Iraq

WASHINGTON — A highly confidential CIA assessment produced at the request of the White House warned President Trump of a wider conflict in Venezuela if he were to support the country’s democratic opposition once its president, Nicolás Maduro, was deposed, a person familiar with the matter told The Times.

The assessment was a tightly held CIA product commissioned at the request of senior policymakers before Trump decided whether to authorize Operation Absolute Resolve, the stunning U.S. mission that seized Maduro and his wife from their bedroom in Caracas over the weekend.

Announcing the results of the operation on Sunday, Trump surprised an anxious Venezuelan public when he was quick to dismiss the leadership of the democratic opposition — led by María Corina Machado, last year’s Nobel Peace Prize laureate, and Edmundo González Urrutia, the opposition candidate who won the 2024 presidential election that was ultimately stolen by Maduro.

Instead, Trump said his administration was working with Maduro’s handpicked vice president, Delcy Rodríguez, who has since been named the country’s interim president. The rest of Maduro’s government remains in place.

Endorsing the opposition would probably have required U.S. military backing, with the Venezuelan armed forces still under the control of loyalists to Maduro unwilling to relinquish power.

A second official said that the administration sought to avoid one of the cardinal mistakes of the invasion of Iraq, when the Bush administration ordered party loyalists of the deposed Saddam Hussein to be excluded from the country’s interim government. That decision, known as de-Baathification, led those in charge of Iraq’s stockpiles of weapons to establish armed resistance to the U.S. campaign.

The CIA product was not an assessment that was shared across the 18 government agencies that make up the U.S. intelligence community, whose head, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, was largely absent from deliberations — and who has yet to comment on the operation, despite CIA operatives being deployed in harm’s way before and throughout the weekend mission.

The core team that worked on Absolute Resolve included Homeland Security Advisor Stephen Miller, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan Caine and CIA Director John Ratcliffe, who met routinely over several months, sometimes daily, the source added.

The existence of the CIA assessment was first reported by the Wall Street Journal.

Signs have emerged that Trump’s team was in communication with Rodríguez ahead of the operation, although the president has denied that his administration gave Rodríguez advance notice of Maduro’s ouster.

“There are a number of unanswered questions,” said Evan Ellis, who served in Trump’s first term planning State Department policy on Latin America, the Caribbean and international narcotics. “There may have a been a cynical calculation that one can work with them.”

Rodríguez served as a point of contact with the Biden administration, experts note, and also was in touch with Richard Grenell, a top Trump aide who heads the Kennedy Center, early on in Trump’s second term, when he was testing engagement with Caracas.

While the federal indictment unsealed against Maduro after his seizure named several other senior officials in his government, Rodríguez’s name was notably absent.

Rodríguez was sworn in as Venezuela’s interim president Monday in a ceremony attended by diplomats from Russia, China and Iran. Publicly, the leader has offered mixed messages, at once vowing to prevent Venezuela from becoming a colonial outpost of an American empire, while also offering to forge a newly collaborative relationship with Washington.

“Of course, for political reasons, Delcy Rodríguez can’t say, ‘I’ve cut a deal with Trump, and we’re going to stop the revolution now and start working with the U.S.,” Ellis said.

“It’s not about the democracy,” he said. “It’s about him not wanting to work with Maduro.”

In an interview with Fox News on Monday, Machado said she had yet to speak with Trump since the U.S. operation over the weekend, but hoped to do so soon, offering to share her Nobel Peace Prize with him as a gesture of gratitude. Trump has repeatedly touted himself as a worthy recipient of the award.

“What he has done is historic,” Machado said, vowing to return to the country from hiding abroad since accepting the prize in Oslo last month.

“It’s a huge step,” she added, “towards a democratic transition.”

WASHINGTON — President Trump has made broad but vague assertions that the United States is going to “run” Venezuela after the ouster of Nicolás Maduro but has offered almost no details about how it will do so, raising questions among some lawmakers and former officials about the administration’s level of planning for the country after Maduro was gone.

