international

A prominent shipping organisation has condemned the United States and Iran’s tit-for-tat capture of commercial ships and is calling for the immediate release of their crews.

In an interview with Al Jazeera, John Stawpert, marine director of the International Chamber of Shipping, said seafarers must be allowed to go about their business “freely and without persecution”.

Stawpert, whose organisation is the top trade association for merchant shipowners and operators worldwide, called the capture of the vessels an affront to freedom of navigation as enshrined in international law.

“All these people are doing is transporting trade. And really, we can’t have a situation where ships are being seized, ultimately for political ends, to prove a political point,” said Stawpert, whose organisation represents about 80 percent of the world’s merchant fleet.

“These are innocent farers and they should be allowed to go about their jobs without fear of, essentially, imprisonment.”

Stawpert said Iran’s stated wish to charge tolls in the Strait of Hormuz had no basis in international law and would set a dangerous precedent.

“If you can do it in the Strait of Hormuz, why can’t you do it in the Strait of Gibraltar, say, or the Straits of Malacca?” he asked.

Stawpert also said the US President Donald Trump’s naval blockade of Iranian ports had heaped further uncertainty on shipping companies already reeling from Iran’s effective closure of the strait.

“We don’t know what conditions are in place. We don’t know what the targeting criteria of Iran are really,” Stawpert said. “And so we then have another state coming in, effectively doing the same thing through the blockade of the straits”.

The US and Iranian militaries have each announced the capture of two commercial vessels over the past week as Washington and Tehran continue to face off in the strait and in waters beyond the Gulf.

The US defence department on Thursday said it had captured the Iran-linked Majestic X as it was transporting sanctioned oil in the Indian Ocean, days after announcing the interception of another ship, Tifani.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on Wednesday said it seized the Panamanian-flagged MSC Francesca and the Greek-owned Epaminondas for “operating without the necessary permits and tampering with navigation systems”.

The Philippines’ Department of Migrant Workers on Wednesday confirmed 15 Filipino seafarers were on the two vessels.

Officials said they had been assured by Iranian authorities that all the crew were “unharmed” and “safe.”

Montenegro’s maritime minister, Filip Radulovic, said in an interview with the state broadcaster earlier this week that four Montenegrin crew on the MSC Francesca were “fine”.

There have been no official updates on the condition of the crews on the vessels captured by US forces.

“It seems they’re not being maltreated,” Stawpert said. “But even so, that’s not really the point. The point is they shouldn’t be in custody in the first place”.

Stawpert also expressed concern for the well-being of an estimated 20,000 seafarers who have been left stranded in the Gulf due to the effective closure of the strait.

“Their welfare is also a priority for us,” he said. “The psychological burden, I think, will be beginning to tell on them after seven weeks now of what’s, to all intents and purposes, house arrest”.

Stawpert called on both the US and Iran to respect freedom of navigation.

“Let’s resume freedom of navigation and respect the right to innocent passage as soon as we possibly can,” he said.

The blockage of the strait, which usually carries about one-fifth of global oil and natural gas supplies, has driven up fuel prices worldwide and forced many governments to start emergency energy-saving measures.

Traffic in the waterway remains a fraction of pre-war levels, with reports saying just five ships transited the strait in the last 24 hours.

Before the US and Israel launched their war against Iran on February 28, the strait saw a daily average of 129 transits, according to the United Nations Trade and Development.

Amnesty International and dozens of U.S. civil and human rights groups issued a “ World Cup travel advisory” Thursday, warning tournament visitors of “rising authoritarianism and increasing violence” in the United States during President Trump’s aggressive immigration enforcement.

The groups said the advisory was necessary “in light of the deteriorating human rights situation in the United States and in the absence of meaningful action and concrete guarantees from FIFA, host cities, or the U.S. government.”

The advisory says visitors may be arbitrarily denied entry to the country, detained in “inhumane” conditions or subjected to invasive phone and social media searches. It points to the aggressive immigration surges in cities including Los Angeles, Chicago and Minneapolis that led to accusations of racial profiling and the violent suppression of protests.

The message was condemned by tourism officials, who said the groups were threatening the livelihoods of service industry workers in an attempt to achieve their political goals.

Geoff Freeman, president & CEO of the U.S. Travel Association, said there are legitimate concerns about U.S. entry policies but they’re being blown out of proportion. There were 67 million international travelers to the United States last year, he said in a statement.

“The notion that visiting America poses a meaningful safety risk is not a good-faith warning, it’s a political tactic designed to cause economic harm,” Freeman said.

A FIFA spokesperson pointed to several statements and policies, including the federation’s governing documents, which say, “FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognized human rights and shall strive to promote the protection of these rights.”

The U.S. has seen a decline in international travelers since Trump returned to the White House last year and offended U.S. allies with talk of making Canada a U.S. state, taking control of Greenland and questioning the value of NATO. The tourism industry is counting on a major boost from World Cup visitors, even as Trump’s travel ban for citizens of 19 countries has injected further uncertainty.

The administration is betting that its push to expedite visa processing for visitors and excitement about the tournament will outweigh concerns that Trump’s immigration messaging undercuts the theme of global unity that the World Cup is meant to represent.

The tournament kicks off June 11 with games spread across North America, including 11 stadiums in the U.S. along with two in Canada and three in Mexico.

Cooper writes for the Associated Press.

April 22 (UPI) — Amnesty International said Venezuela has not dismantled its “repressive apparatus” nearly four months after former President Nicolás Maduro was arrested in a U.S. military operation.

During the presentation of its annual report in Bogotá, the organization said the country’s system of repression remains fully operational under the interim government led by Delcy Rodríguez.

Valentina Ballesta, research director for the Americas at Amnesty International, said Tuesday that Venezuela’s repressive structure continues to operate despite the political transition, according to reports by Infobae.

According to the report, Maduro’s government maintained a policy of systematic repression throughout 2025, with all branches of the state acting in coordination.

Amnesty International said authorities continue to use arbitrary detentions, forced disappearances and torture as tools of social control.

“These are not isolated incidents, but rather a pattern that amounts to crimes against humanity,” the report said.

The organization documented hundreds of cases in which detainees faced judicial proceedings without basic legal guarantees, including ineffective public defenders, the use of special anti-terrorism courts, lack of access to charges and repeated violations of due process rights.

Amnesty International also criticized the implementation of the Amnesty Law approved in February, saying its enforcement has been arbitrary and selective.

Many requests for relief were rejected without explanation, while some people initially granted benefits later had those measures reversed, according to Venezuelan news outlet Efecto Cocuyo.

While the nongovernmental organization Foro Penal and other groups confirmed the release of 673 political prisoners between Maduro’s capture and mid-April, Rodríguez’s government has reported much higher figures as part of what it described as “peace and reconciliation” measures.

In March 2026, government spokespeople said as many as 7,000 people had been granted full release or alternative legal measures. That figure, however, includes common criminals and people already serving conditional release.

Foro Penal said nearly 500 political prisoners remain in detention.

The Amnesty International report said impunity remains the driving force behind Venezuela’s repressive system and warned that the lack of an independent judiciary prevents victims from obtaining justice inside the country.

