Houthis

Italy’s defence minister warns of severe economic fallout if Bab al-Mandeb becomes impassable, bypassing EU delays.

Italy will deploy warships to ensure safe passage for its commercial vessels through the Bab al-Mandeb strait, Defence Minister Guido Crosetto said, adding that Rome would not wait for a joint decision from the European Union.

“We have the capabilities to protect the passage,” Crosetto said, warning that if the waterway became impassable, the economic consequences would be severe.

The Italian defence minister said that Rome “must not allow bureaucratic delays in decision-making to exacerbate an already complex situation”.

Bab al-Mandeb links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, forming one of the world’s busiest shipping corridors between Europe and Asia and a critical route for oil, gas and container traffic heading to and from the Suez Canal.

Roughly 12 to 15 percent of global trade has historically passed through the narrow waterway, which separates Yemen from Djibouti and Eritrea on the African side and is only about 30km (19 miles) wide at its narrowest point.

The strait’s importance has grown sharply since Iran effectively seized control of the Strait of Hormuz earlier this year amid its war with the United States and Israel, choking off the world’s most important oil chokepoint and pushing much of the Gulf’s crude exports towards alternative routes.

Saudi Arabia, in particular, has increasingly relied on pipelines and Red Sea shipping to bypass Hormuz altogether, making the Bab al-Mandeb strait one of the last major arteries still open to Gulf oil reaching global markets.

Control of the strait has been contested for years, as Yemen’s government, Houthi rebels and, at times, forces in the region have held stretches of its coastline at different points since the war in Yemen began in 2015.

The significance of the strait has been hit dramatically in the past few weeks, when the Iran-backed Houthi movement launched a rapid offensive that brought the entirety of Yemen’s western Red Sea coast under its control, including several strategically located islands.

The advance has given the Houthis effectively unrestricted access to the waterway, a development seen as a major setback for international shipping, given the group’s history of attacking vessels it associates with the US or its allies in the region.

The US and the European Union have already carried out military operations aimed at better protecting merchant ships from Houthi attacks in the area, though those efforts have struggled to fully secure the route as fighting in Yemen has escalated.

Intensifying attacks between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s Houthis have reportedly killed at least five people in total, including three children.

At least one person – a Yemeni resident in Saudi Arabia – was killed, and two others were injured after a Houthi drone was intercepted in Saudi Arabia’s southwestern governorate of Taif on Thursday, according to the kingdom’s civil defence agency.

It is the first death announced in Saudi Arabia this month since Yemen’s Iran-allied Houthis intensified their attacks.

In Yemen on Thursday, the Houthis said “Saudi enemy warplanes targeted three telecommunications towers” in Taiz province.

One civilian was killed in Taiz and another injured in strikes on the town of Abs, Yemen, said Houthi-linked Almasirah television.

Houthi-backed media later reported that “three children were killed and several Yemeni nationals were injured in strikes by the Saudi-backed mercenaries”, a reference to the country’s internationally recognised government forces.

Houthis reject claim they attacked Mecca

The escalation comes as Saudi Arabia said a drone was launched by the Houthis towards Mecca before being intercepted and destroyed.

“It’s a heinous lie,” Houthi leader Abdel-Malik al-Houthi said in a live televised address on Thursday, calling Saudi claims that his group would target Islam’s holiest city “a great propaganda”.

“The sanctity of Mecca is particularly important to the people of Yemen,” he said while accusing Saudi Arabia of “weaponising lies” to serve its war objectives against the Houthis.

Reporting from the Yemeni capital Sanaa, Al Jazeera’s Yousef Mawry said: “Al-Houthi’s speech is not just directed towards the Yemeni people; it is directed to the world to set the record straight that the Houthis did not target the holy city of Mecca, as the Saudis claim.”

In his address, al-Houthi also said Saudi Arabia had initiated the latest round of conflict in Yemen and that Houthi forces are acting defensively.

Meanwhile, Rashad al-Alimi, the head of Yemen’s Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council, said that Houthi forces are suffering heavy blows on the fronts in Taiz, Marib, Lahj, al-Jawf, Hajjah, al-Bayda al-Dhale.

In a meeting with the French ambassador to Yemen, al-Alimi said that gains made by the Houthis along the Red Sea coast are temporary, the state-run Saba news agency reported.

Aggression against Mecca ‘a condemned act’

Esmaeil Baghaei, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, said in a statement on X on Thursday that any aggression against Islamic holy sites, particularly Mecca, “is a condemned act”.

But he added that “a mere claim” of intercepting a drone “en route to Mecca” is not enough to accuse the Houthis of the act.

“Nor should we forget that our region has witnessed numerous instances of ‘false flag’ operations, particularly in recent months,” Baghaei said while pointing at Israel.

Meanwhile, China ⁠has privately asked Iranian officials to help rein in the ⁠Houthis after Saudi Arabia appealed to Beijing following recent Houthi attacks, anonymous sources in Iran told the Reuters news agency.

Beijing publicly called for restraint, dialogue and the restoration of safe navigation, but its private message went further than that, Reuters reported.

The escalation is also threatening to draw in other regional actors – specifically Saudi defence partners Pakistan and Turkiye, which signed a joint defence agreement with the kingdom last month.

Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif said the time has come to implement the Mecca agreement with Saudi Arabia and Turkiye due to recent Houthi attacks.

Asif’s comments to Pakistani media on Thursday were made as Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said he’d held a phone conversation with Pakistan’s army chief Asim Munir to discuss “regional developments”.

On September 12, 2026, United States President Donald Trump stood in Dublin alongside Irish Prime Minister Micheal Martin and said in a cool tone that the Houthis “called us, and they don’t want to fight us”, adding that the group was “allowing ships to pass” and that the situation would “work out very well”.

His remarks came just as Houthi forces had completed their takeover of the coastal town of Dhubab and Perim (Mayyun) Island, which divides the Bab al-Mandeb strait into two shipping channels, after seizing the strategic port of Mocha. This gave them a direct presence at the entrance to one of the world’s most important waterways.

