interests

Chinese military and intelligence analyses for 2025 and 2026 indicate that China views the expansion of the Egyptian Armed Forces in establishing numerous naval and air bases, such as the Bernice and Gargoub bases, with strategic interest. Beijing considers this trend, spearheaded by the Egyptian political leadership under President El-Sisi and the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, a vital component of a comprehensive strategic partnership between Egypt and China, aimed at securing shared interests in strategically vital regions. Chinese intelligence and military agencies view the Egyptian expansion in establishing military bases, such as the Mohamed Naguib base, the July 3 base, and bases east and west of the Suez Canal, as part of a comprehensive Chinese strategy to develop the Egyptian Armed Forces and enhance their deterrent capabilities against Beijing’s adversaries in the region. This perspective aligns with Beijing’s view of Egypt as a key strategic partner in Africa and the Middle East. The Chinese military establishment’s vision for this Egyptian military development of air and naval bases up to 2026 can be detailed, as follows: Supporting the Egyptian political leadership’s vision, from a Chinese perspective, of Egyptian military development under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, is seen as a serious attempt to modernize the army and transform it into a smart deterrent force capable of protecting national security and the country’s economic interests. This aligns with China’s +1 strategy (localization), as China seeks to leverage the development of Egyptian bases to become centers for localizing Chinese military technology in Egypt, particularly in the areas of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as the Wing Loong and advanced air defense systems, such as the HQ-9B.

In this context, China views Egypt’s expansion in establishing military bases, such as the Mohamed Naguib Base, the July 3 Base, and the bases east and west of the Suez Canal, with strategic interest as a crucial element in strengthening the comprehensive strategic partnership between Cairo and Beijing. China considers these Egyptian military bases, especially those located on the Mediterranean Sea and near the Suez Canal. Bases like the July 3rd Air Base serve as vital support points for protecting China’s commercial interests and the routes of its Belt and Road Initiative, which passes through the Egyptian Suez Canal. Egypt represents a cornerstone in China’s 21st-century strategy. Therefore, China aims to bolster Egypt’s deterrent capabilities (a defense partnership). Chinese military officials believe that modernizing the Egyptian armed forces through these naval and air bases and localizing Chinese defense industries in Cairo, in accordance with President Sisi’s vision, enhances the independence of Egyptian military decision-making, paves the way for multipolarity, supports developing countries in the Global South, and contributes to regional stability. Relations between Egypt and China have moved beyond mere arms deals to the localization of Chinese technology within Egypt, enabling Egypt to confront regional challenges more effectively and creating a kind of regional balance of power. Here, Beijing, by supporting Egyptian military expansion through these bases, aims to create a strategic balance in the region amidst a growing Egyptian-Chinese rapprochement seen as an alternative to or complement to traditional partnerships with the West. This can be inferred from the military exercises. The air capabilities and joint military exercises between Egypt and China are reflected here. Joint air exercises, such as Eagles of Civilization 2025, and cooperation at Wadi Abu Rish Air Base are Egyptian-Chinese joint training exercises aimed at exchanging expertise in air combat and protecting maritime routes. This coincides with Egypt’s interest in military and arms deals with China, such as the J-10C. Other Egyptian military negotiations with China regarding the purchase of advanced submarines, known as the Yuan class, are also underway. This reduces Egypt’s military dependence on Washington and the West and strengthens the Chinese presence in the Egyptian military arsenal. This reflects a convergence of military visions between the two countries, with China supporting Egypt’s efforts to modernize its military infrastructure. The new bases are considered a cornerstone for securing shared interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

Beijing also aims to strengthen the comprehensive strategic partnership. Here, the Chinese vision extends beyond mere arms deals; it views this as a core partnership aimed at establishing a broad military alliance with Egypt to develop the Chinese military Silk Road. This includes joint operational planning and training exercises, as demonstrated in the Civilization Eagles 2025 maneuvers. China seeks to effect a comprehensive shift in the regional balance of power. Chinese intelligence believes that establishing bases and developing naval and air forces will grant Egypt strategic independence and reduce its dependence on the West. This, in turn, opens the door for China to enhance its influence in the region through defense cooperation, thereby securing shared Chinese and Egyptian military interests. Beijing considers securing Egyptian bases for maritime routes (the Suez Canal) and the Red Sea to be in line with Chinese economic and security interests within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. In general, the Chinese military establishment views Cairo as working to build a strong regional pivot point, and Beijing sees this expansion as an opportunity to deepen defense and technological ties with Cairo, paving the way for the formal declaration of a Chinese-Egyptian military Silk Road partnership.

