international

The administration of United States President Donald Trump has proposed a new 25 percent tariff on imports from Brazil amid allegations of unfair trading practices.

US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer announced the new punitive tariffs late on Monday, stemming from issues including digital trade and illegal deforestation.

The new tariffs would be imposed under Section 301 of US trade policy — a statute that gives the US government broad authority to impose trade sanctions based on violations of trade agreements, as well as what it deems “unfair” trade practices under the Trade Act of 1974.

Greer said there has been an investigation that began in July. The practices under investigation were related to issues such as illegal deforestation, ethanol market access, and anticorruption enforcement, among other key issues, according to the summary released by the US Department of Commerce on Tuesday.

In the 107-page document, the US government said that trade practices between the two nations “are unreasonable and burden or restrict US commerce”, and pointed to agreements that Brazil has with Mexico and India.

“Brazil’s trade arrangements with Mexico and India also create incentives to offshore US production by creating a financial advantage to exporting to Brazil from these countries, as opposed to exporting from the United States,” the document says.

There is a comment period for the general public to weigh in on the proposed tariffs, which begins on Thursday. The written comment period ends on July 1, and there will be a public hearing in Washington on July 6.

Beef, coffee, rare earths, other metals, energy, and aircraft parts are among the products that would be exempt from the tariffs.

On CNBC, Greer said that it would release more findings on unfair trade practices in the next several weeks in order to address what Greer called a “giant” trade deficit.

However, the data shows that the US maintains a trade surplus with Brazil. In March, Brazil bought more goods, worth $3.3bn, from the US than it exported at $2.9bn, representing a $420m trade surplus.

Other countries under investigation include China and Vietnam.

The new tariff would partially replace a tariff of 50 percent on many Brazilian goods imposed last year by Trump, with 40 percent serving as a punishment for Brazil’s prosecution of former President Jair Bolsonaro, a Trump ally.

The White House also recently dropped tariffs on select aluminium, copper, and steel imports, which include agricultural equipment such as harvesters. Those tariffs will drop from 25 percent to 15 percent. The tariffs expire in December 2027.

The new tariffs come after the Supreme Court, in February, struck down the use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which the White House used to impose its sweeping global tariffs.

“They are the first of many new tariffs to replace the IEPPA national security tariffs. The period of public comment will allow for potential modest tweaks and exemptions. Ultimately, it will add to some inflation pressure compared to the last few months but not compared to a year earlier,” Rachel Ziemba, a senior adjunct fellow at the Center for a New American Security, told Al Jazeera.

Political tensions

The changes come despite President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s visit to Washington last month, as relations have deteriorated in recent months.

The US State Department has also designated two of Brazil’s criminal gangs as “terrorist organisations”, a move that supported Senator Flavio Bolsonaro’s position, Lula’s main rival in October’s election, and over the objections of Brazilian officials.

“I expressly asked President Trump not to tariff our companies,” Bolsonaro wrote on X on Tuesday. “Tariffs are not the solution.”

The White House did not respond to Al Jazeera’s request for comment.

Venezuela is far from being the only country in the Americas where State institutions have been used to crack down on independent media and protect the interests of ruling elites. In Guatemala, the case of journalist José Rubén Zamora became one of the clearest examples of how prosecutors, courts and political power can converge to silence investigative journalism.

In early April 2025, I interviewed Ramón Zamora, son of Guatemalan journalist and elPeriódico founder José Rubén Zamora. His arrest following years of investigations into alleged government corruption led to the newspaper’s closure and the persecution of people close to him. During our conversation, Ramón Zamora described how Guatemala has developed a tacit network of complicity between State institutions and political authorities, a system that raises broader questions about this new form of power in Latin America and may also help explain how the chavista State in Venezuela operates.

After elPeriódico published two investigations on May 2 and May 3, 2021 into apparent cases of corruption in the government of former President Alejandro Giammattei, the media outlet was subjected to legal persecution that culminated in the arrest of Rubén Zamora, who had dedicated his work to investigating corruption in the Central American country. 

The persecution began with an investigation into alleged bribery by the newspaper to obtain information related to the publications. The judge who heard the case dismissed it. Later, in 2022, an investigation into money laundering related to the sale of works of art owned by Zamora to cover elPeriódico‘s costs was reopened, leading to his arrest.

The imprisonment of Zamora caught the attention of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. In their 2022 and 2023 annual reports, the IACHR requested information from Guatemala regarding the country’s human rights situation and recalled that Zamora has benefited from precautionary measures since 2003 due to risks linked to his journalistic work. Guatemala rejected parts of the assessment as lacking objectivity. Amnesty International described Zamora as a prisoner of conscience and condemned his detention. Zamora was granted house arrest for the second time on February 12, 2026.

Reducing chavismo to a simple narco-structure simplifies the scope that the organization can have, since apparent drug trafficking would not be the essence of the system but rather an activity within it.

During the arrest and initial detention of journalist José Rubén Zamora in 2022, Guatemala was governed by Alejandro Giammattei, a conservative president whose administration faced strong criticism from international organizations over corruption, institutional deterioration, and pressure against journalists and anti-corruption actors. Since January 14, 2024, Guatemala has been governed by Bernardo Arévalo, a progressive and anti-corruption reformist whose presidential term is scheduled to end in January 2028.

His son, Ramón Zamora, says that his father’s persecution is the result of an unwritten agreement between various powerful sectors within the State that aim to protect their interests.  “In Guatemala, there is something my father called the “Pact of the Corrupt.” The Pact of the Corrupts is a tacit agreement that forms a network of corruption spread across political parties and institutions, where those who reach positions of power must govern according to the pact.”

This explanation describes the composition of a de facto cross-cutting network, which has political parties, institutions, and security forces under its control, punishing dissent as a means of survival, subjecting its detractors to exile, imprisonment, and discredit.

“The judge presiding over the case ordered an investigation into my father’s defense attorneys and witnesses, causing his lawyer to go into exile just five days after his arrest. Currently, six of the twelve lawyers who have defended my father have been detained,” says Ramón, who is also outside Guatemala with his mother after the court issued an arrest warrant against both of them. 

“They also persecuted my family. My mother and I were outside Guatemala visiting the United States when the judge handling my father’s case issued an arrest warrant against us, so we decided not to return.”

But how can the Pact explain the nature of the chavista State?

Corruption as political capital

Chavismo is not exclusively a militarized organization or simply a drug trafficking operation. As in Guatemala with the Pact of the Corrupts, the institutions of the chavista State are co-opted and work in the tacit interest of their members, where one of the main means of maintaining the pact is loyalty based on impunity, while corruption operates as political capital.

Consequently, the exercise of power is not oriented toward citizens or the satisfaction of public demands, but rather toward preserving the internal balance of the Pact itself. Governing involves administering concessions, distributing power quotas, and avoiding any decision that could alter the network of interests that sustains the regime. Reforms, when they exist, do not constitute a project of institutional transformation but are carefully calibrated to avoid destabilizing the architecture of loyalties on which the system rests.

This model of governance, the pacted State, is complemented by a logic of repression, combining massive and indiscriminate terror against actors whose actions threaten the balance of the pact. Similar dynamics can be observed in regimes such as Russia, Belarus, Nicaragua, and several Central Asian States. Journalists, judges, political leaders, and internal and external dissidents are the main targets of a system of coercion designed not to mobilize the masses, but to send clear and disciplining signals to those who break the pact. The selectivity of repression does not mitigate its severity. On the contrary, it makes it more efficient and functional in sustaining the apparatus of power.

Reducing chavismo to a simple narco-structure simplifies the scope that the organization can have, since apparent drug trafficking would not be the essence of the system but rather an activity within it. The Venezuelan State has become a web of systematic corruption that makes crime a functional activity of power.

