Global Finance’s World’s Best IFI winners outperformed the sector in 2025, emphasizing innovation and AI adoption. But new Mideast conflicts pose new challenges.
Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) modestly improved their performance in 2025, recording an average Return on Average Assets of 2% and a 12% increase in total assets. This compares to 1.9% and 9%, respectively, in the prior year. The winners of Global Finance’s World’s Best Islamic Financial Institutions Awards all achieved above-average profitability and growth.
Digitalization and AI remain strong areas of focus and investment as IFIs seek to drive customer growth, increase financing assets and deposits, and strengthen their competitiveness against conventional banks. Retail banking remains the main pillar of most Islamic banks, but IFIs are strengthening their commercial banking delivery as well. Corporate finance, capital markets, and wealth management activities are also becoming increasingly important to the sector.
A relatively low cost of funds contributes to Islamic banks’ positive margins. The biggest of the group, which dominate their domestic markets, continue to outperform their rivals, reflecting funding advantages and cost efficiencies.
The winners of Global Finance’s 2026 World’s Best Islamic Financial Institutions Awards have also distinguished themselves as innovative by introducing new Islamic banking products, consolidating their market share, improving service quality, and achieving good financial results. Collectively, they have shown themselves to be well managed with clear strategies. Like all Middle Eastern banks, however, they face a more challenging road ahead due to the new conflicts in the region, particularly the Iran war that’s disrupted the Persian Gulf.
This year’s top winner, Kuwait Finance House (KFH), enjoyed asset growth of 17% last year, to $139 billion, helping the bank maintain its position as the second-largest Islamic institution globally. KFH has the most diverse geographical reach of any IFI, with operations throughout the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. It has advanced its digital transformation by shifting from basic digitization to value-driven technology adoption.
Meanwhile, Boubyan Bank claimed Global Finance’s inaugural award as Most Innovative Islamic Bank. The bank stands apart for its innovation, technology-driven strategy, and strong commitment to offering financial solutions that enhance the customer experience. Boubyan made significant progress last year in embedding AI into services offered through its app.
Emirates Islamic Bank (EIB) took home the Best Islamic Financial Institution in The Middle East. The bank notched 19% growth in net profit last year, to $910 million, driven by robust balance-sheet growth. Lending grew 26% over both retail and corporate banking. Supported by a sophisticated digital offering, EIB has seen its franchise strengthen through a wide range of Shariah-compliant pro-duct offerings.
HomeAwardsAward WinnersWorld’s Best Islamic Financial Institutions 2026: Country and Territory Winners
In 2026, Islamic financial institutions continue to demonstrate resilience, innovation, and regional impact.
Across the Middle East, Asia, and beyond, leaders are balancing robust growth with Shariah-compliant practices, setting new standards in both domestic and cross-border markets.
Institutions are harnessing digital transformation to deliver more efficient, accessible, and customer-focused banking, from mobile apps and AI-powered services to fully digitized payment and investment platforms. Their portfolios span retail, corporate, and wealth banking, while many are pioneering new products in sukuk, digital savings, and Shariah-compliant investment solutions.
Regional leaders are also championing financial inclusion, SME support, and sustainable initiatives, reflecting a commitment to both community development and responsible growth. Across markets, the combination of innovative technology, solid performance, and ethical finance is positioning these institutions as benchmarks of excellence in the global Islamic finance landscape.
Regional Winners
Bilal Parvaiz, CEO
Asia-Pacific
Standard Chartered Saadiq (SCS)
SCS is a leading Islamic financial institution throughout Asia and particularly in Malaysia, Pakistan, Brunei, Singapore, and Indonesia, providing innovative solutions for Shariah-compliant financial needs. With the support of parent Standard Chartered Bank, it also provides access to the global banking and financial markets. SCS is active across corporate and investment banking, trade finance, wealth management, and retail and private banking as well as the sukuk market.
Farid Al Mulla, CEO
Middle East
Emirates Islamic Bank (EIB)
EIB had a banner year in 2025, reporting net profit up 19% at 3.3 billion UAE dirhams ($899 billion), driven by robust balance-sheet growth and higher recoveries. Financing growth was 26% over the retail and corporate banking segments. Total income in retail banking and wealth management increased 14%, driven by increased customer liabilities and Islamic financing growth. Total income from corporate and institutional banking increased 15%. Supported by a sophisticated digital offering, EIB’s franchise has strengthened across a broad menu of Shariah-compliant products.
