International Trade

Early signs point to the United States and China moving towards a relationship focused on pragmatic areas of common interest following US President Donald Trump’s trip to China, according to analysts, setting aside the turmoil that marked 2025.

Trump was in Beijing for three days this week to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping, accompanied by a delegation of American CEOs, including the heads of Apple, Nvidia, BlackRock and Goldman Sachs.

The meeting between the two leaders came just over six months after they agreed to pause the US-China trade war for a year on the sidelines of a multilateral summit in South Korea. While a frequent critic of China’s economic policies at home, Trump appeared to get along with Xi in person throughout his trip and lavished praise on the Chinese leader.

“It’s an honour to be with you, it’s an honour to be your friend, and the relationship between China and the USA is going to be better than ever before,” Trump told Xi on Thursday.

The White House readout of the Trump-Xi meeting on Thursday stressed areas of common ground, stating that the leaders had “discussed ways to enhance economic cooperation between our two countries” by “expanding market access for American businesses into China and increasing Chinese investment into our industries”.

Notably absent from the statement was any mention of China’s export controls on rare earths, critical materials used across the tech, defence and energy sectors. China controls nearly the entire industry, and it has moved to restrict US access.

William Yang, senior Northeast Asia analyst at the Crisis Group, told Al Jazeera that Trump’s remarks showed he would likely try to compartmentalise US-China relations into areas where the two sides can work together without being overshadowed by geopolitical concerns.

Xi, while less effusive, also spoke of his desire to move towards a new US-China framework based on “constructive strategic stability”, meaning that the US and China should try to “minimise competition, manage differences and allow stability to be the foundation of the bilateral relationship”, according to Yang.

Both leaders appear to have sidestepped other controversial issues, such as the status of Taiwan, a 23 million-person democracy claimed by Beijing but unofficially backed by Washington.

Xi told Trump during their meeting that Taiwan was the “most important issue” in the US-China relationship, and that mishandling it could lead to “clashes and even conflicts” between the two sides. Beijing objects to Washington’s ongoing military support of Taiwan and has pressed the US to take a more explicit line on Taiwan’s political status.

Although the US does not recognise the government in Taipei, it maintains a deliberately vague policy on China’s territorial claims. Despite the controversy, neither the Chinese nor the US readout mentioned whether Trump discussed Taiwan or the future of arms sales – suggesting he either disagreed with Xi or avoided the topic.

Analysts like Yang say it is still too soon to know whether Trump will heed Xi’s remarks by blocking or delaying a $14bn arms deal reportedly in the works for Taiwan. The deal would need Trump’s sign-off to move forward, according to US legislators.

Xi was equally circumspect on Iran and the Strait of Hormuz, which has been shuttered since the US and Israel launched a war on Iran on February 28.

Trump has previously pushed China to encourage Iran to reopen the strait, through which a fifth of the world’s oil and gas passed each year before the war, because of its close relationship with Tehran. China and Iran signed a 25-year “strategic partnership” in 2021, and Beijing buys 80 to 90 percent of Iran’s oil annually.

Trump raised the points again in his meeting with Xi in Beijing, according to the US readout, which said the two leaders “agreed that the Strait of Hormuz must remain open to support the free flow of energy”.

“President Xi also made clear China’s opposition to the militarisation of the Strait and any effort to charge a toll for its use, and he expressed interest in purchasing more American oil to reduce China’s dependence on the Strait in the future. Both countries agreed that Iran can never have a nuclear weapon,” the readout said.

The Chinese readout of their meeting on Thursday did not include mention of Iran or its nuclear programme.

Chucheng Feng, founding partner of Hutong Research based in Beijing, told Al Jazeera that the omissions reflect that Xi and Trump still disagree on key issues, including Iran, but that the overall message from the summit was a desire to move forward.

“For Beijing, the most important thing is to find a floor for the relationship, to set up and enhance guardrails so that no surprises or uncontrolled escalations suddenly emerge. For that, item-by-item disagreements are largely secondary,” he said.

Before arriving for his high-stakes summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, United States President Donald Trump aimed to set expectations high.

He said he would urge Xi to “open up” China’s economy and announced a delegation of top business executives, including Tesla’s Elon Musk, Apple’s Tim Cook and Nvidia’s Jensen Huang, to accompany him.

As Trump and Xi prepare to wrap up two days of meetings on Friday, the expectations for their summit’s outcome among observers generally are modest at best.

While Trump and Xi are anticipated to extend the one-year pause in their trade war agreed to in South Korea in October, the expectations are for a stabilisation – not revitalisation – in ties between the world’s two largest economies, which are locked in a rivalry that spans everything from trade and artificial intelligence to the status of Taiwan.

“It is important to be clear-eyed about the state of relations here,” Claire E Reade, a senior counsel at Arnold & Porter who previously worked on China at the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR), told Al Jazeera.

“China does not trust the US, and China wants to beat the US in what it sees as long-term global competition,” Reade said.

“This limits what can be agreed.”

While Trump and Xi have yet to announce the final contours of any trade agreement, the US side has flagged various business deals in the pipeline.

In a pre-recorded interview with Fox News that aired on Thursday, Trump said that China would invest “hundreds of billions of dollars” in companies run by the CEOs in his delegation, without providing further details.

Trump also said that Beijing had agreed to purchase US oil and 200 Boeing aircraft.

Trump administration officials have said that the sides are also discussing the establishment of a “Board of Investment” to manage investments between the countries.

“A realistic ‘opening up’ of the Chinese market would likely focus first on sectors where the economic complementarity is most obvious,” Taiyi Sun, an associate professor of political science at Christopher Newport University in Newport News, Virginia, told Al Jazeera.

“Agricultural goods such as soybeans and beef, as well as high-value-added manufacturing products like Boeing aircraft, are natural areas for expansion because they match existing Chinese demand with American export strengths.”

Sun said a “gradual” opening for US firms in sectors such as financial services could also be possible.

“But those areas are politically and institutionally more sensitive inside China, so progress would likely be incremental rather than immediate,” he said.

Gabriel Wildau, a senior vice president at global business advisory firm Teneo, said both sides will be seeking to address supply-chain vulnerabilities exposed by their trade war.

“The Iran war has likely increased the US’s vulnerability to export controls on rare earths, given the need to rebuild the munition stocks depleted in that war,” Wildau told Al Jazeera.

“Washington will therefore be willing to offer tariff relief – or at least assurances not to impose new tariffs – in exchange for Beijing’s commitment to keep rare earth exports flowing.”

While Trump and Xi agreed to roll back some trade barriers at their summit in South Korea, US-Chinese business and trade remain severely constrained after a decade of tit-for-tat economic salvoes between the sides.

The average US tariff on Chinese goods stood at 47.5 percent after the South Korea summit, up from 3.1 percent before Trump’s first term, according to the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

China’s average tariff on US goods stood at 31.9 percent, up from 8.4 percent in 2018, according to the think tank.

Two-way goods trade amounted to about $415bn in 2025, down sharply from its 2022 peak of $690bn.

Carsten Holz, an expert on the Chinese economy at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, said China has less incentive to make concessions to the US than before, amid the rise of its domestic industries.

“Across many industrial sectors, PRC [People’s Republic of China] firms hold leading or controlling positions,” Holz told Al Jazeera.

“As a result, the PRC economy has little to gain from opening further to the US and is likely to only offer largely symbolic gestures.”

Deborah Elms, head of trade policy at the Hinrich Foundation in Singapore, voiced similar sentiments about the limits of US leverage.

“Basically, Trump expects China to buy more stuff from America and let US companies operate more freely in China,” Elms told Al Jazeera.

“What is he offering?” Elms said. “Very little, largely because Trump sees the bilateral relationship as one where the US has been fair and China has not.”

Reade, the former USTR official, said Xi would not agree to any measures that “harm Chinese interests in any way.”

“Instead, China will potentially give the US no-cost ‘gifts,’” Reade said, suggesting such measures could include the removal of trade barriers it placed on US beef.

“It may buy US goods it needs,” Reade said.

“If it allows purchases of US tech products, it will only be because it needs them right now,” she added, “But this does not interfere with China’s strategic plans to eliminate dependence on US technology over the longer term.”

Amid an oil blockade against the island, the US blames Cuba’s communist leadership for ‘standing in the way’ of aid.

The United States has offered $100m in humanitarian assistance to Cuba on the condition that the island’s communist government agrees to “meaningful reforms”.

The sum was made public in a statement from the US State Department on Wednesday, though the administration of President Donald Trump underscored it had made the offer privately in the past.

But the $100m comes with strings: namely, that Cuba’s government commits to Trump-approved changes.

“Today, the Department of State is publicly restating the United States’ generous offer to provide an additional $100 million in direct humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people,” the statement said.

“The decision rests with the Cuban regime to accept our offer of assistance or deny critical living-saving aid and ultimately be accountable to the Cuban people for standing in the way of critical assistance.”

The statement marks the latest chapter in an ongoing pressure campaign designed to destabilise Cuba’s communist leadership.

Since Cold War tensions in the 1960s, the US has placed a comprehensive trade embargo on the Caribbean island, in part as a reaction to the Cuban Revolution.

It has become the longest-running trade embargo in modern history, and the US has justified its continuation by pointing to systematic repression under Cuba’s communist government.

But critics have denounced the trade embargo as worsening humanitarian conditions on the island.

The crisis reached a tipping point in January, after Trump abducted Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, a close ally of Cuba.

In the following weeks, Trump cut off Venezuelan funds and oil supplies to Cuba. He then threatened economic penalties against any country that supplied Cuba with fuel, implementing a de facto oil blockade on the island.

Since then, only one Russian oil tanker has reached Cuba in late March. That month alone, the island suffered two island-wide blackouts.

Cuba relies heavily on foreign imports of oil to power its ageing energy grid. Only 40 percent of its oil supply is produced domestically, according to the International Energy Agency.

The United Nations warned earlier this year that Cuba faces the possibility of humanitarian “collapse”, with public transportation grinding to a halt, food prices soaring and public services like hospitals struggling to keep the lights on.

Trump, meanwhile, has repeatedly threatened to shift his focus to Cuba after the US-Israeli war on Iran ends, saying the island is “next” on his list of countries where he would like to see regime change.

“As we achieve a historic transformation in Venezuela, we’re also looking forward to the great change that will soon be coming to Cuba,” Trump told Latin American leaders at a summit in March.

“Cuba’s in its last moments of life as it was. It’ll have a great new life, but it’s in its last moments of life the way it is.”

Earlier this month, the US president issued a fresh wave of sanctions against the Cuban government, accusing the island of posing “an unusual and extraordinary threat to US national security and foreign policy”.

Media reports have also indicated that the Trump administration has stepped up its surveillance flights around Cuba, possibly in preparation for a surge of military assets to the Caribbean.

In Wednesday’s statement, the State Department blamed the communist system for having “only served to enrich the elites and condemn the Cuban people to poverty”.

It did not mention the US role in the humanitarian crisis on the island but instead described Cuba’s government as a hurdle to delivering much-needed aid.

“The regime refuses to allow the United States to provide this assistance to the Cuban people, who are in desperate need of assistance due to the failures of Cuba’s corrupt regime,” the State Department wrote.

It added that, should Cuba accept its terms, the $100m would be distributed through the Catholic Church and “other reliable independent humanitarian organizations”, rather than through the island’s government.

Donald Trump gives conflicting messages on prominence of Iran war in upcoming talks, with his administration emphasising trade.

