Libya

Trade and security are expected to be on the agenda as delegations and leaders from dozens of African countries gather in Moscow for a two-day summit with Russia.

The third instalment of the Russia-Africa Summit will run through October 28–29 and will be chaired by Russian President Vladimir Putin and the current African Union chair, Burundian President Evariste Ndayishimiye.

Russia has boosted security and trade cooperation with African nations as it grapples with Western sanctions imposed in response to its war against Ukraine.

So who will be attending and what is at stake?

Here’s what we know.

What is the Russia-Africa Summit?

The Russia-Africa Summit is a two-day diplomatic and economic meeting being held in Moscow on Wednesday and Thursday.

Leaders and delegations from 48 African countries are meeting to discuss bilateral cooperation spanning politics, defence and technology.

This high-profile forum is the third of its kind. The first summit took place in October 2019 in Sochi, marking an unprecedented turn in Russian-African relations.

What’s on the agenda for the summit?

The event’s official theme is Developing Mutually Beneficial Cooperation and “unlocking the potential of every African country”.

More than 40 sessions and about 100 speakers will cover trade, investment, technology transfer, food and energy security, healthcare, education and youth exchange.

There will also be a business programme, culminating in a plenary session.

Who is attending?

Representatives from 48 African countries will participate, as well as 22 heads of state, according to Kremlin presidential aide Yury Ushakov. Heads of state from 17 countries attended the last summit in 2023.

Fewer leaders came to the last two summits, compared with the first gathering in 2019, when 43 took part, a decline which Moscow blamed on Western pressure.

Russian President Putin is scheduled to meet with his Egyptian counterpart Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.

The guest list includes leaders closely tied to Russia’s growing security role in Africa, including Burkina Faso’s Ibrahim Traore and Niger’s Abdourahamane Tchiani.

Kenya’s William Ruto, Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni and Namibia’s Netumbo Nandi-Ndatiwah are also expected, as well as Sudan’s Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed al-Menfi, the chairman of the Presidential Council of Libya.

What is the relationship between Russia and Africa like?

Russia has gained far more influence in Africa through security than trade, according to a report by the African Security Analysis group (ASA), a security consultancy.

Russia’s security presence has risen significantly in the region. In 2023, Russian forces, mostly from the Wagner Group, operated in only a few African countries, but the ASA now counts Russian missions or troops in at least nine countries.

Trade between African countries and Russia has exceeded $28bn. It was estimated to be about $16.8bn in 2019, when the first summit was held. But trade is mainly concentrated in a few countries and overshadowed by that of China and the European Union.

Russia’s strongest ties to the continent are in energy, fertilisers, defence and nuclear power, where the state-owned firm Rosatom has signed a string of agreements.

Russia has been an essential supplier of fertilisers and wheat to many countries in the region.

In 2023, Russia exported 200,000 tonnes of grain to Mali, Somalia, the Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, Eritrea and Zimbabwe. 

Why does this summit matter?

This is the first summit since 2023, so it will be an indicator of how far the relationship has developed and where it is heading, analysts say.

A final declaration and a Russia-Africa Partnership Forum plan should be adopted by the end of the Summit to cover 2027-2029.

Analysts have said that meetings on the sidelines could be more important than the main event, as talks between African delegations and Russian defence officials can illustrate where Moscow plans to expand its military ties.

The recruitment of Africans to fight in Ukraine could also be a growing problem for Moscow, as it has already caused diplomatic concern in countries such as Kenya.

Amnesty International has used the run-up to the summit to raise the issue of Africans being recruited to fight with Russia.

In an open letter, the directors of Amnesty’s African section urged leaders attending the summit to demand that Moscow end what the group describes as deceptive and coercive recruitment of Africans to fight in its war in Ukraine.

Eastern Libya spent nearly seven years denouncing the maritime memorandum Turkiye struck with its rivals based in Tripoli. Last week, it needed a single sitting of the legislature to embrace it.

On October 20, the House of Representatives (HoR) in Benghazi ratified the deal. The European Union condemned the vote, as did Greece, Israel and Egypt.

Yet the ratification was less a Turkish triumph than the final act of a sequence choreographed by Saddam Haftar, the son of Khalifa Haftar, the military commander who controls eastern Libya. The ultimate goal is the Libyan presidency.

