intervention

This is an abridged version of the original story in Spanish, the second part of the award-winning investigative journalism project Dorada Opacidad by Alianza Rebelde Investiga and Convoca. You can read the first part here.

The picture above—courtesy of Gold Reserve—shows the ground of the Siembra Minera project, which the Canadian mining company recently retook.

Delcy Rodríguez has made her moves in the barracks, where she had no major influence before January 3. Several of the appointments are linked to the mining area. She gave Rafael Prieto Martínez, who had been military chief in Bolívar, the direction of the Strategic Operational Command (CEOFANB), the highest body for planning, direction and operational strategic control of the Venezuelan forces. There were also changes in Guayana’s Strategic Comprehensive Defense Region (the REDI or military region where the Orinoco Mining Arc is located) and in Bolívar’s Comprehensive Defense Operational Zone (ZODI). Rodríguez also put in charge people she completely trusted in civilian gold-related positions. For instance, the current president of the Central Bank of Venezuela, Luis Pérez, is also head of the newly created Vice Ministry of Gold.

Gold mixes with the government and now also with the United States. On June 8, troops flooded Guasipati and Tumeremo, when a group of American investors arrived to tour several gold mines and processing plants of the Venezuelan Mining Corporation (CVM).

They weren’t doing some pleasurable sightseeing. The roads’ craters have not been repaired for years. Tin shacks and shops occupy the sidewalks. At night, some lamp posts illuminate the streets only in case there is electricity. The region was not always this chaotic. Decades ago, the hotels there were not for miners but for tourists going to or coming from La Gran Sabana, the eastern sector of the Canaima National Park. During the nineties, there were two large international mining companies that had concessions to exploit the Las Brisas-Las Cristinas axis, where the country’s most important gold reserves are located. In Las Brisas del Cuyuní, an extensive gold and copper deposit near Kilómetro 88, Canadian company Gold Reserve established a mining project to extract minerals. The deposit has estimated reserves of more than 10 million ounces of gold and 1.4 million pounds of copper. 

Canadian mining company Crystallex International Corporation operated at Las Cristinas, a site bordering Las Brisas and located near the town of Las Claritas. Its reserves are estimated at over 17 million ounces of gold.

During the nationalization process undertaken by Hugo Chávez between 2008 and 2010, both mines were expropriated. The president declared their concessions void, prompting the companies to demand multi-million dollar compensation from Venezuela through international arbitration proceedings.

Whether for theft, robbery, gunshot wounds, homicide, or acts challenging The System, punishments could range from mutilation to murder.

In their place, the chavista government allowed armed criminal “syndicates” (sindicatos) to establish themselves there and in all the mining towns of the south. These groups exercise power through violence and extortion, keeping miners in conditions of modern-day slavery.

Since at least 2012, control of the area was held by the Las Claritas Syndicate, led by AKA Juancho. He received support from the then-Governor of Bolívar, Francisco Rangel Gómez, and his Secretary of Citizen Security, Julio César Fuentes Manzulli—an Army brigadier general who also served as director of the Bolívar Police. Both men purchased gold and diamonds from Juancho to sell abroad. This relationship was exposed by Army First Lieutenant Jesús Leonardo Curvelo in a report presented to the National Assembly in 2016.

In 2015, AKA Johan Petrica, a leader of the Tren de Aragua, arrived in the area, formed an alliance with Juancho and established the local criminal organization known as The System. Petrica’s presence in Las Claritas led to speculation that AKA Niño Guerrero had taken refuge there after the Venezuelan government dismantled the Aragua Penitentiary Center (known as Tocorón prison, famous for being the original headquarters of the Tren de Aragua) in 2023. 

The entire town had witnessed the actions of The System and agreed that any transgression came at a price. Whether for theft, robbery, gunshot wounds, homicide, or acts challenging The System, punishments could range from mutilation to murder. In 2020, organizations like Human Rights Watch documented an incident where a female miner who stole 10 grams of gold from a colleague was tied to a tree and beheaded with a chainsaw; in another case, a 17-year-old who was also accused of stealing gold was made to clasp his hands as if in prayer before being shot seven times and ordered to flee for his life.

