influence

U.S. Vice President JD Vance has accused some members of the Israeli government of attempting to influence American public opinion to undermine Washington’s agreement with Iran, highlighting growing public differences between the two allies over Middle East policy.

Speaking on a podcast with Joe Rogan released on Wednesday, Vance defended the U.S.-brokered deal that ended last month’s conflict with Iran, despite criticism from Israeli officials and some U.S. lawmakers who argue the agreement leaves Tehran’s missile and nuclear capabilities largely intact.

Vance accuses Israeli officials of influence campaign

Vance said he was certain that some figures within the Israeli government sought to steer U.S. policy toward continuing military operations against Iran.

“I know beyond a shadow of a doubt that there have been people within the Israeli government who are trying to actually shift us away from that policy because they want to continue the military campaign,” Vance said.

He added that although he maintains good relationships with some Israeli officials, others were trying to shape American public opinion.

“There are some people within their system that we know beyond a shadow of a doubt are manipulating and trying to change American public opinion to keep the war going on indefinitely,” he said.

Defends Iran ceasefire agreement

Vance argued that the agreement reached last month was the right decision, despite criticism that it failed to place sufficient limits on Iran’s ballistic missile programme or provide a clear roadmap for dismantling its nuclear facilities.

The deal has also been criticised in Israel for restricting its military campaign against Iran-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The vice president said attempts by foreign governments to influence U.S. policy are common and not unique to Israel.

“It doesn’t bother me that Israel tries to do this. It frankly doesn’t even bother me that Russia or some of these other countries do it,” Vance said.

“What does bother me is when those operations, those influence campaigns, actually affect American political judgment.”

Growing public differences with Israel

The remarks add to increasingly visible disagreements between the Trump administration and Israeli leaders over how to handle Iran.

In June, Vance sharply criticised Israeli opponents of the Iran agreement, arguing that President Donald Trump remained Israel’s strongest ally despite objections from some members of the Israeli government.

Israeli officials have argued that the agreement does not adequately address Iran’s nuclear ambitions or ballistic missile programme, concerns they say are widely shared across Israel’s political and security establishment.

Would US have entered the conflict?

Asked whether the United States would have become involved in the recent conflict with Iran without Israeli influence, Vance replied, “Yes, yes I do.”

He added that President Trump independently believes Iran should never obtain a nuclear weapon.

“I think the president, separate from any influence from Israel, believes very strongly, and again I agree with this, that Iran should not have a nuclear weapon,” Vance said.

The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

Why it matters

Vance’s comments expose unusually public tensions between senior U.S. and Israeli officials over the future of Middle East policy. They also underscore ongoing debate within Washington over the extent of foreign influence on U.S. decision-making and the long-term strategy toward Iran.

What to watch

The remarks are likely to draw scrutiny from both Israeli officials and members of the U.S. Congress as the Trump administration seeks to preserve the Iran agreement while managing its close security partnership with Israel. Further disagreements over Iran and regional military operations could test the traditionally strong U.S.-Israel alliance in the months ahead.

With information from Reuters.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s failure to penetrate Chinese society, particularly after the Arab Spring uprisings, stems from the Chinese Communist Party’s tight security grip, China’s policies of localizing religions, and the Chinese public’s rejection of transnational political ideologies. Despite the Brotherhood’s historical and organizational attempts to build ties with Muslim minorities in China, the rigid nature of the Chinese system and society has formed an impenetrable barrier to any infiltration. The fundamental contradiction between ideologies in China, such as Chinese communism as the ruling doctrine and political Islam as a totalitarian movement from which the Muslim Brotherhood emerged and China’s strict security policies aimed at integrating minorities, has led to the failure of these political ideological currents. Political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood have failed to gain a foothold in China for several structural and political reasons. The most prominent of these is the strict nature of the Chinese communist system, which prohibits any political or religious activity outside the state’s control. This is compounded by the Sinicization policies that impose absolute loyalty to Chinese culture and the Communist Party. Furthermore, the internationalist ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam clashes with Chinese nationalism. Additionally, there is a lack of popular support for such projects among Muslim minorities who follow religious traditions different from those in Arab and Islamic countries and around the world. Despite the existence of an Islamic religious group in China called Yihewani, whose name literally means brotherhood, it is a reformist movement within the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence. It originated locally in China in the 20th century, specifically in the 1930s, but it is a completely independent, traditional Hanafi school of thought with no organizational or ideological ties to the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East.

