logistics

Faced with the ubiquitous threat from small attack drones, military forces around the world are resorting to the use of large amounts of mesh netting for protection, something TWZ was among the first to highlight. Now it appears the U.S. Marine Corps may be employing this defensive measure as well.

After a recent logistics training exercise in South Korea, photographs were posted on the Pentagon’s image distribution site showing what appears to be anti-drone netting on a ship-to-shore floating platform used for moving cargo and troops. While it’s possible that it could be for some other purpose, the netting appears to be in line with other examples of drone defensive measures seen in Ukraine and many other places, including recent usage by Dutch forces. We’ve reached out to the Marines for more details.

The idea behind the netting, as we have reported in the past, is that drones will get caught up in the nylon or mesh metal nets and become disabled, or the nets will help keep the drones far enough from personnel before exploding to keep them from being killed. How protective the netting set up by the Marines would be against highly maneuverable first-person view (FPV) drones is questionable, given how open it is on both ends, though it could provide some protection from lighter munitions dropped by so-called bomber drones. Beyond that, the netting only covers one section of the floating platform, presumably where the cargo or a vehicle will go, leaving the rest of it, as well as the ship and its wheelhouse, fully exposed.

The images were taken during Combined Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore 26 (CJLOTS 26) at Dogu Beach, Pohang, South Korea on July 9. The goal of CJLOTS 26 was to allow the Marines and partners from the Republic of Korea’s military to deliver supplies from a vessel stationed offshore without requiring existing infrastructure like a pier.

“The offload was a Maritime Prepositioning Force exercise where 3rd Marine Logistics Group (MLG) distributes equipment from a created port of entry and provides support to III Marine Expeditionary Force units training throughout South Korea, testing and validating 3rd MLG’s ability to conduct integrated logistics operations in complex environments,” the Marines noted. “CJLOTS 26 is a combined exercise designed to integrate U.S. and Republic of Korea lighterage and ship-to-shore connector capabilities, improve combined readiness, strengthen the Republic of Korea-U.S. alliance, and expand combined maritime sustainment capacity during logistics operations.”

The images show Republic of Korea service members aboard an Improved Navy Lighterage System (INLS), “a sea state three (SS3) capable causeway system that resembles a floating pier comprised of interchangeable modules and is used to transfer cargo from Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships to shore areas where conventional port facilities are unavailable or inadequate,” according to the Navy.

The troops were conducting what is called a “beach stabbing,” where the module is attached to the beach so that vehicles and troops can come ashore.

You can see another example of the INLS system in the following photograph taken in 2022.

While the Marines don’t specifically mention drone defense in photos, U.S. Forces Korea/Combined Forces Command did explain it was part of a large-scale training exercise designed with the drone threat in mind.

“To enhance full-domain operational sustainment capabilities, the exercise integrated five types of ground, maritime and air sustainment assets,” according to U.S. Forces Korea/Combined Forces Command. “Reflecting evolving battlefield conditions, the training also strengthened protection measures for sustainment nodes against threats such as hostile drone attacks.”

There’s good reason for counter-drone efforts to be baked into logistics operations. The war in Ukraine has shown that drone attacks have made resupplying front line troops such a deadly endeavor that there is an increasing use of ground robots to carry out these missions.

Ukraine’s ‘Khartia’ brigade turns to land drones to survive the drone-saturated frontline

Any fight against China or North Korea would almost assuredly see large numbers of drones descending on U.S. and allied forces. Both countries have developed large arsenals of these weapons and the technology to use them at scale. North Korea, as we have reported in the past, has gotten assistance from Russia on drone technology as well as direct experiencing fighting Ukraine. The regime has invested significant resources into evolving its drone capabilities across all tiers.

Amphibious operations are especially vulnerable to short-range drone attacks. Approaching over the horizon in open water to a controlled beach means commanders can assume their assets will be attacked by FPV and other short-range drone types, and likely at scale.

The extent and effectiveness of netting that would be deployed as a passive defensive measure in future battles is an open question; however, U.S. military doctrine is starting to acknowledge the need. Newly released guidance from the Pentagon suggests using such systems as part of a layered defense against small drones.

