Lebanon

As President Trump parades through the Middle East this week, he will encounter a very different region than the one he experienced during his first term. True, the Israeli-Palestinian problem remains unresolved, as do the challenges emanating from Iran’s much-advanced nuclear program and the instability and dysfunction in Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Syria and Yemen.

But this old wine is now packaged in new bottles. Beyond the garish headlines of Trump’s plan to accept a Boeing 747 as a gift from Qatar, new trends are emerging that will redefine the region, posing additional challenges for U.S. policy.

Of all the changes in the Middle East since Hamas’ Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel, perhaps the most striking is Israel’s emergence as a regional powerhouse. Aided by the administrations of Presidents Biden and Trump, and enabled by Arab regimes that do little to support Palestinians, Israel devastated Hamas and Hezbollah as military organizations, killing much of their senior leadership. With the support of the United States, Europe and friendly Arab states, it effectively countered two direct Iranian missile attacks on its territory.

Israel then delivered its own strike, reportedly destroying much of Iran’s ballistic missile production and air defenses. In short, Israel has achieved escalation dominance: the capacity to escalate (or not) as it sees fit, and to deter its adversaries from doing so. Israel has also redefined its concept of border security in Gaza, Lebanon, the West Bank and Syria by acting unilaterally to preempt and prevent threats to its territory.

Converting Israel’s military power into political arrangements, even peace accords, would seem like a reasonable next step. But the right-wing government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seems uninterested in such options and is unlikely to be induced to change its outlook. Moreover, securing new, lasting agreements also depends on whether there are leaders among the Palestinians and key Arab states ready to take up the challenge, with all the political risks it entails.

But the Arab world remains in serious disarray. At least five Arab states are dealing with profound internal challenges, leaving them in various degrees of dysfunction and state failure. Amid this power vacuum, two alternative power centers have emerged. The first are the states of the Persian Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. Relatively unscathed by the Arab Spring and blessed with sovereign wealth funds, oil and natural gas, these stable authoritarian powers, particularly Saudi Arabia, have begun to play an outsize role in the region.

The second category comprises non-Arab states. Israel, Turkey and Iran are the only states in the region with the capacity to project significant military power beyond their borders. While each has suffered periods of internal unrest, they currently enjoy domestic stability. Each also boasts tremendous economic potential and significant security, military and intelligence capabilities, including the capability to manufacture weapons domestically.

One (Israel) is America’s closest regional ally, another (Turkey) is a member of NATO and a newfound power broker in Syria, and the third (Iran) retains considerable influence despite Israel’s mauling of its proxies Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran’s nuclear program keeps it relevant, even central, to both Israeli and American policymaking.

All three non-Arab states engender a good deal of suspicion and mistrust among Arab regimes but are nonetheless seen as key players whom no one wants to offend. All three are at odds — with each frustrating the others’ regional objectives — and all three are here to stay. Their influence will most likely only grow in the years to come, given the fractiousness of the Arab world.

In the immediate aftermath of the Oct. 7 Hamas attack, it seemed that the Palestinian issue was once again front and center, not just in the Arab world, but internationally. Those who claimed it had lost its resonance could point to the outpouring of sympathy and support for Gazan civilians as Israel’s war against Hamas led to a humanitarian catastrophe.

Moreover, the United Nations passed resolutions calling for an end to the war, many around the world condemned the war and Israel, the International Court of Justice took up the question of whether Israel is committing genocide, and the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Netanyahu (as well as for Hamas’ military commander, later found to have been killed).

Nonetheless, it has become stunningly clear that, far from pushing the Palestinian issue to the top of the international agenda, the Oct. 7 attack has actually diminished its salience and left Palestinians isolated and without good options. Continued U.S. support for Israel’s war against Hamas, despite the exponential rise of Palestinian deaths, has protected Israel from negative consequences; key Arab regimes have done next to nothing to impose costs and consequences on Israel and the U.S. as Palestinian civilian deaths mount. The international community appears too fragmented, distracted and self-interested to act in any concerted way in defense of Palestine.

Meanwhile, the Palestinian national movement remains divided and dysfunctional, giving Palestinians an unpalatable choice between Hamas and the aging president of the Palestinian National Authority, Mahmoud Abbas. The prospects for anything resembling a two-state solution have never looked bleaker.

How the Trump administration will process these developments remains to be seen. Clearly, it has adopted a pro-Israel view, with Trump musing about turning Gaza into a Riviera-style resort. He has deployed his special envoy to the Middle East to secure the return of hostages taken by Hamas but has yet to invest in any postwar plan for the beleaguered enclave. Indeed, he has left the strategy for Gaza to Israel, which in turn has resumed its military campaign there. Trump has also acquiesced to Israel’s pursuit of aggressive border defenses against both Lebanon and Syria, while enabling Israel’s annexationist policies in the West Bank.

