Humanitarian Crisis

The announcement of a preliminary US-Iran agreement has generated cautious optimism in Lebanon, where months of conflict have displaced large portions of the population and devastated communities across the south.

While the framework reportedly calls for the immediate cessation of military operations, Lebanese authorities are warning residents against assuming that conditions are safe enough for a rapid return.

The caution reflects uncertainty over how the agreement will be implemented and whether all parties will abide by its terms.

Adding to those concerns, Israel has made clear that it does not consider itself bound by the agreement and intends to maintain security zones in southern Lebanon.

Lebanon became one of the principal battlegrounds of the wider regional conflict after Hezbollah opened a front against Israel in support of Iran following the outbreak of hostilities.

The resulting escalation led to extensive Israeli military operations across southern Lebanon, causing widespread destruction and one of the largest displacement crises in the country’s recent history.

Entire communities were uprooted as residents fled bombardment and military activity.

Iran consistently pushed for any agreement with Washington to include provisions addressing Lebanon, viewing the conflict there as inseparable from broader regional tensions.

The inclusion of Lebanon in the framework agreement therefore represents a significant diplomatic concession and a central element of Tehran’s negotiating position.

Why This Matters

Lebanon has become one of the clearest examples of how regional conflicts can produce devastating humanitarian consequences.

The conflict has:

• Displaced more than a million people.
• Damaged homes, infrastructure, and businesses.
• Increased pressure on Lebanon’s already fragile economy.
• Deepened political and social instability.

A durable ceasefire could allow reconstruction efforts to begin and reduce the risk of further regional escalation.

However, the humanitarian benefits will depend on security conditions improving on the ground rather than merely on diplomatic declarations.

The Challenge of Returning Home

For displaced families, peace announcements do not automatically translate into confidence.

Many residents remain uncertain about:

• Whether military operations have truly ended.
• The presence of Israeli forces in southern areas.
• The condition of homes and infrastructure.
• Future security guarantees.

The hesitation expressed by displaced residents reflects a broader reality in conflict zones: trust often takes much longer to rebuild than physical infrastructure.

Even if active fighting stops, communities may remain reluctant to return until they believe the risk of renewed conflict has genuinely diminished.

Israel’s Position Complicates the Picture

A major obstacle to immediate normalization is Israel’s position.

Israeli officials have indicated they will continue maintaining security zones and reserve the right to conduct operations they deem necessary for national security.

This creates ambiguity regarding implementation of the broader agreement.

While the US-Iran framework may establish a diplomatic foundation for reducing violence, the practical situation on the ground will depend on decisions made by actors who were not direct participants in the negotiations.

This distinction could prove crucial in determining whether the agreement produces lasting stability.

A Test of Regional Diplomacy

The inclusion of Lebanon in the agreement demonstrates how interconnected Middle Eastern conflicts have become.

The war was never confined solely to the United States and Iran. It involved multiple regional actors, proxy groups, and overlapping security concerns.

As a result, success will be measured not only by whether Washington and Tehran uphold their commitments but also by whether the agreement influences behavior across the broader region.

Lebanon is likely to become one of the first and most visible tests of that process.

Key Stakeholders

• Lebanon and its government institutions
• Displaced Lebanese civilians
• Israel and its military leadership
• Hezbollah
• Iran
• The United States
• Regional mediators including Pakistan
• Humanitarian organizations operating in Lebanon

What to Watch Next

• Whether military activity in southern Lebanon decreases in the coming days.
• Israeli decisions regarding security zones.
• Hezbollah’s official response to the agreement.
• The pace of civilian returns to southern communities.
• International support for reconstruction and humanitarian assistance.
• Broader negotiations during the 60-day ceasefire period.

The agreement creates an opportunity for Lebanon to move toward greater stability after months of destruction and displacement.

If implemented successfully, reduced hostilities could pave the way for reconstruction, humanitarian relief, and the gradual return of displaced populations.

Yet significant uncertainty remains. Security concerns, damaged infrastructure, and competing interpretations of the agreement could slow progress and complicate efforts to restore normalcy.

For many Lebanese families, the end of active conflict would represent only the beginning of a much longer recovery process.

Analysis

The most revealing aspect of Lebanon’s reaction is the disconnect between diplomacy and reality.

International leaders may celebrate ceasefires and framework agreements, but people living through conflict judge peace by different standards. They look not at official statements but at troop movements, security conditions, and whether it is safe to return home.

That gap is already visible in southern Lebanon. While diplomats describe the agreement as a breakthrough, local authorities are warning residents against rushing back. Israel’s decision to maintain security zones further reinforces uncertainty about how quickly conditions can normalize.

This highlights a recurring challenge in conflict resolution. Agreements can stop wars on paper, but rebuilding trust often takes far longer than negotiating a ceasefire.

