Humanitarian Crisis

Sudan has been engulfed in a devastating civil war since April 2023, when fighting erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The conflict has displaced millions of people, triggered one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises and led to widespread allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Al Obeid, one of Sudan’s largest and most strategically important cities, has become the latest flashpoint as the RSF intensifies military operations around the city. The situation has raised fears of a repeat of the violence witnessed in Al Fashir in North Darfur, where fierce fighting, civilian casualties and widespread reports of abuses drew international condemnation.

Against this backdrop, the United Nations Human Rights Council has moved to increase international scrutiny by launching an urgent inquiry into alleged violations committed during the escalating violence.

The United Nations Human Rights Council on Monday adopted a resolution condemning escalating violence by Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces in Al Obeid and authorising an urgent investigation into alleged human rights abuses committed during the fighting.

The motion, introduced by the United Kingdom with support from 14 other countries, was adopted by consensus, although China distanced itself from the decision over concerns about country specific investigations conducted without the consent of the government concerned.

The inquiry will seek to document alleged violations as international concern grows over the deteriorating humanitarian and security situation in the city.

Diplomats warned that the situation in Al Obeid could mirror previous atrocities reported elsewhere in Sudan.

Britain’s Human Rights Ambassador Eleanor Sanders urged the council to prevent a repeat of the violence seen in Al Fashir, warning that similar patterns of attacks against civilians must not be allowed to recur.

South Africa also backed the resolution, describing the situation as a critical warning and expressing concern that the RSF was employing tactics similar to those previously documented during operations in Darfur.

The mounting international concern reflects fears that the conflict around Al Obeid could rapidly escalate into another large scale humanitarian disaster.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights recently warned that a catastrophe is unfolding around Al Obeid.

According to the Human Rights Office, investigators have documented reports of summary executions, kidnappings, torture and widespread sexual violence in areas surrounding the city.

The findings add to a growing body of evidence gathered by United Nations agencies and international human rights organisations documenting alleged abuses committed during Sudan’s civil war.

The Rapid Support Forces have consistently rejected previous allegations, arguing that the accusations are politically motivated and making similar allegations against rival forces.

The newly approved investigation is intended to independently gather evidence, establish facts and improve accountability for alleged violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.

Although the Human Rights Council does not possess judicial authority, its investigations often provide evidence used by international courts, sanctions bodies and future accountability mechanisms.

The inquiry may also increase diplomatic pressure on parties to the conflict while drawing greater international attention to the humanitarian crisis unfolding in Sudan.

While the resolution was adopted without a formal vote, China stated that it did not support investigations targeting individual countries without their approval.

Beijing has consistently argued that international human rights mechanisms should respect national sovereignty and avoid what it considers politically selective investigations.

Despite China’s position, the resolution received sufficient backing from council members to proceed.

The investigation signals growing international concern that Sudan’s conflict is entering another dangerous phase marked by escalating violence against civilians.

Independent documentation of alleged abuses could strengthen future efforts to pursue accountability while increasing international pressure for humanitarian access and renewed peace negotiations.

The inquiry also demonstrates the Human Rights Council’s willingness to respond quickly when there are warnings of possible mass atrocities.

United Nations Human Rights Council

Launching an urgent investigation into alleged abuses and monitoring developments in Al Obeid.

Rapid Support Forces

Facing renewed international scrutiny over allegations of serious human rights violations, which the group denies.

Sudanese Armed Forces

Continuing military operations against the RSF while remaining a central party to the conflict.

Civilians in Al Obeid

Confronting increasing risks from escalating fighting, displacement and humanitarian hardship.

Seeking greater accountability, humanitarian access and diplomatic efforts to reduce violence.

China

Maintaining its opposition to country specific human rights investigations conducted without state consent.

The Human Rights Council will begin organising the urgent inquiry, with investigators expected to collect evidence, interview witnesses and monitor developments around Al Obeid.

Meanwhile, international attention will remain focused on whether fighting intensifies around the city and whether diplomatic efforts can prevent another humanitarian catastrophe similar to those witnessed elsewhere in Sudan.