Country and Territory Winners
Bahrain
KFH Bahrain
Part of the KFH Group, KFH Bahrain continued to develop its domestic franchise last year; to focus more closely on the local Islamic market, it sold its stake in Oman’s Ahlibank. A signal achievement in 2025 was the successful, $400 billion Additional Tier 1 Sukuk offering, the largest of its kind ever in Kuwait. Also last year, KFH Bahrain launched the KFH Gold Account, Bahrain’s first digital gold investment and savings account. KFH’s MyHassad Savings Scheme is now the island kingdom’s largest prize-based savings product, with a record-breaking deposit portfolio of $675 million following 17% growth last year. The bank also completed its fully digitized Liquidity Management Solution in 2025.
Brunei Darussalam
Bank Islam Brunei Darussalam
Bank Islam Brunei Darussalam is the dominant bank in Islamic finance in Brunei Darussalam, with assets of $8.3 billion covering a range of Islamic SME and consumer financing products.
Egypt
ADIB Egypt
A leading performer in Egypt’s Islamic banking sector, ADIB Egypt reported assets of $7.3 billion last year, up by 42% in US dollar terms, thanks to growing market share as net profit grew 25% to $256 million. ADIB Egypt offers retail and corporate banking services together with investment banking, leasing, asset management, and microfinance.
Indonesia
Bank Muamalat
Indonesia’s first Islamic bank, founded in 1991, Bank Muamalat today holds total assets of $4 billion. It provides a comprehensive range of Shariah-compliant financial services and has pioneered many Islamic banking products in Indonesia.
Jordan
Islamic International Arab Bank (IIAB)
IIAB takes the title as 2026 Best IFI for Jordan thanks to a strong performance in 2025, significant digital progress, and a widening business reach. Growth was in double figures and assets now total some $6 billion. IIAB holds a 22% market share of Islamic assets in the kingdom. IIAB serves individuals, SMEs and large corporates, in addition to financing large projects. It has been an initiator of multiple domestic SME enablers, including the Kafalah Scheme, Jordan’s first Shariah-compliant finance guarantee scheme, and jointly organized the first Islamic funds mobilization with the Central Bank of Jordan, the Arab Fund, the World Bank, and other regional players.
IIAB’s digital banking services include a high-end mobile app that includes digital onboarding, seamless access to most of IIAB’s banking services, personal finance management, and third-party services via the bank’s ecosystem. IIAB is also an active AI adopter, embedding it at the core of its digital transformation to enhance customer experience, operational efficiency, and Shariah-complaint innovation.
Kuwait
Kuwait Finance House (KFH)
Kuwait’s second-largest bank, KFH now controls over 60% of domestic Islamic banking assets and is by far the kingdom’s largest Islamic institution. It holds a 30% share of conventional and Islamic banking assets. Domestically, KFH dominates the Islamic financing and deposit market—and, in turn, has a strong presence in the overall banking sector for both deposits and financing/loans—as well as a strong positions in retail, private, and corporate banking.
Malaysia
Maybank Islamic
Maybank Islamic, Malaysia’s flagship Islamic institution, is innovative, well managed, and over the long term, has recorded impressive performance. It is often first in introducing innovative Shariah-compliant financial products. In its home country, the bank controls around 30% of Islamic assets, but its activities extend across other Asian markets as well, making it the largest Islamic bank outside the Middle East and fifth-largest globally with $90 billion in assets. It also holds a prominent position in the global sukuk market. Maybank’s financial metrics are solid, with a strong capital base and good returns.
Morocco
Umnia Bank
Umnia Bank was Morocco’s first Islamic bank, established in 2017. Shareholders include Qatar International Islamic Bank, CIH Bank (Credit Immobilier et Hotelier), and Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion (CDG). Unmia operates the country’s largest Islamic banking network and is its largest by total assets, with around 50% market share in financings and 40% in deposits. Its main areas of financing are automobiles, real estate, and equipment finance.