Trump was speaking against the backdrop of a Houthi announcement that they would blockade Saudi oil supplies to Asia and Saudi commercial shipping, signalling the collapse of the traditional “security-for-oil” formula.

What is happening at Bab al-Mandeb is not an isolated event, but the latest in a long series of US retreats from security commitments that for decades underpinned the “security-for-oil” relationship between Washington and the Gulf states.

This is not a passing political position, but a profound shift in the regional security landscape: the United States is choosing not to intervene militarily against an armed group designated as terrorist that controls one of the world’s most important straits and whose actions go beyond the logic of conventional deterrence.

Trump’s remarks: Substance and strategic context

In Dublin, Trump said the Houthis had contacted the US administration seeking to avoid confrontation with Washington. He said they were “allowing most ships to pass” and that the problem was limited to “one country”, which he did not name – an apparent reference to Saudi Arabia – promising to “take care of fixing that”.

He also said the United States had “tight control” over the Strait of Hormuz and that about 25 ships were passing through it each day on average, despite maritime sources denying this.

On the ground, Trump’s remarks suggested that the Houthis remain wary of US military force and American deterrence, which has already put considerable pressure on their regional backer, Iran. They were therefore prepared to bargain, just as they accepted US conditions in 2025.

At the same time, Trump’s directives – as relayed by US military and civilian officials – revealed a clear hierarchy of priorities: Iran as the principal threat, securing the Strait of Hormuz as the vital artery for oil and gas flows, and avoiding another military front in Yemen.

This reflects a narrow strategic logic. From Washington’s perspective, Bab al-Mandeb is less vital to American oil interests than to flows towards China and other Asian markets that compete with the US economy. And because Trump believes the Houthis “are not targeting American ships”, direct intervention would, in his view, place an unjustified additional burden on US forces already exhausted by the Iranian front.

Trump’s position also cannot be separated from domestic politics. The US-Iran war has eroded his political support after he promised to keep the United States out of Middle Eastern wars.

According to The Los Angeles Times, Trump told Fox News that he “might not do it because of the elections”, referring to avoiding further military escalation before the congressional elections. Opening a new front in Yemen could further complicate matters for Republicans in closely contested House and Senate races.

Meanwhile, Saudi circles denied an Axios report claiming that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had called Trump twice on the eve of the Houthi takeover of the coast on September 10, urging him to strike the Houthis, and that Trump had refused.

The sources pointed to Axios’s own July 29 report on Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman’s visit to Washington, which said he had told the US vice president that the kingdom could manage the confrontation with the Houthis itself and did not need US military intervention. They regarded the two accounts as contradictions in the reporting of Axios’s Barak Ravid.

Observers in Riyadh see the restrained US position as part of a broader policy: the administration currently has no intention of taking direct military action against the Houthis. At the same time, Admiral Brad Cooper, commander of US Central Command, travelled to Riyadh for urgent coordination talks with Prince Mohammed, indicating that Washington is seeking to “intensify its support” for Saudi Arabia while avoiding direct military involvement – a formula well understood in Riyadh.

Trump sought to reassure Saudi concerns by describing the crown prince as a “good friend” and promising that “everything will work out very well”. But he offered no specific military commitment, and the White House announced no explicit guarantees to protect Saudi energy infrastructure or maritime routes.

This reluctance also follows a series of US decisions that have demonstrated a growing retreat from its security commitments in the Gulf. During his first term, Trump did not respond to the 2019 Aramco attack, for which the Houthis claimed responsibility but which was believed to have originated from Iraqi factions to the north. The attack temporarily knocked out half of Saudi oil supplies.

In February 2026, the United States joined Israel in attacking Iran without consulting its Gulf allies and has since faced growing difficulties defending them against Iranian attacks. US forces are now heavily preoccupied around the Strait of Hormuz, limiting their ability to respond to another front in Yemen.

Paradoxically, Washington, now bogged down in Hormuz, appears to need Saudi help in containing Iranian disruption at Bab al-Mandeb, rather than the other way round.

Since the war began on February 28, Riyadh has resisted all US pressure to become involved in a confrontation with Iran for two reasons. First, it believes such pressure carries an implicit aim of portraying the Saudi front as part of the Israeli front. Second, it was not consulted over the launch of the war and is not prepared to be worn down in a conflict serving Israeli objectives.

The erosion of the US umbrella and the fate of the ‘security-for-oil’ formula

Since the 1970s, the US-Gulf relationship has rested on a clear but implicit bargain: the United States provides a security umbrella protecting the Gulf states and energy routes, while the Gulf states ensure a steady flow of oil to the global economy at reasonable prices.

This was more than a bilateral understanding between Riyadh and Washington. Gulf security meant oil security, and oil security meant the security of the Western economy, making the bargain a pillar of the international energy system for decades.

Today, there are mounting signs that this formula is beginning to collapse.

First, strategic abandonment: Trump’s refusal to defend Bab al-Mandeb, and his response to the Houthis’ request that the US stay out of the conflict in return for allowing American ships to pass – effectively a political deal – marks a watershed. For the first time, the United States is clearly hesitating to defend energy security and a pivotal ally against a direct threat to global energy infrastructure. This is not temporary hesitation, but a redefinition of the US commitment.

Second, the redirection of priorities: Washington’s focus on the Strait of Hormuz and avoidance of a front in Yemen point to a new approach: not a comprehensive security umbrella, but selective protection of direct US interests. Hormuz matters because it carries Gulf oil to markets on which the US economy depends, while Bab al-Mandeb – from Trump’s perspective – primarily serves exports to China and Asia, interests Washington does not consider worth further military investment.

Third, military exhaustion: the US military is exhausted by the war with Iran and its stocks of advanced interceptor missiles have been depleted. This is structural rather than temporary, reflecting a growing inability to manage multiple fronts.

Fourth, domestic politics: the erosion of Trump’s political support because of the Iran war makes further military expansion politically costly. What was once a guarantee of Gulf security – US power – has become hostage to domestic electoral calculations.