Analist also pointed to the recent restructuring of the Attorney General’s Office as an example of political control. The move replaced an official close to Maduro with another figure aligned with the Rodríguez political faction, which currently controls both the interim presidency and the National Assembly.

About 7.9 million Venezuelans have fled the country since 2015. Nearly 2 million people depend on international humanitarian aid, while severe shortages in basic services such as water, electricity and food persist, the report said.

Amnesty International further warned about the growing use of new technologies and artificial intelligence for population surveillance, along with continued harassment of journalists and human rights advocates.

Without a genuine dismantling of coercive state structures, Amnesty International said, Venezuela will not be able to restore fundamental freedoms.

On Sunday night, tens of thousands of Hungarians packed the banks of the Danube waving flags, crying of joy, popping bottles. Celebrating something that political analysts had spent years telling them was almost impossible: the electoral defeat of Viktor Orbán, the autocrat whose ploys and manipulations made him a uniquely disturbing force in the European Union. After 16 years in power, Hungary’s self-proclaimed architect of “illiberal democracy” conceded defeat within hours of the polls closing.

His rival, Péter Magyar (the equivalent of Pedro Veneco), had won 137 seats in a 199-seat parliament, a two-thirds supermajority that gave him not just a government, but the ability to rewrite the very constitution Orbán had rigged to protect himself. This appears to be the plan.

Venezuelans watching from afar could be forgiven for feeling two things at once: genuine joy, and a familiar, creeping doubt. 

Sure, but that’s Hungary.

The doubt is understandable. It’s also, at this particular moment in Venezuelan history, worth interrogating.

To understand whether Hungary provides a useful lesson, we need to venture farther than our diasporic links, like La Danubio, Catherine Fulop and Shirley Varnagy. You first need a category distinction that political scientists call the difference between a closed authoritarian regime and a competitive one. A closed autocracy doesn’t bother with the pretense of real elections. Or when it does, it simply invents the results. Especially after July 2024, Venezuela had become exactly this: we all know what happened. Politically, there was no game to play unless you played by the regime’s rules. The game was a charade. 

Orbán’s Hungary was something different, more insidious. Similar to what Chávez did to the institutions in the 2000s, while using hyper-ideological and reactionary rhetoric. The European Parliament had classified it as a “hybrid regime of electoral autocracy.” Orbán bent every institution he could reach: the judiciary, the media, the electoral rules themselves.

The scene on the Danube on Sunday night was a piece of great news in a political era that doesn’t offer many of them. The scenes in Budapest matter to us. But it shouldn’t be mistaken for a mirror.

He gerrymandered the system to favor the largest single party, confident that party would always be his. But he never quite crossed the line into fabricating vote counts, à la Maduro or Lukashenko. The game was still real, even if the playing field was tilted.

That distinction is now relevant because Venezuela’s political reality has shifted in ways that were unimaginable five months ago. The current regime Delcy Rodríguez leads is not identical to that of 2024 and 2025. Under US pressure, a few hundred political prisoners have been released and an amnesty law was approved in February. albeit with mixed results (more than 500 political prisoners are still behind bars, and amnesty has been formally denied to high-profile politicians and NGO leaders like Javier Tarazona). Overall, we see gestures that try to transmit magnanimity, but are moves meant to look like compliance while chavismo waits for Washington’s attention to wander.

But here’s the thing: even performative openings create real cracks, and the cracks are showing. In February alone, Venezuela has recorded dozens of protests, an exponential increase compared to the same month in 2025. Workers and students have taken to the streets of Caracas four times this year demanding salary increases, openly calling on the Rodríguez siblings to answer for their pleas. Last weekend in Valencia, in a football game between Carabobo and Universidad Central (a game which has enough backdrop to make a book about it), football fans directed chants against the son of Alexander Granko Arteaga (who plays for UCV): “¡Dónde están que no se ven, los enchufados de la UCV,” loud enough so it could be hear transmission (that would translate roughly to “nowhere to be seen, the UCV cronies are nowhere to be seen”). In 2025, that chant would have landed them in jail. That was exactly the outcome in the last domestic football final.

Waiting for the opportunity

Venezuela is still not a democracy. But the differences remain significant: a regime slowly, reluctantly slipping out of its authoritarian fortress, coming to terms with the fact that it will eventually have to face a reckoning at the ballot box. That’s what happened to Orbán. He controlled the courts, the media, the electoral geometry, and still got swept out because of the accumulated weight of economic failure, corruption, and sheer exhaustion that eventually overwhelmed the machinery he had built.

The lesson is not that rigged systems are beatable through optimism. It is that rigged systems have structural limits, and that opposition alliances which survive long enough, and build broad enough coalitions, tend to be standing when those limits are reached. In our case, we’ve seen all possible iterations of what an opposition can be. In 2024, the Maria Corina-led movement became the most formidable electoral force the country has seen in a while. That should have been our Orbán down moment. Nonetheless, the inertia we have seen since the beginning of the year is too good to let it slip away.

Political scientist Yascha Mounk, writing about Magyar’s victory, made an interesting observation that some might believe applies to Venezuelan democratic forces: the Hungarian opposition ousted Orbán on its fourth try, after years of humiliation, internal divisions and strategic errors. Patience, he argues, is its own form of political discipline.

This is Mounk’s post-populist dilemma, live, and a miniature preview of what a potential democratic government in Caracas would have in front of itself.

Again, the Venezuelan opposition doesn’t need that lesson. It already learned it, the hard way, and on a harder playing field. In 2015, it won a supermajority in the Asamblea and watched its powers get neutered one by one. In July 2024, it beat Maduro overwhelmingly and proved its victory with the official tally sheets. Edmundo González Urrutia did not become president because the movement backing him lacked organization, or coalition-building, or the kind of credible leadership that Magyar built from scratch since leaving Orban’s party two years ago. González Urrutia failed to take power because the regime decided that electoral results were optional.

The question was never whether the Venezuelan opposition could win an election. They already did in a way that should clarify the terrain for future opportunities. The actas and the popular support are powerful symbols that should endure. The question is whether they can repeat that performance, seizing the minimal opening they have in front of them whatever the broader circumstances. Then yes, the patience Mounk mentions is relevant.

The post-autocracy trap

Mounk is right to poop the party a little bit with a warning he calls the “post-populist dilemma.” Even with his supermajority, Magyar inherits a State that Orbán hollowed out and refilled with loyalists. He has two options: either fire them and bring about an anti-Fidesz purge; or leave them in place and be sabotaged from within. In his first week in power, Magyar is showing he wants to go for the first option. He has already called for the resignation of several key ministers of the Orban regime.

Venezuela would face this dilemma on steroids. Chavismo has had 27 years to embed itself across nearly everything. Rodríguez herself operates within a questionable agency on security forces (a certain someone remains interior minister and vice president for security). Any future Venezuelan government elected under competitive conditions would inherit an institutional landscape far more captured and complex than anything Magyar faces in Budapest.

