Libya

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has unveiled an updated national security doctrine and displayed a map of rival regional alignments, signalling a security approach that prioritises preemptive military action, the expansion of buffer zones, and the pursuit of new regional partnerships.

The document was developed with the assistance of Israel’s National Security Council and published by the Prime Minister’s Office on Sunday, just nine days before Israel’s parliamentary elections that could spell the end of Netanyahu’s time in office. It outlines a formal policy of preventing perceived threats through military action rather than containment – a policy that has already been seen in action over the past few years, as Israel pursues multiple wars and attacks on its neighbours.

Electoral survival strategy

The timing of the map’s release carries particular political significance, with Netanyahu fighting to retain power amid criticism of his conduct in power, the ongoing corruption trial he faces and his handling of the October 7, 2023, attacks, as well as the wars that followed.

As the October 27 election day draws closer, Netanyahu is attempting to bolster his credentials as Israel’s ‘Mr Security’, hoping to get the votes of Israelis who may not like some of his other policies or behaviour, but still view him as the most likely leader to defend the country.

Netanyahu, who did get the endorsement of US President Donald Trump on Sunday, said during the briefing that Israel could face the possibility of a far less supportive administration in Washington in two years, after the end of the Trump presidency.

“In two years, a president… who is extremely hostile to Israel could come to power [in the United States],” Netanyahu warned.

He therefore argued that Israel must “expand our network of alliances and develop capabilities that make us a valuable asset” to other countries as a way of protecting itself if US policy towards it changed.

The comments, according to analysts, suggest that Netanyahu is seeking to portray his leadership as essential to navigating both Israel’s regional military challenges and its diplomatic isolation, all while keeping a fearful electorate reassured.

Mohanad Hage Ali, deputy director for research at the Malcolm H Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, explained that the strategic presentation centred on competing regional blocs and buffer zones.

That framework “incubates and nurtures existential fears, which would lead Israeli voters to feel the need for a decisive leader”, Hage Ali noted.

In his assessment, Netanyahu stands to benefit from the Israeli public’s fear of regional threats by presenting himself as a familiar leader capable of managing them, making him “the devil you know”, as the analyst put it, to voters reluctant to embrace political change at a sensitive time.

Netanyahu’s political opponents have been quick to push back against that narrative.

Gadi Eisenkot, one of the prime minister’s main challengers in the upcoming election, said that the published doctrine was “two hollow pages, full of slogans that have nothing to do with a security concept”.

Another, former Prime Minister Yair Lapid, described the document as “superficial”.

Expanding security zones

The map displayed during Netanyahu’s briefing was originally published in May by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, a German political foundation. It divides the Middle East and parts of Africa into competing blocs, highlighting the region’s complex network of alliances and rivalries.

Those networks include states, unrecognised entities and non-state actors.

The map identifies an Israel-United Arab Emirates alignment, described as the “Hexagon Alliance”, alongside a separate grouping of Egypt, Turkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia – the latter three of which signed the Mecca mutual defence pact in August – labelled the “Sunni Diamond Alliance”. It also depicts Iran and its regional allies as a separate axis.

The map serves to illustrate the issues outlined in the published security doctrine, presenting a region where Israel faces multiple threats, the alliance that Israel is seeking to cultivate across the wider region, and the perceived need for “buffer zones” – the occupation of territory in other countries.

Israel’s existing illegal occupation of territory in Gaza and southern Lebanon illustrates the potential consequences of expanding the buffer zone approach.

Hage Ali warned that continuing to pursue an approach built around expanding military control could lead to “more conflict and more ethnic cleansing” under the guise of security buffers.

Embracing regional factions

A striking element of the map displayed by Netanyahu is its explicit designation of non-state actors as friendly entities.

The map highlights territories controlled by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in Sudan and Khalifa Haftar’s self-styled Libyan National Army within an alignment deemed cooperative to Israel and the United Arab Emirates.

Israel views these actors as pragmatic partners or at least cooperative entities in a broader strategic grid, Hage Ali explained. However, the public association of these groups with Israel threatens to damage their domestic standing across the Arab world.

That reflects Netanyahu’s immediate priorities, where “what Israelis think matters more than the reputation of your allies and the viability of these alliances”, Hage Ali added.

The portrayal of the Middle East as a region divided into competing alliances also carries risks for Netanyahu’s broader diplomatic ambitions.

Earlier this year, Netanyahu proposed a “hexagon of alliances”, envisaging cooperation between Israel, India, Greece, Cyprus and unnamed Arab, African and Asian partners, against what he described as “radical” regional alliances.