United States President Donald Trump has departed the White House en route to Beijing, where he will meet with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping.

Trump spoke briefly with reporters on Tuesday as he boarded the Marine One helicopter. He was then set to arrive in China aboard Air Force One on Wednesday, ahead of the planned meetings on Thursday and Friday.

United States officials have taken pains in recent days to downplay how big a topic the US-Israel war on Iran will be during Trump’s visit.

Beijing has made its opposition to the war clear, at times asserting behind-the-scenes pressure on its trading partner Iran. However, it has largely avoided being pulled into the fray.

In recent days, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent have stepped up their calls for China to use its influence to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20 percent of the world’s oil supply flowed before the war began.

But Trump again gave conflicting messages on Tuesday about how much the war would feature in his meetings in China.

“We’re going to have a long talk about it. I think he’s been relatively good, to be honest with you,” Trump said of his plans to discuss the conflict – and how it has roiled global oil markets – with Xi.

Minutes later, he added, “We have a lot of things to discuss. I wouldn’t say Iran is one of them, to be honest with you, because we have Iran very much under control.”

“I don’t think we need ⁠any help with Iran. We’ll win it one way or the other, peacefully or otherwise,” he said.

Trade to loom large

The upcoming meetings will be the first face-to-face exchanges since the leaders of the world’s two largest economies met on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Busan, South Korea, in October 2025.

It is the second time Trump will travel to China as president, and the first time since his second term began on January 20, 2025. Xi is expected to travel to the US later this year.

Beyond the war, the US administration has stressed that trade will be a top subject discussed, with Trump seeking a series of business deals and agreements.

Underscoring that initiative, Trump invited an array of US business leaders to accompany him on the trip, including Tesla CEO Elon Musk, who had previously chaired Trump’s so-called Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), and Apple CEO Tim Cook.

Both sides are expected to seek to avoid a return to the tariff war that defined Trump’s early days in office, which saw Trump set tariffs on Chinese goods at 145 percent, while China announced a further tightening of rare-earth export controls that would have hurt US industry.

The two sides reached a fragile truce in October of last year.

China’s continued support for Iran’s ballistic programme and its defence of Tehran’s nuclear programme has also risked again derailing relations.

Last month, Trump threatened to impose a 50 percent tariff on China after reports that Beijing was preparing to deliver a shipment of new air defence systems to Iran. He later backed away from the threat, claiming that he had received written assurance from Xi that he would not provide Tehran with weaponry.

Days later, Trump said that the US Navy had intercepted a Chinese vessel carrying a “gift” for Iran. Neither side offered further details of the incident.

Xi was also expected to push Trump on US arms sales to Taiwan, the self-governing island that China claims as its own.

Senator Hawley plans legislative action supporting President Trump’s bid to waive the petrol tax amid rising consumer costs.

United States President Donald Trump said he will cut the 18-cent federal tax on petrol to offset surging prices that have continued to soar after his comments that the US ceasefire with Iran is on “life support”.

On Monday, Trump said he would suspend the petrol tax, but did not specify an end date.

“Yup, we’re going to take off the gas tax for a period of time, and when gas goes down, we’ll let it phase back in,” Trump told CBS News.

Trump later told reporters that he would waive the tax, which generates $2.5bn in funds used for US roadway infrastructure, “till it’s appropriate”.

The US administration hinted at the idea on Sunday, when US Energy Secretary Chris Wright told the NBC News programme Meet the Press that the White House was considering suspending the tax.

While the Republican president claimed he would waive the tax, that is not within the White House’s authority. Suspending a federal tax requires an act of the US Congress.

However, key Trump ally Senator Josh Hawley, a Republican from Missouri, said on the social media platform X that he would introduce legislation on Monday to do that.

In March, Senator Mark Kelly, a Democrat from Arizona, proposed suspending the tax until October.

“I anticipate it would pass, but there could be a procedural delay. It also suggests that President Trump doesn’t see a quick end to the reduced volumes and is trying to cushion the American consumer,” Rachel Ziemba, adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, told Al Jazeera.

“The impact could be greater in states that have also reduced their own petrol taxes and could reinforce differentiation between petrol prices by region.”

US states also tax petrol, with Indiana, Kentucky and Georgia moving to make cuts to give consumers some relief at the pump.

Petrol prices have continued to climb since the initial strikes of the US-Israel war on Iran on February 28. The average price for a gallon (3.78 litres) of regular petrol is $4.52, according to the American Automobile Association, which tracks daily petrol prices, compared with $2.98 when the strikes first began.

However, news of the stumbling ceasefire has sent oil prices surging. Brent crude futures were up $3.17, or 3.13 percent, at $104.46 a barrel, while US West Texas Intermediate crude was at $98.32 a barrel, up $2.90, or 3.04 percent. Brent reached a session high of $105.99 and WTI hit a peak of $100.37.

On Wall Street, stocks for oil and gas giants are trending upward. Shell was up 1.6 percent in midday trading, Exxon rose 3.1 percent, BP gained 2 percent, and Chevron climbed 1.7 percent.

Airline bailout?

Trump was also asked by CBS on Monday whether a bailout was planned for the airline industry, which has taken a hit since the war on Iran began.

The president told the outlet that a bailout had not “really been presented” and that “the airlines are doing not badly”.

However, earlier this month, budget carrier Spirit Airlines ceased operations after 34 years. Court documents said the airline shut down because of “recent geopolitical events resulting in a massive and sustained increase in fuel prices”.

That comes as other major US carriers raise prices. In April, United Airlines said it would raise fares by 20 percent amid a surge in jet fuel costs.

“I have all the cards,” posted the White House on its X account on Sunday, alongside an image of President Donald Trump holding playing cards from the Uno game, in a message appearing to signal Washington’s confidence in its ongoing war on Iran.

Uno is a card game in which the winner is the first to get rid of all their cards.

The post came after Trump announced on his Truth Social platform that the US military would begin guiding ships stranded around the Strait of Hormuz by the war on Monday, in a sign that the conflict could further escalate, despite the near-month-long fragile ceasefire. Tehran has been effectively blocking nearly all shipping from the Gulf for more than two months, after the US and Israel attacked Iran two months ago, disrupting global energy supplies.

“We have told these countries that we will guide their ships safely out of these restricted waterways, so that they can freely and ably get on with their business,” Trump said, dubbing the campaign “Project Freedom”. “They are merely neutral and innocent bystanders!”

The president added that US negotiators were engaged in “very positive discussions” with Tehran, which could lead to “something very positive” without further elaboration.

Iran, however, reacted by insisting that the security of the waterway was in the hands of its armed forces, and warned that “any safe passage and navigation in any situation” should be “carried out in coordination with the armed forces”.

On Monday, the Iranian Fars news agency reported that a US warship had been hit by two Iranian drones, the claim was denied by US Central Command.

So what leverage do the US and Iran hold over each other, and what happens next?

In response to Trump’s “I have all the cards” social media post, Iran’s Consulate General in Hyderabad, India, posted its own image on X.

“Yes, we have less cards,” Iran’s consulate in the Indian city of Hyderabad wrote on X, together with a photo of an Iranian military spokesperson holding four Uno cards compared to Trump’s five, pointing out that usually holding all the cards means you are losing, not winning, in the game of Uno.

In response to Trump’s “Project Freedom” declaration, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) warned that ships deemed to be in breach of its rules in the Strait of Hormuz “will be stopped by force”, while insisting there has been no change in how it manages traffic through the strategic waterway.

On Monday, it issued a new map of the Strait of Hormuz with boundaries extending further to the east than its previous one, and said any ship travelling between the two sides must coordinate with the IRGC first.

“There has been no change in the management process of the Strait of Hormuz,” spokesperson Sardar Mohebbi said, adding that vessels that comply with the “transit protocols issued by the IRGC Navy” will be “safe and secure”.

“Other maritime movements that are contrary to the declared principles of the IRGC Navy will face serious risks. Violating vessels will be stopped by force,” he said.

What leverage does the US have over Iran?

Sanctions

The United States’ most enduring source of leverage over Iran remains its sanctions regime, which was launched in 1979 when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini declared Iran an Islamic Republic.

Successive US administrations over the past 47 years have hit Tehran with a series of financial restrictions targeting Iran’s banking, oil exports and access to international markets – the US says the sanctions are a response to Iran’s nuclear programme.

Sanctions have significantly constrained Iran’s economy, limiting government revenue and contributing to inflation and currency depreciation. Measures enforced through the US Treasury also deter other countries and companies from engaging with Iran, further strangling its economy.

The economic pressure has been central to US strategy towards Iran, particularly during its attempts to force Tehran back to negotiations over its nuclear programme, under both Democratic and Republican administrations.

Military power

Beyond economics, the US maintains overwhelming military superiority, especially air power. Aircraft carriers, long-range bombers and precision strike capabilities give Washington the ability to target Iranian infrastructure with relatively low risk to its own forces.

US bases across the Gulf, as well as military partnerships with regional allies – most notably Israel – reinforce this advantage.

American forces, together with the Israeli army, have killed more than 3,000 people, and struck thousands of sites across Iran in the current war, including Iran’s energy and nuclear sites.

Naval blockade

Since mid-April, the United States has enforced a widespread naval blockade of Iranian ports and ships. The operation began on April 13 after talks between Washington and Tehran collapsed, with US forces ordered to stop or divert vessels entering or leaving Iranian ports.

US forces have since intercepted or turned back dozens of ships, and seized a container ship, the Touska. On Monday, the US announced that its crew had been repatriated to Iran from Pakistan, where they were taken after their ship was captured in the Gulf of Oman last month.

According to Trump, the blockade is designed to choke Iran’s oil exports, its main revenue source.

US officials say the measures have severely disrupted Iran’s trade, which relies heavily on sea routes.

What leverage does Iran have?

Strait of Hormuz

The vital waterway is Iran’s most significant strategic asset, the narrow passage ships one-fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies in peacetime.

Tehran has effectively closed the strait since the war began on February 28, sending global oil and gas prices soaring and energy markets into turmoil. Iran has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to target shipping, seize vessels, or conduct military exercises, demonstrating its ability to close or restrict the strait.

The result is soaring energy prices globally, forcing many countries to implement severe austerity measures to soften the blow.

Last week in the US, the average price of a gallon (3.8 litres) of gasoline (petrol) rose to $4.30, according to the American Automobile Association (AAA), up from less than $3 before the war.

Surging energy costs have driven up inflation and deepened economic uncertainty in the US, compounding Trump’s political troubles amid overwhelming disapproval for the war amongst Americans.

Even if the US does begin escorting ships through safely – the threat from mines or Iranian strikes may be enough to prevent tankers from attempting to sail, experts say. Insurance companies are also unlikely to underwrite voyages.

Regional allies

Iran’s network of allied groups across the Middle East is another asset that Tehran relies on heavily. These include armed groups in Iraq and Syria, as well as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen

Through these groups, Iran has exerted pressure indirectly, targeting US interests and allies without engaging in direct confrontation.

One critical threat Iran has previously made is for the Houthis to disrupt shipping in the Bab al-Mandeb, another vital maritime chokepoint linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.

The Houthis, an Iran-aligned group in Yemen, have previously targeted shipping in this area, most notably during Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza, further raising concerns about the security of global trade routes.

Roughly 4.2 billion barrels of crude oil and refined petroleum liquids flowed through the strait in 2014, accounting for about five percent of global supply.