The United States is currently trying to broker a power-sharing arrangement between Tripoli and Benghazi. Championed by Massad Boulos, US President Donald Trump’s senior adviser for Arab and African affairs, the deal could install Saddam as Libya’s president.

For that to happen, however, he needs the backing of Ankara, whose sway over western Libya gives it a decisive voice in any such settlement. The ratification of the maritime deal, therefore, is meant to secure Turkiye’s blessing.

The opening move in Saddam’s pursuit of the presidency was a palace coup: a fortnight before the vote, the HoR unseated its speaker, Aguila Saleh, who had spent 12 years in this position. It thus removed both Cairo’s principal ally in the east and the most stubborn obstacle to the memorandum’s ratification.

Yet Saleh’s ouster was never only about Egypt, and the same stone felled a second bird. As speaker and nominal supreme commander, he embodied the de jure authority from which Khalifa’s own command flows, and with a weighty tribal constituency among the Obeidat tribe, he was one of the few men capable of complicating, or even arbitrating, any transfer of power. Removing him cleared Saddam’s path to a handover already quietly under way, which the elder Haftar’s advanced age could hasten at any moment.

Saleh’s successor, Al-Salhin Abdulnabi, a fellow Obeidi, who chaired the HoR’s Libyan-Turkish friendship committee, is able to defuse the risk of tribal backlash while signalling where the chamber now takes its cues.

Whether the gambit pays off will be decided in Washington. Saddam is counting on the Trump administration’s appetite for a Libyan deal, sharpened by Turkish and Emirati lobbying and by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s rapport with Trump.

He hopes it can prevail over the objections of Athens and Nicosia and the displeasure of Israel, which is uneasy about Ankara’s reach. This is directly pitting Trump’s transactional instinct against a longstanding US partnership with the Greek-Cypriot-Israeli axis.

The broadside against Israel may even pay a domestic dividend, allowing Saddam to pose as standing up to Israel while dispelling perceptions of a covert channel to it.

Europe, meanwhile, has sidelined itself into near-irrelevance: when Benghazi expelled the EU’s migration commissioner and three member-state ministers on arrival in July 2025, European capitals responded with something closer to grovelling than resolve.

Less than a year later, Athens was hosting Saddam, who duly sidestepped any commitment on an alternative maritime memorandum.

That deference flows from the EU’s navel-gazing fixation on migration that has reduced its Libya policy to counting the boats leaving Libya’s eastern coast for Crete. A Union that implores Saddam to police the very waters now in dispute is in no position to make him pay for redrawing them.

Abu Dhabi, for its part, has every reason to look the other way because it wants Saddam to succeed. None of Khalifa’s sons has been more faithful to the Emiratis, and seeing their most loyal client installed at the apex of the Libyan state would cap a decade of investment in the Haftar project. Whatever their past flirtation with Greece and Cyprus, a maritime line drawn in Ankara’s favour is a modest price for that outcome, though the closeness of that embrace may yet constrain him.

Egypt remains the real question mark: Cairo’s statement objected chiefly to the memorandum’s encroachment on Egypt’s exclusive economic zone and was framed almost entirely in legal terms, a sign perhaps that it is keeping its political options open.

Its relationship with Ankara has been transformed, with the two now aligned on Sudan and the Red Sea. A shared wariness of Israel’s expansionist ambitions has only drawn them closer.

Offering commercial deals could go some way towards softening Egyptian opposition. But Cairo could also lean on its rapport with Ankara to champion an alternative Haftar heir. It would not have to look far for a candidate: Saddam’s brother Khaled, the Libyan Arab Armed Forces’ chief of staff, is considerably closer to Cairo and publicly criticised the US initiative in April.

Should that happen, Saddam would have little left to bargain with, having cashed in his most valuable chip with the Turks, and the strongest card he still holds is one Abu Dhabi would never let him play.

Cutting off support for Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces would win favour in Ankara and Cairo alike, both backers of the Sudanese army, but that would jeopardise the one relationship he cannot afford to lose.

Squeezed between a patron in Abu Dhabi he dare not cross and a partner in Ankara that has already pocketed its reward, Saddam is betting that he can keep both on side long enough for Washington to see the deal through. That he is prepared to run such risks may say as much about desperation as acumen, for the alternative to an institutionalised succession is one contested, perhaps violently, by his siblings or by the constituencies left out of the new order.