This is not a reason for despair, but it does require confronting an uncomfortable asymmetry. When Magyar navigated Hungary’s post-populist transition, he did so with the EU at his back, a bloc that had spent years dangling billions in frozen funds as an incentive for democratic reform, and whose membership gave Hungarian voters a concrete, tangible alternative to Orbán’s model. Venezuela’s external anchor is the Trump administration, which has been explicit about its priorities: oil first, stability second, elections somewhere further down the list. Rubio’s three-phase roadmap (stabilization, economic recovery, reconciliation and transition) is not an explicit democratic transition plan. It is a business plan with democracy on the side.

Preparation, then, means the opposition must be the one holding the democratic line demanding verifiable electoral conditions, refusing to let institutional reform become a performance to please DC, and cementing a coalition broad enough that can translate the popular inertia and mood towards a margin so big it can’t be tweaked. The EU didn’t save Hungary. Hungarians did. The lesson travels.

Magyar won because Hungarians were organized, patient and ready when the moment arrived. Venezuelans have already proven they can do the same.

Magyar isn’t waiting. Within 72 hours of his victory, he demanded that Hungary’s president resign immediately, and sent the same message to the heads of the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, the State Audit Office and the media authority calling them “puppets who have been in power for the past 16 years.” On Wednesday morning, in his first radio interview in over a year and a half, he told the State broadcaster its news operation would be shut down and relaunched as a true public service. Some are already calling it a witch hunt. Others call it the bare minimum required to transform the country.

This is Mounk’s post-populist dilemma, live, and a miniature preview of what a potential democratic government in Caracas would have in front of itself. If Magyar, armed with a two-thirds supermajority and the EU at his back, is already navigating accusations of overreach on day three, imagine what a Venezuelan opposition government would face trying to dismantle 27 years of institutional occupation in the police, intelligence agencies, the military, the public media, the judiciary. The task ahead is massive, and solving the dilemma probably requires an orderly phase-out agreed before the next presidential vote.

The scene on the Danube on Sunday night was a piece of great news in a political era that doesn’t offer many of them. The scenes in Budapest matter to us. But it shouldn’t be mistaken for a mirror.

Venezuela is not Hungary. Delcy is not Orbán, she is arguably more pragmatic, but also more constrained. Orbán was a standalone autocrat who built his system around his own political survival. Rodríguez governs by a permanent balancing act: between Washington’s demands, the military high command, the hardline faction and other peripheral actors. The competitive opening, if it comes, will be narrower, more fragile and more dangerous than anything Magyar navigated.

These are reasons to take the Hungarian lesson seriously without taking it literally. Magyar won because Hungarians were organized, patient and ready when the moment arrived. Venezuelans have already proven they can do the same. The question now is simpler, and harder: when the moment comes again, can the popular will (and not just the results) be allowed to stand?

NEW YORK — Former New York City Mayor Eric Adams announced Friday that he had become a citizen of Albania, putting him one step closer to his oft-repeated dream of leaving politics behind for a life abroad.

Adams, a Democrat, received the honorary citizenship “at his request,” according to an official decree from the country’s president, Bajram Begaj.

The news was first reported in the Albanian press and confirmed by a spokesperson for Adams, who said the ex-mayor had “long been a friend and ally of the Albanian-American community.”

“The decision by the Republic of Albania to grant Mayor Adams citizenship reflects that enduring relationship and mutual respect,” the spokesperson, Todd Shapiro, said in a text message, adding that the recognition “further strengthens the bond between New York and Albania.”

Adams, who once described himself as an “international mayor,” has previously expressed an affinity for the small Balkan nation. His adult son lived in the country while competing in Albania’s version of “American Idol” and Adams traveled there himself in October — one of several international trips taken in his final months in office.

The purpose, he said at the time, was “to say hello to a friend and learn from a friend and build a relationship with the friendship that would not allow our oceans or seas to divide us.”

It wasn’t immediately clear what, if anything, Adams planned to do with his new citizenship. But he has previously expressed a desire to move far from his hometown of New York City.

“When I retire from government, I’m going to live in Baku,” Adams, then Brooklyn borough president, said at an event honoring the Azerbaijan community in 2018. A few years later, in an interview with a Jewish publication, Adams said he would like to retire in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.

As mayor, Adams’ penchant for international trips to Turkey prompted a federal indictment focused, in part, on allegations that he accepted improper travel benefits from foreign nationals.

Adams denied the allegations, and the case was later ordered dropped by President Trump’s Justice Department. Adams later met with Trump administration officials about the possibility of taking an ambassadorship, which did not materialize.

Shortly after dropping his ailing bid for reelection, Adams embarked on a four-day trip to Albania, meeting with the country’s Prime Minister Edi Rama and members of his Cabinet, along with local business leaders. The trip was paid for in part by the Albanian government.

Since leaving office, Adams has been spotted in Dubai and the Democratic Republic of Congo, though his day-to-day activities remain a source of some speculation.

In January, he launched a cryptocurrency coin that he said would beat back antisemitism and “anti-Americanism,” but it drew scrutiny after losing millions of dollars in value.

Offenhartz writes for the Associated Press.

Opinion polls in Hungary suggest longtime Prime Minister Viktor Orban has a battle on his hands in Sunday’s election.

Washington, Moscow, Kyiv and Brussels will be eagerly awaiting the outcome.

So why is this election so important outside of Hungary?

Presenter: Tom McRae

Guests:

Gabor Scheiring – Former member of Hungary’s National Assembly

Istvan Kiss – Director of the Danube Institute, a political scientist and former political adviser to Orban

Daniel Kelemen – Professor of law and politics and McCourt chair at the McCourt School of Public Policy at Georgetown University

Iran has proposed a 10-point peace plan to end the war as the United States and Israel intensify their attacks on Tehran and a deadline looms that was set by US President Donald Trump for Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz, whose near-closure has triggered a global energy crisis.

At the White House on Monday, Trump called the 10-point plan a “significant step” but “not good enough”.

Iran’s top university and a major petrochemical plant were hit on Monday after Trump threatened to target power plants and bridges until Tehran agreed to end the war and open the strait, through which 20 percent of the world’s oil and gas supplies pass.

Here is more about Iran’s 10-point plan and Trump’s response to it:

What is Iran’s 10-point plan?

On Monday, Pakistan, which has mediated talks in Islamabad aimed at ending the war, put forth a 45-day ceasefire proposal after separate meetings with US and Iranian officials. The Iranian and US negotiators have not met face to face about the 45‑day truce plan. In late March, Trump told reporters that his envoys were talking to a senior Iranian official, but this was not confirmed by Iran. Tehran has denied holding talks with US negotiators.

Iran’s state-run IRNA news agency said Tehran had conveyed its response via Islamabad. Iran reportedly rejected the proposed ceasefire, putting forward instead a call for a permanent end to the hostilities.

The Iranian proposal consisted of 10 clauses, including an end to conflicts in the region, a protocol for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, the lifting of sanctions and reconstruction, IRNA reported. The conflict has spread to the Gulf region and Lebanon, where 1.2 million Lebanese people have been displaced due to Israeli attacks.

Details about the 10 clauses have not been published.

How did the White House respond?

Speaking to reporters about Iran’s plan, Trump said: “They made a … significant proposal. Not good enough, but they have made a very significant step. We will see what happens.”

“If they don’t make a deal, they will have no bridges and no power plants,” he added.