Cheap drones and cluster bombs

While nowhere near the military capabilities of the US, Iran’s investment in missile and drone programmes has proven to be an effective means of deterrence. That is particularly through its ability to threaten regional US bases and impose significant costs on regional countries hosting American assets involved in military operations against Tehran.

While the US undoubtedly has a more sophisticated and powerful arsenal at its disposal, the interceptors it uses to combat Iranian drones cost around $4 million each, while Iran’s Shahed drones can be mass-produced at $20-50,000 each.

Furthermore, Iran’s ballistic missiles have proved capable of breaching Israel’s much-lauded “Iron Dome” defence system on several occasions. Iran has also dropped cluster bombs, which divide before they can be intercepted, making them much harder to stop.

So does the US really hold the most cards?

Michael Clarke, visiting professor at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, said Trump’s overwhelming conventional military strength has failed to translate into strategic leverage on the ground.

“President Trump thinks he is a great poker player,” Clarke told Al Jazeera. “He thought America’s sheer destructive potential put all the ‘cards’ in his hand” when starting the war on Iran.

But Iranian forces have consistently disrupted US expectations through asymmetric tactics, he said.

“At every turn, the Iranians have come up with asymmetric tactics – vicious, reckless tactics – that have negated everything the Americans have tried to do,” Clarke noted, describing a pattern in which traditional US military superiority has been blunted by unconventional responses.

Despite significant American forces and assets in the region – including “no fewer than three US Carrier Strike Groups, two Marine Expeditionary Units, hundreds of combat aircraft and thousands of troops”, Clarke argued that Washington has struggled to find an effective use for its multi-billion-dollar resources at its disposal.

Moreover, he said, domestic pressure on Trump is growing. Trump “can’t find a way to use them [US forces] that will make any real difference to the current stalemate in the limited time he has before his own MAGA base concludes he has lost the game”.

Clarke also highlighted the willingness of Iran’s IRGC to escalate tensions. “Whatever this war might do to Iranian society, the IRGC is prepared to gamble with its own existence in the fight,” he added.

Ministry of Commerce says sanctions against refineries accused of importing Iranian oil violate international law.

China has announced an injunction to block US sanctions placed on five Chinese refiners accused ‌of buying oil from Iran.

The sanctions announced by the United States Department of the Treasury late last month bar the companies from the US financial system and seek to penalise anyone doing business with the firms.

In a statement on Saturday, China’s Ministry of Commerce said the sanctions “improperly” restrict business between Chinese enterprises and third countries “in violation of international law and the basic norms governing international relations”.

The Commerce Ministry said it had issued a “prohibition order” stipulating that the sanctions “shall not be recognized, enforced, or complied with” to “safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests”.

“The Chinese government has consistently opposed unilateral sanctions that lack UN authorisation and basis in international law,” the ministry added.

It said the order blocked US measures against Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery and four other so-called “teapot” refineries: Shandong Jincheng Petrochemical Group, Hebei Xinhai Chemical Group, Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical and Shandong ⁠Shengxing Chemical.

Announcing the sanctions on April 24, the US Treasury Department called Hengli “one of Tehran’s most valued customers”, saying it had generated hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue for the Iranian military through crude oil purchases.

The Trump administration imposed sanctions on the other four refineries named by the Chinese ministry, among other facilities, last year.

China gets more than half of its oil from the Middle East, much of it from Iran.

According to commodities data firm Kpler, China bought more than 80 percent of the oil Iran shipped in 2025.

China’s “teapot” refineries operate independently and are generally smaller than the facilities run by state-owned oil giants, such as Sinopec.

The facilities, which have been crucial to China’s efforts to secure its oil supplies, capitalise on heavily discounted crude sold by countries under sanctions, such as Iran, Russia and Venezuela.

Teapots account for a quarter of Chinese ⁠refinery capacity, operate with narrow and sometimes negative margins, and have been squeezed recently by tepid domestic demand.

US sanctions have created additional hurdles for refiners, including difficulties selling refined products under their correct place-of-origin markings.

Workers are gathering in cities around the world to mark International Labour Day, with some demonstrations, such as those in Istanbul, Turkiye, turning to scuffles with police.

Trade Unions are calling for solidarity and the protection of workers’ rights as the United States-Israeli war on Iran and rising energy costs raise concerns about the global economy.

“Working people refuse to pay the price for Donald Trump’s war in the Middle East,” the European Trade Union Confederation, which represents 93 trade union organisations in 41 European countries, told the media. “Today’s rallies show working people will not stand by and see their jobs and living standards destroyed.”

Josua Mata, leader of the SENTRO umbrella group of workers’ groups in the Philippines, said: “Every Filipino worker now is aware that the situation here is deeply connected to the global crisis.”

Renato Reyes, a leader of the left-wing political group Bayan in the Philippines, told The Associated Press: “There will be a louder call for higher wages and economic relief because of the unprecedented spikes in fuel prices.”

In Indonesia, Said Iqbal, president of the Indonesian Trade Union Confederation, told reporters: “Workers are already living pay cheque to pay cheque.”

Some of the largest demonstrations are being held in South America, including in Chile, Bolivia and Venezuela. In Argentina, angry workers protested on Thursday in the capital of Buenos Aires over President Javier Milei’s recent overhaul of long-held labour protections.

In Cuba, the foreign ministry held a gathering on Thursday in defiance of what it called the US’s “aggressions, threats, intensified blockade, and energy siege”.

On Friday, Cubans are expected to mark International Labour Day with a mass rally and a march in Havana.

In many countries, Labour Day rallies attract large crowds because May 1 is a public holiday. In the Turkish city of Istanbul, roads around Taksim Square were closed to make way for marches during the day. Later on Friday, demonstrators clashed with police, international media reported.

In France, where most people have the day off for May Day, workers’ unions using the slogan “bread, peace and freedom” called for protests in Paris and other cities.

Global recession fears

Fears of a global recession are looming over Labour Day rallies at a time when income inequality is growing.

In Gaza, Palestinian workers have cancelled May Day events because of the economic crisis caused by Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza and poor conditions on the ground.

The Palestinian General Federation of Trade Unions said that about 550,000 workers across Gaza and the West Bank have no income and that the situation is unprecedented.

The International Trade Union Confederation has reported that at least four CEOs of major corporations each pocketed more than $100m in pay and bonuses last year, while many workers are facing potential job cuts.

Workers’ rights coalitions are calling for urgent action to curb extreme wealth. They want governments to impose higher, fairer taxes on the wealthiest and limit excessive executive pay.

While Labour Day began in the US, when workers protested for an eight-hour workday in the 1880s, the US does not count May Day as a public holiday.

However, an umbrella group of activist and workers’ groups known as May Day Strong has called for protests under the slogan, “workers over billionaires”. Hundreds of demonstrations and marches have been planned across the US.

Islamabad, Pakistan – Pakistan has opened six overland transit routes for goods destined for Iran, formalising a road corridor through its territory as thousands of containers remain stranded at Karachi port because of the United States blockade of Iranian ports and ships trying to pass through the Strait of Hormuz.

The Ministry of Commerce issued the Transit of Goods through Territory of Pakistan Order 2026 on April 25, bringing it into immediate effect. The order allows goods originating from third countries to be transported through Pakistan and delivered to Iran by road.

The announcement coincided with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s visit to Islamabad for talks with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and army chief Asim Munir, the latest in a series of diplomatic engagements as Pakistan seeks to mediate an end to the two-month war between Washington and Tehran.

Federal Minister for Commerce Jam Kamal Khan described the initiative as “a significant step toward promoting regional trade and enhancing Pakistan’s role as a key trade corridor”.

Iran has not publicly commented on the move, and Al Jazeera’s query to the Iranian embassy in Islamabad went unanswered.

The notification does not extend to Indian-origin goods. A separate Commerce Ministry order issued in May 2025, following the India-Pakistan aerial war that month, bans the transit of goods from India through Pakistan by any mode and remains in force.

Routes and regulations

The six designated routes link Pakistan’s main ports, Karachi, Port Qasim and Gwadar, with two Iranian border crossings, Gabd and Taftan, passing through Balochistan via Turbat, Panjgur, Khuzdar, Quetta and Dalbandin.

The shortest route, the Gwadar-Gabd corridor, reduces travel time to the Iranian border to between two and three hours, compared with the 16 to 18 hours it takes from Karachi – Pakistan’s biggest port – to the Iranian border. The Gwadar-Gabd route could cut transport costs by 45 to 55 percent compared with costs from Karachi port, according to officials.

But for Iran, firms sending their goods to the country, and transporters, all routes into Iranian territory today are viable options, with the principal maritime passage they have traditionally used – the Strait of Hormuz – blockaded by the US Navy.

Corridor shaped by conflict

The current US-Iran war began on February 28, when US and Israeli forces launched attacks on Iran.

In the weeks that followed, Iran restricted commercial navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil and gas passes during peacetime, disrupting one of the most critical arteries of global trade.

Pakistan brokered a ceasefire on April 8 and hosted the first round of direct US-Iran talks on April 11, in Islamabad. The negotiations lasted nearly a day but ended without a deal. Two days later, Washington imposed a naval blockade on Iranian ports, throttling Tehran’s maritime access.

A second round of talks has since stalled. US President Donald Trump cancelled a planned visit to Islamabad by special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner last weekend.

Iran has ruled out direct negotiations with Washington while the blockade remains in place, though Araghchi told Pakistani officials that Tehran would continue engaging with Islamabad’s mediation efforts “until a result is achieved”.

The transit order appears to be a direct economic response to that impasse.

More than 3,000 containers destined for Iran have been stuck at Karachi port for several days, with vessels unable to collect the cargo. War-risk insurance premiums have surged from about 0.12 percent of a vessel’s value before the conflict to roughly 5 percent, making shipping to the region too expensive for many operators.

Shifting regional dynamics

The corridor also signals a shift away from Afghanistan, whose relations with Pakistan have deteriorated sharply.

The two sides engaged in clashes in October 2025 and again in February and March this year, with skirmishes continuing along the northwestern and southwestern borders.

The Torkham and Chaman crossings have ceased to function as reliable commercial routes since tensions escalated, limiting Pakistan’s overland access to Central Asian markets.

“This is a paradigmatic shift. Pakistan’s relations with the Afghan Taliban, the de facto rulers in Kabul, have no reset switch,” Iftikhar Firdous, cofounder of The Khorasan Diary, told Al Jazeera.

“Kabul has been diversifying away from Pakistan towards Iran and Central Asia, but this move flips the equation. Pakistan can now bypass Afghanistan entirely for westbound trade. The impact on Kabul’s transit relevance and revenue is strategic, not immediate – but it is real.”

Firdous said the implications extend beyond bilateral ties.

“This corridor also reduces Pakistan’s reliance on longer maritime routes through the Gulf. Geopolitics, security, and infrastructure will ultimately determine which corridors dominate, but it places Pakistan as the main overland gateway for China-backed trade routes into West Asia and beyond,” he said.

Minhas Majeed Marwat, a Peshawar-based academic and geopolitical analyst, urged caution. “A cornered Afghanistan is a destabilised Afghanistan, and Pakistan knows better than most what that costs,” she wrote on X on April 27.

“The opportunity here is real. So is the risk. Security on the northwestern and southwestern borders remains the variable that could unravel everything. Pakistan is positioned well. It is not yet positioned safely. Those are different things.”