The Human Rights Council’s decision reflects growing concern that events in Al Obeid are following a pattern already witnessed elsewhere in Sudan’s civil war. The repeated references by diplomats to Al Fashir suggest the international community fears another episode of mass civilian suffering before meaningful intervention becomes possible.

The inquiry itself will not stop the fighting, nor does the Human Rights Council possess enforcement powers. Its primary significance lies in documenting evidence that may later support international legal action, targeted sanctions or future accountability mechanisms. Such investigations also serve as an important warning to armed groups that alleged violations are being monitored by the international community.

The decision also highlights the persistent divisions within the United Nations over country specific investigations. China’s decision to distance itself from the resolution reflects a broader debate between protecting state sovereignty and responding rapidly to alleged mass atrocities. Similar disagreements have shaped international responses to conflicts in Myanmar, Syria and other crisis zones.

For Sudan, however, the immediate challenge remains humanitarian rather than diplomatic. Continued fighting around Al Obeid threatens to worsen displacement, restrict humanitarian access and expose more civilians to violence. If the conflict follows the trajectory seen in other parts of the country, the consequences could further deepen what is already one of the world’s largest humanitarian emergencies.

Ultimately, the inquiry represents an effort to ensure that alleged abuses are documented while there is still an opportunity to deter further violations. Whether it contributes to greater accountability or influences the conduct of the conflict will depend largely on developments on the ground and the willingness of the international community to translate its findings into concrete action.

With information from Reuters.

Venezuela woke up this morning to scenes of destruction and grief that not even three decades of political and economic collapse could have prepared us for. On June 24, two of the strongest earthquakes ever recorded in Venezuelan history struck the country’s northern coastline.

At the time of writing, over 39,000 people have been reported missing, and the interim government of Delcy Rodríguez has confirmed at least 164 deaths. Yet images of flattened residential buildings across Caracas and La Guaira suggest that this number will continue to rise in the days ahead.

The aftermath is even more devastating when one considers how profoundly unprepared Venezuela is to respond to a disaster of this magnitude. Natural disasters are catastrophic by definition, posing immense challenges even for wealthy countries with competent institutions. For the battered nation that is post-Maduro Venezuela, responding to a crisis of this scale may prove overwhelming.

Venezuela has faced what the United Nations defines as a complex humanitarian emergency, a prolonged and multidimensional collapse of the state’s ability to perform its core functions. This has been the status since at least 2016. Few sectors have suffered more than healthcare. Years of mismanagement, systemic corruption, and chronic underinvestment have devastated the country’s health system, compounding the deterioration of the electrical grid and other essential public services.

Since at least 2022, the Venezuelan state has increasingly adopted a hands-off approach to governance. This shift, shaped by a post-socialist form of laissez-faire economic policy, reduced state control over large parts of the economy and contributed to a modest but visible revival in business activity. In many ways, the tate appeared to retreat from major areas of public administration while preserving absolute control over others, particularly the security apparatus and the machinery of censorship and political repression.

The corruption and mismanagement that destroyed Venezuela’s health system, combined with the dangerous belief that the state could simply step aside, help explain why the country now lacks even minimally functional search-and-rescue capacity.

These dynamics, though somewhat altered, have largely persisted after January 3. Following Operation Absolute Resolve, which culminated in the arrest of Nicolás Maduro, the interim administration of Delcy Rodríguez (with the backing of the United States) introduced reforms aimed at attracting American investment in the oil and mining sectors, fueling cautious optimism about eventual economic recovery.

From a public health perspective, however, the economic liberalization first embraced under Maduro and now continued by Rodríguez marks the culmination of a much longer process: the gradual withdrawal of the state from its responsibility to protect the health and welfare of Venezuelans.

The liberalization of recent years also triggered a rapid expansion of private health insurance. For those able to afford plans, often costing thousands of dollars, private coverage has offered an attractive alternative to Venezuela’s chronically underfunded and dysfunctional public hospitals. This produced a deeply unequal arrangement: those with resources could secure healthcare privately, while most Venezuelans remained dependent on a system that had largely ceased to function.

