Military

June 22 (UPI) — The United Nations Human Rights Office reported Monday that the Myanmar military is responsible for at least 702 civilian deaths between August and January.

The United Nations published its report on human rights abuses in Myanmar during conflict from the military’s announcement of elections through the end of the ensuing voting period. The United Nations notes that foreign actors have continued to supply the military with arms and ammunition, potentially facilitating human rights violations.

Of the deaths it says have been credibly verified, 476 were due to airstrikes. Victims included 224 women and 153 children. More than 500 civilians were killed in attacks from jet fighters, drones, paramotors and gyrocopters.

The highest volumes of civilian deaths spiked between two periods: August through September and December through January.

The absence of international assistance has also played a role, the United Nations said. Access to emergency healthcare declined due to military blockades and cuts to foreign aid.

U.N. Human Rights Chief Volker Turk called on the international community to re-engage in support for the people of Myanmar.

“As if the people of Myanmar have not suffered enough at the hands of the military, they have now seemingly been forgotten by those outside the country,” Turk said in a statement. “Funding for localised protection efforts was in many areas the only solace from the suffering caused by constant targeting and indiscriminate attacks by the military. The pullback just compounds the injury.”

Published on
22/06/2026 – 13:32 GMT+2

The German government announced on Monday that it intends to acquire 40% of the defence contractor KNDS, a move designed to bolster European arms production in partnership with its NATO and EU ally France.

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The decision deepens state involvement in a company whose hardware has become central to Europe’s rearmament efforts.

KNDS was created in 2015 through the merger of Germany’s Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and France’s Nexter. The French state holds a 50% stake, while the other half belongs to the German family behind Krauss-Maffei Wegmann, whose planned exit has opened the door for Berlin to step in.

Based in Amsterdam, the group reported revenue of €4.4 billion last year and employs more than 11,000 people.

The timing reflects a broader scramble across Europe to expand military spending and manufacturing capacity, as governments weigh the continued threat from Russia’s war in Ukraine against growing doubts about the reliability of the US as a security guarantor.

Berlin framed the investment in explicitly strategic terms, saying it would secure lasting influence over a business it considers vital to European security and defence.

The German government added that the stake would reinforce domestic industrial output, technological independence and the safeguarding of key national security interests and technologies.

In a joint statement, Germany and France said they had agreed on the future strategy and governance of KNDS, which they intend to co-own through arrangements aimed at giving both countries equal shareholdings.

Clearing the path to a stock market listing

Neither government specified a timeline or the final level at which their holdings would settle, but they stated the agreement opens the way for a possible flotation of KNDS in the near future.

According to people familiar with the matter cited by the Associated Press, the two states plan to trim their stakes to around 30% within two to three years of any listing, while retaining equal voting rights regardless of the size of each holding.

The two governments cast the deal as a joint commitment to building up Europe’s defence industry and armed forces, and to securing the continent’s strategic independence well into the future.

State participation in the firm was first floated by German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius in 2025 as a way to protect strategic expertise and jobs.

Beyond its tanks, KNDS also manufactures the Puma infantry fighting vehicle and the Boxer and Dingo armoured personnel carriers, equipment which is in growing demand as European armies replenish stocks depleted by years of underinvestment and donations to Ukraine’s defence.

Additional sources • AP

The Chinese strategy employs research and intelligence institutions working to foster closer ties between Iranian national security institutions and the Egyptian military, aiming to undermine the American presence in the Middle East. Prominent among these institutions are the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University, the China Institute of International Studies, and the Center for West Asian and African Studies. These Chinese research centers, which shape China’s relations with countries in the region and the Gulf, include the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University (SISU), which directs studies related to security and defense issues and facilitates direct dialogue between think tanks in Iran and research centers in Egypt. Another example is the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), which reports directly to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and works to engineer diplomatic plans that align Egypt’s strategic interests with the objectives of Tehran and resistance movements in the region. Chinese think tanks and intelligence agencies also rely on a number of People’s Liberation Army-backed space intelligence companies, such as MizarVision and EarthEye. These Chinese companies have provided high-resolution satellite imagery and intelligence data to support operations targeting US bases in the Gulf and the Middle East. These Chinese entities coordinate and plan operations through various mechanisms and initiatives officially launched by China, most notably the Global Security Initiative (GSI). Beijing also uses forums, such as the China-Arab Cooperation Forum, to pressure Middle Eastern and Gulf countries to withdraw foreign forces and end US hegemony in the Gulf and the Middle East. This is framed as ending direct interference in the internal affairs of countries in the region. Beijing is also seeking to establish permanent overseas bases, most prominently the Djibouti naval base in East Africa, to support its regional alliances and ensure the continuity of global supply lines for Chinese interests and investments within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative.

The relationship between Chinese military and intelligence think tanks and the Egyptian army is highlighted by their shared goal of countering American hegemony and expelling US military bases from the Gulf and the Middle East. China is strengthening its strategic cooperation with the Egyptian army as part of the Djibouti-UAE-Egypt axis, with Beijing relying on Cairo as a key launching pad to secure maritime navigation and reduce American military influence. Beijing is utilizing its strategic institutions and think tanks to provide technological and logistical support to the Egyptian army, aiming to create a regional power capable of maintaining strategic balance in the region against American hegemony and interventions. This escalating security and strategic relationship between the Egyptian and Chinese armies rests on several key pillars, most notably intelligence and military partnership. China aims to train the Egyptian military elite through Egyptian military academies and coordinate threat assessments and mutual monitoring of the military movements of the United States and its allies in the Gulf and the wider region. With the implementation of several joint exercises between the two sides, the Chinese vision crystallized in the (Civilization Eagles maneuvers), which brought together the air forces of China and Egypt. This paves the way for the transfer of military technology and the integration of Chinese systems with Egyptian defenses independent of the West, along with the localization of Chinese military industries in the heart of Cairo. China is negotiating with the Egyptian Ministry of Defense to develop local manufacturing capabilities and transfer defense technology. There are also reports of integrating Chinese systems into Egyptian systems to reduce Egypt’s dependence on American-supplied weaponry. Beijing seeks to create a counterweight to American hegemony in the Middle East and the Gulf. China sees Egypt’s refusal to host any American military bases as a cornerstone of its strategy, relying on the Egyptian and Emirati armies to guarantee regional security as an alternative to the traditional American presence in the Gulf and the Middle East.