“Two proven ways to disrupt drones are shaping their physical environment and interfering with their signals,” according to a new handbook published by the Pentagon’s Joint Interagency Task Force 401. “Obstacles such as fencing, netting, or over-head structures can alter flight paths, block common avenues of approach, and push drones into visible or unfavorable routes while also degrading control links, GPS (Global Positioning Systems), or navigation timing.”

The Pentagon established JIATF 401 last August to coordinate counter-drone efforts across the department and help accelerate the fielding of new capabilities. The guidance in the handbook follows a call in February by the task force for the increased use of netting, cables, and other kinds of passive physical defenses to protect critical infrastructure. It is part of an evolving trend by the U.S. toward acceptance of these measures, something we discussed in great detail here. 

In addition, as we reported two years ago, U.S. Air Force officials at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia were looking at installing anti-drone nets to help protect F-22 Raptor stealth fighters on the flightline. That came nearly a year after the base was subjected to waves of still-mysterious drone incursions, which The War Zone was first to report. 

Still, despite JIATF 401’s suggestions about netting and the Air Force’s interest in installing it to protect prized aircraft, there is scant evidence of widespread use by the U.S. military, leaving it lagging as these measures proliferate around the globe.

As we noted earlier in this piece, TWZ has showcased examples of netting use beyond Ukraine. The most recent instances emerged in Lebanon, where Israeli troops began using netting to protect against increasing attacks from Hezbollah FPV drones. The netting was erected after Israeli military leaders were heavily criticized for not doing enough to protect their troops from drone attacks. In fact, some Israeli troops were so desperate to get netting they reached out to fisherman.

The following video shows one example of Israel’s use of anti-drone netting.

Elsewhere, we reported that Taiwan is using anti-drone netting to protect its air defense systems. There are also reports published in the Netherlands that Dutch troops trained using anti-drone “net tunnels” – similar to those used by Russia and Ukraine – during an exercise in Germany last month called “Fighter Lion.”

Whether the netting seen in the logistics training exercise in South Korea represents a trend, or a one-off experiment, is currently unknown. However, one thing is clear. Netting, while certainly no panacea, is increasingly viewed as a critical countermeasure for militaries across the globe.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

Ukraine said it reclaimed more of its territory than it lost during May, reversing a Russian trend of monthly net gains.

“The ratio of liberated and lost territories is almost 100 square kilometres (40 square miles) in our favour,” wrote Ukrainian commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskii on his Telegram messaging channel.

Ukrainian defence news outlet Militarnyi estimated net gains slightly higher, at 120 sq km (46 sq miles), citing sources within the military. Militarnyi said Russia seized 130 sq km (50 sq miles) and lost 250 sq km (100 sq miles) during the month.

The Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based think tank using open source geolocated information, assessed Ukrainian gains higher still, saying Russia had seized or infiltrated 40 sq km (15 sq miles) in May but lost control of about 280 sq km (108 sq miles).

The ISW believed Ukraine actually reversed Russian gains in April, when it estimated Moscow’s gains at 28 sq km (11 sq miles) of Ukrainian land and lost 116 sq km (45 sq miles).

The ISW’s assessments suggest Ukrainian gains are growing.

Syrskii said Ukraine reclaimed 600 sq km (230 sq miles) during the first five months of 2026.

However, Russia was successful on one part of the front

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on June 10 that Russian forces had advanced into eastern Konstiantynivka, the southernmost of a “fortress belt” of four cities in the eastern region of Donetsk. Russian forces first infiltrated parts of the city last October, and now hold about 13 percent of it, said the ISW.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has prioritised the capture of the remaining one-fifth of Donetsk he does not possess, but his set deadlines to achieve this have been missed several times.

Putin may be putting out feelers for potential ceasefire talks. Although on June 5 he rejected a call from Zelenskyy for direct talks, Zelenskyy said he had met with Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich who acted as Putin’s intermediary.

Mid-range attacks devastate Russian logistics

Ukraine says its battlefield achievements are thanks to a strategy of disrupting Russian supply lines by striking fuel and ammunition in warehouses and in transit.

“The logistical lockdown is working,” said Ukrainian Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov. “The number of hits on enemy targets at a distance of over 50km (30 miles) from the (frontline) has doubled,” he said, comparing May to April.

Syrskii put the May total at almost 2,000 strikes.

