international

July 10 (UPI) — Canada and the state of Michigan on Friday announced that a long-planned new bridge linking Ontario and Detroit will open at the end of July, 14 years after construction started.

The $4.4 billion Gordie Howe International Bridge between the two cities is set to open on July 27 and is set to offer improved transit on what leaders from Canada and Michigan called one of the busiest transportation corridors in North America.

The mile-and-a-half-long bridge includes new ports of entry on either side, with Canada and the United States establishing a 15-year economic development fund that has been tied to profits from crossing tolls.

President Donald Trump earlier this year threatened to prevent the bridge from opening over disagreements with previously existing trade agreements, his administration’s tariff regime and objections to Canada making trade deals with China.

“The Gordie Howe International Bridge has always been a great deal for our state,” Michigan Gov. Gretchen Whitmer said in a statement.

“Thousands of Michigan workers built this critical bridge, which will speed up auto production, lower costs, ease traffic, strengthen agriculture and give people on both sides of the border better-paying jobs and brighter futures,” she said. “This bridge is a testament to the enduring partnership between Michigan and Canada.”

The bridge project originated with the state’s then-Republican Gov. Rick Snyder agreeing to the six-line bridge because it would alleviate congestion accommodate future travel and create new transportation capabilities between U.S. and Canadian manufacturing regions.

Canada’s minister for housing and infrastructure, Gregor Robinson, hailed the completion and impending opening of the bridge as “strengthening one of the world’s most important trade corridors.”

“This nation-building project is a testament to what Canada can accomplish when we come together with a shared vision,” Robinson said in a statement.

“The Gordie Howe International Bridge will create new opportunities, strengthen our economy and bring economic benefits on both sides of the boarder for generations,” he said.

WEST PALM BEACH, Fla. — A South Florida airport officially changed its name Thursday to the President Donald J. Trump International Airport.

Signs for the Palm Beach International Airport have been removed as new signage goes up.

“Because an entire airport transformation doesn’t happen overnight, you’ll notice a combination of both our classic look and our new brand elements coexisting while traveling through the terminal over the next several weeks,” airport officials said in a Facebook post.

“Trump Force One,” a Boeing 757 owned by the Trump Organization, was the first plane to arrive at the airport under its new name, shortly after 5 a.m. The president’s son, Eric Trump, was one of the passengers. The Trump family regularly uses the West Palm Beach airport when they visit President Trump’s Mar-a-Lago home in nearby Palm Beach. A stretch of road from the airport to Trump’s estate was renamed Donald J. Trump Boulevard earlier this year.

“There is no person who has done more for Florida and our country, and no one more deserving of this incredible honor,” Eric Trump posted on X. “As a son, and someone who flies out of this airport nearly every day, I will forever be proud to see the initials ‘DJT’ on my boarding pass.”

Although the name change took effect Thursday, the three-letter airport code will change from PBI to DJT on Aug. 18.

Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis signed legislation earlier this year that made the name change possible. Changing the airport’s name is expected to cost as much as $5.5 million for new signs, branding and other updates.

Keegan Collett, who was departing the airport Thursday morning on his way to Cincinnati, said he was surprised to see the new name. He said he doesn’t think Trump deserves to have an airport named after him but isn’t necessarily bothered by it.

“At the end of the day, it’s just the name of an airport,” Collett said. “There’s bigger things. I feel like it’s just more of a distraction. Why even worry about it?”

In Dandridge, Tenn., Thursday morning, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, U.S. Sens. Marsha Blackburn and Bill Hagerty and Rep. Tim Burchett attended a ceremony to rename the I-40 Bridge in East Tennessee to the Donald J. Trump Bridge.

Bessent said ahead of the ceremony that “no one is more deserving” of the honor than Trump.

Trump received 82% of the vote in Jefferson County, where Dandridge is located, in the 2024 election.

Dame Sarah Storey, Great Britain’s most-decorated Paralympian, has retired from international competition with immediate effect.

The 48-year-old cyclist has opted not to compete at Los Angeles 2028 to focus on helping improve Para-sport.

The 19-time Paralympic champion feels the sport has “stalled somewhat” since the London 2012 Games and that many areas “still need attention”.

“The years between each Games haven’t been utilised well enough to create the momentum that I and others hoped to see,” she said.

“I see this as a critical stage; there are many areas of Para-sport that still need attention, and that is something that has played a big part in my decision.

“I fully believe that I can have a greater impact off my bike, rather than chasing a 10th Games and possibly further titles.

“I’m excited to be part of a future where we inject the momentum that is needed to ensure the future is bright for all Para-athletes.”

Storey started her career as a swimmer and competed at four Games before switching to cycling, winning a total of 30 Paralympic medals across nine Games, including four golds at London 2012.

World Athletics president Lord Coe, who was chairman of London’s organising committee for the Olympic and Paralympic Games, said: “Para-sport was an enormously significant part of London 2012 and I remain extremely proud of what we were able to deliver.

“However, the issues that Dame Sarah raises upon her retirement resonate with me hugely – sport must continue to take those small but steady steps forward to ensure that what has gone before is not wasted.”

The British Paralympic Association has been approached for comment.

Since last week, the world’s attention has been set again on Venezuela just like six months ago.

Of course, the differences between the events of January 3rd and the terrible disaster of June 24th could not be more stark, even if both evenets have massive implications for the country’s future.

Most coverage coming from international media these days has highlighted two things: first, the terrible devastation seen in worst-hit areas like parts of Caracas and especially in La Guaira State (formerly known as Vargas); and second, that many are complaining about the official response and even calling it “negligent”, like in this report from BBC News correspondent Yogita Limaye.

Interestingly enough, in recent months there has been a reopening to the presence of foreign reporters in the country, a shift from the heavily restricted access during the Maduro years. A larger number of reporters and media crews arrived in the last few days. They have been mostly allowed to do their job (unlike Sky News’ Trump 100 podcast, interrupted by government officials while recording), but they’ve been facing their own set of specific challenges.

Earlier this week, NGO IPYS Venezuela offered a summary of some apparent restrictions from the Communication and Information Ministry to international media workers, like indicating that they could be mobilized to affected areas only through State-authorized buses and establishing a schedule for those trips from the Media Center established at La Carlota Airport in Caracas.

One person quoted in the summary is British freelance journalist Catherine Ellis, who’s covering the disaster for Al-Jazeera and UK weekly magazine The Spectator while also doing some radio interviews for other outlets. She has worked in Venezuela since 2023 and, before that, volunteered for an NGO in Colombia and Spain, helping Venezuelan immigrants. It was Ellis who published on X a picture of the buffet the regime was offering to foreign correspondents while thousands of people were thirsty and hungry.

At the time of writing, several international reporters told Delcy Rodriguez during her recent press conference what they’ve seen firsthand. She minimized those criticisms against the official response and pointed her finger at “media matrixes created in laboratories” (matrices de opinión is a popular term in Venezuela to describe artificial narratives in journalism or social media). 

Caracas Chronicles interviewed Ellis earlier this week to discuss what she recently witnessed.

How has it been for you and other international correspondents to cover the disaster on the ground? Have there been any limitations by government officials and particularly from the Communication and Information Ministry?

The experience so far as a journalist in terms of getting in and communicating with the Ministry has been quite strange in some ways. It needs to be said that it has been much more open than it usually is. Quite often, if I come to Venezuela, I can’t really do any reporting or get a journalist visa; they give very few journalist visas, and it’s particularly hard for freelance journalists when you’re not a fixed employee for a certain media outlet. But this time they let journalists in. They’re letting foreign journalists in without visas. On one hand, it’s been much, much better. This time journalists are actually allowed into the country, and access is not restricted, although we don’t know how long that will go on for. Communications have been terrible and completely lacking to the point of being almost non-existent. 

How was your experience with the bus trip to La Guaira the day after registering at La Carlota airbase in Caracas? 

We took the bus on June 28, the day after we registered in La Carlota. They told us they would take us there, and we left for La Guaira an hour and a half late. No problem, that happens sometimes, but there was no communication about what was happening. The following day was the worst because I arrived early thinking it might leave on time, only to wait for two hours with no explanation at all. Then we knew from other journalists that the trip was cancelled and access had been suspended for 48 hours for journalists. No one on the logistics team provided any explanation. They just said: “we are not in charge of it, we don’t know.” One person told me: “you have to be patient, you have to wait… This is a complex situation, and things don’t move quickly.”

How are you and your colleagues doing your work in the disaster area? 

We were completely given free rein… We were taken to a Misión Vivienda place, but we could go wherever we wanted, so I spoke to people from that place, and some were very critical of the government. I went to other buildings around, which were either for retired people or just normal apartment buildings, and I spoke to lots of people. I was very, very free to speak to people. So much that I missed the bus and the Guardia (Nacional) took another journalist and me to the next site to speak to people. 

Have there been any issues involving the police, the military, intelligence services or local officials?

Some people have been helpful, and some haven’t in terms of the authorities. In La Guaira, generally, no one stopped me from doing anything. Police and military pulled me away from a building because they were excavating to take bodies out, but to be honest, that was more for health and safety reasons, and I did understand. I went to the hotel in Caracas where the Venezuelan deportees were supposed to arrive after they got back, and the hotel collapsed. It was full of SEBIN agents. We weren’t allowed to pass because of “security reasons.” When I started to take photos, I was told off by SEBIN. That was interesting. 

Genuinely, I have to say the police and military have not stopped me speaking to anybody or stopping doing anything. And to be honest, some of them haven’t really been around. I think it’s because, as you wear the pink armband (identifying as foreign press), they know you’re press, that you’ve been approved, but getting to the hotel where the deportees were was impossible.

How has the relationship been with the civilians in the area? How do they react to the presence of the media?

Civilians have been brilliant. Absolutely brilliant. Everybody is very, very open to talking. Venezuelans are incredibly warm and open people. I have no problem chatting to people. If I see people who are visibly, incredibly upset, who have family (members trapped) in buildings, it’s not the right time to talk to them.

Sometimes, I’ve approached them very sensitively, and people have shared their stories, described the people they have lost, told about what they’re lacking or what they need. Some people openly criticize the government, but others who have criticized the government then say they don’t want their names used, and others are not thinking about politics. They’re just in shock.

How has the relationship been between international correspondents and Venezuelan journalists?

Venezuelan journalists are incredibly helpful. I think there has been a lot of solidarity between all journalists, between Venezuelan and international journalists and among the international journalists themselves. I’ve been speaking to people from the US, Canada, Argentina, parts of Europe, and they all want to help each other. 