History, in Libya, has a mordant sense of humour. The maritime memorandum was the price Tripoli paid for the Turkish intervention that helped halt Khalifa Haftar’s offensive at the gates of the capital and sent his forces and mercenaries into headlong retreat in 2020. Where the father tried and failed to storm Tripoli, the son now hopes to be ushered in on a red carpet woven from the very document that sealed his father’s defeat.

Should he succeed, the instrument of the Haftars’ most humiliating setback will have become the cornerstone of their dynasty. Should Washington baulk, it may instead become the epitaph of the son’s ambitions.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Libya’s eastern parliament has walked back its objection to an agreement with Turkiye, demarcating boundaries in the Mediterranean Sea.

Its rival administration, the internationally recognised Government of National Unity, signed the deal seven years ago.

The ratification has revived a simmering dispute over exploring a potentially gas-rich region. Greece, Cyprus and Egypt were quick to object, with Athens referring the issue to the UN Security Council.

They say Libya and Turkiye are ignoring their sovereign rights.

So what are the geopolitical implications of this deal in the eastern Mediterranean?

Presenter: Mohammed Jamjoom

Guests:

Sinan Ulgen – Chairman of the Centre for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies

Maria Gavouneli – Professor of international law at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

Tarek Megerisi – Director of Informmi, a geopolitical research and advisory firm

Libya’s eastern-based parliament has backed a 2019 maritime deal with Turkiye already signed by the North African nation’s internationally recognised government based in Tripoli to delimit maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean Sea.

The vote on Tuesday came as Turkiye has been cultivating close ties in recent years with the eastern parliament, backed by renegade military commander Khalifa Haftar. Ankara had helped the Tripoli government, known as the Government of National Accord (GNA), push back an offensive in 2020 by Haftar’s self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) that aimed to capture Tripoli.

Egypt and the European Union have rejected the ratification of the maritime borders agreement, calling the deal “null and void”.

On Tuesday, the Tobruk-based House of Representatives voted unanimously to approve the agreement, reversing its 2020 rejection.

Israel also condemned the move while Greece, which said the agreement violates international law, briefed the United Nations Security Council.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan dismissed the criticism, calling the deal “entirely legitimate”.

So what is the deal, and why has it drawn such a backlash? Here’s what you need to know:

What is the deal?

It is a memorandum of understanding that draws a sea border between Turkiye and Libya across the eastern Mediterranean.

It was signed in Istanbul on November 27, 2019, by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Fayez al-Sarraj, then-prime minister of the UN-recognised government in Tripoli.

Within weeks, Turkiye sent drones and military advisers to help repel Haftar’s assault on Tripoli.

The deal allowed Ankara to claim large and potentially gas-rich areas of the eastern Mediterranean.

Why does Egypt oppose it?

Because Cairo says it cuts into Egyptian waters.

Egypt’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the agreement “constitutes a clear infringement upon Egypt’s sovereign rights within its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf”.

It said the ratification “carries no legal consequences for Egypt”.

President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has historically been one of Haftar’s strongest backers, but experts said their relations have cooled because Haftar allowed his territory to be used to funnel support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group, which is fighting Sudan’s military, the AFP news agency reported.

Cairo is also now a close security ally of Ankara, and in July, Egypt refrained from objecting to a maritime line drawn between Benghazi and Turkiye.

According to exclusive information Al Jazeera received in July, the rapprochement between Ankara and Haftar’s general command included agreements on developing military facilities and advanced surveillance systems.

The agreements also included training programmes in Turkiye for eastern Libyan officers with specialised Turkish defence companies participating in the projects.

Wolfgang Pusztai, a security policy analyst and former Austrian defence attache in Greece, told Al Jazeera that a possible Turkish military presence in eastern Libya was “probably more of a concern for Egypt”.

“This is not so much an issue for Greece, which has a Turkish military presence next door anyway,” he said, adding, “I doubt Cairo would accept this.”

Why does the EU oppose it?

Because two of its member states said it seeks to take their waters.