Chinese research, military, and intelligence think tanks are working to engineer an asymmetric strategic partnership to end American hegemony in the Middle East and the Gulf. Chinese think tanks, military research centers, and intelligence agencies are operating according to a clear strategic vision aimed at building asymmetrical partnerships in the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf to reduce American influence and establish a multipolar world order. Beijing provides Tehran with technical and intelligence support to deter Washington, while simultaneously seeking to strengthen military cooperation with Egypt as a pivotal regional power. This strategy aims to diminish American influence and secure China’s vital economic interests. The Chinese strategy in the region rests on several pillars, most notably its strategy toward Iran and its technical and intelligence support for the country. China has secretly supplied Iran with advanced satellite technology from its BeiDou satellite system, bypassing Western and American GPS systems, as well as sophisticated air defense systems. This has significantly enhanced the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s ability to monitor and target American military bases in the region and the Gulf.

The objectives of Chinese think tanks, political, strategic, military, and intelligence research centers become apparent here, as they attempt to plan a path to link Iran to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and transform Iranian military pressure into a tool for destabilizing the US bases deployed in the region and the Gulf. The convergence between China and the Egyptian military is highlighted through the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries. Beijing is inclined to strengthen military cooperation with Egypt, capitalizing on its political stability and its geographic location controlling vital maritime trade routes, and to transfer advanced Chinese military technology to Egypt. Beijing has revealed its desire to be a major supplier of equipment to the Egyptian army, such as the J-10 aircraft. This aims to increase Egypt’s strategic maneuvering room and reduce the dominance of Western weaponry.

The stability achieved by the Egyptian leadership is a fundamental pillar supporting the comprehensive strategic partnership, as Beijing seeks to secure its economic and military interests with a stable and influential regional power. Therefore, China is investing in the Belt and Road Initiative, for which the Suez Canal is a vital artery in the Middle East. Cooperation extends to the exchange and transfer of military technology, joint military manufacturing, advanced air defense systems, and the evaluation of potential acquisitions of modern Chinese fighter jets. Furthermore, joint air exercises have been conducted, with the Egyptian Armed Forces carrying out their first-ever joint air exercise, dubbed Eagles of Civilization with China, involving multi-role fighter aircraft from both countries, underscoring the deepening defense partnership between them.

In this context, China relies on the Egyptian military within the framework of its strategic and African axis to counter American influence. For China, Egypt represents its strategic gateway to the African continent and a cornerstone in its maneuvers against the US Africa Command (USAFRICOM). In addition to joint military exercises, China and Egypt have conducted joint air force drills, a clear indication of an unprecedented military rapprochement that has drawn close American scrutiny. With China’s move to transfer technology and arms deals to Cairo, it is positioning itself to support the Egyptian army with advanced air defense systems, such as the HQ-9B. This enhances Egypt’s air deterrence capabilities and forms part of strategic military deals aimed at reducing dependence on the United States and its Western allies. On the other hand, China relies on Iran as a deterrent and direct driver, exerting pressure on American bases in the region. Iran represents the spearhead of China’s brinkmanship policy against American military bases in the Gulf, Iraq, and Syria, with Tehran threatening to strike them should any regional conflict erupt. In conjunction with the economic and diplomatic alliance between Beijing and Tehran, China uses emerging alliances, such as the BRICS group and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), to establish Iran’s political foothold. It sometimes resorts to mediation policies as a tool to reduce the likelihood of a direct confrontation with Iran, which could harm its commercial interests, such as China’s sponsorship of Pakistani mediation efforts between Iran and the United States to stop the war against Iran and allow the Strait of Hormuz to be opened to global trade and navigation.

China’s major objectives in the Middle East lie in a strategy of attrition against the United States. China uses Iranian actions as a clever pressure tactic to test and deplete American military technology without direct involvement in wars of attrition, while simultaneously attempting to create a new regional order. Here, Chinese intelligence agencies coordinate networks of overlapping interests to push countries toward understandings that transcend the American security umbrella, paving the way for the future withdrawal of foreign military bases. The pillars of China’s strategy for alternative hegemony are based on asymmetric partnerships. Beijing focuses on presenting itself as a reliable economic and technological partner without political conditions or interference in internal affairs, unlike the American model based on conditionality and direct military alliances. With China’s emphasis on the economy as a gateway to security, it utilizes the Belt and Road Initiative and its massive investments in infrastructure and ports, such as the Khalifa Port in the UAE and the Port of Duqm in Oman, to solidify its strategic presence and transform economic dependence into long-term geopolitical influence. With Beijing’s use of security diplomacy and mediation, Chinese decision-making centers have adopted a common security approach and offered political mediation, such as sponsoring the Saudi-Iranian agreement, to solidify Beijing’s role as an international peacemaker and portray the United States as a destabilizing force through the militarization of the region. This is coupled with China’s technological and intelligence penetration of the region and the Gulf, where Chinese partnerships focus on transferring 5G technologies, artificial intelligence, and space cooperation with Gulf states. This grants Beijing intelligence-gathering capabilities and allows it to connect the region’s vital systems to the Chinese technological infrastructure. Chinese think tanks and intelligence agencies are planning to cautiously fill the void, as China avoids direct military confrontation with Washington in the region and prefers to capitalize on the Gulf states’ desire to diversify their partnerships and hedge against the gradual decline of American interest in the Middle East.

Accordingly, we analyze that China’s military strategy in the Middle East and Africa relies on building defense partnerships with diverse objectives. It utilizes the Egyptian army as a pivotal regional power to bolster its influence and counterbalance the American presence through advanced training cooperation while simultaneously leveraging its relationship with Iran to exert pressure on American bases, particularly in the Gulf, and secure its oil interests all within a comprehensive policy aimed at dismantling American hegemony in the region.

United States President Donald Trump has pledged there will be no tolls for passage through the Strait of Hormuz, unless they are collected by his own country.

Trump’s statement, made in a Saturday afternoon post on Truth Social, is the latest sign that a recently signed memorandum of understanding (MOU) may be unravelling.

