Means

A new study by Australia’s internet regulator has revealed that more than eight in 10 young Australian teens and preteens are continuing to use social media platforms despite the government’s prohibition for children under 16.

The ban came into effect in December last year.

Here is what we know about how it’s going.

What did the latest report find?

Australia’s internet regulator, eSafety, said it had found that more than eight in 10 Australian under-16s are continuing to use social media despite being banned from doing so.

The report also found that most of those children aged 10 to 15 were using social media just as frequently in March as they had been before the ban came into force on December 10 last year.

“Most under-16s who had social media accounts before commencement were able to either retain them or create new ones at the three-month ⁠mark, with social media platforms’ failure to implement effective age assurance measures cited as the main reason,” eSafety said in a statement.

About half the children who retained their accounts said platforms had not checked their age, the most common reason they were able to stay on the services. Others said that their accounts listed them as aged 16 or older or ‌that age-checking ⁠systems had incorrectly determined they were older.

Prior to the ban, nearly 86 percent of children surveyed reported using at least one age-restricted platform. Three months later, that figure remained above 81 percent, the eSafety report said.

Around 58 percent of teenagers reported using social media daily, the report found. Before the ban, the number was roughly 60 percent.

The report showed minimal change in “sports and physical activity, arts and music, spending time with friends and family, and attendance at community events”.

At the time the new rule was introduced, experts warned that enforcing it would be extremely difficult.

Joanna Orlando, a researcher in digital wellbeing and the author of Generation Connected: How to Parent in a Digital World, told Al Jazeera in December last year: “Tech-savvy teens simply use VPNs, fake birth photos for face scans, or migrate to less regulated platforms like Lemon8, or to platforms not part of the ban like video games. Enforcement is proving to be difficult in the days leading up to the ban.”

In December 2025, Australia prohibited children under 16 from using social media platforms, becoming the world’s first country to do so. Video game platforms are not included in the ban.

The government said this was prompted by increasing concerns about the effects of cyberbullying, sexual exploitation and self-harm content on the mental and physical health of children and young people.

Research commissioned by the Australian government in 2023 found four out of five children aged eight to 16 use social media, often beginning between the ages of 10 and 12. That report was led by former National Australia Bank CEO Andrew Thorburn, who recommended age restrictions.

Under the law, 10 of the biggest social media platforms face $33m in fines if they fail to take “reasonable steps” to block Australian-based users younger than 16. Such steps include using age-verification tools to determine how old users are.

As of January 16, social media companies had revoked access to about 4.7 million accounts identified as belonging to children in Australia, according to officials.

“We stared down everybody who said it couldn’t be done, some of the most powerful and rich companies in the world and their supporters,” Australian Communications Minister Anika Wells told reporters in January.

However, several months later, it now appears that youngsters have been able to open new accounts with relative ease.

Days after Australia’s ban took effect, Reddit, one of the 10 platforms required to block minors, lodged a challenge to the ban in the High Court, while still complying with it. The case is still ongoing.

How has the Australian government responded to the latest findings?

On Saturday, Andrew Leigh, Australia’s assistant minister for productivity, competition, charities and treasury, defended the new law, arguing that the social media ban has already reshaped the “national debate” about the use of social media by children.

The ban has been “an important game changer in the conversation among parents”, Leigh said in televised remarks.

“We’ve had millions of accounts shut down,” he said.

“We never expected that this would have 100 percent compliance. We don’t get 100 percent compliance out of minimum drinking age laws, but it’s still appropriate that we have that law on the books.”

While social media has long provided easy access to unregulated and often harmful content, misinformation and hate speech, the recent explosion of AI‑generated material poses new risks to the wellbeing of children and young people, experts say.

The American Psychological Association published an advisory last year warning that generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems can amplify harmful content such as violent or sexual videos.

It also added that adolescents are less likely than adults to question the accuracy of AI-generated content. “They may also be unaware of the persuasive intent underlying an AI system’s advice or bias,” the advisory stated.

AI can also amplify pre-existing societal prejudices, according to Ayo Tometi, co-creator of the US-based antiracist movement Black Lives Matter.

Children worldwide are also worried about the misuse of AI for online child sexual exploitation and “deepfakes”, according to research by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) on children’s perspectives and AI, which it published in October 2025.

Following the introduction of Australia’s landmark law, some other countries are contemplating similar bans.

In the United Kingdom, the government has announced that it also plans to introduce a ban on social media platforms such as TikTok, Snapchat and Instagram from spring 2027 onward. 

Messaging platforms such as WhatsApp and Signal, educational tools, and e-commerce and music streaming will be excluded.

The government will announce the new regulations by the end of this year.

In November 2025, Denmark’s government said it also plans to prohibit social media platforms for children under 15, saying it had secured majority support in parliament. The ban is due to come into effect later this year.

Around the same time, Malaysia said it would ban social media accounts for people under 16 from this year.

In April, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis formally announced plans to prohibit social media access for children under 15 from January 1, 2027, subject to parliamentary approval.

WE ALL know five-star hotels aren’t made the same – but how do you know which resorts really feel like top-end luxury, and which have some hidden catches?

For example, Grand Hotel du Cap Ferrat on France’s Cote d’Azur will set you back a £2,055 a night in September – while El Mouradi Palace in Tunisia will cost just £123 (including ALL your meals).

Both are 5* but the difference in price is astonishing – and no surprise to a travel journalist like me.

Deciphering exactly how luxurious your five-star holiday resort is has always been a challenge.

The truth is, there is not one, single, global set of standards a hotel has to achieve in order to get that coveted top star status.

While 20 European nations have joined a group called the Hotelstars Union – including Greece, Germany and Austria – agreeing to adhere to a huge 247-point check list to harmonise standards, the likes of France, Italy and the UK are not members.

In Italy, the system is split across 20 different regional governments. In some parts of the country, a hotel can scoop a high star rating simply because it has a lift, a luggage room and a receptionist that speaks two languages.

The fact the rooms are unloved and wallpaper peeling would be irrelevant.

In France, the government enforces some of the strictest legal hotel regulations in the world.

To get five stars in France, a double room must be at least 24sq metres, feature air conditioning, high speed wifi, bathrobes and 24-hour room service.

In Tunisia, the Ministry of Tourism oversees ratings and a 5* property will generally be a sprawling all-inclusive mega resort with lots of amenities.

Because land and staff are relatively inexpensive, the hotels can look amazing with huge pools, private white sand beaches and marble-clad lobbies the size of football pitches.

But that all-inclusive buffet restaurant probably isn’t going to feature the same quality of food as the ultra-exclusive Four Seasons on the Cote d’Azur (think pizzas and pasta instead of lobsters and caviar).