Oman
Bank Nizwa
With $5.2 billion in assets at the end of last year, Bank Nizwa is Oman’s seventh-largest bank, with a focus on innovation that has helped broaden its reach in its home market. Oman’s first digital Islamic bank, it remains focused on digital expansion.
Reinforcing its commitment to leveraging strategic partnerships, Bank Nizwa launched the Tranna app last year in collaboration with Zappit, a financial technology company. The app is designed for expatriates living and working in Oman, enabling instant transfers to six countries: India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Nepal, the Philippines, and Bangladesh. Also last year, Bank Nizwa launched its Electronic Mandate (E-Mandate) for Direct Debit service that streamlines recurring transactions and enhances the overall banking experience for corporate and retail customers.
Pakistan
Meezan PAKISTAN
Meezan Pakistan had a strong 2025, launching several new products. Totall deposits increase by 28% to $17.2 billion, aided by a large branch and ATM network and solid digital infrastructure.
Meezan continued to strengthen its digital offerings via WhatsApp Banking, a simple, secure, and accessible transactions channel, and its highly rated mobile app, which is recognized for its simplicity, speed, and reliability. The app expanded its user base 40% to over 4.3 million while financial transactions increased 40% to 553 million.
The bank offers one of the industry’s most comprehensive portfolios of debit cards, supported by advanced payment technologies including NFC-enabled payments, chip and PIN security, mobile-based contactless transactions, and 3D secure e-commerce payments.
Qatar
Qatar Islamic Bank
The emirate’s largest Islamic bank and its second-largest bank overall, QIB enjoys a strong franchise and market position, when ranked by total banking assets. QIB reported 2025 net profit of $1.3 billion as total assets reached $61 billion, as total assets rose to 10% to $61 billion, QIB is also active in the Islamic capital markets, including sukuk-related activities, structured financing, and transaction execution. QIB has significant government backing, with the Qatar Investment Authority its largest shareholder.
Saudi Arabia
Al Rajhi Bank
Al Rajhi Bank is the world’s largest Islamic financial institution and Saudi Arabia’s flagship Islamic bank with $278 billion in total assets and $6.6 billion in net profit at the end of last year. It operates a strong retail banking network in its home market, particularly measured by deposits and income. It ranks first in banking transactions with 1 billion per month and first in remittances for the Middle East by payment value. Al Rajhi has 20.6 million customers in Saudi Arabia and the leading market share in deposits at 22.6%. Financial metrics are good, particularly capital ratios with total CAR at 21.9% at the end of 2025 and ROAA of 2.4%.
Sri Lanka
Commercial Bank of Ceylon
Al-Adalah, Commercial Bank of Ceylon’s Islamic banking window, offers a diverse portfolio of innovative Shariah-compliant products. Assets grew 67% last year as the financing portfolio doubled. The bank also made a strategic pivot in 2025 toward SME financing and sustainable energy projects.
Turkey
Kuveyt Türk Katilim Bankasi (KTKB)
KTKB is KFH’s Turkish subsidiary. The largest Islamic bank in Turkey and one of the country’s top 10 banks, its business model has proved resilient amid a challenging operating environment. Commanding a 34% market share in Turkish Islamic banking, it also operates an Islamic bank in Germany under the name KT Bank AG as well as a Bahrain office that serves as a bridge between Turkey and the Gulf Cooperation Council states.
United Arab Emirates
Emirates Islamic Bank (EIB)
EIB’s market position grew significantly in 2025 as assets increased 30% to $39.7 billion and deposits grew 33%, bolstered by a strong balance sheet and strong capital and liquidity position. The third-largest Islamic bank in the UAE, EIB has been improving its digital infrastructure and increasing its AI utilization. It has expanded its wealth management services and products, becoming the first Islamic bank in the UAE to launch a Shariah-compliant digital wealth offering and equity trading via mobile banking app.
In an era of 150-page novels in 14-point font, and books on Venezuela’s recent history that feel like overly long opinion pieces, Ulises Milla’s Editorial Alfa opted for something entirely different: a chronicle of how chavismo took over the Venezuelan State between 1999 and 2004, the product of ten years of research, divided into two volumes totaling more than 1,400 pages.