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney took office last year amid a flurry of aggressive actions by his country’s southern neighbour. A recently sworn-in United States president, Donald Trump, slapped tariffs on Canadian exports and threatened to make the US neighbour the 51st state.

The actions were particularly damning as Canada had deep trade and security ties with the US, not only sending nearly 80 percent of its exports to that market, but also often following lockstep on geopolitical policy and strategic moves.

All that was thrown aside when Trump took office, and Canada, under former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, was one of the first countries he slapped with tariffs.

After a year of dealing with a mercurial and unpredictable US president, experts applaud Carney as “standing strong and resolute”, not just in the face of Trump’s threats, but also against internal critics.

“The most notable aspect of the last year was both a bullet dodged and a savvy bit of statecraft to avoid a rush to do a deal on trade and invest with the US the way many other countries did,” said Brett House, a senior fellow at the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy.

“Commitments from this president are absolutely worthless, and the biggest accomplishment of the first year has been standing strong and resolute in the face of internal critics,” House told Al Jazeera.

Indeed, Carney has used Trump’s attacks on allies and others to refocus Canada’s foreign policy and place in the world.

With the US no longer the anchor of a rules-based order, and with there now being a “deep rupture” caused by changes in Washington, “Carney has aimed to build at home and diversify abroad, as Ottawa’s dependence and long ties have now become a source of weakness,” said Vina Nadjibulla, the vice president of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.

“And he’s doing this at a speed, scale and ambition that we haven’t seen in recent years” in Ottawa, Nadjibulla said.

‘Rupture’ in global order

Some of that stance was evident in January, when Carney, in a speech in Davos, said there was a “rupture” in the global rules-based order and that Middle Powers like Canada and others had to rise strategically to address geopolitical tensions.

But it was visible in his actions even before Davos, when he had reached out to countries that had historically been important trade partners but where relations had been frozen due to political tensions under his predecessor, Trudeau.

For instance, Carney invited Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the G7 meeting in Canada to initiate a reset of ties with New Delhi that had been in a deep freeze since Trudeau alleged in 2023 that India was involved in the killing of a Sikh separatist activist on Canadian soil.

Carney also recalibrated Canada’s relations with China, which had been tense since Canadian authorities arrested a key official of Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei as she was transitioning through the Vancouver international airport in December 2018. China retaliated against the arrest of Meng Wanzhou, which was carried out at the request of US authorities, by detaining two Canadians.

Carney has also deepened relations with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others, making sure to align on security and economic issues, and has drawn Canada closer to Europe, Nadjibulla pointed out.

Domestic push

In the lead-up to elections last year, Carney “positioned himself as a centrist, a moderate, and went to great lengths to distance himself from the image of Justin Trudeau,” said Sanjay Jeram, the chair of the political science department at Simon Fraser University in Burnaby, Canada.

“He hasn’t shown much interest in discussing things outside the economy, international relations and trade, and even when asked, has avoided those questions and steered the conversation back to what he believes is his true purpose. Or that could be his political strategy, or a bit of both.”

Under that pragmatist persona, “Carney takes the world and the economy as it is, rather than what we hope it to be”, which allows him to be judged on pragmatist metrics, Jeram said, referring to criticisms that Carney is overlooking concerns related to political interference or human rights in his dealings with foreign partners.

“Canadians have bought that [stance] so far,” Jeram added.

Indeed, Carney’s approval ratings are up. According to a March Ipsos poll for Global News, 58 percent of Canadians approve of him, up 10 percent from a year before, while 33 percent do not.

While there has also been significant movement on paper to remove federal barriers to facilitate business and trade within the country, there have also been concerns about certain policy pushes. A major projects bill, for instance, is meant to fast-track big infrastructure projects, but critics are concerned that it undermines the importance of consultation, especially with the Indigenous communities whose land these projects could go through.

“Carney recognises we need more of infrastructure to be able to diversify trade,” the Asia Pacific Foundation’s Nadjibulla said.

As he settles into his second year, Carney’s main challenge will be to see if he can deliver on his first-year announcements.

One of his biggest challenges this year will be a successful conclusion of the review of the trade pact between the US, Canada and Mexico, known as the USMCA, which starts on July 1 and which has helped shield Canadian exports from US tariffs.

The “US has signalled that a successful review could hinge on Canada lining its external tariffs in line with US tariffs, but that’s at cross purposes with Canada’s efforts”, said the University of Toronto’s House, especially as Canada has lined up deals with China on electric cars and agriculture.

Nadjibulla added that “2026 will be harder, because it will be about implementation and delivery, especially against the US-Canada dynamics.”

The US naval blockade of Iranian ports and the Strait of Hormuz, in place since April 13, has raised concerns that Iran could run out of crude oil storage capacity and be forced to curb production.

Bloomberg reported analysis on Tuesday from the data and analytics company Kpler suggesting Iran could run out of crude storage in 12 to 22 days if the blockade persists.

Last week, United States Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent claimed that storage capacity at Kharg Island, where most of Iran’s oil is exported, would be full “in a matter of days”.

So how quickly could Iran run out of oil storage, and why does it matter?

What is happening in the Strait of Hormuz?

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow channel that connects the Gulf to the open ocean. It spans the territorial waters of Iran on its northern side and Oman on its southern side. It is not in international waters.

During peacetime, 20 percent of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies are shipped through the corridor.

Two days after the US and Israel launched their first air strikes in their war on Iran on February 28, Ebrahim Jabari, a senior adviser to the commander in chief of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), announced that the strait was “closed”. If any vessels tried to pass through, he said, the IRGC and the navy would “set those ships ablaze”.

As the war has dragged on and negotiations have failed to achieve a settlement, Iran has at times in the past two months allowed some “friendly” ships and those that pay tolls to pass. It is currently refusing to allow any foreign-flagged ships, including those previously deemed friendly, to pass until the US lifts its own naval blockade.

Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref said on April 19 that the “security of the Strait of Hormuz is not free”.

“One cannot restrict Iran’s oil exports while expecting free security for others,” he wrote in a post on X.

“The choice is clear: either a free oil market for all, or the risk of significant costs for everyone,” he added. “Stability in global fuel prices depends on a guaranteed and lasting end to the economic and military pressure against Iran and its allies.”

Since the US naval blockade on the strait began, the US has opened fire on and taken control of an Iranian-flagged tanker near the Strait of Hormuz while also redirecting vessels on the high seas transporting cargo to or from Iran. Iran’s armed forces have denounced these actions as “an illegal act” that “amounts to piracy”.

The US naval blockade of the strait means that Iran might have to store the oil it produces.

Iran is the third largest oil producer in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) after Saudi Arabia and Iraq and exports 90 percent of its crude oil via Kharg Island in the Gulf for shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

What has the US claimed?

The US is eager to curb Iran’s oil revenues, which have risen since Tehran closed the Strait of Hormuz to other shipping. This is the primary motive behind Washington’s naval blockade of Iranian ports.

Iran exported 1.84 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil in March and shipped 1.71 million bpd in April, compared with an average of 1.68 million bpd in 2025, according to Kpler.

However, the US naval blockade since mid-April now means that most of its exports are having to be stored instead.

Bessent wrote in an X post on April 22: “In a matter of days, Kharg Island storage will be full and the fragile Iranian oil wells will be shut in.”

“Constraining Iran’s maritime trade directly targets the regime’s primary revenue lifelines.”

How much oil can Iran store?

Iran’s domestic refineries have a production capacity of 2.6 million bpd, according to the energy consultancy Facts Global Energy.

Satellite data show the amount of oil Iran has in storage has risen sharply since the US blockade began, and in the days after the US tightened it, stocks were rising so fast that it appeared Iran had been barely able to export any oil at all.

From April 13 to April 21, data showed that stocks rose by more than 6 million barrels, according to the Columbia Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP). From April 17 to April 21, the stock increased very rapidly, growing by 1.7 bpd.

As of April 20, the storage tanks at Kharg were about 74 percent full after the island alone had taken on about 3 million extra barrels of oil, the CGEP reported.

Generally, oil companies avoid filling their storage beyond 80 percent capacity to balance safety, emissions control and flexibility.

However, Iran and other oil producing countries have exceeded this limit before, for instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic. In April 2020, Kharg island’s stocks reached close to 90 percent capacity, an all-time high.

Iran also has some crude oil storage capacity in the form of “floating tanks”, or parked ships. About 127 million barrels can be stored in this way, Frederic Schneider, a nonresident senior fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, told Al Jazeera in an interview on April 14.

Will Iran need to cut oil production?

Muyu Xu, a senior crude oil analyst at Kpler, told Al Jazeera that the blockade could eventually force Iran to cut production.

“However, given there is still available storage capacity onshore (roughly covering 20 days of Iran’s current production), we expect any production reduction to be gradual over the coming week with a higher likelihood of acceleration into May,” she said.

Analysis by CGEP nonresident fellow Antoine Halff echoed this. Halff wrote in an article published by CGEP on Tuesday that it may be some time before the US blockade causes Iran to shut off its production “in a big way”.

However, Halff added, Iran may still choose to halt production “fairly aggressively” but this “would be more by choice than by necessity”.

He explained: “Doing so would have the advantage of providing Iran with relatively ample spare storage capacity after the shutdown and would allow for a smoother restart of operations once conditions permit, and the constraint is relaxed, thus minimising adverse impacts from the blockade on longer-term supply.”

Why does this matter?

Halting oil production risks damaging underground reservoirs by reducing reservoir pressure, allowing water or gas to encroach into producing layers and changing patterns of oil flow. This can make some oil harder or more expensive to recover later, experts said.

Restarting the process of oil production can also be slow and costly, involving repairs of corroded equipment or unclogging pipelines.

Halting production would also cause Iran’s export revenues to drop. However, analysts said that for a few months, Iran can continue to earn revenue from oil that is already in transit at sea.

Kenneth Katzman, former Iran analyst at the Congressional Research Service in Washington, DC, said Iran is not exporting new oil during the US blockade of Iranian ports but Tehran has 160 million to 170 million barrels of oil on ships around the world currently.

As Iran stares down the economic consequences of a prolonged blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, attention is shifting north.

With Gulf shipping lanes disrupted and oil exports constrained, Tehran may seek to depend less on the Gulf and more on a patchwork of railways, Caspian ports and sanctions-era trade networks linking it to Russia.

The importance of that relationship was underscored this week when Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi travelled to St Petersburg for talks with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, praising Moscow’s “firm and unshaken” support as the two sides discussed the war, sanctions and the future of the Strait of Hormuz.

But could Moscow really offer a lifeline for Iran’s beleaguered, war-torn economy, and would it even want to? We spoke to experts to find out.

Increasing but modest bilateral trade

Economic relations between Iran and Russia deepened after the US withdrew from a 2015 nuclear deal with Iran and other nations in 2018 and reimposed sweeping sanctions on Tehran.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 served to accelerate that trend as both countries found themselves increasingly cut off from the Western financial system. They turned to sanctions-evasion networks, alternative payment systems and non-Western trade corridors to keep goods, energy and money flowing.

Current trade is dominated by agricultural products – especially wheat, barley and corn – alongside machinery, metals, timber, fertilisers and industrial inputs. Tehran has also supplied Russia with low-cost Shahed drones, which Russia updated and has been using in its war on Ukraine.

“Trade turnover reached $4.8bn last year [2024], but we believe that the potential for our mutual trade is much greater,” Russian Energy Minister Sergey Tsivilyov told an intergovernmental commission on trade and economic cooperation between Moscow and Tehran in 2025.