In a profane Truth Social post on Sunday, Trump threatened to attack Iran’s civilian infrastructure, including bridges and power plants, if the Strait of Hormuz is not fully reopened. “Tuesday will be Power Plant Day, and Bridge Day, all wrapped up in one, in Iran. There will be nothing like it!!! Open the F****** Strait, you crazy bastards, or you’ll be living in Hell – JUST WATCH! Praise be to Allah,” he wrote.

The deadline is set for 8pm Washington time on Tuesday (00:00 GMT). Tehran has rejected this ultimatum and threatened to retaliate.

Human rights organisations and members of the US Congress have criticised Trump for threatening to attack civilian targets, which is considered a war crime.

The Axios news website reported that an unnamed US official who saw the Iranian response called it “maximalist”.

What other proposals have been on the table?

The last time the word “maximalist” was used to describe a peace plan in this war was late last month when Iran called a US plan “maximalist”.

An unnamed, high-ranking diplomatic source told Al Jazeera on March 25 that Iran had received a 15-point plan drafted by the US. The plan was delivered to Iran through Pakistan.

The source said Tehran described the US proposal as “extremely maximalist and unreasonable”.

“It is not beautiful, even on paper,” the source said, calling the plan deceptive and misleading in its presentation.

The 15-point plan included a 30-day ceasefire, the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear facilities, limits on Iran’s missiles and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

In return, the US would remove all sanctions imposed on Iran and provide support for electricity generation at Iran’s Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant.

Iran has rejected a temporary ceasefire, arguing it would give the US and Israel time to regroup and launch further attacks. Tehran has pointed to Israel’s 12-day war on Iran in June. The US joined that conflict for one day, hitting Iran’s three main nuclear sites with air strikes. Trump claimed at the time that the US had destroyed Iran’s nuclear facilities but months later justified the current war by saying Iran posed an imminent threat.

The UN nuclear watchdog, however, said Iran was not in a position to make a nuclear bomb.

The US and Israel launched the war on February 28 as Washington was holding negotiations with Iran. On the eve of the war, Oman, the mediator of the talks, had said a deal was “within reach”.

Tehran has said for years that its nuclear programme is for civilian purposes and it does not intend to create nuclear weapons. It even signed a deal with the US in 2015 to limit its nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief. But Trump withdrew from the landmark deal in 2018 and slapped sanctions back on Iran.

In response, Iran decided to enrich uranium from 3.6 percent, which was allowed under the 2015 deal, to almost 60 percent after its Natanz nuclear facility was bombed in 2021. Iran blamed Israel. A 90 percent level of purity is required to make an atomic bomb.

Why does this matter?

With Tuesday’s deadline fast approaching, chances for a ceasefire appear remote as the two sides remain far from agreement and the conflict is now in its second month.

On Tuesday, Reza Amiri Moghadam, Iran’s ambassador to Pakistan, posted on X: “Pakistan positive and productive endeavours in Good Will and Good Office to stop the war is approaching a critical, sensitive stage …”

“Stay Tuned for more”.

Why are many Latin American countries shutting down nonprofit organizations? Amnesty International claims it has the answer: in every case, it’s part of a drive to restrict human rights and “tear up the social fabric.”

Amnesty’s new 95-page report (in Spanish, with an English summary), criticizes governments across the political spectrum for attacking what it calls “civil society organizations.” But Amnesty ignores the history of many such organizations and therefore why governments might be justified in closing them.

Here we focus on the report’s deficiencies in relation to Nicaragua, Venezuela (two NGOs interviewed in each) and Cuba (none).

Data-light analysis supports preconceived conclusions

Amnesty’s report is strikingly thin. Unlike many other Amnesty investigations, this one provides scarce case studies or incidents, almost no statistics, few named victims or affected organizations, and little discussion of specific crackdowns. In most cases, substantive content about a particular country is assumed to apply to all countries.

Amnesty conducted interviews with only 15 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) across six countries: Nicaragua, Venezuela, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador and Ecuador. Its analysis extended to two more, Guatemala and Cuba, where no interviews took place. Yet the six countries alone have around 40,000 NGOs between them, making Amnesty’s sample minuscule. In none of the countries did Amnesty do any direct fieldwork.

Amnesty did not consult with any government sources or individuals close to governments, resulting in a one-sided narrative. According to Amnesty, the issues “should not be interpreted as… differentiation between the countries analyzed.” Thus, countries as politically different as Ecuador and Nicaragua are painted with the same brush.

While claiming to expose the real purpose of these laws, Amnesty fails to explain their political context, despite the widespread and documented use made of NGOs by the US to destabilize countries.

The authors emailed Amnesty with our key criticisms. In a lengthy response, Mariana Marques, Amnesty’s South America Researcher & Advisor, claimed that “the report intentionally prioritizes depth and comparability [between the chosen countries].” However, this is difficult to accept given that the report’s sweeping generalizations are mechanically applied to all six.

The authors also asked Amnesty if they had considered evidence that NGOs in Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba have indeed engaged in political activities – that would very likely be illegal in Western countries such as the US? Did they consider whether allegations that NGOs provoked political violence or other criminal activities might be true? In response, Ms. Marques wrote: “The report does not adjudicate case‑by‑case allegations about individual organizations.”

Nevertheless, the report apparently identified “selective enforcement” and “sanctions” that were “disproportionate.” But how could they reach an impartial judgment on the fairness of a government’s actions without considering whether the alleged infractions might have actually occurred?

Destabilization claims go unexamined

If governments justify their laws as efforts to halt foreign-funded destabilization, surely Amnesty should ask whether such claims have merit. Here are some examples that Amnesty might have considered:

• In Cuba, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) spent $15.5 million from 2009 through 2012 running “civil society” programs aimed at secretly stirring up anti-government activism. Then in just one year (2020), the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) – a reported CIA cutout itself masquerading as an NGO even though it is largely funded by the US government – financed 40 civil-society projects in Cuba with sums up to $650,000. According to the Cuban government, these groups were directly involved in violent demonstrations that affected Cuba in July 2021.

• In Nicaragua, which suffered a major coup attempt in 2018, Global Americans reported that the NED was “laying the groundwork for insurrection” even as the violence was taking place. NED and other bodies bragged to Congress about their regime-change efforts, and the Council on Hemispheric Affairs described in detail how NGOs indoctrinated young Nicaraguans.

• In Venezuela, USAID corroborated the use of NGOs to further US regime-change activities; since 2017 it provided “more than $158 million in humanitarian aid in Venezuela” through questionably “impartial” organizations.

Well-substantiated examples of Washington’s huge investment, extending over many years, to create or infiltrate NGOs in the three countries and use them to provoke anti-government violence, were of no interest to Amnesty researchers.

Rather, the report focuses on restrictions on access to foreign funding, which allegedly have “chilling effects on legitimate human‑rights work.” Amnesty’s refusal to “map individual donors” prevents scrutiny about the purpose of Washington’s funding for NGOs, which are often framed in vague terms such as “promoting democracy” or “strengthening civic society.”