On the other hand, China harbored apprehensions about the political Islam and Muslim Brotherhood model following the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011. Research centers and decision-making bodies in Beijing closely monitored the outcomes of these uprisings, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power in Egypt and Tunisia. China viewed the Brotherhood’s ascent to power in some countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia, followed by their subsequent failures and the descent of some into civil war, as evidence that political Islam harbors a project to destabilize nations. This understanding led Beijing to adopt a firm, principled stance rejecting this model of political Islam entirely in order to protect its own stable development model. Consequently, China adopted a policy of strategic alliance with Egypt under President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and other Arab nationalist regimes following the events of the June 30, 2013, revolution in Egypt and the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood and its president, Mohamed Morsi. China strengthened its strategic and economic partnerships with current Arab governments, such as those in Egypt and the Gulf states. Here, China rejects interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Similarly, Arab states support the One China policy and its actions in Xinjiang. This high-level diplomatic coordination between China, Egypt, and other Arab states, following the Muslim Brotherhood’s failed rule, has led to a crackdown on any attempts to finance or subtly infiltrate the banned group through economic or educational channels within China.

Here, the Chinese state pursues a policy of institutional rejection of political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood. Chinese authorities classify any political activity with a religious basis as a direct threat to national security and territorial integrity. This has led to the banning and dismantling of any cells or attempts to establish branches of the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, Muslim ethnic minorities in regions like Xinjiang (East Turkestan) face strict security and surveillance measures that prevent the formation of any opposing Islamic religious movements within China. Beijing also imposes the forced assimilation of Muslim minorities into Chinese culture and criminalizes any transnational organizational manifestations or affiliations.  With an emphasis on the dominance of communist ideology, the ruling Chinese Communist Party rejects any religious or political activity or movements that seek to assert identity above loyalty to the state and the party. This is coupled with strict Chinese security measures to combat foreign infiltration of religions, organizations, movements, and Islamic political currents within China, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. Beijing maintains one of the world’s most stringent surveillance systems for monitoring religious and political activities. Following the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, Chinese security agencies raised their alert levels to ensure that the contagion of color revolutions or ideological movements did not spread within its borders. China considers any foreign organization, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, a direct threat to national security and social stability. Therefore, any cells or committees attempting to engage with Chinese Muslims are banned and dismantled.

Political Islam movements have failed to penetrate Chinese society and bring about political or social changes as they have in other countries. This is due to several historical, political, cultural, and social factors imposed by the Chinese state. The most prominent of these factors are the tight security and political grip and the nature of the Chinese communist political system. China imposes a highly centralized system in which the state and the Communist Party completely control the public sphere and institutions. No independent political or ideological organization is permitted outside the umbrella of the Communist Party. Chinese authorities impose strict censorship and implement proactive security policies that prevent any political, religious, or opposition organizations or movements from existing or expanding. Furthermore, the primacy of nationalism over religion in China, where Chinese identity is primarily based on belonging to the nation and the nationality, represented by the culture of the majority Han Chinese population, makes loyalty to the state paramount. This renders the transnational ideologies adopted by political Islam movements unacceptable and severely restricted. Here, the government’s policies toward religions in China become clear. China pursues a policy of Sinicization of religions, meaning that the practice of any religious rituals must conform entirely to Chinese culture and socialism. The Chinese state follows policies of Sinicization on religions, with Chinese authorities implementing strict policies to subordinate religions to Chinese socialist culture and values. This has included systematic campaigns to prevent foreign or Middle Eastern influences on mosque style, clothing, and religious practices. China also adopts strict policies to contain any influence of political Islam and subjects religious bodies to state supervision. Beijing aims to Sinicize religions and requires their integration with the culture of the Han majority and the values ​​of the Communist Party, placing loyalty to the nation above all other affiliations.