The stability of the system is due to a network of mostly informal agreements between civilian, military, and economic actors who share a common interest: preserving an order in which rupture is more costly than continuity.

In this context, ideology ceases to serve as the system’s organizing principle and takes on a strictly instrumental role. It is not the compass that guides the action of power, but rather an adaptable rhetorical resource used to justify decisions already made to sustain the pact. Chavismo does not act primarily to carry out an ideological project, but rather to preserve a balance of interests between civilian, military, and criminal elites, in which ideas can mutate without the system suffering. Ideology, thus, does not guide the organization: it accompanies it, decorates it, or excuses it, but does not determine it.

The thesis of a pacted State suggests that authoritarian stability rests not only on repression or ideology, but on a shared understanding among political, military, and economic elites that preserving the existing order is preferable to risking rupture. Such systems can appear remarkably resilient precisely because their survival depends less on ideological coherence than on the mutual guarantees exchanged within the ruling coalition.

The notion of a pacted State helps explain why chavismo has shown a capacity for survival that goes beyond personalistic or circumstantial explanations. The stability of the system is due to a network of mostly informal agreements between civilian, military, and economic actors who share a common interest: preserving an order in which rupture is more costly than continuity. As long as that calculation remains valid, the system does not collapse; it adapts, reconfigures itself, and absorbs pressures without altering its fundamental logic. Yet the resilience of pacted States is not immutable.

Such systems begin to weaken when influential actors within the ruling coalition conclude that the regime can no longer guarantee protection, resources, or political survival. Economic decline, succession disputes, international pressure, social unrest, or weakening coercive institutions can alter the cost-benefit calculations sustaining the pact. Similar dynamics were visible in Eastern Europe after November 1989, when regimes in the German Democratic Republic, Romania, and Bulgaria rapidly collapsed once the elite coalitions sustaining them began to fracture internally, a process that would also unfold in Albania.

History suggests that pacted States often project an image of permanence precisely until the internal understandings sustaining them begin, almost imperceptibly, to dissolve.

It’s always spectacular to see a big shot getting caught. Especially when he’s made a long career at the top of an European democracy under a mask of respectability. And, oh so suddenly, it turns out he’s made a fortune dealing with a Latin American dictatorship.

The sequence was— as people love to say today—worth of a Netflix series. 

Hours before getting on another flight to Caracas, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero decided to stay in Madrid once he knew he had just become the first former prime minister in the history of Spain’s 50-year-old democracy to be indicted for a crime. For those who turn on the phone in the morning across the Atlantic, when it is noon in Spain, the news of the indictment came as one bundle with the footage of Zapatero’s office being raided by an anti-corruption investigative unit of Spain’s National Police Corps, known as UDEF.

Zapatero was indicted by Audiencia National (an equivalent of the Supreme Court) for selling his influence to get a financial relief kit for an airline, Plus Ultra, the smallest of four Spanish carriers that received assistance from Madrid as a result of the demand-side shock during the pandemic. This company, with a fleet of seven aircrafts, was also the youngest of the lot, and had the particular feature of having inaugurated routes to Caracas in the annus horribilis of 2017, a time when international operators were withdrawing from the country en masse. As Armando.Info investigative reporter Roberto Deniz would reveal in December 2018, Plus Ultra’s majority stakeholders were from Venezuela.

Eight years later, Zapatero is being prosecuted over allegations of political influence peddling related to the €53 million bailout of Plus Ultra. He also faces charges of criminal conspiracy, document forgery and money laundering. The judge handling the case describes Zapatero as the head of “a stable and hierarchical influence‑peddling structure” meant to “obtain financial benefits as an intermediary, exerting influence over public bodies on behalf of third parties, mainly Plus Ultra.” At least six other individuals are under investigation, including Plus Ultra’s chairman, its CEO, and Alicante-based businessman Julio Martínez Martínez.

The UDEF report says Zapatero and Martínez were at the center of a structure of businesses and consulting firms meant to syphon money coming from China, Venezuela and Spain into his personal accounts.

This latter will be a key character in this story: Martínez Martínez is not only being accused of acting as Zapatero’s frontman in a number of entities that received payments linked to the Plus Ultra (et al) scheme. His own personal records, such as notebook annotations UDEF just made public, suggest he was fully aware of Zapatero’s business and political dealings with the Maduro regime. That evidence seems to point at both opaque trade deals (over Venezuelan light crude, gold, fuel, asphalt, which were the subject of US sanctions until recently) Martínez and Zapatero may have promoted, and knowledge about a number of high-profile political prisoners released this year. The son-in-law of Edmundo González, security expert Rocío San Miguel and opposition moderate Enrique Márquez (who has publicly praised Zapatero) appear mentioned. Martínez´s notes also provide previously undisclosed details about the contents of a constitutional reform Maduro toyed with, but never brought about after stealing the presidential vote in 2024.

All of this adds to the investigations about shady business in the pandemic that involved Spanish businessman Víctor de Aldama, former Transport Minister and PSOE Organization Secretary José Luis Ábalos, and his close advisor Koldo García. The trio famously met Delcy Rodríguez in the tarmac of the Madrid international airport, for a purported conversation over the sale of Venezuelan gold lingots, despite her being the subject of EU sanctions and therefore unable to step on European soil. These three Spaniards (with Ábalos and Koldo being amongst the closest collaborators of Pedro Sánchez in his primary campaign and early government) are the main actors in a series of corruption scandals that have been getting closer to the Spanish head of government, a darling of the International Left whose reputation has been boosted by a knack for antagonizing Donald Trump. But the former aides of Perro Sanxe have been arrested without bail and indicted (and will soon face a sentencing hearing). His brother is facing trial. His wife has also been indicted and is on the verge of facing trial. And now it looks like his political mentor will also face a lengthy process before Spanish justice.

Just after the Zapatero news broke in Spain, predictable reactions began to come across the political spectrum: bloodthirst at the Right, accusations of conspiracy at the Left. Then, the judge made public the 88-page file, fed with a probe that began in 2024, and the ambiance turned in a second. Many allies of the graft-plagued socialist government admitted that the accusations are solid, the evidence overwhelming, and the outlook quite bleak for Zapatero. The conspiracy theory that this was lawfare against the Sánchez government faded away. Spain’s paper of record, El País, traditionally aligned with Zapatero’s party PSOE, wrote a stern op-ed saying that the Sánchez government was forced to investigate this properly to prevent the “enemies of democracy” in the Far Right from charging against the democratic system. “Full cooperation with the judiciary, full respect for the presumption of innocence, and all my support for President Zapatero,” Sánchez said today. 

As you may have noticed, authorities have released more evidence this week. Spanish media ranging from the State-owned, left-leaning broadcaster RTVE to the investigative El Confidencial are carving out a map of the Zapatero network of sociedades mercantiles. While not all of these companies are under investigation, together they received an estimated €2.6 million between 2020 and 2025 from Chinese capital and entities under investigation.

The investigation will likely reveal more details about the dealings between the chavista regime, Zapatero and other politicians and businesspeople close to the Sanchista government.

The UDEF report says Zapatero and Martínez were at the center of a structure of businesses and consulting firms (under not-at-all pretentious names like Inteligencia Prospectiva and Análisis Relevante) meant to syphon money coming from China, Venezuela and Spain into his personal accounts. Money that looks, in many cases, like kickbacks. For instance, Whathefav, a social media agency owned by his two daughters, got a payment of half a million euros for creating a website and a promotional video for Inteligencia Prospectiva SL, which is owned by Guillemo and Domingo Amaro Chacón. These two are Spanish-Venezuelan citizens who happen to be the sons of a businessman involved in a case of insurance fraud with PDVSA. Inteligencia Prospectiva reported losses, but was paying juicy bills to other businesses of the same network, like Whathefav.