It is titled La oscuridad no llegó sola (no English translation yet), taken from a line by a Colombian poet, and has a subtitle that speaks volumes: “chronicle of a Venezuelan tragedy.” Yes, it is a chronicle in the broadest sense of the term, a systematic and multifaceted account that protects a series of events from oblivion in a specific era. It is also a Venezuelan tragedy, one among many, in which everything leads to an unhappy ending that seems inevitable, as in those of Aeschylus or Sophocles.
There is a classical feel to Mirtha Rivero’s new work, not only because she has drawn on literary genres that are over two millennia old, but also because it is a book that took a long time to write, one made to transcend time. For this reader, it is another essential text about our past, like José Domingo Díaz’s chronicles of the First and Second Republics or Lisandro Alvarado’s Historia de la Revolución Federal, and certainly like Rivero’s previous work: the bestseller La rebelión de los náufragos, published in 2010. It does not attempt to impose a personal thesis, defend one side or one figure, or propose a solution to the nation’s ills. It is an effort to understand how things happened, on a scale vast enough to allow the patterns of behavior developed by political actors over those years to emerge.
For those of us who experienced these events firsthand, through the media, La oscuridad no llegó sola still reveals aspects of the story we didn’t know, thanks to the quantity and quality of its sources. For those who were too young, it is an unparalleled document on how the traditional political class underestimated chavismo, how chavismo took advantage of the negligence and frivolity of its adversaries to seize control of institutions, and how the anti-politics we saw explode in La rebelión de los náufragos helped demolish what little remained of that democracy, which committed suicide, or allowed itself to die. A tragedy that, with its variations, has happened before. And that will very likely happen again. La oscuridad no llegó sola by Mirtha Rivero is available on Amazon and in bookstores in Spain. From Monterrey, Mexico, where she has lived for several years, the economics journalist who is showing how Venezuela’s contemporary history must be written spoke with Caracas Chronicles.
I want to start with the moment when La rebelión de los náufragos was published, had the impact it did, and you began the journey that led to these two volumes. You addressed this in the preface to La oscuridad no llegó sola, but what was the process like for defining not only the 1999-2004 timeframe, but also the questions you wanted to answer?
After La rebelión de los náufragos was published, I didn’t immediately consider any other topics. It was the third book I had written, but it was the first one that was published, and its reception changed my way of working. It was like a shock. For a year and a half, I couldn’t think about another “topic” because I was adapting to that new reality. It was in mid-June 2011 that another topic emerged. I wanted to answer a question: What happened in the 2004 recall referendum? For me, it was personally very important because, as a result, my husband and I began looking for a new place to live. Did voting fraud occur or not? What was it like? How did we get to that point? So I marked the period: from Chávez’s inauguration on February 2, 1999, until the day of the referendum, August 15, 2004.
It wasn’t so much that chavismo was pressuring the Supreme Court, but rather that a large part of society favored a Constituent Assembly.
I had to go back quite far because Chávez didn’t appear out of nowhere. Nor did other figures: the architects who helped him set up his political machine, those who accompanied him from that day forward, and those who had been with him even before the 1992 uprisings didn’t appear out of nowhere. They all have a past and a reason for being there, just like the people who kept appearing in my research. I confirmed along the way that during those years, the foundations were laid and the entire structure that allows chavismo to endure was built. As I guide my narrative, I realize that I not only have to look back, but that I often force myself to project into the future. For example, I look back when I discuss the oil industry, which is an important topic in my chronicle, but I also look forward when someone talks about the changes in the judicial sphere that the 1999 Constitution imposed, and I’m going to the trial against Judge Afiuni in 2009.
I see. For me, La oscuridad no llegó sola is a twin of La rebelión de los náufragos, in its structure, its tone, and its intention: first, you show how the political class sacrificed democracy with Carlos Andrés Pérez and paved the way for chavismo, and now we see how it overestimated its own strength and underestimated Chávez. Was describing this hall of mirrors the plan, or did it emerge during the research?
It wasn’t the plan. I didn’t see it as a continuation, nor as a hall of mirrors: it turned out that way, the story led me there. Exploring the recall referendum was actually a pretext for me to delve into that era, which I was afraid of. What was important was what happened before the referendum. How the referendum was repeatedly postponed until Chavismo had all institutions and powers under its control, which culminated in the expansion of the Supreme Court, and how it was able to regain popular support through direct subsidies via the social missions. How the opposition promoted the recall referendum without having a candidate to challenge Chavismo if Chávez lost and elections were held.