And while the French hotel will be staffed by some of the most experienced hospitality professionals in the world, the same might not be said for the earnest, hardworking staff in Tunisia’s emerging tourist economy.

So how do you work out how 5* your holiday resort is?

Tour operators have been tackling the issue themselves – they don’t want to promise customers a 5* hotel in a non-European resort if, in reality, it is probably equivalent to a 3* in Europe.

Many will create their own ratings and often downgrade some hotels – TUI’s T system might decide that a 5* hotel in Egypt is actually a 4T based on the standards and facilities.

Jet2 has their own rating system, based on guest feedback, facilities, service and their team’s own in-person visits.

While that is a good start, what’s more important is to read the most recent reviews from real customers on websites like TripAdvisor, Feefo and TrustPilot – read as many of those as you can as a hotel may have had a good reputation five years ago but gone downhill since.

Look out for fakes though – if a hotel has a flurry of 5* reviews or multiple reviews using similar language, take that as a red flag.

And of course, look for reviews in The Sun’s very own travel section – our experienced journalists will give the verdict based on their own stays.

So next time you are browsing summer getaways, treat hotel stars like pirate maps – they are a rough guide, but you will need to do your own digging to find the real treasure.

WHAT THE STARS MEAN IN ENGLAND

England’s hotels are rated by VisitEngland or the AA (Automobile Association) using a standardised three to five star Quality Scheme with inspectors conducting annual, unannounced overnight visits to assess strict physical criteria, service levels and hospitality standards.

3 Stars:

Must have on-site dining options and offer a buffet breakfast with hot and cold options.

All bedrooms must have ensuite bathrooms, an iron and ironing board, space for guests to easily move around, good access to both sides of a double bed and individually-controlled heating systems.

You should also expect efficient service from approachable staff.

4 Stars:

All of the above is expected, as well as an elevated level of service where courteous, polite staff demonstrate good levels of service and in restaurants, can show they have good knowledge of the food and drinks on offer.

Room service should be provided and rooms have more space. Guests should be offered assistance with luggage.

5 Stars:

All of the above but staff should be anticipating guests needs to create unique and memorable experiences.

Impeccably-presented staff should be showing guests to their room and providing a full explanation of the hotel and room facilities.

There should be a 24hour return laundry service and at least one restaurant open to residents for all meals.

There should also be outstanding quality food and 24-hour room service with hot and cold options.

Breakfast should be served to the table.

Rooms should be spacious, double beds at least 5ft wide and air conditioning available.

WHAT THE STARS MEAN IN SPAIN

Like Italy, Spain doesn’t have a single national star rating system, each of its 17 autonomous regions (like Andalusia, Catalonia or Madrid) writes its own rules.

In the past, the rules were very focused on hardware checklists – the square metre size of rooms and corridors.

But now a more modern system allocates points for optional services like having a spa, pillow menu or valet parking.

3 Stars:

Rooms must be at least 15sq metres with a private ensuite bathroom of at least 4sq metres and include a telephone, television, and a safe either in room or at reception.

Central heating and air conditioning is required in all public areas – and in some rooms depending on the region.

Reception must be staffed at least 14hours a day with a phone number for overnight emergencies. Hotels must feature a bar or cafe.

4 Stars:

All of the above but rooms must be at least 16sq metres and feature air conditioning and heating.

Rooms must also feature a fully-stocked mini bar and an in-room safe.

Reception must be staffed 24/7 and staff should be multilingual, fluent in Spanish and English at an absolute minimum.

Luggage porter services and room service should be offered for a significant portion of the day.

5 Stars:

To gain five stars in Spain is legally-protected, very difficult to achieve, and heavily scrutinised by regional inspectors.

Rooms must be a minimum of 17sq metres with ensuites at least 5sq metres or larger.

Reception must be open 24/7 with dedicated concierge desk and valet parking.

Luxury room service must be available 24hours a day and the hotel should feature multiple premium dining options (including fine-dining or celebrity chef-backed restaurants) as well as high-end spa and wellness facilities and distinct luxury finishes.

Because the 5* category became so crowded, regions like Murcia and Andalusia created a special, ultra-exclusive legal tier 5GL (Grand Luxury) and to earn it, hotels must score hundreds of extra points by offering luxuries like private transfers, high staff-to-guest ratios and historic building preservation.

WHAT THE STARS MEAN IN GREECE

For decades, hotel stars in Greece were handed out by the Hellenic Chamber of Hotels and were based on strict criteria.

If you had a pool and a big lobby, you got five stars, regardless if the service wasn’t great.

But now the country has signed up to the Hotelstars Union, where hotels must meet a handful of strict, non-negotiable legal minimums plus amass a set number of points from a catalogue of luxury features.

3 Stars:

Reception must be open at least 10 hours a day, with a means to communicate 24hours and a comfortable lounge or waiting area.

Rooms must feature a desk and chair, colour TV with remote control, private safe and reliable wifi.

You should also expect a reading light next to the bed, a breakfast buffet and access to laundry / ironing services.

4 Stars:

All of the above plus reception available 16hours a day with a spacious seating area and dedicated lobby bar or cafe.

Rooms should be more comfortable with an upholstered chair or couch with a side table.

The hotels should offer a mini bar or 16hours of room service as well as premium touches like bathrobes and slippers.

5 Stars:

This tier must be audited by independent inspection bodies.

Reception must be open 14hours a day by multilingual staff that speak English.

A professional doorman or valet parking service is mandatory.

Guests must receive a personalised greeting – often a gift of local Greek products, fresh fruit or flowers in the room.

A safe, an internet device (on request) and a premium evening turndown service are also mandatory.

Food and drink must be available 24hours a day and the hotel should provide ultra-fast laundry services.

WHAT THE STARS MEAN IN TURKEY

All official star ratings are strictly controlled by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and to get a star rating, hotels must pass a rigorous assessment with mandatory entry requirements and a specific points system to evaluate everything from staff training to physical infrastructure.

3 Stars:

The reception should have a formal lounge offering hot and cold drinks to arriving guests.

Public spaces – and rooms – should have air conditioning.

Rooms should also have a TV, hairdryer in the bathroom and direct-dial phone to reach reception.

The hotel cannot just serve breakfast and should have at least one restaurant or cafe on site for more comprehensive meal options.

4 Stars:

Hotels must have a second restaurant on the property that is required to serve at least five authentic Turkish dishes to promote local gastronomy.

The hotel must also provide a swimming pool, entertainment options and at last three distinct activities or facilities from a pre-approved government list – including Turkish baths, saunas and tennis courts.

Rooms must add premium touches including a stocked minibar, in-room safe and room service.

5 Stars:

To achieve 5* status in Turkey, hotels must legally feature an on-site men’s and women’s hair salon, local shopping arcade or market and offer 24hour room service.