Both Trump and Delcy Rodríguez reported only the killing of Niño Guerrero, offering no word on the whereabouts of Juancho, Petrica, and their lieutenants.

Surveillance throughout the town was constant. Lookouts (known as gariteros) kept a close watch on every movement from street corners, while checkpoints were deployed along the roads leading to the mines to monitor access to the deposits. The crimes The System committed to enforce its control were often followed by actions designed to portray it as a benefactor to the town. The local health clinic was always well-stocked with medicines and supplies, boasting high-quality equipment that nearby public clinics lacked. Miners enjoyed a form of “health insurance” provided by The System, which covered the treatment of any wounds or injuries sustained during gold extraction. The System organized toy giveaways for all the children at Christmas and during the Children’s Day celebrations held every July. Mother’s Day and Father’s Day were celebrated at the Las Claritas sports court, where gifts were distributed to those being honored. “In 2025, Juancho and El Viejo handed out about 200 motorcycles on Father’s Day. Everyone who went there left with a motorcycle,” Julio remarked. 

Both Trump and Rodríguez reported only the killing of Niño Guerrero, offering no word on the whereabouts of Juancho, Petrica, and their lieutenants. Everyone in the town who was asked agreed that the armed group’s leaders had fled before the military arrived, knowing a “change of government” was imminent. Witnesses in Santa Elena de Uairén—located more than 230 kilometers south of Las Claritas—stated on Monday, June 8 (the day before the incursion), that they had spotted several members of The System, including Juancho, at the Escamoto checkpoint. That post is near the military fort of the same name, less than nine kilometers from the Venezuela-Brazil border. Those who saw them could not be certain that Niño Guerrero was among the group.

In early July, Wesley Costa de Oliveira—a commissioner with the Civil Police of Roraima state, Brazil, specifically the Unit for the Repression of Criminal Organizations (DRACO)—told this investigation that he was not surprised members of The System might be taking refuge in his country, given the weak border controls. Another official from Brazil’s Federal Police confirmed to this project that their government suspected the leaders of this organization were within its territory.

A week after the raid in Las Claritas—on June 16—police in Roraima state revealed that initial progress in “Operation Northern Route” had struck a portion of the Venezuelan criminal gang’s structure in Brazil, resulting in the arrest of 25 people across Roraima, Amazonas, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and Paraná.

While uniformed personnel exploit their power in Las Claritas, there is still no news regarding which companies will arrive to take over the deposits. Criminal leaders continue their operations quietly in other cities.

The most prominent figure arrested was businessman Gustavo Vieira Rufino, identified as the financial manager for the TDA. He allegedly moved over 300 million reais (nearly 60 million dollars) in crypto-assets to launder capital derived from illicit activities.

Ana, a local hairdresser, recalled that El Callao was under military control during the Las Claritas-Kilometer 88 operation due to the presence of US investors visiting government recovery plants—such as El Chocó, El Perú, and the headquarters of the now-defunct Minerven. This state of affairs lasted for a week, until the foreigners departed.

In Las Claritas, while uniformed personnel exploit their power, there is still no news regarding which companies will arrive to take over the deposits. Meanwhile, in El Callao, Tumeremo, and El Dorado, criminal leaders continue their operations quietly.

Although El Callao breathes easier following the operation, for Ana, the ousting of The System offers hope that the town might return to what it was in the 1990s: a tourist stop where downtown shops sold gold jewelry at prices far lower than those found in the country’s major cities.

The interviewees’ identities have been changed for their safety. This report was supported by the Pulitzer Center.

Text and photos: Lorena Meléndez | Coordination and editing: Ronna Rísquez | General direction: Milagros Salazar | Design and infographics: ET

This is an abridged version of the original story in Spanish, the second part of award-winning investigative journalism project Dorada Opacidad. We will publish the second (and last) part of this investigation tomorrow.

