missiles

No response by Yemen’s Houthis to a claim by the coalition forces that its missiles targeted Taif and Yanbu.

Saudi-led coalition forces fighting Yemen’s Houthis say they have intercepted six ballistic missiles allegedly fired by the Iran-allied group towards cities in Saudi Arabia.

The missiles were destroyed on Thursday in the direction of the Saudi cities of Taif and the strategically important port of Yanbu, according to Major General Turki al-Malki, the spokesman for the Saudi-backed Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen.

Saudi air defences intercepted some of the missiles attempting to target the cities, Al-Malki told the Saudi Press Agency (SPA).

There was no immediate claim of responsibility from the Houthis or other groups.

The coalition statement came as the Reuters news agency reported that an ‌‌air defence system operated by Greek ⁠⁠military ⁠⁠personnel in Saudi Arabia intercepted a ballistic missile and a drone on Thursday in ⁠⁠the wider Yanbu region, home to major oil refining facilities.

“Both were shot down,” a Greek security source told Reuters, adding that the Greek Patriot system launched two missiles but did not give details ⁠⁠on the origin of the ⁠⁠drone and the ballistic missile. A second source confirmed the information to the news agency.

Yanbu port is key to Saudi crude when shipments through the Strait of Hormuz are disrupted.

Earlier on Thursday, Saudi Arabia’s General Directorate of Civil Defence issued alerts warning of potential danger in the holy city of Mecca, the northwestern area of Tabuk, the Red Sea areas of Jeddah and Yanbu and the southern area of Taif. They later said the threat had passed and the cities were out of danger.

Last week, Saudi Arabia said it intercepted a drone launched by the Houthis towards Mecca, an accusation the group strongly denied, with Houthi leader Abdel-Malik al-Houthi calling the Saudi claims “a heinous lie”.

It was the first time in nearly 10 years that a security alert had been activated in Mecca, home to the Kaaba, Islam’s holiest site.

The Houthis have largely attacked southern areas of Saudi Arabia.

They stepped up attacks on the kingdom after declaring a naval blockade in July, a second theatre for the US-Iran war. The Houthis also seized the whole of Yemen’s western coast in a lightning offensive nearly two weeks ago that brought them to the shores of the Red Sea’s strategic Bab al-Mandeb waterway.

Forces with Yemen’s Saudi-backed internationally recognised government said on Thursday they repelled Houthi attacks along several fronts in Yemen’s southwestern Taiz governorate.

Colonel Majid al-Nuzaili, spokesman for the Yemeni government forces, said that the Houthis launched coordinated attacks on Wednesday night in a bid to reach positions on a key road connecting the Aden, Lahj and Taiz governorates.

Debris from a Chinese-made ballistic missile found in Yemen could have inadvertently revealed a previously undisclosed addition to Saudi Arabia’s secretive ballistic missile arsenal. Imagery circulating online appears to show the wreckage of a Chinese DF-15A short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), potentially marking the first known Saudi combat use of a weapon in this class, although both the identification and ownership remain unconfirmed.

It is also unclear what happened to the missile itself. The debris suggests a stage separation or the missile broke apart or crashed before reaching its target. The Houthis are not known to possess any weapons that could have intercepted it.

The development comes amid a sharp escalation in the long-running Saudi-Houthi conflict. After years of relative de-escalation following the 2022 truce, fighting has intensified in recent weeks as Houthi forces have dramatically overrun Saudi-backed Yemeni government positions, including around strategically important Marib and Taiz. The Houthis have also escalated missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia, targeting military and energy infrastructure while threatening the kingdom’s ability to move oil through the Red Sea. The group has declared the Bab el-Mandeb closed to Saudi oil traffic, adding a direct threat to one of Riyadh’s critical energy-export routes.

You can catch up with our latest coverage of the fighting here.

As for the DF-15, also known by its NATO designation CSS-6, this is a road-mobile, solid-fueled SRBM developed by China during the 1980s. The system formed part of Beijing’s effort to develop a new generation of conventionally armed mobile ballistic missiles, including systems primarily intended for export.

As you can read about here, the DF-15 family has evolved through several variants, although open-source information concerning their capabilities remains inconsistent.

The DF-15A reportedly entered Chinese service in the mid-1990s. Estimates of these missiles’ maximum range vary substantially, from roughly 600 kilometers (373 miles) for the original DF-15 to as much as 900 kilometers (559 miles) for later versions.

China is the only confirmed operator of the DF-15 family. There have been longstanding reports of Chinese transfers of the DF-15 or the related M-9 export version to Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, and Syria, but in each case, the export record is heavily disputed, with some reports likely conflating the DF-15 with the broadly similar DF-11.

While Saudi Arabia has never publicly acknowledged operating the DF-15 family, it has a well-established history of acquiring Chinese ballistic missiles.

In 2013, Prince Fahd bin Abdullah bin Mohammed, Deputy Minister of Defense, visited the Strategic Missile Forces of Saudi Arabia, and was given this model. YEARS of speculation on the smaller missiles (The large is DF-3). Now we know – they are DF-15 and DF-15A. pic.twitter.com/oOn8qiCgye

— Tal Inbar (@inbarspace) September 14, 2026

Saudi Arabia imported Chinese ballistic missiles to expand its long-range strike options. Its desire for a land-based strategic deterrent was initially driven by concerns over Iran, regional missile proliferation, and nuclear hedging. More recently, however, it shifted toward fielding more accurate, mobile systems with greater conventional military utility.

Riyadh secretly obtained DF-3A missiles from China beginning in the late 1980s, establishing a strategic ballistic-missile capability that remained largely outside public view.

The kingdom has also subsequently been linked to the DF-21 family. Satellite imagery and other open-source intelligence have provided evidence of Chinese-designed ballistic-missile infrastructure in Saudi Arabia.

While the Houthis have their own ballistic-missile arsenal, this is principally associated with Iranian technology, captured Yemeni systems, and locally produced or modified weapons.

Saudi employment of an SRBM in the current fighting would represent a notable expansion of the kingdom’s response options. If Saudi Arabia did indeed do this, its main advantage would be speed and responsiveness. A solid-fueled ballistic missile could reach targets deep inside Yemen within minutes while keeping Saudi aircraft and crews out of the immediate engagement area, providing Riyadh with a rapid strike option against fixed Houthi targets. That could be particularly valuable as the conflict expands and Saudi forces face pressure to respond quickly to Houthi attacks on military and energy infrastructure.

Saudi F-15 Eagles Live Missile Firing in Pakistan | Naseem Al-Bahr 13 Exercise

Previous losses at the hands of Houthi ground-based air defenses could also dissuade Riyadh from relying on crewed aircraft to strike targets on the ground deep inside Yemen. Houthi air defenses, while pathed together in many ways, are capable enough to give even U.S. airpower a serious run for their money.

At the same time, a conventional SRBM like the DF-15A can deliver a large warhead at very high speed, imparting significant kinetic energy, making it particularly useful against fixed, high-value, or hardened targets.

Use of an SRBM would also be in line with the current pattern of escalation, with the Houthis conducting missile and drone attacks against Saudi military and energy targets while Saudi-backed Yemeni forces are engaged in renewed ground fighting. Riyadh’s demonstration of an SRBM capability in this campaign would also signal that it is is willing to draw more heavily on its strategic missile inventory as the conflict intensifies, potentially further raising the stakes of the confrontation.

Such a move would carry a message beyond Yemen. Using a previously unacknowledged ballistic missile capability in combat would signal to Iran that Riyadh is now willing to employ this arsenal, after decades of keeping it very much in the shadows.

If the evidence ultimately points to a Saudi DF-15A launch, the discovery would offer a rare look at the operational use of an extremely secretive part of the kingdom’s arsenal, and add a significant new dimension to the rapidly escalating Saudi-Houthi war.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Iran-backed Houthi militants in Yemen say they carried out drone and ballistic missile attacks on the Saudi capital Riyadh, as well as energy sites on the country’s Red Sea coast.

Saudi authorities said they intercepted and destroyed a ballistic missile fired at Riyadh earlier that day, without confirming any further strikes or causalities.

Earlier, a column of black smoke was seen rising from fuel tanks near the Saudi capital’s international airport, where flights were disrupted temporarily on Saturday.

Air raid alerts had sounded in the capital for the first time since the Iran-backed Houthis increased their attacks on Saudi Arabia in July.

Air defences also stopped “hostile attempts to target civilians” in the cities of Bish, Taif, Farasan and Yanbu, an official spokesperson for the Saudi-led coalition said in a statement.

In a statement posted online, Houthi military spokesman Yahya al-Sarea said a “large number of ballistic and cruise missiles and drones” had been used to attack “sensitive sites” in Riyadh and Aramco state oil and gas company facilities in Yanbu on the coast.

He added that the attacks were “in response to the Saudi enemy’s criminal attempts” to target the Yemeni capital Sanaa.

Earlier, Sarea had accused Saudi Arabia of carrying out 300 strikes across Yemen during the past week.

The Houthis are locked in a civil war with Yemen’s internationally recognised government, which is backed by Saudi Arabia.

They have attacked targets inside Saudi Arabia on several occasions in recent months, and said this week that they were responsible for downing a Saudi fighter jet over Yemen.

According to an unconfirmed report from AFP news agency, quoting military sources on both sides of Yemen’s civil war, fighting between the Houthis and Saudi-backed government forces claimed 48 lives on Saturday.

The Houthis said 31 of their fighters had been killed while government sources said their side had lost 17 soldiers, according to the news agency.

