or the P-3 AEW, with added surface search and track capability, too. At the same time, as mentioned at the start, those assets are in heavy demand, especially in light of the conflict with Iran. On top of that, the Air Force’s E-3 fleet is facing serious sustainment challenges itself, with replacement E-7 Wedgetail aircraft still years away from being delivered.

The Air Force, in particular, is also aiming to eventually push most, if not all, air moving-target indicator (AMTI) tasks currently performed by aircraft like the E-3 and E-7 into space. The service is heavily investing to accelerate the fielding of those capabilities, which could eventually offer revolutionary constant, persistent coverage globally. The first of those satellites are still not expected to reach an early operational state until 2028. It is possible that CBP could get access to a tailored data feed from this system when it does become operational. It still does not obviate the need to have crewed or uncrewed aircraft capable of more closely investigating tracks of interest using EO/IR cameras and other sensors.

Whatever the future might now hold, CBP’s unique time as the operator of the P-3 AEW aircraft has come to an end.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The mission also said Iranian authorities committed crimes against humanity during their crackdown on protests in late 2025 and early this year.

The United States likely committed “war crimes” in Iran when it launched a pair of air strikes that killed at least 178 civilians, including women and children, a United Nations fact-finding mission has found.

The report by the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran on Thursday also accused Iran of human rights violations and crimes against humanity during protests last year and in early 2026.

The mission referred to the US attack on Shajareh Tayyebeh Primary School in Minab, which killed over 150 people – including approximately 120 children – on February 28, when the US and Israel launched their war against Iran.

The mission also referred to the US air strike on a “clearly identifiable” sports complex and residential area in Lamerd the same day, where precision strike missiles dispersed clouds of tungsten pellets, killing 22 civilian men and women.

The findings, to be submitted to the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, examined the US’s conduct during the Iran war and the Iranian government’s response to nationwide unrest that began in late December.

US air strikes against civilians

The attack on the school in Minab was conducted with the use of Tomahawk missiles.

“The Mission concluded that when identifying and directing its attack against the primary school in Minab, whose civilian nature is apparent, the US failed in its obligation to do everything feasible to verify that it was a military objective,” the report stated.

The report’s authors said that photographs and videos depicting the school before and after the strike showed “readily identifiable features” that it was associated with an educational facility for young children.

“These included child-oriented murals painted on exterior walls, school signage, and playground areas,” said the UN report.

“According to public reporting, satellite imagery of the school before the strike also appears to show human figures, readily identifiable as children, gathered in its courtyard.”

Following the strike, state-affiliated media showed widespread destruction at the site, including parents holding the body parts of their children, and bloodied backpacks and schoolbooks.

“Several families lost more than one child, reflecting the devastating impact of the attack on families and the wider community,” the report said.

In June, US President Donald Trump said that “nobody” purposefully attacked a girls’ school in Iran in February, citing an investigation into the incident, for which the Pentagon has not yet published any findings.

Regarding the strike in Lamerd, the mission similarly found that the sports centre attacked was “visibly separate” from an adjacent compound belonging to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The US Central Command said in a statement in March that US forces did not launch any strikes into the city of Lamerd on that day.

Iran protests

The UN mission additionally accused Iran of repressing demonstrators during the country’s 2025-2026 protests through an internet shutdown, unlawful killings, torture, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances and severe restrictions on freedom of expression.

It also stated that the number of deaths and injuries by state forces is much higher than the government’s reported toll – which says 3,038 people were killed and 25,000 people injured – but could not verify exact numbers.

Tehran claims the majority of deaths occurred due to “rioters” during the protests backed by exiled opponents and the US and Israel.

The UN fact-finding mission urged Iran and the US to immediately end hostilities, provide reparations to victims, and seek permanent peace through diplomatic means.

America’s nuclear weapons deterrent and how it is controlled is increasingly critical in the face of the rapidly-expanding arsenals across multiple adversaries. A new fleet of E-4C nuclear-hardened survivable airborne operations center aircraft is now in development, as is the U.S. Navy E-130J, which will provide next-generation communications with nuclear ballistic missile submarines deep beneath the waves. Focus is also turning to a mission that’s dedicated to emergency communications with the U.S. nuclear forces in times of crisis, a role known as Operation Looking Glass, which is also poised for updating under a program dubbed Looking Glass-Next.

The comprehensive modernization of America’s nuclear strike muscle involves three major elements – new B-21 Raider stealth bombers, the LGM-35A Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program to replace Minuteman IIIs, and new Columbia-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines. A fourth facet that ties all these new elements, as well as existing ones, together is the next generation nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) architecture. It securely connects nuclear weapons systems to decision-makers. Without it, America’s nuclear deterrent isn’t a deterrent at all.