But this model can only take a country so far.

The private sector (particularly one as small and fragile as Venezuela’s) cannot replace the functions of a public health system. Private clinics in Caracas, however modern, cannot conduct nationwide vaccination campaigns, build epidemiological surveillance networks, or address child malnutrition at scale.

Nor can private healthcare alone care for the thousands of victims created by disasters such as these earthquakes. It cannot train sufficient first responders, coordinate nationwide rescue efforts, or provide the ambulances, heavy equipment, and emergency infrastructure required in the immediate aftermath of a catastrophe.

This may become the clearest test yet of how committed the Trump administration truly is to supporting Venezuelans, not merely safeguarding its economic interests in the country.

The corruption and mismanagement that destroyed Venezuela’s health system, combined with the dangerous belief that the state could simply step aside, help explain why the country now lacks even minimally functional search-and-rescue capacity. They also explain its overwhelming dependence on foreign aid.

For that reason, many Venezuelans are watching statements from Marco Rubio as closely as those from Rodríguez. All signs suggest that meaningful large-scale assistance will need to come from Washington rather than Miraflores. Rubio has already promised a “big, fast, and effective whole-of-government response,” offering a measure of hope to an exhausted and grieving population.

This disaster may become the clearest test yet of how committed the Trump administration truly is to supporting Venezuelans, not merely safeguarding its economic interests in the country. Recovery without explicit and substantial American support appears highly unlikely.

Other countries across the globe and the ideological spectrum—including Mexico, El Salvador, Cuba, Iran, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain—have also offered assistance. All such support is welcome. In these first critical hours, every resource matters if lives are to be saved.

The images circulating on social media, people trapped beneath rubble in La Guaira, surrounded by exhausted neighbors refusing to abandon them, or volunteers searching debris with only the flashlights of their mobile phones, amount to a testimony of the solidarity of the Venezuelan people and an urgent plea for help, one that both Venezuelan authorities and the international community must answer.

They also serve as a painful reminder that public health and disaster preparedness are responsibilities that governments simply cannot outsource.

If you want to know more about ways to help, or need information on missing people, please visit the following link.

The occupied West Bank has seen sustained and rising violence amid ongoing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Israeli forces conduct frequent raids in Palestinian areas, saying they are targeting militants and preventing attacks, while Palestinians and rights groups accuse the military of using excessive force and say settlement expansion is a major driver of instability. Israeli settlements in the territory are widely considered illegal under international law by the United Nations and most countries, though Israel disputes this and views the West Bank as disputed land with historical and security significance. In recent months, tensions have further escalated with increased restrictions on Palestinian movement near settlements, alongside a rise in attacks by both Palestinians against Israelis and by settlers against Palestinians, contributing to a cycle of violence that continues to claim lives on both sides.

Fatal Shooting Near Beit Ummar

The incident took place near the town of Beit Ummar in the southern West Bank.

Palestinian news agency WAFA identified the victims as teenagers aged 15 and 19. A relative confirmed their ages to Reuters.

Israeli Military’s Account

The Israeli military said its forces confronted three individuals who were throwing fire bombs and burning tyres near the settlement of Karmei Tzur.

According to the military, soldiers opened fire, killing two of the individuals and wounding a third.

Reuters could not independently verify the military’s account.

Third Teenager Hospitalized

WAFA reported that the third person involved in the incident was hospitalized in stable condition.

The Palestinian Red Crescent Society said the wounded individual is 15 years old.

Tensions Remain High in the West Bank

Israeli forces regularly conduct raids across the occupied West Bank and have tightened movement restrictions around Palestinian communities located near Israeli settlements in recent months.

The territory has experienced heightened tensions amid ongoing violence involving Israeli security forces, settlers and Palestinians.

Dispute Over Settlements

The international community, including the United Nations and most countries, considers Israeli settlements in the West Bank illegal under international law and a major obstacle to the creation of a Palestinian state.