This occurs while the Chinese state officially manages and oversees Islamic institutions, such as the Islamic Association of China, thus preventing the emergence of independent religious leaders or institutions that could adopt or disseminate the ideas of political Islam. Herein lies the role of cultural and historical diversity within China. Muslim minorities in China, such as the Hui ethnic group, have absorbed traditional Chinese culture and integrated it with their beliefs over centuries, making their communities well-integrated into the broader social fabric and resilient against external influences. Muslims have been historically integrated into China, and Islam has been part of the Chinese social fabric for over 13 centuries.  Muslim ethnic groups, such as the Hui, have successfully integrated into Chinese society and adapted to local culture. This integration has made political Islam alien to their environment due to China’s strict security measures. The Chinese government deals harshly with any religious or ethnic movements with a political character, particularly in the predominantly Muslim Xinjiang region of northwest China, under the banner of combating extremism and terrorism. Security policies and measures have been implemented to restrict any religious activity outside the official control of the Chinese state. The state adopts a dual strategy: containing practices acceptable to official state institutions while categorically rejecting any separatist or political tendencies that Beijing considers a threat to the country’s unity and stability.

Beijing manages religious pluralism through the Islamic Association of China and views any ideologies that deviate from loyalty to the state with extreme caution. The relationship between the state and Islam in China is shaped by several pillars, including national diversity. China has 56 officially recognized ethnic, religious, and national groups, with the Han Chinese constituting the vast majority at approximately 92% of the population. Regarding Muslim ethnic groups, there are 10 Muslim-majority groups in China, such as the Hui and Uyghurs, with the total number of Muslims estimated in the tens of millions. China officially adopts a policy of Sinicization, whereby Chinese authorities lead campaigns to eliminate transnational religious expressions, prohibiting religious institutions from having ties with their counterparts abroad. Religious institutions are required to adhere to the Party’s leadership and integrate their doctrines with Chinese cultural traditions. The Chinese government pursues a policy of Sinicization of Islam. The Chinese state adopts a firm strategy based on integrating Islam and its culture into the Chinese national identity (in accordance with socialism with Chinese characteristics). As we mentioned, Muslim affairs are officially managed through the Islamic Association of China, which is under the control of the ruling Communist Party. This closure of the religious sphere has thwarted the Islamic internationalism ideology promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood in Middle Eastern countries, as China confines religious teaching and practice to purely local frameworks, preventing the introduction of the writings of Sayed Qutb or Hassan Al-Banna into Chinese territory.

Therefore, we conclude that attempts by political Islamist movements, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, to infiltrate China or penetrate its Muslim communities have failed. Here we observe the cultural and ethnic differences between the Muslim minorities in China and the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is banned in Egypt and the Middle East. The main Muslim population in China is divided into two primary groups that fail to resonate with the Brotherhood’s ideology: the Hui ethnic group, a Chinese Muslim minority. The Hui are Chinese-speaking Muslims fully integrated culturally and socially into the fabric of the Chinese state. Their primary loyalty is to China, and therefore, the Arab political ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood finds no echo among them. The second group is the Uyghur ethnic group. Uyghurs reside in the Xinjiang region (East Turkestan) in northwest China. Despite the presence of nationalist and religious tendencies, Beijing has imposed extremely strict security measures (including re-education camps and biometric surveillance, which are security systems within China that use an individual’s biological characteristics, such as fingerprints, facial features, and iris scans, to verify their identity), effectively isolating the region from any activism emanating from the Middle East, particularly from the Muslim Brotherhood.

China said on Tuesday it does not seek a “sphere of influence” in the Pacific, as Foreign Minister Wang Yi defended Beijing’s growing engagement with Pacific island nations following criticism over a recent missile test in the South Pacific.