The infrastructure of the hotel should be able to support large numbers of guests while maintaining luxury – think round-the-clock reception, multilingual concierges, valet parking, multiple fine-dining a la carte restaurants and spa complexes.

It’s important to know that a 5* rating doesn’t mean that the offering is always top notch – think local spirits and beers instead of premium brands.

For true luxury, look for hotels that offer Ultra All Inclusive, an industry shorthand for premium, imported alcohol and branded goods.

WHAT THE STARS MEAN IN TUNISIA

Regulated by the Tunisian National Tourism Office (TNTO), for many years the star system was based heavily on grand architecture but a recent modernisation has seen the criteria overhauled to focus more on hygiene, safety and quality of service.

Four and five star hotels face unannounced inspections by the TNTO as well as inspectors acting as mystery guests.

It’s also important for guests to know that hotels must legally turn on their central air conditioning from June 15 to September 15.

If there’s a heatwave outside of those dates, the hotel isn’t legally required to turn its air con on.

Hotels also legally do not have to provide facilities year-round. In winter outdoor water slides and beach bars may be closed and entertainment cancelled.

3 Stars:

Rooms must be 13.5sq metres and feature a colour TV and private safe.

The hotel needs to have a reception staffed 12 hours a day, main restaurant, bar and wifi.

4 Stars:

Rooms must be 16sq metres. If the hotel has more than 30 rooms, the reception must be staffed 24hours.

The hotel must have multiple on-site facilities including an expansive outdoor pool, secondary bar, room service options and lifts if the hotel is more than two stories.

5 Stars:

Hotel must have premium furnishings, extensive grounds and flawless staff service.

Rooms must be a minimum of 24sq metres and guests can be expected to be pampered around the clock with 24 hour room service, dedicated concierge desk, porter and personalised guest greetings.

ANOTHER problem has arisen with the new EES entry rules for Europe and it could affect thousands of people.

In a recent case, one woman was questioned about her travels when she was confused for her sister.

EES has been introduced to use biometrics and fingerprinting to stop the need for manual checks at the border.

But it appeared that the system failed to correctly identify one woman from her twin sister.

As reported by Politico, the case involved one Brit who was accused of being illegally in the Schengen zone.

She was questioned by police while trying to fly back to the UK from Cluj-Napoca in Romania in May.

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Romanian authorities at the airport said that the woman’s departure hadn’t been properly recorded after a visit to Amsterdam in April 2026.

The problem was that she hadn’t been to Amsterdam – but her identical twin sister had.

EES appeared to have confused the twins despite taking biometrics.

The woman was questioned for about 15-minutes but was ultimately allowed to fly home.

Around 12,000 sets of twins are born in the UK every year, so this could cause problems for thousands of people.

Asking experts what could have caused the flaw in the system, Niovi Vavoula, chair in cyber policy at the University of Luxembourg, gave two possible explanations.

The first suggestion is that there may have been an improperly registered exit for the twin in Amsterdam.

The second they explained could have been down to the Romanian authorities in Cluj.

Niovi Vavoula told Politico, “It appears that the authorities are not well trained to distinguish between different processes and rely on facial images as the sole identification method.

“The fact they didn’t check the passport details in the EES, nor take into account that the EES is still fresh and there are various problems, shows what is called anchoring bias — when you rely on the first piece of evidence and disregard everything else.”

Romanian Border Police responded in a statement that said that EES had functioned properly at the time.

But that data in the system had to be “corrected” by border staff, who it added had not followed “applicable operational procedures.”

They added “we emphasise that this is an isolated incident and should not be considered representative of the overall performance of the [EES] system.”

For nearly two decades, Nigeria fought Boko Haram and its offshoots, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Ansaru, largely with bombs, bullets, and casualties announced in press briefings. However, the slow process of delivering justice through prosecution was the part of the counterterrorism machine that never quite got built properly. 

Thousands of suspects, many of them innocent, disappeared into the barracks and detention facilities of Giwa, Wawa, and the Borno Maximum Security Prison, some for a decade or more, without ever seeing a judge. HumAngle has reported extensively on that. Now, that is visibly changing.

At least 865 convictions were secured between January and July 2026 alone, according to Nigeria’s Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA). The convictions are part of the country’s Mass Trial Programme, a series of tribunal sittings. That figure represents more than half of all terrorism-related convictions the programme has produced since its inception, according to Zakari Mijinyawa, the ONSA’s Director of Legal Services.

However, ONSA has not released comprehensive data on acquittals, dismissals, plea agreements, or pending cases within this period, making it difficult to assess the programme’s overall prosecutorial performance or conviction rate.

In April, a federal court in Abuja convicted 386 people in a single sitting after four days of hearings before a panel of 10 judges, with sentences ranging from five years to life. In June, 12 more defendants were sentenced to death by hanging in cases spanning terrorism financing, kidnapping, and the 2022 massacre at St. Francis Catholic Church in Owo, Ondo State, where terrorists killed more than 40 worshippers.

The charges themselves read like a mirror of how an insurgency actually sustains itself: not only fighters but financiers, couriers, and suppliers. One man was sentenced to 20 years for selling cattle and goats to Boko Haram; the presiding judge, Justice Binta Nyako, called the offence “so gruesome” and rejected pleas for leniency. Another received ten years for exchanging roughly ₦750,000 with the group. A woman was convicted for ferrying hundreds of rounds of ammunition to a terror leader in the country’s northwestern region. 

This is prosecutorial attention to the economic scaffolding of terrorism – financing, logistics, and information-withholding; rather than a fixation on the terrorist with the gun, which has historically been the easiest and least useful person to punish.

Justice delayed – now being served 

Just as significant, though less publicised, is what has been happening on the other side of the ledger. The Department of State Services, under its current Director-General, Oluwatosin Adeola Ajayi, has spent the past year and a half reopening what officials describe as “inherited” detention files, including cases dating back to 2021 and 2022 involving people held for years on suspicion of terrorism before internal review panels ultimately found the allegations baseless.

A Kaduna farmer and herder, Nura Idris, arrested in 2024 over alleged Boko Haram links, was cleared and paid ₦3 million. A Yobe State resident, Ya’u Mohammed, received a similar package after two years in custody. Perhaps the starkest case is that of Sunday Ifedi, arrested with his wife, Calista, in 2021 over alleged links to the separatist group IPOB; Calista died in detention before either of them was ever tried. Sunday was released in December 2025 and paid ₦10 million, and the DSS says it now intends to rebuild the restaurant Calista once ran, in her name. Agency sources say more than 30 such cases have been reviewed and over ₦300 million has been paid out in total.

None of this restores what was lost. Years of a life lost, families destroyed, or a wife who did not come home. But as a matter of institutional behaviour, it is a genuine departure. Public compensation for wrongful terrorism detention remains unusual among West African security services. 