The proposed grouping has not been established as a formal alliance, and commentators in Israel and the international press have described the project as a branding exercise rather than a binding military pact, noting that countries like India prioritise non-alignment and pragmatic trade over ideologically rigid blocs.

For Tehran and its regional partners, the map also offers potent political leverage.

Hage Ali emphasised that the visual layout “will certainly help their propaganda machine”, providing Hezbollah and other Iranian allies with evidence to reinforce the narrative that Israel seeks to expand and dominate the region.

Eastern-based parliament votes to replace longtime speaker with Al-Salhin Abdelnabi al-Obeidi.

Libya’s eastern-based House of Representatives has elected a new speaker, ending Aguila Saleh’s 12-year tenure amid growing discontent among lawmakers over his leadership.

Legislators in the 170-member House voted on Tuesday to replace Saleh with Al-Salhin Abdelnabi al-Obeidi, the parliament’s spokesperson announced on X.

The vote came a day after 98 members of the House approved a new system limiting the speaker and deputy speakers to a single 12-month term.

The change ended an arrangement that had been in place since the chamber’s first leadership was elected in 2014.

“There was significant discontent among MPs with the previous leadership over numerous errors,” lawmaker Jebree Oheida told the Reuters news agency. “We tried to engage with the leadership to address these issues, but to no avail. Among these errors were decisions made without consulting MPs.”

The vote was overseen by Second Deputy Speaker Misbah Douma, according to the Libya Observer.

Saleh has previously rejected the proceedings, saying the initial vote to limit the speaker’s term was “not official and had no legal effect”, according to the outlet.  He had also announced that he had cancelled the session he had called for Tuesday.

The developments come as Libya remains divided politically and militarily between the United Nations-recognised government in Tripoli led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, and a rival administration in the east backed by renegade military commander Khalifa Haftar.

Haftar’s camp relies in particular on the parliament, which sits in the eastern city of Benghazi under their control.

Saleh has long been considered a staunch ally of the Haftar clan, but analysts said he appeared to be weakened as Haftar’s sons, in particular Saddam Haftar, consolidated their positions.

“Agila Saleh appears to be the latest casualty of Saddam Haftar’s drive to centralise decision-making in eastern Libya and bulldoze his way into a political role,” said Emadeddin Badi, an analyst at the London-based Chatham House.

Al-Obeidi, who comes from the same tribe as Saleh, represents the eastern city of Tobruk and has chaired parliament’s Libyan-Turkish friendship committee.

The House on Tuesday also elected Tarek al-Ashtar and Mesbah Douma as first and second deputy speakers, respectively.

Their election follows the signing of a landmark agreement by representatives of Libya’s rival political camps in Tripoli in August that could see presidential and legislative elections held within two years.

Mediated by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the “4+4 committee” agreement attempts to resolve recurring legal and institutional disputes that have crippled the nation since the overthrow of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.

The United States is pursuing a separate reunification plan for the oil and gas-rich North African country, led by Massad Boulos, President Donald Trump’s senior adviser for Arab and African affairs.

Amid the worsening global energy crisis triggered by the US-Israel war on Iran, European countries, desperate for alternative energy supplies, trade routes and partnerships, have looked across the Mediterranean for solutions.

As a result, governments across North Africa have started to reassess their strategic value. Algeria is in an especially strong position as an established gas supplier, while Egypt can offer infrastructure, refining capacity and access through the Suez Canal.

Libya has also seen its strategic value increase. It has around 48 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, the largest in Africa, and produces 1.5 million barrels of oil per day. It also has substantial natural gas reserves.

Its oil reaches international markets through the Mediterranean, while the Greenstream gas pipeline connects its Mellitah complex directly to Europe.

Libya cannot replace the Gulf in terms of oil and gas exports, but it can become a major player in diversification efforts not just in Europe but elsewhere in the world. The challenge the country faces is how to take full advantage amid structural constraints and insecurity.

Energy insecurity at home

Libya is simultaneously a major energy exporter and an energy-insecure state. Although the country possesses vast oil and gas resources, Libyans experience regular electricity blackouts due to an inefficient domestic energy system.

More than 70 percent of Libyan gas production is consumed domestically, mostly for electricity generation. Production has struggled to meet both domestic needs and export commitments. Gas exports consequently fell year on year from around 200 billion cubic feet in 2019 to 35 billion in 2025, the lowest export levels in 22 years.

At the same time, the country is flaring at least 200 billion cubic feet of gas annually due to underdeveloped infrastructure. Gas that could generate electricity, support industry or increase exports is instead being wasted.