UDEF  also cites evidence of conversations between Domingo Amaro Chacón and Julio Martínez Martínez, from 2021 to 2024, discussing a deal with Minerven (coded as “comercialización de amarillo”), nickel reserves in Venezuela, a major tourism development project on La Tortuga Island, and what seems like efforts to promote the opening of the UAE embassy in Caracas (coded as “the desert guys”). All of this may have something to do with UDEF’s suggestion (reviewed here by The Objective) alleging that the Plus Ultra case might be linked to a money-laundering operation involving proceeds from the Venezuelan CLAP food-box scheme, as well as the shipment of 5-8 tons of gold from Caracas to Dubai.

Yes, it’s a lot. And we’re not even getting into other grim details, like reports that Whathefav received a €100,000 payment from the company behind VenApp, which you’ll remember as the mobile app Maduro promoted in the past two years to encourage chavistas to snitch on dissidents.

“I told you so…”

Until that day, Zapatero was able to sell to the Spanish people that he had been in Venezuela not just as a negotiator helping take people out of jail, but as a peacemaker trying to prevent the country from falling into a civil war. Apparently through his good heart and blue eyes.

Suddenly, Spain has discovered that a former president, adored among socialists for his term’s achievements like the disbandment of terrorist group ETA, who left Moncloa Palace with no scandals on his shoulders, and who kept enough prestige to back the rise of Sánchez, is an international operator that used his connections and knowledge to make at least 2.6 million euros in ways that spill way beyond the disputable boundaries of legal lobbying.

Once again, Venezuelans raised their eyes to the sky and whispered with resignation. That “yes, moron, we have known this for years” feeling we are so familiar with. 

This case should remind the EU that post-Maduro Venezuela still harbors kleptocratic networks embedded well within European jurisdictions.

For Venezuelan media, and we dare to say a great deal of the public, Zapatero has been known for years as a loyal operator of the chavista regime who works at the expense of the people to help Maduro, and now the Rodríguez siblings, to preserve power. In doing so, he has kept the boardgame tilted against the opposition. The statesmanship that many Spaniards attribute to Zapatero has served only to defend Maduro’s interests during several negotiation rounds with international presence, and to corner the opposition into disadvantageous arrangements by presenting himself as an arbiter when, in fact, he’s no more than an able messenger of Miraflores. Former political prisoners like Lorent Saleh have recalled how Zapatero pressured their families to keep quiet about torture and abuse endured in prison. All that work, of course, has been handsomely rewarded.

We saw his shadow in the humiliation of president-elect Edmundo González Urrutia, in the Spanish ambassador’s house in Caracas, during his last hours in Venezuela in August 2024. Edmundo was pressured by Delcy and Jorge Rodríguez to sign a self-incriminating letter as a condition for being allowed to leave for Spain. After that, the Rodríguez siblings and Zapatero have actively endorsed each other: one of the Spaniard’s last visits to Caracas saw him declaring next to Jorge and other National Assembly lawmakers as a key international sponsor of the 2026 amnesty law, which Delcy recently discontinued. One of those lawmakers, fake opposition politician Timoteo Zambrano, is another close friend and ally of Zapatero. The latter’s influence looks so significant that Delcy just appointed Zambrano as the Venezuelan ambassador in Madrid.

Bad for Delcy, good for María Corina

The investigation will likely reveal more details about the dealings between the chavista regime, Zapatero and other politicians and businesspeople close to the Sanchista government. It will all depend on what prosecutors can find and prove, but it’s fair to say that a wave of scandals and a thickening of corruption dossiers of this kind could make any democratic government in the world collapse (though with Sánchez, in the end, we’re talking about a man Spanish voters know for surviving all kinds of reputational crises). 

The Spanish government was among the first to recognize Delcy Rodríguez as head of state. As early as January, its top diplomat said he would request that the EU lifts sanctions on Delcy. Just a few weeks ago, the same official confirmed that Caracas would resume talks with the IMF. The Spanish Foreign Ministry used to be run by Josep Borrell, a socialist from the non-Zapaterista faction (the more moderate, Felipista wing) of the ruling PSOE, who has become a vocal critic of both the Maduro dictatorship and Zapatero. But Madrid’s latest efforts to normalize relations with Delcy haven’t gone unnoticed, perhaps encouraged by the Trump administration, and also by Maria Corina Machado’s close ties with the Spanish Right.

With such accusations against a key enabler of this bilateral relationship, the image of normalcy (and common sense) both Sánchez and Delcy are trying to project should take a hit. This case should remind the EU that post-Maduro Venezuela still harbors kleptocratic networks embedded well within European jurisdictions.

We should note this is not a problem where Delcy can turn to the Trump administration for help. Not only because Trump despises Sánchez, but because Homeland Security reportedly gave leads to Spain’s National Police in the Plus Ultra case, in cooperation through the American embassy in Madrid.

A big winner in this case is María Corina Machado, who recently held a massive rally in Madrid’s main square that few Spanish politicians could have matched. Machado was lambasted by Foreign Minister José Luis Albares for refusing to meet Sánchez or other leftwing leaders during her Madrid visit. Throughout her trip, when asked by journalists about this decision, Machado did not name Sánchez but thanked the Spanish government for receiving Venezuelan migrants over the years, while also stressing her utmost respect for Spanish institutions. It is false that Machado only met with the right-wing opposition: she appeared publicly with former PM Felipe González, a historic figure of Spanish social democracy and a key leader of the country’s famous Transition.

Machado may now be feeling some relief about how the whole Spanish saga is unfolding (both Zapatero and Machado have acknowledged they have never spoken to each other).

In another era, she might have summed it up with one of her classic phrases: se los dije.

May 22 (Asia Today) — POSCO International said Friday it plans to enter the U.S. rare earth separation, refining and permanent magnet business through a joint investment with ReElement Technologies.

The South Korean trading company said it signed an agreement with the U.S. firm to pursue a joint venture for rare earth separation and refining production in the United States.

The signing ceremony was held in Washington, D.C., with POSCO International CEO Lee Kye-in, ReElement Technologies CEO Mark Jensen, U.S. government officials and South Korean Embassy officials in attendance.

The companies plan to jointly invest $200 million to build a rare earth separation and refining plant with annual capacity of 6,000 tons. They also plan to develop an integrated production complex that can later produce permanent magnets.

Rare earth materials are used in electric vehicle motors, robots and artificial intelligence data centers. Heavy rare earths such as dysprosium and terbium are considered essential for high-performance permanent magnets.

POSCO International will lead management of the joint venture, while ReElement Technologies will provide core separation and refining technology.

The venture plans to produce neodymium-praseodymium oxide, dysprosium oxide and terbium oxide. It will first build annual production capacity of 3,000 tons before expanding to 6,000 tons.

Trial production is scheduled for the fourth quarter of 2027, with mass production targeted for 2028.

POSCO International said the project is part of its broader plan to build an integrated value chain from raw material sourcing to separation and refining, permanent magnets and electric vehicle motor cores.

“This joint venture is more than the establishment of a refining plant. It is the starting point for building a critical minerals value chain in the United States,” Lee said.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260522010006592

The United States and India are seeking to mend ties after a year of diplomatic see-saw during which tariffs were imposed and then quickly scrapped because of the US-Israel war on Iran.

This is just one example of how international relations and conflict have become more complex and interlinked in recent years.

So, is pragmatism replacing ideology in today’s diplomatic world?