Even though it comes after years of pressure from human rights groups and media organisations, the reviews suggest a shift in institutional practice under the current DSS leadership, in which “we got this wrong” is no longer an unspeakable sentence inside Nigeria’s intelligence services. However, it is too early to know whether the approach will endure. 

For a country whose counterterrorism record has been shadowed for years by allegations of arbitrary detention, torture, and enforced disappearance in military custody, allegations HumAngle and other outlets have documented extensively, that is not a small shift.

Communities in the North East, particularly in Borno and Yobe, where terrorism has been ravaging lives, have long complained that indiscriminate sweeps net far more innocent men than actual insurgents. In 2014, for instance, 42 men from Gallari, a community in Borno State, were arbitrarily arrested and detained by the Nigerian Army. By 2025, more than a decade later, only five were still alive. Of those five, only three were eventually released. 

Each acquittal or compensation payout, in theory, is a data point against that particular grievance, and a small deposit into public trust that has been overdrawn for a generation. 

Still, an important puzzle remains why this shift is happening, and if there are measures in place to prevent further arbitrary or illegal arrests and detention of innocent citizens. An official with the DSS, who pleaded anonymity because they were not authorised to speak to the media, offered some insight into this. 

“The Director-General, on assuming office, directed that no arrest is made until all reasonable evidence is gathered about the offence being committed or believed to be about to be committed and the evidence is substantial enough to secure conviction in court,” they said. 

The halt of Operation Safe Corridor? 

It is against this backdrop that the Senate’s intervention on July 8 lands. Meeting to discuss a wave of attacks on military personnel,  prompted by the abduction and death in captivity of retired Major General Rabe Abubakar, the Senate adopted a resolution urging the federal government to halt Operation Safe Corridor (OPSC), the decade-old programme that screens, deradicalises, and reintegrates former Boko Haram terrorists who surrender rather than fight to the end. 

In July, Senator Joseph Ikpea, who represents Edo Central Senatorial District, made an additional prayer, seconded by former labour leader and Edo North Senator Adams Oshiomhole, arguing that pardoning and rehabilitating people responsible for atrocities makes no sense while their victims and the families of fallen soldiers receive comparatively little. The Senate wants surrendering fighters prosecuted instead, and “made to face the full wrath of the law”. 

The instinct is neither irrational nor new. Communities that watched OPSC graduates return home with vocational grants while widows of soldiers got condolence visits have voiced exactly this complaint for years. HumAngle’s own reporting from Borno has documented residents’ fury, alongside cases of the programme’s supposed “clients” turning out to be non-combatants swept up in raids and warehoused there simply because army cells were overcrowded. 

HumAngle understands that not everyone who goes through a deradicalisation programme was once a terrorist. Some of them can, in fact, be described as victims. Sources confirmed to HumAngle that whenever Boko Haram or ISWAP terrorists storm a village, they often prevent anyone from leaving and force residents to choose between joining the insurgents or being killed. For some people, the instinct to survive leaves them with little choice but to go along with the terrorists, hoping they will eventually find an opportunity to escape and surrender to the military. 

Even after surrendering, such individuals are usually required to undergo the deradicalisation process because of the time they spent under the control of the insurgents and the possibility that their beliefs or worldview may have been influenced.

There are also people who are made to undergo deradicalisation because they spent long periods in military detention facilities or prisons alongside high-profile terrorist suspects. The concern is that prolonged exposure to extremist inmates could have affected their thinking, even if they are later cleared and released. That was the case for Abubakar, a man who was once accused of belonging to Boko Haram but was later freed after authorities established that he was innocent. He told HumAngle that because of the years he spent in detention, he was still required to pass through the deradicalisation programme at Mallam Sidi, a facility in Gombe State that serves as the OPSC rehabilitation centre.

However, civil society groups such as the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC) and the CREAP Africa Initiative, in response to the Senate’s move, called for something more surgical: an evidence-based review of the programme’s screening and transparency, not its abolition.

“CISLAC commends the Senate for responding to earlier calls drawing national attention to the worsening security situation and reiterates that protecting the lives of Nigerians, upholding justice, and restoring public confidence in national security institutions must remain central to all government responses to terrorism and violent extremism,” stated its director, Auwal Rafsanjani. 

But the Senate’s prescription runs into an operational reality that the mass trials should make obvious: Operation Safe Corridor and the tribunal system are not rivals competing for the same defendants. They were designed, from the start, to sort two different populations: hardened commanders and financiers who should be prosecuted, and conscripted or coerced low-level members whom the military itself has long argued should not be, because there would be nowhere to put tens of thousand of them, and because the promise of a “safe corridor” home is one of the few incentives that reliably pulls terrorists out of the bush faster than bullets do. 

Babayo Sule, a security analyst, put it this way in response to the resolution: the programme exists precisely because years of a purely kinetic strategy failed to end the insurgency on its own; scrapping it removes one of the few levers that can shrink Boko Haram’s manpower without a single shot being fired.

“The Nigerian government will not have opted for the choice of deradicalisation except that Nigeria’s security architecture is overwhelmed by the multi-pronged and multidimensional challenges of insecurity across the country,” he said.

There is also a due-process irony the Senate seems not to have registered. The same week lawmakers called for suspending rehabilitation in favour of prosecution, courts were demonstrating, at unprecedented volume, that prosecution is now genuinely available and increasingly being used. 

The danger of the Senate’s resolution, then, is less that it is emotionally wrong (grief for a murdered general and for civilians killed for a generation is entirely legitimate) than that it collapses two distinct instruments into one, at the exact moment when both are showing, separately, signs of working. 

That distinction has, in fact, just been reinforced by the federal government itself. On Monday, July 13, the ONSA, through the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), unveiled a comprehensive set of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for Nigeria’s Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme. Rather than expanding eligibility for rehabilitation, the framework seeks to formalise a process that has often been criticised as opaque by defining institutional responsibilities, referral pathways, case management procedures, human rights safeguards, and mechanisms for inter-agency coordination.

Perhaps more importantly, officials were explicit that DDR is not intended to replace criminal accountability. Abimbola Wońosikou, the NCTC’s Director of Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, stressed during the validation workshop that individuals accused of serious crimes would continue to face prosecution through the appropriate legal processes, while only those who meet established eligibility criteria would proceed through rehabilitation and reintegration. 

In effect, the SOPs are intended to codify the distinction between those who should stand trial and those whose circumstances warrant disengagement and rehabilitation, an area critics have long argued lacked sufficient clarity and transparency.

“What needs to be done is to look at what is wrong, how to amend it and how to make it better. It is even better to expand the programme rather than discard it,” Babayo said.