The International Monetary Fund has estimated Libya’s total energy subsidy burden at around $17bn, equivalent to roughly 35 percent of GDP – one of the largest in the world.

Much of these funds go into subsidising imported refined fuels, as domestic refining capacity is largely underdeveloped and cannot meet demand.

The domestic energy situation is compounded by political fragmentation, institutional disputes and periodic disruptions to production due to conflict.

Increasing exports without addressing these problems risks improving energy security abroad while neglecting it at home, and that is a recipe for more instability in an already fragile nation.

Opportunity or trap?

The global energy crisis triggered by the Iran war is surely a major opportunity for Libya to increase its revenues from hydrocarbons. But it also carries a risk.

As I pointed out during the 5th meeting of the Mediterranean Energy Experts Circle earlier this month, greater demand for Libyan oil and gas could reinforce the economic model the country has struggled to escape from for decades: producing hydrocarbons, exporting them, distributing the revenues and postponing structural reform.

This model does not allow Libya to capture the full economic potential of its resource wealth. It keeps the Libyan state stuck in the all too familiar “resource curse”, which promotes economic stagnation and inefficiency.

That is why when taking advantage of heightened demand for energy, it is crucial that Libya uses the proceeds to transform its energy system.

That means capturing flared gas, modernising electricity generation and transmission, expanding domestic refining where economically viable, reforming subsidies, investing seriously in renewable energy and participating in sustainable regional energy cooperation.

Libya’s National Sustainable Energy Strategy aims to have 22 percent of electricity generation from renewable sources by 2035, an ambitious target that requires major positive shifts in security and governance conditions. Increased revenue flows can help jump-start the process.

Another important consideration is how the country should approach heightened foreign interest. Libya’s first major oil and gas licensing round since 2007 was concluded in February, with the US’s Chevron, Italy’s Eni, QatarEnergy, Spain’s Repsol, Hungary’s MOL, Nigeria’s Aiteo, and Türkiye’s TPAO securing new licences.

Commercial and geopolitical interests are rarely completely separate in energy. For Libya, this creates bargaining power—if managed coherently by the Libyans. Rather than becoming an arena in which external actors compete for individual assets and relationships, Libya could use diversified partnerships to attract investment and technology while reducing dependence on any single partner.

From energy exporter to Mediterranean energy hub

The transformation Libya seeks should not be confined to its borders. Its strategic objective should be to become an integral player in a Mediterranean energy hub by expanding cooperation with neighbouring states and leveraging existing production capacities and infrastructure.

To Libya’s east, Egypt has a large electricity system and significant refining and processing capacity. To its west, Tunisia provides access towards the wider Maghreb and increasingly towards European markets. Libya sits between them with enormous hydrocarbon resources, considerable solar potential and existing energy connections with both neighbours.

Important steps have already been taken to deepen regional energy integration. In January, Egypt and Libya signed an energy cooperation agreement covering exploration and the development of crude-oil refining. The two countries are also discussing the construction of an 800km pipeline connecting Tobruk to Alexandria. The project is worth $1bn and would carry Libyan crude directly to Egyptian refineries.

Libya and Tunisia are also expanding cooperation. Earlier this month, the Libyan-Tunisian company Joint Oil opened an international licensing round covering around 3,000 square kilometres of shared offshore acreage and development of the cross-border Zarat oil and gas discovery. Formal awards are expected by the end of April 2027.

The risk here is that expanded cooperation could develop into dependence. How to avoid that is the lesson Libya can learn from the Strait of Hormuz crisis. The country still needs sufficient domestic electricity, refining and production capacity to protect itself. Regional integration should add alternatives rather than create new vulnerabilities: more markets, more electricity connections, more processing options and more export routes.

The objective should therefore be specialisation, connectivity and redundancy all achieved in the right sequence depending on needs and conditions.

A moment for strategic redesign

The Iran war has given Libya something potentially more valuable than temporarily higher hydrocarbon prices: renewed strategic relevance. But greater strategic relevance does not automatically make the country a more reliable energy partner.

Converting the former into the latter requires a radically different approach not just to the domestic oil and gas industry, but also to overall economic development and regional geopolitics.

Libya must use this moment to pursue strategic redesign: to increase production while recovering wasted gas, improve electricity infrastructure, develop refining and renewables, strengthen regional connections and cooperation, and use competition among international partners to attract investment.

Libya already has the resources and the geography to become an even bigger player in the energy market. The question is whether it can build the rest.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.