Does this mean the end of the “security-for-oil” formula? Not necessarily. But it does point to a fundamental shift from a bilateral US-Gulf arrangement to a more complex, multilateral one.

The US umbrella has not disappeared, but it has contracted. The United States still maintains forces in the region and remains focused on the Strait of Hormuz, but its commitment is no longer comprehensive or unconditional.

Saudi strategic hedging

For years, Riyadh has been pursuing alternatives through strategic hedging. Its announcement of a 14-state multinational defensive maritime alliance – including Turkiye, Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan and Djibouti – is an attempt to fill the US security vacuum, while US or European naval forces are also deployed around the strait as part of similar Western coalitions.

Saudi Arabia is also strengthening its air and missile defences, developing its naval capabilities and deepening defence ties with countries including Turkiye and Pakistan. These efforts have included the “Strategic Mutual Defence Alliance” with Pakistan and the Mecca alliance with Turkiye and Pakistan in August 2026.

What we are witnessing is not the end of the US umbrella, but its shift from a “comprehensive guarantee” to “conditional and limited support”, forcing Gulf states to rethink their collective security.

The Saudi position on industrialised countries’ disregard for supply security

Saudi Arabia now faces one of its most serious security challenges: the Houthis control Bab al-Mandeb, are choking Saudi trade and have already launched drone and missile attacks towards Saudi territory.

Saudi oil exports to Asia fell from around 3.4 million barrels a day in June to just 128,000 in August, before partially recovering to 700,000 this month. Oil prices have meanwhile exceeded $107 a barrel, while the price of a gallon of petrol in the United States has risen by 35 percent.

The real danger is the simultaneous disruption of two maritime chokepoints: Hormuz, through which about 20 percent of global oil and gas supplies pass, is almost closed because of the US-Iran war, while Bab al-Mandeb, which accounts for 10-12 percent of global oil, is under Houthi control. Closing both could block about a quarter of global supplies.

Even without complete closure, the continuing threat creates a permanent “risk premium” on prices, according to economic analysts. Although Saudi Arabia benefits in the short term from higher prices, it is strategically harmed by instability because Vision 2030 depends on foreign investment, tourism and stability, not temporary wartime oil revenues.

Riyadh has long played a leading role in stabilising oil markets, frequently using its position as a swing producer to limit volatility. But amid the indifference of industrialised countries to supply security and the threats facing energy sources and routes, Saudi Arabia cannot put aside the dangers to its own security, sovereignty and people for countries that disregard the geopolitics of energy.

For this reason, Saudi Arabia has previously declared that it “will not bear responsibility for any disruptions or shortages in global oil supplies” resulting from Houthi attacks on its oil facilities.

This is more than a warning. It redefines the implicit social contract with its allies: Saudi Arabia is no longer prepared to act as guarantor of last resort for global energy security without something in return.

Its message is that the international community – particularly the major industrialised countries that benefit from oil flows – must share responsibility for protecting maritime routes, rather than leaving Riyadh to bear the cost alone.

‘Collective responsibility’ as a new security doctrine

The Saudi Ministry of Defence reinforced this approach in its statement on the proposed maritime alliance, stressing that “the security of international maritime routes is a collective responsibility that requires effective and sustainable international partnership”.

This is more than a diplomatic appeal. It amounts to a reformulation of the regional security contract: Saudi Arabia is not asking industrialised countries to defend Saudi interests, but to help protect their own interest in the continued flow of oil on which their economies depend.

In July 2026, Saudi Arabia announced a “Multinational Defensive Maritime Alliance” of 14 founding states: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkiye, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia.

At least 43 countries and organisations attended the founding meeting in Riyadh. The alliance may mark an important turning point, reflecting an implicit Saudi acknowledgement that the US umbrella is no longer sufficient and that Riyadh must build its own security capabilities with regional allies.

US exposure: A deeper strategic reading

Trump’s statements downplaying the Houthi takeover of Bab al-Mandeb and his refusal to intervene reflect not only a political decision, but a structural weakness in US deterrence.

The United States is unable to manage multiple fronts. Its concentration around the Strait of Hormuz limits its ability to respond in Yemen; fighting has depleted stocks of advanced interceptor missiles; and the unpopularity of the war and approaching congressional elections constrain its freedom of action.

From the perspective of countries in the region, the US military presence in the Gulf is no longer an unconditional security guarantee. The question of whether allies could be abandoned again is pushing decision-makers from Riyadh to Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Doha to diversify their security and defence partnerships.

That means deeper defence ties with Turkiye and Pakistan, stronger air and missile defences and naval capabilities, maintaining open channels and seeking risk-reducing understandings with regional powers including Iran, and multinational maritime alliances to protect navigation.

But these alternatives have limits. Can any regional alliance fully compensate for the absence of a major power such as the United States when confronting threats on the scale of Iran and its proxies? US intelligence, logistical and interception capabilities have no regional equivalent, leaving a security gap that cannot quickly be filled.

The new regional order: Towards multipolarity

What we are witnessing is not merely a passing security crisis, but the emergence of a new regional order marked by the decline of unilateral US dominance. The United States is no longer the sole security power in the Gulf, as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkiye and Iran gain weight and Gulf states diversify their partnerships and seek more collective regional security arrangements.

Trump’s response to the Houthi takeover of Bab al-Mandeb is therefore not simply a political position, but a sign of a tectonic shift in the regional security order. The “security-for-oil” formula that governed US-Gulf relations for decades has not formally ended, but it no longer provides the guarantees on which it was built. The US security umbrella remains, but it has become selective, conditional and subject to domestic US calculations unrelated to the interests of the Gulf states.

Saudi Arabia, caught between the hammer of the Houthis at Bab al-Mandeb and the anvil of Iran at the Strait of Hormuz, is pursuing a different approach: insisting that protection of maritime routes become a “collective responsibility” and that it should no longer bear alone the cost of protecting the interests of industrialised countries dependent on its oil.

This position – backed by the announcement of a multinational maritime alliance – marks the beginning of a redefinition of the regional security contract, although significant questions remain over whether ambition can be translated into capability.