This, HumAngle gathered, could include reforming screening, introducing tighter oversight of who qualifies as a “low-risk” defector, and ensuring faster referral of the genuinely culpable into the tribunal system. The newly adopted DDR SOPs appear designed to achieve many of these objectives by clarifying institutional mandates, strengthening oversight, and embedding human rights safeguards throughout the process. Such measures would address almost every grievance the Senate raised without discarding the one mechanism that has, for a decade, given terrorists still in Sambisa and the Lake Chad Basin forests a reason to walk out instead of dig in.

Whether these safeguards restore public confidence will depend less on the existence of the SOPs than on how consistently they are applied, particularly in deciding who qualifies for rehabilitation and who is referred for prosecution. 

The largest single piece of federal housing legislation to come out of Congress in at least a generation is is now law.

It happened in the middle of night early Saturday, without fanfare — or even President Trump’s signature — and it might be a while before many Californians notice its effects.

That’s because the bill, though politically monumental — both chambers approved it overwhelmingly — doesn’t do one big thing. Instead, it does a lot of little things. Individually, none of the bill’s 56 regulatory tweaks, pilot programs and low-cost loans and grants are likely to move the needle on the nation’s housing affordability woes, nor on California’s specifically.

Supporters hope that collectively, they just might.

Even the law’s path to enactment had an under-the-radar quality to it. The White House abruptly canceled a planned signing ceremony late last month, with Trump vowing not to sign the bill until Congress first passed his restrictive national voter ID proposal. That bill has stalled out in the Senate.

Still, Trump did not veto the housing package, so it automatically became law Saturday just after midnight, as per the Constitution.

For all that, supporters say this is still a big deal: a major, bipartisan piece of legislation aimed at boosting housing construction from a hyperpartisan legislative body that doesn’t typically touch the topic.

“We don’t often gather to celebrate federal housing legislation,” Stephen Russell, president of the San Diego Housing Federation, said at a news conference Thursday. “I think the last time Congress passed anything of this magnitude, many of you were not even alive. … It is almost a once-in-a-lifetime event.”

That’s thanks in part to a growing caucus of lawmakers aligned with the “Yes In My Backyard” movement that helped push the bill into law. Many hail from California, a state that has had more experience than most contending with wildly unaffordable housing. But the cause of making housing more affordable, and attributing high housing costs to a lack of sufficient supply, has become a national and bipartisan concern. Case in point: The bill originated as a joint proposal by Sens. Tim Scott (R-S.C.), an ardent conservative, and Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), among the most liberal members of the Senate.

While the constituent parts of the bill are relatively narrow and none is specifically focused on California, experts highlight a few provisions that could leave a notable imprint on the state.

Build now (or else)

For high-cost cities that don’t build much housing, as in much of urban California, the federal bill includes a novel carrot and stick.

This portion of the bill would change the Community Development Block Grant, one of the largest sources of federal funding for affordable housing and local economic development. Pricey cities — defined through a variety of data benchmarks like median prices and vacancy rates — with a track record of under-building that continue to see below-average housing construction will have their grant funds cut by 10%. The savings will go to their municipal counterparts that build at a faster clip.

That’s likely to have “real implications for cities like Los Angeles and San Francisco that have traditionally lagged behind” in adding housing supply, said David Garcia, the deputy director of policy at UC Berkeley’s Terner Center for Housing Innovation.

The city of Los Angeles received $48.4 million in its last award from the block grant program in 2024, according to U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development data. San Francisco received $18.9 million.

Those numbers aren’t enough to make or break the budget of either city.

“I think this will be a small nudge,” said Laura Foote, executive director of YIMBY Action, in an email. “Which taken across the country could still have a good impact! Little nudges add up.”

More dramatic than the number of dollars involved may be the precedent the policy sets. Even in California, where the state government has aggressively incentivized cities to plan for more housing development and penalized those that don’t, lawmakers have never punished municipalities for failing to actually grow — an outcome that may not always be under a city government’s control.

Such an idea would have been “inconceivable in previous congresses,” Garcia said.

Despite that, the provision hasn’t engendered much public opposition from local government groups yet. In an online summary, Michael Wallace, a lobbyist with the National League of Cities, applauded the overall housing bill as an example of the federal government “choosing partnership with local governments over preemptions.” He singled out other provisions of the bill that provide expanded flexibility for Community Development Block Grant spending, new incentive programs for adding supply, and new supports for local urban planning.

Chassis change

Manufactured housing units are often colloquially referred to as mobile homes, but they don’t tend to move around much. Built on assembly lines and shipped to where they’re needed, these naturally affordable houses — the likes of which lawmakers across California and the United States claim we need in droves — are often placed upon permanent foundations where a fewer than 1 in 10 ever move again.

Even so, the federal building code applied to manufactured housing includes a costly, vestigial reference to its mobile origins: a permanent chassis.

A giant steel frame with removable axles and wheels, the chassis ostensibly exists to make it easier to pick up and move a manufactured house by truck. In practice, it serves as a 10- to 12-inch-thick floor beneath the floor. Because it cannot be removed upon delivery, it just serves as “dead space and wasted money,” said Jess Maxcy, president of the California Manufactured Housing Institute, the industry’s trade group. Aside from adding thousands of dollars in added costs per unit, it also makes it harder for manufactured units to be stacked into double story homes or multifamily apartment buildings.

The federal housing bill removes the permanent chassis requirement, something that manufacturers and some housing policy experts have been pushing for since the mid-1980s.

“That relatively minor change will expand access to one of the most affordable forms of home ownership available,” Rep. Scott Peters (D-San Diego) said at the Thursday news conference.
Maxcy said he doesn’t expect the end of the chassis requirement to trigger an overnight building boom in the manufactured home industry. But especially in California, where, due to the high price of land, new single-family homes are more likely to be built stacked on small lots, the regulatory change “provides more opportunities and helps us reduce the price.”

Recovering after disaster

In the months after a natural disaster, long after emergency federal dollars have come and gone, Congress has provided communities with long-term rebuilding grants through the Community Development Block Grant—Disaster Recovery program. Over the last three decades, the program has spent more than $100 billion on the long-term work of recovery, like home construction, infrastructure repair and rental and relocation assistance. That money tends to be reserved for low-income people and communities “who are not going to bounce back without the funds,” said Marion McFadden, who used to run the program under the Biden administration and now works at the disaster preparation and recovery consulting company IEM.

Unfortunately for California, the program only kind of exists. Since the mid-1990s, it’s been stood up and funded on an ad hoc basis, one appropriation bill at a time. That presents a challenge for communities planning in the middle of post-disaster planning. It also means the rules that govern the program — when the money goes out, to whom, under what conditions and for what purposes — are redrafted with each political administration. That’s had the effect of slowing things down considerably. No program funding has gone to Los Angeles in the wake of the 2025 fire storms, according to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Congress has yet to appropriate any.