In a joint statement on Tuesday, European Council President Antonio Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said the memorandum infringes on the sovereign rights of third states and does not comply with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

They reaffirmed the bloc’s solidarity with Greece and Cyprus.

Athens said the deal ignores Greek islands, including Crete, Rhodes and Karpathos, and therefore infringes on its maritime territory, according to a briefing document from the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Sotirios Zartaloudis, an associate professor in comparative European politics at the University of Birmingham, told Al Jazeera that Athens and Nicosia see the deal as a Turkish attempt to block the “crucial Great Sea Interconnector”.

The planned subsea power cable, which would link Greece’s grid to Cyprus and later Israel, has been delayed by a dispute between Athens and Ankara over waters off the Greek island of Crete, the Reuters news agency reported last year. The project is estimated to cost about $2.1bn.

Turkiye has not signed UNCLOS, which means Ankara is not bound by the treaty’s rules governing maritime boundaries.

On Wednesday, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas urged all countries to respect member states’ sovereign rights under EU and international law, including UNCLOS.

Zartaloudis said both countries had pushed for the EU to condemn the deal, but “so far expectations were not met”, and that “they will try to gain further support against the deal”.

He added that “the main actor in the region is the US”, which he said had not repudiated the agreement.

What does Turkiye say?

Ankara said the deal is lawful and already in force.

Turkiye’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the memorandum safeguards both countries’ rights on the basis of international law and “the principle of equity”.

“There are countries reacting to this. We know why they are reacting,” Fidan told state media.

“However, this is an entirely legitimate deal, both from a legal and a statutory perspective,” he said.

Why did eastern Libya change its mind?

Because Ankara has spent years courting it and its parliament has new leadership.

After Ankara struck a deal with Haftar’s LNA in July, the eastern parliament on October 6 elected Al-Salhin Abdelnabi al-Obeidi as speaker, replacing Aguila Saleh after more than 12 years.

Al-Obeidi previously chaired the Libyan-Turkish parliamentary friendship committee.

Anas El Gomati, director of the Sadeq Institute, a Libyan think tank, told Al Jazeera that the turnaround in eastern Libya was about the route to the presidency under a US mediation plan for Saddam Haftar, Khalifa Haftar’s son and deputy commander.

“Turkiye is now the most consequential outside power in Libya with leverage over Tripoli and a military presence in the west, and he needs it to get there and to stay there,” El Gomati said.

“But a ratified treaty is hard to reverse, so Ankara gets something that looks permanent in return for support that, depending on how the Haftars use it, may not be,” El Gomati said.

Does the vote unite Libya’s rivals?

Not on the issues that divide them most.

Tripoli’s GNU welcomed Tuesday’s vote, meaning both of Libya’s rival centres of power now back the deal.

But El Gomati said the “unification was never about the sea”.

“It’s about who controls the budget, the army and the electoral commission, and this vote touches none of them,” he said.

What happens next?

Athens said it would take all appropriate measures to safeguard its sovereign rights.

El Gomati said implementation now depended on institutions such as Libya’s National Oil Corporation and he expected pressure “to be diplomatic and slow”.

Pusztai said the risk of naval incidents if Turkiye or Libya act on the deal at sea was “very high”.

He said it might also lead to the involvement of the EU naval mission enforcing the UN arms embargo on Libya since 2020.

In August 2020, months after the deal was signed with the GNU, Ankara sent the survey vessel Oruc Reis to explore for oil and gas in waters Greece claims, bringing the two NATO allies to the verge of military confrontation.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has unveiled an updated national security doctrine and displayed a map of rival regional alignments, signalling a security approach that prioritises preemptive military action, the expansion of buffer zones, and the pursuit of new regional partnerships.

The document was developed with the assistance of Israel’s National Security Council and published by the Prime Minister’s Office on Sunday, just nine days before Israel’s parliamentary elections that could spell the end of Netanyahu’s time in office. It outlines a formal policy of preventing perceived threats through military action rather than containment – a policy that has already been seen in action over the past few years, as Israel pursues multiple wars and attacks on its neighbours.

Electoral survival strategy

The timing of the map’s release carries particular political significance, with Netanyahu fighting to retain power amid criticism of his conduct in power, the ongoing corruption trial he faces and his handling of the October 7, 2023, attacks, as well as the wars that followed.