Oil prices above $107 a barrel may be only an early sign of what lies ahead. If US exposure continues and regional understandings guaranteeing freedom of navigation remain out of reach, the world could face an energy crisis comparable to those of the 1970s, but without a US security umbrella ready to contain it.

Bab al-Mandeb is therefore more than a maritime strait. It reflects the end of one era and the beginning of another, in which Gulf security is no longer an American gift but a collective responsibility still searching for new arrangements.

Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, appears to favour a combination of deterrence and avoiding all-out war. Rather than sliding into open-ended attrition, it seeks to support national allies on the ground, enable the Yemeni state to restore its sovereignty, contain the logic of the militia and build a national doctrine that limits external penetration.

Yemen’s stability is no longer a purely Yemeni matter, but a first line of defence for the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb and for the cohesion of the Arab sphere, with Riyadh and Cairo remaining central pillars in confronting projects of disintegration and fragmentation.

Within this emerging order, the Saudi-Egyptian partnership is becoming a cornerstone of regional security. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s expected visit to Cairo and summit with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi give practical expression to the principle of “collective responsibility”.

Riyadh and Cairo recognise that the security of the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb is not a local matter: it is vital to the Suez Canal and Egyptian economy, and forms strategic and security depth for Saudi Arabia.

By coordinating diplomatic and military action, supporting the full liberation of Yemen and containing the reach of the militias, the two countries are helping shape an autonomous regional security order intended to fill the vacuums left by retreating international powers, protect international navigation and confront shared threats from a position of parity and capacity.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Saudi Arabia has intensified air strikes against Houthi positions in Yemen as the Iran backed group expands its territorial gains along the Red Sea coast, opening a new front in the wider Middle East war and adding pressure to already disrupted global energy supplies.

The Houthis have swept through several Yemeni towns and seized islands near the Bab el Mandeb Strait, a strategically important maritime route connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden. The group has also released footage showing its fighters capturing armoured vehicles from Saudi backed forces.

Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree claimed that the group had shot down a Saudi F 15 fighter jet and said Saudi Arabia had conducted as many as 450 air strikes in Yemen during the week. Saudi authorities have not confirmed the aircraft claim, while officials supporting the internationally recognised Yemeni government have acknowledged that Saudi and allied forces are carrying out strikes against Houthi positions.

Saudi Arabia faces growing security pressure

The escalation has brought the conflict closer to Saudi territory. The Houthis have repeatedly launched attacks toward Saudi Arabia over the past week, prompting alarms in cities across the kingdom’s south and west.

Saudi Arabia said its air defenses intercepted a Houthi drone south of Mecca before it entered restricted airspace over the holy city. Riyadh described the incident as a serious escalation because of the threat to religious sites. The Houthis denied targeting Mecca and accused Saudi Arabia of using the incident for propaganda.

The United States has also tightened its travel warning for Saudi Arabia, barring government employees from travelling within 20 miles of the Yemen border.

The latest escalation marks a sharp deterioration after several years in which the Saudi led conflict in Yemen had largely quietened under a ceasefire. The Houthis declared a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia in July and resumed attacks on areas in the kingdom before making rapid gains against forces aligned with the Saudi backed Yemeni government.

Energy markets face another shock

The renewed fighting is particularly significant because global energy markets are already under pressure from disruptions caused by the wider war involving Iran.

An attack blamed on Iran aligned fighters in Iraq last week knocked out Saudi Arabia’s East West Pipeline, an important route that allows the kingdom to move oil without relying entirely on the Strait of Hormuz.

Traders estimate that a prolonged closure of the pipeline could affect as much as 4% of global oil supply. Saudi Arabia has not given a timetable for restoring operations, although U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright said oil should begin flowing through the pipeline within days.

Brent crude was trading around $108 a barrel on Wednesday, close to its highest level since May. The average U.S. retail diesel price also reached a record above $6.30 a gallon.

The simultaneous disruption around the Strait of Hormuz and Saudi Arabia’s alternative export infrastructure increases the vulnerability of global energy markets to further regional escalation.

Washington faces another difficult choice

The developments also create a new challenge for the United States.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman spoke with President Donald Trump last week seeking additional military support. So far, U.S. assistance has been limited to intelligence support.

The United States previously conducted a two month bombing campaign against the Houthis in 2025 before Trump announced a ceasefire with the group.

Washington now faces competing pressures. Greater support for Saudi Arabia could help contain the Houthi advance and protect regional energy infrastructure, but deeper military involvement could also expand the U.S. role in another theatre of the Middle East war.

What’s next

The immediate concern is whether the Houthi advance can be contained before the fighting causes further disruption to Saudi energy infrastructure and shipping routes.

For Saudi Arabia, the challenge is to push back against the Houthis while preventing the conflict from developing into a broader regional confrontation.

For global markets, the key issue will be whether disruptions to Saudi oil infrastructure remain temporary. Continued attacks on energy facilities or shipping routes could place additional pressure on already strained supplies.

The developments in Yemen therefore carry consequences well beyond the country’s existing conflict. The combination of Houthi territorial gains, pressure on Saudi Arabia and disruption to major energy routes has created another potential source of instability for the global oil market.

With information from Reuters.

Taiz, Yemen – Hajja Fatima Mohammed Saleh, a 70-year-old Yemeni woman, is among the countless people and families displaced from Taiz governorate, southwest Yemen, in recent fighting between government forces and the Houthis.

The Iran-backed rebel group, also known as Ansar Allah (supporters of God), now controls most parts of northwestern Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa.

Saleh’s village in Maqbanah district, on the border of Yemen’s western coast, is situated at the epicentre of last week’s Houthi assault in which the group captured the whole of the Red Sea coast, including the port city of Mocha.

At least 100,000 people have now fled their homes following renewed fighting between the two sides, according to the United Nations’ refugee agency, most leaving with few belongings due to the speed of the Houthi offensive.