The new housing bill would officially write the program into law for at least three years.

“It creates the ability for HUD to have money on hand before a disaster and then make a decision within 15 days about whether they’re going to provide funding,” McFadden said.

What the housing bill doesn’t do: provide fresh funding. Disaster-prone communities will need to wait for Congress to take that up later.

A ‘bottleneck’ removed

For the last two decades, public housing authorities in Los Angeles and the Bay Area have been turning to the federal Rental Assistance Demonstration program to help repair and upgrade their aging stock of increasingly dilapidated public housing. The program works by switching up funding sources in a way that gives locals more flexibility to borrow money and attract private investment dollars.

Until the new law took effect this weekend, the federal government was only authorized to permit 455,000 of these conversions. The law raises the cap by an additional 100,000.

“This has been a bottleneck in California for years and that bottleneck just got removed,” said Russell with the San Diego Housing Federation.
Not all affordable housing advocates are cheering the development. The National Low Income Housing Coalition has consistently opposed expansion of the program on the grounds that the change in funding source could weaken existing tenant protections. It’s unclear whether and to what extent that might be true. A study from last year found no evidence that conversions under the program lead to more evictions.

Wall Street out of suburbia

If you’ve heard only one thing about this housing bill, it’s that it bans “large institutional investors” from buying up more single family homes.

Caveats apply in the final version of the law. The bill defines “large” as any of a number of business structures with control over more than 350 single-family homes. It doesn’t apply retrospectively, so current investors with portfolios brimming with houses need not divest. Exemptions exist for new construction, renovations and senior housing. In California specifically, where corporations and other major investors do not play a significant role in the housing market, the effect is likely to be muted.

The measure “takes a hyper-salient issue for lots of people across the country and does a pretty modest intervention to address it,” said Chad Maisel, a fellow at the liberal-leaning Center for American Progress and a former housing policy advisor to President Biden.

Even so, the provision has plenty of bipartisan appeal. Earlier this year, Trump called for an even stricter crackdown on so-called corporate landlords. Gov. Gavin Newsom followed suit the same week.

The anti-investor language was considerably watered down from earlier this year, when a related provision threatened to undermine “build-to-rent” projects: well-financed subdevelopments of single-family homes reserved for renters. That prompted a revolt by many developers and YIMBY activists who had otherwise enthusiastically supported the bill, who argued that such communities are one of the fastest growing sources of the U.S. housing stock and provide some of the few opportunities for renters to live in suburban-style, family-sized housing.

After the build-to-rent provision was left on the cutting room floor of Congress, state Sen. Aisha Wahab, a Fremont Democrat who is now running for Congress, introduced a bill that picked it back up again. SB 880 would have banned the bundled sale of multiple single-family homes, striking at the heart of the build-to-rent business model. That bill died in the Assembly Judiciary committee in late June.

Christopher writes for CalMatters.

The United States Senate has voted in favour of invoking its war powers to force President Donald Trump to halt his military campaign against Iran or seek congressional approval before any further action is taken.

Here is a closer look at Tuesday’s vote – the 10th attempt Congress has made to rein in the US-Israel war on Iran – and what this means for the US government.

Why did this vote take place?

A similar measure had already been approved in the House of Representatives on June 3 by a vote of 215 to 208, and on Tuesday, the Senate passed it in a 50-48 vote. Trump’s Republican Party has slim majorities in both chambers.

Speaking on the Senate floor before the vote, top Democrat Chuck Schumer advocated for the war powers resolution as he criticised Trump’s military campaign against Iran.

“For years, Trump promised to put maximum pressure on Iran, but he ended up delivering maximum confusion, maximum chaos, maximum cost to the American people with his disastrous war,” Schumer said.

“Time after time, the vast majority of Senate Republicans sided with Trump and his war instead of the American people. The American people have paid the price for Trump’s historic blunder in Iran. It’ll go down in the history books as one of the worst foreign policy forays America has ever made.”

The war against Iran has proved highly unpopular in the US. A poll released on Tuesday by the news agency Reuters and the research firm Ipsos found that 24 percent of respondents felt the war had been worth the cost.

The Senate passed its first war powers resolution against the Iran conflict on May 20, but that effort was a procedural move only and did not progress.

Who voted and how?

Four Republican senators crossed party lines to vote for the resolution, and all but one of the chamber’s Democrats also voted in favour.

Tuesday’s breakaway Republicans were Bill Cassidy of Louisiana, Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, Susan Collins of Maine and Rand Paul of Kentucky. A further two Republicans did not vote: Mitch McConnell of Kentucky and Dave McCormick of Pennsylvania.

The lone Democrat to vote against the measure was Pennsylvania’s John Fetterman.

What does the resolution say?

The war powers resolution “directs the President to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities against the Islamic Republic of Iran”.

Only if “explicitly authorised by a declaration of war or a specific congressional authorisation” would Trump be allowed to use further military force against Iran, it says.

The resolution, however, does allow for a limited military presence to remain in the Middle East to prevent any “imminent attack” against the US or its allies.

What is the significance of the vote?

The vote reflects growing unease even among some of Trump’s Republican supporters about the unpopular conflict, which began with US-Israeli air strikes on Tehran on February 28.

This is the first time both chambers of Congress have passed a resolution directing a president to remove US armed forces from a warzone under the War Powers Act although it was not immediately clear how the votes might affect the conflict.

Technically, the Trump administration should now seek explicit congressional approval for further strikes on Iran. However, previous administrations have found routes around this by securing more limited authorisations for the use of military force (AUMFs) instead.

For example, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 2001, Congress passed an AUMF that gave then-President George W Bush broad powers to conduct what would become the global “war on terror”.

And one year later, it passed another AUMF, allowing the use of the military against the government of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, which became the basis of the 2003 invasion.

The two authorisations remain in place, and presidents continue to rely on them to carry out strikes without first seeking congressional approval. The assassination of top Iranian General Qassem Soleimani in 2020 in Baghdad was authorised by Trump under the 2003 AUMF.

In addition, a resolution does not have the force of law. Experts said, therefore, that while the Senate vote is viewed as a rebuke to Trump, it is largely symbolic.

What effect will this have on US-Iran talks in Switzerland?

Before the vote on Tuesday, some Republican senators had warned that the war powers resolution would weaken Trump’s standing in the Switzerland negotiations.

“If this passes, the Iranians are going to simply stand up and walk away from negotiations,” Senator James Risch of Idaho told the Senate on Tuesday.

“They’re going to say: This thing’s over. The Congress has told the president of the United States, ‘Leave us alone. We can do whatever we want to do,’ and they will walk away.”

How will the Trump administration respond?