What did you learn, while writing this book, about the ability of the various opposition leaders to interpret reality? Do you share the common opinion that popular support for Chávez was underestimated in 1998 and 1999?
I was very surprised by their inability to see what was right in front of them. We had already seen how short-sighted the political parties were, their reluctance to form and renew themselves, since the 1980s. This is evident in the conspiracy against Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1993, based on a check from the secret fund that had been annulled in 1989 and was used against him in 1992; in the corruption accusations made by (future chavista minister) José Vicente Rangel; in the resistance to the reforms of the Presidential Commission for State Reform; and in the insistence of the old leaders on remaining political bosses.
There were people who knew who this Hugo Chávez they were opposing really was, but even so, there were those clumsy last-minute maneuvers in the 1998 campaign, and they weren’t prepared for the scenario in which Congress would be eliminated, as Chávez himself had said would happen. They acted with great carelessness in the face of Chávez’s rise: society, the political parties, and even a political animal like Teodoro Petkoff underestimated him. I was very surprised that they didn’t know how to confront the lieutenant colonel, the authoritarian tendencies that came with him, the power-hungry Left that accompanied him, the people who applauded the military coup attempts of 1992. They offered no resistance when Chavismo abolished Congress, taking advantage of the anti-political sentiment that had also been brewing since the 1980s. The lack of vision, and even of any statesman-like discourse, on the part of the politicians, did surprise me greatly.
One of the book’s many achievements was to unearth and trace a somewhat forgotten but key episode: how the Supreme Court accepted the Constituent Assembly’s suspension of the Legislative Branch. Did that also surprise you, how they paved the way for the dissolution of the separation of powers? How much pressure was chavismo exerting on the Supreme Court?
It didn’t surprise me that much, because we experienced it firsthand. The chavistas had just come to power and were barely learning how to use it, and they couldn’t exert pressure before Chávez took office on February 2, 1999. It wasn’t so much that chavismo was pressuring the Supreme Court, but rather that a large part of society favored a Constituent Assembly, even though a constitutional reform would have sufficed. Many people believed that this Constituent Assembly would save the country, to create a new, bright, efficient nation. Everyone was riding that wave. As Simón Alberto Consalvi said, we cannot absolve the people of their decisions.
Some of your interviewees, as expected, fall into hindsight bias: assigning to certain moments a meaning that we see today but that wasn’t easy to discern then. For example, everyone in your book says they knew the 2002-2003 strike was a bad idea, but that “the majority decided”: Didn’t you yourself fall into hindsight bias? Because when I write about those years, I have to tell myself, “Remember what you thought then about the 2002 general strike, not what you think today.”
One can always fall into that bias because one isn’t objective, pristine, but I was very careful about that and made an effort to compare the accounts. Because many interviewees told me things that didn’t happen as they said; they were mixing what others had told them with what they would have liked to have happened. My own interpretations of a particular moment fell apart as I investigated. Sometimes the same scene had six different testimonies, and I had to cross-reference them, sometimes going back to the witnesses to confirm or discuss parts of their story. The good thing is that I encountered very little reluctance from the interviewees, although of course there were people who didn’t want to talk, who stood me up, and I even made trips for nothing.
Both the oil workers and the dissident military officers were convinced they were right and that they could convince some people, while these people already had a plan in place.
With those I did talk to, I sometimes confronted them, because now it turns out, for example, that nobody agreed with the national civic strike, or as we called it then, the “oil strike.” But the investigation was able to determine who truly resisted, and how society pressured for a repeat of what happened on April 11, even though it was so unlikely to have any effect.
April 11, 2002, is like the novel Rashomon; the same event is seen differently depending on many perspectives. But it’s quite well documented; much less known is what happened within PDVSA, and you contributed a lot to those of us who aren’t familiar with the oil world. How do you see today the role played by the oil executives when they decided to step outside their bubble?