On a critical note, there have been a couple of international journalists who either pushed me out of the way at certain sites because they want to film or come up to me when I’m interviewing people and taking my interviewees. This isn’t a show, people have lost (their) lives. I would encourage the international press to have a heightened level of sensibility and respect for all Venezuelans and all affected by this crisis.

Have you noticed the difference between how you see the situation on the ground, how it is covered outside, and how it is covered inside, how the government is presenting it? 

From what I’ve seen, Delcy and the government are trying to project an image of solidarity with the international community, thanking and praising them for being here and helping Venezuelans in their time of need. But not necessarily announcing tangible and concrete steps of what they’re actually putting in place. Someone put it to me like this: “The government has been very visible, key figures have been very visible in terms of presence on social media and even visiting sites, but there has not been enough concrete information about donation centers, about what’s happening next, about actually managing the actual crisis.”

How have people in La Guaira been coping?

A lot of people are still in shock. It’s very hard to process, but everybody seems to be very grateful to everyone who is helping them, either members of their own community or the international rescue teams. Some people have said, “Other governments are helping us more than our own government.” 

I think the most important thing to emphasize, which is non-political, is that people are saying “Venezuelans are helping Venezuelans, they’re helping each other.” Someone said to me the other day, “We are a family, this is what we do, we help each other, we won’t give up, and you know, keep going.”

I spoke to a guy who came from Valencia. He had three kids back home and said, “I couldn’t bear to think of my own kids lying somewhere like that and no one going to find them,” so he came on his way, he got lists from people, and he came so he can help with the search and rescue. 

There’s definitely a lot of shock. A lot of kids are still scared and adults feel that any movement or anything, not just aftershocks, mean something is going to happen again. People are getting through by supporting each other.

Is the aid arriving properly? Have you seen aid being delivered?

There’s so much aid everywhere. In Caracas, I’ve seen so many trucks coming in. The problem is that I can’t exactly say what’s happening to the aid. Some aid is getting through, but there seem to be a little bit of bottlenecks or bureaucracy; I don’t know the full reasons… It’s getting through to some people but isn’t getting through to other people, and they’re running out of some things. People want proper accommodation also. Definitely, in a lot of places there are now international NGOs setting up food points as well.

– 

Just yesterday, while covering relief efforts taking place at Parque del Este, Ellis was approached by a couple of suspicious looking fellows. This was the exchange:

I was in Parque del Este tonight speaking to volunteers and affected families camping there. I was chatting to one family when two men came over to look what was going on then left. I started helping the family move their stuff to the road (I was carrying the cat!) as they were moving somewhere else. The two men called me over, asked me if I was a journalist, to which I said yes and showed them my wristbands. Asked more questions, who I was, where from, what I was doing. I asked who they were, as they still hadn’t introduced themselves by this point. One (the politer one) said they were intelligence police, asked what I was doing, so I said speaking to the family etc. Asked if I knew them, I said no. Then asking qus like my age, which was weird as one had my passport which has my DOB. Took photos of my passport. Asked where I lived, said I didn’t want to give that info. I asked why they wanted to know all this, they said for security and that people were taking children, so I asked if they thought I was taking kids. They said no. I told me they were asking me because I was a journalist and there was not a real free press. One was fairly polite and said they didn’t want to make me uncomfortable. I said they already had. Eventually they gave me it back. It’s ok to check who someone is, check they have a wristband which you now should have in the park – but I did, and I showed them, so why the need for questionning and taking photos of my passport? And why was the first qu, are you a journalist? Does everyone who enters the park get that level of treatment?

It doesn’t take much for chavismo to step back into its old ways.

WASHINGTON — President Trump did not like what he saw. So, once again, he picked up the phone.

Trump said Monday that he called FIFA President Gianni Infantino after he disagreed with the World Cup referee who gave a red card to U.S. men’s soccer team star Folarin Balogun. The discipline, which Trump called “very unfair” and a “stain” on the World Cup, would have barred Balogun from playing in Monday’s elimination game against Belgium.

“I asked for a review because I didn’t think it was a foul,” Trump told reporters during an event in the Oval Office. “I am good at this stuff. I didn’t think it was a foul. I thought it was two great athletes that crashed into each other and got entangled.”

Trump said he initially didn’t know “what the hell a red card was” or what it meant. “When I found out, I said, ‘You gotta be kidding!’” he said.

Trump’s involvement in soccer’s disciplinary process created an international uproar.

UEFA, European soccer’s governing body, said FIFA “crossed a red line” with the reversal. Belgium’s football association appealed the ruling, which FIFA denied during a hearing Monday. Belgian coach Rudi Garcia mocked the decision as an April Fools’ joke.

“This decision clearly raises many questions,” Belgian Foreign Minister Maxime Prévot said in a statement Monday, according to the New York Times.

“If a phone call really is what explains this incomprehensible decision, it would amount to undermining the most basic rules of soccer and sports,” added Prévot, a former soccer referee.

Trump’s close relationship with Infantino also has drawn new scrutiny.

In December, Infantino presented Trump with the inaugural FIFA Peace Prize, an award the governing body created after Trump was passed over for the Nobel Peace Prize. That decision is now the subject of an ethics complaint, backed by members of the European Parliament, who argue it compromised FIFA’s political neutrality.

Trump said he did not ask Infantino to reverse the call. But that was the outcome reached by FIFA’s disciplinary committee, which, in 64 years, has reversed a red-card penalty only once during a World Cup tournament.

The episode serves as a reminder of a pattern of behavior the president has exhibited when he doesn’t get his way, regardless of the rules of the game. For Trump, a deal-maker who has described the world as “a casino,” often pushes the boundaries of long-standing norms.

After FIFA reversed course, Trump called the decision “brilliant” and said Belgium can now “be really proud” if they were to beat the U.S. team on Monday night.

“The other way, if they beat us, we’ll say, or I’ll say it was rigged, just like the election was rigged in 2020, but I won’t get into that,” Trump said.

Steven Levitsky, a Harvard political scientist and co-author of “How Democracies Die,” said Trump’s action are “perfectly consistent with how Trump has behaved on the world stage.”

“He has no interest in or no respect for any kind of international rules or norms,” he said.

Levitsky said the events illustrate the Trump administration’s worldview, one that, he argues, revolves around the ethos that “if we’re strong enough, we can leverage our way to whatever the hell we want.”

As examples, he pointed to the administration’s military strikes on boats in the Caribbean and efforts to acquire Greenland, both of which have led to diplomatic tensions.

Trump also has a history of using phone calls to pressure officials to reach an outcome he wants.

In a 2019 call, he asked Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to investigate his political rival, a moment that became the catalyst of his first impeachment. And after losing the 2020 election, he pressed Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger to “find 11,780 votes,” the margin he needed to flip the state, a move that ultimately led to a criminal indictment.

FIFA President Gianni Infantino presents President Trump with the FIFA Peace Prize in December.

(Evan Vucci / Associated Press)

Trump defended his call with Infantino to reporters and appeared to downplay how much it may have contributed to the red card penalty being reversed.

“I can’t tell [Infantino] what to do, and I don’t believe he made the decision,” Trump said. “I think it was a committee that made the decision, and they made the right decision, because No. 1, it wasn’t a foul, and you want to see a game with your best players.”

Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas), who was in the Oval Office when Trump acknowledged the call with Infantino, made reference to the Peace Prize as he thanked Trump for “getting rid of the ridiculous red card” ahead of the knockout game.

“There was a reason the FIFA trophy sat here for as long as it did,” Cruz told Trump.

Infantino, for his part, issued a statement Monday insisting that the decision came from FIFA’s independent disciplinary committee and that he told Trump the case would be decided by the body. Bill White, the U.S. ambassador to Belgium, also defended Trump, saying he “would never interfere with the inner workings of FIFA.”

Norman Eisen, co-founder of Democracy Defenders Action, said Trump’s decision to get involved in soccer’s disciplinary process is a “classic example of achieving a right outcome through wrong means.” He added that he believes the Trump administration and FIFA showed to be “two of the most corrupt entities around.”

“Like many Americans who are following the World Cup and rooting our team on, I thought it was a bad call,” Eisen said. “But I would never have chosen to bring that about in this fashion.”

Levitsky argued that given the popularity of the World Cup, which hundreds of millions of people around the world are tuning into to watch, Trump is opening himself up for more scrutiny on the global scale.

“People across the world who don’t give a damn about politics are following the World Cup, and they’re seeing the United States behave this way, taking what it can take at the expense of others unfairly,” he said. “Of course it is going to hurt the U.S. image abroad.”

When Stokes was away from the England team for the second Test, he played for Durham and said returning to his county rekindled a love for the game. He confirmed he will continue to play domestic cricket.

“Being back at Durham, when I wasn’t playing in the second Test, I found a new lease of life for the game, but unfortunately I just couldn’t get that feeling back this week,” said Stokes.

“I’m very excited about the next part of what I get to do. Going back to playing for my boyhood club Durham, I’m comparing this week to that week – right now I am buzzing, but there have been moments this week that have been really tough and it just adds to everything and it makes it clear that I’ve made the right decision.”

Stokes said he made the retirement decision when he was putting on his pads to prepare to bat in England’s first innings at Trent Bridge on Saturday.

He told former captain Joe Root and vice-captain Harry Brook on Saturday evening, then revealed the news to the rest of the team on Sunday morning.

“It’s been an interesting four or five weeks, maybe six months in general,” added Stokes. “There are all kinds of emotions when this day comes – relief, happiness, excitement, sadness. Everything that you go through.

“It’s the best thing that I’ve ever been asked to do, captaining England. It is the greatest honour to have on your shoulders but there is also another side to it that people don’t see, only those closest to you see it.

“My family, my wife, they see the bits where it does drain you and it does affect you negatively.”

England test captain Ben Stokes will retire from international cricket after the ongoing test match against New Zealand.

England captain Ben Stokes has made the dramatic decision to announce his imminent retirement from international cricket midway through the deciding third test against New Zealand.

“This is my last two days as your captain and my last two days representing England,” Stokes told his England teammates inside the dressing room on Sunday at the start of play at Trent Bridge on Day 4, in a video released on social media by England Cricket.

The match is headed to a fifth and final day on Monday, with the series on the line at 1-1.

The shocking announcement came 15 minutes before the tea break. Stokes picked up a wicket moments later and was given a standing ovation as he led England off at the end of the session.