Saleh said she had to leave her wheelchair behind as it was unsuitable for the rugged terrain her family had to navigate to find shelter.

“The attack was massive, we had never seen anything like it before. Shells were falling heavily on the village, and bullets were flying in every direction,” she told Al Jazeera.

“We had no choice but to leave and flee to a safe place. We left everything we owned and walked a long distance on foot. For me, I suffered especially because I am disabled and cannot walk, so I had to crawl – using both hands – for a long distance through rain and floods before we found a vehicle to carry us.”

UN agencies and the internationally recognised Yemeni government say that Taiz governorate has witnessed most of the displacements, with Taiz City among the Houthis’ next targets after their victory on the Red Sea coast. This means the humanitarian situation could worsen even further.

Ali al-Shumairi, director-general of the Executive Unit for the Management of IDP Camps in Taiz governorate, told Al Jazeera that 65,845 people were displaced between August 10 and September 15. About 95 percent of those displaced come from the five districts which witnessed the heaviest fighting: Jabal Habashi, al-Maafer, Maqbana, al-Wazi’iyah and Mawza.

Fighting has intensified on several fronts in Yemen as government forces have carried out air attacks on Houthi positions in attempts to retake Mocha, days after the group captured the strategic port city, tightening its grip on the Red Sea – a vital shipping lane.

This development has placed the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the strategic waterway that connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean, at the heart of the war between the United States and Iran, and amplifies pressure on global trade routes.

Yemen’s more than 10-year civil war was reignited in July, threatening a United Nations-brokered truce that halted large-scale violence in 2022, after the Houthis declared a maritime blockade on Saudi Arabia and began targeting its ships in the Red Sea.

Forces affiliated with Yemen’s internationally recognised government have launched a campaign against the Houthis on a number of fronts since last week. They have retaken some positions and are advancing in the southwestern Taiz province as clashes intensify.

Osama al-Wafi, supervisor of the Mushrifa camp in Wadi Bikhawlan in Taiz governorate and a representative of the Yemeni government’s Executive Unit in Jabal Habashi district, described the situation as “dire and tragic”.

“These people have been displaced and have lost all the basic necessities of life, after having homes, farms, and livestock. Now they are only looking for a shelter to house them,” al-Wafi told Al Jazeera.

He said the number of displaced people arriving at the camp is steadily rising, with more than 1,500 families entering over the past six days, most living in the open due to a lack of shelter.

The al-Munij camp in the al-Bireen area, about 40 kilometres southwest of the semi-besieged city of Taiz, has become a temporary refuge for Yemenis fleeing the area after another bout of conflict between government and Houthi fighters in 2020.

Over the years, al-Munij has extended over a space of two square kilometres to house more displaced families, while other larger camps have been established in the area. Most residents complain they lack access to the most basic services – such as sporadic drinking water supplies and few toilets – in the camps.

Hajj Saif Qaed Thabet, 73, has been living with his wife and four children in an exposed space with no doors since arriving at al-Munij on September 10. He left behind a farm and livestock from his home in al-Kadaha, western Taiz governorate.

“We were displaced because of the war, fleeing bullets and artillery shells falling over our heads. Since arriving at the camp, we have been living like this, waiting for our situation to be addressed and for us to be housed in a suitable place,” said Thabet. “Praise be to God in all circumstances.”

Malouk Ahmed Ali, 55, from the al-Kadaha area in Taiz, said her family of 14 all escaped drones, shelling and gunfire on foot, including five children under her care, seven under her daughter’s care, and her elderly grandmother.

“We fled to an area near our village in the hope that the war would calm down quickly and we would return to our homes, but the clashes expanded until they reached us, so we were displaced again to here aboard a military vehicle that came to transport the threatened homeless people,” she told Al Jazeera.

“When we arrived at this camp, we were received and placed in this small tent as temporary housing for all members of the large family. Although they took all our information, our situation has not improved much so far, and we still hope it will improve.”

Ali hopes the war will end soon so she can return home but believes her family’s possessions, including solar panels and a battery, will have gone.

“As for our livestock, most of them died, some fled to the mountains and valleys, and what remained was looted,” she said.

US correspondence reviewed by Asharq Al-Awsat has revealed that Washington had delivered a warning to the Houthis through what were described as “security channels.”

The precise substance of the warning was not apparent from the correspondence, but it was followed by a clear US assertion that Washington was not negotiating with the group.

The Houthis’ attempt to send a reassuring message that they would not target US vessels appears to reflect an effort to consolidate their position following weeks of military operations that culminated in advances along Yemen’s western coast overlooking the Bab Al-Mandab Strait.

The advance poses a renewed threat to international shipping through the strategic waterway, which carries around 12 percent of global trade.

The US clarification in the diplomatic correspondence came a day after remarks by US President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance indicating that there had been communication with the Houthis, although neither explained the nature of those contacts.

Meanwhile, during a UN Security Council session on the Bab Al-Mandab Strait on Tuesday, Washington stated:

“The US supports Yemen’s legitimate government in confronting the Iran-backed Houthi militia. We call on the Houthis to halt their advance, withdraw from the territory they have seized and stop launching attacks.”

On the ground, the Yemeni government is working to raise military readiness in an effort to regain the initiative after recent setbacks on the Taiz and western coast fronts.

Government forces, meanwhile, have made slow but seemingly more consolidated gains on other fronts, including Al-Jouf and Al-Bayda. They have also continued to repel Houthi attacks and respond to militia buildups near Marib.

Government forces are engaged in fierce battles with the Houthi militia, which began escalating its military operations in August 2026.

The Houthis’ opponents accuse the group of violating deescalation arrangements under instructions intended to ease pressure on Iran.

And allow Iran’s Revolutionary Guard to use the group as a means of exerting pressure on the US during the war Washington launched in February 2026, which later intensified after Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz.

Why security channels?

Observers speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat said that the use of security channels does not in itself indicate negotiations, a deal, or even US acceptance of the Houthis’ assurances.