Within that bubble were people like Edgar Paredes and Juan Santana who, having been involved in university politics, were politically savvy. They knew their place and what might happen, but also what they needed to do. They created that protest movement to rescue PDVSA. Society joined them because, in reality, it used the PDVSA conflict as an excuse to protest many other things, but the oil workers were trying to defend their company because, ever since Chávez was elected in ’98, they saw him as a threat. Naively, they believed they could change the policies because they came from a school of thought where debate and consensus were reached. But even during the 2002 strike, they continued fighting to rescue PDVSA. They were fighting for the country too, but to rescue the country, they believed, PDVSA had to be rescued. The same was true for the soldiers in Plaza Altamira. Right or wrong, they wanted to rescue the FAN (National Armed Forces) where they had made their careers, without understanding that they couldn’t, because the first political prisoners of chavismo were military personnel.
The idea that Chávez also provoked the April 11th march, or the movement to crush it, is a narrative he fabricated after those events.
Both the oil workers and the dissident military officers were convinced they were right and that they could convince some people, while these people already had a plan in place. They thought that the truth would prevail and that the people would act for the good of the country. But that wasn’t meant to happen. They suffered a lack of understanding of the country’s political history, of what the 1992 coups meant. Because they were caught up in their own business, in what they knew. In fact, not all the oil workers or the military saw Chávez as a threat and voted for him in 1998, like a large part of the country.
Reading the book, I came to feel more empathy for what the oil workers and even certain military personnel, did than for what the politicians did.
Because they actually did more than the politicians in terms of trying to rescue their respective organizations. With all their naiveté, the oil workers and the military did force others to act. They gave their all to try to save not only their professional world, but democracy itself.
The book makes it clear that Chávez sought out conflicts, he provoked them. Even the massacres, not to mention the strikes: he sought out battles because he saw them (and he was right) as opportunities to wipe out pockets of resistance. Right? Do you see this as a pattern that connects everything from the 2001 enabling legislation to the recall referendum?
Chávez sought out battles because it was his way of life. He always said, like Pinochet, that he was a soldier. I believe he launched the enabling legislation package in 2001 to impose his agenda, not to provoke, because I don’t think he knew it would generate such strong resistance, even though there had already been protests since 2000. He introduced those laws at the last minute and without consulting anyone because he was an authoritarian who believed he was the center of the world. The idea that he also provoked the April 11th march, or the movement to crush it, is a narrative he fabricated after those events. He knew there were disaffected military officers and expected a classic coup, which he planned to counter with civilians, but he didn’t provoke it, because in fact, his intelligence services ultimately failed him. Just as there are people who, after the strike failed, said they never agreed with it, he rewrote history to impose the narrative that everything was his agenda. But many things surprised him, even though he eventually managed to navigate each situation. However, after April 11th, he did dedicate himself to provoking conflicts, now with the advice of Fidel Castro, and surrounded by radicals like Alí Rodríguez Araque.
Another pattern I noticed is the persistence of anti-politics, how distrust of political parties shaped different situations. And you get the feeling that this still resonates with people, that three decades after the 1990s, anti-politics continues to define us, right?
The parties were already badly weakened, following a decline that began in the mid-1980s, and even more so after what happened with Pérez II. Their crisis became impossible to hide by the second year of Chávez’s presidency, but anti-politics was very much present during Chávez’s election itself, before that night of April 11, 2002, when decisions were made driven by the desire to remove politicians from important matters. Although politicians met, participated in discussion groups, and sought solutions on their own, such as promoting Adán Celis as transitional president, anti-politics was pervasive across all sectors and prevailed among the main actors who attempted to remove Chávez from power in 2002. The book includes testimonies from politicians who recount how the media favored the opinions of emerging civil society actors who viewed politicians as corrupt and stuck in the past. And yes, as you say, this continues today. Those in power still promote this idea of politicians as a corrupt caste that led the country to ruin. Because it’s very easy to blame politicians for something in which the citizenry also played a part.
SACRAMENTO — Before it all came crashing down, Eric Swalwell appeared on the cusp of rising to the top of the Democratic field in the California governor’s race.
Swalwell had just announced a statewide tour and aired his first ad. The former prosecutor and Dublin city councilman launched his campaign on “Jimmy Kimmel Live!” in November, a comfortable setting for a politician who’d built a national reputation by appearing on cable news shows to attack President Trump.
Influential forces in Sacramento had begun coalescing behind the then-Bay Area congressman, including some consultants and advisors close to Gov. Gavin Newsom. Newsom hasn’t endorsed, but his associates’ involvement lent credibility to Swalwell.