Lebanon’s experience may therefore become a key measure of whether the US-Iran agreement delivers meaningful change beyond diplomatic symbolism. If displaced communities can safely return, reconstruction begins, and violence declines, the agreement will gain credibility. If insecurity persists despite the deal, questions will quickly emerge about its effectiveness.

Ultimately, Lebanon represents the human dimension of the broader regional settlement. The success of the agreement will not be judged solely by geopolitical outcomes or energy markets but by whether ordinary people feel secure enough to rebuild their lives after months of war.

With information from Reuters.

A day after the chavista-controlled National Assembly gave the cold shoulder to Magaly Vásquez, and confirmed Larry Devoe as Attorney General, I spent the day going through the latter’s public record as a “Venezuela agent” in multilateral spaces.

It was a shocking way to spend a Friday afternoon. What was I expecting? Back in 2014, Devoe was handed the so-called Human Rights Council just as Venezuela was about to spiral into a multi-dimensional crisis. Súper Bigote seemingly set three tasks in the international arena:

Find excuses and someone to blame for the disaster that was about to unfold, by casting the chavista government as the victim.

No matter how bad the humanitarian situation can get and the extent to which social indicators were reversed, insist that Chávez lifted millions out of poverty forever. 

Every time other diplomats, foreign officials or humanitarian personnel showed details and data that showed a dire country, answering that Venezuela was sovereign and democratic and no one needed to meddle with our own mess.

Devoe was one of the three main bureaucrats that defined such diplomatic chavista wisdom in those days. These three had fancy degrees from European schools, and were clever enough to fabricate a good headline amidst pervasive criticism. Besides Devoe, there was a lady called Delcy Rodríguez, disgraced in the late-Chávez years but handed the Information Ministry soon after el comandante passed, with studies from London’s Birkbeck University and Paris Nanterre University. There was also Bernardo Álvarez, Maduro’s representative in the OAS who had been the man in Washington when Chavez’s beef with Bush reached peak levels.

Soon after they started to defend Maduro in Venezuela and abroad, the international perception about his regime suffered a deep setback. In July 2016, dozens of Venezuelan NGOs addressed Ban Ki-moon complaining about the behavior of UN agencies in reaction to the country’s humanitarian situation. The letter was based on a report that covered plummeting indicators in the previous four years (measuring institutional quality, human rights and the conditions of vulnerable groups). On August 10, the South Korean secretary general said Venezuela was undergoing a humanitarian emergency, quoting that very report.

In 2016, Devoe said an opposition-drafted amnesty law was a “serious threat” to human rights.

Rodríguez, Álvarez and Devoe had work to do. Footage of Delcy denying the humanitarian crisis in June 2016 (did so again in 2018 before the UNHCR) has circulated in recent days, but it was actually Álvarez who first established the regime’s position. In an IACHR human rights hearing that featured the likes of Alfredo Romero, Carlos Correa, Rafael Uzcategui, Liliana Ortega and other prominent human rights defenders—many of which the newly minted prosecutor will have to deal with— , Álvarez said: “It’s not a humanitarian crisis, that has a political intentionality.”

A 43-year-old UCAB lawyer, with human rights studies from the iconic Alcalá de Henares University, sat next to Álvarez and in front of Romero et al. He was Larry Devoe, and came with the goods in his turn to speak, praising the “23,146 health centers across the territory, a 333% in terms of infrastructure” that Maduro had inherited by 2015.

He made another remark that day that now sounds like a prescient spell. Back then, the opposition-led parliament approved an amnesty bill aimed at 82 political prisoners held in Venezuela. Devoe said its contents were a “serious threat” to human rights with the allegation that the bill pardoned international crimes like the use of minors to commit crimes, drug trafficking, terrorism and corruption.

Whataboutism at its best

Devoe would use that technique several times after. In October 2018, he was invited as a conference speaker in the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo to discuss OAS’ record in defending human rights in the region. His lecture’s talking points: Venezuela became “the theater of operations of OAS and US actions” and the OAS whitewashed the pre-Chávez regime. Before that, he showed up in a local TV program, El Matinal, where interviewer Pablo McKinney tried to make him feel at ease by introducing the brotherly ties between Dominicans and Venezuelans. Devoe started speaking of Venezuela’s all-round, positive transformation since 1999 in terms of human rights. When McKinney raised his eyebrows, Devoe claimed Venezuela had one of the best social security programs in the Americas, but the nation was under MECANISMOS DE AGRESIÓN since 2013.

Devoe kept going. Chavez had ended illiteracy and handed out two million homes, and so goes that famous song. Unconvinced by the explanation, McKinney said he couldn’t bear Venezuelans wandering the streets of his city. Es demasiado grave, to which Devoe replied that Maduro was getting the Allende treatment, and that Venezuelan migrants were returning home from Colombia and the DR because of the treatment they got in those countries.

Is this surprising?