Had the researchers talked to actual NGOs doing humanitarian work, they might have heard testimony such as this one from Rita Di Matiatt with Master Mama, a Venezuelan NGO dedicated to offering support to breastfeeding mothers: “NGOs that conspire against the stability and rights of a nation or its citizens, as well as everything that does not comply with the norms and laws of a country must be held accountable.” Venezuelan National Assembly deputy Julio Chávez expressed concern about such NGO’s working “to generate destabilization.”

And, indeed, the current NED president, Damon Wilson, recently confirmed that Nicaragua, Cuba and Venezuela are his highest priorities in the region.

Comparison with other countries

Amnesty claims a “global” trend toward laws resembling Russia’s “foreign agents” legislation. However, a more relevant comparison is the US Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) which is really the model.

The US has some of the world’s strongest and most detailed regulatory powers governing NGOs. Indeed, the US typically closes around 44,000 nonprofits annually that fail to comply. This is not unusual. The Charity Commission in Britain closes around 4,000 nonprofits each year. New regulations have led to large-scale closures in India, Turkey, South Africa and elsewhere.

Washington’s foreign agents act is not unique: The Library of Congress has examples of 13 countries with similar legislation. In Britain, the government has consulted on the introduction of a “Foreign Influence Registration Scheme,” which is similar to FARA, as are regulations which apply in the European Union.

However, it does not suit Amnesty’s narrative to make comparisons with Western countries that might caste the laws in Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela in a different light.

Amnesty’s longstanding bias

Amnesty has a long history of bias against countries such as Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Ecuadorian-Canadian journalist Joe Emersberger documents how Amnesty minimizes the impact of US sanctions – illegal under international law – which target all three countries.

While Amnesty refused to recognize Nelson Mandella as a prisoner of conscious, because he failed to renounce violence in self-defense against the South African apartheid regime, Amnesty readily bestowed the honor on Leopoldo López, who fomented a number of violent coup attempts in Venezuela.

María Corina Machado is arguably Amnesty’s most lauded Venezuelan. Her legitimacy is based largely on her victory in an opposition primary. However, the contest was conducted by her personal NGO, Súmate, rather than the official Venezuelan electoral authority as is customary. This is relevant to NGO law, because Súmate received NED funds. Machado won that privately run primary by an incredible 92% landslide in a crowded field of eight candidates. When the runner-up, Carlos Prosperi, cried fraud, the ballots were destroyed to prevent an audit of the vote.

Camilo Mejia, a US military resistor and an Amnesty “prisoner of conscience,” published an open letter expressing his “unequivocal condemnation of Amnesty International with regards to the destabilizing role it has played in Nicaragua, my country of birth.”

Amnesty has long been accused of bias on an international scale. Journalist Alexander Rubinstein documented Amnesty’s collaboration with US and UK intelligence agencies dating back to the 1960s. Francis A. Boyle, human rights law professor and founding Amnesty board member, observed: “You will find a self-perpetuating clique of co-opted Elites who deliberately shape and direct the work of AI and AIUSA so as to either affirmatively support, or else not seriously undercut, the imperial, colonial, and genocidal policies of the United States, Britain, and Israel.”

NGOs and the “human rights industry”

Alfred de Zayas, former UN independent human rights expert, argues in The Human Rights Industry that there are few fields that are “as penetrated and corrupted by intelligence services” as NGOs. “The level of NGO interference in the internal affairs of states and their destabilizing impact on the constitutional order has become so prevalent that more and more countries have adopted… legislation to control this ‘invasion’ of foreign interests, or simply to ban them.”

While de Zayas recognizes Amnesty International when it does good work, he points out that in Latin America it ignores the struggle of sovereign nations “to shake off the yoke of US domination.” In a general comment that might apply specifically to Amnesty’s Tearing Up the Social Fabric, de Zayas condemns “entire reports… compiled from accounts of US-backed opposition groups.”

Nicaragua-based writer John Perry publishes in the London Review of Books, FAIR, CovertAction and elsewhere. Roger D. Harrisis with the Task Force on the Americas and the Venezuela Solidarity Network. Both authors are active with the Nicaragua Solidarity Coalition.

The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

Following the Carabao Cup final defeat by Manchester City earlier this month, defender William Saliba confirmed he would not be joining up with France because of an ankle injury.

His centre-back partner Gabriel then withdrew from the Brazil squad with a knee problem.

They were later joined by England forward Eberechi Eze (calf), Norway midfielder Martin Odegaard (knee) and Netherlands defender Jurrien Timber (groin) – who all missed the cup final defeat at Wembley through injury – as well as Belgium forward Leandro Trossard (hip).

After players joined up with their respective countries, five more from Arsenal withdrew – England trio Declan Rice (knock), Bukayo Saka (knock) and Noni Madueke (injured his knee against Uruguay) as well as Spain’s Martin Zubimendi (knee) and Ecuador’s Piero Hincapie (undisclosed).

Arteta said his players were “desperate” to play for their countries.

“When you are fit and available to play for the national team, you have to play,” he added.

“It makes us so proud that we had that many players in the national team.

“Players are desperate to play for their nation. I know how important it is to them. We are fully supportive of that and when we can do it, we do it.”

Premier League leaders Arsenal are in FA Cup quarter-final action on Saturday as they visit in-form Championship side Southampton (20:00 BST).

Arteta confirmed Eze will miss the game through injury, but Odegaard and Timber are in contention to return, while Madueke’s injury is not as bad as first feared and is a doubt.

Asked how many of those 11 players who withdrew from international duty will be available for selection against the Saints, Arteta added: “You will see. I will let you do the speculation. You can judge afterwards.

“We are in a position right now where we need to make the strongest line-up we possibly can to win every competition.

“We are two or three games away from the FA Cup and we know how important that competition is for us.”

April 1 (UPI) — Bolivia’s government, led by President Rodrigo Paz, said it has uncovered an international criminal network responsible for sabotaging and adulterating imported fuel shipments that entered the country over the past five months.

Interior Minister Marco Antonio Oviedo told a news conference Tuesday that at least 150 million liters of gasoline and diesel were tampered with, citing an official investigation that identified a scheme involving fuel theft and contamination with water and oil in Chilean territory.

Authorities said the operation targeted tanker trucks transporting fuel to Bolivia, particularly in northern Chilean cities. In those locations, part of the fuel was allegedly siphoned off and replaced with a mixture of water and oil, according to local broadcaster Unitel.

President Paz said the adulteration began around October.

Investigators believe the network operated mainly in Chile, with additional links and operational hubs in Paraguay and Argentina. The direct economic loss to the Bolivian state is estimated at $150 million, excluding indirect costs linked to transport disruptions.

Consumers also have felt the impact. More than 10,000 vehicle owners, including long-distance transport operators and private drivers, have reported severe engine damage.

“We are facing an attack against the assets of Bolivian families,” Paz said, adding that the government will pursue legal mechanisms to compensate those affected, according to local newspaper El Deber.

Bolivia’s landlocked status makes transporting fuel from Chile critical to its energy supply chain. The country relies on Chilean ports such as Arica, Iquique and Mejillones to receive international shipments of crude oil and refined products.

After a virtual meeting Tuesday, Paz and Chilean President José Antonio Kast agreed on a joint roadmap to dismantle the transnational organized crime network behind the fuel adulteration, according to Bolivia’s state-run broadcaster BTV.