As the October 27 election day draws closer, Netanyahu is attempting to bolster his credentials as Israel’s ‘Mr Security’, hoping to get the votes of Israelis who may not like some of his other policies or behaviour, but still view him as the most likely leader to defend the country.

Netanyahu, who did get the endorsement of US President Donald Trump on Sunday, said during the briefing that Israel could face the possibility of a far less supportive administration in Washington in two years, after the end of the Trump presidency.

“In two years, a president… who is extremely hostile to Israel could come to power [in the United States],” Netanyahu warned.

He therefore argued that Israel must “expand our network of alliances and develop capabilities that make us a valuable asset” to other countries as a way of protecting itself if US policy towards it changed.

The comments, according to analysts, suggest that Netanyahu is seeking to portray his leadership as essential to navigating both Israel’s regional military challenges and its diplomatic isolation, all while keeping a fearful electorate reassured.

Mohanad Hage Ali, deputy director for research at the Malcolm H Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, explained that the strategic presentation centred on competing regional blocs and buffer zones.

That framework “incubates and nurtures existential fears, which would lead Israeli voters to feel the need for a decisive leader”, Hage Ali noted.

In his assessment, Netanyahu stands to benefit from the Israeli public’s fear of regional threats by presenting himself as a familiar leader capable of managing them, making him “the devil you know”, as the analyst put it, to voters reluctant to embrace political change at a sensitive time.

Netanyahu’s political opponents have been quick to push back against that narrative.

Gadi Eisenkot, one of the prime minister’s main challengers in the upcoming election, said that the published doctrine was “two hollow pages, full of slogans that have nothing to do with a security concept”.

Another, former Prime Minister Yair Lapid, described the document as “superficial”.

Expanding security zones

The map displayed during Netanyahu’s briefing was originally published in May by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, a German political foundation. It divides the Middle East and parts of Africa into competing blocs, highlighting the region’s complex network of alliances and rivalries.

Those networks include states, unrecognised entities and non-state actors.

The map identifies an Israel-United Arab Emirates alignment, described as the “Hexagon Alliance”, alongside a separate grouping of Egypt, Turkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia – the latter three of which signed the Mecca mutual defence pact in August – labelled the “Sunni Diamond Alliance”. It also depicts Iran and its regional allies as a separate axis.

The map serves to illustrate the issues outlined in the published security doctrine, presenting a region where Israel faces multiple threats, the alliance that Israel is seeking to cultivate across the wider region, and the perceived need for “buffer zones” – the occupation of territory in other countries.

Israel’s existing illegal occupation of territory in Gaza and southern Lebanon illustrates the potential consequences of expanding the buffer zone approach.

Hage Ali warned that continuing to pursue an approach built around expanding military control could lead to “more conflict and more ethnic cleansing” under the guise of security buffers.

Embracing regional factions

A striking element of the map displayed by Netanyahu is its explicit designation of non-state actors as friendly entities.

The map highlights territories controlled by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in Sudan and Khalifa Haftar’s self-styled Libyan National Army within an alignment deemed cooperative to Israel and the United Arab Emirates.

Israel views these actors as pragmatic partners or at least cooperative entities in a broader strategic grid, Hage Ali explained. However, the public association of these groups with Israel threatens to damage their domestic standing across the Arab world.

That reflects Netanyahu’s immediate priorities, where “what Israelis think matters more than the reputation of your allies and the viability of these alliances”, Hage Ali added.

The portrayal of the Middle East as a region divided into competing alliances also carries risks for Netanyahu’s broader diplomatic ambitions.

Earlier this year, Netanyahu proposed a “hexagon of alliances”, envisaging cooperation between Israel, India, Greece, Cyprus and unnamed Arab, African and Asian partners, against what he described as “radical” regional alliances.

The proposed grouping has not been established as a formal alliance, and commentators in Israel and the international press have described the project as a branding exercise rather than a binding military pact, noting that countries like India prioritise non-alignment and pragmatic trade over ideologically rigid blocs.

For Tehran and its regional partners, the map also offers potent political leverage.

Hage Ali emphasised that the visual layout “will certainly help their propaganda machine”, providing Hezbollah and other Iranian allies with evidence to reinforce the narrative that Israel seeks to expand and dominate the region.