America’s nuclear modernization is set against a backdrop of rapidly-developing nuclear strength across adversaries and pacing threats, which could threaten not only U.S. fighting forces, but also the existing aging NC3 infrastructure. This could impede the collective responsiveness and effectiveness of the American nuclear enterprise. For example, a coordinated attack on NC3 could degrade the National Command Authority chain, which could prevent communications that are necessary to conduct a retaliatory strike.

If fixed underground command posts are targeted and rendered inoperable, the current strategy would involve turning to a set of highly-survivable air assets that are designed to be on hand to execute emergency war orders. This includes the U.S. Air Force’s E-4B National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC) “Nightwatch” aircraft, and the E-6B Mercury that is operated by the U.S. Navy.

A major recapitalization effort is already underway for the NAOC E-4Bs, which are being superseded under the E-4C Survivable Airborne Operations Center (SAOC) contract. It is being led by defense contractor SNC. The new SAOC aircraft are based on the far more modern 747-8i, and are planned to have a much broader mission set than the four E-4B Nightwatch types they are set to replace, as you can read more about here.

The Navy’s E-6B Take Charge and Move Out (TACAMO) aircraft have a primary role of strategic connectivity with the ballistic missile submarine fleet. These converted 707s also execute another mission known as the Airborne National Command Post (ABNCP), more recently renamed “Looking Glass.” For this they are manned by U.S. Air Force missileers and U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) battle managers who are responsible for running the airborne nuclear NC3 systems.

The joint service team on Looking Glass mirrors some operations performed by USSTRATCOM’s underground command posts, and a small portion of what the NAOC executes. The Looking Glass mission is really focused on performing an airborne backup mission solely for USSTRATCOM to ensure another means of communicating with fielded nuclear bombers, their assigned tankers, ICBMs and deployed nuclear submarines. It is best known for its ability to supply airborne communications connectivity to the USAF’s ICBM force on the ground and can command remote launches of those weapons if necessary.

Additional NC3-related modernization is coming on the heels of SAOC, with the new E-130J set to assume the Navy’s TACAMO role from the ageing E-6Bs, assuming strategic connectivity for nuclear ballistic submarines. It means that at some point roughly two-thirds of the E-6 current mission will go to the new E-130J aircraft – raising the question of what will fulfill the critical Looking Glass mission.

Since the E-130J is not planned to take on the Looking Glass role, the USAF is in the early stages of what’s dubbed Looking Glass-Next (LG-N), which presents the future pathway for USSTRATCOM’s mobile contingency operations. This could take on a number of forms, including NC3 communications functions being increasingly moved to space-based assets and more distributed operations across the ground, although an air platform is still likely to form a major part of the overall capability.

The need to modernize America’s NC3

Brian Golden is a retired USAF colonel who intimately understands nuclear command and control (NC2) and the associated NC3 equipment and processes from both a service and industry perspective. As a subject matter expert for SNC, he draws on his extensive experience as a former E-4B NAOC commander and he commanded much of the USAF’s multi-domain NC3 systems, including the Airborne Launch Control System onboard the current E-6B Looking Glass. He is also extremely familiar with all the nation’s continuity of government and continuity of operations missions for both Congressional and executive branches of the U.S. government.

“Everyone referred to the nuclear triad as the platforms that were controlled through the NC3 architecture,” Golden told TWZ during a detailed discussion. “Those platforms received their messages and executed their missions. But this isn’t just about that platform triad. The U.S. nuclear enterprise has four primary pillars, and nuclear command, control, and communications is a critical part of it. Without a robust NC3 system, it’s like having a brand new Bugatti Veyron but without the keys! It looks awesome on the driveway, but you can’t drive it.”

Golden explains that the current NC3 enterprise consists of a series of exquisite systems that are extremely reliable, but that are in need of modernization to stay ahead of the steepening threat curve, and stay in front of supply chain constraints. “What we have currently is very reliable, robust, and very survivable, but it can be difficult to maintain some of our legacy systems. Additionally, as threats evolve we must ensure our communications pathways also evolve. 

“Our nation’s industrial base engineers figured out extremely robust methods of nuclear communications when these systems were fielded. Looking at the overall command and control [NC2], and then the NC3 communications pathways, any new systems that we introduce must be sustainable, scalable and modular.”