Presenter: Scott McLean

Guests:

Brahma Chellaney – Professor emeritus of strategic studies at the Centre for Policy Research

Chris Weafer – Chief executive officer at Macro-Advisory strategic consultancy

Shaun Rein – Founder and managing director of the China Market Research Group

The latest episode of the Venezuelanalysis podcast sees VA editor Ricardo Vaz speak with Austin Cole and Michela Martinazzi about international solidarity with Venezuela and the challenges of organizing against imperialism from inside the United States.

The discussion covers solidarity initiatives, escalating US attacks abroad and repression at home, the need to connect struggles for justice domestically and internationally, and the difficulties social movements face in building meaningful solidarity and broad coalitions.

Powered by RedCircle

Guests

Michela Martinazzi: Organizer with Brooklyn Against War and member of the Steering Committee of the International League of Peoples’ Struggle.

Austin Cole: National Co-Coordinator of the Black Alliance for Peace and co-coordinator of BAP’s Haiti/Americas Team.

141 UN member states voted in support of the ICJ’s finding climate change is an ‘existential threat’.

The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has voted to support a landmark ruling from the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which found states have a legal responsibility to act to prevent the climate crisis from worsening.

More than two-thirds of UN member states, 141, voted in favour of the resolution on Wednesday, with eight voting no and 28 abstaining.

Ralph Regenvanu, the minister for climate change from Vanuatu, which championed the case, described the vote as a victory for “communities on the frontlines of the climate crisis”.

“Today the international community affirmed that climate change is not only a political and economic challenge, but a matter of law, justice, and human rights,” Regenvanu said in a statement.

“For vulnerable countries like Vanuatu, this resolution is deeply significant because it confirms that no State is above its obligations to protect people, future generations, and our planet.”

The historic ruling from The Hague-based court in July last year found that states have a legal obligation to act on the “existential threat” of climate change.

The case was the biggest ever to be considered by the ICJ’s 15 judges, who reviewed tens of thousands of pages of written submissions and heard two weeks of oral arguments before delivering their verdict.

The case came to the court at the request of the UNGA after a resolution led by Vanuatu was adopted by consensus in March 2023.

Wednesday’s vote, by contrast, attracted a number of objections, with Belarus, Iran, Israel, Liberia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United States and Yemen voting no.

Al Jazeera reported in February that the US had sent a diplomatic cable urging UN member states not to support the resolution.

“We are strongly urging Vanuatu to immediately withdraw its draft resolution and cease attempting to wield the Court’s Advisory Opinion as a basis for creating an avenue to pursue any misguided claims of international legal obligations,” a copy of the cable seen by Al Jazeera stated.

Wesley Morgan, a fellow with the Climate Council, an Australian nonprofit, said the vote confirmed states had a legal duty to act on climate change.

“This landmark resolution is a massive victory for Vanuatu and the Pacific leaders who have spent decades fighting for survival on the frontlines of the climate crisis and a warning for Australian governments,” Morgan said in a statement.

“For far too long, fossil fuel heavyweights have treated climate action as a political choice, but the UN General Assembly has now confirmed it is a binding legal duty,” he added.

Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in China on Tuesday evening for a two-day visit centred on talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, as Moscow and Beijing draw closer amid war, sanctions and an increasingly fractured global order.

Putin’s visit is the second face-to-face meeting he has held with Xi in less than a year and coincides with the 25th anniversary of the 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, the agreement that formalised ties between Russia and China following decades of ideological rivalry and mutual suspicion.

The visit comes just days after United States President Donald Trump left Beijing following his own two-day visit to the Chinese capital for meetings with Xi.

Both Moscow and Beijing are navigating tricky relations with Washington, with analysts saying the unpredictability of Trump’s foreign policy has had the effect of pushing Russia and China even closer together.

Their deepening partnership also comes against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, mounting tensions around Iran, and disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz – a crisis that has rattled global energy markets and renewed Beijing’s concerns over the security of its oil and gas supplies.

With one of the world’s most strategically vital waterways under threat, China has increasingly turned towards Russia as a reliable overland energy supplier.

Analysts say Xi’s decision to host Trump and Putin within the space of a week is no coincidence, reflecting Beijing’s attempt to cast itself as a trusted actor in an increasingly fragmented and volatile world order.

How have China-Russia relations changed over the decades?

China and Russia have long occupied a complicated place in each other’s histories. Once bound together through communist ideology and shared opposition to Western capitalism, the Soviet Union and Maoist China later became bitter rivals, with tensions along their 4,300km (2,670-mile) border bringing the two countries close to conflict during the Cold War.

However, that border has since transformed from a frontier of insecurity into one of strategic cooperation and trade.

Neither Xi nor Putin is a frequent international traveller. Putin is the subject of an International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant over the war in Ukraine, while Xi rarely leaves China other than for carefully choreographed state visits. But both leaders have invested heavily in maintaining personal ties with each other.

The two have repeatedly called each other “friends”, and their relationship has deepened, particularly since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which pushed Moscow further into international isolation and forced the Kremlin to look southeastwards for trade amid Western sanctions.

“Russia and China look confidently towards the future,” Putin said in remarks carried by Russian state media ahead of the visit.

He said the two countries were “actively developing cooperation in politics, economics, defence, expanding cultural exchanges, and fostering interpersonal interaction”.

“In essence, jointly doing everything to deepen bilateral cooperation and advance global development for the wellbeing of both nations,” Putin added.

Why Russia needs China

China has become an economic lifeline for Russia as the country’s economy has shifted to a wartime footing, with two-way trade between the countries more than doubling between 2020 and 2024, when it reached $237bn for the year.

But the relationship is also uneven. While China is Russia’s largest trading partner, Russia accounts for only about four percent of China’s total international trade. China’s economy is also vastly larger, and Beijing holds considerably more leverage in negotiations between the two sides.

Since the invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has become increasingly reliant on Chinese technology and manufacturing. A recent Bloomberg report found Russia was sourcing more than 90 percent of its sanctioned technology imports from China, including components with military and dual-use applications vital to drone production and other defence industries.

China has also emerged as a crucial buyer of Russian oil and other energy products at a time when European markets have largely closed to Moscow in response to the Russia-Ukraine war. With Western sanctions restricting Russia’s options, the Kremlin has few viable alternatives to China’s scale of demand.

Analysts say the imbalance means Beijing is often able to negotiate from a position of strength, securing access to Russian oil and gas at discounted prices while expanding its influence over Moscow’s economic future.

Why China still needs Russia

While the relationship is uneven, it is not one-sided. Russia provides something increasingly valuable in a turbulent world: secure access to vast energy resources beyond vulnerable maritime trade routes.

The war surrounding Iran and disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz have heightened Beijing’s concerns over energy security, given China’s heavy dependence on imported oil and gas passing through contested shipping lanes.

That has renewed attention on the proposed Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, a long-delayed project expected to feature prominently in this week’s discussions.

If completed, the pipeline would transport 50 billion cubic metres of Russian gas annually to China via Mongolia, significantly expanding energy flows between the two countries.

But it is more than just an economic relationship. China also values Russia as a geopolitical partner. Both countries are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and frequently align diplomatically in opposition to US-led policies.

While analysts say China has been careful not to become formally tied to Moscow through a rigid military alliance, the two countries have still gradually reinforced their partnership through increasingly regular joint military exercises, including the “Joint Sea” naval drills that began in 2012.

Last year, China and Russia launched fresh naval drills in the Sea of Japan near the Russian port of Vladivostok, with exercises focused on submarine rescue, anti-submarine warfare, air defence, missile defence and maritime combat operations. Analysts say the drills help signal strategic alignment between Beijing and Moscow without the mutual defence commitments of a formal alliance.