As an immediate response, Bolivia announced tighter controls at facilities operated by state energy company Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos, known as YPFB, and the National Hydrocarbons Agency. Authorities will implement mandatory laboratory testing at production sites and border checkpoints.

Civil society groups have called for accountability as the investigation continues, urging authorities to prosecute those responsible abroad and to address potential internal failures that allowed the sabotage to go undetected for months.

The crisis comes as Bolivia faces a severe fuel supply shortage. After a structural decline in domestic hydrocarbon production, which fell about 44% between 2014 and 2024, the country shifted from a net exporter to a heavily import-dependent market. Bolivia now imports about 90% of the diesel and 50% of the gasoline it consumes.

The situation has worsened since 2023 due to a shortage of foreign currency, particularly U.S. dollars, complicating payments to international suppliers and contributing to intermittent shortages and partial disruptions in transport and productive sectors.

In 2012, I participated in a United Nations mission in Ethiopia for a technical cooperation event on international trade, which at the time was my area of expertise. Since then, every major development in Venezuela brings me back to that trip, which proved far more revealing than I could have imagined. More than once, I have found myself thinking: this is just like in Ethiopia.

I witnessed firsthand, before it unfolded in Venezuela, that totalitarian systems do not just collapse. They transform in order to survive and advance, as Hannah Arendt argued. Over time, I also came to understand that while authoritarian regimes may promise reform and a democratic transition, without sustained external and domestic commitments those promises tend to dissolve sooner rather than later. This insight is particularly relevant in the current Venezuelan process.

On my way from Addis Ababa airport to the hotel, I noticed large portraits of a politician displayed throughout the city. Thinking of the strongman politics I knew from home, I asked the official accompanying me whether he was the president. “No,” he replied, “the prime minister. He died.” Surprised, I asked why his images were still everywhere. “Don’t these images bother the new one?” “No, because he chose his successor,” came the answer. When I pressed further and asked whether people had voted for him, the response was matter-of-fact: they belonged to the same party, and parliament had selected him.

In those few days, I caught a glimpse of what Venezuela would later experience between 2013 and 2019, after Chávez died and his handpicked successor Maduro came to power. I saw a country marked by hunger, where people wandered with a vacant, distant gaze. A look that would later become painfully familiar during Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis. That image contrasted sharply with the ruling elite, visibly prosperous, gathering in luxury hotels and indulging in imported comforts. I saw women collecting firewood to cook because two decades of socialist mismanagement and corruption had destroyed the electrical system. I saw the haze produced by environmental degradation, similar to what would later hang over Caracas. I also observed a strong Chinese presence, already a dominant economic partner and creditor.

During that mission, I came to understand how the ruling system had entrenched poverty, controlled resources, and normalized corruption, not merely as governance failures but as mechanisms of social control. Years later, working from a human rights perspective, I would recognize these patterns as instruments of ideology, repression, and economic, and ethnic exclusion.

His profile seemed ideal: a system-man, with military and security credentials, Western education, and a discourse centered on reform and reconciliation.

I also witnessed the regime’s hostility toward international actors, imposing strict conditions on United Nations operations and limiting the work of officials on the ground. Hearing the likes of Jorge Rodríguez and other Venezuelan representatives threaten Volker Turk this year, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, did not surprise me. I had seen that before, years earlier, in the Horn of Africa.

Now, I return to the phrase like in Ethiopia because, following the US operation to capture Maduro, the proposed plan for stabilization, recovery, and democratization echoes a trajectory that Ethiopia followed over the past decade. 

The Ethiopian Delcy

Let’s go back to 2018. A figure from within the ruling coalition, Abiy Ahmed, rose to power after three years of widespread protests and political unrest that led to the resignation of Hailemariam Desaleng. Although it is not clear how much the US and the EU were involved in his rise, he was not directly imposed from outside as has been the case with Delcy Rodríguez, but he was “unequivocally embraced” by the United States and the European Union. Abiy became the media’s darling, who placed their bets on him and promoted the new leader as a reformist capable of modernizing the country.

His profile seemed ideal: a system-man, with military and security credentials, Western education, and a discourse centered on reform and reconciliation. Between 2018 and 2020, Ethiopia experienced a period of remarkable transformation on three fronts: recovering the economy, stabilizing the region and strengthening the rule of law.

The economy grew at an annual rate of around 7 percent, key sectors were opened to foreign investment, and political reforms were introduced, including the release of political prisoners, the return of those in exile, the legalization of opposition parties, and greater press freedom. Women were incorporated into government at unprecedented levels. On the international stage, Ethiopia expanded its diplomatic engagement, signed trade agreements, and most notably reached a peace agreement with Eritrea, which earned Abiy the Nobel Peace Prize.

Political attention from foreign actors is limited, international agendas evolve rapidly, and what might begin as a priority can quickly be overtaken by other crises.

Yet this period of optimism proved fragile. Tensions in 2020 with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, once part of the ruling coalition, escalated into a full-scale internal conflict. Abiy’s government shifted course and relapsed. The reform process gave way to a reassertion of authoritarian power, along with widespread human rights violations, restrictions on the press, and accusations of war crimes.

The response from the United States and the European Union included targeted sanctions, visa restrictions, suspension of trade benefits, and partial freezes on aid. Abiy’s international image deteriorated significantly, and Ethiopia began to diversify its alliances, strengthening ties with China, engaging with Russia, and expanding cooperation with actors such as Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran, eventually becoming members of the anti-West BRICS alliance.

Careful with the honeymoon phase

The Ethiopian case offers at least one revealing lesson. External support can facilitate an initial opening and even generate strong economic momentum, but it does not guarantee a democratic transition. 

When international commitment weakens before new institutional rules are consolidated, the outcome is often not transformation but reconfiguration. The system adapts to the new reality, but is not replaced or merely revamped. This dynamic reflects a broader pattern in contemporary international politics. Particularly since the costly experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan, external actors have tended to favour reform processes led by internal figures rather than imposing leadership from outside. However, the central challenge lies not in how these processes begin, but in what happens when external support diminishes, which often occurs during the crucial consolidation phase.

Both the United States and Europe tend to operate within relatively short time horizons when supporting political transitions, often between two and four years, three if I revert to an American security and communications expert whom I worked with yet in another career chapter. These timelines are shaped by electoral cycles, budgetary constraints, shifting strategic priorities, and, in the European case, the difficulty of sustaining consensus among multiple states with divergent interests. Political attention is limited, international agendas evolve rapidly, and what might begin as a priority can quickly be overtaken by other crises. The result is a form of strategic fatigue that has been evident in multiple contexts over the past decades.

By contrast, the transitions most often cited as successful (such as those in Chile, South Africa, and Eastern Europe) were characterized by sustained external engagement over much longer periods, often a decade or more, combined with favourable internal conditions. These cases demonstrate that democratic consolidation is not the product of a short window of opportunity, but of a prolonged commitment.

For Venezuela, the implications are clear. The current process may well generate an initial opening, attract investment, and produce early signs of stabilization. But without sustained international engagement beyond the initial phase, there is a risk that the system will stabilize without fundamentally democratizing. The lesson from Ethiopia is not that transition is impossible, but that it is incomplete if the conditions for its consolidation are not maintained.