“The reasons can wait [about] why,” Stokes said in his dressing-room speech. “But I’ve had many trips to the well before for this team, and I’ve got one more trip to do.”

Stokes, 35, one of the world’s best known cricketers, has represented England for 15 years, the peak surely coming in 2019 when he starred for England in its wild win over New Zealand in the 50-over World Cup final at Lord’s.

He was also a key player in England’s T20 World Cup-winning team in 2022, the same year he became test captain.

Stokes has decided to quit international cricket during a series when he made front-page news after being dropped by England for the second test amid an investigation following a night out with teammate Gus Atkinson after the first test at Lord’s.

The two players were in a London nightclub when an England team security official was reportedly struck by a rugby player from English club Saracens.

The England and Wales Cricket Board (ECB) dropped Stokes and Atkinson, and later said they had “breached specific contractual obligations” and were given a written warning. The sport’s independent oversight panel – the Cricket Regulator body – said after its investigation that there was “insufficient evidence to establish that any regulatory breach occurred”.

Stokes was recalled for the third test.

ECB chairman Richard Thompson said Stokes is “one of England’s greatest ever cricketers and one of the defining figures of his generation.”

“His performances under pressure, his relentless competitiveness and his ability to produce the extraordinary when it matters most have given me and millions of other fans memories that will endure forever,” Thompson said.

“Beyond his remarkable achievements on the field, his performances have inspired many youngsters to embrace cricket with positivity and belief. We are losing a batsman, a bowler, a captain and a talisman.”

England captain Ben Stokes has made a stunning announcement to end his international career at the conclusion of the ongoing third Test against New Zealand.

All-rounder Stokes, one of the finest cricketers to ever play for England, was in the middle of a bowling spell at Trent Bridge when a statement was released confirming his intention to end a 15-year international career.

The 35-year-old missed England’s second Test after being involved in an incident in a London nightclub.

Before his return to the leading the team in Nottingham, he referred only to leading the team “this week”.

China has added 10 United States-based companies to its export control list and barred government procurement from nearly 50 US companies two weeks after the Pentagon blacklisted some of China’s best-known companies for their alleged ties to the Chinese military.

China’s Ministry of Commerce announced the export order on Monday, barring Chinese companies from exporting “dual-use” items that can be used for civilian or military purposes to the US firms.

The list of companies includes rare-earth mine operator MP Materials Corp, rare-earth magnet maker USA Rare Earths, and US defence contractors specialising in fields such as aerospace, drones, synthetic-aperture radar, and shipbuilding and repairs.

Under the order, “foreign institutions and individuals worldwide are also prohibited from transferring or providing Chinese dual-use goods to them” while ongoing export transactions must be suspended immediately.

The Commerce Ministry said the export ban had been issued to “safeguard national security and interests and fulfil international obligations such as non-proliferation”.

China’s Ministry of Finance on Monday separately barred Chinese government procurement from 46 companies, including subsidiaries of major US defence contractors like Lockheed Martin, Boeing, General Atomics and General Dynamics. US-funded, locally registered companies, however, have been given an exemption by the ministry.

Experts described Beijing’s orders as a retaliation, albeit a largely symbolic one, against the US after the Pentagon in early June added about 80 Chinese companies and their subsidiaries to its list of “Entities Identified as Chinese Military Companies Operating in the United States”.

The designation means the Pentagon either believes the companies are owned or controlled by the Chinese military or they are “military-civil fusion contributors”, a term for commercial companies that contribute to China’s military development despite their civilian status.

The updated list includes Chinese e-commerce giant Alibaba Holdings, search engine giant Baidu and electric automaker BYD, some of China’s largest and best-known companies.

While the order does not bar US companies from doing business with them, it does impact US defence contractors and their future supply chains.

“We can interpret this as a tit-for-tat response, and that fits into China’s playbook any time we’ve seen escalation from the US side in terms of trade and investment tools,” said Nick Marro, global trade lead analyst at the Economist Intelligence Unit.

China-based supply chain consultant Cameron Johnson said the Commerce Ministry’s order mirrors US semiconductor export controls designed to keep the most advanced chips out of Chinese hands.

“They basically say it doesn’t matter where or who you are, you are bound by this regardless of circumstance,” said Johnson, who is also a senior partner at the Shanghai consultancy Tidal Wave Solutions. “Organisations or individuals in any country or region are prohibited from transferring dual-use materials that originated in China.”

He said Beijing’s orders in practice may be hard to enforce and many of the companies named in those orders have already moved their supply chains out of China or begun to “de-risk” their operations there.

Johnson said the wide scope of companies included in Washington’s and Beijing’s directives could be a sign of more to come and may signal a new front in the US-China trade war.

“This is probably just the beginning of the back and forth,” he said. Last year, after returning to the White House for a second term, US President Donald Trump reignited the US-China trade war, leading Washington and Beijing to impose escalating rounds of tariffs on each other.

Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to a trade truce in October, which was extended during a summit between the two leaders in Beijing in May.

Despite promises to “enhance economic cooperation” during the meeting, observers like Singapore-based geopolitical analyst Steve Okun predicted the goodwill may be short-lived.

“The US’s recent closure of chip export loopholes and China’s continuing addition to its export bans show the national security lane remains active in both capitals regardless of the diplomatic niceties at the recent Trump-Xi summit,” Okun told Al Jazeera.

“There is no ‘truce’ in the US-China trade war. Expect further actions from both sides as well on export controls and investment restrictions,” he said.

As Colombia comes down from the ecstasy-filled high of its recent win in their 2026 World Cup opener, a sadder, and much darker reality is beginning to set. On June 21^st, 2026, Colombians will vote in a historic runoff election that will not only hurt Colombia but will have serious effects on the future of Venezuela. 

No matter the outcome, Colombia will be worse off, as both Iván Cepeda and Abelardo De la Espriella are a study on how a democracy can offer voters a choice between two particular brands of terrible.

The first-round of the election provides a clear insight into the current state of Colombian civil society. Like many presidential systems, Colombia structures its presidential elections in a two-round system.  If no candidate surpasses 50% of the vote in the first round, as happened on May 31st, a second runoff election is called between the first and second placed candidates. That runoff is this Sunday, June 21^st. Moderate and moderate right-wing candidates Sergio Fajardo and Paloma Valencia achieved historic electoral lows for centrists with 4% and 6% of the vote respectively, whilst the radical extremes of the political scale rejoiced in victory. 

The biggest surprise was undoubtedly Abelardo de la Espriella´s first round victory, with the self-anointed “Tiger” garnering 43.7% of the vote to first round favourite Iván Cepeda´s 40.9%. With a mere 600,000 votes separating the candidates and about 3 million votes being contested, both can win the election. 

Cepeda, who is President Gustavo Petro’s hand-picked heir, initially questioned the results alongside the controversial president, and only accepted them on June 7^th, a week after the election. With his institutional backing, that delay matters. All in all, Colombians ran to the extremes, which provided a clear data-backed picture of just how polarized Colombian civil society is.

Whoever gets sworn in Bogotá on August 7^th2026, will have more operational influence over Venezuelan affairs than any other head of state in the hemisphere, apart from Trump.

Regardless of the result in the June 21^st runoff, the Colombian elections will have a lasting effect on the future of Venezuela and could be the catalyst for very different answers to the question of the country´s political future. 

First and foremost, Colombia is the country that has received the largest number of Venezuelan migrants, with approximately 3 million Venezuelans calling the country home. Since January 2025, Colombia has been hosting the diaspora without US funding and support. Furthermore, part of the the 2,219 kilometre-long border between both countries is controlled by the Colombian Guerrilla ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional), who lost key ally and facilitator Nicolás Maduro on January 3^rd and is currently massing on the Colombian side.

Bogotá’s diplomatic influence and posture is one of the few international players that can have significant effects on whether interim dictator Delcy Rodríguez will eventually push for elections in Venezuela. 

All in all, whoever gets sworn in Bogotá on August 7^th 2026, will have more operational influence over Venezuelan affairs than any other head of state in the hemisphere, apart from the self-proclaimed most popular man in Venezuela, Donald Trump.

Now, it’s time to get down to brass tacks, the who is who. Inside trash can number one we find Iván Cepeda. Cepeda’s personal arc is worryingly similar to that of the Rodríguez siblings in Venezuela. His father was a radical Left politician murdered by far Right paramilitary groups. That fuelled Cepeda’s deep hatred towards the Colombian political system and institutions. A career senator and politician, Cepeda is probably the smartest mind in Colombia’s hard Left. He is also an admirer of Hugo Chávez, and strong critic of former president and kingmaker Álvaro Úribe. Cepeda’s followers will frame him as a left-wing moderate, but he is not. He is Petro without the cocaine, prostitutes and charisma, running on continuing the Total Peace framework that has seen record numbers of cocaine production in the country, and bolstered the rearming of the ELN. His commitment to governmental continuity will no doubt hurt Colombia, starting with the fact that current policies have driven down Foreign Direct Investment in Colombia by 30% from a 2023 peak.

De la Espriella is a one-man band who won the first round through violent speeches, AI anthropomorphic videos of himself as a tiger, and evangelical networks.

Furthermore, his delay in recognizing the electoral results provides an interesting insight on how Cepeda could interact with institutions that he finds inconvenient. A man who questions clean elections certified by international observers has no business rewriting constitutions, a key pillar on his first-round electoral campaign, which he recently dropped in a pathetic attempt to attract centrists and moderates. Cepeda’s rhetoric and language is extremely divisive. He frames every political opponent as an oligarch, every private enterprise as an exploiter, every security operation as state violence whilst analysing the deep social gaps and concerns the country must navigate. Rather than seeking to solve them, Cepeda weaponizes them to further divide the Colombian population.

But Cepeda’s rottenness is not counterbalanced by a knight in shining armour, but by a different but equally foul-smelling individual. We find Abelardo “The Tiger” de la Espriella inside trash can number two. The part-time attorney, part-time rum maker, aspiring opera singer, fashionista with terrible taste is one of the most questionable figures in the Colombian public sphere. A criminal defence attorney, who became famous for being the lawyer and fixer for chavista allies like Alex Saab and paramilitary leaders, has found a new “passion project” in his expanding list of questionable side hustles: becoming the president of Colombia. De la Espriella comes in as a true outsider who has no congressional or political backing. He is a one-man band who won the first round through violent speeches, AI anthropomorphic videos of himself as a tiger, and evangelical networks.