Seemingly contradictory statements from Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio have suggested at once that the U.S. now controls the levers of Venezuelan power or that the U.S. has no intention of assuming day-to-day governance and will allow Maduro’s subordinates to remain in leadership positions for now.

Rubio said the U.S. would rely on existing sanctions on Venezuela’s oil sector and criminal gangs to wield leverage with Maduro’s successors.

The uncertainty on definitive next steps in Venezuela contrasts with the years of discussions and planning that went into U.S. military interventions that deposed other autocratic leaders, notably in Iraq in 2003, which still did not often lead to the hoped-for outcomes.

‘Disagreement about how to proceed’

The discrepancy between what Trump and Rubio have said publicly has not sat well with some former diplomats.

“It strikes me that we have no idea whatsoever as to what’s next,” said Dan Fried, a retired career diplomat, former assistant secretary of state and sanctions coordinator who served under both Democratic and Republican administrations.

“For good operational reasons, there were very few people who knew about the raid, but Trump’s remarks about running the country and Rubio’s uncomfortable walk back suggests that even within that small group of people, there is disagreement about how to proceed,” said Fried who is now with the Atlantic Council think tank.

Supporters of the operation, meanwhile, believe there is little confusion over the U.S. goal.

“The president speaks in big headlines and euphemisms,” said Rich Goldberg, a sanctions proponent who worked in the National Energy Dominance Council at the White House until last year and is now a senior adviser to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a hawkish think tank.

Goldberg does not see Rubio becoming “the superintendent of schools” but “effectively, the U.S. will be calling the shots.”

“There are people at the top who can make what we want happen or not, and we right now control their purse strings and their lives,” he said. “The president thinks it’s enough and the secretary thinks it’s enough, and if it’s not enough, we’ll know very soon and we’ll deal with it.”

If planning for the U.S. “to run” Venezuela existed prior to Maduro’s arrest and extradition to face federal drug charges, it was confined to a small group of Trump political allies, according to current U.S. officials, who note that Trump relies on a very small circle of advisers and has tossed aside much of the traditional decision-making apparatus.

These officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss their understanding of internal deliberations, said they were not aware of any preparations for either a military occupation or an interim civilian governing authority, which has been a priority for previous administrations when they contemplated going to war to oust a specific leader or government. The White House and the State Department’s press office did not return messages seeking comment.

Long discussion among agencies in previous interventions

Previous military actions that deposed autocratic leaders, notably in Panama in 1989 and Iraq in 2003, were preceded by months, if not years, of interagency discussion and debate over how best to deal with power vacuums caused by the ousters of their leaders. The State Department, White House National Security Council, the Pentagon and the intelligence community all participated in that planning.

In Panama, the George H.W. Bush administration had nearly a full year of preparations to launch the invasion that ousted Panama’s leader Manuel Noriega. Panama, however, is exponentially smaller than Venezuela, it had long experience as a de facto American territory, and the U.S. occupation was never intended to retake territory or natural resources.

By contrast, Venezuela is vastly larger in size and population and has a decadeslong history of animosity toward the United States.

“Panama was not successful because it was supported internationally because it wasn’t,” Fried said. “It was a success because it led to a quick, smooth transfer to a democratic government. That would be a success here, but on the first day out, we trashed someone who had those credentials, and that strikes me as daft.”

He was referring to Trump’s apparent dismissal of opposition leader Maria Corina Machado, whose party is widely believed to have won elections in 2024, results that Maduro refused to accept. Trump said Saturday that Machado “doesn’t have the support within or the respect within the country” to be a credible leader and suggested he would be OK with Maduro’s No. 2, Delcy Rodríguez, remaining in power as long as she works with the U.S.

Hoped-for outcomes didn’t happen in Iraq and Afghanistan

Meanwhile, best-case scenarios like those predicted by the George W. Bush administration for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq that it would be a beacon of democracy in the Middle East and hopes for a democratic and stable Afghanistan following the ouster of the Taliban died painfully slow deaths at the tremendous expense of American money and lives after initial euphoria over military victories.