Israel rejects that position, describing the territory as disputed and citing historical Jewish ties to the area.

Rising Violence

According to United Nations data, at least 57 Palestinians have been killed this year in incidents involving Israeli settlers and security forces.

At the same time, Palestinians have carried out attacks against Israeli soldiers and settlers in the West Bank, including at least one fatal attack in 2026, according to Israel’s Shin Bet domestic security service.

What’s Next

The Israeli military is expected to continue reviewing the circumstances of the shooting, including whether the individuals posed an immediate threat and how the confrontation unfolded near the settlement.

Palestinian officials are likely to pursue diplomatic and legal avenues, as similar incidents in the West Bank are often raised with international bodies, including the United Nations, amid ongoing disputes over the use of force by Israeli troops.

On the ground, the incident is likely to add to already high tensions in the West Bank, where Israeli raids, settlement activity, and Palestinian attacks have contributed to a cycle of violence in recent months.

Further clashes cannot be ruled out, particularly in areas close to settlements where movement restrictions and security operations have intensified.

International attention on West Bank violence is also likely to continue, especially as reported fatalities involving Palestinians and Israelis have remained elevated this year, keeping pressure on both sides amid an already fragile security situation.

With information from Reuters.

The announcement of a preliminary US-Iran agreement has generated cautious optimism in Lebanon, where months of conflict have displaced large portions of the population and devastated communities across the south.

While the framework reportedly calls for the immediate cessation of military operations, Lebanese authorities are warning residents against assuming that conditions are safe enough for a rapid return.

The caution reflects uncertainty over how the agreement will be implemented and whether all parties will abide by its terms.

Adding to those concerns, Israel has made clear that it does not consider itself bound by the agreement and intends to maintain security zones in southern Lebanon.

Lebanon became one of the principal battlegrounds of the wider regional conflict after Hezbollah opened a front against Israel in support of Iran following the outbreak of hostilities.

The resulting escalation led to extensive Israeli military operations across southern Lebanon, causing widespread destruction and one of the largest displacement crises in the country’s recent history.

Entire communities were uprooted as residents fled bombardment and military activity.

Iran consistently pushed for any agreement with Washington to include provisions addressing Lebanon, viewing the conflict there as inseparable from broader regional tensions.

The inclusion of Lebanon in the framework agreement therefore represents a significant diplomatic concession and a central element of Tehran’s negotiating position.

Why This Matters

Lebanon has become one of the clearest examples of how regional conflicts can produce devastating humanitarian consequences.

The conflict has:

• Displaced more than a million people.
• Damaged homes, infrastructure, and businesses.
• Increased pressure on Lebanon’s already fragile economy.
• Deepened political and social instability.

A durable ceasefire could allow reconstruction efforts to begin and reduce the risk of further regional escalation.

However, the humanitarian benefits will depend on security conditions improving on the ground rather than merely on diplomatic declarations.

The Challenge of Returning Home

For displaced families, peace announcements do not automatically translate into confidence.

Many residents remain uncertain about:

• Whether military operations have truly ended.
• The presence of Israeli forces in southern areas.
• The condition of homes and infrastructure.
• Future security guarantees.

The hesitation expressed by displaced residents reflects a broader reality in conflict zones: trust often takes much longer to rebuild than physical infrastructure.

Even if active fighting stops, communities may remain reluctant to return until they believe the risk of renewed conflict has genuinely diminished.

Israel’s Position Complicates the Picture

A major obstacle to immediate normalization is Israel’s position.

Israeli officials have indicated they will continue maintaining security zones and reserve the right to conduct operations they deem necessary for national security.

This creates ambiguity regarding implementation of the broader agreement.

While the US-Iran framework may establish a diplomatic foundation for reducing violence, the practical situation on the ground will depend on decisions made by actors who were not direct participants in the negotiations.

This distinction could prove crucial in determining whether the agreement produces lasting stability.