The remarks came during talks in Beijing with Solomon Islands Foreign Minister Rick Houenipwela, as regional tensions continue to intensify amid strategic competition between China and Western allies.

China Rejects Geopolitical Motives

Wang Yi said China’s cooperation with Pacific island nations is based on mutual respect and shared development rather than geopolitical ambitions.

He stressed that Beijing’s partnerships come without political conditions and are not imposed on other countries. Wang also said Pacific island states are independent and sovereign nations that should not be treated as any country’s “backyard” or be subject to outside interference.

China reaffirmed its willingness to expand cooperation with the Solomon Islands in areas including green energy, healthcare, and climate change.

Missile Test Sparks Regional Concerns

The meeting followed China’s recent test launch of a missile carrying a dummy warhead from a nuclear powered submarine into the South Pacific.

The test drew criticism from several regional governments, including the Solomon Islands, which questioned both the timing and the message sent by the launch.

Solomon Islands Prime Minister Matthew Wale described China as “a good friend” but said the missile test was “not something a friend does,” while reaffirming his country’s commitment to strengthening ties with Australia.

The launch also coincided with the signing of a new mutual defense agreement between Fiji and Australia, highlighting growing security cooperation among Pacific nations.

Pacific Becomes Strategic Battleground

The Pacific has become an increasingly important arena for geopolitical competition as China expands its diplomatic, economic, and security engagement across the region.

Meanwhile, Australia, the United States, New Zealand, and other partners have stepped up investment, defense cooperation, and development assistance in an effort to maintain their influence among Pacific island countries.

Many Pacific governments continue to pursue a balanced foreign policy, seeking economic cooperation with multiple partners while avoiding alignment with any single major power.

Why This Matters

China’s latest comments underscore the growing diplomatic contest for influence in the Pacific, where infrastructure investment, security partnerships, and climate cooperation have become central to regional politics. The region’s strategic location and maritime significance make it increasingly important in broader competition between China and Western allies.

Future Outlook

China is expected to continue expanding economic and development cooperation with Pacific island nations, particularly in renewable energy, healthcare, and infrastructure. At the same time, Australia and its partners are likely to deepen security and development initiatives across the region. As strategic competition intensifies, Pacific governments will continue balancing relationships with competing powers while seeking investment and support that align with their national priorities.

With information from Reuters.

Global Policy Institute president, Paolo von Schirach, says the era of unrivalled US dominance that emerged after World War II has ended.

He points to the rise of China and other emerging powers as key forces reshaping the global order.

China officially objected through its Foreign Ministry to the Japanese draft resolution to increase armaments and abandon Japan’s post-World War II commitment not to rearm its military, as approved by the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan during its general council meeting. The draft resolution proposed amending three key security documents, which are the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Medium-Range Defense Forces Enhancement Plan. It was to be submitted to the Japanese government and parliament for further discussion. Chinese authorities officially rejected and objected to the draft, deeming it a threat to their national security and their spheres of direct influence in Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Indo-Pacific region. They considered it a radical escalation of Japan’s security strategy, detrimental to Chinese national security and to the global security initiative proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Here, the revision of Japan’s three security documents, represented in the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Force Enhancement Plan, represents a strategic shift away from its post-war pacifist constitution toward more proactive and independent military policies. The nature of this shift is evident in Tokyo’s easing of restrictions on lethal weapons exports and its reorientation of its armament toward counter-offensive capabilities and missile development. Under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s administration, the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan has adopted a proactive approach, reshaping Japanese industries and institutions to address the greatest strategic challenge posed by China. The updated National Security Strategy has already fundamentally altered the country’s pacifist military doctrine by disarming the Japanese military and preventing its rearmament since World War II, a move that has drawn staunch opposition from China, which seeks to protect its own national security. The most significant amendments to the three Japanese security documents included Japan’s acknowledgment of its ability to double and enhance its counter-strike capabilities. This was achieved by allowing Japan to possess long-range missiles capable of striking enemy targets before launch. Simultaneously, Japanese authorities approved doubling defense spending, raising the military budget to 2% of GDP.