Experts say the strength of the partnership lies in its flexibility. While Western governments have often portrayed the relationship as fragile and driven largely by a shared opposition to the West, analysts say, it may prove more durable because it is rooted in shared economic and strategic interests rather than ideology alone.

Uzbekistan’s National Investment Fund, known as UzNIF, began trading on the London Stock Exchange on Monday, marking the country’s first international equity offering.

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The fund, which is managed by Franklin Templeton, also launched simultaneously on the Tashkent Stock Exchange through a dual listing structure, bringing Uzbek state-linked assets to international equity markets for the first time.

The opening ceremony at the London Stock Exchange brought together executives, investors and Uzbek officials, with speakers presenting the listing as a significant step in the country’s efforts to expand access to international capital markets.

First international equity offering

Speaking during the ceremony, Julia Hoggett, Chief Executive Officer of the London Stock Exchange, described the IPO as “the first ever international IPO out of Uzbekistan” and said the transaction could help “more global investment to flow” into the country’s economy.

Hoggett also said the dual listing marked “a new chapter both in London and in Tashkent”, adding that the offering connected international investors with a portfolio of Uzbek companies through a single fund managed by an international asset manager.

Saida Mirziyoyeva, Head of the Administration of the President of Uzbekistan, said Uzbekistan was preparing “new listings” and expanding private sector participation, while also working on plans linked to the proposed Tashkent International Financial Centre.

Speaking from the London Stock Exchange balcony, Mirziyoyeva said the IPO was “not just about raising capital” but also about “building trust in a new generation of Uzbek institutions”.

Jenny Johnson, President and Chief Executive Officer of Franklin Templeton, described the IPO as “a defining and historic milestone” for both Uzbekistan and Franklin Templeton, saying the transaction had generated more than $2.8 billion in investor demand globally.

Johnson said orders exceeded the initial offering by more than four times during the bookbuilding process, which ran from late April to mid-May. She added that the domestic offering in Tashkent had become the country’s “largest local listing to date”, allowing local investors to participate alongside international institutional funds.

International investors and state assets

Thirty percent of the fund’s shares were offered internationally through global depositary receipts, while part of the allocation was also made available to domestic investors through the Tashkent Stock Exchange.

According to previously released information from the fund and its advisers, international demand reached around $2.9 billion (€2.6bn), with more than 160 institutional investors participating in the offering. Among them were BlackRock, Franklin Templeton and Redwheel.

The IPO raised approximately $603.6 million (€540m), valuing the fund at around $1.95 billion (€1.74bn) at the offer price. The shares were sold by Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Economy and Finance, meaning the proceeds from the transaction will go to the state rather than directly to the fund itself.

The international tranche included more than 23 million global depositary receipts, or GDRs, listed in London under the trading symbols UZNF and UZ20. One GDR represents 64,700 shares in the fund.

Cornerstone investors, including funds and accounts managed by BlackRock, Franklin Resources and Redwheel, as well as treasury companies linked to the Allan & Gill Gray Foundation, committed a combined $300 million (€268m) to the offering.

UzNIF was established in 2024 under a presidential decree and is managed by Franklin Templeton, the US-based investment company that oversees more than $1.4 trillion (€1.25 trn) in assets globally and operates in more than 150 countries.

The fund’s portfolio includes stakes in 13 state-linked companies operating in sectors considered strategic for the Uzbek economy, including electricity distribution, thermal power generation, hydropower, telecommunications, aviation, rail infrastructure, utilities and banking.

Among the companies included in the portfolio are Uzbektelecom, Uzbekistan Airways, Uzbekhydroenergo and several state energy and infrastructure operators.

The listing also reflects broader efforts to develop domestic capital markets in Uzbekistan and increase participation from local investors alongside international institutions.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi says his talks with the Dutch PM also focused on expanding cooperation in defence and security.

India’s Tata Electronics has signed a deal with Dutch technology giant ASML to build a major semiconductor plant in western India, as Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited the Netherlands during his European tour.

The agreement, announced on Saturday, will support the development of Tata’s semiconductor facility in Dholera, Gujarat – Modi’s home state.

ASML, Europe’s largest technology company by market value, manufactures advanced lithography machines used to produce high-end microchips found in products ranging from mobile phones to cars.

The Dutch company said it would help “establish and ramp up” production at the plant by supplying its cutting-edge chipmaking tools.

Tata Electronics plans to invest $11bn in the facility, which is expected to manufacture chips for artificial intelligence, the automotive industry and other sectors.

ASML chief executive Christophe Fouquet said the company saw “many compelling opportunities” in India’s growing semiconductor industry.

“We are committed to establishing long-term partnerships in the region,” Fouquet said in a statement.

The deal comes as India and the Netherlands move to deepen economic ties, with New Delhi seeking foreign technology and investment to boost manufacturing and create jobs.

The European Union has increasingly viewed India – the world’s most populous country and one of its fastest-growing economies – as a key future market.

During his visit, Modi held talks with Dutch Prime Minister Rob Jetten and met King Willem-Alexander.

“My conversations with Prime Minister Rob Jetten were extensive and covered a wide range of topics,” Modi wrote on X.

“One of them was defense and security. I spoke about the possibility of drawing up an action plan for the defense industry as quickly as possible. We can also collaborate in sectors such as space travel, maritime systems, and maritime security.”

Modi also addressed members of the Indian diaspora and is expected to inspect centuries-old Chola copper plates being returned to India by Leiden University.

Indian and Dutch officials are also discussing a more flexible visa arrangement for Indian students and workers in the Netherlands.

Modi will next travel to Sweden for talks with Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson focused on trade, innovation and green technology cooperation. The visit marks his second trip to the country since attending the first India-Nordic summit in 2018.

The Hague in the Netherlands hosts the world’s most powerful international courts, where judges speak for the conscience of humanity. Yet we consult them only after atrocities have erupted – after wars have shattered communities and legal battles begin.

In theory, law can hold power to account. But has it been enough? Can it truly confront militarism, prevent atrocities, and protect people before disaster strikes?

Join Ali Rae for episode two of All Hail the Military, a five-part series that reveals the systems, power, and hidden complicities that sustain global militarism – and the profound impact it has on us all.

The Philadelphia Eagles will play in London as part of the NFL’s international games next season.

The NFL will stage a record nine regular-season games overseas during 2026, with three in the UK while Australia and France are hosts for the first time.

The London series begins on 4 October with the Washington Commanders hosting the Indianapolis Colts at Tottenham Hotspur Stadium.

The Jacksonville Jaguars will then host games on the following two Sundays against the Eagles at Tottenham then the Houston Texans at Wembley.

The first international game will take place during the first week of the season, with the Los Angeles Rams having a divisional match-up against the San Francisco 49ers at the iconic Melbourne Cricket Ground.

The 49ers will also face the Minnesota Vikings as the NFL returns to Mexico, while the Baltimore Ravens meet the Dallas Cowboys in the league’s first game in Rio de Janeiro.

There will be three games in continental Europe, with the New Orleans Saints facing the Pittsburgh Steelers as Paris hosts its first game at the Stade de France.

The Cincinnati Bengals then face the Atlanta Falcons at the home of Real Madrid while the New England Patriots, who reached last season’s Super Bowl, will take on the Detroit Lions in Munich.

International Olympic Committee urges sporting bodies to let Belarusian athletes compete again without vetting as neutrals.

Athletes from Belarus should once again compete with their full national identity and not be vetted for neutral status, the International Olympic Committee has said.

Though the advice to sports governing bodies does not yet apply also to Russia, it seemed to point towards being closer to ending Russia’s isolation in Olympic circles during its war on Ukraine.

One barrier to Russia’s return is an ongoing World Anti-Doping Agency investigation into recent reports implicating Russian anti-doping agency official Veronika Loginova.