“There will be NO TOLLS in the Hormuz Strait for 60 days during the Cease Fire Period, and there will be NO TOLLS after the 60 day period has expired,” Trump wrote, “unless they are imposed by and for the United States of America.”

Since the US and Israel launched a war against Iran on February 28, Iran has successfully used the Strait of Hormuz as a pressure point, closing the strategic waterway to traffic.

But under the terms of Wednesday’s ceasefire memorandum, the strait is supposed to reopen for an interim period of 60 days. During that time, Iran is barred from charging vessels for passage.

On Saturday, however, Iran’s joint military command said it had closed the Strait of Hormuz, citing a “clear breach” of the memorandum’s commitments.

US Central Command (CENTCOM), the agency that oversees military operations in the region, denied that report and maintained that the traffic continues to flow through the waterway.

The Strait of Hormuz has long been a flashpoint in the conflict between the US and Iran. Nearly 20 percent of the world’s oil and natural gas is transported through the strait, as well as about 30 percent of the global fertiliser trade.

Closure of the strait has caused global fuel costs to soar and has tested agricultural sectors across the world.

Trump had responded to Iran’s chokehold over the strait by imposing a US naval blockade on Iran’s ports in the region.

But that naval blockade was lifted under the terms of Wednesday’s memorandum. The deal also paused fighting on all fronts in the regional conflict, including in Lebanon.

The memorandum, though, was not intended as a long-term deal. It serves as a launching point for negotiations on key issues, including the future of Iran’s nuclear programme.

Several points of divergence also went unaddressed in the memorandum. Nowhere does the memo say that future tolls cannot be collected from the strait after the 60-day period expires.

Before the war, there was no charge for passage through the strait. Trump himself said in an interview with The New York Times that the waterway should remain “permanently toll-free”.

But he appeared to reverse course in Saturday’s post, once again floating the possibility that the US could extract tolls in the strait, while barring Iran from doing so.

No fees should be levied, Trump wrote, “unless they are imposed by and for the United States of America, should the deal not be completed”.

He explained that such a charge would compensate the US “for services rendered as the Guardian Angel to the countries of the Middle East for purposes of both past, present, and future reimbursement of costs”.

Trump used similar language in his New York Times interview earlier this week, floating the US becoming “the guardian of the Middle East” in exchange for 20 percent of its revenue.

Saturday’s post is not the first time Trump has mused about the US imposing tolls in the strait, either.

In April, for instance, he discussed the idea with reporters, saying, “What about us charging tolls? I’d rather do that than let them have them. Why shouldn’t we? We’re the winner. We won.”

There has been no indication that Trump’s plans have been officially presented to countries in the region, many of whom have struck a careful balance in their dealings with both the US and Iran during the war.

Iranian officials, meanwhile, have repeatedly said they will not rule out imposing tolls in the strait, framing the issue as a matter of sovereignty and regional negotiation. The strait sits between Iran and Oman.

Further discussions are expected on the matter in the coming weeks.

But such negotiations have been thrown into jeopardy amid ongoing Israeli military operations in Lebanon, which threaten to violate Wednesday’s ceasefire memorandum.

Iran claimed that Saturday’s closure of the strait was a result of new Israeli attacks in southern Lebanon, which killed dozens of people after the ceasefire was announced.

Iranian officials have also said that any upcoming talks should focus on proper implementation of the initial memorandum, and that the 60-day negotiating period stipulated in Wednesday’s deal would begin after that was settled.

Pakistan, a top mediator between the US and Iran, has said that follow-up talks are set to begin in Switzerland on Sunday.

Switzerland’s Federal Department of Foreign Affairs has confirmed that an Iranian delegation, led by parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, has already arrived for the negotiations.

On the US side, Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, special envoy Steve Witkoff and Vice President JD Vance are expected to attend.

Vance departed for Switzerland late Saturday.

June 18 (UPI) — The U.S. military on Thursday lifted naval blockades in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, with reports showing that shipping vessels have departed the region through the Strait of Hormuz.

U.S. Central Command said in a series of posts on X that, following direction from President Donald Trump, blockades on maritime traffic along the coasts of Iran have ended.

Centcom noted, however, that the U.S. Navy will stay in the “general area” to be sure that “all aspects” of the peace agreement signed by the United States and Iran “are adhered to, obeyed and in full force and effect.”

Trump signed the agreement Wednesday at the Palace of Versailles in France after the G7 Summit wrapped up, which included among its 14 points reopening the Strait of Hormuz, which is a vital shipping route for the region and much of the world.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian had signed the deal earlier in the day.

“American forces are not impeding the transit of vessels to or from Iranian ports,” Centcom said in one of the posts on X on Thursday.

“All U.S. military blockade efforts have ceased,” it said.

At least 12 energy tankers transited the Strait on Thursday, reopening a sailing route through which roughly 20% of the world’s oil supply is shipped around the globe, CNBC and the New York Post reported.

Among the vessels that transited the Strait were three Saudi Arabian supertankers, which together are carrying six million barrels of crude oil and are the kingdom’s first tankers to sail the shipping route since before the three-month-long U.S.-Iran war launched in February.

Vice President JD Vance also told reporters that more than 12 million barrels of oil had shipped through the Strait overnight Wednesday after the deal had been signed.

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has signed a US-Iran memorandum of understanding aimed at ending the war between the two countries. US President Donald Trump and Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian signed on Wednesday.

President Donald Trump says it’s ‘unfair’ for Iran to lack ballistic missiles if other regional countries have them. Trump is at the G7 in France where the US-Iran deal has taken centre stage.

Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich says Israel has transferred authority over Hebron to the army. It includes control of the key holy site, Cave of the Patriarchs. Al Jazeera’s Nour Odeh explains.

FIFA President Gianni Infantino praised Iran’s players during a World Cup dressing room visit after the team’s 2-2 draw with New Zealand on Monday.

British armed forces intercepted an oil tanker believed to be part of Russia’s sanctioned shadow fleet. The oil tanker ‘SMYRTOS’ was taken in an first-ever operation by the British military in the English Channel.

United States President Donald Trump has said an initial agreement to end the US-Israeli war with Iran is “scheduled to get signed tomorrow”.

But that announcement, made on Trump’s Truth Social account on Saturday, contradicts an earlier statement by Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei.