China objected to the Japanese draft resolution, which aimed to increase Japanese armament and militarize the region and global supply chains, and threatened to escalate the situation. Beijing strongly condemned these trends, describing them as new militarism. A key point of contention for China was what Chinese intelligence and military circles perceived as a warning of Japanese and foreign interference in Taiwanese affairs, as China considers Taiwan an integral part of its territory. Beijing condemned the Japanese leadership’s statement that any emergency in Taiwan is an emergency for Japan, describing a potential Chinese military intervention in Taiwan as an act of aggression. Here, Beijing rejects Japan’s new military approach, characterized by advanced military deployment. China has officially protested and taken countermeasures against Japan’s plans to deploy defensive missiles on Yonaguni Island, located only about 110 kilometers from Taiwan. China has strongly accused Japan of violating its commitments, arguing that this new Japanese military expansion violates Tokyo’s international obligations and its pacifist constitution. China has warned Japan that it will pay a heavy price if it intervenes militarily in the Taiwan Strait.

Chinese intelligence, military, security, and defense circles link Japan’s armament activities in Taiwan to American interference in Chinese affairs through its network of allies in the Asian region, such as Japan, given its close alliance with Washington. Here, Japan defends its military rearmament against China, with several of its officials sending political and security warnings to China. They argue that, given the uncertainty in Japan stemming from US policies and the fluctuating stance in Washington, Japan seeks to bolster its own capabilities and build regional alliances (with the Philippines, Australia, and NATO) to expand deterrence against Beijing and maintain regional security from a Japanese perspective. Strategic circles in Tokyo view the potential fall of Taiwan to China as a direct and existential threat to Japanese national security and vital shipping lanes, making the protection of the Taiwan Strait a fundamental component of Japan’s updated defense doctrine.

For these reasons, China’s decisive response was seen as a challenge to its national security, especially given Japan’s de facto official classification of Beijing as the greatest and most unprecedented strategic challenge to its security. This classification was further reinforced by Japanese authorities’ approval of developing military production, strengthening domestic defense industries, and easing restrictions on arms exports. This is where the dimensions of China’s official rejection and objection lie, as it is considered a violation of the pacifist principle enshrined in the Japanese military doctrine, which was internationally and regionally agreed upon after World War II for Japan’s disarmament. Beijing believes that Tokyo is abandoning its pacifist constitution and returning to a militaristic path, while Japan exaggerates the narrative of a China threat. Beijing accuses Japan of fabricating flimsy pretexts to justify its military expansion and arsenal, which threatens China’s regional security. Therefore, China warned that these Japanese steps to increase armament undermine peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and jeopardize the principles of China’s global security initiative. China also registered its objection to Japan’s exclusionary approaches to its initiative based on shared and sustainable security. Furthermore, China linked this Japanese escalation in its confrontation with China in the region to the sensitive issue of Taiwan and the close alliance between the United States and Japan, while categorically rejecting Japanese interference in Taiwan’s affairs and considering the island’s security an integral part of China’s national security.

Attorneys for musician Chuck Redd say a D.C. Superior Court judge dismissed a breach of contract lawsuit filed against the artist after he canceled a Christmas Eve performance at the Kennedy Center in protest of President Trump’s influence over the venue.

The dismissal was granted Friday under Washington’s Anti-SLAPP laws, which are designed to prevent meritless lawsuits intended to silence opposing points of view on matters of public interest.

Redd, a drummer and vibraphone player who has toured with Dizzy Gillespie, Ray Brown and others, had presided over holiday “Jazz Jams” at the Kennedy Center since 2006. He called off last year’s performance shortly after Trump’s handpicked board for the Kennedy Center voted to add the president’s name to the venue, which Congress named for President Kennedy after his assassination.