Abelardo’s rhetoric only serves to perpetrate a never-ending cycle of violence. The anti-democratic claims that he will literally “gut leftists,” his active endorsements of states of exception and support for arbitrary concentrations of power within the presidency, his promise to open ten CECOT-style mega prisons, and his constant disregard and attacks against human rights are problematic. 

His “security agenda” is not offering any coherent security policy. On the contrary, he’s seeking to create a permission structure for state-sponsored political violence, dressed as law and order. His policy against the ELN of all-out war has no institutional backing, and risks triggering considerable escalation. Events like the April 25^th bombing can serve as a prelude of what an empowered ELN can look like. 

De la Espriella’s polarization is of a different flavour to Cepeda’s, but equally problematic. Instead of using social and class divides, the Tiger weaponizes the us-versus-them mentality along the lines of patriots and enemies. In a country with such a tragic and saddening history of political violence, that rhetoric has a body count attached to it.

Cepeda’s attitude will likely be lukewarm and soft on Venezuela, dragging his feet on any meaningful action such as Venezuelan migrants in Colombia or elections in our country.

At the end of the day, either candidate will face serious problems to govern, and will bring a myriad of conundrums for Colombia, but how do their stances translate into the Venezuelan question? On one hand, Iván Cepeda has constantly framed the operation to extract Nicolás Maduro as violation of sovereignty, a position which lacks any diplomatic nuance, and at the same time provides strong insights into how Cepeda will behave towards Venezuela and how much pressure he´ll exert on Venezuela to call for elections. The Total Peace Framework will provide the ELN with the political umbrella to consolidate in the border region, stacking an unpredictable situation on top of an already volatile powder-keg in Venezuela. Calling Cepeda a “friend” of Maduro or Delcy is not accurate, but he is the regime’s useful neighbour. His attitude will most likely be lukewarm and soft on Venezuela, dragging his feet on any meaningful action like his predecessor Gustavo Petro such as Venezuelan migrants in Colombia or elections in our country.

On the other hand, analysing Abelardo’s impact on Venezuela must begin with the fact that he was the leading defence attorney for Alex Saab between 2013 and 2018, the same years Saab ran Maduro’s sanction-busting operation. Although his divisive rhetoric claims forceful actions, his personal history and contacts in his rolodex prove that rather than full force, there is a clear entanglement with the chavista operation. De la Espriella also has no real plan for the domestic situation with refugees, and his ultra-nationalist stance could cause serious problems for foreign populations in Colombia. Furthermore, his full force campaign against the guerrillas can drive the ELN back over the Venezuelan border.

A small “silver lining” does exist. On one hand, Cepeda has stated that he will try to push for regularization mechanisms in Colombia. On the other, Abelardo’s ties to the International Right and Donald Trump can transform him into a key figure to push for a decisive presidential election and as a source of pressure on Delcy.

Colombia’s role as a key interlocutor with Venezuela is undeniably at risk regardless of who wins the presidency. Because the region and Venezuela needed a Colombian president that could be a genuine bridge between Washington and Caracas, between the Venezuelan diaspora and integration, between the ELN and disarmament, and for the ever-divided poles of the Colombian population. But rather, on June 21, the country was forced to choose between ideological blindness dressed in progressive language, and maximum pressure dressed over an obvious conflict of interest. Venezuela might again pay the price for someone else’s terrible choices.

Daiki Kaneko had only 24 hours before his World Cup journey took him to Dallas, where his home country’s squad will take on Sweden.

The Japanese soccer fan was making the most of it on Tuesday in Inglewood, snapping pictures of SoFi Stadium before taking in a different kind of monument: a space-age, two-story branch of the chicken chain Raising Cane’s, complete with a 308-square-foot screen, a mirrored dog sculpture and a massive halo hovering around the exterior.

For Kaneko, 25, who lives in the Tokyo suburbs, it was the perfect encapsulation of American grandeur.

“All this for chicken,” he said. “I love America.”

Inglewood is already diverse — most residents are Latino or Black, and nearly a third are immigrants. But during the World Cup, it’s looking more like the United Nations. English, Japanese, Swiss, Iranians, Paraguayans, Bosnians, Belgians and others are flocking to the city of about 102,000, where eight matches are being played at SoFi Stadium.

Though visitors from abroad may not have heard of Inglewood until now, they’re soaking up the vibes of a city that has long been a major sports and entertainment hub, home to venues such as the Kia Forum and Intuit Dome, and a crucible of Black culture, immortalized in hip-hop songs by artists such as Tupac Shakur and Dr. Dre.

“We’re an international city now,” Mayor James Butts said.

Butts said locals were already proud of what the city has become, but the World Cup has put the celebratory feelings over the top.

“We have people from so many different countries migrating to Inglewood, and there’s an explosive sense of community pride,” he said.

Bartender Elijah Gonzalez, left, mixes a drink at the Nile Bar in Inglewood while customers watch a World Cup soccer preview.

(Allen J. Schaben / Los Angeles Times)

City officials are doing everything they can to embrace the spirit of the tournament, including speeding up permits so small businesses and neighborhoods can hold World Cup gatherings and watch parties, Butts said. During the U.S.’s opening match against Paraguay on June 12, the city hosted the Wood Cup, a block party on Market Street that brought in more than 5,000 people.

Businesses across the city are embracing the tournament as well, vying for a piece of the roughly $17 million the city expects to haul in. For a few weeks, concerns about skyrocketing housing costs and gentrification, brought on by the city’s increasing popularity as a place to settle down, are taking a back seat to the sheer fun of international soccer.

The supersized Raising Cane’s had its grand opening on June 11, the first day of the tournament. During the USMNT’s opening match, Cinepolis, a luxury movie theater down the road from SoFi Stadium, turned into a global sports hub, according to CEO Luis Olloqui.

Maddy Daversa, a bartender at the Meeting Spot, a restaurant near the stadium, said 2,000 people poured in when the Americans played Paraguay.

“I was selling beers for five hours straight,” she said. “It was crazy.”

Daversa said the restaurant is usually closed on Mondays but opened in hopes of getting some spillover fans from the Iran-New Zealand game at SoFi.

“Every table was full,” she said. “We’re taking advantage.”

Tuesday was an off day for Inglewood, with no games at SoFi. But the energy was still palpable, with locals sporting soccer jerseys and tourists popping up across the city.

“I just want to be where the fans are,” said David Meier, a Swiss fan in town for his home country’s match against Bosnia-Herzegovina on Thursday.

Meier, 45, plans to explore L.A. via bars, restaurants and watch parties, taking in every game that his schedule will allow before heading north of the border to Vancouver, where Switzerland will face Canada on June 24.

“Everyone has been so kind,” he said. “Soccer and beer turns strangers into friends.”

Flags from countries competing in the World Cup are on display at Manchester Boulevard and South Market Street in Inglewood.

(Allen J. Schaben / Los Angeles Times)

The energy carried over to Market Street, a historic shopping district about a mile from SoFi Stadium. Businesses set up signs, posters and international flags to lure locals and tourists alike, while the Miracle Theater hosted a watch party for the match between France and Senegal.

Owen Smith, who co-owns the theater with his wife, Mariana, said a Senegalese friend who grew up in France asked if he would be willing to show the game on the big screen. A day later, fans of both teams assembled inside, snapping photos in front of a giant inflatable World Cup trophy in the lobby.

“The Miracle is a cultural event theater. It’s about accommodating the community,” Smith said.

Benyam Woldegiorgis, who co-owns the Nile Bar on Market Street, is showing every single World Cup match — all 104 of them.

“It brings in business,” he said. “Usually it’s just football, basketball and baseball, but now we’re adding soccer to the mix.”

Dionte Johnson, owner of the streetwear store Kingsrowe, partnered with Adidas to hold a watch party for the U.S. team’s opener and said the turnout was massive, bringing in loads of Mexico fans who are local residents, even though their team had already won their opener the day before.

“The downside of the World Cup is that tickets are so expensive, so a lot of locals can’t go check out the games themselves. That’s why we’re hosting events,” Johnson said. “The games are in our backyard, so this is something people have had on their calendar for a long time.”

Homeowners are cashing in as well, with some renting out their places on Airbnb for a small fortune, figuring that crashing on a friend’s couch or booking a hotel room elsewhere is well worth the lofty payouts brought by World Cup demand.

Across L.A., hotel demand lagged compared with initial expectations, but short-term rental prices still jumped 56% compared with typical rates, and more than 70% of rentals were booked by December 2025.

In Inglewood — especially for rentals walkable to SoFi Stadium — prices became dizzying.

David Orenstein and his wife, Peggy, run an Airbnb across the street from SoFi Stadium. It usually rents for $400 per night, but for the U.S. team’s opening game, it went for $3,000.

(Robert Gauthier / Los Angeles Times)

Peggy Orenstein and her husband, David, own a home steps from the stadium that typically rents for $400 a night on Airbnb. For the U.S. team’s opener, the nightly rate shot up to $3,000.

For other matches, the four-bedroom house is going for $1,200 to $1,500 a night. Orenstein said the high demand and international crowds are a teaser for what’s to come.

“Next up is the Olympics,” she said. “This is a great learning lesson for what we can expect.”

EASYJET is launching 13 new routes from the UK including to lesser-known destinations.

The routes include the airline’s first international destination from a tiny UK airport.

EasyJet will launch a route between Newquay Airport in Cornwall and Geneva in Switzerland – which will be its first international route from the airport.

The route will launch on January 16, 2027 and operate once a week on Saturdays until February 27, 2027.

Among the 12 other routes being launched are new routes from London Luton to Kittila in Finland launching on November 24 and Strasbourg in France launching on November 29.

Flights to Kittila will operate twice a week, on Tuesdays and Saturdays whereas flights to Strasbourg will operate four times a week on Mondays, Thursdays, Fridays and Sundays.

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London Southend will get new flights to Edinburgh, Scotland operating twice a week from October 25 on Thursdays and Sundays from £23.99 per person.

From Birmingham you will be able to fly to Copenhagen in Denmark, twice a week on Mondays and Fridays, launching on November 16 and costing from £31.99 per person.

Or if you live near Manchester, you can head to Cairo in Egypt from November 9 – the only direct route from Manchester to the ‘Sphinx’ airport.

The route will operate twice a week on Mondays and Fridays, with flights costing from £131.99 per person.