Bilateral trade is reported to have increased by 16 percent during that period, driven largely by Russian exports of grain, metals, machinery and industrial goods.

But experts say that despite this increase, the overall trade relationship remains relatively modest compared with Iran’s trade with China or the Gulf countries.

Trade between the two is “not substantial, because both countries are producing almost similar products and the industries are similar”, Mahdi Ghodsi, an economist at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, told Al Jazeera.

Alternatives to Hormuz

The backbone of Russia-Iran trade is the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a network of shipping lanes, railways, and roads linking Russia to Iran and onward to Asia, bypassing Western-controlled maritime routes.

Goods move from southern Russian ports, across the Caspian Sea to northern Iranian ports, including Bandar Anzali, before continuing by rail or truck.

The route has become increasingly important for Russian grain, machinery and industrial exports to Iran.

This route can serve as a “viable but partial lifeline”, Naeem Aslam, chief market analyst at London-based Think Markets, told Al Jazeera, adding that Russian ports in Astrakhan, on the Volga River delta near the Caspian Sea, and Makhachkala, on the Caspian Sea, are already “primed for a surge in grain, metals, timber and refined products”.

A western branch also runs through Azerbaijan, though a key missing rail link between Rasht and Astara in northern Iran remains unfinished.

In 2023, Moscow agreed to help finance the line, with Russia’s president calling the agreement a “great event” that “will help to significantly diversify global traffic flows”.

Easier in theory than in practice

Analysts say that, although these routes may provide a temporary solution, the Strait of Hormuz offers a scale and efficiency that rail and land corridors cannot easily replicate.

Although maritime trade has been highly volatile in recent weeks, “from a historical perspective it is simply the quickest and the most cost-effective way of transporting anything”, Adam Grimshaw, an economic historian at the University of Helsinki, told Al Jazeera.

“Roughly 90 percent of Iran’s international trade is maritime trade that goes through the Gulf, which can’t be quickly or immediately replaced through land access to Iran or through air transport to circumvent the American blockade”, Nader Hashemi, an associate professor at Georgetown University, told Al Jazeera.

Ghodsi said Russia might be able to offer a “lifeline” in the short term, as it did when it exported grain during Iran’s droughts, but in the long run, it simply “cannot substitute” the vast amounts of maritime trade.

Re-routing trade routes via land “takes time”, pushing up prices for consumers and creating more food waste as perishables rot en route.

Does Moscow want to help Iran?

Most analysts say throwing an economic lifeline to Iran is not in Russia’s interests.

“They’ve got their own economic problems,” John Lough, head of foreign policy at the New Eurasian Strategies Centre, told Al Jazeera, pointing to signs of stagnation inside Russia, pressure on reserves and growing frustration over the prolonged war in Ukraine.

While Moscow could offer symbolic support or limited humanitarian assistance, “now is not a good time” to invest in Iran, he said, referring to the US-Israel war on the country.

Replacing maritime trade with overland routes would be extremely difficult, despite years of discussion about alternative corridors linking the two nations, he said.

It also won’t necessarily help Iran’s economy, which needs all the export revenue it can get, experts say.

“Much of Iran’s economy revolves around the sale of oil, and with that blocked or prevented by the American blockade, Russia really can’t help in that regard”, Hashemi said.

Others are more optimistic, however.

“Propping [up] Iran locks in higher global oil prices that buoy Russia’s war economy, cements INSTC dominance for Asian trade, and keeps a key anti-Western ally alive – no downside for Moscow in a fragmented Gulf,” Aslaam said.

China has detained nearly 70 Panamanian-flagged ships after a Supreme Court ruling on the Panama Canal, US officials say.

Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guyana, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United States have released a joint statement in support of Panama, while criticising Chinese economic retaliation, after a Hong Kong-based conglomerate lost a legal dispute over the management of ports on the Panama Canal.

Panama’s Supreme Court in late January annulled contracts that had allowed a subsidiary of Hong Kong’s CK Hutchison to administer the Balboa and Cristobal port terminals on the Panama Canal after deeming the decades-old agreements unconstitutional.

In their joint statement on Tuesday, the six countries claimed that following the court ruling, China has retaliated against Panama with “targeted economic pressure” on Panamanian-flagged ships.

China detained nearly 70 Panamanian-flagged ships in March, according to the US Federal Maritime Commission, a number “far exceeding historical norms”.

“These actions – following the decision of Panama’s independent Supreme Court regarding the Balboa and Cristobal terminals – are a blatant attempt to politicise maritime trade and infringe on the sovereignty of the nations of our hemisphere,” the signatories said.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said separately on X that Washington was “deeply concerned” by China’s economic pressure on Panama.

“We stand in solidarity with Panama. Any attempts to undermine Panama’s sovereignty are a threat to us all,” he said.

China has previously accused the US of “bullying” and trying to smear its reputation in Latin America, while it described the Panamanian Supreme Court ruling as “absurd” and “shameful”.

US Federal Maritime Commission head Laura DiBella said last month that Beijing’s detention of Panamanian ships had repercussions for both Panama and the US.

“These intensified inspections were carried out under informal directives and appear intended to punish Panama after the transfer of Hutchison’s port assets,” DiBella said.

“Given that Panama‑flagged ships carry a meaningful share of US containerised trade, these actions could result in significant commercial and strategic consequences to US shipping,” she said.

‘States know how vulnerable shipping is’

Panama’s decision to invalidate the contracts held by CK Hutchison’s subsidiary Panama Ports Company was made at a time of heightened media attention around the Panama Canal amid threats by US President Donald Trump to seize the strategic waterway.

Trump had made the approximately 80km (49-mile) waterway a focus of his second administration, alleging in his inaugural address in January 2025 that China was “operating” the canal and pledging that the US would “take back” control.

US officials allege that, in addition to targeting Panama and its interests, China has also retaliated against shipping giants Maersk and the Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC), whose subsidiaries were granted 18-month contracts to administer the Balboa and Cristobal terminals after CK Hutchison was removed.

Representatives of Maersk and MSC were both summoned by China’s Ministry of Transport for “high-level discussions”, the Federal Maritime Commission said in March, while Chinese shipping giant COSCO has suspended operations at the Balboa terminal.

CK Hutchison, through its Panama Ports Company subsidiary, is separately pursuing international arbitration against the government of Panama and seeking more than $2bn in damages.

David Smith, an associate professor at the University of Sydney’s US Studies Centre, said that the Panama Canal dispute and China’s retaliation were the latest example of how shipping has become a political target, from Latin America to the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea in the Middle East.

“We have taken for granted that the world runs on container ships just freely sailing around the world,” he told Al Jazeera.

“What we’re seeing now is that states know how vulnerable shipping is. They know they can cut shipping lanes off if necessary. It should not surprise us from now on if ships and shipping in general become pawns in international politics.”

A prominent shipping organisation has condemned the United States and Iran’s tit-for-tat capture of commercial ships and is calling for the immediate release of their crews.

In an interview with Al Jazeera, John Stawpert, marine director of the International Chamber of Shipping, said seafarers must be allowed to go about their business “freely and without persecution”.

Stawpert, whose organisation is the top trade association for merchant shipowners and operators worldwide, called the capture of the vessels an affront to freedom of navigation as enshrined in international law.

“All these people are doing is transporting trade. And really, we can’t have a situation where ships are being seized, ultimately for political ends, to prove a political point,” said Stawpert, whose organisation represents about 80 percent of the world’s merchant fleet.

“These are innocent farers and they should be allowed to go about their jobs without fear of, essentially, imprisonment.”

Stawpert said Iran’s stated wish to charge tolls in the Strait of Hormuz had no basis in international law and would set a dangerous precedent.

“If you can do it in the Strait of Hormuz, why can’t you do it in the Strait of Gibraltar, say, or the Straits of Malacca?” he asked.

Stawpert also said the US President Donald Trump’s naval blockade of Iranian ports had heaped further uncertainty on shipping companies already reeling from Iran’s effective closure of the strait.

“We don’t know what conditions are in place. We don’t know what the targeting criteria of Iran are really,” Stawpert said. “And so we then have another state coming in, effectively doing the same thing through the blockade of the straits”.

The US and Iranian militaries have each announced the capture of two commercial vessels over the past week as Washington and Tehran continue to face off in the strait and in waters beyond the Gulf.

The US defence department on Thursday said it had captured the Iran-linked Majestic X as it was transporting sanctioned oil in the Indian Ocean, days after announcing the interception of another ship, Tifani.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on Wednesday said it seized the Panamanian-flagged MSC Francesca and the Greek-owned Epaminondas for “operating without the necessary permits and tampering with navigation systems”.

The Philippines’ Department of Migrant Workers on Wednesday confirmed 15 Filipino seafarers were on the two vessels.

Officials said they had been assured by Iranian authorities that all the crew were “unharmed” and “safe.”

Montenegro’s maritime minister, Filip Radulovic, said in an interview with the state broadcaster earlier this week that four Montenegrin crew on the MSC Francesca were “fine”.

There have been no official updates on the condition of the crews on the vessels captured by US forces.

“It seems they’re not being maltreated,” Stawpert said. “But even so, that’s not really the point. The point is they shouldn’t be in custody in the first place”.

Stawpert also expressed concern for the well-being of an estimated 20,000 seafarers who have been left stranded in the Gulf due to the effective closure of the strait.

“Their welfare is also a priority for us,” he said. “The psychological burden, I think, will be beginning to tell on them after seven weeks now of what’s, to all intents and purposes, house arrest”.

Stawpert called on both the US and Iran to respect freedom of navigation.

“Let’s resume freedom of navigation and respect the right to innocent passage as soon as we possibly can,” he said.

The blockage of the strait, which usually carries about one-fifth of global oil and natural gas supplies, has driven up fuel prices worldwide and forced many governments to start emergency energy-saving measures.

Traffic in the waterway remains a fraction of pre-war levels, with reports saying just five ships transited the strait in the last 24 hours.

Before the US and Israel launched their war against Iran on February 28, the strait saw a daily average of 129 transits, according to the United Nations Trade and Development.

On April 20, the United States fired at and then seized an Iranian-flagged container ship close to the Strait of Hormuz in the northern Arabian Sea, amid its blockade of Iranian ports.

It was similar to a scene which played out in the 1980s during the so-called Tanker War between Iran and Iraq, during which both countries fired on each other’s tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, seeking to cripple each other’s economies.

As naval tensions rise again in the Strait of Hormuz – this time between Iran and the US – we break down what happened in the 1980s and examine the parallels and differences between the situations then and now:

How the 1980s Tanker War played out – a timeline

The war between Iran and Iraq began in 1980 when then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein launched a full-scale invasion of Iran following Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution.

In 1984, this war reached the Gulf when Iraq attacked Iranian oil tankers, seeking to cripple its oil-revenue-dependent economy. Iran retaliated by firing at oil tankers belonging to Iraq and its allies in the Gulf.

According to a report by the University of Texas’s Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law, Iran also threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz then, but did not do so since its own economy, already crippled by the war, was dependent on exporting oil to the rest of the world through it.

In November 1986, when Iran struck Kuwait’s ships, Kuwait asked for foreign help. The former Soviet Union was the first to respond and helped escort the nation’s ships in the Gulf.

The US, led by then-president Ronald Reagan, launched Operation Earnest Will in July 1987, also seeking to protect tankers in the Gulf and render more assistance than Moscow. The operation involved reflagging Kuwaiti tankers with the US flag so they could legally sail under US protection.