The effects of Ukraine’s strategy have begun to build up.

Weeks of attacks in the southern regions of Kherson and Zaporizhia reduced Russian military traffic by more than 70 percent along the M-14 motorway, the main east-west route, said Robert Brovdi, commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces.

On June 7, regional authorities prohibited traffic along the M-14 altogether, Brovdi said.

That forced Russian planners to route more supplies along two highways that reach Kherson and Zaporizhia, via Crimea – the E105 and E97.

The following day, Ukraine struck a bridge that shoulders the E105 over the Chonhar Strait, leaving only the E97 passable. On June 9, as about 50 Russian fuel and ammunition trucks were routed to the E97, Ukrainian forces ambushed and destroyed some of them at Armyansk, commander Dmitry Filatov told Suspilne Radio.

“This operation would not have been possible if other units had not struck at Mariupol and the road to Berdyansk,” Filatov said, referring to the mainland routes. “This is what led to the units stationed in the Hulyaipil direction starting to be supplied, not via the Mariupol highways, but via Crimea.”

Civilians in Crimea have faced severe fuel shortages as a result of Ukrainian strikes, and these became dramatically worse in the past week.

On June 7, Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev rationed fuel to 20 litres per car per day. He later changed that to 20 litres per week.

Shortages were reportedly forcing troop evacuations from some outlying positions.

The Ukrainian underground group Atesh, which operates in Crimea, said Russian units were abandoning their positions on the Kinburn Spit because they were running out of food and fuel.

“We will create conditions under which it will be extremely difficult for military personnel and defence industry workers to remain in Crimea, in the temporarily occupied territories, or to use the routes leading to them,” Brovdi told Reuters.

Although Russia’s air force continues to command the skies over eastern Ukraine and to drop large ordnance there, Ukraine’s own figures suggest its drone superiority is the more effective tool.

Ukrainian short-and medium-range drones hit 180,000 targets in May, said Syrskii, 12.7 percent more than in April.

Ukrainian defenders are also reportedly becoming more adept at shooting down Russian Shahed drones with their own interceptor drones. Although Russia launched 25 percent more Shaheds in May compared to April, shoot-downs increased by 50 percent to about 4,000, said Fedorov,

Fedorov expected a step-change in Shahed elimination once a new generation of interceptor goes into full production which “automates 95 percent of the entire interception process”.

Beyond these mid-range strikes, Ukraine has also continued a successful long-range strike campaign that has devastated Russian refineries, oil depots and offloading terminals, reducing Russian oil production and export revenue.

Russian recruitment is low

Aware of the Ukrainian drone threat, Russia has created unmanned systems units of its own but appears to be having trouble manning them.

Since the beginning of the year, 14,500 people have signed contracts to serve in these units, about 21 percent of the annual recruitment target, said Syrskii. Overall, Ukraine has killed or wounded 12,500 more troops than Russia has been able to recruit this year, he said.

That is both because casualty figures have been rising since last autumn there – Ukraine estimated 31,500 Russian casualties in May – and because Moscow’s recruitment has been falling, despite increased bonuses to sign-up.

Russian opposition source Vazhnye Istorii said 71,200 people had been paid enlistment bonuses in the first quarter of 2026 according to budget data, compared to almost 90,000 in the first quarter of 2025.

It estimated that recruitment in 2025 was already 10 percent lower than in 2024.

Over the past several weeks, news began emerging about Ukraine’s use of modified, AI-enhanced kamikaze drones to target Russian cargo trucks, fuel tankers, railroad cars and even vessels as far as 150 miles behind the front lines. Dubbed the mid-range strike campaign by Kyiv, this effort is having a devastating effect on Russian logistics, cutting off key highways to Crimea, helping to halt Moscow’s gains and pave the way for Ukrainian advances.

To learn more about this campaign, we reached out to one of the soldiers leading this effort from the unit that created it. In an exclusive interview, an Unmanned Systems Department Officer for the First Corps Azov of the National Guard of Ukraine offered us unique insights into how the program began, how it’s going, where it is headed and how AI is helping to identify and hit targets deep behind the lines. It’s a capability we described in great detail — about how it was rapidly gestating and would arrive on the battlefield around now. The officer spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss operational details.