“The Center sued Mr. Redd because he publicly and rightly objected to adding Donald Trump’s name to the Kennedy Center, a living memorial to former President John F. Kennedy,” Lisa J. Banks, one of Redd’s lawyers, said in a statement. “The lawsuit against Mr. Redd was political retribution, pure and simple, by the Trump Kennedy Center, and the Court correctly saw it as such in dismissing the case with prejudice.”

Redd told the Associated Press in an email Saturday that he is “very pleased with the judge’s ruling.”

The motion to dismiss, filed in March, argued that Redd wasn’t contractually obligated to perform. It included the contract provided by the Kennedy Center, which the artist never signed.

Representatives for the Kennedy Center did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the suit’s dismissal.

Goldin writes for the Associated Press.

Even on her way out, Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-San Francisco) — 86 and retiring — held sway.

Last month, in the final stretch of the race to replace her, Pelosi endorsed Connie Chan, a member of the San Francisco board of supervisors and a candidate who had until then struggled to gain traction. The move clearly had an effect, with Chan advancing out of Tuesday’s primary to the general election in November, according to the Associated Press.

Political observers were quick to note that Pelosi’s famed political influence was alive and well, as made clear as of Wednesday morning by Chan’s bounding past the third-place finisher, tech millionaire and Democratic political operative Saikat Chakrabarti, who self-funded his campaign to the tune of nearly $10 million.

But cast another way, the race’s early results also showed the limits of Pelosi’s influence — in the form of state Sen. Scott Wiener, who as of Wednesday morning was clearly the race’s front-runner, holding a double-digit lead over both Chan and Chakrabarti.

Wiener — an ambitious and prolific state lawmaker with a strong base in San Francisco, particularly in the liberal bastion’s LGBTQ+ community — has long eyed the seat but held off from running for years in deference to Pelosi, a trailblazing politician and one of the most powerful of her generation. She was the first woman ever elected House Speaker in 2007 and oversaw both of President Trump’s first-term impeachments.

However, that changed in late October, when Wiener, 56, announced he couldn’t wait any longer and would be running this year. His announcement came before Pelosi had announced her own plans, amid broader party backlash against gerontocracy and elderly incumbents holding on within the aging Democratic establishment, and it appeared to irk her.

In early November, shortly after California voters passed Proposition 50 to allow Democrats to redraw the state’s congressional districts to better favor Democrats — an initiative she helped spearhead — the still influential Pelosi announced she would retire.

In that announcement, Pelosi thanked San Francisco voters for giving her wide latitude to be a fearless voice in Washington. She hadn’t faced a serious election challenge since the Reagan administration. In her last race, in 2024, she won reelection with 81% of the vote.

Pelosi then waited until last month to endorse Chan as her chosen successor.

Chan, 47, who was born in Hong Kong and immigrated to San Francisco with her family at age 13, was first elected to the board of supervisors in 2020, and has been chair of its budget committee since February 2023. Before winning office, she was a Chinese interpreter and then an aide for nearly 15 years to several different Democratic politicians from the Bay Area, including then-San Francisco Dist. Atty. Kamala Harris.

Other establishment figures, such as Sen. Adam Schiff (D-Calif.) and former San Francisco Mayor Willie Brown, endorsed Chan as well.

Last week, Pelosi said she’d decided to weigh in and back Chan in part because, after spending years boosting women into positions of power, she’d realized there weren’t enough around anymore.

“It’s not about women being better than men; it’s that we have to have women at the table,” she told NBC News.

At her election night party, Chan told the SF Standard that Pelosi’s endorsement “absolutely changed the tide” in the race, delivering a “fatal punch” on behalf of her campaign.

But that punch, if devastating to Chakrabarti’s campaign, had clearly not knocked out Wiener — who was ready Tuesday night with a few punches of his own in a speech to his supporters.

“Tonight, San Franciscans sent a very clear message,” he said, according to shared remarks. “San Franciscans are ready for bold leadership, real results, and a new generation of leaders that isn’t afraid to take on the toughest fights facing our country.”