Liverpool will get two new routes including to Kittilä in Finland and Reykjavik in Iceland.

Flights to Kittila will start on November 25, departing twice a week on Wednesdays and Saturdays with tickets costing from £30.99 per person.

On the other hand, flights will head to Reykjavik from November 2, taking off on Mondays and Fridays, with flights costing from £43.99 per person.

And Newcastle will get several new destinations including Barcelona in Spain, Berlin in Germany, Copenhagen in Denmark, Hurghada in Egypt and Rovaniemi in Finland.

Flights to Barcelona will be the first to launch on October 25, operating twice a week on Fridays and Sundays and costing from £28.99 per person.

Hurghada flights will then start on October 27 twice a week on Tuesdays and Saturdays, costing from £121.99 per person.

Copenhagen flights will launch on November 5, followed by Berlin on November 20 and then Rovaniemi on November 25.

Walking through Budapest, it is impossible not to notice the contradictions. Hungary is a member of NATO, a member of the European Union, and a beneficiary of decades of Western integration. At the same time, Chinese companies are building multibillion-dollar factories, Russian energy remains essential, and Viktor Orbán spent years cultivating close ties with both Moscow and Beijing. 

From Caracas, many would interpret this reality as an anomaly. Perhaps for a country so accustomed to contradictions, it is a window into the world that is coming. Or into the world that already arrived.

For decades, international politics was dominated by a relatively straightforward question: whose side are you on? The Cold War forced countries to choose between Washington and Moscow, although Venezuela took a novel approach in the second half of its democratic period. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the American unipolar moment sustained the assumption that development, prosperity, and international integration were ultimately synonymous with Westernization.

The twenty-first century has proven more complicated. Turkey purchases Russian weapons while hosting American bases as a NATO member. India participates in strategic partnerships with the United States while maintaining longstanding military and energy ties with Moscow. The United Arab Emirates hosts capital, companies, and citizens from virtually every geopolitical camp. Hungary, home to CPAC Europe and a destination for both Chinese investment and Western conservative movements, has perhaps turned this logic into a national strategy more successfully than any other European country.

These countries are not neutral. Nor are they non-aligned in the classical Cold War sense. They are states that have learned to maximize their options in a multipolar world.

Time to embrace multipolarity?

For years, discussions about Venezuela’s future have been framed as a choice between opposing models. Would the country resemble Cuba or Colombia? Nicaragua or Costa Rica? Would a transition imply a return to the Western consensus that shaped much of Latin America after the Cold War?

Five months after January 3 and the beginning of a period of unprecedented American tutelage, those questions appear increasingly outdated.

The symbolism of recent weeks is difficult to ignore. While Delcy Rodríguez was in India seeking to deepen energy ties with one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, General Dan Caine was simultaneously in Caracas discussing security cooperation with Venezuelan authorities. In the traditional chavista worldview, these developments would have belonged to rival geopolitical universes. In today’s Venezuela, they increasingly appear as part of the same strategy.

Venezuela arrives at this reality from a different place. Questions of external influence, compromised sovereignty, competing centers of power, and tutelage have played a far larger role here than among our neighbors.

The concept of regime learning refers to the ways political systems adapt in order to survive. In Venezuela, that process has already transformed the country’s economic model. Price controls have largely been abandoned. The private sector is in a slow process of rehabilitation. In short, revolutionary orthodoxy has repeatedly yielded to political necessity.

Regime learning does not only change how states govern. It changes how they understand the world.

What is becoming apparent in 2026 is that the same process may be transforming Venezuela’s geopolitical posture.

The Bolivarian Revolution was founded on a particular assumption. Venezuela would help construct an alternative pole of power, aligned with actors such as Cuba, Russia, Iran, and eventually China. The goal was not merely to diversify partnerships. It was to build a geopolitical project capable of challenging American influence in the hemisphere.

Twenty-five years later, the lesson learned appears remarkably different.

Arriving late to the game

Russia became absorbed by its invasion of Ukraine. China proved willing to defend its own interests, but not necessarily those of its partners. Iran remained geographically distant and economically constrained. Cuba, despite years of leeching off the Venezuelan state, proved largely incapable of defending the revolution against genuine external pressures. The experience of governing under sanctions, isolation, economic collapse, and great-power competition appears to have produced a different conclusion: dependence on any single external patron creates vulnerabilities.

The logical response is not non-alignment, but rather hedging.

Instead of anchoring Venezuela to a single geopolitical camp, the emerging strategy appears designed to maintain productive relations with several simultaneously. Security cooperation with Washington. Oil exports to India. Commercial ties with China. Investment from the Gulf. Access to Western financial markets. None of these relationships are mutually exclusive. In fact, they reinforce one another.

To some extent, there is nothing uniquely Venezuelan about this. Much of Latin America already operates in a multipolar environment. Governments across the ideological spectrum maintain economic ties with China while preserving political, commercial, and security relationships with the United States. Yet Venezuela arrives at this reality from a very different place. Questions of external influence, compromised sovereignty, competing centers of power, and political tutelage have played a far larger role in Venezuelan politics than in most neighboring countries.

The lesson Venezuela appears to be learning is neither socialist nor liberal, neither anti-Western nor fully Western.

In some respects, the country’s experience over the last quarter century has more in common with the dilemmas faced by some post-communist European states (like Ukraine) than with those of Colombia, Peru, or Ecuador. Venezuela is never going to become Switzerland, nor is it going to become India. It lacks the geography, the institutions, and the scale required for either role. Yet it may be discovering a different path, one better suited to its circumstances: not a great power, not a neutral sanctuary, but a medium-sized energy producer whose strategic value derives from its ability to remain relevant to multiple centers of power simultaneously.

This is what makes Hungary such a useful comparison. Not because Hungary represents a political model for Venezuela, nor because Viktor Orbán and Nicolás Maduro are comparable figures. If anything, a Venezuelan transition led by María Corina Machado would likely have more in common ideologically with a post-Orbán government than with Orbán himself. Yet that is precisely the point. Even a post-Orbán Hungary would remain a member of NATO and the European Union, continue attracting Chinese investment, and remain constrained by the economic and energy relationships accumulated over decades. Hungary is useful because it illustrates a broader phenomenon: the emergence of states whose prosperity depends less on belonging to a bloc than on remaining useful to several at once.

Viewed from this perspective, Venezuela’s current trajectory increasingly resembles neither Cuba nor the Colombia of the early 2000s. It is not moving toward the permanent isolation of the former, nor toward the straightforward Western alignment of the latter under Álvaro Uribe. Instead, it is beginning to occupy an intermediate position, one that may become increasingly common in a multipolar world.

The Bolivarian Revolution aspired to create a twenty-first-century Cuba. Five months after January 3, its most enduring geopolitical legacy may be the emergence of an oil-rich Hungary in the Caribbean.

Regime learning does not only change how states govern. It changes how they understand the world. After 25 years of revolution, sanctions, collapse, and adaptation, the lesson Venezuela appears to be learning is neither socialist nor liberal, neither anti-Western nor fully Western. It is something more pragmatic: in a multipolar world, survival belongs to those who can make themselves useful to everyone.

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s meeting with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang on Sunday is significant for one reason.

It’s not that they are meeting: The two men met in Beijing just a year ago when China held a massive military parade to mark 80 years since Japan surrendered unconditionally to Allied forces, bringing an end to the second world war.

What’s surprising is that Xi is travelling at all.

The Chinese leader has not travelled to Pyongyang since 2019, having steadily cut down his travel in recent years, and world leaders like US President Donald Trump and Russian leader Vladimir Putin generally come to him these days.

“We need to remember that Xi Jinping has not really travelled abroad that much,” William Yang, Crisis Group’s senior analyst for Northeast Asia, told Al Jazeera. “The growing trend is foreign leaders heading to Beijing to meet with him.

“For Xi Jinping to be the one who decides to travel to Pyongyang, it shows the level of significance that China attaches to this trip.”

Xi averaged about 14 trips a year between 2013 and 2019, but dropped to approximately six a year between 2022 and 2025, according to the Asia Society. In 2020, he made just one overseas trip, and in 2021, he made none, as China grappled with the COVID-19 pandemic.

He may be travelling now, though, amid concerns about North Korea’s relationship with Russia, Yang said.

Senior partner no more?

Traditionally, Beijing played the role of senior partner in the China-North Korea relationship, with North Korea heavily dependent on China for as much as 95 percent of its trade, according to one 2022 estimate from the National Committee on North Korea, a US-based nonprofit.

That dynamic has been changing since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, however. North Korea has provided Russia with critical weapons, artillery and manpower and is credited by observers with helping to keep Moscow’s war machine going.

South Korea’s Institute for National Security Strategy, a government-funded research institute, estimates that since 2023, Moscow has paid North Korea as much as $14.4bn for troop deployments and the export of “artillery, shells, and guided and ballistic missiles”.

The report said that North Korea may only have received between $580m and $1.5bn of that in the form of “goods”, which means there is a “significant possibility that the majority of the payment from Moscow was in the form of ‘sensitive military technology or related precision parts and materials that are difficult to observe via satellite’,” according to a translation.

Although China shares a mutual defence treaty with North Korea, it is still wary of North Korea acquiring new military technology, Yang said.

“Beijing has always been very careful about providing military assistance to North Korea because they do not see a militarily stronger North Korea as necessarily in its favour,” he said. “A North Korea that is militarily emboldened through its relationship with Russia could be a potential source of disruption to the balance of power and status quo on the Korean Peninsula.”

North Korea has already carried out eight missile launches since the start of the year, and in May unveiled a new AI-guided tactical cruise missile, according to North Korean media and the US Naval Institute.

Earlier this week, North Korean state media also released photos of Kim touring a new “weapons-grade nuclear materials” factory, which would be used to expand Pyongyang’s nuclear capability at an “exponential rate”.

Fluctuating tensions

North Korea has technically been at war with South Korea since 1950, with the conflict suspended by a 1953 armistice agreement. The two countries are divided by a 250-kilometre-long (155-mile-long) Demilitarized Zone, splitting the Korean Peninsula.

Tensions have fluctuated dramatically over the years, reaching a recent low point in 2024 when Kim abandoned the long-term goal of Korean unification.

He has largely cut off communications ever since, according to observers. On Friday, South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that it hopes that Xi’s trip will “play a constructive role in addressing issues related to the Korean Peninsula” – suggesting that Seoul may have lobbied the Chinese leader to try to smooth over relations.