Some of the questions and answers have been edited for clarity.

Q: Walk me through the genesis of the mid-range strike campaign.

A: I will first of all start with answering the question of why. So the reason why we are currently conducting this campaign is to hunt enemy logistics capabilities, and currently we have a lot of quite cheap assets that can strike enemy targets at quite a deep range. So the overall meaning, the overall sense of this campaign is to strike enemy concentrations of cargo in the places where this concentration is the highest and the protection of those enemy logistical assets is at the lowest level.

So, if we’re talking about enemy logistics very close to the front line, to the line of contact, we are mostly talking about a person with a backpack. Then, if we are moving deeper into the enemy controlled area, further from the front line, then we’re talking about cars. Then even deeper we’re talking about trucks. Even deeper we’re talking about long haulers with trailers, so a higher concentration of cargo. Even deeper into the enemy controlled area, we’re talking about the railroads, the trains that are carrying supplies. So the deeper we go from the line of contact, the higher is the concentration of enemy cargo.

The other part of answering this question is basically about how the enemy protects their logistical assets. So the deeper we go from the line of contact, not only is the distance larger, but also the areas that the enemy needs to protect. So just simple mathematical calculations show us that the distance of 50 kilometers deep from the line of contact is usually the most concentrated area the enemy has to defend against our strike assets. But if we go to the depths of 300 kilometers, then the areas that the enemy should protect are much larger, and it’s basically impossible to saturate that area with all the necessary protection assets that the enemy needs to strike down our drones.

The point I would like to make is that we conduct those strike operations at deeper ranges with basically the same assets that we use for the tactical depths, for example, at the depths of 50 kilometers. That means we do not increase the cost of our assets. We just introduced some technical modifications, and we can use the same assets to strike in the deep area.

How Ukraine Uses the US-made Hornet AI Strike Drone To Disrupt And Cut Russian Logistics Lines

Q: What drones are you using to carry out these attacks and how are you increasing the ranges?

A: Basically, we’re using fixed-wing kamikaze drones with some modifications in terms of communication systems. We’ve installed Starlink systems on those drones, and we have also introduced a number of modifications in terms of the engine of the drones – in terms of the overall propelling unit. And this allowed us to increase the range of the assets that we used previously for the range up to 50 kilometers, with some modifications for longer distances.

Q: What kinds of drones are you using?

A: Just the simple fixed-wing chemical drones, such as Hornet systems, such as the Darts systems, and also some other assets that, for now, we prefer not to mention.

Darts

Q: Can you provide additional details about the modifications you have made to these drones and what is their maximum range?

A: Well, I would say that these are quite technical things, and I wouldn’t want to disclose those, because I would want to avoid the situation where the enemy is going to do the same modifications.

Q: Are you reaching as far as 100 kilometers?

A: From what we can say now, we can cover distances of up to 250 kilometers, but as you might understand, with time we will cover longer and longer distances.

Q: Can you describe how these attacks work? Do you operate these as first-person view drones through a video feed? Do they have a terminal seeker? 

A: The process is really simple. So, for example, we select a section of the road, or the road as a whole and we distribute that road or the sections among our units. And I would like to mention that this is an all Ukrainian operation. It’s not a task for just one single unit, and basically each unit has its own area of responsibility and its own section of the road. 

And then we just send drones there in hunting mode, and I cannot disclose how this works from the standpoint of intelligence, but the overall principle is that the intelligence just gives us the priorities for the targets. For example, they say that you need to target this type of vehicle with these types of cargo.

And in terms of the targeting, I remember that you were also asking the question about how the targets are selected. For this we use both the AI tools and also the operator himself, so we’re using both methods for that.

Q: I want to get back to AI in a bit, but what area of operations do you cover?

A: Our area of interest and area of responsibility is related to all the roads that the enemy is using to bring in supplies to the area of operations of our corps, which is roughly in the area of the town of Dobropillia in eastern Ukraine, and for example, this may be the route from Rostov that goes to Mariupol and then goes to Donetsk, and this could be any other route that the enemy might use to bring military cargo to the area of operations of our corps.

Q: What were some of the more successful mid-range drone strike missions you carried out?

A: That’s basically an easy principle. When I said that we are hunting the enemy’s logistics, I mean that this is a daily process. This is a continuous process, and this is not about one standalone mission, when we fly somewhere, when we hit a target and the mission is over.