In remarks carried by Iran’s IRNA news agency, Baghaei said a memorandum of understanding would not be signed on Sunday and that negotiators are not planning to travel immediately to Geneva, Switzerland, in preparation for such an event.

According to Baghaei, a signing could happen “in the coming days”.

Hours later, Trump wrote, “The Deal is scheduled to get signed tomorrow, and immediately after it is signed, the Hormuz Strait is OPEN TO ALL.” Sunday marks Trump’s 80th birthday.

In recent days, Iran and the US have repeatedly contradicted each other when describing the details of the anticipated agreement, even as both sides have broadly signalled that a deal was closer than ever before.

Still, no terms have been officially released, with US and Iranian officials on Friday stressing that the agreement had not been finalised.

Beyond opening the Strait of Hormuz, Trump said in Saturday’s post that the agreement would be a “A WALL TO NO NUCLEAR WEAPON!” and that “no money would exchange hands”.

Trump also maintained that “at the appropriate time, when all is calm, we will go in and get the Nuclear Dust”, referring to Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium.

But speaking on Iran’s Press TV on Friday, Iranian ⁠⁠Foreign ⁠⁠Minister Abbas Araghchi said the initial memorandum of understanding would only be a launch point for negotiations about the future of Iran’s nuclear programme.

He added that the signing would result in an immediate pause in fighting, but that Iran and Oman would continue to administer the Strait of Hormuz.

The issue of lifting foreign sanctions against Iran and unfreezing the country’s assets would be discussed following the signing of the memorandum of understanding, Araghchi said.

From threats to diplomacy

The latest flurry of diplomacy came after the US and Iran traded strikes for two days this week, threatening to end a pause in fighting that has persisted since April 8.

The US and Israel launched the war on Iran on February 28, amid ongoing indirect talks on the future of Iran’s nuclear programme.

The US and Israel had also launched a 12-day war on Iran in 2025, during another round of nuclear talks.

Iranian officials have said that deep distrust towards the US has slowed the progress towards creating a lasting agreement to bring the current war to an end.

Trump, meanwhile, has repeatedly pledged to reach a deal that would surpass the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), struck under his Democratic rival, former President Barack Obama.

That agreement, from which Trump unilaterally withdrew in 2018, saw Tehran agree to limit its nuclear programme and allow for international inspections in exchange for sanctions relief.

For years, Iran has maintained that it is building a nuclear programme for civilian use only and is not seeking a nuclear weapon.

In his post on Truth Social, Trump again pledged that any deal reached would be more stringent than the JCPOA.

“Our relationship with Iran is a much different and better one than previous Administrations have had,” he said.

“Hopefully, this process will all work out quickly, easily, and smoothly,” he added.

“If it doesn’t, we have the ultimate alternative, hopefully never to be used again!” he wrote, without elaborating on what his threat meant.

Israel has continued to attack Lebanon, despite Iran saying it was included in a potential memorandum of understanding with the US. Fresh forced displacement orders were issued on Saturday morning, following Israeli bombardment throughout Friday night on towns and villages in the south.

WASHINGTON — President Trump said Friday that a “swift and lethal kinetic” U.S. strike has killed Hector Rusthenford Guerrero Flores, whom he called “the infamous leader” of the Tren de Aragua gang.

Tren de Aragua has been labeled by the United States as a terrorist organization. Guerrero Flores was charged in a New York federal court with racketeering conspiracy and other crimes, including lending support to terrorists in crimes that stretched more than a decade, authorities announced in December.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth posted on X that the strike occurred earlier in the week on a Tren de Aragua compound in Venezuela.

U.S. Atty. Jay Clayton alleged at the time that the gang is responsible for countless acts of violence, extortion and drug trafficking in North America, South America and Europe. Trump nominated Clayton on Thursday to be director of national intelligence.

The U.S. State Department had offered rewards of up to $5 million for information leading to Guerrero Flores’ arrest.

In a post on his social media site, Trump wrote, “Tren de Aragua terrorists no longer have safe haven in Venezuela or anywhere else and, under my leadership, we will find these vicious murderers and drug lords anytime, anyplace, and send them to the depths of hell where they belong.” Trump’s post referred to Guerrero Flores by his alias, Niño Guerrero.

Hegseth said, “The operation underscores the shared U.S. and Venezuelan commitment to take the fight to narco-terrorists and deny them any safe haven in our hemisphere.”

Venezuela’s ministry of communications did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the operation.

Trump has taken a series of extraordinary actions against the gang, including a series of strikes on small boats his administration has accused of smuggling drugs to the U.S.. At least 207 people have been killed in boat strikes by the U.S. military in the eastern Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea since the Trump administration began the campaign in early September.

Independent investigations, by the Associated Press and others, have raised questions about the boat passengers’ alleged connection to drug trafficking. And, in any case, many legal experts say the boat attacks amount to extrajudicial killings in violation of international law.

Trump and administration officials have consistently blamed Tren de Aragua for being at the root of the violence and illicit drug dealing that plague some U.S. cities. The president spent months repeating the claim — contradicted by a declassified U.S. intelligence assessment — that Tren de Aragua had operated under Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s control. The U.S. invaded Venezuela and seized Maduro in January to face U.S. drug charges.

Tren de Aragua originated more than a decade ago at an infamously lawless prison in Venezuela’s central state of Aragua. The gang has expanded in recent years as millions of Venezuelans migrated to other Latin American countries or the U.S. in search of better living conditions.

Guerrero Flores returned to the prison in Aragua on murder and other convictions in 2013, when Venezuela’s crisis began and corruption, mismanagement and a drop in crude prices wrecked the oil-dependent economy. Guerrero Flores and a few other inmates saw a profitable opportunity as the government neglected prisons.

They assumed control and administration of the prison, establishing a system that controlled the entire inmate population through force and extortion. Over time, they transformed the lockup into a sort of city that included a zoo, baseball field, casino and restaurants. Guerrero Flores had his own lavish suite.

The size of the gang is unclear. Countries with large populations of Venezuelan migrants, including Peru and Colombia, have accused the group of being behind a spree of violence in the region. Still, unlike other criminal organizations from Colombia, Brazil and Central America, Tren de Aragua has no large-scale involvement in smuggling cocaine across international borders, according to InSight Crime, a think tank that tracks crime across Latin America.