“Venezuela looks nothing like Libya, it looks nothing like Iraq, it looks nothing like Afghanistan. It looks nothing like the Middle East,” Rubio said this weekend of Venezuela and its neighbors. “These are Western countries with long traditions at a people-to-people and cultural level, and ties to the United States, so it’s nothing like that.”

The lack of clarity on Venezuela has been even more pronounced because Trump campaigned on a platform of extricating the U.S. from foreign wars and entanglements, a position backed by his “Make America Great Again” supporters, many of whom are seeking explanations about what the president has in mind for Venezuela.

“Wake up MAGA,” Republican Rep. Thomas Massie of Kentucky, who has bucked much of his party’s lockstep agreement with Trump, posted on X after the operation. “VENEZUELA is not about drugs; it’s about OIL and REGIME CHANGE. This is not what we voted for.”

Sen. Rand Paul, also a Kentucky Republican, who often criticizes military interventions, said “time will tell if regime change in Venezuela is successful without significant monetary or human cost.”

“Easy enough to argue such policy when the action is short, swift and effective but glaringly less so when that unitary power drains of us trillions of dollars and thousands of lives, such as occurred in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Vietnam,” he wrote on social media.

In addition to the Venezuela operation, Trump is preparing to take the helm of an as-yet unformed Board of Peace to run postwar Gaza, involving the United States in yet another Mideast engagement for possibly decades to come.

And yet, as both the Iraq and Afghanistan experiences ultimately proved, no amount of planning guarantees success.

Lee writes for the Associated Press.

The reported capture of Venezuelan president evokes previous eras when other leaders were seized by the US.

President Donald Trump’s claim that the United States has captured his Venezuelan counterpart Nicolas Maduro and his wife amid “large scale” attacks on Venezuela, has stunned the world.

Venezuela’s Vice President Delcy Rodriguez says the government does not know the whereabouts of Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores.

In an audio message broadcast on state television on Saturday, Rodriguez said the government was demanding proof that Maduro and Flores are still alive.

The rapidly escalating developments follow repeated deadly strikes by US forces in the Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean on what Washington claims are drug-smuggling boats, and an attack on a docking area for alleged Venezuelan drug boats.

The reported capture of Maduro evokes previous eras when other leaders, such as Panama’s former military leader Manuel Noriega and former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, were seized by the US.

Manuel Noriega

In another direct intervention into Latin America, the US invaded Panama in 1989 to depose military and de facto leader Manuel Noriega, citing the protection of US citizens in Panama, undemocratic practices, corruption and the illegal drug trade.

Before attacking Panama, the US indicted Noriega for drug smuggling in Miami in 1988, just as it has targeted Maduro.

Noriega forced Nicolas Ardito Barletta to resign in 1985, cancelled the elections in 1989 and backed anti-US sentiment in the country, before the operation took place.

The US foray into Panama was at the time the largest US combat operation since the Vietnam War. The US government trotted out various justifications for the operation, such as improving the lot of the Panamanians by hauling Noriega off to the US to face drug-trafficking charges.

When the general began to show signs of being less obliging to US regional designs, however, he was rendered persona non grata by Washington.

He was tried on the Miami indictment after being flown to the US and was imprisoned there until 2010, when he was extradited to France to face another trial. France then sent him back to Panama a year later.

Noriega died in prison in Panama in 2017, where he was serving a sentence for his crimes.

Saddam Hussein

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was captured by US forces on December 13, 2003, nine months after the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq started based on false intelligence of Baghdad possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Like Noriega, Saddam had for years been a key Washington ally, in his case, during the years of the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s that killed one million people.

The US also claimed in the build-up to the 2003 war, without basis, that Saddam supported armed groups like al-Qaeda.

However, no WMDs were ever found in the country.

Saddam was found hiding in a hole near his hometown of Tikrit.

He stood trial in an Iraqi court and received the death penalty, leading to his execution by hanging for crimes against humanity on December 30, 2006.

