India-Pakistan Tensions

India has taken a major step towards opening one of its most sensitive areas of defence production to private companies.

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh approved the transfer of technologies developed by the state-run Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) for all conventional missile systems to Indian industry for domestic production, the country’s Ministry of Defence said on Tuesday.

The move marks a significant shift for the sector dominated by government-run firms and research laboratories. Private companies will be able to compete for the technology and production rights, subject to technical qualifications, certifications and other regulatory requirements, the ministry said.

The Narendra Modi-led government says the aim is to move missiles from development into mass production faster, increase domestic manufacturing and reduce India’s dependence on imports.

So, does India’s private defence industry have the capacity to manufacture sophisticated missile systems at the scale and reliability the military needs, is the country moving towards developing its own military-industrial complex, and are there security risks involved?

What did the government announce?

India’s Defence Ministry said Singh had approved the transfer of DRDO-developed technology for all conventional missile systems to Indian defence companies for production inside the country.

“The objective is to enhance domestic manufacturing capabilities, strengthen the defence industrial base, and create opportunities for the participation of Indian MSMEs (micro, small and medium-sized enterprises) and other technology partners in the supply chain,” the ministry said in a statement.

The measure would enable the “successful transition of missile system development to industrial production” and create opportunities for MSMEs and other technology partners, the ministry added.

“DRDO remains committed to working closely with Indian industry to facilitate the transfer and absorption of advanced defence technologies and to further strengthen the country’s indigenous defence capabilities.”

The announcement spans a wide range of missiles, said Aditya Ramanathan, a research fellow with the Bengaluru-based Takshashila Institution.

“It will include surface-to-air missiles, air-to-air missiles, anti-radiation missiles, antitank systems, and so on. It will also include more heavy-duty hardware like land-attack cruise missiles,” he told Al Jazeera.

Why is India doing this?

India has traditionally relied heavily on state-owned defence companies to turn weapons developed by DRDO into large-scale production. Bharat Dynamics, one such state-owned company, has long held a monopoly in missile production.

Tuesday’s announcement is a “big change” because it ends that monopoly, said Ramanathan.

“Private companies have been making missile components for years, but what this decision does is allow them to move up the value chain and become prime integrators for these systems,” he said.

While India largely relies on domestically made missiles, it also imports missiles — especially from Russia and Israel, two key weapons suppliers to the country.

But under Modi, India has attempted to both encourage self-reliance in defence — a concept that the government calls Atmanirbhar Bharat or self-reliant India — and prod foreign defence majors to manufacture in India.

At a time when geopolitical allegiances are changing fast, and India faces uncertainties on both major borders — with rivals Pakistan and China — the country under Modi has more than doubled its defence budget, from $38bn in 2014 to $86bn in the current financial year.

The brief four-day conflict with nuclear-armed rival and neighbour Pakistan last year has injected fresh urgency into India’s defence preparedness plans. This year’s defence budget is 16 percent higher than the previous year’s.

Other geopolitical events have forced the government’s hand too, suggested Ramanathan.

“I don’t think this move would have happened as soon as it did if not for the experience of recent wars. Indian decision-makers have been looking at Ukraine, they’ve been looking at the US war with Iran, and of course they’ve been imbibing the lessons of operations from last year,” he said.

“One reason you’re going to need large stockpiles is that, as we’ve seen recently, you’re going to burn through your inventory pretty quickly. The other reason is that your adversary could also degrade your stockpiles using their own precision-strike systems.”

China, he said, was a major factor in India’s calculations.

“India believes that to deter China, which is its most capable adversary, it will need to demonstrate that it can both inflict and absorb really punishing attrition over weeks of gruelling warfare,” Ramanathan said.

To that end, India is also creating a tri-services conventional missile force. “To be a viable and effective force, it’s going to require serious magazine depth, and this cannot be achieved without the active involvement of the private sector,” he added.

What is India’s defence industry already manufacturing?

In June, India announced that it was preparing to spend more than $2bn on military drones from domestic manufacturers, reflecting the rapid expansion of the country’s private defence industry.

More than 600 companies were involved in India’s drone industry, including major groups such as Adani, Larsen & Toubro, and Tata Advanced Systems, as well as startups.

In July, India also approved the purchase of a range of military equipment for its defence forces worth $5.46bn, including missiles, electronic warfare systems and Kamikaze drones.