The real challenge, therefore, is not how the transition begins, but whether it is sustained long enough to transform the underlying structures of power. Otherwise, we may once again find ourselves looking at a familiar outcome and thinking, once again, like in Ethiopia.

One Friday night last year, Akylah Cox and her boyfriend took a red-eye flight from Pennsylvania to Dublin for a whirlwind adventure. The trip lasted less than 30 hours. They hit up an impressive number of spots: the Guinness Storehouse, the Book of Kells experience at Trinity College, Ha’penny Bridge, Capel Street for thrifting (“I gave myself only 30 minutes to do this, but it had to get done,” Cox says) and the Celtic Nights dinner and show.

They were back home on Sunday and went to work the next day.

She shared her experience on TikTok with the caption, “Was this crazy?!” The responses varied.

“I would be tired the rest of the week,” one person commented with two woozy-face emojis.

“This inspired me!” another said.

“I’m tryna be this level crazy,” commented another.

Akylah Cox and boyfriend Akram Imam in Dublin in February 2025.

(Akylah Cox)

For Cox, who was working full time in engineering and pursuing an MBA while her boyfriend was completing his medical residency, creating an ultra-compacted itinerary was the only possible way to travel. And she loves the practice. On TikTok, she shares her itineraries for “microtrips” — short, usually international trips lasting 24 to 72 hours.

“You can just leave,” says Cox, who lives in Chicago. “You can have that quick break, that quick reset.”

She’s part of a new wave of travelers, particularly Gen Z, opting for these types of trips over extended vacations, according to an AirBnb trend report. Partly fueled by a viral TikTok trend in which people break down how they spent one to two days in another country, young travelers are no longer waiting for spring break or to accumulate paid time off to cross destinations off their bucket lists. A recent Expedia survey found that 25% of Gen Z and millennial travelers said they plan to take a microtrip in 2026, with Toronto; Nassau, Bahamas; and San Juan, Puerto Rico, being the most popular destinations.

“Short trips can fit busy schedules much better than a longer vacation can, which allows more people to explore the world without committing to long absences from work or family,” says Airbnb communications lead Ali Killam. “I think people are really embracing this idea that even brief changes of scenery can really recharge you, your mind and spirit.”

Another driver of the trend could be the fact that younger generations consider travel a top priority in their lives. In 2023, Gen Z and millennial travelers took an average of five trips per year, compared with Gen Xers and baby boomers who took less than four. Gen Zers and millennials allocate an average of 29% of their income for travel, reports the management consulting firm McKinsey & Co. (though a study last year by Savings.com found that a growing number of parents are helping their adult children out financially more than ever). Among younger generations, there’s also a mantra of doing things “for the plot” and taking chances because the future feels uncertain.

“Younger millennials and Gen Z are really creating their own version of the American dream, which I think is really based off of experiences and the memories that you’re able to create,” said N’Dea Irvin-Choy, 30, an L.A.-based content creator who posts about luxury travel, skiing and tennis experiences.

Kareen Hill, 27, of New York, is another microtrip crusader on social media. Since October, he’s been taking trips to explore the food scenes of various cities. In January, he went to London for two days and posted a recap video on TikTok that received more than 1.5 million likes. He now tries to take a trip, either international or domestic, about every two weeks.

“I just realized you do have free will,” says Hill, who works at an airport. “Like why not?”

N’Dea Irvin-Choy at the Eiffel Tower in Paris, left, and Kareen Hill at the Colosseum in Rome.

(N’Dea Irvin-Choy; Kareen Hill)

Beyond convenience, microtrips can also be more affordable than longer trips — an important factor as oil prices rise and airfares are already beginning to surge. With the help of credit card points and a travel credit, Cox’s trip to Dublin was just under $450. She says these quick trips are a “low barrier to entry” to international travel because you only have to plan an itinerary for one or two days. And the more flexible you can be on the timing or destination, the better chance you’ll have at finding deals.

Another benefit is how short trips force you to be intentional about how you spend your limited time. “You can get a lot more done than maybe you think you can,” she said. During a three-day trip to Japan with her mother and grandparents in May (not including the travel time), they were able to squeeze in a food tour and multiple tourist attractions in Tokyo and Mt. Fuji.

Of course, a common concern about microtrips is how exhausting they can be, especially if you’re traveling across time zones. And, yes, the fatigue can be real and travelers should certainly consider their bodies’ limits. But the purpose of these trips is to explore a destination rather than relax, Cox says. Once you’re in that mindset, you can better embrace the experience. “You really don’t have the impact of jet lag because you’re purely running on adrenaline,” she says.

Want to take a microtrip yourself? Here are some tips:

• Book the earliest flight possible to your destination and the latest flight back so you can optimize your time, advises Irvin-Choy. Definitely try to opt for nonstop flights.
• Make it easy to move around your destination. Hill says it’s best to avoid checking a bag and to pack light. Cox recommends booking a hotel that allows you to store your bag even if your room isn’t ready.
• Prioritize your “musts.” For each of her microtrips, Cox uses the same formula: Pick three must-do activities or sights and plan the rest of your trip around those. One of her favorite things to do in any new city she’s visiting is go on a food tour.
• Prepare to jump back into the grind at home. Irvin-Choy recommends parking your car at or near the airport, which can sometimes be cheaper than opting for a ride share when it’s such a short trip. You also might want to wear your work clothes on the plane, so you can head straight into work if necessary.
• And finally, don’t forget to get some rest during your trip — even if it’s on the plane. “That’s the hardest part when it’s so short,” Irvin-Choy says. “But make sure you get some sleep at some point during the weekend.”

Republic of Ireland manager Heimir Hallgrimsson has called Portsmouth winger Millenic Alli into his squad for Tuesday’s friendly against North Macedonia in Dublin [19:45 BST].

The 26-year-old earns his first call-up to the senior squad and took part in training at Abbotstown on Sunday.

Alli began his career in England playing non-league before signing for Exeter City in 2024, catching the eye of Luton Town who spent £1.5 million to bring him to Kenilworth Road.

The Dubliner scored four goals in the final six games of last season, but the Hatters would suffer relegation to League One.

Despite falling out of favour, Alli was picked up on loan by Portsmouth and he has started all 14 games since his arrival at Fratton Park.

He has scored once in the Championship club’s bid to beat the drop and his performances have caught the attention of Hallgrimsson who brings him into the squad with others unavailable for Tuesday.

Midfielder Jack Taylor has left the squad for family reasons, while Sammie Szmodics has returned to Derby County to continue his recovery from a concussion sustained in Thursday’s World Cup play-off semi-final defeat on penalties by the Czech Republic.

That defeat in Prague saw the Republic of Ireland’s hopes of qualifying for this summer’s World Cup come to an end, while North Macedonia were beaten in their semi-final by Denmark, leaving both nations to face each other in a friendly.

Former prosecutor at the International Criminal Court Geoffrey Nice says that the US-Israel war on Iran was not based on imminent threat and warns that holding powerful states accountable is ‘unrealistic.’

Schools and hospitals bombed; strikes on apartment buildings; energy facilities targeted and attacks on neighbouring states.