Juan Orlando Hernandez

The case of Honduras’s Hernandez demonstrates what some observers suggest is a hypocritical approach by the US.

Hernandez was captured in his home in Tegucigalpa in an operation by the US agents and Honduran forces in February 2022 – only days after he left his position as president of his country.

In April 2022, he was extradited to the US over his alleged involvement in corruption and the illegal drug trade, and in June of the same year, he was sentenced to 45 years in prison.

However, Hernandez was pardoned by US President Donald Trump on December 1, 2025.

Days later, Honduras’s top prosecutor issued an international arrest warrant for Hernandez, intensifying legal and political turmoil just days after the ex-leader walked free from a United States prison.

Anyone travelling to these destinations could invalidate their holiday insurance

There are certain spots around the globe that are considered quite risky, and travellers heading there receive guidance on safety precautions they should adopt to avoid mishaps.

However, only 55 locations feature on the ‘do not travel’ list, which has been flagged with a warning by the Foreign Office.

Anyone journeying to these places will be voiding their holiday insurance, meaning if things go pear-shaped, they’ll be left without support. Officials also caution that they could be jeopardising their safety. If you require consular assistance locally, it will likely be difficult to obtain.

For specific countries, the Foreign Office also advises against all but essential travel, implying you should reconsider any holiday plans The Foreign Office cautions: “Get advice and warnings about travel abroad, including entry requirements, safety and security, health risks and legal differences.”

It explained: “No foreign travel can be guaranteed safe. FCDO publishes travel advice to help you decide if it’s safe enough for you to travel to a particular destination. In some instances we also give information about how to reduce the risks you may face there. All environments contain some level of risk and you should consider what precautions you should take.

“You must take personal responsibility for your own travel. Only you can decide whether you should travel to a country or stay there, and what activities to take part in.”

People may face different risks due to their:

• gender
• ethnic background
• sexuality
• health

The Foreign Office has general guidance for specific types of traveller to help you understand some of these risks.

The FCDO sometimes formally advises British people against ‘all but essential travel’ or ‘all travel’ to a particular country. It said:

“Your travel insurance could be invalidated if you travel against advice from FCDO. We only advise against travel if we think the risk to British nationals is unacceptably high. For example, this could be due to:

• armed conflict
• military coups
• civil unrest
• disease outbreaks
• natural disasters

“For terrorist threats, we only advise against travel:

• in situations of extreme and imminent danger
• where the threat is sufficiently specific, large-scale or widespread to affect British nationals severely

“We may advise against travel to:

• a whole country
• parts of a country

“The ‘Warnings and insurance’ section of each travel advice page lists all the areas where we advise against travel. If you want to know about changes to travel advice for a specific country, you can sign up to receive email alerts about updates.”

FCDO advises against all travel

1. Afghanistan – “The security situation is volatile”
2. Belarus – “You face a significant risk of arrest”
3. Burkina Faso – “Due to the threat of terrorist attacks and terrorist kidnap”
4. Haiti – “Due to the volatile security situation”
5. Iran – “British nationals are at significant risk of arrest”
6. Mali – “Due to unpredictable security conditions”
7. Niger – “Due to the rise of reported terrorist and criminal kidnappings”
8. Russia – “Due to the risks and threats from its continuing invasion of Ukraine”
9. South Sudan – “Due to the risk of armed violence and criminality”
10. Syria – “Ongoing conflict and unpredictable security conditions”
11. Yemen – “Unpredictable security conditions”