A Test of Regional Diplomacy

The inclusion of Lebanon in the agreement demonstrates how interconnected Middle Eastern conflicts have become.

The war was never confined solely to the United States and Iran. It involved multiple regional actors, proxy groups, and overlapping security concerns.

As a result, success will be measured not only by whether Washington and Tehran uphold their commitments but also by whether the agreement influences behavior across the broader region.

Lebanon is likely to become one of the first and most visible tests of that process.

Key Stakeholders

• Lebanon and its government institutions
• Displaced Lebanese civilians
• Israel and its military leadership
• Hezbollah
• Iran
• The United States
• Regional mediators including Pakistan
• Humanitarian organizations operating in Lebanon

What to Watch Next

• Whether military activity in southern Lebanon decreases in the coming days.
• Israeli decisions regarding security zones.
• Hezbollah’s official response to the agreement.
• The pace of civilian returns to southern communities.
• International support for reconstruction and humanitarian assistance.
• Broader negotiations during the 60-day ceasefire period.

The agreement creates an opportunity for Lebanon to move toward greater stability after months of destruction and displacement.

If implemented successfully, reduced hostilities could pave the way for reconstruction, humanitarian relief, and the gradual return of displaced populations.

Yet significant uncertainty remains. Security concerns, damaged infrastructure, and competing interpretations of the agreement could slow progress and complicate efforts to restore normalcy.

For many Lebanese families, the end of active conflict would represent only the beginning of a much longer recovery process.

Analysis

The most revealing aspect of Lebanon’s reaction is the disconnect between diplomacy and reality.

International leaders may celebrate ceasefires and framework agreements, but people living through conflict judge peace by different standards. They look not at official statements but at troop movements, security conditions, and whether it is safe to return home.

That gap is already visible in southern Lebanon. While diplomats describe the agreement as a breakthrough, local authorities are warning residents against rushing back. Israel’s decision to maintain security zones further reinforces uncertainty about how quickly conditions can normalize.

This highlights a recurring challenge in conflict resolution. Agreements can stop wars on paper, but rebuilding trust often takes far longer than negotiating a ceasefire.

Lebanon’s experience may therefore become a key measure of whether the US-Iran agreement delivers meaningful change beyond diplomatic symbolism. If displaced communities can safely return, reconstruction begins, and violence declines, the agreement will gain credibility. If insecurity persists despite the deal, questions will quickly emerge about its effectiveness.

Ultimately, Lebanon represents the human dimension of the broader regional settlement. The success of the agreement will not be judged solely by geopolitical outcomes or energy markets but by whether ordinary people feel secure enough to rebuild their lives after months of war.

With information from Reuters.

A day after the chavista-controlled National Assembly gave the cold shoulder to Magaly Vásquez, and confirmed Larry Devoe as Attorney General, I spent the day going through the latter’s public record as a “Venezuela agent” in multilateral spaces.

It was a shocking way to spend a Friday afternoon. What was I expecting? Back in 2014, Devoe was handed the so-called Human Rights Council just as Venezuela was about to spiral into a multi-dimensional crisis. Súper Bigote seemingly set three tasks in the international arena:

Find excuses and someone to blame for the disaster that was about to unfold, by casting the chavista government as the victim.

No matter how bad the humanitarian situation can get and the extent to which social indicators were reversed, insist that Chávez lifted millions out of poverty forever. 

Every time other diplomats, foreign officials or humanitarian personnel showed details and data that showed a dire country, answering that Venezuela was sovereign and democratic and no one needed to meddle with our own mess.

Devoe was one of the three main bureaucrats that defined such diplomatic chavista wisdom in those days. These three had fancy degrees from European schools, and were clever enough to fabricate a good headline amidst pervasive criticism. Besides Devoe, there was a lady called Delcy Rodríguez, disgraced in the late-Chávez years but handed the Information Ministry soon after el comandante passed, with studies from London’s Birkbeck University and Paris Nanterre University. There was also Bernardo Álvarez, Maduro’s representative in the OAS who had been the man in Washington when Chavez’s beef with Bush reached peak levels.