The IOC said its executive board noted “with concern the recent information” being looked at by WADA, without naming Loginova.

Athletes from Russia and Belarus had to be approved as neutrals who did not support the war for individual events at the 2024 Paris Olympics and February’s Milano Cortina Winter Olympics. A total of 32 athletes from the two countries competed in Paris, to win five medals combined, including one gold in trampoline by an athlete from Belarus.

“The IOC reaffirms that athletes’ participation in international competition should not be limited by the actions of their governments, including involvement in a war or conflict,” the Olympic body said on Thursday.

The IOC noted the qualification period for the 2028 Los Angeles Olympics “starts this summer.”

The Russian Olympic Committee has been suspended by the IOC since October 2023 for incorporating regional sports bodies in illegally occupied eastern Ukraine.

“Whilst the ROC has held constructive exchanges with the IOC on its suspension,” the IOC said, “it remains suspended while the IOC Legal Affairs Commission continues to review the matter.”

Workers are gathering in cities around the world to mark International Labour Day, with some demonstrations, such as those in Istanbul, Turkiye, turning to scuffles with police.

Trade Unions are calling for solidarity and the protection of workers’ rights as the United States-Israeli war on Iran and rising energy costs raise concerns about the global economy.

“Working people refuse to pay the price for Donald Trump’s war in the Middle East,” the European Trade Union Confederation, which represents 93 trade union organisations in 41 European countries, told the media. “Today’s rallies show working people will not stand by and see their jobs and living standards destroyed.”

Josua Mata, leader of the SENTRO umbrella group of workers’ groups in the Philippines, said: “Every Filipino worker now is aware that the situation here is deeply connected to the global crisis.”

Renato Reyes, a leader of the left-wing political group Bayan in the Philippines, told The Associated Press: “There will be a louder call for higher wages and economic relief because of the unprecedented spikes in fuel prices.”

In Indonesia, Said Iqbal, president of the Indonesian Trade Union Confederation, told reporters: “Workers are already living pay cheque to pay cheque.”

Some of the largest demonstrations are being held in South America, including in Chile, Bolivia and Venezuela. In Argentina, angry workers protested on Thursday in the capital of Buenos Aires over President Javier Milei’s recent overhaul of long-held labour protections.

In Cuba, the foreign ministry held a gathering on Thursday in defiance of what it called the US’s “aggressions, threats, intensified blockade, and energy siege”.

On Friday, Cubans are expected to mark International Labour Day with a mass rally and a march in Havana.

In many countries, Labour Day rallies attract large crowds because May 1 is a public holiday. In the Turkish city of Istanbul, roads around Taksim Square were closed to make way for marches during the day. Later on Friday, demonstrators clashed with police, international media reported.

In France, where most people have the day off for May Day, workers’ unions using the slogan “bread, peace and freedom” called for protests in Paris and other cities.

Global recession fears

Fears of a global recession are looming over Labour Day rallies at a time when income inequality is growing.

In Gaza, Palestinian workers have cancelled May Day events because of the economic crisis caused by Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza and poor conditions on the ground.

The Palestinian General Federation of Trade Unions said that about 550,000 workers across Gaza and the West Bank have no income and that the situation is unprecedented.

The International Trade Union Confederation has reported that at least four CEOs of major corporations each pocketed more than $100m in pay and bonuses last year, while many workers are facing potential job cuts.

Workers’ rights coalitions are calling for urgent action to curb extreme wealth. They want governments to impose higher, fairer taxes on the wealthiest and limit excessive executive pay.

While Labour Day began in the US, when workers protested for an eight-hour workday in the 1880s, the US does not count May Day as a public holiday.

However, an umbrella group of activist and workers’ groups known as May Day Strong has called for protests under the slogan, “workers over billionaires”. Hundreds of demonstrations and marches have been planned across the US.

April 30 (UPI) — Israeli forces intercepted and boarded the Global Sumud Flotilla in international waters off Greece on Thursday, preventing it from delivering aid to Gaza and drawing international condemnation.

The Israeli military, using drones and armed personnel, blocked the fleet of ships in the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of the Greek island of Crete. Twenty-two of 58 vessels were seized, with passengers held at gunpoint.

“Our boats were approached by military speedboats, self-identified as ‘Israel’, pointing lasers and semi-automatic assault weapons, ordering participants to the front of the boats and to get on their hands and knees,” the Global Sumud Flotilla aid mission said in a statement.

The Israeli Foreign Ministry said in a social media statement on Thursday that it detained about 175 activists from the more than 20 boats of the flotilla.

“Well done to our Navy!” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in a statement following the operation, stating he had directed the military to intercept the boats before they reached Gaza.

“No ship and no Hamas supporter reached our territory, and not even our territorial waters. They were turned back and will return to their countries of origin.”

The flotilla was sailing from Barcelona, Spain, to Gaza when its ships were intercepted. Crete is more than 700 miles from the Palestinian enclave.

The Global Sumud Flotilla social media page posted that Israeli forces smashed engines and destroyed navigation arrays on its ships before retreating.

“Intentionally leaving hundreds of civilians stranded on powerless, broken vessels directly in the path of a massive approaching storm,” the social media post reads. “Furthermore, communications with multiple vessels have been jammed, severing their ability to coordinate or signal for help.”

Israel has maintained a maritime blockade of Gaza since 2009. It has said the blockade is meant to block weapons smuggling to Gaza.

The Israeli Foreign Ministry called the aid flotilla a “PR stunt.”

“As international media have exposed, these are professional provocateurs on pleasure cruises, addicted to self-promotion,” the Israeli Foreign Ministry wrote on social media.

Numerous countries, politicians and human rights organizations voiced condemnation of the Israeli operation, with a dozen-country bloc, including Brazil, Pakistan, Spain, Malaysia and South Africa, describing the interception as an “Israeli assault” on a peaceful civilian humanitarian initiative.

“The Israeli attacks against the vessels and the unlawful detention of humanitarian activists in international waters constitute flagrant violations of international humanitarian law,” the bloc said in a statement.

Italian President Giorgia Meloni separately condemned the seizure, while Turkey’s Foreign Ministry called upon the international community “to adopt a unified stance against this unlawful act by Israel.”

The U.S. State Department, meanwhile, issued a statement condemning the flotilla.

A prominent shipping organisation has condemned the United States and Iran’s tit-for-tat capture of commercial ships and is calling for the immediate release of their crews.

In an interview with Al Jazeera, John Stawpert, marine director of the International Chamber of Shipping, said seafarers must be allowed to go about their business “freely and without persecution”.

Stawpert, whose organisation is the top trade association for merchant shipowners and operators worldwide, called the capture of the vessels an affront to freedom of navigation as enshrined in international law.

“All these people are doing is transporting trade. And really, we can’t have a situation where ships are being seized, ultimately for political ends, to prove a political point,” said Stawpert, whose organisation represents about 80 percent of the world’s merchant fleet.

“These are innocent farers and they should be allowed to go about their jobs without fear of, essentially, imprisonment.”

Stawpert said Iran’s stated wish to charge tolls in the Strait of Hormuz had no basis in international law and would set a dangerous precedent.

“If you can do it in the Strait of Hormuz, why can’t you do it in the Strait of Gibraltar, say, or the Straits of Malacca?” he asked.

Stawpert also said the US President Donald Trump’s naval blockade of Iranian ports had heaped further uncertainty on shipping companies already reeling from Iran’s effective closure of the strait.

“We don’t know what conditions are in place. We don’t know what the targeting criteria of Iran are really,” Stawpert said. “And so we then have another state coming in, effectively doing the same thing through the blockade of the straits”.

The US and Iranian militaries have each announced the capture of two commercial vessels over the past week as Washington and Tehran continue to face off in the strait and in waters beyond the Gulf.