Wiener, who served in the San Francisco board of supervisors himself before winning election to the state Senate in 2016, said in this political moment, “we can’t afford politics that simply preserve the status quo.”

He said, “I’m not going to Washington to sit quietly, protect the status quo, or wait my turn.”

“I’m going to fight relentlessly for Medicare for all, to build millions of homes, to make public transit more expansive and reliable, for affordable clean energy, for working families, for civil rights, and for democracy itself,” he said. “I’m going to fight to protect our immigrant neighbors, LGBTQ people, reproductive freedom, and the rule of law — and to protect them from Donald Trump and MAGA extremism.”

Others, including many in the LGBTQ+ community, also cheered the strong showing from Wiener, who is gay and has long championed LGBTQ+ rights. Kelley Robinson, president of the LGBTQ+ rights organization Human Rights Campaign, said her organization was “thrilled.”

“We need more voices like Wiener in Washington. Not only would he expand the number of openly LGBTQ+ members of Congress, he has a record of impact and delivering for his constituents,” Robinson said. “We are excited to support him on to victory in November.”

With Tuesday’s primary settled, a new head-to-head race for Pelosi’s seat begins — one that, given her endorsement of Chan and Wiener’s intentional focus on pulling San Francisco in a new direction, will be an even clearer referendum on her influence.

Russia’s influence across its traditional sphere of influence is facing growing challenges as the war in Ukraine continues to consume military, economic and diplomatic resources. For decades, Moscow maintained strong ties with former Soviet states through security guarantees, energy supplies and economic integration. However, several longtime partners have increasingly sought closer relations with the West, raising concerns in the Kremlin about the erosion of its geopolitical position.

One of the most notable examples is Armenia, a longtime Russian ally that has recently deepened engagement with the United States and Europe while exploring a path toward eventual European Union membership.

What Happened

Russian President Vladimir Putin has warned Armenia that pursuing closer integration with the European Union could come at a significant economic cost. Ahead of Armenia’s parliamentary elections, Putin suggested that Yerevan could lose access to discounted Russian oil and gas if it continues moving toward the EU.

The warning comes as polls indicate that the party of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who has pursued a more Western-oriented foreign policy, is likely to perform strongly in the vote.

Russia has already taken measures that many observers view as pressure tactics, including temporary restrictions on certain Armenian exports and warnings about possible reductions in economic cooperation.

Why Armenia Is Moving Closer to the West

Relations between Moscow and Yerevan have cooled significantly in recent years. Armenia signed a partnership agreement with the United States last month and has taken legislative steps that could eventually support EU membership aspirations.

Pashinyan’s government argues that Armenia must diversify its international partnerships and reduce its dependence on any single power. Supporters of closer Western ties point to economic opportunities, political reforms and security cooperation as key motivations behind the shift.

Russian officials, however, view Armenia’s growing engagement with Western institutions as part of a broader effort by the United States and Europe to weaken Moscow’s influence in the South Caucasus region.

Russia’s Wider Struggle to Retain Influence

The dispute with Armenia highlights a broader challenge facing Russia as it attempts to preserve its global standing while remaining heavily focused on the war in Ukraine.

Across multiple regions, Moscow is confronting increasing competition from Western powers. In Europe, countries once considered friendly to Russia are strengthening ties with the European Union and NATO. In the Balkans, political pressure is growing on governments that have traditionally maintained close relations with Moscow.

Russia also faces challenges in Moldova’s breakaway region of Transdniestria, where pro-European political forces are gaining influence. In Central Asia, Moscow is closely watching expanding Western engagement in a region it has long regarded as part of its strategic sphere.

Beyond its neighborhood, Russia’s relationships with partners such as Cuba, Venezuela and Iran are being tested as geopolitical dynamics shift and Western pressure intensifies.