According to an article by the Veterans Breakfast Club, a US-based website which shares experiences of former US military veterans, during Washington’s very first escort mission in July 1987, a reflagged tanker hit an Iranian mine in the Gulf.

“The convoy continued, but the incident made clear that the United States had entered a shadow war with Iran at sea,” the article said.

“Over the next fourteen months, dozens of US warships rotated through the region escorting tankers and protecting shipping lanes. US forces also conducted special operations to hunt Iranian mine-layers at night and conducted strikes against Iranian military positions and ships. The mission wasn’t a small one, consuming 30 US Navy ships at one time,” the article added.

Then in April 1988, the US frigate USS Samuel B Roberts was damaged by an Iranian mine in the Strait of Hormuz. Historian Samuel Cox, writing for the US Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC), noted in 2018 that by the end of 1987 that vessel was so badly damaged, that “the only thing actually holding the ship together was the main deck”.

So, the US launched Operation Praying Mantis, seeking to destroy Iranian vessels.

The tanker war eventually ended in August 1988, following a United Nations-brokered ceasefire agreement between Iran and Iraq.

Cox noted that by the end of 1987, “Iraq had conducted 283 attacks on shipping, while Iran attacked 168 times. Combined, the attacks had killed 116 merchant sailors, with 37 missing and 167 wounded, from a wide variety of nationalities.”

“Initially, there was great concern that the attacks would cut off the vital flow of oil from the Arabian Gulf, but all they really did was drive up insurance rates. The world’s need for oil was so great, that over 100 dead merchant seamen was apparently an acceptable price,” he wrote.

What is happening in the Strait of Hormuz now?

The current hostilities between the US and Iran in the Strait of Hormuz began when Tehran, whose territorial waters extend into the strait, closed passage to all vessels after the US and Israel began bombing the country. On March 4, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) declared that it was in full control of the strait, and ships would need to get clearance from them to pass through it.

Shipping through the strait collapsed by 95 percent, sending the price of oil – 20 percent of global supplies of which are shipped this way – soaring above $100 a barrel.

Iran, through its imposition of control over who passes through Hormuz, has for almost eight weeks now, determined which vessels can exit the strait from the Gulf into the Gulf of Oman.

At first, Iran indicated that it would allow “friendly” ships to pass if they paid a toll. On March 26, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told Iran’s state TV: “The Strait of Hormuz, from our perspective, is not completely closed. It is closed only to enemies. There is no reason to allow the ships of our enemies and their allies to pass.”

Vessels from Malaysia, China, Egypt, South Korea, India and Pakistan passed through the strait through most of March and early April.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) provided these vessels with an alternative route through the Strait of Hormuz to avoid potential sea mines. US officials, including Donald Trump, have said mines have been placed there by Iran, although it has not officially confirmed or denied this.

But on April 13, alarmed that Iran was continuing to ship its own oil out of the strait, the US imposed a naval blockade of all Iranian ports. Since then, US Central Command has said US forces have directed 33 Iran-linked vessels to turn around or return to an Iranian port.

On Monday, the US military fired on and then captured the Iranian-flagged container ship Touska close to the Strait of Hormuz in the northern Arabian Sea, and, a day later, detained another oil tanker sanctioned for transporting Iranian crude oil as it sailed in the Bay of Bengal, which links India and Southeast Asia.

In a post on social media after detaining the Touska, the Pentagon wrote: “As we have made clear, we will pursue global maritime enforcement efforts to disrupt illicit networks and interdict sanctioned vessels providing material support to Iran – anywhere they operate.
International waters are not a refuge for sanctioned vessels.”

Since the US naval blockade of Iranian ports began, Tehran, which was earlier allowing vessels from “friendly” nations to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, has further tightened its grip on the strait.

Justifying the decision not to allow any foreign ships to pass until the US ends its naval blockade on April 19, Iran’s First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref said the “security of the Strait of Hormuz is not free”.

“One cannot restrict Iran’s oil exports while expecting free security for others,” he wrote in a post on X.

Last Saturday, Iran reportedly fired at two Indian-flagged merchant vessels in the strait. The IRGC said the two ships were attacked because they were “operating without authorisation”, according to state media reports.

Then, on April 22, Iran captured two container ships seeking to exit the Gulf via the Strait of Hormuz after firing on them and another vessel.

What are the parallels between the two wars?

Just like during the Tanker War of the 1980s, shipping has been severely disrupted by the US-Israel war on Iran, upending global oil and gas prices.

According to an April 17 article by the World Economic Forum, from the mid-1980s when the Tanker War took place, to the start of the new millennium, a barrel of crude oil averaged $20.

On Friday, while a ceasefire between the US and Iran was in effect, a naval battle was still playing out in the Strait of Hormuz, and Brent crude, the international benchmark, topped $106 per barrel. During open warfare between the US, Israel and Iran in March and early April, oil rose as high as $119 per barrel.

Mines in the sea are another problem common to both time periods.

While vessels were damaged by mines during the 1980s Tanker War, there has so far been no report of vessels being damaged by mines in the current war. However, the risk is the same.

US President Donald Trump has said the US will ramp up efforts to remove mines from the Strait of Hormuz. This has not begun yet, however.

According to CNN, there are only a few US minesweeping ships in the Gulf. The US Navy also told the broadcaster that four dedicated minesweepers stationed in the Gulf region were decommissioned last year.

John Phillips, a British safety, security and risk adviser and former military instructor, told Al Jazeera: “There are some clear parallels between the current situation in Hormuz and the Tanker War of the 1980s. In both cases, the basic idea is the same: pressure at sea can have effects far beyond the water itself.

“A relatively small amount of naval disruption, whether that means mining, harassment of shipping, missile threats, or attacks on tankers, can create real strategic and economic consequences, especially in a chokepoint like the Strait of Hormuz. So in that sense, the original Tanker War is a useful reminder of how vulnerable global trade can be when the maritime domain becomes part of a wider political or military confrontation.”

What are the differences between the two wars?

During the Tanker War, the US escorted ships to protect them from Iranian attacks and also deployed vessels to remove mines. NATO countries like the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Italy also joined.

But in the current standoff in the Strait of Hormuz, US allies like the UK and other NATO nations have refused to join Washington in reopening the Strait of Hormuz, or begin minesweeping operations, fearing they will be dragged into the war.

In a post on Truth Social in early April, the US president took aim at allies, “like the United Kingdom”, which, he said, have “refused to get involved in the decapitation of Iran”, telling them to either buy US fuel or get involved in the rapidly escalating war.

“You’ll have to start learning how to fight for yourself, the U.S.A. won’t be there to help you anymore, just like you weren’t there for us. Iran has been, essentially, decimated. The hard part is done. Go get your own oil!” Trump wrote.

The framework of the US-Israel war on Iran is different from that of the war between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s, experts say.

“In the 1980s, the Tanker War was part of the broader Iran-Iraq War, so the shipping attacks were tied to a much larger land conflict between two regional armies. Today, the situation is more about Iran’s standoff with the United States and its allies, and the maritime activity is less about asymmetrical war at sea and more about deterrence, signalling and the threat of escalation,” said Phillips.

“The military lesson, really, is that Hormuz is still one of those places where limited actions can have outsized effects, but the modern setting is more fast-moving, more technologically advanced and potentially more volatile than the original Tanker War,” he added.

Analysts have also pointed out that, unlike in the 1980s, Iran is currently stronger when it comes to withstanding attacks and naval blockades by the US.

In the Tanker War, Iraq was militarily supported by Western allies, while Iran was under a US arms embargo imposed in 1979 after the Iranian revolution. While this gave Iraq a military advantage, Iran’s IRGC used asymmetric warfare tactics by striking Iraq’s allies’ ships and oil tankers.

Experts also say that since the 12-day war between Iran and Israel last year, Tehran has shifted its military doctrine from one that is primarily about defensive containment to an explicitly offensive asymmetric posture.

“Iran today appears more structurally aggressive in doctrine where it is formally embracing earlier and more extensive use of regional missiles, drones, cyberattacks and energy coercion [when energy resources and infrastructure are targeted or cut off], but is operationally constrained by battle damage, sanctions and internal instability,” Phillips, the risk adviser and a former military chief instructor, told Al Jazeera in an interview on March 2.

A former US ambassador to Bahrain, Adam Ereli, also told Al Jazeera that Iran and the IRGC have “revolutionary fervour”, which means they can “survive”.

“They can tolerate pain for a lot longer than I think most American decision-makers and planners calculate,” he said.

United States President Donald Trump has claimed Iran is “collapsing financially” and said the country is losing millions of dollars a day due to Washington’s naval blockade of Iranian ports.

In a post on his Truth Social platform on Tuesday night, Trump wrote: “Iran is collapsing financially! They want the Strait of Hormuz opened immediately – Starving for cash! Losing 500 Million Dollars a day. Military and Police complaining that they are not getting paid. SOS!!!”

The US blockade of Iranian ports began at 14:00 GMT on April 13. Since then, the US has fired on and seized an Iranian-flagged tanker near the Strait of Hormuz, and redirected ships in the open seas carrying cargo to or from Iran. Iran’s armed forces have called this “an illegal act” that “amounts to piracy”.

In response to the US naval blockade, Iran has closed the Strait of Hormuz to all foreign shipping and has captured several foreign-flagged ships. Previously, it had allowed some ships deemed “friendly” to Iran to pass.

On April 19, Iran’s First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref said the “security of the Strait of Hormuz is not free”.

“One cannot restrict Iran’s oil exports while expecting free security for others,” he wrote in a post on X.

“The choice is clear: either a free oil market for all, or the risk of significant costs for everyone,” he added. “Stability in global fuel prices depends on a guaranteed and lasting end to the economic and military pressure against Iran and its allies.”

In a statement on social media on Thursday, Iran’s parliamentary speaker and lead negotiator in the ceasefire talks, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, said a full ceasefire could only work if the US naval blockade is lifted.

Analysts say the blockade is hurting Iran but believe the country has the economic and political will to sustain it.

How long can Iran survive the naval blockade?

Here’s what we know:

How is the naval blockade hurting Iran?

Iran exports oil, gas and other goods including petrochemicals, plastics and agricultural products by sea. Analysts say the US naval blockade of its ports, including in the Strait of Hormuz, could therefore affect this trade.

Soon after the start of the US-Israel war on Iran on February 28, authorities in Tehran implemented the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the only waterway out of the Gulf, through which 20 percent of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies were shipped from Gulf producers in peacetime.

The near-shutdown of the vital chokepoint sent global oil and gas prices soaring, and since then, Iran has controlled the strait. However, it has continued to export its own energy products through the waterway.

Iran’s oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz account for about 80 percent of its total oil exports. According to Kpler, a trade intelligence firm, Iran exported 1.84 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil in March and has shipped 1.71 million bpd so far in April, compared with an average of 1.68 million bpd in 2025.

From March 15 to April 14, it exported 55.22 million barrels of oil. The price per barrel of Iranian oil – across its three major variants, known as Iranian light, Iranian heavy and Forozan blend – has not fallen below $90 per barrel over the past month. On many days, the price has surpassed $100 a barrel.

Even at the conservative estimate of $90 a barrel, Iran has earned at least $4.97bn over the past month from its ongoing oil exports.

By contrast, in early February before the war started, Iran was earning about $115m a day from its crude oil exports, or $3.45bn in a month.