The US defence department on Thursday said it had captured the Iran-linked Majestic X as it was transporting sanctioned oil in the Indian Ocean, days after announcing the interception of another ship, Tifani.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on Wednesday said it seized the Panamanian-flagged MSC Francesca and the Greek-owned Epaminondas for “operating without the necessary permits and tampering with navigation systems”.

The Philippines’ Department of Migrant Workers on Wednesday confirmed 15 Filipino seafarers were on the two vessels.

Officials said they had been assured by Iranian authorities that all the crew were “unharmed” and “safe.”

Montenegro’s maritime minister, Filip Radulovic, said in an interview with the state broadcaster earlier this week that four Montenegrin crew on the MSC Francesca were “fine”.

There have been no official updates on the condition of the crews on the vessels captured by US forces.

“It seems they’re not being maltreated,” Stawpert said. “But even so, that’s not really the point. The point is they shouldn’t be in custody in the first place”.

Stawpert also expressed concern for the well-being of an estimated 20,000 seafarers who have been left stranded in the Gulf due to the effective closure of the strait.

“Their welfare is also a priority for us,” he said. “The psychological burden, I think, will be beginning to tell on them after seven weeks now of what’s, to all intents and purposes, house arrest”.

Stawpert called on both the US and Iran to respect freedom of navigation.

“Let’s resume freedom of navigation and respect the right to innocent passage as soon as we possibly can,” he said.

The blockage of the strait, which usually carries about one-fifth of global oil and natural gas supplies, has driven up fuel prices worldwide and forced many governments to start emergency energy-saving measures.

Traffic in the waterway remains a fraction of pre-war levels, with reports saying just five ships transited the strait in the last 24 hours.

Before the US and Israel launched their war against Iran on February 28, the strait saw a daily average of 129 transits, according to the United Nations Trade and Development.

Amnesty International and dozens of U.S. civil and human rights groups issued a “ World Cup travel advisory” Thursday, warning tournament visitors of “rising authoritarianism and increasing violence” in the United States during President Trump’s aggressive immigration enforcement.

The groups said the advisory was necessary “in light of the deteriorating human rights situation in the United States and in the absence of meaningful action and concrete guarantees from FIFA, host cities, or the U.S. government.”

The advisory says visitors may be arbitrarily denied entry to the country, detained in “inhumane” conditions or subjected to invasive phone and social media searches. It points to the aggressive immigration surges in cities including Los Angeles, Chicago and Minneapolis that led to accusations of racial profiling and the violent suppression of protests.

The message was condemned by tourism officials, who said the groups were threatening the livelihoods of service industry workers in an attempt to achieve their political goals.

Geoff Freeman, president & CEO of the U.S. Travel Association, said there are legitimate concerns about U.S. entry policies but they’re being blown out of proportion. There were 67 million international travelers to the United States last year, he said in a statement.

“The notion that visiting America poses a meaningful safety risk is not a good-faith warning, it’s a political tactic designed to cause economic harm,” Freeman said.

A FIFA spokesperson pointed to several statements and policies, including the federation’s governing documents, which say, “FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognized human rights and shall strive to promote the protection of these rights.”

The U.S. has seen a decline in international travelers since Trump returned to the White House last year and offended U.S. allies with talk of making Canada a U.S. state, taking control of Greenland and questioning the value of NATO. The tourism industry is counting on a major boost from World Cup visitors, even as Trump’s travel ban for citizens of 19 countries has injected further uncertainty.

The administration is betting that its push to expedite visa processing for visitors and excitement about the tournament will outweigh concerns that Trump’s immigration messaging undercuts the theme of global unity that the World Cup is meant to represent.

The tournament kicks off June 11 with games spread across North America, including 11 stadiums in the U.S. along with two in Canada and three in Mexico.

Cooper writes for the Associated Press.

April 22 (UPI) — Amnesty International said Venezuela has not dismantled its “repressive apparatus” nearly four months after former President Nicolás Maduro was arrested in a U.S. military operation.

During the presentation of its annual report in Bogotá, the organization said the country’s system of repression remains fully operational under the interim government led by Delcy Rodríguez.

Valentina Ballesta, research director for the Americas at Amnesty International, said Tuesday that Venezuela’s repressive structure continues to operate despite the political transition, according to reports by Infobae.

According to the report, Maduro’s government maintained a policy of systematic repression throughout 2025, with all branches of the state acting in coordination.

Amnesty International said authorities continue to use arbitrary detentions, forced disappearances and torture as tools of social control.

“These are not isolated incidents, but rather a pattern that amounts to crimes against humanity,” the report said.

The organization documented hundreds of cases in which detainees faced judicial proceedings without basic legal guarantees, including ineffective public defenders, the use of special anti-terrorism courts, lack of access to charges and repeated violations of due process rights.

Amnesty International also criticized the implementation of the Amnesty Law approved in February, saying its enforcement has been arbitrary and selective.

Many requests for relief were rejected without explanation, while some people initially granted benefits later had those measures reversed, according to Venezuelan news outlet Efecto Cocuyo.

While the nongovernmental organization Foro Penal and other groups confirmed the release of 673 political prisoners between Maduro’s capture and mid-April, Rodríguez’s government has reported much higher figures as part of what it described as “peace and reconciliation” measures.

In March 2026, government spokespeople said as many as 7,000 people had been granted full release or alternative legal measures. That figure, however, includes common criminals and people already serving conditional release.

Foro Penal said nearly 500 political prisoners remain in detention.

The Amnesty International report said impunity remains the driving force behind Venezuela’s repressive system and warned that the lack of an independent judiciary prevents victims from obtaining justice inside the country.

Analist also pointed to the recent restructuring of the Attorney General’s Office as an example of political control. The move replaced an official close to Maduro with another figure aligned with the Rodríguez political faction, which currently controls both the interim presidency and the National Assembly.

About 7.9 million Venezuelans have fled the country since 2015. Nearly 2 million people depend on international humanitarian aid, while severe shortages in basic services such as water, electricity and food persist, the report said.

Amnesty International further warned about the growing use of new technologies and artificial intelligence for population surveillance, along with continued harassment of journalists and human rights advocates.

Without a genuine dismantling of coercive state structures, Amnesty International said, Venezuela will not be able to restore fundamental freedoms.

On Sunday night, tens of thousands of Hungarians packed the banks of the Danube waving flags, crying of joy, popping bottles. Celebrating something that political analysts had spent years telling them was almost impossible: the electoral defeat of Viktor Orbán, the autocrat whose ploys and manipulations made him a uniquely disturbing force in the European Union. After 16 years in power, Hungary’s self-proclaimed architect of “illiberal democracy” conceded defeat within hours of the polls closing.

His rival, Péter Magyar (the equivalent of Pedro Veneco), had won 137 seats in a 199-seat parliament, a two-thirds supermajority that gave him not just a government, but the ability to rewrite the very constitution Orbán had rigged to protect himself. This appears to be the plan.

Venezuelans watching from afar could be forgiven for feeling two things at once: genuine joy, and a familiar, creeping doubt. 

Sure, but that’s Hungary.

The doubt is understandable. It’s also, at this particular moment in Venezuelan history, worth interrogating.

To understand whether Hungary provides a useful lesson, we need to venture farther than our diasporic links, like La Danubio, Catherine Fulop and Shirley Varnagy. You first need a category distinction that political scientists call the difference between a closed authoritarian regime and a competitive one. A closed autocracy doesn’t bother with the pretense of real elections. Or when it does, it simply invents the results. Especially after July 2024, Venezuela had become exactly this: we all know what happened. Politically, there was no game to play unless you played by the regime’s rules. The game was a charade. 