What Comes Next

The outcome of Armenia’s parliamentary election will be closely watched in both Moscow and Western capitals. A victory for Pashinyan’s party could strengthen Armenia’s efforts to deepen ties with Europe and the United States, potentially leading to further tensions with Russia.

For the Kremlin, the situation represents a broader strategic dilemma. As the war in Ukraine continues without a clear resolution, Russia must balance military commitments with the need to maintain influence among traditional allies increasingly exploring alternative partnerships.

The coming months are likely to reveal whether Moscow can preserve its position in regions it has long considered part of its sphere of influence or whether Western engagement will continue to reshape the geopolitical landscape across Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and beyond.

With information from Reuters.

WASHINGTON — The first baby boomer on the Supreme Court hit a milestone on Thursday, becoming the second-longest-serving justice in history at a time when his influence has never seemed greater.

Once an outlier on the nation’s highest court, Justice Clarence Thomas has become a towering figure in the conservative legal movement over the last decade as he helped secure landmark rulings on abortion, voting and Second Amendment rights.

The only justice with a longer tenure is liberal William O. Douglas. Thomas would overtake Douglas in 2028 if he remains on the court — and there’s no sign he plans to retire anytime soon.

“I think he’s more energized and excited now than when I first met him,” said John Yoo, a law professor at the University of California, Berkeley, who served in Republican President George W. Bush’s administration after his time as a Thomas clerk three decades ago.

Thomas was confirmed in 1991 after contentious hearings that included sexual harassment allegations. More recently, his acceptance of luxury trips has raised a storm of ethics questions. He’s nevertheless gone from near-silence at oral arguments to asking the first questions and penning a landmark ruling expanding Second Amendment rights.

Following the appointment of three conservative justices by Republican President Trump, Thomas is now the most senior member of a supermajority that’s also overturned abortion as a constitutional right, ended affirmative action in college admissions and sharply limited the Voting Rights Act.

“The court has radically moved in his direction over the course of his time on the court,” said Stanford University law professor Pamela Karlan. Thomas’ seniority means he can decide who writes an opinion if he’s part of a majority that doesn’t include Chief Justice John Roberts, a factor that can nudge other votes behind closed doors, Karlan said.

Off the bench, Thomas’ sphere of influence also includes his large, close-knit network of former clerks, who have served in the Trump administration and are increasingly filling out the ranks of federal judges.

“That is an important legacy that he will leave,” said Sarah Konsky, director of the Supreme Court and Appellate Clinic at the University of Chicago Law School. “Even as justices’ own time on the court winds down, significant influence lives on through their clerks.”

That’s not to say Thomas’ time on the court is up. In a recent speech, Thomas tied the nation’s highest ideals to a conservative vision of limited government — and launched a broadside on progressivism seen by critics as unfair and inappropriate. In the room at the University of Texas, though, it earned a standing ovation.

Thomas, who became the second Black member of the court, now has a tenure that tops 34 years, putting him ahead of Justice Stephen J. Field, who was appointed by Lincoln before the end of the Civil War and served as the only 10th justice until 1897.

For Thomas, 77, it’s a long way from the hearings at which his nomination by Republican President George H.W. Bush was nearly derailed by allegations that he had sexually harassed Anita Hill, a charge he forcefully denied.

Thomas has more recently come under scrutiny for lavish, undisclosed trips from a GOP megadonor and the conservative political activism of his wife, who backed false claims that the 2020 election was stolen from Trump. The justice has said he wasn’t required to disclose the trips he took with friends and ignored calls to recuse himself from cases related to the election.

On the court, though, recent years have also brought perhaps the most significant work of his career, especially a 2022 opinion he wrote that found people generally have the right to carry a gun in public. The justice did not respond to a request for comment on his tenure.

His own jurisprudence has changed little over the years, said Scott Gerber, author of “First Principles: The Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas.” Even as the majority moves his way, he’s continued to write dissents that get noticed.

“He’s incredibly consistent,” Gerber said. Once known for solo dissents, “now he writes majority opinions.”

Whitehurst writes for the Associated Press.