South Korean Minister of Unification Chung Dong-young separately told reporters last month that he expects the two leaders to discuss a possible meeting between Kim and Trump later in the year.

Xi may also be alarmed by other security developments in East Asia, including news of a possible military-logistics ‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌support pact between South Korea and Japan, which was raised at the Shangri-La Dialogue of regional defence officials in Singapore last weekend.

While China and South Korea’s relationship fluctuates, its ties with Japan are acrimonious due to longstanding grievances dating back to Imperial Japan’s occupation of China in the 1930s and 1940s. Beijing has also objected to recent moves by Tokyo to expand its de facto military.

The administration of United States President Donald Trump has proposed a new 25 percent tariff on imports from Brazil amid allegations of unfair trading practices.

US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer announced the new punitive tariffs late on Monday, stemming from issues including digital trade and illegal deforestation.

The new tariffs would be imposed under Section 301 of US trade policy — a statute that gives the US government broad authority to impose trade sanctions based on violations of trade agreements, as well as what it deems “unfair” trade practices under the Trade Act of 1974.

Greer said there has been an investigation that began in July. The practices under investigation were related to issues such as illegal deforestation, ethanol market access, and anticorruption enforcement, among other key issues, according to the summary released by the US Department of Commerce on Tuesday.

In the 107-page document, the US government said that trade practices between the two nations “are unreasonable and burden or restrict US commerce”, and pointed to agreements that Brazil has with Mexico and India.

“Brazil’s trade arrangements with Mexico and India also create incentives to offshore US production by creating a financial advantage to exporting to Brazil from these countries, as opposed to exporting from the United States,” the document says.

There is a comment period for the general public to weigh in on the proposed tariffs, which begins on Thursday. The written comment period ends on July 1, and there will be a public hearing in Washington on July 6.

Beef, coffee, rare earths, other metals, energy, and aircraft parts are among the products that would be exempt from the tariffs.

On CNBC, Greer said that it would release more findings on unfair trade practices in the next several weeks in order to address what Greer called a “giant” trade deficit.

However, the data shows that the US maintains a trade surplus with Brazil. In March, Brazil bought more goods, worth $3.3bn, from the US than it exported at $2.9bn, representing a $420m trade surplus.

Other countries under investigation include China and Vietnam.

The new tariff would partially replace a tariff of 50 percent on many Brazilian goods imposed last year by Trump, with 40 percent serving as a punishment for Brazil’s prosecution of former President Jair Bolsonaro, a Trump ally.

The White House also recently dropped tariffs on select aluminium, copper, and steel imports, which include agricultural equipment such as harvesters. Those tariffs will drop from 25 percent to 15 percent. The tariffs expire in December 2027.

The new tariffs come after the Supreme Court, in February, struck down the use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which the White House used to impose its sweeping global tariffs.

“They are the first of many new tariffs to replace the IEPPA national security tariffs. The period of public comment will allow for potential modest tweaks and exemptions. Ultimately, it will add to some inflation pressure compared to the last few months but not compared to a year earlier,” Rachel Ziemba, a senior adjunct fellow at the Center for a New American Security, told Al Jazeera.

Political tensions

The changes come despite President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s visit to Washington last month, as relations have deteriorated in recent months.

The US State Department has also designated two of Brazil’s criminal gangs as “terrorist organisations”, a move that supported Senator Flavio Bolsonaro’s position, Lula’s main rival in October’s election, and over the objections of Brazilian officials.

“I expressly asked President Trump not to tariff our companies,” Bolsonaro wrote on X on Tuesday. “Tariffs are not the solution.”

The White House did not respond to Al Jazeera’s request for comment.

Venezuela is far from being the only country in the Americas where State institutions have been used to crack down on independent media and protect the interests of ruling elites. In Guatemala, the case of journalist José Rubén Zamora became one of the clearest examples of how prosecutors, courts and political power can converge to silence investigative journalism.

In early April 2025, I interviewed Ramón Zamora, son of Guatemalan journalist and elPeriódico founder José Rubén Zamora. His arrest following years of investigations into alleged government corruption led to the newspaper’s closure and the persecution of people close to him. During our conversation, Ramón Zamora described how Guatemala has developed a tacit network of complicity between State institutions and political authorities, a system that raises broader questions about this new form of power in Latin America and may also help explain how the chavista State in Venezuela operates.

After elPeriódico published two investigations on May 2 and May 3, 2021 into apparent cases of corruption in the government of former President Alejandro Giammattei, the media outlet was subjected to legal persecution that culminated in the arrest of Rubén Zamora, who had dedicated his work to investigating corruption in the Central American country. 

The persecution began with an investigation into alleged bribery by the newspaper to obtain information related to the publications. The judge who heard the case dismissed it. Later, in 2022, an investigation into money laundering related to the sale of works of art owned by Zamora to cover elPeriódico‘s costs was reopened, leading to his arrest.

The imprisonment of Zamora caught the attention of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. In their 2022 and 2023 annual reports, the IACHR requested information from Guatemala regarding the country’s human rights situation and recalled that Zamora has benefited from precautionary measures since 2003 due to risks linked to his journalistic work. Guatemala rejected parts of the assessment as lacking objectivity. Amnesty International described Zamora as a prisoner of conscience and condemned his detention. Zamora was granted house arrest for the second time on February 12, 2026.

Reducing chavismo to a simple narco-structure simplifies the scope that the organization can have, since apparent drug trafficking would not be the essence of the system but rather an activity within it.

During the arrest and initial detention of journalist José Rubén Zamora in 2022, Guatemala was governed by Alejandro Giammattei, a conservative president whose administration faced strong criticism from international organizations over corruption, institutional deterioration, and pressure against journalists and anti-corruption actors. Since January 14, 2024, Guatemala has been governed by Bernardo Arévalo, a progressive and anti-corruption reformist whose presidential term is scheduled to end in January 2028.

His son, Ramón Zamora, says that his father’s persecution is the result of an unwritten agreement between various powerful sectors within the State that aim to protect their interests.  “In Guatemala, there is something my father called the “Pact of the Corrupt.” The Pact of the Corrupts is a tacit agreement that forms a network of corruption spread across political parties and institutions, where those who reach positions of power must govern according to the pact.”

This explanation describes the composition of a de facto cross-cutting network, which has political parties, institutions, and security forces under its control, punishing dissent as a means of survival, subjecting its detractors to exile, imprisonment, and discredit.

“The judge presiding over the case ordered an investigation into my father’s defense attorneys and witnesses, causing his lawyer to go into exile just five days after his arrest. Currently, six of the twelve lawyers who have defended my father have been detained,” says Ramón, who is also outside Guatemala with his mother after the court issued an arrest warrant against both of them. 

“They also persecuted my family. My mother and I were outside Guatemala visiting the United States when the judge handling my father’s case issued an arrest warrant against us, so we decided not to return.”

But how can the Pact explain the nature of the chavista State?

Corruption as political capital

Chavismo is not exclusively a militarized organization or simply a drug trafficking operation. As in Guatemala with the Pact of the Corrupts, the institutions of the chavista State are co-opted and work in the tacit interest of their members, where one of the main means of maintaining the pact is loyalty based on impunity, while corruption operates as political capital.

Consequently, the exercise of power is not oriented toward citizens or the satisfaction of public demands, but rather toward preserving the internal balance of the Pact itself. Governing involves administering concessions, distributing power quotas, and avoiding any decision that could alter the network of interests that sustains the regime. Reforms, when they exist, do not constitute a project of institutional transformation but are carefully calibrated to avoid destabilizing the architecture of loyalties on which the system rests.

This model of governance, the pacted State, is complemented by a logic of repression, combining massive and indiscriminate terror against actors whose actions threaten the balance of the pact. Similar dynamics can be observed in regimes such as Russia, Belarus, Nicaragua, and several Central Asian States. Journalists, judges, political leaders, and internal and external dissidents are the main targets of a system of coercion designed not to mobilize the masses, but to send clear and disciplining signals to those who break the pact. The selectivity of repression does not mitigate its severity. On the contrary, it makes it more efficient and functional in sustaining the apparatus of power.

Reducing chavismo to a simple narco-structure simplifies the scope that the organization can have, since apparent drug trafficking would not be the essence of the system but rather an activity within it. The Venezuelan State has become a web of systematic corruption that makes crime a functional activity of power.

The stability of the system is due to a network of mostly informal agreements between civilian, military, and economic actors who share a common interest: preserving an order in which rupture is more costly than continuity.

In this context, ideology ceases to serve as the system’s organizing principle and takes on a strictly instrumental role. It is not the compass that guides the action of power, but rather an adaptable rhetorical resource used to justify decisions already made to sustain the pact. Chavismo does not act primarily to carry out an ideological project, but rather to preserve a balance of interests between civilian, military, and criminal elites, in which ideas can mutate without the system suffering. Ideology, thus, does not guide the organization: it accompanies it, decorates it, or excuses it, but does not determine it.

The thesis of a pacted State suggests that authoritarian stability rests not only on repression or ideology, but on a shared understanding among political, military, and economic elites that preserving the existing order is preferable to risking rupture. Such systems can appear remarkably resilient precisely because their survival depends less on ideological coherence than on the mutual guarantees exchanged within the ruling coalition.

The notion of a pacted State helps explain why chavismo has shown a capacity for survival that goes beyond personalistic or circumstantial explanations. The stability of the system is due to a network of mostly informal agreements between civilian, military, and economic actors who share a common interest: preserving an order in which rupture is more costly than continuity. As long as that calculation remains valid, the system does not collapse; it adapts, reconfigures itself, and absorbs pressures without altering its fundamental logic. Yet the resilience of pacted States is not immutable.

Such systems begin to weaken when influential actors within the ruling coalition conclude that the regime can no longer guarantee protection, resources, or political survival. Economic decline, succession disputes, international pressure, social unrest, or weakening coercive institutions can alter the cost-benefit calculations sustaining the pact. Similar dynamics were visible in Eastern Europe after November 1989, when regimes in the German Democratic Republic, Romania, and Bulgaria rapidly collapsed once the elite coalitions sustaining them began to fracture internally, a process that would also unfold in Albania.

History suggests that pacted States often project an image of permanence precisely until the internal understandings sustaining them begin, almost imperceptibly, to dissolve.

It’s always spectacular to see a big shot getting caught. Especially when he’s made a long career at the top of an European democracy under a mask of respectability. And, oh so suddenly, it turns out he’s made a fortune dealing with a Latin American dictatorship.