In Venezuela, gang leaders have long been known to participate in various illegal activities, including illicit gold mining.

Weissert writes for the Associated Press. AP writer Regina Garcia Cano in Mexico City contributed to this report.

As Washington and Tehran move towards a long-term ceasefire agreement, Gulf states will likely look for new long-term security solutions when a war in their region – which they did not start – finally ends.

It comes as United States President Donald Trump cancelled new strikes on Iran saying that a deal with Tehran was imminent, and that a “time” and “place” for signing would soon be announced.

In Tehran, officials appeared more cautious with one senior Iranian official telling Al Jazeera that the government was still reviewing a proposed Memorandum of Understanding with Washington.

Subsequent comments by Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif point to a deal being made, and what follows in the coming days could have important implications for collective regional security.

Attacks on the Gulf

The United States operates military facilities in at least 19 locations across the MENA region, including permanent bases in Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, according to the Council on Foreign Relations. Between 40,000 and 50,000 US troops were stationed across the region before the war on Iran started.

This US-Gulf nexus appeared to insulate states from conflicts engulfing other parts of the region, but over the past four months, Gulf states hosting US military facilities have been targeted by Iran.

“If there is a way to describe the prevailing security model in the region since the 1980s, the concept of security partnerships best encapsulates it,” said Mahjoub Al-Zuwairi, an academic and expert on Middle East politics.

“The countries of the region have chosen to align their security with broad international alliances. For decades, this model has provided a reasonable deterrent and logistical and intelligence depth that is difficult to replace.”

A security umbrella with holes

The war on Iran has exposed a paradox – while Iranian officials have repeatedly referred to their Gulf neighbours as “brothers”, they have also repeatedly targeted them during the war.

Despite the protestations of Gulf states that no attacks on Iran were launched from their soil, they have been repeatedly targeted.

At least 28 people have been killed across the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states in suspected Iranian drone and rocket attacks, since the US and Israel launched their offensive on Iran on 28 February. This has led to questions about the US-Gulf security arrangement.

“Just the war itself has pierced that sense of security, the US security umbrella is moribund at worst, or ineffective at best,” Simon Mabon, professor of international relations at Lancaster University, told Al Jazeera.

“They’ve long relied on it for their own security. Yet the presence of US forces on their territory directly meant they became targets. They can’t escape their geography [and] despite the tensions, despite the hostilities, despite the attacks, Iran isn’t going away. They have to find a way of dealing with this reality.”

The economic cost of war

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has proven be a setback for some Gulf states working to diversify their energy-reliant economies towards tourism, services and finance, but not all have been affected equally.

Saudi Arabia was able to redirect some oil exports through its East-West pipeline to the Red Sea, while Oman – whose main ports are outside the Strait of Hormuz – has also benefited from rising energy prices.

The UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar have been more heavily affected due to their dependence on the waterway for their energy exports, but the war has encouraged new thinking on long-standing security and economic arrangements.

“There are new pipelines being set up, but the capacity of these alternatives is infinitely smaller than the Strait itself,” said Mabon. “It will take enormous investment and years of development before they can come close to replacing it.”

Moving closer to Iran?

One possible lesson from the conflict is that Gulf states may seek engagement with Iran rather than confrontation, something that Gulf states had already made some groundwork on before the US-Israel war began.

The UAE restored diplomatic ties with Tehran in 2022, and a year later, Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to normalise relations in a deal brokered by China.

Al-Zuwairi says that the conflict could revive plans for MENA-led regional security arrangements, as envisioned in the 2019 Hormuz Peace Initiative, which proposed a Gulf security framework involving Iran, Iraq and the six GCC states.

But the distrust fostered since then – notably Tehran’s strikes on its Gulf neighbours – would make such a formation unlikely in the near future. 

“The recent war has opened the door wide to reconsidering the Gulf security system with its neighbours,” Al-Zuwairi said.

“How can Tehran propose a non-aggression pact while raining missiles on neighbouring cities? The initiative appears theoretically sound but practically bankrupt unless Iranian behaviour changes.”

Looking beyond Washington?

The solution for the Gulf could be a hybrid arrangement where ties with Washington are maintained, but other regional and domestic options are explored, including greater investment in local defence industries.

A possible blueprint for this could be the mutual defence agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan last September, stating that an attack on one country would be considered an attack on both.

Yet previous instances when Gulf states felt abandoned by the US have led to divergent responses, with the UAE and Bahrain deepening ties with Israel, but a new paradigm means that a more collective action to the issue of security might be considered.

“The war has demonstrated that every guarantor, no matter how many banners it flies, primarily protects its own interests,” said Al-Zuwairi.

“The region ends up paying the price for a war it did not choose … The security of the Gulf will not be created in Washington … It will be created when Gulf countries recognise that they must build it themselves, because when fires start, it is always those closest to the flames who pay the price.”

France and Germany have announced this week that they are ditching a landmark project to jointly develop a sixth-generation fighter jet.

French President Emmanuel Macron confirmed on Monday that the project is being terminated, in what is being seen as a major blow to efforts to boost defence cooperation between European Union states, a key issue amid uncertainty cast by United States President Donald Trump over the readiness of the US to help defend its NATO allies.

Trump’s disdain for Europe’s reliance on the US has been building for years.

Since 2019, the US president has been flirting with the idea of obtaining Greenland.

His remarks about his desire for the island, a self-governing territory which is part of the Kingdom of Denmark, built to a crescendo at the start of this year, with European leaders signalling their displeasure with the idea and Trump even threatening additional trade tariffs on those countries standing in his way.

Both Denmark and Greenland have repeatedly stated that the island is not for sale.

At one point, before Trump backed down after agreeing to a “framework of a future deal” on Greenland during a January meeting with NATO’s Mark Rutte in Davos, it seemed as if the US might even try to take the island by force – a notion that would have been inconceivable before the era of Donald Trump.

The threat of military action set off alarm bells in European capitals.

In addition to all this, Trump has withdrawn much of the US’s support for Ukraine and has consistently berated his European NATO partners for not spending enough on their own defence for years, outright urging them to reduce their reliance on the US for military protection.

More recently, Europe’s refusal to join the US-Israeli war on Iran, which began with strikes on Tehran on February 28, has further irked the US president and deepened concerns that a widening transatlantic rift could weaken the continent’s security and embolden Russia.