Last night, Ukraine expanded its mid-range strike campaign to the Sea of Azov, hitting at least 5 vessels carrying Russian cargo.

At least two of the cargo vessels were hit at the occupied ports of Berdyansk and Mariupol, as Ukrainian forces seek to cut off Russian logistics. pic.twitter.com/NoXeAO7Ca6

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) June 5, 2026

Q: How are these mid-range strikes on Russian logistics affecting their ability to fight?

A: This is causing shortages of fuel for the enemy. This was already commented on by our media, and also the media resources of the enemy, and now we understand that this is true, not only for Crimea, where there is a severe shortage of fuel now, but also this is true about the other Russian-controlled territories. And basically, when we are striking enemy logistical supplies of fuel, this affects the overall situation, because what is fuel? Fuel is basically the blood of war, which is necessary to fuel the generators that the enemy is using for the FPV operations. The fuel is used for the vehicles that basically bring in those FPVs to the combat zone.

I’d like to add an additional explanation of how this works. If we destroy a car that brings fuel to the line of contact, then we’re talking about destroying like two canisters, so that’s approximately 40 liters of fuel. But if we strike a fuel tank and a tank vehicle, which is bringing fuel to the overall area, so then we can talk about several tons of materials.

Gas stations across Russian-occupied Crimea are facing worsening fuel shortages, with long queues, rationing, and voucher-based distribution reported by residents. Some locals say fuel has become so scarce that it is treated as a luxury, while Moscow insists there is no cause for… pic.twitter.com/0LSYWEqiDH

— Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (@RFERL) June 5, 2026

Q: Is this setting the stage for a Ukrainian advance in the east or Zaporizhia?

A: I would say that blocking the logistical supplies to the Zaporizhia Oblast and also to Crimea is a byproduct of our attacks aimed at cutting enemy logistics to our area of operations. Because we’re targeting the roads that go through Mariupol, also to Crimea, to supply the Zaporizhia region, and as well our area of operations. But as for the most strategic aspect of this question of whether this might influence some counter-offensive capabilities of the Ukrainian Defense Forces, I think that is not the question within my scope of responsibility, because I’m an officer responsible for the UAS component of the corps, and I think that this is more of a question that should be directed to the general staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Ukraine 🇺🇦 continues to launch an important number of mid-range strike, targeting Russian 🇷🇺 logistics in occupied territories

Since early may, more than 270 trucks have been hit, together with multiple fuel depots and trains.

🧵THREAD🧵1/14 ⬇️ pic.twitter.com/YnisZf2kJ6

— Clément Molin (@clement_molin) June 4, 2026

Q: Tell me how you came to use the U.S.-made Hornet drones.

A: I would say that this is also a question that should be directed at one level up from my level. We get those drones, we deploy those drones, but the questions of how we get them and what are the specifics of their supply, this is not a question that I can answer.

Q: When did you start getting them?

A: We have been receiving these drones for almost a year.

Q: When you got the Hornet drones, were you given any instructions on what missions to accomplish with them or what targets to pursue?

A: I think that the principle thing to explain here is that the Hornet drone is a tactical level UAV system. It can be used at the maximum range of 50 kilometers – the maximum range of the basic configuration of this drone. The drones we are currently using are the modification of the Hornet drone, but the basic configuration of this drone is only a tactical-level UAV. This is why our mid-strike operations, which have started only recently, are using modified drones.

I think that it is important to add that these modifications are conducted by the units themselves.

The First Corps Azov of the National Guard of Ukraine maintains control over enemy logistics near Donetsk.

Strike UAV pilots are targeting Russian logistics deep in the operational rear. Drone units maintain constant surveillance and fire control over all supply routes around… pic.twitter.com/i4TYOWJBg4

— First Corps Azov of the National Guard of Ukraine (@azov_media) April 16, 2026

Q: When did you begin to make the modifications and was the mid-range strike concept something that Azov developed?