Have Israel, the United States and Iran broken international law in the war? Or what legal justification might they claim?

Presenter: James Bays

Guests:

Geoffrey Nice – Human rights lawyer and former International Criminal Court prosecutor

Brian Finucane – Senior adviser with the US programme at the International Crisis Group and former legal adviser at the US State Department

Nicholas Tsagourias – Professor of international law at the University of Sheffield

The head of US Central Command says forces have struck Iranian coastal missile sites and infrastructure, degrading Tehran’s ability to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, as Washington vows to continue targeting its regional military capabilities.

Iran’s strike on Qatar’s Ras Laffan gas facility will cut an estimated 17% of the country’s Liquefied Natural Gas export capacity for up to five years, officials say. The damage is a major blow to the global energy market, which could disrupt supplies to Europe, Asia and beyond.

Northern Ireland manager Michael O’Neill says that Chris Atherton’s switch to the Republic of Ireland is “disappointing, but we have to accept it”.

Atherton made history in September 2022 when he became the youngest senior footballer in the United Kingdom at 13 years and 329 days old, when he featured for Glenavon in the League Cup in Northern Ireland.

The 17-year-old moved from Glenavon, who he had been with since the age of four, to Chelsea’s academy in July 2025 before signing a professional contract in October.

Atherton represented Northern Ireland at under-16 and under-17 level, and was a youth ambassador at the announcement in Nyon for the UK and Ireland’s successful bid to host Euro 2028 in October 2023, but has now changed allegiance to the Republic of Ireland.

Speaking at his squad announcement for the World Cup play-off semi-final in Italy, O’Neill said “every player has the right to make that choice”.

“He’s a young player that had been initially in the Republic of Ireland set-up,” he continued.

“He came back to be part of our set-up and I think Chris played maybe 17 times for representative teams for us.

“But every player has the right to make that choice, and obviously he’s made that choice.”

O’Neill also referenced the decision of Omari Kellyman, who is on loan at Cardiff City from Chelsea and switched to England from Northern Ireland in 2023.

Northern Ireland have also benefited from changes of allegiance, as Jamie Donley and Ronan Hale switched from England and the Republic of Ireland respectively in the past 12 months.

“We can’t handcuff them to a decision that they made initially,” O’Neill added.

“They have the right to make that choice once in their career, and Chris has decided to make that choice.

“We can only wish him well”.

Rights groups have slammed United States Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth for saying that “no quarter” will be shown to Iran, as the US and Israel continue their military campaign against the country.

“We will keep pressing. We will keep pushing, keep advancing. No quarter, no mercy for our enemies,” Hegseth told reporters on Friday.

Under the Hague Convention and other international treaties, it is illegal to threaten that no quarter will be given.

Domestic laws, such as the 1996 War Crimes Act, also prohibit such policies. US military manuals likewise warn that threats of “no quarter” are illegal.

Brian Finucane, a senior adviser at the International Crisis Group, a think tank, said Hegseth’s comments appear to run afoul of those standards.

“These comments are very striking,” Finucane told Al Jazeera over a phone call. “It raises questions about whether this belligerent, lawless rhetoric is being translated into how the war is being conducted on the battlefield.”

But Hegseth has publicly dismissed concerns about international law, claiming he would abide no “stupid rules of engagement” and no “politically correct wars”.

His rhetoric has provoked concern among some experts that measures designed to prevent civilian harm are being ignored in favour of a campaign of “maximum lethality”.

Hegseth’s remarks also come after a US strike on a girls’ school in southern Iran that killed more than 170 people, most of them children. The war has left at least 1,444 Iranians dead and millions more displaced.

‘Inhumane and counterproductive’

Prohibitions against declaring “no quarter” go back more than a century, part of an effort to impose restraints on conduct during war.

The Nuremberg trials after World War II upheld that legal standard, as Nazi officials were prosecuted, in some cases, for denying quarter to enemy forces.

“The basic idea is that it’s both inhumane and counterproductive to execute people who have laid down their arms,” said Finucane.

He added that the “mere announcement” of “no quarter” from a government official can itself be a war crime.

The US and Israel have already faced allegations of violating international law during their war against Iran. Experts have condemned their initial strike on February 28 as “unprovoked”, deeming the conflict an illegal war of aggression.

Iranian officials also protested after a US submarine sank a military vessel, the IRIS Dena, off the coast of Sri Lanka, as it returned from a ceremonial naval exercise in India. That attack killed at least 84 people.

While warships are considered legal military targets, Iran has said that the ship was not fully armed, raising questions about whether it could have been interdicted rather than sunk.

US forces also purportedly declined to help rescue sailors from the Dena, even though the Geneva Convention largely requires aid to the shipwrecked. The Sri Lankan navy ultimately helped collect survivors from the wreckage.

Responding to the attack, Hegseth described the sinking of the ship as a “quiet death”. He also told reporters, “We are fighting to win.”

US President Donald Trump himself remarked that he asked why the ship had been sunk, not captured.

“One of my generals said, ‘Sir, it’s a lot more fun doing it this way,’” Trump said.

‘Serious red flag’

The US military has faced criticism for killing civilians in military operations for decades.

That includes during the so-called “global war on terror”, when airstrikes resulted in thousands of civilian deaths, including a 2008 attack on a wedding party in Afghanistan.

Even before the war with Iran, the Trump administration had faced accusations that it violated international law by attacking alleged drug-trafficking vessels in the Caribbean Sea and eastern Pacific Ocean.

At least 157 people have been killed in those attacks since they started on September 2.

The Trump administration, however, has never identified the victims nor presented evidence against them. Scholars have condemned the attacks as a campaign of extrajudicial killings.

Analysts say that the Pentagon’s policies of emphasising lethality at the expense of human rights concerns has carried over into its war against Iran.

“Death and destruction from the sky all day long. We’re playing for keeps. Our warfighters have maximum authorities granted personally by the president and yours truly,” Hegseth said during a briefing on March 4.

“Our rules of engagement are bold, precise and designed to unleash American power, not shackle it.”

Sarah Yager, the Washington director at Human Rights Watch, called such rhetoric alarming.

“I’ve been engaging with the US military for two decades, and I’m shocked by this language. Rhetoric from senior leaders matters because it helps shape the command environment in which US forces operate,” Yager said.

“From an atrocity-prevention perspective, language that dismisses legal restraints is a serious red flag.”

While the impact of Hegseth’s rhetoric on combat operations is not certain, a recent report from the watchdog group Airwars found that the pace of the US and Israeli assault on Iran has far outstripped other military operations in modern history.

Reports indicate that the US dropped nearly $5.6bn worth of munitions in the first two days of the war alone. Airwars says the US and Israel hit more targets in the first 100 hours of the Iran war than in the first six months of the US campaign against ISIL (ISIS).

Following Hegseth’s remarks on Friday, Senator Jeff Merkley condemned the Pentagon chief as a “dangerous amateur”. He cited the attack on the Iranian girls’ school as an example of the consequences.

“His ‘no hesitation’ engagement rules set the stage for failing to distinguish a civilian school from a military target,” Merkley wrote in a social media post.

“The result, more than 150 dead schoolgirls and teachers from an American missile.”