Until this week, a counterweight to these burgeoning concerns was in hand – the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) project, a landmark pact to jointly develop a next-generation fighter jet involving France, Germany and Spain.

But disagreements over whether France’s Dassault Aviation, or Airbus, which also represents Germany and Spain, should take the lead on the project have ultimately led to its collapse.

Analysts, however, say all hope is not lost: despite the dissolution of the bellwether venture, Europeans can indeed become strategically autonomous, they say – but the road there runs through shared military integration, rather than shared political aspiration.

The FCAS hoopla does “highlight the limitation of Europe’s defence industrial landscape, where national needs sometimes clash with the broader goal of defence integration”, Giuseppe Spatafora, a policy analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies, told Al Jazeera.

“But we also shouldn’t overestimate its impact.”

Setback, not collapse

According to Jamie Shea, a retired NATO official and associate fellow with the International Security Programme at Chatham House, FCAS’s dissolution is certainly a setback – but does not spell the collapse of European defence integration in its entirety.

“It was the type of high-tech, innovative and future-oriented programme that Europeans need to be able to achieve successfully if they are to become strategically autonomous and break their dependence on the US for major weapons systems,” Shea told Al Jazeera.

It had been hoped that FCAS would move the needle forward, particularly in the areas of artificial intelligence (AI), space, data fusion, and the manned and autonomous systems interface space, he said.

Others would have additionally joined the project as it gained momentum, as Spain did, he added, potentially creating a domino effect in next-generation defence technologies across the continent.

But, crucially, Spatafora said, the project dates back to 2017 – a different era, before Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine and before Trump’s return to the White House.

“Nowadays, the project might be designed differently to reflect the scenario,” he said.

“But it doesn’t affect the broader trend in Europe towards reducing dependencies on US military systems and strengthening its own defence capabilities.”

France and Germany will continue with some components of FCAS, such as its “combat cloud” feature, which will increase Europe’s cyber command-and-control capabilities, said Spatafora.

Airbus and a number of other German companies are also seeking to continue the programme in other areas, particularly software architecture and drone technology, Shea said.

“So there may be benefits for European defence and its defence technology base even if a manned fighter aircraft is not built,” said Shea.

Furthermore, there are “scores” of other joint defence projects being launched in Europe at the moment, even if they are not quite as ambitious as FCAS, he added.

Guntram Wolff, a senior fellow at the European think tank Bruegel, similarly urged against alarmism.

“I would not interpret this decision overly negatively,” Wolff told Al Jazeera.

“FCAS was a very complicated project and its military relevance may well be overstated at a moment of increasing importance of cheap autonomous systems. In part, the decision also reflects a reassessment of whether the high cost was really warranted.”

Europe, meanwhile, has other strengths it can build on, the analysts said.

The continent is strong in shipbuilding, submarines, short-range missiles and air defence – with systems like the German IRIS-T and the French-Italian SAMP/T – and has demonstrated it can build capable fighter jets, such as the Eurofighter Typhoon, Tornado and Gripen programmes have shown, Shea said.

Lessons and challenges

Europe’s main problem is underinvestment and the difficulty it has in scaling up to the level of mass production that modern warfare demands, said Shea.

This issue was brought into sharp focus this week when the UK’s secretary of state for defence dramatically resigned from government over defence funding.

He simply cannot keep the country safe on what he has been given to spend, he said. In his resignation letter to the prime minister, he wrote: “You have been unable and the Treasury has been unwilling to commit the resources that the nation needs to defend the country at this time of rising threats,” he wrote.

Ultimately, European nations are going to have to come together if they have any hope of matching US military might in the future, analysts say.

“It is the challenge of integrating all systems and all domains into a single battlefield management space where the US is in advance of the Europeans,” Shea said.

“Drones, which Russia and Ukraine are producing in the millions, are a case in point. Even the US suffers from weapons shortages as we have seen in the Iran war,” the former NATO official added.

Spatafora echoed the idea that the Russia-Ukraine war has lessons to offer the rest of Europe.

“The lesson of the war in Ukraine is that, in order to deter and defend itself properly, Europe needs cheap, mass-produced capabilities,” he said.

FCAS was about a very expensive capability, “so it was not really the key need for Europe’s deterrence today”, the analyst said.

The more pressing question that FCAS raises is how European nations will coordinate large projects which single countries cannot produce on their own and which could clash with the interests of numerous national industries. This is the conundrum which will likely shape the design of future EU instruments to support cooperative defence projects, said Spatafora.

Another challenge facing the continent is that major platforms like aircraft, ships or land warfare vehicles can take decades to develop, and contracts signed today will yield equipment that will not be on the battlefield before 2040, Shea said.

Europe will need to upgrade its current capabilities – recent upgrades to the Eurofighter jet and the Leopard tank are examples he cited – and look for gap-fillers elsewhere.

Spatafora argues that the FCAS collapse should not push European countries back towards reliance on American systems – or at least not more than they already have.

“The Trump administration’s approach and the depletion of stock after the Iran war have significantly reduced the reliability of US supplies,” he said.

The reliability of US guarantees, he added, depends on other assets – long-range missiles, forward-deployed troops, command-and-control infrastructure – “rather than on a next-generation fighter jet”, the analyst added.

‘Military requirements’ over ‘political ambition’

The FCAS failure is certainly good news for Russia, Shea said, “and also for the US, which will hope to sell Europe even more F-35s and maintain Europe’s traditional dependency on US military equipment”.

A rebound from the collapsed project, therefore, he argued, is necessary. But that is already in the works, analysts say, as Europe is already turning away from US dependability.

They point to the high likelihood of renewed interest in the UK-Italy-Japan Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) for a sixth-generation stealth fighter jet, in European Space Agency military space capabilities, and in EU defence financing mechanisms like the Security Action for Europe (SAFE).

Joint ventures with Ukraine, which, under fire from Russia for four years, has mastered mass production of drone technology and AI, should also help keep Europe up to speed in key areas, Shea added.

“The US has proven to be unreliable, or simply unable to remain committed to Europe, and the defence budgets are growing,” Spatfora said.