The U.S. nuclear enterprise is facing greater threats than ever with adversaries challenging U.S. nuclear infrastructure in multiple domains: space, cyber, ground, air. Because of this, NC3 demands a continuous process of improvement.

Going forward, the NC3 enterprise will likely need to integrate upgraded proven legacy systems with all-new technology. “Sometimes the physics of radio waves may dictate the need for a legacy approach with upgraded systems, such as communicating with a submarine that’s very deep in the ocean.”

Golden’s view is that NC3 requires a layered, open architecture approach as modernization is evaluated. “Applying those same physics and then adding new layers such as artificial intelligence may determine a better way of doing things.”

Upgrading to SAOC

Golden points to the SNC-led E-4C SAOC program as a clear example of critical NC3 modernization, while emphasizing that the NC2 mission is far from being the primary role of the E-4B and its forthcoming successor. “Nuclear command and control is only a fraction of what the current NAOC does and what the future SAOC will do for our nation and our allies and partners.”

The E-4B initially featured just a handful of communications systems, which have grown over time, leading to what Golden calls the “King Kong” of communication capabilities today. The E-4 is not a battlefield communications platform, its mantra is all about supporting Presidential-level requirements across the board. It does possess an extensive NC3 suite, but it also serves the White House Communications Agency (WHCA) and the Department of Homeland Security, through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in many other crisis roles. Another mission the E-4B fleet performs is to safely transport the Secretary of War on trips within the United States and abroad.

The E-4B NAOC and Looking Glass are two complementary tiers of the same survivable architecture. The NAOC (and future SAOC) is designed to anchor national-level decision-making and government continuity from the very top, while Looking Glass provides USSTRATCOM with the dedicated airborne command and battle-management capacity required to direct forces. Both roles are critical and non-negotiable.

“The new E-4C SAOC, like the E-4B before it, will deliver an expansive communications suite and increased capacity supported by a larger fleet,” Golden explains. “SAOC is built to ensure the President and national leadership can direct the entire country through any crisis. Looking Glass supports an equally vital and highly specialized mission. It is dedicated to USSTRATCOM’s operational needs, connecting directly to bombers, ICBMs and submarines. Attempting to merge these unique missions on a single airframe would compromise the unique, essential role that each was created to perform.”

Looking Glass-Next

The Looking Glass role and the platform that fulfills it is not classified as a national-level mission. As Golden alluded to earlier, it’s not assigned to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs or to the Secretary of War. It’s exclusively assigned to USSTRATCOM; however, without the Looking Glass mission being upgraded soon, America has a gaping hole in its nuclear architecture.

The commander of USSTRATCOM is the customer and ultimately the decision-maker when it comes to Looking Glass-Next, and the USAF has been tasked by the Secretary of War to develop and field it. SNC is looking at several options for the requirement, with some sort of air platform at its core, which Golden refers to as an “E-6C.” He endorses that the current E-6B is one of the “cogs in the wheel that has to be replaced,” but adds that this doesn’t mean the next-generation Looking Glass is just an aircraft.

“At SNC, we have significant expertise and experience with mission system integration,” says Golden, adding that SNC is evaluating what he calls “aggressively creative options,” for the modernization requirement. He further noted that the modern threat is driving a requirement for Looking Glass-Next to be very difficult to target and must be dispersed.

“Having an aircraft as the only option for this USSTRATCOM mission is a legacy mindset,” Golden states. “We have advanced multi-domain capabilities, including numerous space capabilities available through the Sierra Space Corporation. Future mission resilience requires a creative and integrated approach.”

“We believe a creative approach to provide NC3 options will ensure a robust, reliable, survivable and cost-effective solution.”

Golden endorses this approach to creativity and development and indicated that SNC will continue to inform and respond to the ongoing Looking Glass-Next requests for information that may result in a future program.

“SNC has leaned heavily into the nuclear command, control, and communications architecture and it’s a natural fit for us, building on our work with the Department of War and our subcontractors on the E-4C SAOC. Our Looking Glass-Next responses and inputs will leverage relevant work and experience gained from SAOC, but we are also focused on being creative. We’re small enough to be agile, but big enough to deliver. That’s why we think we’re very well positioned in the NC3 space.”

The majority of SNC’s work on the E-4C SAOC is being completed at the NC3 Center of Excellence, housed in the Aviation Innovation and Technology Center (AITC) in Dayton, Ohio. 

Golden believes the timing couldn’t be better to deliver bold and creative NC3 solutions. “The USAF is already asking the right questions, and industry is really able to innovate, which will result in a transformational era for nuclear command, control and communications.”