Risch also argued that the resolution is essentially useless, given its symbolic nature. “It’s going to have no effect. The president isn’t going to pay any attention to it,” he said.

The US Constitution gives Congress the sole power to declare war, but that division of power has eroded over the past 75 years as successive presidents alone have committed US forces to overseas conflicts.

Trump has pointed to that precedent to argue that he does not need congressional authorisation at all.

In an appearance on The Axios Show last week, Trump denied learning any “lesson” about the limits of his executive powers during the Iran war. “There are no limits,” he said.

The last time Congress voted to go to war was during World War II although it has passed AUMFs in the decades since, which allow for limited military engagement without congressional approval for all-out war.

During Trump’s first term, there were concerns that he could use the 2001 AUMF to strike Iran under the unfounded claim that Tehran supports al-Qaeda.

Some critics pointed out that Republicans may be more willing to confront Trump over the issue of congressional authorisation now as they defend their seats before November’s midterm elections.

Kevin Turner is in intensive care and his family will need to pay the bill – and the cost of getting him home

A dad faces a £30,000 medical bill after falling ill on holiday because he didn’t declare a common ailment on his travel insurance. Kevin Turner flew to Alicante with his partner Joy Peck in May after feeling poorly the week before with a chest infection.

After taking antibiotics and steroids, the 63-year-old said he felt assured by his GP that he was ‘good to go’ and was prescribed more medication to account for being away. The retired painter and decorator felt ‘off’ when he landed but put it down to the journey. It was when his chest pains worsened the following day that Joy called an ambulance.

After being rushed to a hospital in Alicante, doctors discovered Kevin had a pierced lung and pneumonia and he was put in intensive care. Despite having holiday insurance, Kevin’s family says his medical bills aren’t covered as he didn’t declare his chest infection before travelling – meaning he faces bills of at least £30,000.

Kevin’s daughters Sam Turner, 44, and Natalie Fowell, 40, have set up a GoFundMe to help pay his medical bills and get him home to the UK. Sam, from Winsford, Cheshire, said: “It was really, really scary because obviously you’re helpless. You’re over here and you don’t know what’s going on.

“He did have an existing chest infection that he had visited the doctor for that week and had been given antibiotics and steroids. He did also say that he was due to go on holiday and there were no warnings or concerns around that [from the GP] so he thought he was good to go.

“They just gave him enough medication for the fact that he was going away and that was it. He’d arrived at midnight, had something to eat and drink and gone to bed, feeling a bit off but just put it down to travel. It got progressively worse from there.

“By the next day the pains were just so much that in hindsight he probably already had pneumonia when he got on the flight, but he wasn’t aware. Joy rang me from the hotel and said ‘I’ve had to call him an ambulance, he’s not good’ and we were like ‘right, ok get him to the hospital’, trying to get updates all the time.

“They [doctors] said he had a pierced lung and chest and stomach pain where it’s believed air and gases had built up and had to be drained.”

Wedding co-ordinator Sam flew out to be with her dad on May 30 to be by his bedside. After contacting the insurance company, Sam says she was told that Kevin’s medical bills wouldn’t be covered as he didn’t declare the ongoing chest infection on his travel insurance before flying.

The cost of his bills is estimated to be £30,000, but as Kevin is still in intensive care it may rise. You can donate to Kevin’s GoFundMe here: https://www.gofundme.com/f/support-kevs-recovery-and-journey-home

Sam said: “It very much looks like it’s a case of, the small print says if there are any significant health changes up to the date of travel then you must notify them. He’s still in intensive care and we’re trying to find out what the prognosis is.

“He hasn’t been out of bed, he hasn’t used his legs or feet and he’s just really worried because he’s lost all feeling in them. The insurance took about two weeks for them to decide that they weren’t going to pay out. It involved a lot of chasing from us.

“I would always say read the small print of the insurance document, make sure you go with a reputable company and look at their reviews.”

The United Kingdom’s Court of Appeal has ruled that the British government was right to proscribe the Palestine Action activist group as a “terrorist” organisation last year.

Palestine Action is a British protest group which was founded six years ago and describes itself as a movement “committed to ending global participation in Israel’s genocidal and apartheid regime”.

On Monday, police made more arrests of protesters demonstrating in support of Palestine Action outside the Court of Appeal in London.

Since the group’s proscription, which also bans support for proscribed groups, about 3,000 people have been arrested.

The Metropolitan Police welcomed the ruling and said it would continue to arrest those who protest in support of the group.

Here is what we know about the ruling:

What has the Court of Appeal ruled?

The judgement released on Monday states: “The proscription of an organisation like Palestine Action is highly controversial. But it is a fundamental mistake to overlook the fact that Palestine Action overtly promotes unlawful violence amounting to terrorism”.

The ruling was made by a five-strong panel, including the two most senior judges in England and Wales.

Palestine Action, which was formally proscribed by the UK last July, is a British protest group founded six years ago. It says it uses “disruptive tactics” to target “corporate enablers” and companies involved in the manufacture of weapons for Israel, such as Israeli group Elbit Systems, Italian aerospace company Leonardo, French multinational Thales and Teledyne from the United States. The group has targeted British facilities linked to those companies.

In all, British police say action by the group has resulted in millions of pounds of criminal damage.

A court in London ruled on June 12 that four Palestine Action members convicted of criminal damage at a British facility owned by Israeli weapons group Elbit Systems near Bristol, west England, would be sentenced on the basis that their actions had a “terrorist connection”.

Why was this case brought?

Following the proscription of Palestine Action last year, the group’s co-founder, Huda Ammori, challenged the decision in the High Court. In February, the High Court ruled that the government’s “terror group” ban was unlawful and disproportionate.

The government immediately said it would appeal. “I am disappointed by ⁠the court’s decision ⁠and disagree with the notion that banning ⁠this terrorist organisation ⁠is disproportionate,” ⁠Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood ⁠said.

The judgement on Monday agreed with her. Its ruling states: “The Home Secretary had the institutional competence and the democratic accountability to make the decision. The Proscription Decision was consistent with the Home Secretary’s Proscription Policy and was proportionate. It was not unlawful.”

Why did the UK proscribe Palestine Action?

On June 20, 2025, Palestine Action activists broke into the Royal Air Force base at Brize Norton in Oxfordshire and sprayed two military aircraft with red paint.

Days after the Brize Norton attack, members of parliament voted in favour of proscribing the group. That classified Palestine Action as a “terrorist” organisation, bringing it into the same category as armed groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIL (ISIS).

Critics decried the vote, arguing that while members of the group have caused damage to property, they have not committed violent acts that amount to terrorism. More than 130 high-profile public figures have spoken out against the proscription.