Washington will continue to remain relevant for certain capabilities – nuclear deterrence above all – but over time, European countries will seek to develop more and more on their own.

The ultimate lesson of FCAS, however, Shea argued, is that defence integration “has to be driven by military requirements rather than political ambition”.

Cooperation between France and Germany has always been difficult, he said – they have large defence companies “that do not want to play second fiddle to the other”, he said.

A more promising model, he said, is the joint UK-Norway agreement to produce a new destroyer-class warship, with BAE Systems as the main contractor and smaller Norwegian companies participating.

“Both countries operate in the North Atlantic and the Baltic Sea and share exactly the same concept of what the ship should be,” explained Shea.

“So it is this model of bottom-up, natural cooperation rather than top-down political cooperation that Europe needs to pursue.”

June 11 (UPI) — U.K. Defense Secretary John Healey resigned on Thursday after criticizing his government for spending “well short” of what it should on the military.

Healey resigned from the position in a letter addressed to British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, which was posted on X, because the country’s Defense Investment Plan does not meet requirements and could “reduce the readiness of our forces.”

Hours after Healey’s resignation, junior defense minister Al Carns also resigned from his post because of his own concerns about the “level of investment I know to be inadequate to the task,” NBC News reported.

Starmer said after Healey quit that he is “proud of our record on funding” and that he believes the funding plan that has been agreed to between the Parliament and Defense ministry “will provide the resources our military needs to keep us safe,” The BBC reported.

The prime minister has in recent weeks been called on to resign after less than great election results last month, and Healey is the second member of his cabinet to resign recently after former health secretary Wes Streeting quit because he’d “lost confidence” in Starmer.

In addition to Healey and Carns, Starmer’s parliamentary assistant to the Defense Ministry also left her role over “delays and difficulties” to fund the United Kingdom’s military readiness goals.

“We came into government recognizing Britain faced a new era of threat which demanded a new era for defense,” Healey wrote in the letter.

“Since then, you have been unable, and the Treasury has been unwilling, to commit the resources that the nations needs to defend the country at this time of rising threats,” he wrote.

Starmer on Thursday named former security minister Dan Jarvis to be the secretary of defense, whose job it will be to finalize the new defense funding plan, which is reportedly expected to be about half of the $37 million the ministry had requested.

Among the goals that had been set out in the most recent U.K. strategic defense review were increases in ammunition stockpiles, next-generation warplanes, drones and updated submarines.

With President Donald Trump proclaiming his desire to take Iran’s Kharg Island — whether he actually means it or not – we reached out to some former military commanders to get a sense of what it would take to seize and hold it and how telegraphing such a move could impact operations. The island, as we have noted in the past, is Iran’s main center of oil exportation, and a U.S. seizure would have tremendous military and economic impacts. An attempt to take it by force and hold it, as we have highlighted in prior reporting, would be an extremely risky operation, by all accounts.

Trump’s latest statements about taking Kharg Island came in the wake of the most intense round of tit-for-tat attacks between the U.S. and Iran since the ceasefire went into effect April 8. The U.S. launched waves of strikes across Iran, including firing what Trump said was 49 Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles at Iranian targets. In response, Iran launched missiles and drones at U.S. bases in Kuwait, Jordan and Bahrain.

Meanwhile, Iran claimed it shut the Strait of Hormuz completely after the new round of kinetic action while U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) insisted it remains “open for transit.”

However, in the wake of yesterday’s back-and-forth strikes, Trump proclaimed his desire to seize Iran’s vital oil infrastructure, including Kharg Island.

“At some point in the not too distant future, we will be taking Kharg Island, and other oil infrastructure points, and assume total control of their Oil and Gas Markets, much like we have with Venezuela, which is working out brilliantly for both Venezuela and the United States of America,” Trump said on Truth Social.

A short while later, the president modified those remarks in an interview with Fox News.

“I don’t know that America has the stomach for it, to be honest with you,” Trump later told the network. “You’d make a fortune, but I don’t know that America has the stomach, I think they’d like to see us come home.”

Located about 20 miles from the Iranian coastline, Kharg Island presents a daunting challenge, leaving troops trying to take it under threat from Iran’s remaining arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles, drones, rocket artillery, and fast boats that can launch swarming attacks on ships, fire missiles, and lay mines. This is something we were among the first to point out, before the possibility of invading the island became a nation news story.

“It seems unusual that we would announce an intention to seize Kharg Island in advance,” retired Army Gen. Joseph Votel, former leader of U.S. Central Command, told us. “Military commanders always want to preserve the principle of surprise in any operation – it helps reduce risk and often times gives us the tactical edge.”

“In this case the president did not announce any specific details – which can preserve some operational flexibility,” Votel noted. “It may also be a part of a more elaborate communications strategy that is focused on getting the regime to understand they are running out of options and that we can and will do whatever we need to, militarily, to support diplomatic efforts and bring the conflict to a conclusion.”

“Seizing Kharg Island is a significant undertaking,” added Votel, now a Distinguished Military Fellow at the Middle East Institute. “Not only will it involve ground troops to actually control the terrain – but also tactical delivery means, air cover, a strike campaign to set the conditions and then all the resources to protect this force while they are on the Island. In addition – the force has to be sustained meaning we have to have a way to get them supplies, engineering capabilities, life support, evacuate casualties, and if necessary reinforce them with additional force.”

All these actions would be taken close enough to the Iranian coast to “potentially subject [assault forces] to missile and drone attacks,” the former CENTCOM commander noted. “Not impossible, but certainly not insignificant either.”

When we first spoke to Votel about this issue in March when stories first bubbled up about Trump threatening Kharg Island, he told us that “a battalion sized force of Marines or soldiers could probably do that. So you’re probably looking at 800 to 1,000 troops, kind of size, maybe a little bit smaller, probably not much larger than that.”

Plans for the US military to try and capture the island “have been drawn up for months but continuously shelved because the operation was considered too risky,” a senior Pentagon official and two administration officials told CNN.

Speaking to us on Thursday, Chris Miller, who served as acting Defense Secretary at the end of Trump’s first administration, said it would take considerably more troops for such an operation than Votel first suggested.