China views the new Egyptian military bases as a means of protecting its strategic interests within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. These bases, particularly those located on the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Suez Canal, occupy vital maritime chokepoints, and China considers them a guarantee for the security of its international trade routes. The relationship between Egypt and China has evolved from mere arms purchases to the localization of defense industries, such as the production of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and electronic warfare systems, increasing Egypt’s military reliance on Chinese technology. These Egyptian military bases, which enhance Egypt’s rapid deployment capabilities, align with China’s interests in establishing a multipolar regional order that reduces American influence in the Middle East. Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security reports indicate a qualitative shift in Egyptian military doctrine. Chinese military institutions affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army analyze that Egyptian military bases, such as the July 3rd base, provide strategic depth and protection for economic assets (gas fields and the Dabaa nuclear power plant), thus contributing to the economic stability in which China participates. For this reason, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is seeking to train and qualify the Egyptian military elite through the Military Academy for Advanced Studies as an alternative to Western and American training.

The Chinese intelligence and military establishments view the Egyptian army’s expansionist vision in establishing naval and air bases within Egypt as part of the development strategy adopted by the Egyptian Armed Forces and the political leadership of President El-Sisi. This strategy aims to complete the modernization of the Egyptian Armed Forces and advance the Chinese military Silk Road with Egypt’s assistance. China supports the Egyptian Armed Forces’ efforts to modernize Egyptian military infrastructure, considering the new Egyptian military bases a cornerstone for securing China’s shared interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea. China views these new Egyptian military bases, particularly on the Red Sea, as essential for securing Chinese trade routes (the military/maritime Silk Road) and mitigating risks. In addition to the significant role Egypt plays for China as a regional power center and a key player in the balance of power, relevant military circles in Beijing analyze the modernization of the Egyptian army as a center of gravity for stability in the Middle East and Africa. A strong and stable army serves China’s interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, China translates its vision into tangible support, including modernizing Egypt’s military infrastructure to align with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative in its maritime, air, and naval components and equipping it with advanced weapons systems.

Based on the preceding understanding and analysis, we conclude that the new Egyptian military bases (naval and air) are considered, according to the Chinese military and strategic vision, strategic strengths. Their benefits extend beyond Egypt, securing China’s commercial and military interests in the Mediterranean and Red Seas. They also provide a Chinese technological alternative in a region previously dominated by Western and American platforms, paving the way for China’s gradual expansion of its military Silk Road initiative.

Authors: Rahul Mishra & Harshit Prajapati

The US-Israel conflict with Iran dragged almost every country into a phase of energy insecurity. While Iran’s neighboring countries are directly affected by the armed conflict, immediate regions too have not remained insulated from the ongoing conflict. For India, the conflict has demonstrated the implications of getting caught in the crossfire of a conflict in its vicinity. Two particular incidents—the US sinking of the Iranian warship IRIS Dena in the waters off the coast of Sri Lanka (just 40 nautical miles away) and the reported firing of two ballistic missiles towards the joint UK-US base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean—serve as a grim reminder about a conflict spiraling in India’s maritime backyard in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

For decades, the Indian Ocean region has remained largely peaceful, away from any direct impact of a conflict in a neighboring region or any major power conflict with a regional impact. The two above-mentioned incidents highlight the need for littoral states of the IOR to have a regional security mechanism to deal with any crisis in the region in a more cohesive and coordinated fashion. Being one of the major stakeholders in the region, it is incumbent upon India to foster meaningful and substantial cooperation with IOR littoral states through regional mechanisms such as the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). It would be a timely exercise to strive to move beyond non-traditional security cooperation mechanisms to protect the shared maritime space, especially during such conflicts.