Other previous actions the group has taken include:

• In 2021, members protested for six days on the roof of Elbit Systems’ subsidiary, UAV Tactical Systems in Leicester, until some were arrested by police.
• In 2022, the group broke into a Thales equipment factory in Glasgow, causing damage to weapons worth more than a million pounds ($1.3m).
• In 2024, 10 months into Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza, Palestine Action activists broke into an Elbit Systems UK facility near Bristol in southwest England, causing another million pounds of damage.

How has Palestine Action responded to the ruling?

In a statement read by a representative following the ruling, Palestine Action’s Ammori said the group will challenge the judgement in the UK’s Supreme Court.

“We will fight this all the way. We will seek permission to appeal to the Supreme Court and, if need be, take this to the European Court of Human Rights,” Ammori said.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), established by the Council of Europe, allows individuals to hold member states accountable for rights violations through a dedicated court. When the ECHR finds a violation, its judgements are legally binding on the state concerned under the European Convention on Human Rights.

“We will not stop fighting to overturn one of the most extreme attacks on free speech and the right to protest in modern British history,” Ammori added.

“This unprecedented abuse of power has devastated the lives of thousands of people while silencing dissent over Israel’s slaughter of the Palestinian people during the genocide, when that dissent could not be more urgent.”

How have others reacted to the ruling?

Anas Mustapha, Head of Public Advocacy at CAGE International, said: “This ruling tells us exactly what these powers are for. They are not safeguards against violence, they are authoritarian tools for crushing dissent.”

Mustapha added: “No ruling from any court is going to convince people that their conscience is wrong, and no amount of legislation will make support for Palestine disappear. The only sustainable outcome is the abolition of these laws in their entirety.”

Thomas Bell, acting UK Director of Human Rights Watch, said: “This disastrous decision further cements the UK’s place among countries that are backsliding on human rights by classifying acts of protest as terrorism.”

“When Palestine Action members have committed criminal damage, that should be dealt with under normal criminal laws, not by misusing overbroad and poorly defined terrorism powers. Defining a protest group as terrorists has created an absurd situation where thousands of people peacefully holding up signs have been arrested,” Bell added.

Venezuela is becoming increasingly important in Colombia’s presidential election, though not necessarily from a policy perspective. The three leading candidates are not offering radically new approaches toward Caracas. Instead, they broadly accept that Colombia will not shape Venezuela policy in a vacuum, but within a regional framework increasingly defined by Washington.

Even among the Colombian Right, the differences are narrower than the rhetoric sometimes suggests. Some candidates favor preserving parts of the thaw in relations initiated under Gustavo Petro, while others align themselves more openly with the Trump administration’s emerging three-phase approach toward Venezuela, combining pressure, negotiation, and eventual normalization while maintaining support for María Corina Machado and the democratic opposition.

The real competition is happening elsewhere.

As Bogotá increasingly adapts itself to strategic realities designed in Washington, Venezuela has become less a matter of concrete policy and more a source of symbolic legitimacy inside the Colombian Right. The question is no longer simply who has the best Venezuela strategy, but who is most closely aligned with the hemisphere’s most internationally legitimized anti-chavista figure.

Both Paloma Valencia and Abelardo de la Espriella have sought proximity to Machado, likely recognizing her growing political value among Colombian-Venezuelan voters and sectors of the Colombian Right that increasingly view her as a hemispheric democratic symbol after July 28, 2024. Early in the electoral cycle, both candidates publicized meetings with Machado and members of her team, presenting themselves as politically aligned with the Venezuelan opposition’s struggle. Valencia recently traveled to Panama to meet Machado personally, while De la Espriella has repeatedly emphasized his relationship with anti-chavista circles to position himself as part of a broader regional conservative realignment.

Yet the two candidacies embody very different political instincts.

Support from figures close to Machado, Trump-world Republicans, Miami exile networks, and conservative media ecosystems now carries political value extending far beyond Venezuela itself.

Valencia represents a more traditional conservative internationalism tied to institutional anti-chavismo, democratic legitimacy, and Atlanticist conservatism. De la Espriella, meanwhile, has increasingly embraced a far more populist style of politics, openly presenting himself as a Colombian version of Nayib Bukele that promises to build ten CECOT-style mega prisons in Colombia.

That contradiction becomes particularly striking when placed alongside one of the defining professional relationships of De la Espriella’s career: his representation of Alex Saab during the height of the CLAP era. Saab became one of the clearest symbols of late-stage chavismo’s corruption architecture, embodying the opaque financial networks, sanctions arbitrage, and humanitarian corruption that increasingly defined the Maduro era.

The irony of Saab’s former lawyer attempting to embody Colombia’s hardest anti-chavista and anti-corruption posture is difficult to ignore. But the contradiction also reveals something deeper about contemporary Latin American politics, where anti-establishment rhetoric and proximity to opaque power structures are no longer necessarily disqualifying contradictions.

The contradictions are perhaps most visible within parts of the Venezuelan opposition’s own media ecosystem. Some anti-chavista pundits spent years cultivating reputations as uncompromising anti-corruption crusaders, often accusing opposition figures of moral weakness, accommodationism, or hidden financial interests. Their enthusiastic support for Abelardo de la Espriella, despite his long professional relationship with Alex Saab during the height of the CLAP era, suggests that ideological affinity and political aesthetics are increasingly overriding the moral rigidity that once characterized parts of anti-chavista discourse.

Venezuela’s role in the Colombian election is not primarily about foreign policy. It is about political identity.

At the same time, other sectors of Machado’s broader international coalition appear more naturally aligned with Valencia’s institutional conservatism. The result is an increasingly visible fragmentation within the anti-chavista ecosystem itself, one that reflects broader tensions inside the Latin American Right between institutional conservatism, populist maximalism, and Bukele-style punitive politics.

Washington has only reinforced those dynamics. As the US once again becomes the principal external actor shaping Venezuela’s political future, different Colombian candidates increasingly compete to position themselves as the preferred interlocutors of the emerging regional order. Support from figures close to Machado, Trump-world Republicans, Miami exile networks, and conservative media ecosystems now carries political value extending far beyond Venezuela itself.

In that sense, Venezuela’s role in the Colombian election is not primarily about foreign policy. It is about political identity.

And perhaps more importantly, it may also offer a glimpse into the future political terrain of a post-transition Venezuela itself. If chavismo eventually collapses or evolves into some form of negotiated transition, the country will not emerge into a region defined by liberal democratic consensus. It will emerge into a hemisphere shaped by Bukele, Milei, Trumpism, social media maximalism, and deep public exhaustion with traditional political elites.

The rise of figures like De la Espriella suggests that the post-chavista Right may not necessarily resemble the liberal democratic opposition that spent decades fighting chavismo. It may instead reflect a harsher, more punitive, and more performative political culture, one forged not despite the region’s prolonged crises, but because of them.