India is also pushing to rapidly modernise its navy with an eye on Beijing’s growing influence in key Indian Ocean shipping lanes. In December, New Delhi announced plans to procure at least 75 ships and submarines, with most expected to be constructed domestically.

At the same time, India is trying to diversify the foreign sources of its weapons. Over the past decade, New Delhi has worked to move away from its longstanding reliance on Russia for military hardware, expanding defence ties with countries such as the United States, France and — increasingly — Israel.

Does the private sector have the capacity to build missiles?

Private arms manufacturers in India have been increasing spending on bolstering military production in the past few years.

Major conglomerates have invested heavily in ammunition, drones, aerospace and military electronics. Of late, they have started to invest in facilities that aim to manufacture missiles.

Adani Defence & Aerospace, owned by business tycoon Gautam Adani, a close associate of Indian Prime Minister Modi, announced plans in 2024 to invest more than 30 billion rupees ($315m) in ammunition and missile manufacturing facilities in Uttar Pradesh.

The facilities would include capabilities for handling explosives used in missiles and precision munitions.

But commitments and intent don’t build missiles.

“Ultimately, I think the success or failure of this move will depend on how the Indian government places orders,” Ramanathan said. “Making missiles is an incredibly complex and costly affair, and companies are going to have to invest a lot in infrastructure, technology and people. These sorts of investments will only pay off if the government places large enough orders to justify them and also, hopefully, leave these companies with some profits that they can pour back into research and development.”

What missiles does India have?

India has a range of cruise and ballistic missiles, several of which are also capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

In May, on the anniversary of the 2025 war with Pakistan, India successfully test-fired the Agni-V, its most advanced nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile that can reach a distance of 5,500km (3,418 miles) — a range that covers all of China, the Middle East and even parts of Europe.

Its other ballistic missiles have ranges from as little as the Prithvi-1 (150km or 93 miles) to the Agni-IV (4,000km or 2,485 miles), again covering everything from border skirmishes with Pakistan to India’s extended neighbourhood.

It also has powerful cruise missiles, like the BrahMos, co-developed with Russia, which has a range of up to 500km (311 miles), and was used in last year’s war with Pakistan.

Is India also exporting missiles and other weapons?

India has dramatically ramped up its military exports in recent years, from just $72m in 2014-15 — when Modi came to power — to $4bn in 2025-2016.

Paras Defence, one of India’s fast-growing defence manufacturers, said this month it expects its exports to more than double in the 2026–27 financial year, up to $14m, driven partly by increased demand linked to conflicts in the Middle East.

Indian arms makers have also been involved in joint ventures with companies abroad. Adani Defence, in partnership with Elbit Systems – Israel’s largest weapons manufacturer – produces the large Hermes 900 armed drone systems.

A 2024 investigation by Al Jazeera exposed how India was exporting rocket parts and ammunition to Israel, even as the Modi government was publicly calling for diplomacy to end the war on Gaza.

In June 2026, Amnesty International said in a report that India’s weapons exports to Israel made it complicit in the genocide in Gaza.

But it isn’t just Israel that has sought and received weapons from Indian manufacturers. Nor is it just bullets and weapons parts that India is exporting today — complete missiles are in demand, too.

In 2022, the Philippines bought three batteries of the BrahMos missiles from India. Since then, Vietnam and Indonesia have signed deals with India for the purchase of these missiles. And India has submitted a proposal to the United Arab Emirates offering to supply the Gulf country these missiles, too.

Is the latest move a step towards building a military-industrial complex?

That appears to be the intention.

While Tuesday’s announcement marks the first time that India’s state-run research and manufacturing facilities will transfer missile technology to the private sector, the government earlier this year shortlisted private firms to manufacture the country’s next-generation fighter jets.

Tata Advanced Systems, a subsidiary of Tata Sons, and Bharat Forge are among companies to be shortlisted, and are emerging as major makers of artillery systems, ammunition and aerospace systems. India has its homegrown jets, but imports the most cutting-edge planes in its arsenal, including the Rafale fighters from France. The Indian Air Force also relies heavily on Soviet-era jets.

Still, while India “wants to build a wider defence industrial base”, said Ramanathan, “it is very far from developing the sort of military-industrial complex that [former US President Dwight] Eisenhower worried about. Power in India still resides overwhelmingly with the government.”