Swalwell’s campaign quickly collapsed with the explosive allegations that he sexually assaulted a former staffer and had acted inappropriately with other women who were just beginning political careers. Swalwell denies the allegations but dropped out of the race for governor and resigned his seat in the House.
The whiplash over Swalwell’s rapid rise and fall has Democratic leaders facing questions about whether they had a blind spot about his alleged behavior.
His onetime allies in Congress are being asked whether they knew about his conduct, which has been described as an open secret on Capitol Hill. Unions who backed Swalwell have fled, and political consultants are returning donations.
Lorena Gonzalez, president of the California Federation of Labor Unions, speaks to Kaiser Permanente nurses and healthcare workers at the Kaiser Permanente Zion Medical Center in San Diego on Jan. 26.
(K.C. Alfred / San Diego Union-Tribune via Getty Images)
California Federation of Labor Unions President Lorena Gonzalez, whose group endorsed Swalwell and three others in the race, said she confronted Swalwell more than a month ago after hearing rumors about womanizing and illicit photos.
“He’s a liar,” Gonzalez said. “He’s just a very skillful politician who did not tell the truth even when asked directly.”
Though he was little known in much of California, Swalwell, 45, was a youthful and fresh face in a field of candidates, many of them veteran politicians, when he entered the contest.
A little more than a week ago, his campaign was on an upward trajectory. His first statewide ad emphasized his hometown roots and concerns faced by Californians, including rising costs at his favorite doughnut shop in his hometown of Dublin. He rolled out new endorsements from state and federal elected officials almost daily.
Former and current advisors close to Newsom were also helping Swalwell’s campaign, multiple sources told The Times. Others associated with the governor are also helping rival candidates.
“He’s a liar. He’s just a very skillful politician who did not tell the truth, even when asked directly.”
— California Labor Federation president Lorena Gonzalez
Other Democrats in the race said the warnings about Swalwell should have been investigated more thoroughly by the powerful California politicians and interest groups that backed him.
Antonio Villaraigosa, the former mayor of Los Angeles, called him a “flash in the pan” — someone who lacked substance.
“People thought just because he was popular on TV that maybe he had been vetted,” Villaraigosa said. “He had not been vetted.”
Gubernatorial candidates Katie Porter and Antonio Villaraigosa share a moment while participating in a candidate forum in Los Angeles on Jan. 10.
(Christina House / Los Angeles Times)
Swalwell’s entrance into the race last fall came at a time when elected officials and leaders of powerful interest groups in Sacramento were unimpressed by the field, particularly after big-name Democrats including former Vice President Kamala Harris, Sen. Alex Padilla and state Atty. Gen. Rob Bonta had passed on running.
Steven Maviglio, a Sacramento-based Democratic consultant, said there was pressure to find the “perfect candidate” for the state’s most powerful office.
“Democrats are looking for a fighter against Trump, and he fit the bill,” Maviglio said. “That was enough for most people.”
As with most members of California’s congressional delegation, Swalwell was an unfamiliar figure to many Californians living outside his Alameda County district, even though he had a lighthearted, robust presence on social media.
He’d never held statewide office when he was elected to Congress after a career that included serving on the Dublin City Council and working as a criminal prosecutor for Alameda County.
But he appeared to be close to former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-San Francisco), who selected him to be an impeachment manager for the case against President Trump in 2021.
Former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) addresses the crowd at the California Democratic Party State Convention in San Francisco on Feb. 21, 2026.
(Christina House/Los Angeles Times)
At a forum in Washington this week, Rep. Pelosi rejected suggestions that Democrats looked past the accusations.
“None whatsoever,” she said, when asked what allegations she’d heard about.
Sen. Adam Schiff (D-Calif.), who previously worked alongside Swalwell on the House Judiciary Committee and endorsed him, said on MS NOW that he felt betrayed and “sickened” by the allegations.
“My paramount feeling is that I’m grateful these women came forward,” Schiff said. “I’m grateful that they did so when they did — it prevented our state from making a potentially terrible mistake.”
Sara Azari, an attorney for Swalwell, said in a statement that he denies all of the allegations of sexual misconduct and assault and will pursue “every legal remedy” against those making the claims.