Not really. That was the standard rhetoric wielded by chavista diplomats, or Cuban officials since the 1960s, which Devoe also liked to quote. That doesn’t exempt Devoe from being a cold liar that now heads one of Venezuela’s most important institutions. He’s still good for Delcy, as he was good for the three tasks that I listed several paragraphs ago. 

Devoe could not acknowledge the humanitarian crisis in public. It was too embarrassing. It would give credibility to widespread reports about malnutrition, tropical diseases and growing maternal mortality rates.

The videos show how Devoe reacts to well-documented accusations to “defend the country” and conceal responsibility. Take for instance this occasion in 2018, two years after Ban Ki Moon’s now-historic statement, where Devoe addressed Venezuelan experts in the Inter American Commission on Human Rights. He admits the scarcity of medical supplies, but attributes its cause to “sanctions and economic blockades” (sectoral sanctions then in place affected Venezuelan credit). When asked about Maduro’s public refusal to accept humanitarian assistance, Devoe said:

“Commissioner, Venezuela has the capacity to buy and provide the resources to guarantee the rights of its population.”

A kidney transplant patient, Francisco Valencia, interrupted Devoe to tell him he had not received medical treatment for six months. “I am dying.” Devoe replied: “Well Francisco, I ask you to leave this room and ask Euroclear to unfreeze the 1,650 million dollars that would let us buy your treatment.”

The problem with that statement is not only Devoe’s audacity in talking back to a helpless patient. Venezuelan humanitarian organizations were, at that point, getting resources because of international cooperation. That cooperation was, to an extent, greenlighted by the Venezuelan State. ECHO, Caritas International, the Red Cross, the International Rescue Committee and others were already in the country, liaising with local groups.

Like Maduro and Delcy, Devoe could not acknowledge it. It was too embarrassing. It would give credibility to reports that maternal mortality grew 90% between 2016 and 2017, of 11.4% of acute malnutrition among kids under 5 years old, and claims that the government was hiding data on spikes of tuberculosis, diphtheria and malaria.

Hard Left roots?

It recently emerged that Larry Devoe is the maternal grandson of Pompeyo Márquez, who had been a communist militant during Betancourt and Leoni’s war against Cuba-funded guerrillas. Márquez later joined the party system with Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS) through Caldera’s pacification process. He broke with Chávez when MAS endorsed his 1998 candidacy, and spent his final years opposing chavismo from within the Left.

On that shocking Friday afternoon, I also came upon a book about Venezuelan universities in the second half of the 20^th century. One chapter speaks about the political climate in Caracas’ Universidad Central in the 1970s. It mentions a Larry Devoe in the youth ranks of MAS, which clashed with the Leftwing Revolutionary Movement (MIR)—where Jorge Antonio Rodríguez, father of Jorge and Delcy, was a student leader—on campus and in student council elections. (At this point, everyone knows the fate of Jorge Rodríguez padre, murdered in the custody of DISIP in 1976 after the kidnapping of William Niehous).

Albeit rivals in the halls of UCV, it seems like the fathers of Larry Devoe and the Rodríguez siblings were part of the same political community 50 years ago. There’s a chance the new prosecutor general, born after the killing of Rodriguez padre, has known Delcy and Jorge for quite a while. Devoe Sr. was a MAS member along with Jorge Valero, a former Venezuelan ambassador to the UN and OAS this century, whom Devoe defended in his Santo Domingo speech.

Delcy, Ernesto Villegas and Larry Devoe presented a 2017 report denying the State’s responsibility for the great majority of deaths during that year’s protests.

Part of what people like Devoe and the Rodríguez siblings likely absorbed early on were accounts of the extrajudicial killings and torture Venezuelan communists endured in the 1960s. Then came the 1976 case of Rodríguez. And later, when Devoe was 11, the Caracazo—preceded by massacres like Cantaura and El Amparo, carried out by state officials, often with impunity.

These events are not just real; they must be remembered as part of the bloodier side of our recent history, one that did not begin in 1999. What is striking is that Devoe, now prosecutor in this “new political moment”, has repeatedly covered up similar crimes, the very kind the Rodríguez siblings have long grieved over.

In 2023, Devoe dismissed the ongoing investigation in the International Criminal Court as a political ploy, said Caracas proved crimes against humanity were never committed, and echoed Tarek William Saab’s claims that Venezuelan courts were doing their job in dealing with the bad apples. That now contradicts the discourse of the Rodríguez siblings, who got rid of Saab to appoint him. Six years before that, Delcy, Ernesto Villegas and Larry Devoe presented a report denying the State’s responsibility for the great majority of deaths during the 2017 protest cycle. This denialism has been a recurring pattern in his career as a Venezuelan State agent, and remains a part of chavismo’s rhetoric about “political violence since 1999.”

Someone told me that Devoe was respectful and decent in one-on-one interactions, even after heated debates over the causes and scale of the Venezuelan crisis. That perhaps he was caged by his own surroundings. Let’s see if Devoe can somehow turn that record around.

After all these years, we have reasonable doubts he’ll do so.