What about India’s military imports?

Despite the surge in domestic manufacturing and exports of specific weapons systems and parts, India on the whole remains a major military importer.

India was the world’s second-largest importer of weapons between 2021 and 2025, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI): Russia was its biggest source, accounting for 40 percent of India’s imported weapons.

Are there risks in transferring sensitive technology to the private sector?

As the US and Israel bombed Iran in March this year, a group of Iranian hackers claimed it broke into the servers of major US defence manufacturer Lockheed Martin, stealing blueprints of components used in the F-35 fighter jets.

The alleged data breach exposed the risks of private companies — which often have lower security standards and oversight than top-secret government laboratories — holding sensitive information.

But Ramanathan pointed out that in India’s case, “the companies that are most likely to get the missile contracts are all old hands”.

“They’ve been involved in the defence sector in some capacity for decades, and they have experience in dealing with confidentiality and secrecy,” he said.

The Indian government, on its part, also “doesn’t want the technology or its missile secrets to go to its adversaries, and it also wants to abide by its commitments to the Missile Technology Control Regime, which gives India several advantages,” he said, referring to one of the world’s major export-control regimes.

“So India has good reasons, in its own self-interest, to ensure that missile technology doesn’t leak.”

Islamabad, Pakistan – Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the top United States diplomat in Islamabad on Wednesday, hours after US Ambassador to India Sergio Gor described Indian-administered Kashmir as “an important part of India” during his first visit to the territory.

Islamabad rejected the remark and reasserted Kashmir’s status as disputed territory.

The visit by Gor, who also serves as President Donald Trump’s special envoy for South and Central Asia, was the first standalone trip by a serving US ambassador to Indian-administered Kashmir since 2019, and the first since India stripped the territory of its autonomy that year.

His remarks were made publicly, alongside Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Omar Abdullah, adding to Islamabad’s irritation.

The episode also comes at a delicate moment for Washington’s ties with both South Asian rivals, as Pakistan courts Trump’s administration more closely than it has in years, and as the US tries to balance that relationship against its strategic partnership with India.

So, what exactly did the US ambassador say, why has it caused such offence, and does it change anything? Al Jazeera explains.

What did the US ambassador say?

Sergio Gor, a 38-year-old former Trump aide who was confirmed as US ambassador to India in January, spent two days in Srinagar and Ladakh this week.

After meeting Abdullah in Srinagar, he told reporters he was thrilled to be visiting “an important part of India” for the first time.

He also said Washington was reconsidering its “do not travel” advisory, citing improved security under Abdullah’s administration.

The advisory at the moment places Jammu and Kashmir at a “Do Not Travel” level, citing terrorism and civil unrest, though it exempts the eastern territories of Ladakh and Leh.

Islamabad’s response came the same Wednesday evening. The Foreign Ministry summoned Charge d’Affaires Natalie Baker, who currently heads the US mission in the country.

The ministry lodged what it called a “strong demarche”, rejecting the “characterisation of Indian-administered Kashmir as a ‘part of India’” and reasserting it as an internationally recognised disputed territory awaiting final disposition under United Nations Security Council resolutions.

The statement called Gor’s remarks factually incorrect and said they negated Washington’s longstanding position on the dispute.

It also thanked Trump for his offer – made after India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire ending their four-day war last year – to help resolve the Kashmir question, urging Washington to keep its public language consistent with that position.

Why does Kashmir trigger such a reaction?

Kashmir is a Himalayan region claimed by both India and Pakistan since British colonial rule ended in August 1947.

India and Pakistan each administer part of the territory but claim it in full and have fought several wars over it.

A UN Security Council resolution passed in 1949 called for the territory’s final status to be decided by a plebiscite, which has never been held.

In June, European Union foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas signed a joint statement with Pakistan’s foreign minister in Islamabad that bracketed Kashmir alongside the war in Ukraine and called for its resolution “through dialogue and diplomacy”.

India’s Ministry of External Affairs rejected the reference, saying those with no standing in the matter should refrain from commenting on it.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has drawn similar protests from Delhi at least twice after voicing support for Pakistan’s position on Kashmir.

Trump himself triggered a dispute in 2019 when, during a meeting with then-Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, he claimed Prime Minister Narendra Modi had personally asked him to mediate on Kashmir. Modi’s government swiftly denied the account in parliament.