Soon after they started to defend Maduro in Venezuela and abroad, the international perception about his regime suffered a deep setback. In July 2016, dozens of Venezuelan NGOs addressed Ban Ki-moon complaining about the behavior of UN agencies in reaction to the country’s humanitarian situation. The letter was based on a report that covered plummeting indicators in the previous four years (measuring institutional quality, human rights and the conditions of vulnerable groups). On August 10, the South Korean secretary general said Venezuela was undergoing a humanitarian emergency, quoting that very report.

In 2016, Devoe said an opposition-drafted amnesty law was a “serious threat” to human rights.

Rodríguez, Álvarez and Devoe had work to do. Footage of Delcy denying the humanitarian crisis in June 2016 (did so again in 2018 before the UNHCR) has circulated in recent days, but it was actually Álvarez who first established the regime’s position. In an IACHR human rights hearing that featured the likes of Alfredo Romero, Carlos Correa, Rafael Uzcategui, Liliana Ortega and other prominent human rights defenders—many of which the newly minted prosecutor will have to deal with— , Álvarez said: “It’s not a humanitarian crisis, that has a political intentionality.”

A 43-year-old UCAB lawyer, with human rights studies from the iconic Alcalá de Henares University, sat next to Álvarez and in front of Romero et al. He was Larry Devoe, and came with the goods in his turn to speak, praising the “23,146 health centers across the territory, a 333% in terms of infrastructure” that Maduro had inherited by 2015.

He made another remark that day that now sounds like a prescient spell. Back then, the opposition-led parliament approved an amnesty bill aimed at 82 political prisoners held in Venezuela. Devoe said its contents were a “serious threat” to human rights with the allegation that the bill pardoned international crimes like the use of minors to commit crimes, drug trafficking, terrorism and corruption.

Whataboutism at its best

Devoe would use that technique several times after. In October 2018, he was invited as a conference speaker in the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo to discuss OAS’ record in defending human rights in the region. His lecture’s talking points: Venezuela became “the theater of operations of OAS and US actions” and the OAS whitewashed the pre-Chávez regime. Before that, he showed up in a local TV program, El Matinal, where interviewer Pablo McKinney tried to make him feel at ease by introducing the brotherly ties between Dominicans and Venezuelans. Devoe started speaking of Venezuela’s all-round, positive transformation since 1999 in terms of human rights. When McKinney raised his eyebrows, Devoe claimed Venezuela had one of the best social security programs in the Americas, but the nation was under MECANISMOS DE AGRESIÓN since 2013.

Devoe kept going. Chavez had ended illiteracy and handed out two million homes, and so goes that famous song. Unconvinced by the explanation, McKinney said he couldn’t bear Venezuelans wandering the streets of his city. Es demasiado grave, to which Devoe replied that Maduro was getting the Allende treatment, and that Venezuelan migrants were returning home from Colombia and the DR because of the treatment they got in those countries.

Is this surprising?

Not really. That was the standard rhetoric wielded by chavista diplomats, or Cuban officials since the 1960s, which Devoe also liked to quote. That doesn’t exempt Devoe from being a cold liar that now heads one of Venezuela’s most important institutions. He’s still good for Delcy, as he was good for the three tasks that I listed several paragraphs ago. 

Devoe could not acknowledge the humanitarian crisis in public. It was too embarrassing. It would give credibility to widespread reports about malnutrition, tropical diseases and growing maternal mortality rates.

The videos show how Devoe reacts to well-documented accusations to “defend the country” and conceal responsibility. Take for instance this occasion in 2018, two years after Ban Ki Moon’s now-historic statement, where Devoe addressed Venezuelan experts in the Inter American Commission on Human Rights. He admits the scarcity of medical supplies, but attributes its cause to “sanctions and economic blockades” (sectoral sanctions then in place affected Venezuelan credit). When asked about Maduro’s public refusal to accept humanitarian assistance, Devoe said:

“Commissioner, Venezuela has the capacity to buy and provide the resources to guarantee the rights of its population.”