FCDO advises against all travel to parts

1. Algeria – all travel to within 30km of Algeria’s borders with Libya, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Tunisia
2. Armenia – within 5km of the full eastern border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the M16/H26 road between the towns of Ijevan and Noyemberyan
3. Azerbaijan – within 5km of the Azerbaijan-Armenia border
4. Benin – northern border regions
5. Burundi – Cibitoke and Bubanza provinces, former Kayanza province, former Bujumbura Rural province and the RN5 road north of Melchior Ndadaye airport
6. Cambodia – within 50km from the border with Thailand
7. Cameroon – Bakassi Peninsula, parts of the Far-North Region, North-West Region and South-West Region and within 40km of the Central African Republic, Chad and Nigeria borders
8. Central African Republic – against all travel except to the capital, Bangui
9. Chad – Borkou, Ennedi Ouest, Ennedi Est and Tibesti provinces, Kanem Province, including Nokou, Lake Chad region and within 30km of all Chad’s other borders
10. Congo – within 50km of the Republic of Congo-Central African Republic border in Likouala Region
11. Côte d’Ivoire – within 40km of borders with Burkina Faso and Mali
12. Democratic Republic of the Congo – within 50km of the border with the Central African Republic, the province of Kasaï Oriental, the Kwamouth territory of Mai-Ndombe Province and provinces in Eastern DRC
13. Djibouti – Djibouti-Eritrea border
14. Egypt – within 20km of the Egypt-Libya border and the North Sinai Governorate
15. Eritrea – within 25km of Eritrea’s land borders
16. Ethiopia – international border areas, parts of the Tigray region, Amhara region, Afar region, Gambela region, Oromia region, Somali region, Central, Southern, Sidama and South West regions and Benishangul-Gumuz region
17. Georgia – South Ossetia and Abkhazia
18. India – within 10km of the India-Pakistan border and Jammu and Kashmir
19. Indonesia – Mount Lewotobi Laki-Laki, Mount Sinabung, Mount Marapi, Mount Semeru, Mount Ruang, Mount Ibu
20. Iraq – advises against all travel to parts of Anbar province, Basra province, Diyala province, Kirkuk province, Ninawa province, Salah al-Din province, Sadr City and within 30km of federal Iraq’s borders with Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
21. Israel – against all travel to Gaza, parts of the West Bank and Northern Israel
22. Jordan – within 3km of the border with Syria
23. Kenya – Kenya-Somalia border and northern parts of the east coast
24. Lebanon – areas in Beirut and Mount Lebanon Governorate, the South and Nabatiyeh Governorates, the Beqaa Governorate, the Baalbek-Hermel Governorate, the Akkar Governorate, the city of Tripoli and Palestinian refugee camps
25. Libya – advises against all travel to Libya except for the cities of Benghazi and Misrata
26. Mauritania – Eastern Mauritania and within 25km of the Malian border
27. Moldova –Transnistria
28. Mozambique – Cabo Delgado Province
29. Myanmar (Burma) – Chin State, Kachin State, Kayah State, Kayin State, Mon State, Rakhine State, Sagaing and Magway regions, Tanintharyi Region, Shan State North, North Mandalay Region
30. Nigeria – Borno State, Yobe State, Adamawa State, Gombe State, Kaduna State, Katsina State, Zamfara State and the riverine areas of Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom and Cross River states
31. Pakistan – within 10 miles of the border with Afghanistan, areas in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province and the Balochistan Province
32. Philippines – western and central Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago
33. Saudi Arabia – within 10km of the border with Yemen
34. Somalia – advises against all travel except the western regions Awdal, Maroodijeh and Sahil
35. Sudan – against all travel except to the Hala’ib Triangle and the Bir Tawil Trapezoid
36. Palestine – against all travel to Gaza, parts of The West Bank and Northern Israel
37. Thailand –parts of the south, near the Thailand-Malaysia border, the Hat Yai to Padang Besar train line and within 50km of the whole border with Cambodia
38. Togo – within 30km of the border with Burkina Faso
39. Tunisia – parts of Western Tunisia, including the Tunisia-Algeria border and Southern Tunisia, including the Tunisia-Libya border
40. Turkey – within 10km of the Turkey-Syria border
41. Ukraine – all regions of Ukraine with the exception of some western regions
42. Venezuela – within 80km of the Venezuela-Colombia border, within 40km of the Venezuela-Brazil border, Zulia State
43. Western Sahara – within 30km of ‘the Berm’ boundary line and areas south and east of the Berm boundary line

FCDO advises against all but essential travel

With regard to the definition of ‘essential travel’, the FCDO says: “Whether travel is essential or not is your own decision. You may have urgent family or business commitments which you need to attend to. Only you can make an informed decision based on your own individual circumstances and the risks.”