For Pakistan, US language on Kashmir’s disputed status is an important external validation of its effort to internationalise the issue.

For India, meanwhile, any suggestion that Kashmir remains open to outside mediation cuts against the foundation of its position.

What has the US position been, historically?

The US has officially maintained that Kashmir is disputed and its status should be settled between India and Pakistan, taking into consideration the wishes of the Kashmiri people.

American officials have repeated some version of “our policy has not changed” across successive administrations, including in 2019, when a senior US diplomat told Congress that India’s move had not altered Washington’s view of the Line of Control as a “de facto” boundary.

Formally, Washington has avoided recognising sovereignty over the territory for either country.

A major turning point came in 1999, when President Bill Clinton told Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif that Pakistani forces would have to withdraw from Kargil in Indian-administered Kashmir, following the fighting there between the two countries in the region.

Analysts widely saw the episode as the beginning of Washington’s tilt towards Delhi.

But after the two countries’ most intense clash in decades last year, Trump claimed credit for the ceasefire and offered to “work with you both” on a Kashmir “solution”.

Pakistan welcomed the offer and nominated Trump for a Nobel Peace Prize. India rejected suggestions of US mediation, saying the ceasefire had been reached through direct military talks.

Jauhar Saleem, Pakistan’s former foreign secretary and president of the Islamabad-based Institute of Regional Studies, told Al Jazeera that Gor’s remark should not be mistaken for a change in US policy.

“US policy on a question as consequential as Jammu and Kashmir cannot be read from an off-the-cuff formulation during a visit by a US ambassador posted in India,” Saleem said. “Any change in policy would be reflected in Washington’s formal statements, State Department language and, in fact, should be at the level of the White House.”

He said such lapses were not new.

“Sometimes ambassadors fall prey to what we call ‘localitis’, and in an attempt to please their hosts can make comments entirely out of line with their country’s stated policy, creating unpleasant situations,” he said. “This is a classic example and has therefore evoked an expected strong demarche from Pakistan’s Foreign Office.”

Saleem said Trump’s repeated offers to mediate between Pakistan and India, “which was not appreciated in New Delhi”, showed that Washington’s position remained unsettled at the top rather than shifting towards India. “I would actually expect a clarification from Washington soon,” he added.

Will it affect Pakistan-US ties?

Saleem, who summoned a US ambassador in Islamabad during his tenure as foreign secretary in late 2022 over what he called “a very objectionable remark” by then-President Joe Biden, said a demarche was not primarily a tool to punish Washington. Biden had described Pakistan as “one of the most dangerous nations in the world”.

“A demarche is not just made to increase the cost of a policy; rather it is made to press a point and ask for an explanation,” the former ambassador told Al Jazeera. “The US response was constructive [then], and will be in this case as well, I believe.”

He said the Pakistan-US relationship was too broad-based for one ambassador’s remark to unsettle it, pointing to Pakistan’s role as a peacemaker between the US and Iran, economic cooperation, counterterrorism, regional security, Afghanistan, defence cooperation, “and of course Pakistan’s relationship with the Trump administration itself”.

Tariq Rashid Khan, a Pakistani former military general and diplomat, described the episode as “issue-specific boundary-setting”.

Islamabad’s protest, he told Al Jazeera, signals that a close strategic partnership with Washington “does not mean acceptance of any position on Kashmir contrary to Pakistan’s stated position”.

“Kashmir remains an unfinished agenda of the 1947 partition, which is why even one sentence can become strategically significant,” he said.

For Saleem, the significance lies less in Gor’s specific words than in what any drift in language could set in motion.

“Jammu and Kashmir is not just a territorial dispute; it is an issue of national identity, legitimacy and security for Pakistan,” he told Al Jazeera. “Neither Pakistan nor India can afford to let the international community’s vocabulary on Kashmir drift even slightly, because both sides believe that language today can become precedent tomorrow.”

Aizaz Chaudhry, a former Pakistani ambassador to the US, told Al Jazeera he believed Gor’s remarks “might be his personal comments”, adding that the US position on the disputed territory is well known.

“Our demarche is only a reminder that the US envoy in Delhi must comply with the US position on the subject. The Kashmir dispute is a longstanding issue that must be resolved for the larger peace and stability of South Asia,” Chaudhry said.