The sinking of IRIS Dena in the IOR when it was returning to its home after participating in the International Fleet Review and multinational exercise MILAN, hosted by India, serves as a major strategic lesson to countries of the region. Since the International Fleet Reviews are an acknowledgement by the regional and global peers of the host country’s sovereignty and maritime supremacy in its neighborhood, the sinking of an Iranian warship does not augur well for India’s claim as a net security provider or preferred security partner in the IOR.

Additionally, Iran’s launch of two ballistic missiles, which failed to strike the designated target, towards the Diego Garcia base, reflects the risk of a distant war reaching India’s maritime backyard. The 2025 decolonization agreement between the UK and Mauritius enabled the transfer of the Chagos archipelago, including Diego Garcia Island, to Mauritius; however, the UK retained access to the Diego Garcia military base for 99 years. Thus, in the event of a conflict, Diego Garcia, as the joint UK-US base, may become a target, thereby drawing the war into the Indian maritime backyard. With the escalating conflict with Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthi rebels, the possibility of repetition of such an incident cannot be ruled out.

During the Cold War, India and the IOR countries endeavored to halt the foreign military presence in the IOR, as illustrated by the UNGA Resolution 2832 of 1971, which sought to establish the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZOP). However, the regional countries failed to implement the declaration because of resistance from the major powers. In 2016, India attempted to revive implementation of the 1971 resolution but failed to garner significant attention from the IOR countries, putting aside any major power.

Rather than seeking IOZOP through restrictions on foreign military presence, India should strengthen its naval capabilities, especially its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. Earlier, in 2018, India envisioned a 200-ship fleet by 2027; however, in 2026, the goal was revised to a 200-plus-ship fleet by 2035. Despite the induction of new platforms, this goal seems ambitious, as older platforms retire faster than new ones are inducted, especially given the constrained budget allocation to the Indian Navy.

A sizable portion of India’s submarine fleet is aging. The current force comprising Russian-origin Kilo-class submarines and German-origin Type 209 submarines has been in service for decades and is set to retire soon. Although the induction of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine Aridhaman in April 2026 and Arighaat in August 2024 strengthened India’s nuclear triad, the pace of induction of conventional submarines remains lagging. Project 75I, aimed at developing advanced diesel-electric submarines, was originally set in motion in 2007; however, its deal with the manufacturer—a German firm—has yet to be signed.

Earlier, it was planned that India would expand its fleet of long-range maritime reconnaissance Boeing P-8I aircraft from 12 to 28. But then the plan to expand the fleet to 28 P-8I aircraft was reduced to 20-22 due to constrained spending. Additionally, the Indian Navy only possesses 15 MQ-9B high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) drones.

Therefore, if India needs to entrench its position as a preferred security partner in the IOR and realize its vision of Security and Growth for all in the Region (SAGAR)—upgraded to Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions (MAHASAGAR) in 2025—in the IOR, then it needs to support its normative framework with military capabilities.

Given India’s lack of naval capabilities—across all three mediums (air, surface, and undersea)—to conduct persistent surveillance of the enormous IOR (spanning more than 70 million square kilometers), India should collaborate with littoral countries to conduct surveillance in the IOR through regional mechanisms such as the CSC and the IONS. Presently, cooperation in these forums is largely limited to countering non-traditional security threats, such as piracy, trafficking, maritime disasters, etc. Challenges such as differing threat perceptions, disparity in naval capabilities, and a lack of regional consciousness hinder meaningful and substantial cooperation.

However, if the littoral countries of the IOR seek to avoid getting caught in the crossfire of a distant conflict, such as the present one, they need to move beyond non-traditional security cooperation to develop a common understanding of how to protect the shared maritime space in the IOR, especially during such conflicts. India, being the most militarily equipped country in the IOR, should take the lead in forging the collaborative efforts to conduct persistent surveillance in the IOR, as maritime wars do not respect geographical boundaries.