Simply put, Iran has earned 40 percent more from oil exports in the past month than it did before the war.

Stopping this is a key motivation behind the US naval blockade of Iranian ports.

In an interview with Al Jazeera on April 14, Frederic Schneider, a nonresident senior fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs, told Al Jazeera that the previous six weeks had been a boon for Iran in terms of oil revenues, but with the US blockade, that will change.

“Iran has some buffer in the form of crude oil reserves in floating tanks – basically parked tankers – which was estimated at about 127 million barrels in February. But that doesn’t mean that the blockade wouldn’t hurt Iran,” he said.

On Friday, Schneider told Al Jazeera that Iran, however, seems to be “playing the longer game” and has anticipated and prepared for this sort of conflict to some degree.

“The naval blockade has added economic strain, as several civilian ships have been captured in international waters. But it remains unclear how tight the blockade is, how many ships manage to pass given the considerable amount of floating Iranian oil, and how long Trump can maintain the blockade,” he said.

Can the US keep the blockade going for long?

Schneider noted that Trump will face a legislative challenge by May 1, when the 60 days he can maintain a foreign offensive without congressional approval come to an end.

Dire conditions have been reported on the ships that are upholding the blockade, he said, and it remains to be seen how China will react to the continuing seizure of ships that carry any of its cargo.

“China has already said it sees the blockade of Chinese trade with Iran as unacceptable. Further, the closure of Hormuz by Iran in retaliation is hurting, if not the US itself that much, American allies in the region and globally, raising the pressure on Trump,” he said.

“If we can glean anything from the behaviour of the two sides, it is Iran that is signalling patience and Trump showing impatience,” he added.

Adam Ereli, a former US ambassador to Bahrain, told Al Jazeera’s This is America programme that while the US blockade of Iranian ports and seizure of vessels transporting Iranian oil “makes sense” as a policy, it may not work as intended due to domestic political considerations in the US.

“The Iranians have prepared for this, for this eventuality. They have their own plans. They’ve got alternative means of storing their oil or selling their oil,” Ereli told Al Jazeera.

“Even if they ran out of oil, they have ways to survive a very tough blockade and sanctions regime that, frankly, I think will outlast Trump’s patience and the patience of the American people,” he said.

“Remember, this isn’t just about moving soldiers and ships and planes around on a map. There’s politics involved here in the United States,” he added.

“Trump is nothing if not attuned to the political winds. And for that reason, I think that you’ve got this Iran strategy on the one hand that runs up against an electoral strategy on another hand, and therefore, the question is, which one is going to give?”

Can Iran store the oil the US is blockading in the meantime?

Iran’s domestic refineries have a capacity of 2.6 million bpd, according to consultancy FGE Energy. Its oil and gas production facilities are concentrated in southwestern provinces: Khuzestan for oil and Bushehr for gas and condensate from the South Pars gasfield.

Iran is also the third-largest oil producer in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and exports 90 percent of its crude oil via Kharg Island for shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

The US naval blockade has begun affecting the country’s storage capacity, according to TankerTrackers, the maritime intelligence agency. The blockade means Iran has to store more oil, and space could become tight.

TankerTrackers said that on Kharg Island, to prepare for the possibility of running out of oil storage space, Iran has brought an old tanker named NASHA (9079107) out of retirement.

“She’s a 30yo [year old] VLCC [Very Large Crude Carrier] that’s been anchored empty for the past few years; currently spending 4 days on a trip that should take 1.5-2 days,” TankerTrackers said in a post on X, suggesting that the tanker is being used to store oil. It is unclear if the ship has a heading or course.

Can Iran continue to earn revenues from oil?

Yes, analysts say that for a few months, Iran can continue to earn revenue from oil which is already in transit at sea.

Kenneth Katzman, former Iran analyst at the Congressional Research Service in Washington, DC, said Iran is not exporting new oil amid the US blockade of Iranian ports, but Tehran has between 160 million and 170 million barrels of oil “afloat” on ships around the world currently.

Those supplies, which transited the Strait of Hormuz before the US blockade was imposed, are on board hundreds of tankers and “waiting to be delivered”, Katzman told Al Jazeera.

Katzman said he had been informed by an Iranian professor that, based on those supplies, Tehran could have revenue flows that can last until August despite the US naval blockade.

“Which is a long time. Does President Trump have until August? Probably not,” he said.

“He’s probably going to have to look at kinetic escalation if he wants to bring this to the conclusion that he wants, or he’s going to have to accept less than the deal he ideally wants,” he said.

Iranian ships will still have to avoid US naval ships on the open ocean, as the US Navy has also recently intercepted ships carrying Iranian cargoes.

On Wednesday this week, for example, the US military intercepted at least three Iranian-flagged tankers in ‌Asian waters, Reuters reported, and was said to be redirecting them away from their positions near India, Malaysia and Sri Lanka.

How else can Iran earn revenue?

Besides oil revenue, Iran is also currently receiving revenue from a “toll booth” system that the country imposed on the Strait of Hormuz in March.

On Thursday, Iran’s deputy parliament speaker Hamidreza Haji-Babaei said Tehran’s central bank had received the first revenues from tolls imposed since the start of the war, according to the semiofficial Tasnim news agency. It is unclear how much that toll revenue is.

Iranian politician Alaeddin Boroujerdi told the United Kingdom-based, Farsi-language satellite TV channel Iran International in March that the country has been charging some vessels as much as $2m each to pass through the strait.

According to Lloyd’s List, the shipping news outlet, at least two vessels that have transited the strait so far have paid fees in yuan, China’s currency. Lloyd’s List reported that one “transit was brokered by a Chinese maritime services company acting as an intermediary, which also handled the payment to Iranian authorities”. It is, however, not clear how much the vessels paid.

How resilient is Iran’s leadership?

In recent days, while pressuring Iran to negotiate a ceasefire deal, US President Donald Trump has claimed that Iranians are “having a very hard time figuring out who their leader is”, alleging that there is “crazy” infighting between “moderates” and “hardliners” in Tehran.

But the country’s officials have insisted that Iran’s government is united.

Mohammad Reza Aref, Iran’s first vice president, said on Thursday: “Our political diversity is our democracy, yet in times of peril, we are a ‘Single Hand’ under one flag. To protect our soil and dignity, we transcend all labels. We are one soul, one nation.”

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi also dismissed allegations that the Iranian military may be at odds with the political leadership.

“The failure of Israel’s terrorist killings is reflected in how Iran’s state institutions continue to act with unity, purpose, and discipline,” he wrote on X, referring to the assassinations of Iranian political and military figures Israel has carried out in recent weeks.

“The battlefield and diplomacy are fully coordinated fronts in the same war. Iranians are all united, more than ever before.”

One of the strongest messages of unity came from Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian.

“In Iran, there are no radicals or moderates,” he said on X.

“We are all Iranians and revolutionaries. With ironclad unity of nation and state and obedience to the Supreme Leader, we will make the aggressor regret.”

How strong is Iran militarily?

Iran has demonstrated considerable military resilience in the face of weeks of US-Israeli strikes through its use of asymmetric warfare.

This includes the use of guerrilla tactics, cyberattacks, arming and supporting proxy armed groups and other indirect tools.

During its war with the US and Israel, Iran has targeted energy infrastructure in Israel and across the Gulf, threatened to target banking institutions and targeted US data centres of technology companies such as Amazon in the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain.

Iran has also blocked the Strait of Hormuz and reportedly placed mines in the strait to disrupt shipping, sending global oil prices soaring.

Since the US began its naval blockade of Iranian ports in mid-April, Iranian officials have repeatedly promised that their country will defend itself and respond to any US attack.

Earlier this week, after the US military said it had seized an Iranian vessel and ordered dozens of others to turn around, Iran also retaliated by capturing foreign commercial vessels around the Hormuz Strait, which it said violated naval regulations.

Ereli, the former US ambassador, told Al Jazeera that Iran and the IRGC have “revolutionary fervour”, which means they can “survive”. “They can tolerate pain for a lot longer than I think most American decision makers and planners calculate,” Ereli said.

Ereli said it was unknown how long Tehran could last under “siege conditions” imposed by the US, but probably a lot longer than the US anticipates.

“I think they can go a lot longer, especially than most people imagine, and especially when it comes to kneeling to the Americans,” Ereli said.

“There’s a level of pride and survival. They’re at war with us, and for them it’s a war of necessity. They’ve got to survive,” he added.

A Cuban Foreign Ministry official said the exchange with Washington was ‘respectful and professional’ and devoid of threats.

The Cuban government has confirmed that it held recent talks in Havana with officials from the United States, as tensions remain high between the two countries over Washington’s energy blockade of the Caribbean country.

Alejandro Garcia del Toro, deputy director general in charge of US affairs at the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said on Monday that the US delegation included assistant secretaries of state, and the Cuban delegation included representatives at the level of deputy foreign minister.

Garcia de Toro said that the US delegation did not issue any threats or deadlines as had been reported by some US media outlets.

“The entire exchange was conducted with respect and professionalism,” he said.

In comments reported by Cuba’s Communist Party newspaper Granma, Garcia del Toro emphasised that ending the three-month-old US oil blockade was “a top priority” for the Cuban government in the talks, and accused Washington of “blackmail” for threatening countries that export oil to Cuba with tariffs.

“This act of economic coercion is an unjustified punishment for the entire Cuban population,” he said.

“It is also a form of global blackmail against sovereign states, which have every right to export fuel to Cuba, in accordance with the principles of free trade,” he added.

US news outlet Axios reported on Friday that officials from US President Donald Trump’s administration held multiple meetings in Havana on April 10, including with Raul Guillermo Rodriguez Castro, grandson of former President Raul Castro. The meetings marked the first time that American diplomats had flown into Cuba since 2016 in a new diplomatic push.

According to reports, US officials laid out several conditions for negotiations with Cuba to continue, including the release of prominent political prisoners, an end to political repression, and liberalising the island’s ailing economy.

The Reuters news agency said that US proposals for Cuba also include allowing Elon Musk’s Starlink internet terminals into the country and providing compensation for Americans and US corporations for assets confiscated by Cuba after the 1959 revolution. Washington is also concerned about the influence of foreign powers on the island, a US official told the news agency.

Trump has hinted at military intervention in Cuba and warned of tariffs on any country that sells or supplies oil to Cuba. The fuel blockade has aggravated Cuba’s economic and energy crisis, leading to warnings of a humanitarian disaster.

Cubans have also braced for a possible attack following Trump’s repeated warnings that the country will be “next” after his war on Iran and the US military’s abduction of Venezuela’s President Nicolas Maduro in January.

Last week, Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel said that his country was prepared to fight if the US carried through on its threats.

The leaders of Mexico, Spain and Brazil on Saturday voiced concern over the “dramatic situation” in Cuba and urged “sincere and respectful dialogue”.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said on Monday there was no evident justification for the US to attack Cuba.

“The ability to defend oneself does not mean the right to intervene militarily in other states when their political systems do not match what others might have in mind,” he said.

Hungary’s newly elected leader, Peter Magyar, stormed to power last weekend after campaigning to, among other things, take a step back from Russia.

Instead, Magyar has promised voters he will steer Hungary back towards the European Union, following the 16-year rule of far-right Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who went to great lengths to deepen ties with Russia.

Under Orban, Hungary opposed most of the European Union’s stances against Russia and  blocked sanctions and obstructed military aid for Ukraine.

Above all, he and his Fidesz party entrenched Hungary’s reliance on Russian oil.