On Friday, the International Organization for Migration, a UN body, reported that the number of people displaced as a result of recent fighting had passed 104,796, external.

WASHINGTON — The governor of a Japanese territory where the Pentagon is thinking about basing missiles capable of threatening China has a message for the United States: Not on my island.

“I firmly oppose the idea,” said Gov. Denny Tamaki, the governor of Okinawa, in an email to The Times.

Officials in other Asian countries are also signaling they don’t want them.

But Pentagon planners aren’t backing down after the Trump administration withdrew last year from a 33-year-old arms control treaty that barred U.S. land-based intermediate-range missiles in Asia.

Senior officials now say that putting hundreds of American missiles with nonnuclear warheads in Asia would quickly and cheaply shift the balance of power in the western Pacific back in the United States’ favor amid growing Pentagon concern that China’s expanding arsenal of missiles and other military capabilities threaten U.S. bases in the region and have emboldened Beijing to menace U.S. allies in Asia.

The missile plan is the centerpiece of a planned buildup of U.S. military power in Asia projected to consume tens of billions of dollars in the defense budget over the next decade, a major shift in Pentagon spending priorities away from the Middle East.

But it also highlights the complex relationship between the U.S and its Asian allies, many of whom feel increasingly threatened by China but are reluctant to back new U.S. military measures that might provoke Beijing, which has built the biggest navy in the world in the last decade.

Australia and the Philippines publicly ruled out hosting American missiles when the Trump administration first floated the idea last year. South Korea is also considered an unlikely location, current and former officials say.

In Japan, the decision on whether to allow U.S. missiles on its territory will be made by the central government in Tokyo. Gov. Tamaki said officials at the Pentagon and in Tokyo have told him there are no definite plans to put missiles on Okinawa. But Tamaki isn’t reassured.

With a Japanese mother and an American father who served with the Marines on Okinawa before abandoning the family, Tamaki personifies the complex relationship between the U.S. and its allies in Asia. He was elected two years ago after pledging to oppose expansion of the already-substantial U.S. military presence on the island.

More than half of the 50,000 U.S. military personnel stationed in Japan are in Okinawa, most concentrated at a Marine base surrounded by residential areas in the largest city. Opposition to the 70-year-old U.S. military presence has sparked local protests for years, which would probably intensify if there were a move to base missiles there.

“If there is such a plan, I can easily imagine fierce opposition from Okinawa residents,” Tamaki said.

For the last year, the Pentagon has been testing several new types of short- and intermediate-range missiles — those with ranges up to 3,400 miles — including a ballistic missile that could be placed in Guam, a U.S. territory, and mobile missiles carried on trucks.

The first of the new weapons could be in operation within two years, though no decision has been announced about where they will be based. Similar missiles are now carried on U.S. warships and planes based in Asia, but there are no land-based systems.

U.S. officials say that many allies are privately supportive of the missile plan and may come around to permitting them on their territory but don’t want to provoke opposition from Beijing and their own public before decisions are on the table.

The U.S. has a defense treaty with Japan, as it does with South Korea, the Philippines and Australia. Taiwan is not a formal ally but has close, unofficial defense ties with Washington.

“We are very attentive to our allies’ concerns, and we recognized their political challenges,” said a senior defense official, who agreed to discuss Pentagon planning if he was not identified. “Everything that’s said in the media is not necessarily what’s said behind closed doors.”

To lessen the political opposition, the U.S. could rotate missile batteries in and out of locations around the region or place them in strategic locations without publicly disclosing it.

“It wouldn’t make much sense to announce plans now, which would stoke Chinese anger and possibly play into the domestic politics,” said Randy Schriver, who was a senior Pentagon official responsible for Asia until his resignation last year.

A decision to go ahead in Asia would intensify an arms race between the region’s two biggest powers whose relations — already tense over President Trump’s confrontational trade agenda and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s hawkish policies — have nosedived since the coronavirus outbreak.

“It’s naïve and dangerous,” said Alexandra Bell, a former Obama administration arms control official and a critic of deploying U.S. missiles. “Instead of looking at how we can prevent a full-out arms race, that’s our opening salvo?” added Bell, a senior policy director at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation in Washington.

Putting land-based missiles in Asia capable of attacking China is not a new strategy.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. kept them at bases across the region, including in Okinawa, where hundreds of nuclear-armed warheads were stored secretly for decades even though Japan’s constitution prohibited the presence of nuclear weapons on its territory.

The missiles were gradually taken out of service in the 1960s and 1970s, because of budget cuts and a shift in U.S. strategy away from defense of the region focused on nuclear weapons. In 1987, the Reagan administration signed an arms control treaty that prohibited the U.S. and the Soviet Union (and later Russia) from deploying any land-based intermediate range missiles, including in Asia.

China was not a signatory, leaving it free to build up its missile arsenal.

The Trump administration withdrew from the treaty last year after accusing Russia of developing new land-based missiles that violated its terms. The exit opened the way for the Pentagon to consider reintroducing ground-launched missiles in Asia.

With mobile missiles around the region, the U.S. could pose an even bigger challenge for China, forcing it to hunt for hundreds of launchers capable of targeting its planes, ships and bases, strategists say.

“Ground-based missiles aren’t some kind silver bullet,” said Eric Sayers, a former consultant to U.S. commanders in the Pacific and a fellow at the Center for a New American Security, a Washington think tank. “But they are a way in the near term … to create dilemmas for the [People’s Liberation Army] planners.”

Although the risk of large-scale conflict with China seems low, tensions have continued to ratchet up over Beijing’s crackdown in Hong Kong, its military maneuvers near Taiwan, its border dispute with India and its offshore maritime claims in the East China Sea and South China Sea.

Nearly a quarter of world trade travels through the South China Sea, making the contest between Beijing and Washington over control of its maritime lanes and rich resources especially tense and certain to continue, no matter who wins the U.S. presidential election in November.

The U.S. Navy for decades dominated the “first island chain,” as strategists call the area of the western Pacific stretching from Japan to Taiwan to the Philippines that fell within America’s defense umbrella after World War II.

But American reliance on bases, warships and airfields in the region has become increasingly risky, officials and analysts say.

China has developed its own missiles, sophisticated radars and anti-satellite weapons as well as a growing fleet of warships and submarines in recent decades that could threaten American bases and other targets early in a conflict, said Collin Koh, a research fellow in Asian maritime security at the S. Rajatnam School of International Studies in Singapore.

China’s People’s Liberation Army can project significant firepower on U.S. and allied military installations in the western Pacific and “threaten to overwhelm” American forces “in times of armed conflict,” Koh said.

The Chinese weapons in many cases have ranges that exceed those on U.S. warships, though the U.S. retains a significant advantage in attack submarines and in advanced fighters and bombers armed with cruise missiles that can be fired from long distances.

“Their capability and their reach have created vulnerabilities for our legacy basing structure,” said the defense official, who agreed to discuss U.S. planning on condition that he not be identified.

Earlier this year, an Iran-linked actor used Anthropic’s Claude artificial intelligence model to scrape and analyze data with the aim of helping target U.S. naval forces in the Middle East. A group in Yemen – very likely Iranian-backed Houthi militants – also used Claude to assist with work on guidance systems for ballistic and hypersonic missiles.

These are just some of the revelations about how adversaries and other malign actors have been using one of the premier pieces of AI software being developed in the United States that were contained in a new report Anthropic released late yesterday. The 154-page document also details instances where Claude was used directly and indirectly to support intelligence gathering and surveillance, cyberattacks, influence operations, and even worrisome biological research over the past eight months. In addition to Iran and Yemen, the human actors behind these activities were based in Russia, China, and a host of other countries.

Anthropic has shared details about what it calls the “misuse” of its models in the past, but describes the new report as its “most detailed” to date. The company has clearly been cataloging these case studies, and has assigned each one a control number. Though the entire contents of the report are cause for concern, the explicit attempt to use Claude to target American forces, as well as to develop new higher-end missiles and other military technology, are particular standouts and signs of what’s to come, as we will highlight below.

GTG-30005: Military reconnaissance

GTG-30005 is the case study dealing with the targeting of U.S. naval forces, and the summary is as follows:

“In another investigation, we identified and disrupted an Iran-nexus threat actor that used Claude to collect and analyze publicly accessible data to develop targeting recommendations against US naval forces in the region. The threat actor used Claude to compile targeting handbooks, through a Python pipeline the threat actor built with Claude’s assistance, to identify and track naval positions based on open-source information. The compiled material included a roster of US personnel scraped from captions on public military photographs; publicly accessible ship and aircraft transponder identifiers; commercial satellite-imagery query scripts; and an inventory of public websites that exposed US naval movements. The threat actor also directed Claude to compile vulnerability research on shipboard systems, cataloging known CVEs in maritime VSAT terminals, Cisco communications equipment, and industrial control products.”

“We banned the actor’s account, developed detections to reduce the risk of future misuse, and shared threat intelligence with government authorities to disrupt the threat.”

How exactly Anthropic defines the term “nexus” here is not immediately clear, and other entries in its new report also use “state-nexus” in addition to country-based variations. However, in this specific case, an addendum is added to the entry that explicitly says that the same account was separately tied to “domestic mass surveillance” software development work “for Iranian state systems,” clearly pointing to an actor directly linked to the regime in Tehran.