The sequence was— as people love to say today—worth of a Netflix series. 

Hours before getting on another flight to Caracas, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero decided to stay in Madrid once he knew he had just become the first former prime minister in the history of Spain’s 50-year-old democracy to be indicted for a crime. For those who turn on the phone in the morning across the Atlantic, when it is noon in Spain, the news of the indictment came as one bundle with the footage of Zapatero’s office being raided by an anti-corruption investigative unit of Spain’s National Police Corps, known as UDEF.

Zapatero was indicted by Audiencia National (an equivalent of the Supreme Court) for selling his influence to get a financial relief kit for an airline, Plus Ultra, the smallest of four Spanish carriers that received assistance from Madrid as a result of the demand-side shock during the pandemic. This company, with a fleet of seven aircrafts, was also the youngest of the lot, and had the particular feature of having inaugurated routes to Caracas in the annus horribilis of 2017, a time when international operators were withdrawing from the country en masse. As Armando.Info investigative reporter Roberto Deniz would reveal in December 2018, Plus Ultra’s majority stakeholders were from Venezuela.

Eight years later, Zapatero is being prosecuted over allegations of political influence peddling related to the €53 million bailout of Plus Ultra. He also faces charges of criminal conspiracy, document forgery and money laundering. The judge handling the case describes Zapatero as the head of “a stable and hierarchical influence‑peddling structure” meant to “obtain financial benefits as an intermediary, exerting influence over public bodies on behalf of third parties, mainly Plus Ultra.” At least six other individuals are under investigation, including Plus Ultra’s chairman, its CEO, and Alicante-based businessman Julio Martínez Martínez.

The UDEF report says Zapatero and Martínez were at the center of a structure of businesses and consulting firms meant to syphon money coming from China, Venezuela and Spain into his personal accounts.

This latter will be a key character in this story: Martínez Martínez is not only being accused of acting as Zapatero’s frontman in a number of entities that received payments linked to the Plus Ultra (et al) scheme. His own personal records, such as notebook annotations UDEF just made public, suggest he was fully aware of Zapatero’s business and political dealings with the Maduro regime. That evidence seems to point at both opaque trade deals (over Venezuelan light crude, gold, fuel, asphalt, which were the subject of US sanctions until recently) Martínez and Zapatero may have promoted, and knowledge about a number of high-profile political prisoners released this year. The son-in-law of Edmundo González, security expert Rocío San Miguel and opposition moderate Enrique Márquez (who has publicly praised Zapatero) appear mentioned. Martínez´s notes also provide previously undisclosed details about the contents of a constitutional reform Maduro toyed with, but never brought about after stealing the presidential vote in 2024.

All of this adds to the investigations about shady business in the pandemic that involved Spanish businessman Víctor de Aldama, former Transport Minister and PSOE Organization Secretary José Luis Ábalos, and his close advisor Koldo García. The trio famously met Delcy Rodríguez in the tarmac of the Madrid international airport, for a purported conversation over the sale of Venezuelan gold lingots, despite her being the subject of EU sanctions and therefore unable to step on European soil. These three Spaniards (with Ábalos and Koldo being amongst the closest collaborators of Pedro Sánchez in his primary campaign and early government) are the main actors in a series of corruption scandals that have been getting closer to the Spanish head of government, a darling of the International Left whose reputation has been boosted by a knack for antagonizing Donald Trump. But the former aides of Perro Sanxe have been arrested without bail and indicted (and will soon face a sentencing hearing). His brother is facing trial. His wife has also been indicted and is on the verge of facing trial. And now it looks like his political mentor will also face a lengthy process before Spanish justice.

Just after the Zapatero news broke in Spain, predictable reactions began to come across the political spectrum: bloodthirst at the Right, accusations of conspiracy at the Left. Then, the judge made public the 88-page file, fed with a probe that began in 2024, and the ambiance turned in a second. Many allies of the graft-plagued socialist government admitted that the accusations are solid, the evidence overwhelming, and the outlook quite bleak for Zapatero. The conspiracy theory that this was lawfare against the Sánchez government faded away. Spain’s paper of record, El País, traditionally aligned with Zapatero’s party PSOE, wrote a stern op-ed saying that the Sánchez government was forced to investigate this properly to prevent the “enemies of democracy” in the Far Right from charging against the democratic system. “Full cooperation with the judiciary, full respect for the presumption of innocence, and all my support for President Zapatero,” Sánchez said today. 

As you may have noticed, authorities have released more evidence this week. Spanish media ranging from the State-owned, left-leaning broadcaster RTVE to the investigative El Confidencial are carving out a map of the Zapatero network of sociedades mercantiles. While not all of these companies are under investigation, together they received an estimated €2.6 million between 2020 and 2025 from Chinese capital and entities under investigation.

The investigation will likely reveal more details about the dealings between the chavista regime, Zapatero and other politicians and businesspeople close to the Sanchista government.

The UDEF report says Zapatero and Martínez were at the center of a structure of businesses and consulting firms (under not-at-all pretentious names like Inteligencia Prospectiva and Análisis Relevante) meant to syphon money coming from China, Venezuela and Spain into his personal accounts. Money that looks, in many cases, like kickbacks. For instance, Whathefav, a social media agency owned by his two daughters, got a payment of half a million euros for creating a website and a promotional video for Inteligencia Prospectiva SL, which is owned by Guillemo and Domingo Amaro Chacón. These two are Spanish-Venezuelan citizens who happen to be the sons of a businessman involved in a case of insurance fraud with PDVSA. Inteligencia Prospectiva reported losses, but was paying juicy bills to other businesses of the same network, like Whathefav.

UDEF  also cites evidence of conversations between Domingo Amaro Chacón and Julio Martínez Martínez, from 2021 to 2024, discussing a deal with Minerven (coded as “comercialización de amarillo”), nickel reserves in Venezuela, a major tourism development project on La Tortuga Island, and what seems like efforts to promote the opening of the UAE embassy in Caracas (coded as “the desert guys”). All of this may have something to do with UDEF’s suggestion (reviewed here by The Objective) alleging that the Plus Ultra case might be linked to a money-laundering operation involving proceeds from the Venezuelan CLAP food-box scheme, as well as the shipment of 5-8 tons of gold from Caracas to Dubai.

Yes, it’s a lot. And we’re not even getting into other grim details, like reports that Whathefav received a €100,000 payment from the company behind VenApp, which you’ll remember as the mobile app Maduro promoted in the past two years to encourage chavistas to snitch on dissidents.

“I told you so…”

Until that day, Zapatero was able to sell to the Spanish people that he had been in Venezuela not just as a negotiator helping take people out of jail, but as a peacemaker trying to prevent the country from falling into a civil war. Apparently through his good heart and blue eyes.

Suddenly, Spain has discovered that a former president, adored among socialists for his term’s achievements like the disbandment of terrorist group ETA, who left Moncloa Palace with no scandals on his shoulders, and who kept enough prestige to back the rise of Sánchez, is an international operator that used his connections and knowledge to make at least 2.6 million euros in ways that spill way beyond the disputable boundaries of legal lobbying.

Once again, Venezuelans raised their eyes to the sky and whispered with resignation. That “yes, moron, we have known this for years” feeling we are so familiar with. 

This case should remind the EU that post-Maduro Venezuela still harbors kleptocratic networks embedded well within European jurisdictions.

For Venezuelan media, and we dare to say a great deal of the public, Zapatero has been known for years as a loyal operator of the chavista regime who works at the expense of the people to help Maduro, and now the Rodríguez siblings, to preserve power. In doing so, he has kept the boardgame tilted against the opposition. The statesmanship that many Spaniards attribute to Zapatero has served only to defend Maduro’s interests during several negotiation rounds with international presence, and to corner the opposition into disadvantageous arrangements by presenting himself as an arbiter when, in fact, he’s no more than an able messenger of Miraflores. Former political prisoners like Lorent Saleh have recalled how Zapatero pressured their families to keep quiet about torture and abuse endured in prison. All that work, of course, has been handsomely rewarded.

We saw his shadow in the humiliation of president-elect Edmundo González Urrutia, in the Spanish ambassador’s house in Caracas, during his last hours in Venezuela in August 2024. Edmundo was pressured by Delcy and Jorge Rodríguez to sign a self-incriminating letter as a condition for being allowed to leave for Spain. After that, the Rodríguez siblings and Zapatero have actively endorsed each other: one of the Spaniard’s last visits to Caracas saw him declaring next to Jorge and other National Assembly lawmakers as a key international sponsor of the 2026 amnesty law, which Delcy recently discontinued. One of those lawmakers, fake opposition politician Timoteo Zambrano, is another close friend and ally of Zapatero. The latter’s influence looks so significant that Delcy just appointed Zambrano as the Venezuelan ambassador in Madrid.

Bad for Delcy, good for María Corina

The investigation will likely reveal more details about the dealings between the chavista regime, Zapatero and other politicians and businesspeople close to the Sanchista government. It will all depend on what prosecutors can find and prove, but it’s fair to say that a wave of scandals and a thickening of corruption dossiers of this kind could make any democratic government in the world collapse (though with Sánchez, in the end, we’re talking about a man Spanish voters know for surviving all kinds of reputational crises). 

The Spanish government was among the first to recognize Delcy Rodríguez as head of state. As early as January, its top diplomat said he would request that the EU lifts sanctions on Delcy. Just a few weeks ago, the same official confirmed that Caracas would resume talks with the IMF. The Spanish Foreign Ministry used to be run by Josep Borrell, a socialist from the non-Zapaterista faction (the more moderate, Felipista wing) of the ruling PSOE, who has become a vocal critic of both the Maduro dictatorship and Zapatero. But Madrid’s latest efforts to normalize relations with Delcy haven’t gone unnoticed, perhaps encouraged by the Trump administration, and also by Maria Corina Machado’s close ties with the Spanish Right.

With such accusations against a key enabler of this bilateral relationship, the image of normalcy (and common sense) both Sánchez and Delcy are trying to project should take a hit. This case should remind the EU that post-Maduro Venezuela still harbors kleptocratic networks embedded well within European jurisdictions.

We should note this is not a problem where Delcy can turn to the Trump administration for help. Not only because Trump despises Sánchez, but because Homeland Security reportedly gave leads to Spain’s National Police in the Plus Ultra case, in cooperation through the American embassy in Madrid.