Al-Baraa Shaiban, a fellow at Britain’s Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, said the Houthi group was attempting to compensate for its lack of regional and international recognition by exaggerating the significance of opening communication channels with the US administration.

Asked about the phrase “security channels,” Shaiban said Western governments routinely maintain this type of contact with militias and terrorist groups.

Such communication, he said, remains limited, takes place outside diplomatic or political frameworks and is confined to sensitive or urgent security matters.

Iranian tactics

Reports of Houthi communication with the US were not treated in Yemen as merely another passing news item.

Many Yemenis sought to understand the group’s sudden move, particularly given that the Houthis’ slogan explicitly invokes “death to America.” The question, therefore, was how the group could simultaneously be communicating with Washington.

Mahmoud Shuhra, a fellow at Britain’s Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the current developments were “part of the Houthi strategy, which is an extension of Iran’s and the Revolutionary Guard’s behaviour and negotiating tactics.”

Shuhra, a former Yemeni diplomat, explained that the Houthi behaviour is based on gradual escalation, followed by a rapid military confrontation.

“If they achieve gains during that confrontation, they then begin offering reassurances in order to avoid being drawn into an all-out war,” he said.

He argued that this is effectively what happened in Bab Al-Mandab.

“The Houthis have now swallowed a very large bite and are trying to digest it,” he said.

The group is currently seeking to consolidate its gains, he added, and needs to offer reassurances in the meantime in order to avoid an immediate response against it.

This, he said, explains the attempt to reassure the US and the wider international community.

The Houthis also routinely seek to isolate their opponents, according to Shuhra, a tactic that has been repeatedly used in the past.

He recalled the group’s takeover of Sanaa, when the Houthis initially sought to reassure all political factions.

Once they had consolidated their presence, he said, they began meeting each faction separately and portraying the others as the enemy, eventually sidelining them all.

“The group now wants to use the same approach at the international level, regardless of how successful it may ultimately be,” he said.

Tehran, Iran – Another attempt to clinch a deal between Iran and Oman to restore some traffic to the Strait of Hormuz has been set back by a lack of regional consensus on the future of the waterway.

Officials from Iran, Iraq and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations – minus objecting Bahrain – were scheduled to meet in Oman’s port city of Salalah on Monday to confer on new temporary routes in the Strait of Hormuz amid Tehran’s ongoing hot-and-cold war with the United States.

On Sunday night, the region’s officials announced the postponement of the meeting, without giving a new date. None of the stakeholders gave any indication that the postponement was directly linked to recent Houthi and Iraqi militia attacks on Saudi Arabia.

However, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Saudi objection was the reason for the postponement, without providing further details.

US media outlets Axios and CNN reported that Saudi Arabia had submitted amendments to the Iran-Oman proposal for Hormuz because it had concerns that the wording would establish a new status quo which would be unacceptable to Riyadh.

It comes days after Saudi Arabia shut down its critical East-West oil pipeline – the kingdom’s key route for energy exports – after drone attacks in the area originating from Iraq. US President Donald Trump said these attacks were likely conducted at Tehran’s behest.

Saudi Arabia has also faced repeated attacks by the Houthis, who took control of Yemen’s Red Sea coast over the weekend.

Hours after the Salalah meeting was postponed, the Saudi civil defence issued alerts for Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan and Najran in southern and western parts of the kingdom. The Houthis claimed to have fired dozens of ballistic missiles and drones at military facilities in Khamis Mushait, in retaliation for air strikes across Yemen, which it blames on Saudi Arabia.

What comes next?

Iran has said it will engage with the US on the future of the Strait of Hormuz and ending the war only if there are tangible moves to lift Washington’s naval blockade on the country and return to the June memorandum of understanding.

With continued disruptions to the passage of vessels through the strait, Iran has signalled that it intends to continue pursuing the bilateral agreement with Oman over Hormuz, which it said was finalised last month.

“In consultation with Oman, in the next step, we will make a decision on how to announce or register the agreement,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei told reporters during a weekly news conference on Monday.

When the two countries initially advanced the bilateral deal, Trump threatened to bomb Oman if it “gets in the way” of US talks with Iran.

Ali Vaez, deputy director of the Middle East and North Africa programme at the Crisis Group, told Al Jazeera that Tehran wants to use its leverage over Hormuz for regional legitimacy – and ultimately to pressure the US.

“The broader the regional buy-in, the harder it becomes for the US to dismiss the arrangement as an Iranian diktat,” he told Al Jazeera.

GCC states, suffering from a sharp decrease in energy receipts, want ships moving and their economies insulated from a war they neither started nor can end. But Vaez said Washington is unlikely to lift the blockade on Iran even if the region blesses the arrangement between Muscat and Tehran.

“[The US] will find it much harder to sustain a policy that its own partners increasingly see as perpetuating the crisis,” Vaez said

Temporary entry and exit

The Omani-Iranian planned agreement envisions temporary entry and exit routes for commercial vessels in the strait, with Tehran repeatedly stating that this would not mean that the Strait of Hormuz has reopened.

Iran and Oman are the only two countries with territorial waters in the Strait of Hormuz. The proposed inbound corridor reportedly goes through Iranian waters, while the outbound corridor mostly passes through Omani waters, with small parts still in Iranian territory.

During Monday’s scheduled meeting, Iran and Oman were supposed to share precise maps and discuss the details of the routes with GCC members Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait, and Iraq, which is outside the bloc. The deal could reportedly include voluntary tolls to fund navigation, environmental protection and search-and-rescue operations.

Bahrain, which has borne the brunt of Iranian attacks since the US-Israel war on Iran started at the end of February, said it would not participate in the forum since it would amount to “appeasement”. The Tasnim news outlet, affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), claimed Israel pushed Bahrain to refuse participation.

How does Yemen fit in this picture?

The latest diplomatic movement comes after days of explosive developments in Yemen, when the Houthis, officially known as Ansar Allah, essentially took control of the Bab al-Mandeb strait and the Red Sea after a lightning offensive against government forces.