Whether or not any of the data collected and analysed here was directly used to subsequently carry out attacks on U.S. forces is unknown. However, there have been media reports just in recent weeks that Iran has been increasingly trying to strike American warships. Those same reports have raised questions about how the country has been prosecuting those operations given its limited capabilities and capacity to track maritime targets far from its shores. The possibility that Russia or China could be supplying targeting data has been put forward.

The use of AI technology by nation-state armed forces to develop target sets and engage them is already known to be growing globally. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have been a pioneer in this regard, but the U.S. military, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and others are also known to be developing and fielding these capabilities.

U.S. military officials have also voiced increasing concern in recent years about the ability to track the movements and disposition of U.S. military assets and personnel using publicly available pictures and other data. There has been much talk, in turn, about how to balance transparency and operational security.

GTG-87001: Disrupting a Yemen-based guided weapons engineering cell using Claude to develop guidance software

Anthropic’s new report details an instance where an individual in Yemen used Claude as part of missile guidance work, which is given the control number GTG-87001.

“We identified a cell of threat actors based in northern Yemen running three weapons development programs: a guided rocket that used a commodity phone-class flight computer with final-phase homing guidance; a multi-stage ballistic missile with a stated range goal above 2,000 km; and a multi-variant missile (referred to as the “R2000” set) that included a hypersonic glide vehicle variant.”

“The actors used Claude Code in place of human software engineers to develop the guidance, navigation, and control (GNC) software that steers and stabilizes a flying vehicle. For example, they used Claude to integrate an open-source autopilot onto a phone-class flight computer, writing the control and position estimation software, tuning the control settings, running a firmware build pipeline, and performing a flight simulation. The actors managed several Claude instances at once, assigning each one a role, much as a lead would delegate work on a small engineering team: the actors tasked one instance with writing the code, another with research, and a third with reviewing the code the first instance produced.”

“Our safeguards blocked many of their requests, but not all of them. The actors used a variety of tactics to evade our safeguards, including hiding their goals and the products the software was meant for, and they split their work across multiple sessions so no single session revealed their full intent.”

“These actors carried out a sustained effort to develop guided weapons, including using Claude to design guidance software. We do not have evidence the actors succeeded in fielding an operational device; but they did test-fire a guided rocket. This field test appears to have failed: within hours, the actors returned to Claude to work out why it failed.”

“We identified this activity as part of our internal investigations into suspected weapons development. We banned accounts associated with the actors and shared threat information with public- and private-sector partners to mitigate risks posed by the actors. Nevertheless, we have evidence that the actors had already built an offline simulation toolkit that does not rely on Claude or other engineering computing environments such as MATLAB.”

As mentioned earlier, the report does not name the Houthis, but that group has historically been based primarily in the northern end of Yemen. It is also the only entity in the country known to have active missile development programs, which are conducted with critical support from Iran.

Whether this particular work directly resulted in any new capabilities is unknown. Anthropic notes that there looked to be at least one failed test launch before the accounts were banned, which would have occurred sometime after the beginning of this year, based on the stated cutoff dates for the report. By the end of 2025, the Houthis had already amassed a wide array of very real ballistic missiles, including types with at least claimed ranges of 2,000 kilometers (approximately 1,242 miles). The group also has a variety of cruise missiles and one-way attack drones that it has employed operationally.

Still, being able to leverage Claude could only have helped any domestic missile development efforts in Yemen, which might help reduce dependency on Iran, at least to a degree. Furthermore, developing functional hypersonic glide vehicles capable of prolonged stable flight has historically been notoriously difficult, even for entities with extensive relevant knowledge bases on an organizational level.

GTG-17001: Disrupting a China-based operation using Claude to draft a fire control specification and acquisition documents for undersea warfare

Use of Claude in foreign military endeavours goes beyond the Middle East, as evidenced by case study GTG-17001. This involved a Chinese actor conducting work related to a naval counter-torpedo defense system.

“We identified a China-based threat actor who used Claude to advance three parallel tracks of work on an anti-torpedo weapons system:”

• “First, the actor used Claude to draft a Chinese-language specification for an anti-torpedo fire control system (the core logic that aims and times an anti-torpedo weapon’s response). The document was written to win approval from a Chinese defense manufacturer, which would move the work on to technical certification and operational testing.”
• “Second, the actor used Claude to produce a Chinese-language technical proposal of more than 200 pages, accompanied by an executive briefing deck.”
• “Third, the actor used Claude to benchmark their own system against specific US anti-torpedo and anti-submarine programs based on publicly accessible information. They then generated a Chinese-language briefing on US Navy systems derived from open-source reporting.”

“The actor presented themselves as an original equipment manufacturer in the US defense sector. We assess the actor was associated with a Chinese defense industry manufacturer aiming to produce a weapons specification and acquisition proposal for the People’s Liberation Army Navy.”

“The actor used Claude to write the acquisition proposal, refining it over many drafts. After each draft, the actor instructed Claude to role-play a hostile expert reviewer to critique the proposal, then used that feedback to sharpen the next version. In parallel, the actor used Claude to build pieces of the anti-torpedo weapons system’s fire control software and a test matrix to validate them.”

“The operational lift the actor achieved was a function of using Claude to automate complex technical outputs. The actor leveraged the model to compress the development timelines for the certification registry, compliance documentation, and automated fire control logic. The actor also accelerated the traditional human review cycle by having Claude critique the acquisition proposal across multiple rounds of review while role-playing a persona.”

“We uncovered this activity as part of our internal investigations into suspected weapons development. We cannot attribute the activity to a specific entity or actor. But we have banned the account for violating our Supported Regions Policy and our Usage Policy, which prohibits weapons design and development, and incorporated our investigative findings into our safeguards to mitigate the risk of future misuse.”

Anthropic’s report does not name the U.S. programs leveraged here, but does note the information in question was publicly available. Anti-torpedo systems for surface warships and submarines have been an area of significant interest for the U.S. Navy for years now. Those developments have also produced compact torpedo designs for use in other applications.

The PLAN’s interest in these same kinds of capabilities is not at all surprising. Underwater threats and countermeasures to them, broadly speaking, would play a central and vital role in any future conflict between the United States and China across the broad expanses of the Pacific.

GTG-27005: Disrupting a Russia-based operation using Claude to engineer an autonomous military drone swarm

Another case study, GTG-27005, details the use of Claude by Russian actors working on drone swarming technology.

“We identified likely freelance Russia-based threat actors who set out to build a full-stack autonomous first-person-view (FPV) kamikaze drone swarm. The actors used Claude Code to write and test the code and save it directly into the actors’ own project files. In addition to Claude Code, the actors used a software-in-the-loop simulation stack and a rented graphics processing host for model training. They called the operation ‘DronDoc’ or ‘Serafim.’”

“The actors used Claude to build the core software system, including the drones’ shared swarm memory and fault-tolerant coordination logic (FTCL); an onboard small language model to govern attack, observe, and return-to-base behaviors; a terminal guidance software system to steer drones to their target (using the onboard camera) and issue the call to detonate; a control-link geolocation module to find opposing drone operators; a passive acoustic detection layer; and low-level logic for the drones’ programmable chips. The actors designed the platform for autonomous lethal engagement; the onboard model could select targets (including a ‘person’ target class) and issue detonation commands without a human in the loop. The actors’ activity—including flashing the low-level firmware to live development boards, provisioning single-board computers, and wiring up a simulation environment over a mesh network—confirmed that they were using real hardware-in-loop testing within their sessions.”

“The actors trained a computer vision classifier on scraped Ukrainian combat footage, splitting the target classes into “enemy” and “friendly,” and allow-listing Russian systems. They also repeatedly used a fixed coordinate in Donetsk Oblast as the demonstration strike point, with front-line cities and corridors in Ukraine as the mission geography.”

“The actors created their accounts between late 2025 and early 2026 and started the operation in mid-May 2026. The actors circumvented our geographic access controls by routing traffic through commercial virtual private servers.”

“We assess the actors were a small, specialized freelance team doing a mix of civilian and military work, not a Russian state entity. We identified nine accounts associated with this group; eight were used only for ordinary freelance work, not weapons-related software development. Based on our investigation, we assess the actors had ties to a regional university with a federal research center associated with the Russian Academy of Sciences. The actors claimed to have received funding from Russia’s Advanced Research Foundation, National Technology Initiative, and Ministry of Defence, though we cannot verify those claims. We identified this activity as part of our internal investigations into suspected weapons development, we banned accounts associated with the actors, and have incorporated our investigative findings into safeguards to reduce the risk of future misuse.”

Anthropic’s report included a table, reproduced below, detailing different types of drones and other capabilities that were fed into the model as part of this work.

Also, while Anthropic said it could not confirm any direct ties in this instance to the Russian government, the work described here is fully in line with capabilities that have already been demonstrated to varying degrees in Ukraine in the past few years. TWZ has been very closely tracking developments on both sides of the conflict when it comes to new automated targeting and swarming capabilities for shorter- and longer-ranged kamikaze drones. In 2024, we also published a detailed feature outlining a coming revolution in drone warfare, signs of which were already emerging then, thanks to AI and the ever-lowering barrier to entry for leveraging that technology.

GTG-17002: Disrupting a China-based operation using Claude to build targeting software for electronic warfare and air defense suppression

The last case study in the Conventional Weapons section of Anthropic’s new report, GTG-17002, covers electronic warfare-related work by a Chinese actor, with a particular focus on potential air defense targets in Taiwan.

“We identified a China-based actor who used Claude’s chat, coding, and agentic work tools to design, build, and iterate on a Chinese-language suite of about 16 modules for electronic warfare, using the electromagnetic spectrum to detect, jam, or deceive an opponent’s radar and communications, and for suppressing an opponent’s air defenses.”