“These accusations are false, fabricated and deeply offensive — a calculated and transparent political hit job designed to destroy the reputation of a man who has spent twenty years in public service,” Azari said.
Attorney Lisa Bloom reaches toward a photo at a news conference where Lonna Drewes, left, is seen with former Rep. Eric Swalwell, at a news briefing in Beverly Hills on Tuesday. Drewes detailed a 2018 encounter in which she claimed Swalwell drugged and sexually assaulted her after offering professional mentorship.
(Myung J Chun/Los Angeles Times)
On Tuesday, Lonna Drewes accused Swalwell of drugging and raping her in 2018 while she worked as a model, an allegation now being investigated by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department.
Azari, in an interview on NewsNation, said of Drewes’ allegation: “Two adults consenting, which is our position is, is not against the law.”
California Democratic Party Chairman Rusty Hicks declined to answer questions this week about whether the scandal hurts the party’s credibility, saying only that the allegations are “clear for voters: [Swalwell] is not a suitable choice.”
In an interview with The Times, Hicks said the party relies on delegates to vet candidates before endorsement votes at the party convention. While no gubernatorial candidate reached the necessary level of support to earn the endorsement at the February gathering,Swalwell had the largest share with 24%.
Gonzalez, of the labor federation, said she called Swalwell in the first week of March after being contacted by several people about his sexually inappropriate behavior.
She described the awkward conversation — and his immediate denials. None of it was true, he said. If there was anything sordid to find in his past, it would have been dug up by Trump and conservatives who went after him when he was helping to try and impeach the president, he said.
At the union group’s endorsement meeting, members grilled Swalwell about several issues, including his claimed residency in Livermore, his involvement with a nonunion film production, and his ability to manage his own finances.
The issue of inappropriate sexual behavior never came up at the endorsement, Gonzalez said.
“We were in a position, like so many, of trying to figure out who this guy was with all these red flags, but being told by a lot of surrogates that they were his choice — whether it’s people in Congress or folks who knew him from home,” Gonzalez said.
Other institutional players also threw in their support. The California Medical Assn. endorsed Swalwell early in February. The group represents more than 50,000 physicians in the state and spends heavily in elections.
“It definitely was a nod that that’s where the establishment should head,” Maviglio said.
California Medical Assn. spokesperson Erin Mellon said the group met with candidates and backed Swalwell “based on the information available to us” at the time.
Behind the scenes, Swalwell was courting attention. He began hanging out at the Grange, a favorite hotel bar in Sacramento for state lawmakers and lobbyists, trying to make connections, according to a source who ran into him there.
Months earlier, he sent a text to a California political consultant with questions about who should help his campaign. He asked about the well-known firm of Bearstar Strategies, according to the text exchange, which was viewed by The Times.
Swalwell texted, “would you recommend having our IE go to them?” to the consultant, a reference to an “independent expenditure,” which is an outside committee that raises money in support of candidates but is barred from coordinating with their campaigns.
Bearstar Strategies ultimately launched an independent committee to support Swalwell, which in recent weeks raised more than $7 million from political action committees for the California Medical Assn., DaVita and other medical industry groups, as well as Uber.
Antonio Villaraigosa, left, shakes hands with Tom Steyer during a gubernatorial candidate forum in Sacramento on April 14, 2026.
(Godofredo A. Vásquez / Associated Press)
Bearstar Strategies, whose members have long advised Newsom, also provides media consultants for a committee running attack advertisements against environmentalist Tom Steyer, another candidate in the race. Swalwell would have benefited from the committee’s spending.
Jim DeBoo, a consultant and Newsom’s former chief of staff, is helping on the anti-Steyer committee, according to multiple sources, which has raised $14 million from real estate agents’ and utility industry groups. DeBoo didn’t respond to a request for comment, and a representative for Bearstar declined a request for an interview.
No one has claimed that any of those consultants or individuals knew about Swalwell’s alleged behavior. Bearstar Strategies said in a statement last week that it had suspended all activity on Swalwell’s independent expenditure.
Jamie Court, president of the nonprofit Consumer Watchdog, said institutional groups backed Swalwell because they thought he could win and they wanted to maintain the status quo in Sacramento.