1. North Korea – “The security situation can change quickly with no advance warning”

United States President Donald Trump’s second administration has introduced a bold and unconventional strategy for the Middle East. The administration intends to recalibrate US influence in a region historically scarred by conflict, prioritising regional stability through economic strength and military consolidation by asserting a stronger, business-minded US presence.

At the centre of Trump’s ambitious goal is what the new US envoy to Iraq, Mark Savaya, described as his goal to “make Iraq great again”. This approach moves away from traditional endless war tactics towards a transactional, results-oriented diplomacy that aims to restore Iraqi sovereignty and economic vitality. It could be the “great gamble” for Trump, who seeks an Iraq that serves as a stable, sovereign regional hub rather than a battleground for foreign interests.

Trump’s primary plans and wishes for Iraq involve a twofold mission: consolidating all armed forces under the command of the legitimate state and drastically reducing the influence of malign foreign players, most notably Iran. The administration seeks to open Iraqi markets to international investment, upgrade the country’s infrastructure, and secure the independence of its energy sector. Hence, the plan is to ground a genuine partnership that respects Iraq’s unity while ensuring that it is no longer a central node for militia activity or external interference.

Militias and political gridlock

This assertive US strategy lands directly in a highly contested and fractured political environment in Iraq, which is less a single state than a patchwork of competing powers. The heart of the problem lies not just in parliament, but also in the persistent shadow influence of armed factions and militias that often operate outside the formal chain of state command. Those groups were among the biggest winners in the November 2025 elections.

Now the ongoing government negotiations have thrown a stark light on these non-state actors.

Their power raises crucial concerns for the future: How can Iraq enforce the law and, crucially, attract the foreign investment needed for revival if armed groups challenge state authority? The consolidation of the country’s armed forces under complete state control is an urgent necessity, underscored by rising regional tensions and security threats.

Moreover, the path to achieving genuine stability is severely obstructed by entrenched political interests.

For Iraq to achieve stability, it must urgently strengthen its institutional frameworks and clearly establish a separation of powers. Yet, many political parties seem more focused on maintaining control over lucrative state resources than on implementing the meaningful reforms the country desperately needs. The result is a governance model struggling to stand firm amid the crosscurrents of competing loyalties and power grabs.

Washington’s play

To achieve these high-stakes goals, Trump has bypassed traditional diplomatic channels by appointing Mark Savaya as the US special envoy to Iraq on October 19. Such an appointment signals a shift towards “deal-making” diplomacy. Savaya’s mission is to navigate the complex political turmoil following Iraq’s parliamentary elections to steer the country towards a stable transition. His job is to bridge the gap between institutional support and massive financial investment, acting as a direct representative of Trump’s business-centric foreign policy.

Savaya is an Iraqi-born, Detroit-based businessman lacking the traditional diplomatic background; his experience is rooted in the private sector in the cannabis industry, but he gained political prominence as an active supporter of Trump’s campaign in Michigan.

He played a key role in the delicate negotiations that secured the release of Elizabeth Tsurkov, the Israeli-Russian academic and Princeton University student who had been kidnapped by an Iraqi militia for more than two years.

Savaya’s communal and ethnic ties have given him significant access to Iraqi power centres that traditional diplomats often lack.

The Iran factor

Iraq’s position in a geopolitical tug-of-war is compounding the internal struggles, forced to balance its critical relationships with two giants: the US and Iran. On the one hand, Washington’s objective is clear: it wants to bolster Iraq’s sovereignty while simultaneously pushing back against the dominance of powerful, often Iran-backed, militias. The US believes that allowing these armed groups too much sway could leave the nation isolated and wreck its fragile economic stability.