“The actor used Claude to build the software system, from the underlying logic to the user interface, and iterated through 12 versions. This included implementing and optimizing the system’s radar detection and jamming physics, generating a vulnerability analysis module, and drafting Chinese-language targeting instructions. The software suite the actor built analyzed an opponent’s radars, surface-to-air missile sites, command posts, and communications nodes, then computed their detection coverage, assessed the effectiveness of jamming, ranked targets by value and vulnerability, including which to suppress first, and determined how best to assign jammer sorties to targets across multi-day campaigns. The suite also ranked which of an opponent’s assets to suppress first, and modeled specific engagement envelopes, including those of Patriot and THAAD-class [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] systems.”

“Mid-project, we observed the actor change the simulation’s default scenario to 12 targets in Taiwan. The targets included a command bunker in Taiwan, an early warning radar site, Patriot and Tien Kung [surface-to-air missile] batteries, major air bases, and a regional combatant command headquarters.”

NCSIST – Tien Kung III Air Defense Missile & Hsiung Feng III Anti-Ship Missile Live Firing [480p]

“The actor also ran a self-hosted model on an internal network alongside Claude and connected the software suite to this model through a tool-use integration.”

“Based on our investigation, we assess the actor is a China-based defense and military-industrial researcher. Account-level metadata and content flagged by our safeguards indicated the actor was linked to PRC research institutions, including the PLA Academy of Military Sciences. We detected this activity as part of our internal investigations into suspected weapons development, we banned accounts linked to the actor, and have incorporated our investigative findings into our safeguards to reduce the risk of future misuse.”

An accompanying table, seen below, mentions several specific types of U.S.-made air defense radars, as well as the Link-16 datalink network, as having come up in the course of this work. Electronic warfare variants of the Chinese Y-8 and Y-9 aircraft, as well as the J-16D electronic warfare jet, and what appears to be a reference to the Golden Eagle drone helicopter, are also mentioned.

China’s J-16D Shows Versatility Across Reconnaissance, Attack, Defense: Designers

The suppression of enemy air defenses is an essential part of any modern air campaign, whether conducted independently or as a part of a larger operation. This would be no less critical in any military intervention against Taiwan from the mainland, or any other larger-scale conflict the PLA might find itself in.

Guardrails and ethics

Beyond the details in any of the specific case studies, Anthropic’s new report underscores growing broader concerns about guardrails for the use of AI and general ethics surrounding the technology. As noted in the instances above, Anthropic has also implemented various safeguards to try to block access to Claude from certain regions and/or to prevent the model from conducting certain types of work. At the same time, what the company has now shared makes clear that those protections can still be circumvented to a significant degree, at least for now.

For its part, Anthropic has been publicly supportive of transparency laws and regulation, at least within the United States. The company also notably made tweaks to certain Claude models earlier this year to address U.S. government cybersecurity concerns.

Starting in December 2025, Anthropic has also been very publicly embroiled in a dispute with the Pentagon over the potential use of Claude to support mass surveillance and fully autonomous weapon systems. This subsequently led to the company being designated a supply chain risk, and limitations being imposed on the use of that model within the U.S. military and elsewhere across the U.S. government. Anthropic is continuing to fight that action in court. However, just yesterday, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Pentagon Chief Technology Officer Emil Michael said the U.S. military had scaled back the use of Anthropic’s products in support of classified work by 90 percent.

The concerns about ‘misuse’ outlined in Anthropic’s new report apply, in general terms, to publicly accessible models being developed by other companies, too. There have already been publicly disclosed instances of AI agents themselves engaging in hacking and other malign behavior in order to complete assigned tasks, raising additional questions about security and public safety, not to mention ethics.

TWZ has noted in the past that America’s adversaries are likely to be less worried about ethics, in general, when it comes to AI. Anthropic’s new report also shows there are few bounds to what state-aligned or even non-state actors might seek to use this technology for, including the development of potential weapons of mass destruction.

At the same time, AI models like Claude are not going away, and developments continue to advance at an ever-quickening pace, opening the door to further proliferation. Developments are rapidly intermingling globally, with companies in China notably leveraging models created in the U.S. to further their own work, which is then released publicly. The technology will increasingly become more integrated and critical to most aspects of military operations and weapons development, alongside its commercial and civilian applications. It is just as much a superweapon as anything else, and the country with the more capable models, and the willingness to deploy them, will have a major edge in future conflicts.

With all this in mind, it seems very plausible, if not probable, that the case studies described in Anthropic’s new report are just the tip of an approaching iceberg that will need a concerted effort to tackle.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

South Korea said it boosted its surveillance posture and was closely exchanging information on the launches with the US and Japan.

North Korea has fired ballistic missiles towards the sea off its eastern coast, according to South Korea’s military.

South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said that it detected several missiles launched from North Korea’s eastern coastal area of Wonsan about 5:20am on Saturday (20:20 GMT on Friday), which flew about 250 kilometres (155 miles). It added that it is closely exchanging information on the launches with the United States and Japan.

South Korea’s presidential National Security Office said it held an emergency security meeting with the Defence Ministry, the JCS and other relevant agencies following the launch.

The US Pacific Command said North Korea’s launch event does not pose an immediate threat to US territory or to its allies, adding that Washington remains committed to the defence of South Korea and its other allies in the region.

The missiles were launched a day after South Korea concluded five days of joint maritime drills with the US and Japan that were focused on North Korea.

Hours after the exercises began on Monday, North Korea’s defence minister, Kim Song Gi, criticised the exercise and warned North Korea was capable of taking “strong and reflective countermeasures from the standpoint of power”.

Late last month, North Korea slammed plans for the so-called Freedom Edge exercises in international waters off South Korea as a “threat” to Pyongyang and other countries in the region.

The North also fired a barrage of missiles into the sea on August 20, despite an overture from US President Donald Trump, who said he planned to meet this year with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

The August launch from the nuclear-armed North came as South Korea and the US held a shorter edition of their annual Ulchi Freedom Shield military exercises, following an order from Trump to scale back the drills.

The order from Trump, who called the exercises “inappropriate and hostile” towards North Korea, alarmed US allies in the region.

Pyongyang has long condemned US-South Korea joint exercises as rehearsals for invasion, often staging missile launches around the drills.

Lockheed Martin and a team made up of Boeing and Anduril are now facing off head-to-head to supply a new middle-tier surface-to-air missile to the U.S. Army. The service wants a second interceptor for its new Enduring Shield system, which can already fire AIM-9X Sidewinders, to expand its capabilities, especially against incoming cruise missiles.

Boeing and Anduril announced their offering had been selected to move ahead to the next phase of the competition to develop what is formally called the Integrated Fires Protection Capability Increment 2 (IFPC Inc 2) Second Interceptor on Wednesday. The Army subsequently confirmed to Breaking Defense that Lockheed Martin advanced to phase 2 of this program. Rafael Systems Global Sustainment, a U.S. subsidiary of Israeli defense contractor Rafael, had also been in the running, but was not down-selected.

The Army’s search for a second interceptor for Enduring Shield traces back to at least 2023. The system, developed by Leidos’ subsidiary Dynetics, is entering operational service now paired with the AIM-9X. It is designed to provide short-to-medium range defense against a variety of aerial threats, including drones. The Army has not had any kind of mid-range air defense capability since it retired its Hawk surface-to-air missile systems in the 1990s.

A model of the missile Boeing and Anduril have put forward was only shown publicly for the first time earlier this year. Boeing says it is a clean-sheet design and it uses a solid-fuel rocket motor provided by Anduril.

In its announcement about the Army’s down-selection, Boeing shared a previously unreleased rendering of the design, which notably had two sets of fins toward the tail end of the body. The model that has been shown so far only has one set of fins at the very rear of the body. Whether the rendering reflects a newer or older version of the design is unclear. What is seen in the rendering may also be an additional booster rocket motor not seen on the model, which could be necessary for ground-launched applications.

Boeing has also said that the new interceptor is being developed with an emphasis on lower cost and producibility. Modularity and open-architecture systems to enable “faster, lower-cost upgrades by allowing seeker, avionics or software blocks to be swapped without redesigning the entire weapon” have also been particular focus areas, according to the company.

Other details about the missile’s design and capabilities, including how it is guided, remain limited.

“Our scalable production approach is designed to provide a reliable, affordable layer of defense against a range of aerial threats to protect the warfighter with practical, dependable capability when it matters most,” Bob Ciesla, vice president of Boeing Precision Engagement Systems, had said in a statement earlier this week.

Lockheed Martin first showed a rendering of its design last year, but has also shared relatively specific details about it since then. For what has been seen so far, it is visually reminiscent, at least in broad strokes, of a compact air-to-air missile concept called Cuda, which the company previously promoted for a time in the 2010s.

The design is “not new,” Chris Murphy, senior manager of Business Development for Integrated Air and Missile Defense Advanced Programs at Lockheed Martin’s Missiles and Fire Control division, confirmed to TWZ in October 2025.

“There are technologies that we already have that we’re leveraging,” Murphy added at the time. “But the requirements for the missile are such that they’re going to be new technologies, and there’s going to be some level of development in order to get those integrated.”

“So you know that our [PAC-3] MSE missile [for the Patriot surface-to-air missile system] is a hit-to-kill system, right? We have great confidence in that technology,” he also said when asked specifically about whether the interceptor would have a traditional warhead. “We also work [on] blast-frag[mentation warheads] on other programs. So we will look at everything. That’s part of the trade space the Army has asked us to look at.”

The PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) is generally presented as a hit-to-kill weapon, meaning that it is designed to destroy its target through sheer force of impact. However, it is actually something of a hybrid design that includes a high-explosive “lethality enhancer” charge to increase its chance of scoring a hit, something you can learn more about here.

For its part, the Army has talked in the past about wanting its second interceptor for Enduring Shield to offer roughly comparable capabilities to the AIM-120D Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), but in the same form factor as the AIM-9X. A key driving factor behind the size requirement is retaining magazine depth. The system’s existing palletized launchers can currently be loaded with up to 18 Sidewinders in individual canisters.

Magazine depth, together with more flexibility to engage different threats in different envelopes, is exactly in line with the stated purpose of the Enduring Shield system. The ongoing conflict with Iran, as well as other recent crises in the Middle East and the war in Ukraine, have underscored the threats posed by large-scale complex barrages that blend together long-range one-way-attack drones and cruise missiles. Ballistic missiles are also a very worrisome part of the equation, though Enduring Shield is not capable of engaging them. We will come back to this in a moment.

“I do want to highlight a couple of things that I think are very critical gaps that we have. I don’t think – I cannot add anything to the emphasis on magazine depth for currently fielded systems, or for the need for cheaper and [a] wide-ranging mix of interceptors,” Lt. Gen. John Rafferty, head of the Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC), told TWZ and other attendees in a keynote address at the 2026 Space & Missile Defense Symposium last month. “That couldn’t be made more loud and clear from the highest levels of our government.”

At that time, Rafferty also stressed the need to further expand the Army’s ability to provide multi-layered air and missile defense capabilities. Enduring Shield, as the Army’s first middle-tier air defense system in decades, is already a key component of that broader effort.

The Army also more specifically sees Enduring Shield as central to reducing over-reliance on its Patriot surface-to-air missile systems. The immense strain on the service’s Patriot force and its inadequacy to meet existing operational demands are well established at this point, and have only been reinforced by the latest conflict with Iran. The Army is notably in the process of establishing its first new Patriot battalion in years, on Guam, which will actually be a composite unit also equipped with Enduring Shield. Pairing the two systems together helps free up Patriot batteries to engage higher-tier threats, especially ballistic missiles, which may themselves be targeting air defenders directly.

The PATRIOT Missile in Action

Additional efforts are underway now to further expand the Army’s array of available lower- and higher-end air and missile defense interceptors, as well as new and improved sensors and networks to go with them. This will only help further distribute capability and capacity, giving air defenders more operational space to employ systems when and where they are likely to be most effective.

There is still a question of whether the Army will actually start receiving new interceptors for Enduring Shield. A major issue that has emerged in recent years is being able to produce key munitions in a timely manner to bolster stocks ahead of conflicts and keep them replenished during sustained operations. To use the example of the Army’s Patriot units again, strain there has been further exacerbated by massive expenditures of interceptors in the course of operations in the Middle East in recent years, as well as demand emanating from Ukraine. There have been a succession of reports in recent months about stockpiles of Patriot interceptors, as well as other critical munitions, becoming ever more critically low. The Pentagon has been working with several companies to dramatically step up production of munitions, including existing and new designs, but it will still take time for those agreements to translate into physical results.

The Army has now at least moved to the next phase of the competition for a second interceptor for the Enduring Shield system, demand for which is already growing.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

AMMAN: Jordan’s army said Wednesday it shot down 18 missiles from Iran targeting the US-allied kingdom.

“Jordan’s air defense systems engaged 20 ballistic missiles launched toward Jordanian territory, successfully intercepting and destroying 18 of them, while two missiles fell in unpopulated areas,” the army said in a statement, adding that they came from Iran.

The German Navy has demonstrated the launch of Israel Aerospace Industries’ (IAI) LORA ballistic missile from an F125 frigate, with at least two missiles fired from the Sachsen-Anhalt during a test in the North Atlantic last night. The demonstration points to a potentially significant new long-range strike capability for Germany’s surface fleet, should it be adopted.

Video released by the German Ministry of Defense alongside the test shows two LORA launch canisters positioned on the frigate’s flight deck, followed by a missile launching from each container.

The launches were conducted as part of the Bundeswehr’s operational experimentation (OPEX) program in cooperation with the Bundeswehr Innovation Center in Erding. Reportedly, two German frigates were deployed to the waters between Ireland and Iceland for the test, and a warning was issued to maritime and air traffic 45 days beforehand.

The test marks a notable expansion of the weapons capabilities demonstrated by Germany’s F125 frigates and could provide a pathway toward a new long-range naval strike capability.

German Navy Inspector General Vice Adm. Jan Christian Kaack described the event in a statement distributed through the Bundeswehr’s official WhatsApp channel:

“With the successful launch of a ballistic missile last night in the North Atlantic, we have made naval history. I am extremely pleased with this achievement. The system can be successfully deployed by our units, and its potential range exceeds anything we have seen before. For the protection of Germany and our allies, this test marks a new chapter in deterrence and defense readiness at sea.”

IAI also confirmed the results of the test, stating that both missiles followed their planned trajectories and struck their targets with high precision.

The exact targets, engagement ranges, flight profiles, and missile configurations used during the test have not been disclosed.

There is no possibility that Sachsen-Anhalt will retain the launchers in their current location, since they mean the F125’s flight deck cannot be used, depriving it of a critical capability. Potentially, they could be installed elsewhere on the vessel, but, moreover, it is unclear if the current experiment will lead to a formal acquisition program.

At the same time, LORA is a substantially different weapon from the anti-ship and land attack cruise missiles normally associated with modern surface combatants.

Available for ship- and ground-launch, the missile is approximately 17 feet long, 25 inches in diameter, and weighs around 3,500 pounds. It follows a quasi-ballistic trajectory and has an officially stated range of approximately 60 to 270 miles. An air-launched derivative has also been developed.

A weapon capable of reaching targets hundreds of miles away would give German surface combatants a long-range strike option extending far beyond the range of traditional naval guns and many shorter-range precision weapons.

Its quasi-ballistic flight profile also differentiates LORA from a conventional cruise missile. A ballistic-style trajectory allows the weapon to cover distance rapidly and presents an air-defense challenge different from that posed by a low-flying cruise missile. This type of missile also impacts its target with much greater kinetic energy, making it especially useful for striking more hardened target sets.

LORA uses a navigation architecture combining GNSS satellite navigation with an inertial navigation system and can achieve a circular error probable, or CEP, of approximately 33 feet. IAI also says LORA can be launched within minutes, including from unprepared positions, and can attack a target within its range in less than 10 minutes after a decision to launch.

Back in 2017, as you can read about here, IAI successfully test-fired LORA from a containerized launcher on the back of a truck sitting on the deck of a cargo ship. The missile successfully struck a target on land.

LORA Ballistic Missile Firing Trial

What is less clear is its ability to strike targets at sea.

A long-range anti-surface application would be particularly interesting for the German Navy, although the weapon, in its basic form, has no terminal seeker. This limits the missile to use against targets with a fixed location, rather than autonomously finding and tracking a maneuvering warship during the terminal phase of flight.

In a 2020 test, IAI demonstrated firing two LORA missiles from a ship before hitting separate floating targets at approximately 60 miles and 250 miles. However, striking a static floating target is different from an enemy warship that is maneuvering and potentially employing electronic warfare and air defenses.

Regardless, Germany has an even clearer requirement for land attack capabilities, which LORA is fully capable of fulfilling, as we will return to later.

As for Germany’s F125 frigates, these were designed primarily for long-duration deployments, maritime security, stabilization operations, and other missions requiring a persistent naval presence. Their overall lack of firepower is something we have examined in detail before now.

The latest test involving the Sachsen-Anhalt is in line with the Bundeswehr’s OPEX framework, which is intended to evaluate emerging technologies and operational concepts under realistic conditions before decisions are made about wider adoption.

There is precedent for such experimentation leading to operational capabilities. Israeli-developed systems, including IAI’s Blue Whale autonomous underwater vehicle, have previously been evaluated through German naval experimentation efforts and subsequently moved toward formal adoption.

As well as the four F125 hulls, Germany might look to incorporate LORA from the start on its future F127 multi-purpose frigates and/or its planned Large Remote Missile Vessels (LRMV), uncrewed vessels that will serve as arsenal ship ‘wingmen,’ supporting conventional surface combatants.

It is worth noting that Germany has recently acquired various other Israeli-made missile and rocket systems. These include the Arrow 3 anti-ballistic missile system — the largest-ever Israeli defense export deal — and the PULS multiple rocket launcher. A German purchase of the land-based version of LORA would also be an option, with the truck-mounted system also able to be launched from ships at sea.

Meanwhile, Germany is a major provider of weapons systems to Israel, among them its most powerful surface combatants and submarines.

The LORA test also reflects a broader European push toward longer-range precision fires.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has underscored the importance of ballistic and cruise missiles, while NATO countries have increasingly sought weapons capable of holding targets at greater distances at risk.

Germany has historically possessed comparatively limited deep-strike capability. The Bundeswehr is now working to expand its ability to conduct long-range precision engagement, both independently and within NATO structures. This includes planned procurement of land-based Tomahawk cruise missiles, with a range exceeding 1,000 miles depending on the exact configuration.

The statistics are sobering — so sobering that Defense Department officials refuse to confirm, deny or discuss them.