A big winner in this case is María Corina Machado, who recently held a massive rally in Madrid’s main square that few Spanish politicians could have matched. Machado was lambasted by Foreign Minister José Luis Albares for refusing to meet Sánchez or other leftwing leaders during her Madrid visit. Throughout her trip, when asked by journalists about this decision, Machado did not name Sánchez but thanked the Spanish government for receiving Venezuelan migrants over the years, while also stressing her utmost respect for Spanish institutions. It is false that Machado only met with the right-wing opposition: she appeared publicly with former PM Felipe González, a historic figure of Spanish social democracy and a key leader of the country’s famous Transition.

Machado may now be feeling some relief about how the whole Spanish saga is unfolding (both Zapatero and Machado have acknowledged they have never spoken to each other).

In another era, she might have summed it up with one of her classic phrases: se los dije.

May 22 (Asia Today) — POSCO International said Friday it plans to enter the U.S. rare earth separation, refining and permanent magnet business through a joint investment with ReElement Technologies.

The South Korean trading company said it signed an agreement with the U.S. firm to pursue a joint venture for rare earth separation and refining production in the United States.

The signing ceremony was held in Washington, D.C., with POSCO International CEO Lee Kye-in, ReElement Technologies CEO Mark Jensen, U.S. government officials and South Korean Embassy officials in attendance.

The companies plan to jointly invest $200 million to build a rare earth separation and refining plant with annual capacity of 6,000 tons. They also plan to develop an integrated production complex that can later produce permanent magnets.

Rare earth materials are used in electric vehicle motors, robots and artificial intelligence data centers. Heavy rare earths such as dysprosium and terbium are considered essential for high-performance permanent magnets.

POSCO International will lead management of the joint venture, while ReElement Technologies will provide core separation and refining technology.

The venture plans to produce neodymium-praseodymium oxide, dysprosium oxide and terbium oxide. It will first build annual production capacity of 3,000 tons before expanding to 6,000 tons.

Trial production is scheduled for the fourth quarter of 2027, with mass production targeted for 2028.

POSCO International said the project is part of its broader plan to build an integrated value chain from raw material sourcing to separation and refining, permanent magnets and electric vehicle motor cores.

“This joint venture is more than the establishment of a refining plant. It is the starting point for building a critical minerals value chain in the United States,” Lee said.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260522010006592

The United States and India are seeking to mend ties after a year of diplomatic see-saw during which tariffs were imposed and then quickly scrapped because of the US-Israel war on Iran.

This is just one example of how international relations and conflict have become more complex and interlinked in recent years.

So, is pragmatism replacing ideology in today’s diplomatic world?

Presenter: Scott McLean

Guests:

Brahma Chellaney – Professor emeritus of strategic studies at the Centre for Policy Research

Chris Weafer – Chief executive officer at Macro-Advisory strategic consultancy

Shaun Rein – Founder and managing director of the China Market Research Group

The latest episode of the Venezuelanalysis podcast sees VA editor Ricardo Vaz speak with Austin Cole and Michela Martinazzi about international solidarity with Venezuela and the challenges of organizing against imperialism from inside the United States.

The discussion covers solidarity initiatives, escalating US attacks abroad and repression at home, the need to connect struggles for justice domestically and internationally, and the difficulties social movements face in building meaningful solidarity and broad coalitions.

Powered by RedCircle

Guests

Michela Martinazzi: Organizer with Brooklyn Against War and member of the Steering Committee of the International League of Peoples’ Struggle.

Austin Cole: National Co-Coordinator of the Black Alliance for Peace and co-coordinator of BAP’s Haiti/Americas Team.

141 UN member states voted in support of the ICJ’s finding climate change is an ‘existential threat’.

The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has voted to support a landmark ruling from the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which found states have a legal responsibility to act to prevent the climate crisis from worsening.

More than two-thirds of UN member states, 141, voted in favour of the resolution on Wednesday, with eight voting no and 28 abstaining.

Ralph Regenvanu, the minister for climate change from Vanuatu, which championed the case, described the vote as a victory for “communities on the frontlines of the climate crisis”.

“Today the international community affirmed that climate change is not only a political and economic challenge, but a matter of law, justice, and human rights,” Regenvanu said in a statement.

“For vulnerable countries like Vanuatu, this resolution is deeply significant because it confirms that no State is above its obligations to protect people, future generations, and our planet.”

The historic ruling from The Hague-based court in July last year found that states have a legal obligation to act on the “existential threat” of climate change.

The case was the biggest ever to be considered by the ICJ’s 15 judges, who reviewed tens of thousands of pages of written submissions and heard two weeks of oral arguments before delivering their verdict.

The case came to the court at the request of the UNGA after a resolution led by Vanuatu was adopted by consensus in March 2023.

Wednesday’s vote, by contrast, attracted a number of objections, with Belarus, Iran, Israel, Liberia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United States and Yemen voting no.

Al Jazeera reported in February that the US had sent a diplomatic cable urging UN member states not to support the resolution.

“We are strongly urging Vanuatu to immediately withdraw its draft resolution and cease attempting to wield the Court’s Advisory Opinion as a basis for creating an avenue to pursue any misguided claims of international legal obligations,” a copy of the cable seen by Al Jazeera stated.

Wesley Morgan, a fellow with the Climate Council, an Australian nonprofit, said the vote confirmed states had a legal duty to act on climate change.

“This landmark resolution is a massive victory for Vanuatu and the Pacific leaders who have spent decades fighting for survival on the frontlines of the climate crisis and a warning for Australian governments,” Morgan said in a statement.

“For far too long, fossil fuel heavyweights have treated climate action as a political choice, but the UN General Assembly has now confirmed it is a binding legal duty,” he added.

Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in China on Tuesday evening for a two-day visit centred on talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, as Moscow and Beijing draw closer amid war, sanctions and an increasingly fractured global order.

Putin’s visit is the second face-to-face meeting he has held with Xi in less than a year and coincides with the 25th anniversary of the 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, the agreement that formalised ties between Russia and China following decades of ideological rivalry and mutual suspicion.

The visit comes just days after United States President Donald Trump left Beijing following his own two-day visit to the Chinese capital for meetings with Xi.

Both Moscow and Beijing are navigating tricky relations with Washington, with analysts saying the unpredictability of Trump’s foreign policy has had the effect of pushing Russia and China even closer together.

Their deepening partnership also comes against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, mounting tensions around Iran, and disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz – a crisis that has rattled global energy markets and renewed Beijing’s concerns over the security of its oil and gas supplies.

With one of the world’s most strategically vital waterways under threat, China has increasingly turned towards Russia as a reliable overland energy supplier.

Analysts say Xi’s decision to host Trump and Putin within the space of a week is no coincidence, reflecting Beijing’s attempt to cast itself as a trusted actor in an increasingly fragmented and volatile world order.

How have China-Russia relations changed over the decades?

China and Russia have long occupied a complicated place in each other’s histories. Once bound together through communist ideology and shared opposition to Western capitalism, the Soviet Union and Maoist China later became bitter rivals, with tensions along their 4,300km (2,670-mile) border bringing the two countries close to conflict during the Cold War.

However, that border has since transformed from a frontier of insecurity into one of strategic cooperation and trade.

Neither Xi nor Putin is a frequent international traveller. Putin is the subject of an International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant over the war in Ukraine, while Xi rarely leaves China other than for carefully choreographed state visits. But both leaders have invested heavily in maintaining personal ties with each other.

The two have repeatedly called each other “friends”, and their relationship has deepened, particularly since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which pushed Moscow further into international isolation and forced the Kremlin to look southeastwards for trade amid Western sanctions.

“Russia and China look confidently towards the future,” Putin said in remarks carried by Russian state media ahead of the visit.

He said the two countries were “actively developing cooperation in politics, economics, defence, expanding cultural exchanges, and fostering interpersonal interaction”.

“In essence, jointly doing everything to deepen bilateral cooperation and advance global development for the wellbeing of both nations,” Putin added.

Why Russia needs China

China has become an economic lifeline for Russia as the country’s economy has shifted to a wartime footing, with two-way trade between the countries more than doubling between 2020 and 2024, when it reached $237bn for the year.

But the relationship is also uneven. While China is Russia’s largest trading partner, Russia accounts for only about four percent of China’s total international trade. China’s economy is also vastly larger, and Beijing holds considerably more leverage in negotiations between the two sides.

Since the invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has become increasingly reliant on Chinese technology and manufacturing. A recent Bloomberg report found Russia was sourcing more than 90 percent of its sanctioned technology imports from China, including components with military and dual-use applications vital to drone production and other defence industries.

China has also emerged as a crucial buyer of Russian oil and other energy products at a time when European markets have largely closed to Moscow in response to the Russia-Ukraine war. With Western sanctions restricting Russia’s options, the Kremlin has few viable alternatives to China’s scale of demand.

Analysts say the imbalance means Beijing is often able to negotiate from a position of strength, securing access to Russian oil and gas at discounted prices while expanding its influence over Moscow’s economic future.

Why China still needs Russia

While the relationship is uneven, it is not one-sided. Russia provides something increasingly valuable in a turbulent world: secure access to vast energy resources beyond vulnerable maritime trade routes.

The war surrounding Iran and disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz have heightened Beijing’s concerns over energy security, given China’s heavy dependence on imported oil and gas passing through contested shipping lanes.

That has renewed attention on the proposed Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, a long-delayed project expected to feature prominently in this week’s discussions.

If completed, the pipeline would transport 50 billion cubic metres of Russian gas annually to China via Mongolia, significantly expanding energy flows between the two countries.

But it is more than just an economic relationship. China also values Russia as a geopolitical partner. Both countries are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and frequently align diplomatically in opposition to US-led policies.

While analysts say China has been careful not to become formally tied to Moscow through a rigid military alliance, the two countries have still gradually reinforced their partnership through increasingly regular joint military exercises, including the “Joint Sea” naval drills that began in 2012.

Last year, China and Russia launched fresh naval drills in the Sea of Japan near the Russian port of Vladivostok, with exercises focused on submarine rescue, anti-submarine warfare, air defence, missile defence and maritime combat operations. Analysts say the drills help signal strategic alignment between Beijing and Moscow without the mutual defence commitments of a formal alliance.

Experts say the strength of the partnership lies in its flexibility. While Western governments have often portrayed the relationship as fragile and driven largely by a shared opposition to the West, analysts say, it may prove more durable because it is rooted in shared economic and strategic interests rather than ideology alone.