“I would expect it would take an infantry brigade at a minimum,” said Miller, referring to a unit of between 3,000 to 5,000 troops. “I’d prefer two brigades and a lot of mobile air defense to protect from Shaheds and plenty of barrier material to make bunkers when artillery starts dropping in. Plus, obviously, significant air power to hit time-sensitive Iranian targets like artillery and missile batteries.”

“It’s completely doable by our combat forces in the region, ” added Miller, now founder and CEO of FPF Defense, a startup building a low-cost Shahed drone interceptor. “This is exactly the type of operation they are designed and optimized for. It’s not that heavy of a lift for them.”

Holding the island, if taken, won’t be easy, however, Miller posited. 

“The logistics would be challenging for us because it will be difficult to get resupply ships in under the Iranian defensive shield,” he explained. “And aerial resupply will be contested as well.”

Miller said he was not concerned that Trump told the world he wants Kharg Island.

“My assessment is the Iranian regime continues to misunderstand President Trump,” Miller said of his former boss. “I suspect the Iranians have already prepared for such an eventuality.”

Former Army Maj. Gen. Pat Donahoe, who retired in 2022 as commanding general of the U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence and Fort Benning in Columbus, said asking how Kharg Island can be taken “is the wrong question.”

“It’s not taking it, it’s holding it over time and enduring the slow bleed of casualties that comes with holding it,” noted Donahoe, now chief operating officer at Columbus State University in Columbus, Georgia.

“It’s Khe Sanh,” explained Donahoe, a reference to one of the longest and bloodiest battles of the Vietnam War, where about 6,000 Marines and their South Vietnamese counterparts held out at a base along the Laotian border against 20,000 North Vietnamese troops for nearly 80 days. 

“Sure we can grab it, but it puts us in range of all their stuff,” Donahoe said. “And we have to resupply it etc. It’s dumb.”

The U.S. struck military targets on the island during Epic Fury, but Trump has stated he ordered all the oil infrastructure to be left untouched. Since the ceasefire, Iran has been preparing for a possible U.S. operation to take control of Kharg Island, CNN noted today.

Video released by US Central Command shows what the military says are ‘self-defence’ strikes on Iranian military surveillance capabilities, communications systems and air defence sites. The footage accompanied a statement that US forces had completed the latest wave of attacks.

Tehran remains defiant amid US attacks, orders complete closure of Strait of Hormuz to all vessels.

Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth has confirmed that the United States is launching strikes on “key facilities” in Iran, framing the attacks as part of the ongoing negotiations for a permanent ceasefire.

Hegseth spoke to reporters on Wednesday in Tampa, Florida, as he left the headquarters for the US Central Command (CENTCOM), the military apparatus that oversees operations in the Middle East and parts of Asia.

His remarks echoed the escalating rhetoric of Republican President Donald Trump, who warned earlier that Iran would “have to pay the price” for taking too long with the negotiations.

“ CENTCOM — Central Command — will be busy tonight because President Trump said we will be hitting Iran hard, and we will be,” Hegseth said.

He explained that he had just reviewed the plans for Wednesday night’s attack with Admiral Bradley Cooper, CENTCOM’s commander.

“ Those strikes that’ll happen tonight will be strong. They will be clear,” said Hegseth, who then suggested they may continue into a second day. “If they have to happen tomorrow night, they will be strong, and they will be clear.”

CENTCOM followed Hegseth’s comments with a social media post, announcing “additional self-defence strikes” at 5:15pm US Eastern time (21:00 GMT).

“The strikes are in response to Iran’s unwarranted and continued aggression,” it wrote.

Within minutes of those comments, Iran’s IRNA media outlet reported explosions in Bandar Abbas, Qeshm, Gorgan and Hengam.

Wednesday’s attack will mark the second straight day of US attacks against Iran, fracturing the fragile truce struck on April 8.

The US has been at war with Iran since February 28, when the Trump administration joined Israel in an unprovoked attack on the country.

Both Israel and the US have argued that the attack was necessary to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, though Tehran has long denied seeking one.

But the Trump administration has offered contradicting rationales for the war in the months since it began.

At one point, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio suggested that the US acted “pre-emptively” because it “knew that there was going to be an Israeli action” and it wanted to head off retaliation. Rubio has since walked back those remarks.

Hegseth on Wednesday credited the upcoming strikes to frustration with Iran’s negotiating tactics.

“ As President Trump said, they’ve been tap-tap-tapping. You can see when someone’s trying to tap-tap-tap on a deal,” he said. “Instead, they’re going to have tap, tap, tap bombs dropping on key facilities in Iran from the United States of America.”

Since a temporary ceasefire was announced on April 8, much of the most intense fighting between the US and Iran has been paused.

But this week’s escalation began when an AH-64 Apache helicopter was downed near the Strait of Hormuz overnight on Monday.

Trump on Tuesday blamed Iran for the helicopter’s crash. Though no US service members were hurt, he said the US “must, of necessity, respond to this attack”.

In announcing a second round of attacks, Hegseth denied that the US sought to resume full-scale fighting. He instead framed the offensive as a means of kick-starting the stalled negotiations with Iran.

“That’s not because we want to restart anything we don’t have to restart,” Hegseth said of Wednesday night’s attack. “It’s because the War Department is prepared to set the terms to ensure that we get the kind of deal President Trump expects.”

The two sides have differed over issues like the fate of Iran’s nuclear programme and whether Iran would receive sanctions relief.

Trump has repeatedly threatened to attack Iran’s bridges and energy infrastructure, at one point warning that “a whole civilization will die” as a result of US attacks.

Those comments have prompted human rights concerns. Intentionally targeting civilian infrastructure can be considered a war crime, and critics compared Trump’s threats against Iranian “civilisation” to genocidal remarks.

Reporters confronted Hegseth with those concerns on Wednesday.

“You just mentioned you’re going to plan to hit them and strike them hard tonight,” one reporter asked. “If the response is in hitting bridges, electrical infrastructure, how would that not be a war crime, potentially targeting civilian infrastructure?”

Hegseth dismissed the question as “disingenuous” and accused the reporter of “impugning the motives” of the US military. But he did not rule out that civilian infrastructure would be struck as part of Wednesday’s attacks.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) says its forces began launching ‘self-defence’ strikes against Iran, holding Tehran responsible for downing a US Army Apache helicopter. Al Jazeera’s Alan Fisher has the latest from the White House.