When they pass through the streets of the Las Claritas–Kilómetro 88 mining corridor in Bolívar state, southern Venezuela, a thick, yellowish cloud of dust blankets them like a veil. The sound is unmistakable: a convoy of 15, 20, or 25 motorcycles riding together. Aboard are soldiers from the Orinoco Mining Arc Protection Group (GPAMO)—a unit conceived and activated in 2022 under the command of the Strategic Operational Command of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (CEOFANB) to safeguard the deposits. They had never been there before June 9, 2026, when three rockets, shot by a US aircraft, shook the area’s flimsy houses. Now, GPAMO is the law.

Although some cover their faces, Rafael knows them well. He owns one of the gold mills operating at the El Mecatico mine—one of many in an area that holds the world’s fourth-largest gold deposit, according to a 2018 certification by Canadian mining company Gold Reserve. Standing beneath the tin roof that shelters his business, he explained that he would soon have to pay the GPAMO 20 grams of gold (roughly 2,000 US dollars) in exchange for a registration form that in theory is free. He is also required to make monthly payments to remain on the site.

For Rafael and the residents of Las Claritas, everything changed on the morning of June 9, when they woke up to find the area occupied by the military. In the early hours, dozens of vehicles transported hundreds of troops from various branches of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB)—such as the Special Affairs Directorate (DAE) of the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM)—who patrolled the streets alongside unidentified men dressed in black and carrying long guns. Meanwhile, a pair of military aviation Cougar helicopters flew just above the rooftops of the houses.

The objective of that mobilization was to dismantle “The System.” That was the name given to the criminal alliance between Juan Gabriel Rivas Núñez—known as “Negro Juancho”—and Yohan José Romero (nicknamed “Johan Petrica” ​​or “El Viejo”), one of the leaders of the “mega-gang” born in the Tocorón prison: the Tren de Aragua. For over a decade, this criminal alliance had dominated the territory containing one of the world’s largest gold mining complexes—Las Brisas-Las Cristinas—and had subjugated the local population through torture, mutilation, and murder.

All signs pointed to a “change of government”—a term used in the Venezuelan criminal underworld to describe one criminal group replacing another in a territory.

The residents were so terrified that they remained locked themselves in their homes for days. Rafael did not hear the explosions that rang out mid-morning in Brisas de Cuyuní, near the Kilómetro 88 mining area, because he had gone to his ore mill in the early hours of the morning without noticing the military deployment. Hours later, the military arrived in El Mecatico to destroy the warehouses and properties belonging to The System. This operation was repeated at other mines, as well as at hotels, homes, and businesses in the town.

To determine who truly holds power along the Las Claritas-Kilómetro 88 corridor and in the southern mining towns extending as far as Guasipati, a team of reporters from the Alianza Rebelde Investiga (ARI) and Convoca toured the region as part of the investigative series Dorada Opacidad (Golden Opacity). Interviews with more than twenty sources—ranging from merchants, mill operators, police officers, and local residents to religious figures and local government officials—made it possible to map out the new criminal landscape of the Orinoco Mining Arc.

For days, information about the events was available only through social media or details gathered by journalists working remotely. The first official explanation did not come from any Venezuelan authority, but from Donald Trump. Three days after the bombings, the president stated that his country’s Southern Command had launched a “kinetic attack” to “take out”  AKA Niño Guerrero—the nickname of Héctor Rusthenford Guerrero Flores, the most prominent leader of the Tren de Aragua—with the collaboration of the Delcy Rodríguez government.

A new criminal governance

From then on, a military-imposed order took hold in Las Claritas. Rafael recounted that shortly after the town was seized, all mine workers were summoned to a meeting where a FANB captain urged them to keep working without pause, as they had to “produce as Commander Delcy Rodríguez ordered.” 

All signs pointed to a “change of government”—a term used in the Venezuelan criminal underworld to describe one criminal group replacing another in a territory, without necessarily putting an end to criminal activities.