From Feb. 28 through July, the first five months of the war with Iraq, U.S. forces burned through almost 60% of the nation’s advanced defensive missiles — the Patriot and THAAD interceptors that protect American troops.

When the war began, the Pentagon had almost 2,800 Patriot and THAAD missiles in its worldwide inventory, according to a study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, an independent think tank. By the end of July, that number had dropped to about 1,100, CSIS reported. Almost two-thirds of the Patriots and almost 40% of the longer-range THAAD were gone.

“This is a generational annihilation of our theater missile defense capability,” said Tom Karako, director of CSIS’s Missile Defense Project. “There’s no way you can look at this and not see it’s a setback.”

The White House and the Pentagon have not challenged the CSIS figures, although they have issued sweeping denials that any shortage exists.

“We have far more munitions than anyone in the world, and far more than we need,” President Trump said in July.

That’s true, but misleading. The U.S. military still holds vast inventories of short-range offensive missiles. But the sophisticated defensive missiles that protect U.S. troops no longer are abundant — as even Trump has acknowledged.

“We have certain types of munitions [of which] we have unlimited, virtual unlimited supply,” he said last month. “We have others where it’s a little bit tighter.”

The result is a squeeze that has prompted U.S. commanders to husband Patriot and THAAD interceptors as scarce assets.

For much of August, when a frayed de facto ceasefire was in effect, U.S. forces did not respond with high-end missiles when Iran attacked oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz.

But when Iran launched rockets against U.S. bases in Jordan last week, Patriots reportedly were used to knock the incoming missiles down. (The Pentagon has declined to confirm or deny those reports.)

The U.S. weapons arsenal “no longer has the capacity to deter a Chinese attack against Taiwan,” the Council on Foreign Relations warned in a report last month. Defense planners share the same concern over a potential Russian assault on the Baltic states.

The conservative Heritage Foundation has forecast that the Pentagon’s inventory of missiles would run out “within the first week of a Taiwan conflict.”

In Europe, a U.S. defense official told the Associated Press last month that the shortfall was “beyond critical.” If Russia attacked a NATO country, the official said, U.S. forces in the area would “take punch after punch in the mouth.”

The core question is whether the United States has so few missiles that it cannot credibly deter China or Russia from attacking their neighbors.

“You’ve got to be strong enough to send a clear message that our enemies should not try anything because we’re a credible force,” said Leon Panetta, President Obama’s former defense secretary. “Now we’re losing a lot of that credibility — and that’s dangerous.”

Knowing that U.S. forces have been left without thousands of weapons needed to deter conflict, Karako said, could in itself be provocative. “It could tempt an aggressor to do something, knowing that we have fewer [missiles] to thwart them.”

The obvious remedy is to build more interceptors — a process Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered even before the war began. But ramping up missile production won’t immediately replenish the stockpile.

Before the Iran war, defense contractors were producing only about 620 Patriots and 96 THAAD each year — fewer than half the number expended during a few weeks this spring.

At current production rates, it will take at least three years to return the Patriot inventory to its prewar level, and at least four years for THAAD, CSIS reported.

Defense experts warn that the stocks need to be even larger than they were before the war to credibly deter China or Russia.

Mark Cancian, a retired Marine colonel and principal author of the CSIS estimates, says most analysts believe it will take years after replenishing the stocks expended in the Persian Gulf to build a credible deterrent against China.

The Pentagon has enough munitions, both offensive and defensive, to continue fighting the campaign against Iran, he added — but some of those less-sophisticated weapons can be used only at shorter ranges, which means placing more troops in harm’s way.

Cancian said the CSIS figures were based on publicly available Pentagon budget and acquisition documents, updated in some cases from recent press reports — but not from leaks of classified information.

The roots of the missile shortage began long before the war with Iran. Trump and Hegseth are not the only ones to blame, although their belief that Iran would quickly capitulate appears to have been a major factor.

Nor did former President Biden cause the shortage, as Trump has claimed Biden gave several hundred Patriots to Ukraine, but the shortfall is far larger than that.

The underlying problem, defense experts say, is that the United States designed its missile defense programs for a world in which only a few major powers like China and Russia posed serious threats.

But the landscape of military technology has changed. Missiles and drones have become cheaper and easier to acquire, and countries like Iran can strike targets at great distances without making a huge investment in weaponry.

That’s a transformational change — and the Pentagon has been behind the curve, argues Michael C. Horowitz, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “This is the kind of situation in which great-power militaries like the United States struggle,” he said.

So the Trump administration faces several challenges. It needs to replenish its depleted stores of advanced defensive missiles — a process that has only just begun, and which Congress has not yet funded. Meanwhile, Horowitz and others argue, it also needs to build less expensive missile and drone systems to fill the multiyear gap before Patriot and THAAD inventories can be restored.

The Pentagon has begun that process, deploying several relatively inexpensive anti-drone missile systems.

Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act last year included $7.7 billion for low-cost missile and drone programs, but 13 months later, more than 90% of the money remains unspent, Horowitz said.

The U.S. Central Command (Centcom) said that its forces struck three Iranian oil tankers on Saturday after Iran launched ballistic missiles towards two of its Navy warships, signaling the latest retaliatory strikes between the parties this week.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary

Russia used a longer-range Iskander ballistic missile for the first time in an attack on Kyiv, Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR) said on Thursday. Missiles fired from deeper inside Russia would present additional challenges to Ukraine’s new campaign to attack the systems before they launch.

“In one of the combined missile strikes on the capital this summer, the enemy first used the updated 9M723-2 ballistic missiles, also known by the code name ‘Iskander-1000,’” GUR stated. “The updated missile, due to the increased engine and, accordingly, the increased launcher, is capable of hitting targets at a distance of up to 550 km (about 341 miles).”

According to GUR, the range of the previous Iskander variant, the 9M723-1, is 390 km, or about 242 miles.

In its statement about the new Iskander, GUR included photos of what appear to be recovered components of the weapon. However, the agency did not provide any specifics about what the components were, where they were found or when.

While GUR states that the new Iskander short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) was only recently fired at Ukraine, unconfirmed reports emerged in January that this weapon may have been introduced back then. Reports also began to appear last year that Russia was poised to start mass-producing a new version of the Iskander SRBM, with a range of about 600 miles and improved accuracy. Talk of the development of this new missile emerged after the termination by the United States of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in 2019. This had previously prohibited the Soviet Union (later Russia) and the United States from fielding any ground-launched conventional or nuclear-capable missile of any type that can hit targets between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (310 and 3,420 miles) away. Russia formally abandoned the treaty a short while after the U.S pulled out.

We have reached out to GUR for details.

A Telegram channel operated by Russian paratroopers lauded the development.

“Now, rearward facilities that were previously considered relatively safe are within range,” gloated the Paratrooper’s Diary. “The missile retains its ballistic trajectory, which means it can maneuver throughout its flight path, making interception more difficult for air defense systems.”

“According to preliminary data, the increase in the fuel compartment may have allowed for adjustments to the warhead mass, but the missile is still capable of carrying both cluster and high-explosive warheads with increased power,” the paratroopers continued. “The deployment of the ‘Iskander-1000’ indicates that the Russian defense industry is not only replenishing stockpiles but also scaling up a major modernization of missile weaponry.”

Reducing the size of the warhead and increasing fuel storage is a well proven way of extended the range of certain missiles without drastically chaining its outer mold line. Other improvements, such as new motors and guidance capabilities can also help in this regard.

Russia produces dozens of these weapons a month, noted missile expert Fabian Hoffmann.

“Recently, Ukrainian intelligence provided an updated estimate of Russian missile production capacity, stating that Russia produces around 60 9M723 ballistic missiles per month,” he pointed out in May.

“Based on recent employment trends, this figure is not entirely implausible (at least compared to when this number was first mentioned in 2024), though it should be treated as an upper-bound estimate,” Hoffmann added. “More realistically, Russia’s combined 9M723 and Kh-47M2 production capacity in mid-2026 may be between 600 and 800 units annually, with monthly production potentially fluctuating significantly depending on the availability of internationally sourced components. This would allow Russia to sustain an average employment rate of roughly 50 to 70 monthly ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine, with greater peaks possible if part of the production is stockpiled in a given month.”

To bolster its stocks of short-range ballistic missiles, Russia is receiving more KN-23 and KN-24 missiles from North Korea, which are loosely akin to the Iskander-M. Russia has also asked Pyongyang for an additional tranche of KN-30 missiles, also known as the Hwasong-11C, according to a separate GUR report issued today.

“The new KN-30 ballistic missiles, which are three times more powerful than the KN-23/24, were requested by Moscow from Pyongyang, but so far, the transfer of these missiles from North Korea to Russia has not been recorded,” GUR added.

The KN-30 is an enlarged derivative of the original Hwasong-11 and designed to carry larger warheads. North Korea has previously said it has tested subvariants of the Da/C type with 2.5-ton and 4.5-ton conventional high-explosive warheads, and that it can also be fitted with a nuclear warhead.

Ukraine has had to absorb a lot of damage because it ran out of Patriots months ago. However, President Volodymyr Zelensky recently said an unspecified number of additional interceptors would be delivered. Evidence has also emerged that a new supply of Patriots is being used against Russian missiles, including Iskanders. Still, the concern stands because of the precarious nature of Ukraine’s interceptor supply and Russia’s ability to make new and improved missiles.

As we noted earlier in this story, Ukraine has a new campaign, recently announced by Zelensky, to go after Russia’s ballistic missiles prior to launching to offset a dearth of interceptors. However, Russia’s ability to launch missiles another 100 or so miles further away from Ukraine will make them harder to find and hit.