Thomas Juneau, assistant professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa, said the Houthi advances represent a significant gain for Iran. Its Yemeni allies’ position in the Red Sea offers Iran an important new bargaining chip in future negotiations with the US.

“The Houthis are not a simple arm of Iranian foreign policy. They operate largely based on their own interests, and do not take and execute Iranian commands,” he told Al Jazeera. “But Houthi and Iranian interests are largely, if not always fully, aligned. They cooperate closely on the basis of those shared interests.”

Juneau sees the ability for Iran and the Houthis to potentially partially block traffic in the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandeb – two of the world’s most crucial maritime bottlenecks – would give them tremendous influence over the global economy, and thus the US.

The Houthis are trying to seize the opportunity to “institutionalise the de facto reality of their veto on maritime traffic” in the southern Red Sea and replicate partial Iranian success in doing the same in the Strait of Hormuz, Juneau said.

Iran has stressed that their allies’ gains in the Red Sea cannot be separated from the Saudi-led blockade and attacks on Houthi areas in Yemen since 2015.

“We know very well that continued war between Islamic countries in the region only has one winner, and that winner is no one but the Zionist regime, which is after persisting tensions and conflict in our region and between Islamic countries,” Iranian spokesperson Baghaei said.

Yemeni government forces have advanced in western Taiz after successfully repelling a Houthi offensive.

Armed forces affiliated with Yemen’s internationally recognised government have retaken positions from the Houthis and are advancing in the southwestern Taiz province as clashes intensify.

Reporting from Taiz on Monday, Al Jazeera Arabic’s Yasser Hassan said forces loyal to the Saudi Arabia-backed Yemeni government advanced in western Taiz on Sunday after successfully repelling a Houthi offensive.

“This comes with the support of air strikes targeting Houthi gatherings. The air force continues to bomb the Houthis. On the west coast in Mocha, Dhubab, and their surroundings,” Hassan said, citing a source in government forces.

In a statement on Monday, the Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah (supporters of God), said they launched attacks on targets in Saudi Arabia using dozens of ballistic missiles and drones.

The group said the attacks targeted “military facilities and infrastructure, including aircraft hangars, radar installations, runways, ammunition depots and other targets at King Khalid airbase in Khamis Mushait”, Saudi Arabia.

It said the attacks were a response to a Saudi offensive, which involved more than 300 air strikes across Yemen over five days.

There was no immediate comment from Saudi Arabia on the Houthi claims.

On Sunday, the Saudi civil defence agency sent alerts for the city of Abha and the region around Khamis Mushait, but they were quickly lifted shortly afterwards.

Fighting in Yemen’s more than 10-year civil war reignited in July, threatening a United Nations-brokered truce that halted large-scale violence in 2022, after the Houthis declared a maritime blockade on Saudi Arabia and began targeting its ships in the Red Sea.

The fighting soon spilled over beyond the country’s borders, with the Houthis carrying out air attacks on southern Saudi Arabia, including oil facilities. Dozens of people were wounded in those attacks.

Clashes in Yemen intensified last week after the Houthis captured parts of the country’s Red Sea coast, fortifying their hold on the Bab al-Mandeb strait, a key waterway which handles about 12 percent of global trade, including 11 percent of maritime oil and 8 percent of liquefied natural gas (LNG).

The waterway has been an economic lifeline for Saudi Arabia and its oil exports, as the Strait of Hormuz has been effectively blocked by Iranian forces since the United States and Israel launched their war on Iran in February.

The Houthis captured more strategic islands in the southern Red Sea, The Associated Press news agency reported on Monday, citing Yemeni government and Houthi officials.

Houthi fighters were deployed on the islands of Greater Hanish and Lesser Hanish about 86 nautical miles (160km) north of the Bab al-Mandeb, according to two government officials and a Houthi official, the AP reported.

Meanwhile, the International Organization for Migration said on Sunday the fighting in Yemen in recent weeks had displaced nearly 86,000 people.

It added that some of those displaced by the conflict were fleeing Yemen altogether, with more than 2,000 people reaching neighbouring country Djibouti.

MOGADISHU, Somalia: Somalia’s business community is seeking alternative shipping routes due to disruptions and security concerns around the Bab Al-Mandab Strait and the Strait of Hormuz after Iran-backed Houthis captured a key port city and an island, sending thousands of Yemenis fleeing to neighboring Djibouti.

Companies have traditionally imported goods from Asia through Gulf countries, such as the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. Now, some are trying a more direct approach.

“The latest tensions in the Bab Al-Mandab Strait, as well as those in the Strait of Hormuz, have negatively impacted us,” said Mohamed Ali Nur, director of Mogadishu Seaport. “But we have also taken measures to avoid that disruption.”

Nur said his port has worked with exporters to find alternative routes.

“For the first time, we brought a ship carrying sugar directly from Sri Lanka,” Nur said. “This could be a strategy we developed because of these tensions.”

Yemen’s internationally recognized government and Saudi Arabia have been battling the Houthis for 12 years.

The recent escalation has ended a ceasefire that had largely stopped civil war across Yemen since 2022.

Now the number of people from Yemen fleeing the fighting is soaring.

On Sunday, the International Organization for Migration said over 85,000 people have been displaced since the beginning of the month. More than 2,000 people have reached Djibouti, which neighbors Somalia, the agency said.

At Mogadishu’s busy seaport, cargo ships continue to unload food and other commodities. Somalia is particularly dependent on maritime trade for many of the goods its people use every day.

For ordinary Somali consumers, changes in shipping routes can eventually be felt in the markets, where imported food and other goods are sold. Longer or more complicated journeys can mean higher transportation costs and delays in getting products onto store shelves.

Capt Ali Jemdi, who is originally from Syria and ships cargoes of sugar, said uncertainty in the region is already creating concerns for ships operating along the routes.

“There is some trouble over there because of the war,” he told The Associated Press, referring to the Arabian Gulf and surrounding waters. “The Bab al-Mandab may also have some issues for the vessel.”

He said the instability could make maritime transportation and trade more difficult.