Now, following a massive electoral turnout and a landslide victory, Magyar – once a devotee of Orban and now leader of the centre-right Tisza party – has promised to end Russian oil imports by 2035. But how realistic a goal is that? And can he achieve it?

How much does Hungary depend on Russia for energy?

Hungary has been central to keeping Russian oil and gas flowing into the EU, even as Europe and the US banned some imports and imposed sanctions on anyone paying more than $60 a barrel for Russian oil.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU banned seaborne imports of Russian oil but kept land flows legal. That allowed Hungary to continue importing most of its crude by pipeline via Ukraine.

The EU first announced plans to phase out Russian energy imports in May 2022, shortly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In December 2025, a binding agreement was made for member nations to completely phase out Russian oil and gas imports by late 2027. But, instead of diversifying from Moscow, Hungary increased its dependency.

According to a 2026 report by the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD), Hungary had expanded its reliance on Russian crude from 61 percent in 2021 to 93 percent by 2025.

Much of the crude oil Hungary imports from Russia comes via the Druzhba pipeline. It is one of the key pipelines that ensures the continued flow of Russian crude to both Hungary and Slovakia. At 5,500 km (3,420 miles) long, it begins in Almetyevsk in western Russia and runs into Belarus. It splits at Mozyr, with one branch going to Poland and Germany and the southern branch goes through Ukraine into Slovakia, Hungary and Czechia.

In January, the section of the pipeline running through Ukraine suffered significant damage. Ukraine blamed a Russian airstrike – Moscow denies that.

Hungary and Slovakia have complained that Ukraine has been deliberately slow to repair the damage. As a result, in March, Orban vetoed a 90 billion euro ($106bn) loan from the EU to Ukraine until the pipeline reopens.

On Tuesday this week, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said oil will flow again through the conduit by the end of April as he expects the new Hungarian leadership to lift its veto on the loan by then.

As for gas, Hungary remains one of the most dependent EU member states on Russian natural gas, accounting for roughly three-quarters of its annual imports, the CSD report shows.

Since the start of Russia’s invasion, Hungary has imported an estimated 15.6 billion euros ($18.4bn) worth of Russian gas. Long-term contracts with Russia’s state-owned Gazprom, the continued reliance on TurkStream – a natural gas pipeline running from Russia to Turkiye – and “the weak use of alternative interconnectors have locked the country into Russia’s reconfigured gas export system”, the CSD report states.

Nuclear energy dependency is yet another issue. Hungary granted Rosatom, the Russian state nuclear energy corporation, the construction contract for the expansion of its Paks atomic plant, 100km (62 miles) southwest of Budapest on the Danube River. Russia, in turn, provided Hungary with a state loan to finance most of the development of new reactors. The European Commission approved the plan in 2017 and construction started in February.

Now, Magyar says he intends to reassess the project’s financing. But the Paks plant provides 40 to 50 percent of all electricity generated in Hungary. The expansion plans will increase that to between 60 and 70 percent, which would cut reliance on imported energy, but keep Hungary tied to Russia. 

According to a 2025 joint research paper by the Center for the Study of Democracy and the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air, Hungary could potentially diversify its energy supply by importing non-Russian oil via alternative sources such as the Adria pipeline. It transports crude from the Adriatic Sea to refineries in Croatia, Serbia, Hungary and Slovakia. Their refiners, which are controlled by Hungarian oil and gas company MOL, are capable of processing non-Russian crude, the research paper said.

Russian oil has been coming in at a discounted rate as a result of Western sanctions, so any diversification will likely be more expensive.

Can Hungary wean itself off its dependence on Russian oil?

It won’t be easy, and Magyar knows it. “The geographical position of neither Russia nor Hungary will change. Our energy exposure will also be here for a while,” he said before last weekend’s election. And in an interview with the Financial Times, Magyar insisted that Russian imports should remain an option. “This does not mean that by ending dependence on someone you no longer continue to buy from them,” he said.

Magyar will seek to strike a balance between respecting current contracts with Moscow to ensure Hungary’s energy security, while establishing political distance, said Pawel Zerka, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

“I would expect this government not to be pro-Russia in the sense of going to Moscow and keeping ties with the Russian government, but they don’t have easy options to replace Russian fuel with something else, especially considering the international situation with the Middle East,” Zerka said, referring to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz in the Gulf which has blocked the shipping of 20 percent of the world’s oil and LNG supplies.

Zerka added that the newly elected leader will not have political room to be particularly cordial with Russian President Vladimir Putin, considering the disapproval of Russia by his electoral base. A recent poll by the European Council on Foreign Relations shows that a majority of Tisza’s voters see Russia as an adversary or rival to compete with.

“It will be interesting to see how he combines this with energy needs,” Zerka said.

How does the EU view Hungary’s energy ties to Russia?

The strong energy ties between Russia and Hungary have long caused friction with the EU. Following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the European bloc has worked to cut imports of Russian oil and gas. Budapest has done the opposite.

In January, the EU passed legislation to completely phase out Russian gas and LNG imports by late 2027.

Orban’s government had called for all restrictions on Russian oil to be lifted as a result of the global energy crisis triggered by the war in the Middle East. While Trump has made some concessions on Russian oil already loaded on tankers at sea – causing several heading for China to head to India instead – EU leaders have maintained they will hold firm on sanctions.

In the lead-up to last weekend’s election, Magyar’s manifesto called the dependence on Russian energy a “systemic risk” and he would wean Hungary off its reliance by 2035. But whether he can do that in time to beat the EU’s 2027 deadline is likely to provoke discussion in Brussels.

Modern warfare has dramatically changed as we have seen from the Russia-Ukraine war, conflicts involving Gaza, India and Pakistan, and the recent US-Israeli strikes on Iran. At the centre of this shift is a surging global reliance on drone and missile technology as well as advanced air defence systems.

Turkiye, one of the largest military powers in the Middle East, is increasingly positioning itself as a major supplier in the global defence sector. Central to this effort is Roketsan, a company founded in 1988 to supply the Turkish Armed Forces, which has since evolved into the country’s primary manufacturer of missile and rocket systems.

Currently exporting to approximately 50 countries, the firm is one of the fastest-growing defence companies globally.

So how did Roketsan secure a large share of the global arms trade?

Bypassing Western embargoes

Turkiye’s defence expansion was largely accelerated by restrictions placed upon it. Western embargoes aimed at halting its military advancement meant Ankara could not acquire the necessary technical systems or components.

In 2020, the United States imposed Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) restrictions on Turkiye – a key member of the transatlantic military alliance NATO. These sanctions targeted Turkiye’s military procurement agency, its chief Ismail Demir, and three other senior officials. Washington also ejected Ankara from the F-35 stealth jet programme in July 2019.

The measures came after Ankara purchased Russia’s S-400 missile defence system, which was seen as a potential threat to NATO security. The European Union also prepared limited sanctions and discussed restricting arms exports following energy exploration disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean.

To circumvent this, the country built an integrated, domestic defence ecosystem. Today, Turkiye relies on a vast supply chain of nearly 4,000 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) scattered across the country. As a result, the Turkish defence industry now operates with a local production rate exceeding 90 percent.

This shift has yielded significant financial returns for Ankara. In 2025, Turkiye’s defence industry reported $10bn in exports. Roketsan’s General Manager Murat Ikinci told Al Jazeera that the company currently ranks 71st among global defence firms, with ambitions to break into the top 50, then the top 20, and ultimately the top 10.

To support this expansion, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan inaugurated several large-scale facilities last week, including:

• Europe’s largest warhead facility.
• new research and development (R&D) centre housing 1,000 engineers.
• the “Kirikkale” facility dedicated to rocket fuel technology.
• new infrastructure for the mass production of ballistic and cruise missiles.

These projects represent a $1bn investment, with the company planning to inject an additional $2bn to expand mass production capabilities.

The ‘Tayfun’ and modern warfare

Roketsan’s R&D strategy – which employs 3,200 engineers and makes the company the third-largest R&D institution in Turkiye – is heavily influenced by data gathered from ongoing global conflicts.

According to Ikinci, the war in Ukraine highlighted the impact of cheap, first-person view (FPV) and kamikaze drones supported by artificial intelligence. In response, Roketsan developed air defence systems like “ALKA” and “BURC,” alongside the “CIRIT” laser-guided missile.

The regional landscape was further complicated during the US-Israel war on Iran, as cheap Iranian-designed Shahed drones – recently upgraded by Russia with “Kometa-B” anti-jamming modules – overwhelmed defences and even struck a British base in Cyprus in March 2026. During the same month, NATO air defences were forced to intercept three Iranian ballistic missiles that entered Turkish airspace.

Meanwhile, the recent conflict between Israel and Iran showcased the use of complex attacks combining ballistic missiles with “swarms” of kamikaze drones designed to overwhelm air defences. This environment makes hypersonic technology a critical asset.

This brings the Tayfun (Typhoon) project into focus. Tayfun is a developing family of long-range ballistic missiles. Its most advanced iteration, the Tayfun Block 4, is a hypersonic missile engineered to penetrate advanced air defence systems by travelling at extreme speeds.

When Al Jazeera asked for specific details regarding the Tayfun’s exact operational range, Ikinci was elusive. “We avoid mentioning its range; we just say its range is sufficient,” he noted.

Similarly, historical Western sanctions have pushed Turkiye to form new cooperation initiatives, effectively accelerating an “Eastern shift” away from Western defence dependence. Turkish drones are now being used by a growing number of countries, including by Pakistan during its war against India last May.

Based on these threat assessments, Roketsan has prioritised five key areas of production:

1. long-range ballistic and cruise missiles.
2. air defence systems, including the “Steel Dome”, Hisar-A, Hisar-O, and Siper.
3. submarine-launched cruise missiles, utilising the AKYA system to leverage Turkiye’s large submarine fleet.
4. smart micro-munitions designed specifically for armed drones.
5. long-range air-to-air missiles, a need highlighted by the brief India-Pakistan skirmish.

A strategic export model

Unlike traditional arms procurement, Turkiye is marketing its defence industry to international buyers as a strategic partnership.

“Our offer to our partners… is as follows: Let’s produce together, let’s develop technology together,” Ikinci stated.

By establishing joint facilities and R&D centres in allied nations across the Middle East, the Far East, and Europe, Turkiye is attempting to secure long-term geopolitical alliances rather than purely transactional sales. Ikinci highlighted Qatar as a prime example of this model, describing it as a benchmark for technological, military, and security cooperation in the region.

Filling the global stockpile gap

This rapid expansion comes at a critical time for the global arms trade. Ongoing wars have severely depleted the stockpiles of advanced weapon systems worldwide.

During the recent US-Israel war on Iran, Washington relied heavily on multimillion-dollar Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems to intercept cheap Iranian drones targeting US assets across Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. With growing concerns that US interceptor supplies could run low, Gulf states – which have collectively detected over 1,000 drones in their airspace – are actively seeking alternative defence technologies, creating a highly lucrative opening for Turkiye’s missile industry.

Defence analyses indicate that even military superpowers like the US will require significant time to replenish their current air defence inventories due to the complexity and massive infrastructure required to build them.

Turkish defence officials view this shortage as a strategic opening. Having localised its supply chain, Turkiye claims it can manufacture and export these highly sought-after complex systems independently.

As global demand for air defence and ballistic technologies rises, Roketsan is aggressively reinvesting its revenues into production infrastructure to expand its footprint in the international arms market.