Yet Trump is nothing if not unpredictable. In April, he announced new U.S. negotiations with Iran in the presence of Netanyahu, who himself has tried to persuade the president that the only solution to Iran’s nuclear program is military action. But if U.S.-Iranian negotiations do advance, or if Trump’s interest in Israeli-Saudi normalization intensifies, he may find himself drawn into the Middle East negotiating bazaar, dealing with the intricacies of day-after planning in Gaza and a political horizon for Palestinians.

These paths are already fomenting tension between Trump, who will not be visiting Israel on his Middle East trip, and a recalcitrant Netanyahu. But given Trump’s absolute control over his party, Netanyahu will have few options to appeal to Republicans if the White House proposes policies that he opposes. As most U.S. allies have already learned, if Trump wants something, he’s not averse to using pressure to get it.

Aaron David Miller, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is a former State Department Middle East analyst and negotiator in Republican and Democratic administrations and the author of “The End of Greatness: Why America Can’t Have (and Doesn’t Want) Another Great President.” Lauren Morganbesser is a junior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

UNIFIL says incident first of its kind since Israel and Lebanese-armed group Hezbollah agreed to a ceasefire last November.

Direct fire from the Israeli military hit the perimeter of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon’s (UNIFIL) peacekeeping positions in south Lebanon, the mission said.

In a statement on Wednesday, UNIFIL added that the incident on Tuesday was the first of its kind since Israel and Lebanese-armed group Hezbollah agreed to a ceasefire last November.

UNIFIL said one of its bases in the village of Kfarchouba in southern Lebanon was hit. There was no immediate comment from the Israeli army.

“In recent days, UNIFIL has also observed other aggressive behaviour by the [Israeli military] towards peacekeepers performing operational activities in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1701,” it said in a post on X, referring to a UN resolution originally adopted in 2006 to end hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah.

UNIFIL is concerned by the recent aggressive posture of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) involving UNIFIL personnel and assets near the Blue Line, including yesterday’s incident in which a direct fire hit the perimeter of a UNIFIL position south of the village of Kfar Shouba.

— UNIFIL (@UNIFIL_) May 14, 2025

Tuesday’s incident occurred near the Blue Line, a UN-mapped demarcation separating Lebanon from Israel and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, it added.

Any unauthorised crossing of the Blue Line by land or by air from any side constitutes a violation of Security Council Resolution 1701.

UNIFIL cited other alleged incidents it blamed on the Israeli army, including being targeted by lasers while it was performing a patrol with the Lebanese army in the southern border town of Maroun al-Ras on Tuesday.

“UNIFIL protests all such and we continue to remind all actors of their responsibility to ensure the safety and security of UN personnel and property and to respect the inviolability of UN assets and premises at all times,” it added.

Volatile ceasefire

Separately on Wednesday, Israel’s military said it killed a Hezbollah fighter in a strike on southern Lebanon.

“Earlier today [Wednesday], the [Israeli military] struck in the area of Qaaqaaiyet El Jisr in southern Lebanon, eliminating a Hezbollah terrorist who held the position of the commander of the Qabrikha area within the Hezbollah terrorist organisation,” a military statement said.

The November ceasefire ended a conflict in which Israel attacked Lebanon by air and invaded the country, devastating vast swaths of southern Lebanon. Hezbollah’s longtime leader, Hassan Nasrallah, was killed in an Israeli attack in September.

The ceasefire terms require that neither Hezbollah nor any other armed group have weapons in areas near the border south of the Litani River, which flows into the Mediterranean some 20km (12 miles) north of the Israeli border.

They require Israel to withdraw troops from the south and the Lebanese army to deploy into the border region.

Although the truce officially ended hostilities, sporadic cross-border attacks have continued. Israel has regularly broken the truce and carried out air raids across southern Lebanon, also hitting neighbourhoods in Beirut’s southern suburbs, where Hezbollah retains strong support.

Israel still occupies five strategic hilltops along the border. While rockets have been fired into Israel from Lebanese territory on two separate occasions, Hezbollah has denied involvement.

Hezbollah’s leader, Naim Qassem, has maintained that the group no longer keeps weapons in the border zone, in accordance with the truce.

BEIRUT, Lebanon, May 13 (UPI) — The oil-rich Gulf countries, once Lebanon’s main supporters, now are making a cautious comeback after years of disengagement. This shift comes as Hezbollah has been significantly weakened, Iran’s regional influence has declined and a new Lebanese leadership has emerged, promising long-overdue reforms.

Lebanon has long depended on the financial support and investments of Gulf countries, particularly during times of economic hardship and political instability.

For decades, Gulf states — especially Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait — provided crucial aid and direct investments that helped Lebanon reconstruct after the 1975-90 civil war and the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel war, sustain its economy and support its banking sector.