A kidney transplant patient, Francisco Valencia, interrupted Devoe to tell him he had not received medical treatment for six months. “I am dying.” Devoe replied: “Well Francisco, I ask you to leave this room and ask Euroclear to unfreeze the 1,650 million dollars that would let us buy your treatment.”

The problem with that statement is not only Devoe’s audacity in talking back to a helpless patient. Venezuelan humanitarian organizations were, at that point, getting resources because of international cooperation. That cooperation was, to an extent, greenlighted by the Venezuelan State. ECHO, Caritas International, the Red Cross, the International Rescue Committee and others were already in the country, liaising with local groups.

Like Maduro and Delcy, Devoe could not acknowledge it. It was too embarrassing. It would give credibility to reports that maternal mortality grew 90% between 2016 and 2017, of 11.4% of acute malnutrition among kids under 5 years old, and claims that the government was hiding data on spikes of tuberculosis, diphtheria and malaria.

Hard Left roots?

It recently emerged that Larry Devoe is the maternal grandson of Pompeyo Márquez, who had been a communist militant during Betancourt and Leoni’s war against Cuba-funded guerrillas. Márquez later joined the party system with Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS) through Caldera’s pacification process. He broke with Chávez when MAS endorsed his 1998 candidacy, and spent his final years opposing chavismo from within the Left.

On that shocking Friday afternoon, I also came upon a book about Venezuelan universities in the second half of the 20^th century. One chapter speaks about the political climate in Caracas’ Universidad Central in the 1970s. It mentions a Larry Devoe in the youth ranks of MAS, which clashed with the Leftwing Revolutionary Movement (MIR)—where Jorge Antonio Rodríguez, father of Jorge and Delcy, was a student leader—on campus and in student council elections. (At this point, everyone knows the fate of Jorge Rodríguez padre, murdered in the custody of DISIP in 1976 after the kidnapping of William Niehous).

Albeit rivals in the halls of UCV, it seems like the fathers of Larry Devoe and the Rodríguez siblings were part of the same political community 50 years ago. There’s a chance the new prosecutor general, born after the killing of Rodriguez padre, has known Delcy and Jorge for quite a while. Devoe Sr. was a MAS member along with Jorge Valero, a former Venezuelan ambassador to the UN and OAS this century, whom Devoe defended in his Santo Domingo speech.

Delcy, Ernesto Villegas and Larry Devoe presented a 2017 report denying the State’s responsibility for the great majority of deaths during that year’s protests.

Part of what people like Devoe and the Rodríguez siblings likely absorbed early on were accounts of the extrajudicial killings and torture Venezuelan communists endured in the 1960s. Then came the 1976 case of Rodríguez. And later, when Devoe was 11, the Caracazo—preceded by massacres like Cantaura and El Amparo, carried out by state officials, often with impunity.

These events are not just real; they must be remembered as part of the bloodier side of our recent history, one that did not begin in 1999. What is striking is that Devoe, now prosecutor in this “new political moment”, has repeatedly covered up similar crimes, the very kind the Rodríguez siblings have long grieved over.

In 2023, Devoe dismissed the ongoing investigation in the International Criminal Court as a political ploy, said Caracas proved crimes against humanity were never committed, and echoed Tarek William Saab’s claims that Venezuelan courts were doing their job in dealing with the bad apples. That now contradicts the discourse of the Rodríguez siblings, who got rid of Saab to appoint him. Six years before that, Delcy, Ernesto Villegas and Larry Devoe presented a report denying the State’s responsibility for the great majority of deaths during the 2017 protest cycle. This denialism has been a recurring pattern in his career as a Venezuelan State agent, and remains a part of chavismo’s rhetoric about “political violence since 1999.”

Someone told me that Devoe was respectful and decent in one-on-one interactions, even after heated debates over the causes and scale of the Venezuelan crisis. That perhaps he was caged by his own surroundings. Let’s see if Devoe can somehow turn that record around.

After all these years, we have reasonable doubts he’ll do so.