A: Yeah, I would say that basically that was Azov development. So the first tests of these new modifications started in early winter. After approximately a month of testing, we started combat deployment of those drones approximately in January or February of this year. And we use those new modifications to ensure our middle strike operations. In terms of the tactics, I would also like to say that Azov developed new tactics of the deployment of middle strike drones, because the previous tactics they were mostly concentrated on the use of very expensive assets, which are available in limited numbers, so the targeting cycle was different, which is why we needed to develop new tactics and change this targeting cycle.

Q: What systems were you using before that were so expensive?

A: Well I’m not really talking about some specific assets here. I’m mostly talking about the overall tactics and the targeting cycle. So, the tactics of middle strikes were developed for expensive assets that the Corps didn’t have at the moment. So, this is basically why we started developing our own assets that could ensure that we have those middle strike capabilities, and we can also engage targets at the operational level.

Magyar claims a reduction from 3,800 cargo journeys to 1,100 cargo journey (71.05%) along the E-58 Mariupol -Berdiansk – Melitopol – Simferopol highway in the past two weeks

He makes it clear that doesn’t mean they’ve destroyed 2,700 trucks, nor that they have total fire control… https://t.co/O3K2Iz53Xg pic.twitter.com/VTPn3ghZcD

— Ukraine Control Map (@UAControlMap) June 9, 2026

Q: When you added Starlink, did you have to seek permission from SpaceX to use their system for these weapons?

A: The first thing that I would like to say is that we do not use only Starlink. It is just one of the possible communication systems and communication solutions that we’re using. And the second thing that I would like to add is that all the international issues, international cooperation questions, are the issues that should be dealt with at the level of our ministries and at the level of our central government, so once again, this is not a question that I can answer.

Una parte vital de la efectividad de los drones Hornet con los que Ucrania está atacando las rutas logísticas rusas entre 80 y 120km del frente es la recopilacion de datos para que el algoritmo aprenda. Por eso algunos modelos llevan grandes terminales Starlink. https://t.co/yGePjoPo2K pic.twitter.com/iWu2bLrwq5

— Martin Tuitero (@TuiteroMartin) June 2, 2026

Q: Can you tell me what other communications systems you use?

A: No, this information is still secret, because none of those assets have been taken by the enemy, so the enemy doesn’t know yet that we’re using those. But I think that in some time we will be able to go public with those assets and tell more about what we use, apart from Starlink.

Q: Are you using Starlink and the other systems on the Darts drones as well, or just Hornet?

A: Yes, we are using Darts for those middle strike attacks. So, basically, the overall tactics of those mid-strike attacks with small UAV systems, it can use any fixed wing kamikaze drones with modifications which is why we are using Hornets, we are using Darts and also the other types of drones.

While the Ukrainian “Hornet” strike UAV is receiving a lot of attention recently, the “Darts” UAV remains a workhorse for mid-range strike.
It, too, has AI terminal targeting and control capabilities to defeat Russian jamming. https://t.co/cNcQytap1D pic.twitter.com/C8nYJ20Uer

— Roy🇨🇦 (@GrandpaRoy2) June 6, 2026

Q: Can you talk about the other types of drones? 

A: Unfortunately, no. The enemy has not yet got hold of those assets, and if one of them will be shot down, or if one of them will be captured by the enemy, then I think that we will be able to go public with those assets.

Q: Can you talk more about how you are using AI for the Hornets and Darts?

A: The AI is used for the so-called last-mile system. I’m talking about the terminal guidance here, and also the AI can also be used to identify the targets, especially when the drone is flying in the autonomous mode. It can recognize the type of the target and it can automatically engage the target. So all of these processes can happen without the involvement of the operator. This allows us to launch several drones at the same time, and this also allows us to ensure a higher level of coordination for those attacks.

I think that one of the examples of these attacks was captured by one of our videos that you might have seen when one fixed-wing drone is observing the target and the other drone is actually hitting it. 

1-й корпус НГУ «Азов» контролює ворожу логістику під Донецьком. Знищення російської техніки

Q: Is there a man in the loop or a man on the loop during the terminal phase of the attack or is it fully autonomous?

A: Since we are trying to control the whole process, usually it is the person who takes the final decision and actually makes this decision to strike the target, because we do not want to over rely on the artificial intelligence. If necessary, this whole process can also happen without human involvement, but as I have already mentioned, our policy is that the decision should be made exclusively by the operator.

Q: So this is man in the loop?