However, in recent years, Hezbollah’s dominance, Iran’s expanding influence, and the Lebanese government’s failure to implement reforms prompted Gulf countries to withdraw their support.

The suspension of political and financial backing exacerbated Lebanon’s severe economic crisis, which began in 2019. Strained diplomatic ties further discouraged private investors, and tourism suffered a major blow.

The country was left increasingly isolated at a time when it most needed external assistance.

Change begins

That began to change last September, when Hezbollah suffered significant setbacks during a destructive war with Israel that broke out in support of Gaza in October 2023, and Iran started to lose its “Axis of Resistance.”

With Hezbollah’s influence substantially reduced, a breakthrough in Lebanon’s political deadlock followed. Former army commander Joseph Aoun was elected president and a new government was swiftly formed under Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, a respected jurist.

Aoun and Salam have pledged to disarm all militias, reassert the state’s monopoly on arms and implement long-requested reforms — signals that the Gulf states welcome.

UAE’s decision last week to lift the travel ban and allow its citizens to visit Lebanon was a sign of warming relations and renewed willingness to engage.

On Monday, Kuwait announced that it will facilitate the return of its citizens to Lebanon, although they kept on visiting the country discretely during the past years. Saudi Arabia, which has snubbed Lebanon, may follow suit soon.

Qataris had no issue, as they did not join the Gulf countries in isolating Lebanon in 2021 and have kept on coming, according to an official Lebanese source.

The move to alleviate Gulf travel restrictions came after successive visits by President Aoun to urge Saudi, UAE and Kuwait leaders to help revive tourism in his country for such a move would generate immediate revenues.

A new reality

Aoun was keen to demonstrate that “there is a new reality” in Lebanon, and that there was “no need any more to continue isolating Lebanon and keeping the travel bans,” according to the official source.

The source said the security situation has improved a lot, despite Israel continuing airstrikes on alleged Hezbollah targets mainly in southern Lebanon beyond the Feb. 18 cease-fire deadline.

“These attacks do not threaten the whole country as was the case during the war,” he told UPI.

Lebanon has been experiencing a significant decline in tourist numbers, which dropped to 1.13 million people in December 2024 from 2.1 million in 2018 to due to political instability, security tensions, the ongoing economic crisis and the recent Israel-Hezbollah war.

Tourism revenues, which have been estimated at $5 billion annually in recent years, peaked at $8.6 billion in 2019.

To the Gulf countries, security was the main concern.

At Beirut’s Rafic Hariri International Airport, strict security measures are now in place. New security chiefs have been appointed, advanced tools — including AI-powered systems — have been introduced, several airport staff linked to Hezbollah have been removed and smuggling attempts tied to the group, including a recent effort to move 22 kilograms of gold, have been foiled.

Restoring the image

The road leading to the airport has received a makeover. Hezbollah flags, banners and images of its leaders and Iranian figures were removed as part of a broader campaign targeting all political groups and aimed at restoring the capital’s image and promoting tourism.

Now, large posters welcoming visitors with messages of a “New Era” for Lebanon line the route from the airport.

Even though such steps — unthinkable just months ago — were significant, Saudi Arabia chose to assess the new security measures independently.

“We want things to be back to normal. We are waiting for the Saudis, who want to evaluate the security and political situation before taking a decision,” the official source said.

A Saudi delegation is expected to visit Beirut soon, potentially paving the way for the return of Saudi tourists to Lebanon before the Muslim Al Adha Eid in early June.

The source, however, discounted that the return of the Gulf tourists also was linked to disarming Hezbollah, saying that “the issue of Hezbollah weapons is moving slowly.”

According to Mohanad Hage Ali, an analyst and fellow at the Beirut-based Carnegie Middle East Center, if the Gulf countries’ re-engagement is “truly linked” to disarming Hezbollah, “it might be a long wait.”

Hage Ali told UPI that the increase in Gulf travel will positively impact Lebanon’s tourism this summer. However, any financial support or investments from the oil-rich countries would require Lebanon to implement necessary reforms, which “are currently stuck in [the Lebanese] parliament, awaiting U.S. pressure.”

Reform is slow

He added that “the reform process is slow and depends on international pressure,” expressing hope that reform laws would pass before summer and allowing for some support, particularly in the energy sector.

That’s why attracting back Arab, especially Gulf, tourists and “gaining their trust again,” became Lebanon’s “high priority,” according to Tourism Minister Laura El-Khazen Lahoud.

“We are working to address all the issues. … We are doing everything we can to ensure that the reforms are adopted,” Lahoud told UPI. “We want to put Lebanon back on track … to make sure that it regains the place it deserves on the international touristic map, but things don’t happen overnight.”

She expressed hope that Saudi Arabia will be encouraged and that other countries will lift their ban one after the other.

“Unfortunately, they have forgotten how beautiful Lebanon is with its rich history, diverse culture and fascinating nature,” she added.