But Iranian influence remains a formidable and enduring force. Tehran views Iraq not just as a neighbour but also as a crucial strategic ally for projecting its power across the entire region. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has been actively working to maintain unity among key Shia factions in Baghdad. This move clearly signals Iran’s deep and enduring interest in shaping Iraq’s political alignment and its future path. Iraq must therefore navigate this high-stakes balancing act to survive.

Savaya’s mission unfolds at a time when Iran’s regional “axis of resistance” is under unprecedented pressure. Having already lost their primary foothold in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime in late 2024, and seeing Hezbollah’s political and military standing in Lebanon severely decimated by the 2025 conflict with Israel, Iranian proxies now face the very real prospect of losing their grip on Iraq too.

In Lebanon, a new government is committed to regaining the state’s monopoly on the use of force, leaving Hezbollah increasingly isolated. This regional retreat means that for Tehran, maintaining influence in Baghdad is a final, desperate stand to remain a relevant regional power.

Other regional actors

The success of Trump’s gamble also depends on the roles of other regional players. Turkiye has recently recalibrated its strategy to integrate Iraq into ad hoc regional trade and security frameworks, effectively diluting Iran’s centrality. Simultaneously, Gulf monarchies such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are emerging as key economic and security partners for Baghdad, offering an alternative to reliance on Iran.

However, these regional actors also bring their own agendas — such as Turkiye’s focus on containing Kurdish movements — which may conflict with US objectives. If Savaya can successfully align these diverse regional interests with Trump’s plan, he may fundamentally rewrite Iraq’s turbulent future.

A realist pragmatism

The “Make Iraq Great Again” strategy reflects a pragmatic reassertion of US interests within the anarchic international system, prioritising Washington’s security and economic power over idealistic goals.

By appointing Savaya — an unconventional, business-oriented envoy — the Trump administration is employing “transactional realism”, utilising economic diplomacy and personal ties as strategic tools to pull Iraq away from Iran’s orbit. This approach views the US-Iran rivalry as a zero-sum game of power politics, where integrating Iraq’s armed forces under centralised state control is fundamental to restoring a state-centric order and sidelining non-state militias that currently feed Tehran’s regional influence.

The new US envoy to Iraq has made clear that “there is no place for armed groups in a fully sovereign Iraq”. His calls resonated with Iraqi officials and militia leaders alike – now at least three militias close to Iran have publicly agreed to disarm. However, other groups have yet to do the same, while rejecting the call from the outset.

However, this high-stakes attempt to shift the regional balance of power faces a significant “security dilemma”, as aggressive moves to diminish Iranian influence may trigger a violent defensive response from Tehran to protect its remaining strategic assets. While the strategy seeks to exploit a regional shift – leveraging the weakened state of Iranian proxies in Syria and Lebanon – it must contend with the “hybrid” power of Iraqi militias and the narrow self-interests of neighbouring players like Turkiye and the Gulf states.

The success of this gamble depends on whether the US can dismantle the shadow economies that facilitate foreign interference and establish a stable, autonomous Iraqi state capable of navigating the intense geopolitical tug-of-war between Washington and Tehran.

The stakes for Iraq’s future

Ultimately, the appointment of Savaya serves as the definitive stress test for Iraqi sovereignty, marking a high-stakes transition towards a transactional “America First” strategy aimed at “Making Iraq Great Again”. By attempting to consolidate military command under the state and dismantle the shadow economies fuelling Iranian influence, Savaya’s mission seeks to exploit the current regional weakening of Tehran’s proxies to transform Iraq into a stable, autonomous hub.

However, the success of this “Great Gamble” hinges on Savaya’s ability to overcome entrenched political opposition and reconcile the presence of US forces with the demand for national unity. If this unconventional diplomatic push can bridge internal divides — particularly between Baghdad and the semi-autonomous Kurdish region in the north — Iraq may finally secure a path towards economic independence; otherwise, the nation risks remaining a perpetual battleground caught in the geopolitical crossfire between Washington and Tehran.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.