That call for productivity came with no guarantees. The mill operator, his shoulders slumped in despair, recalled the sense of security The System had once provided: he could leave his tools outside and stay at his mill until midnight. After the military incursion, however, he had to finish his work and leave before 6:00 pm for fear of being robbed, as happened to others in the mine.

The military has displaced the armed group in the Las Claritas-Kilómetro 88 area, but shares control with criminal mafias in El Dorado and Guasipati.

Since the military took control to oust The System, extortion of merchants, gold buyers, and even random passersby had become commonplace, according to several sources on the ground consulted for this investigation. Soldiers seized sacks of gold-bearing sand left behind by members of The System in order to process them and extract the gold, recounted Óscar, speaking from a shop on the town’s main road. “A captain who extracts gold every day exchanges 5,000 or 6,000 dollars in cash, and asks a friend to convert it to USDT [a cryptocurrency] and send it to Puerto Ordaz,” he said.

According to witnesses, soldiers confiscated motorcycles and vehicles belonging to people with no ties to The System and spread fear across all the mining towns in southern Bolívar, about whether FANB would bomb all territories within the Mining Arc where armed groups operate, or the joint operation with the Americans would end in another massacre of workers by military forces. 

However, local residents confirmed that the intervention was limited to Las Claritas-Kilómetro 88. Meanwhile, in towns like El Dorado, Tumeremo, and El Callao, criminal gangs continue to reign, albeit more discreetly and without the brazen displays of the past.

Former Bolívar lawmaker Américo De Grazia claimed on social media that The System’s ringleaders had returned to their old territory, though locals dispute this. Yet De Grazia’s account is not far-fetched: locals told the ARI and Convoca team that some of The System’s bosses—including the men known as Juancho and Johan Petrica—had left Las Claritas a few days before the military incursion. Apparently, they had been tipped off and fled. They were spotted trying to lay low near the Brazilian border.

What does seem clear is that in the Las Claritas-Kilómetro 88, the military displaced the armed group, but in El Dorado and Guasipati, they share control with criminal mafias—albeit maintaining a lower profile to preserve appearances before the Venezuelan government’s new partners: American businesspeople.

The American footprint 

Five days after Maduro was taken away, Delcy Rodríguez announced a package of legislative amendments designed to appease Washington—such as a reformed mining law, whose latest version offers low taxes and numerous concessions to foreign capital that was previously unwelcome.

The new legislation, enacted in April, repealed the decree that had reserved the exploration and exploitation of gold and other strategic minerals for the State, paving the way for private and international companies to engage in these activities through concessions lasting up to 50 years.

Furthermore, it established special payments (up to 1% of gross production under the concession contract for the National Mining Fund and a royalty of up to 13% for the State), a tax of up to 6% regulated by the government, and incentives such as exemptions from the Large Assets Tax, as well as special contributions mandated by four other laws—including the Law on the Protection of Social Security Pensions—all aimed at benefiting the new companies operating in Venezuela’s mining sector.

Alongside the law’s approval, the United States also took action: in March, it issued licenses allowing American companies to purchase, transport, and resell Venezuelan gold. On September 2, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) expanded the scope of these licenses, authorizing US companies to participate in the export, sale, purchase, storage, transport, processing, and refining of minerals of Venezuelan origin, including gold. It also permitted the supply of specific goods and services for mineral operations, as well as the negotiation and execution of contracts within the mining sector.

This entire framework has enabled Rodríguez to consolidate her economic team within the government through the appointment of key officials—both civilian and military—to positions within the Mining Arc. Their key figures are positioned not only within the executive branch but also across the State-owned enterprises involved in the business, and among military personnel capable of guaranteeing gasoline supplies and mine operations.

The interviewees’ identities have been changed for their safety. This report was supported by the Pulitzer Center.

Text and photos: Lorena Meléndez | Coordination and editing: Ronna Rísquez | General direction: Milagros Salazar | Design and infographics: ET