A: Yes, so technically men can be out of this loop, but in our case we involve humans in this system, so that’s man in the loop.

Visual look of Hornet UI. Not much new, can mark soldiers individually. Seems aiming is done by either by lock a target (red) or manually aiming by continusly clicking (green) https://t.co/d2LGtV2aON

— Tommy Lund (@TommyLundn) June 6, 2026

Q: Have the Russians developed countermeasures for this effort?

A: Since the overall intent was to go to the massive deployment of those drones against the enemy logistics at once, as for now, the enemy has not yet had enough time to adapt to these tactics of ours. And now they’re desperately trying to find some countermeasures to find some ways to react to this. 

They are putting on anti-drone nets deep into their controlled territory. They are placing people armed with shotguns every 50 meters of their critical roads, but basically, as for now, there is no Russian tactic that would be effective in protecting their logistics. I do not say that they will not come up with this tactic in a month or so, but as for now, they do not have an effective countermeasure for that.

The only thing that I would like to add is that we approximately know the direction in which the enemy is moving to ensure counter measures to this tactic of ours, and we already have countermeasures for their countermeasures.

The current Ukrainian superiority in mid-range drone warfare is a brilliant advantage that comes with an expiration date.

Failing to prepare for the day Russia matches this capability guarantees a catastrophic collapse of front line logistics for Ukraine.

Ukraine is rightfully… pic.twitter.com/RI1NWLNYUc

— Joni Askola (@joni_askola) June 8, 2026

Q: Is the AI enhancement helping to mitigate Russian jamming and electronic warfare measures?

A: Well, I would like to say that EW is not the only way to counter UAVs. So, in addition to EW assets, there are other counter drone methods. Nets can be used. Air observation posts can be used. The drones can be shot down with enemy interceptor drones, and also there are hundreds and hundreds of people armed with shotguns who can also try to shoot the drones down. So the EW systems are just a small part of this overall system of drone countermeasures, and it is a general misconception that all anti-drone efforts are from the EW system. I would say that EW accounts for approximately 10% of overall counter drone efforts.

The main idea of the use of the AI systems is not only to help operators to counter enemy drone countermeasures, but the AI also helps the operator with navigation, with orientation, with the identification of the targets. So this is a complex system that helps the operator with many tasks.

Here: strike by the Ukrainian-American “Hornet” drone on occupier positions. Two Russians confirmed as “gruz 200” (KIA).
Interestingly, the Russians call this drone “Martian-2” because its capabilities seem “out of this world” to them.

High Autonomy: Operates with AI (autonomous… pic.twitter.com/Ao0MAiCqUp

— Takeshi Kovacs (@PrzemekShura) May 12, 2026

Q: What are the lessons that the U.S. can learn from your mid-range drone strike campaign, given the importance of logistics everywhere.

A: Well, I would say that the main lesson that the U.S. can learn from our experience is that drones in their basic configuration, right out of the box, is not something that can work, and this is not something that can bring you the best results at once. This is why every unit should have their own drone laboratory that can reconfigure those drones and modify them, and I’m not only talking about reconfiguring tactical level drones to turn them into middle strike capacities. I’m talking about all warfare in general.

Assets become obsolete very quickly and in three months everything can change, starting from the navigation systems and ending with the control systems. For example, today the GPS signal works, in a month it doesn’t work anymore. Today we use this set of frequency ranges, and in a month all those frequency ranges are jammed by the enemy. So I’m saying this for you to understand that for example, if the U.S. government purchases Hornet drones for their units, then the units are going to have good tactical level drones. But if you want to squeeze all of the possible benefits from those drones, then you will need to modify the structure of your units and include the departments, include the sections that will deal with the modification and reconfiguration of those drones to ensure the most efficient results that can be achieved.

From what I see now, the U.S. is mostly just giving the unit some assets, but they are not thinking about re-configuring or repurposing those drones.

Q: Is there anything I haven’t asked you that you would like to address?

A: I think that we have covered all the topics. The only thing that I would like to add is that I would like your audience to see that Ukraine introduces new innovations that can basically change the battlefield, and this is why trying to forecast the outcome of the war based on the number of tanks or aircraft or bombs that would be incorrect, so the victory will belong to the side capable of adapting faster and not to the side that has more resources.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com