“When our anti-ballistic missile stocks are at a minimum, there is another tactic,” Zelensky commented. “It is more difficult, and we developed it. It is hunting their nearby positions from which ballistic missiles are launched.”

Zelensky offered no details about how the campaign would be carried out. However, “Ukraine has already targeted Russian ballistic missile infrastructure in several operations this year in Crimea and Rostov, Russia, with drones, Euromaidan Press reported.

❗️Zelensky says Ukrainian forces struck an Iskander-M missile launcher on Russian territory near Ukraine’s border. He called it another success and said operational details cannot be disclosed because of the mission’s sensitivity, but confirmed the launcher was hit. #Ukraine pic.twitter.com/Ao0ooa8JYt

— NOELREPORTS 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 (@NOELreports) August 23, 2026

It is always preferable to shoot the archer not the arrow, but doing so reliably is very challenging as the Iranians proved again in Epic Fury. Despite a concerted campaign by the U.S. and Israel to go after Iranian missile launchers, the Islamic Republic was still able to fire off numerous volleys, creating a swath of destruction across the region.

For Ukraine, this kind of effort would have to mirror its mid-range strike campaign against Russian logistics using longer-range drones. Ukrainians told us they are hitting targets up to 250 km away in the occupied territories. However, that’s been aided in no small measure by the use of Space X Starlink systems.

Carrying out a similar campaign in Russia would be challenging, because Space X owner Elon Musk is reluctant to allow their use deep inside Russia. As we previously noted, Ukraine is asking Musk for permission to “use Starlink-equipped drones against ballistic missile launchers up to 200km inside Russia,” the Financial Times reported last week.

However, Zelensky recently said Musk ultimately refused to grant that permission.

GUR is calling for increased efforts to cut off the supply of foreign assistance Russia receives.

“To counter the aggressor’s plans, it is crucial to consolidate efforts aimed at limiting Russia’s program for the development, production, and modernization of ballistic weapons,” the directorate proffered.

The Ukrainian intelligence information about the new Iskander was part of a report on the amount of foreign components found on these missiles. The information is published on the directorate’s War & Sanctions portal, which identifies foreign assistance to Russia’s weapons programs.

“Only a quarter of the 140 components published today are manufactured by Russian enterprises,” GUR stated.

Almost half – 63 – were manufactured by American firms, GUR explained. The Iskanders also contained components from Switzerland, Belarus, Germany, Taiwan and China.

“In one of the most important components of the missile guidance system — the flight information processing unit obtained from the laser gyroscope — only 5 out of 43 components are manufactured in the Russian Federation,” GUR added. 

That foreign components would be found in Russian weapons is neither surprising nor new. TWZ has been chronicling this since the start of the war. These parts have been found in everything from helicopters to radars to cruise missiles. There was even a decoy drone found to be made completely of Chinese components.

These parts all found their way into Russian weapons despite international sanctions designed to prevent that from happening.

Russia isn’t the only country whose weapons – reliant on foreign components – have been used in attacks on Ukraine. A short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) produced by North Korea and used against Ukraine by Russia in 2024 relied on more than 290 foreign-sourced components, many of them originating from U.S. manufacturers. This is the alarming result of a study by Conflict Armament Research (CAR), a U.K.-based investigative organization.

China is also providing engines for Russia’s drones, including its jet-powered variants.

All this news about Russian missile supplies comes as President Vladimir Putin has threatened to escalate attacks on Ukraine over its strikes on Russian infrastructure and the faltering peace process. The Russian leader is also reportedly again mulling using tactical nuclear weapons to stop these attacks. That would be a word-changing escalation and TWZ cannot independently confirm those claims.

Though he hasn’t pulled the trigger on expanding attacks yet, Putin is clearly building the means to do so if he chooses.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

Europe is entering an interesting, and potentially highly consequential, period in the development of beyond-visual-range (BVR) air-to-air weapons. While the public emergence of new U.S. weapons in this class has unsurprisingly grabbed the headlines in recent months, Europe is meanwhile working on several projects that ultimately seek to field its next generation of far-reaching air-to-air missiles.

As in the United States, the immediate catalyst is the rapid evolution of Chinese air-to-air missiles, particularly the PL-15 and newer systems that are emerging around it. The India-Pakistan air combat experience from last year has brought the issue into sharper focus, demonstrating the operational consequences of underestimating an opponent’s long-range air-to-air capabilities. However, while Pakistan said its Chinese-made fighters and missiles shot down several Indian aircraft, the precise circumstances, numbers, and tactics involved remain the subject of competing claims and outside analysis.

For Europe, the MBDA Meteor is currently the state of the art in terms of BVR air-to-air missiles, and its unique set of capabilites is something we have discussed in depth in the past. The question is increasingly not simply how to improve the Meteor, but what should come after it, and what kind of weapons architecture (or ‘kill chain’) will be needed for the next generation of crewed and uncrewed combat aircraft and their weapons.

One of the most intriguing current developments is France’s Comet program, which appears to be led by the French side of the pan-European MBDA consortium. Very little is publicly known about the weapon, and its exact specifications remain unclear. It nevertheless appears to represent an effort to provide a significant step beyond the current MICA family, offering greater range and speed. If the apparent timeline of around 2030 is correct, Comet could be viewed as a relatively near-term response to an increasingly demanding threat environment.

Douglas Barrie, senior fellow for military aerospace at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) research institute in London, told TWZ that Comet looks like “a response to the exchanges between the Pakistanis and the Indians, where, on day one, the Indians underestimated how aggressive the Pakistanis were going to be, particularly with PL-15. It seems coincidental at the very least that this kind of thing has just popped up onto the horizon.”

That would distinguish Comet from the U.K.’s Future Air Superiority Effectors, or FASE, program which appears to be associated much more closely with the longer-term requirements of the U.K.’s Future Combat Air System and GCAP/Tempest.

Talking to TWZ, Justin Bronk, a research fellow for airpower at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), explained that FASE “is likely aimed at providing significantly better combat capabilities by the early-mid 2030s than a mid-life upgrade of the Meteor missile would be able to offer within the bounds of its basic layout and size.”

Creating an interesting overlap with FASE and Comet is a joint Franco-British study looking at what comes after Meteor. In April, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding launching the 12-month effort that will assess future air-combat threats and potential next-generation missile concepts. The study is intended to identify the technologies required for a successor weapon and establish a development roadmap. While the two countries are at least formally examining the same post-Meteor problem, their longer-term combat air priorities appear to be diverging.

Beyond Meteor

Meteor remains one of Europe’s most capable air-to-air weapons. Its ramjet propulsion system gives it an important advantage over conventional solid-rocket missiles by allowing it to retain propulsion and energy much further into an engagement.

However, the threat environment that Meteor was designed against is changing. Meteor’s requirements were established in an environment dominated by the Soviet/Russian air-to-air missile threat. Today’s planning increasingly has to account for Chinese weapons such as the PL-15 and newer systems that may combine very long range with substantially greater speed.

“Since the Meteor is still more than a match for current Russian air-to-air missiles in air-to-air engagements, it is likely that the capability goals for the FASE program will use far more capable Chinese air-to-air missiles, aircraft, and sensors as pacing threats,” Bronk ​​​​added.

That raises the uncomfortable question of what happens when both sides can launch extremely capable BVR weapons against each other?

Simply put, higher speed now matters more, because it reduces the target’s reaction time and can make the terminal engagement substantially more demanding. One of Meteor’s advantages is the considerable energy it retains when it reaches the terminal phase, but the tradeoff is a slower average speed across the entirety of its flight envelope.

Meteor

Barrie explained: “Meteor’s fly-out speed is somewhere between Mach 3.5 and somewhere below Mach 4. If you launch a PL-15 off a J-20, which is doing Mach 2, that weapon probably stays above Mach 5 for an awfully long time, which is one of the issues. It’s that risk of a mutual kill. Obviously, if the weapon against the J-20 is coming out at Mach 3.5 to Mach 4, then you have a bit an issue there.”

At the same time, a missile’s effectiveness depends on many other factors, including launch conditions, flight profile, midcourse guidance, seeker performance, electronic warfare environment, and target maneuvering.

However, the nature of the threat may push the next generation of European weapons toward a combination of greater range, substantially higher speed and greater terminal energy rather than simply another incremental improvement to Meteor. Indeed, the United Kingdom has dropped its plans for a Meteor mid-life upgrade, presumably to focus its efforts on an altogether more ambitious and capable successor, or successors.

Does the next weapon need a ramjet?

The Meteor was designed around a ramjet motor, especially since it was expected to face a ramjet version of the Russian R-77 (AA-12 Adder) missile. This was never fielded, and, as far as we know, China doesn’t have a weapon in this class either. A Meteor successor therefore won’t necessarily use the same kind of propulsion.

Meteor demonstrated the advantages of air-breathing propulsion, but there are trade-offs involved in using a ramjet or another air-breathing system. Achieving very high speeds while maintaining useful range and maneuverability can become increasingly difficult, and propulsion complexity adds cost and potentially consumes valuable internal volume.

The performance being attributed in open sources to Chinese solid-propellant weapons like the PL-15 suggests that another approach is possible.

Barrie would not be surprised if the ramjet is dropped. “The issue with a ramjet is it’s not impossible to get above Mach 5, but it’s difficult, and there are lots of compromises you probably have to make … I wonder if they may just look at energetic solids.”