Orbán’s Hungary was something different, more insidious. Similar to what Chávez did to the institutions in the 2000s, while using hyper-ideological and reactionary rhetoric. The European Parliament had classified it as a “hybrid regime of electoral autocracy.” Orbán bent every institution he could reach: the judiciary, the media, the electoral rules themselves.

The scene on the Danube on Sunday night was a piece of great news in a political era that doesn’t offer many of them. The scenes in Budapest matter to us. But it shouldn’t be mistaken for a mirror.

He gerrymandered the system to favor the largest single party, confident that party would always be his. But he never quite crossed the line into fabricating vote counts, à la Maduro or Lukashenko. The game was still real, even if the playing field was tilted.

That distinction is now relevant because Venezuela’s political reality has shifted in ways that were unimaginable five months ago. The current regime Delcy Rodríguez leads is not identical to that of 2024 and 2025. Under US pressure, a few hundred political prisoners have been released and an amnesty law was approved in February. albeit with mixed results (more than 500 political prisoners are still behind bars, and amnesty has been formally denied to high-profile politicians and NGO leaders like Javier Tarazona). Overall, we see gestures that try to transmit magnanimity, but are moves meant to look like compliance while chavismo waits for Washington’s attention to wander.

But here’s the thing: even performative openings create real cracks, and the cracks are showing. In February alone, Venezuela has recorded dozens of protests, an exponential increase compared to the same month in 2025. Workers and students have taken to the streets of Caracas four times this year demanding salary increases, openly calling on the Rodríguez siblings to answer for their pleas. Last weekend in Valencia, in a football game between Carabobo and Universidad Central (a game which has enough backdrop to make a book about it), football fans directed chants against the son of Alexander Granko Arteaga (who plays for UCV): “¡Dónde están que no se ven, los enchufados de la UCV,” loud enough so it could be hear transmission (that would translate roughly to “nowhere to be seen, the UCV cronies are nowhere to be seen”). In 2025, that chant would have landed them in jail. That was exactly the outcome in the last domestic football final.

Waiting for the opportunity

Venezuela is still not a democracy. But the differences remain significant: a regime slowly, reluctantly slipping out of its authoritarian fortress, coming to terms with the fact that it will eventually have to face a reckoning at the ballot box. That’s what happened to Orbán. He controlled the courts, the media, the electoral geometry, and still got swept out because of the accumulated weight of economic failure, corruption, and sheer exhaustion that eventually overwhelmed the machinery he had built.

The lesson is not that rigged systems are beatable through optimism. It is that rigged systems have structural limits, and that opposition alliances which survive long enough, and build broad enough coalitions, tend to be standing when those limits are reached. In our case, we’ve seen all possible iterations of what an opposition can be. In 2024, the Maria Corina-led movement became the most formidable electoral force the country has seen in a while. That should have been our Orbán down moment. Nonetheless, the inertia we have seen since the beginning of the year is too good to let it slip away.

Political scientist Yascha Mounk, writing about Magyar’s victory, made an interesting observation that some might believe applies to Venezuelan democratic forces: the Hungarian opposition ousted Orbán on its fourth try, after years of humiliation, internal divisions and strategic errors. Patience, he argues, is its own form of political discipline.

This is Mounk’s post-populist dilemma, live, and a miniature preview of what a potential democratic government in Caracas would have in front of itself.

Again, the Venezuelan opposition doesn’t need that lesson. It already learned it, the hard way, and on a harder playing field. In 2015, it won a supermajority in the Asamblea and watched its powers get neutered one by one. In July 2024, it beat Maduro overwhelmingly and proved its victory with the official tally sheets. Edmundo González Urrutia did not become president because the movement backing him lacked organization, or coalition-building, or the kind of credible leadership that Magyar built from scratch since leaving Orban’s party two years ago. González Urrutia failed to take power because the regime decided that electoral results were optional.

The question was never whether the Venezuelan opposition could win an election. They already did in a way that should clarify the terrain for future opportunities. The actas and the popular support are powerful symbols that should endure. The question is whether they can repeat that performance, seizing the minimal opening they have in front of them whatever the broader circumstances. Then yes, the patience Mounk mentions is relevant.

The post-autocracy trap

Mounk is right to poop the party a little bit with a warning he calls the “post-populist dilemma.” Even with his supermajority, Magyar inherits a State that Orbán hollowed out and refilled with loyalists. He has two options: either fire them and bring about an anti-Fidesz purge; or leave them in place and be sabotaged from within. In his first week in power, Magyar is showing he wants to go for the first option. He has already called for the resignation of several key ministers of the Orban regime.

Venezuela would face this dilemma on steroids. Chavismo has had 27 years to embed itself across nearly everything. Rodríguez herself operates within a questionable agency on security forces (a certain someone remains interior minister and vice president for security). Any future Venezuelan government elected under competitive conditions would inherit an institutional landscape far more captured and complex than anything Magyar faces in Budapest.

This is not a reason for despair, but it does require confronting an uncomfortable asymmetry. When Magyar navigated Hungary’s post-populist transition, he did so with the EU at his back, a bloc that had spent years dangling billions in frozen funds as an incentive for democratic reform, and whose membership gave Hungarian voters a concrete, tangible alternative to Orbán’s model. Venezuela’s external anchor is the Trump administration, which has been explicit about its priorities: oil first, stability second, elections somewhere further down the list. Rubio’s three-phase roadmap (stabilization, economic recovery, reconciliation and transition) is not an explicit democratic transition plan. It is a business plan with democracy on the side.

Preparation, then, means the opposition must be the one holding the democratic line demanding verifiable electoral conditions, refusing to let institutional reform become a performance to please DC, and cementing a coalition broad enough that can translate the popular inertia and mood towards a margin so big it can’t be tweaked. The EU didn’t save Hungary. Hungarians did. The lesson travels.

Magyar won because Hungarians were organized, patient and ready when the moment arrived. Venezuelans have already proven they can do the same.

Magyar isn’t waiting. Within 72 hours of his victory, he demanded that Hungary’s president resign immediately, and sent the same message to the heads of the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, the State Audit Office and the media authority calling them “puppets who have been in power for the past 16 years.” On Wednesday morning, in his first radio interview in over a year and a half, he told the State broadcaster its news operation would be shut down and relaunched as a true public service. Some are already calling it a witch hunt. Others call it the bare minimum required to transform the country.

This is Mounk’s post-populist dilemma, live, and a miniature preview of what a potential democratic government in Caracas would have in front of itself. If Magyar, armed with a two-thirds supermajority and the EU at his back, is already navigating accusations of overreach on day three, imagine what a Venezuelan opposition government would face trying to dismantle 27 years of institutional occupation in the police, intelligence agencies, the military, the public media, the judiciary. The task ahead is massive, and solving the dilemma probably requires an orderly phase-out agreed before the next presidential vote.

The scene on the Danube on Sunday night was a piece of great news in a political era that doesn’t offer many of them. The scenes in Budapest matter to us. But it shouldn’t be mistaken for a mirror.

Venezuela is not Hungary. Delcy is not Orbán, she is arguably more pragmatic, but also more constrained. Orbán was a standalone autocrat who built his system around his own political survival. Rodríguez governs by a permanent balancing act: between Washington’s demands, the military high command, the hardline faction and other peripheral actors. The competitive opening, if it comes, will be narrower, more fragile and more dangerous than anything Magyar navigated.

These are reasons to take the Hungarian lesson seriously without taking it literally. Magyar won because Hungarians were organized, patient and ready when the moment arrived. Venezuelans have already proven they can do the same. The question now is simpler, and harder: when the moment comes again, can the popular will (and not just the results) be allowed to stand?