A future European missile could therefore use a substantially larger solid-propellant motor, potentially coupled with a different boost and sustain architecture, to achieve the required combination of speed and range. Using more than one stage, or a multi-pulse solid rocket motor could be other solutions to the issue.

The size problem

Perhaps the biggest opportunity for a new European BVR weapon comes from the aircraft that will carry it.

Meteor was developed within the physical constraints imposed by existing fighter aircraft and their weapons-carriage arrangements, including internal carriage in the F-35. A future combat aircraft such as Tempest is expected to have significantly greater internal volume available for weapons.

“One of the drivers for Tempest is internal carriage, obviously, but lots of it,” Barrie continued. “A big main bay, and then probably sizeable side bays as well. That lets you carry a considerably larger weapon mass internally than an F-35. If you look at size of the platform in terms of what they’ve released, it’s a big aircraft, and one would assume it has a very significant internal weapons bay.”

A larger missile can carry more propellant, potentially support a more powerful propulsion system, accommodate a larger or more capable seeker, and provide additional volume for electronics and other subsystems.

As we have explained in the past:

There are different ways of increasing the range of an air-to-air missile, but this process is always easier if the weapon can be made larger. Bigger dimensions can translate to a bigger engine, more fuel, multi-stage rocket motors, and air-breathing engines, like the ramjet used in the Meteor. Other range-extending options that the United States has examined include throttleable “multi-pulse solid rocket motors” and more exotic “propellants, grain configurations, cases, and liners,” all of which would also be able to ensure greater range — as well as higher speed — compared to existing weapons.

The result could be a weapon that is considerably larger than Meteor but still fully compatible with the aircraft for which it was designed.

This realuty, and the use of the plural effectors in the U.K.’s FASE terminology raises the possibility that the future European BVR requirement may not be for one missile, but for a family of weapons — at least as far as the British are concerned.

Why “effectors” may matter

If FASE ultimately refers to multiple effectors rather than a single missile, that could point to the broader direction of future air combat, involving crewed aircraft as well as various uncrewed wingmen.

Tempest is expected to operate as a so-called quarterback, supported by a number of uncrewed combat aircraft, remote carriers, or other systems operating considerably farther forward. Those uncrewed systems will have different size, payload and weapons-carriage constraints from the crewed aircraft.

This means that not every platform will need the same BVR weapon, or even be able to accommodate them, when it comes to the larger missiles.

Instead, a future force might require something resembling a family:

• A large, long-range, high-speed weapon for the crewed Tempest aircraft, optimized for the highest-end air-superiority engagements.
• A medium-sized weapon suitable for existing fighters and potentially future aircraft with more constrained weapons carriage.
• A smaller weapon optimized for CCAs or other uncrewed systems where internal bay dimensions, payload and cost are more restrictive.

A modular missile could possibly cover two of these categories at once. More broadly, these weapons could share technologies without necessarily being identical missiles. Common seekers, electronics, datalinks, software, guidance technologies or other subsystems could potentially be reused across the family.

The result would be a fundamentally different approach from simply developing a single Meteor replacement.

The seeker may be as important as the motor

The front end of a future European BVR weapon is another area where significant change is likely.

An active electronically scanned array (AESA) seeker would seem a logical baseline for a next-generation weapon. The United Kingdom’s previous work with Japan on the Joint New Air-to-Air Missile program, or JNAAM effort was particularly interesting in this regard, given Japan’s experience with active electronically scanned air-to-air seekers.

A future weapon could also incorporate a passive radio-frequency capability alongside its active radar. That would provide another means of detecting or tracking emitting targets and could increase the weapon’s resilience in a heavily contested electromagnetic environment.

For its PL-17 ultra-long-range air-to-air missile, China appears to have chosen a combination of active and passive seekers, although, as Barrie points out, it also appears to have been designed around a very specific target set: E-7 Wedgetail, E-2 Hawkeye, other airborne early warning and control platforms, and support assets, like tankers and strategic electronic surveillance and attack aircraft.

Whether such a capability is worth the additional cost and complexity is another question. A highly sophisticated multimode missile will inevitably be expensive, however, the same technologies could potentially provide utility against a broader range of targets than conventional fighter-on-fighter engagements. An air-to-surface capability should also not be ruled out, with a passive seeker potentially bestowing an anti-radiation missile (ARM) capability on the weapon.

Another passive seeker alternative could be based on an imaging infrared (IIR) sensor. This could provide an interesting complement to an active-radar seeker, making use of the same kind of two-way datalinked midcourse guidance system already included in Meteor. It could be esepcially relevant for engaging small or low-signature (stealthy) targets and in a heavily contested electromagnetic environment.

The weapon is becoming part of the network

Perhaps the biggest change will be the extent to which future BVR missiles exploit the wider kill chain, becoming much more than weapons guided by the aircraft that launches them.

The key requirement is for the missile to be track-source agnostic. This means a future long-range air-to-air missile could receive targeting information from a CCA, an airborne early warning aircraft, another fighter, a naval platform, or potentially space-based sensors.

For example, with Tempest operating alongside forward-deployed CCAs, the sensor that initially detects a target could be the CCA. The launching aircraft could then receive the track, launch a weapon, and continue receiving updates from multiple platforms.

Alternatively, a CCA could launch the weapon using targeting information generated by the crewed aircraft or another sensor elsewhere in the force, provided it is on the network.

Two-way datalinks, midcourse guidance, electronic warfare resilience, and the ability to accept high-quality third-party targeting information become central requirements. Some of this functionality is available, to varying extents, on some current air-to-air missiles, but it will be even more important as air combat becomes increasingly reliant on distributed sensor networks and crewed/uncrewed aircraft teaming.

If it can rely on offboard sensors, the missile’s engagement range no longer needs to be constrained by the organic sensor range of the launching fighter. Faced increasingly by the realities of an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) environment, this could enable weapons that fly far beyond what the launch platform could independently detect and engage. The A2/AD threat is alreayd pushing research into much farther-reaching air defese missiles, potentially with a range of up to 1,000 miles.

This also opens the door to more exotic propulsion concepts, including multi-stage weapons designed to combine very high-speed boost with a separate sustain or terminal stage.

The next generation of long-range air-to-air missile may therefore be defined as much by the kill chain they plug into as by the architecture and performance of the missile itself.

What happens to Meteor?

Meteor is one of Europe’s strongest examples of a successful multinational defense program. Six European nations participated in its development, and the program eventually produced a weapon that is widely regarded as a highly capable system.

Now, however, the countries that developed Meteor do not necessarily have identical requirements for the next generation.

The United Kingdom is moving toward GCAP/Tempest with Japan and Italy. Its future combat air requirements will increasingly be shaped by that program and by the threat assessment driving it.

The United Kingdom appears to want a very large, very high-performance weapon optimized for Tempest and the future air-superiority mission, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. Japan likely needs very much the same.

Meanwhile, other Meteor users may prioritize a weapon that can be integrated onto existing fighters and remain affordable in larger numbers.

France’s Comet effort could meet that requirement, since it appears to be a comparatively rapid response to the emerging threat. With that in mind, France could eventually find itself with a near-term weapon, a future clean-sheet requirement, and a continuing relationship with the Meteor family, all while pursuing its own future combat air requirements.

Overall, it is far from clear whether the Meteor consortium will survive for another generation, at least in its current form.

Could Japan become part of the answer?

Given that it’s a partner in GCAP/Tempest, and based on its previous air-to-air missile studies with the British, Japan is particularly interesting in this context.

Japan faces a threat environment in which long-range air combat is of obvious importance, and Japan has already demonstrated advanced capabilities in active electronically scanned air-to-air seekers. The Japanese-developed Mitsubishi AAM-4B became the first air-to-air missile to feature an AESA seeker.

Although earlier air-to-air missile cooperation between Japan and the United Kingdom did not evolve into an operational program, the two countries are now developing a combat aircraft together through GCAP.

With Britain and Japan designing the future combat aircraft together, they could eventually develop some of its principal weapons together as well, although Italy’s requirements are likely very different.

Thinking beyond the missile

Europe can almost certainly build a faster missile than Meteor, but there are plenty more questions about what kind of air combat system that missile — or missiles — will fit into.

A future BVR weapon will have to operate from multiple types of platforms (crewed and uncrewed), receive targeting data from offboard sensors, communicate with CCAs, function in a highly contested electromagnetic environment, engage maneuvering targets at extreme range, and retain enough energy to remain dangerous in the terminal phase.

Increasingly, it seems that, rather than a single weapon, a family of effectors will be the solution.

For the United Kingdom, FASE may become one of the most important programs to watch because it could reveal how Britain intends to bridge the gap between Meteor and the weapons of the GCAP/Tempest era. At this stage, FASE appears to be ‘for U.K. eyes only,’ although Japan and Italy would appear to be likely beneficiaries, due to their teaming on GCAP.

Elsewhere, Comet could provide an early indication of how France intends to respond to the emerging long-range missile threat while maintaining flexibility for a future system.

And for the wider Meteor consortium, it remains to be seen whether the program’s success can be carried forward into another multinational weapon, or whether the emergence of GCAP/Tempest and increasingly divergent national requirements marks the beginning of the end for the Meteor model.

Either way, the next generation of European BVR weapons is likely to be larger, faster, more networked, and more deeply integrated with the combat air system around it. At the same time, the need to create a family of effectors designed around a distributed force of crewed aircraft, CCAs, and offboard sensors will bring some formidable challenges.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com