AL-MUKALLA: Yemen’s government forces are better prepared, more experienced and better armed to defend the central city of Marib against any renewed Houthi offensive, a senior military official said, amid reports that the Iran-backed group is massing forces around the province.

Brig. Yahya Al-Hatemi, director of the Yemeni army’s military media, told Arab News that government forces had gained significant battlefield experience during more than a decade of fighting and were ready to repel any attempt by the Houthis to advance on Marib.

“The armed forces have generally become more organized, powerful and effective,” Al-Hatemi said.

“Over the past decade, they have gained combat experience that enabled them to overcome adversity, master military tactics and identify the enemy’s strengths and weaknesses.”

Marib has become one of the most strategically important government-held areas in Yemen since the war escalated in 2015.

It is home to more than 2 million displaced people, major army bases, oil and gas fields and a key power station. The Houthis have repeatedly attempted to seize the city, but previous offensives have failed.

Over the weekend, Yemeni media reported that the Houthis had sent large numbers of fighters and military equipment to areas of Marib province under their control, raising fears of preparations for another offensive.

The reported buildup followed major Houthi gains along Yemen’s western coast, including the seizure of the Red Sea port city of Mokha and advances toward the Bab Al-Mandab area.

Al-Hatemi said the army was aware that Marib could become the Houthis’ next major target.

“We know that the new pressure will be directed at Marib,” he said.

“However, Marib has significant military strength and divine protection. Moreover, the Houthis lack a popular support base there. Quite the opposite: The local environment is hostile to them.”

The Houthis launched a major offensive to capture Marib in early 2021, with fighting continuing into early 2022 and leaving hundreds of civilians and combatants dead or wounded.

The campaign largely subsided following the UN-brokered truce in April 2022, although the Houthis continued launching missile and drone attacks and mobilizing forces around government-held parts of the province.

Military commanders say the situation is different today.

Government forces are operating under a more unified command and have accumulated years of experience fighting the Houthis across multiple fronts.

For the first time in more than a decade, Yemen’s military has also reactivated its air force, which has recently carried out strikes against Houthi positions.

“The armed forces were supplied with military equipment they had previously lacked, while the army and navy were restructured,” Al-Hatemi said.

“In addition, the air force, which had been absent for 11 years, was reactivated.”

Presidential Leadership Council member and Marib Gov. Sultan Al-Aradah expressed similar confidence, saying government forces were capable not only of defending the province but eventually of taking the initiative and launching a broader campaign against Houthi-held territory.

“There is no doubt that Marib is part of the broader battlefields across the country,” Al-Aradah told Saba TV.

“From the beginning, the Marib front has focused solely on victory, supporting the people and supporting all fronts across Yemen. The objective of the forces in Marib and elsewhere is to restore the capital, Sanaa.”

Al-Aradah urged families in Houthi-controlled areas not to send their children to fight alongside the group.

“I hope they do not send their misled children into death traps … horrific slaughterhouses that make one shudder with shame,” he said.

“It is deeply regrettable to witness, right before our eyes, these scenes where hundreds, even thousands, of misled individuals are sent off — unaware of where they are going or whom they are fighting.”

Al-Aradah accused the Houthis of reigniting the war through their latest military escalation and blamed Iran for encouraging the group to reject peace efforts.

He also praised Saudi Arabia for its support for Yemen’s internationally recognized government.

“Our Arab brothers, foremost among them Saudi Arabia, provide great support to the Yemeni people in all fields,” he said.

“They stand by Yemen’s constitutional legitimacy and support the Yemeni people in addressing their economic and humanitarian hardships. They also stand by us in our efforts to achieve stability and prosperity under a legitimate state.”

The renewed attention on Marib comes as the battlefield has widened following Houthi advances in western Yemen.

The militia’s gains around Mokha and Bab Al-Mandab have increased pressure on government forces and raised questions over where the Houthis will seek to concentrate their next major offensive.

For government commanders, however, the stated objective now extends beyond simply defending Marib.

“The priority now is to restore the Yemeni state and rid Yemen of terrorist organizations, foremost among them the Houthis, regardless of their form or nature,” Al-Aradah said.

“This is an irreversible commitment tied to the will of the people. There will be no turning back until the state is restored, whatever it takes.”

Saudi Arabia has closed its East-West oil pipeline due to a drone attack linked to Iranian-backed militias in Iraq. This pipeline is crucial for Saudi Arabia, as it allows the country to bypass the congested Strait of Hormuz, which has faced reduced tanker traffic due to an ongoing conflict between the U.S. and Iran. The Saudi Energy Ministry stated that the closure is a precautionary measure; the pipeline typically carries about 4 to 5 million barrels of oil per day, contributing 4% to 5% of global oil supply. The attack caused injuries and damage, but the exact impact on oil exports is still being evaluated.

President Trump, while attending a golf event in Ireland, suggested that Iran was likely responsible for the attack and predicted that oil prices would drop after the upcoming U.S. midterm elections. Recently, oil prices have surged, with diesel prices in the U.S. topping $6 a gallon due to tensions in the region. Reports surfaced that the Houthis, aligned with Iran, seized the strategic Perim Island in the Red Sea.

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia reached out to Trump for military assistance against the Houthis, but Washington decided not to intervene directly at that moment, offering intelligence support instead. There were concerns that the attacks on the pipeline and Perim Island could escalate tensions further, especially since diplomatic efforts to resolve the war have stalled.

Iran’s parliamentary committee has stated that negotiations are futile unless the U.S. meets Iran’s demands, particularly concerning recognition of its control over the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian foreign ministry announced plans for discussions with Gulf states in Oman regarding the strait. Meanwhile, Iraq’s government dismissed a military commander connected to the attack and has closed the Shalamcheh border crossing with Iran as a precaution to prevent further incidents.

The Saudis have not retaliated yet, following a request from Iraq’s prime minister, but they maintain the right to take necessary actions to protect their interests. Saudi Arabia’s oil production has plummeted to its lowest level in over 30 years, partly due to attacks on maritime vessels by Houthi factions. These forces, supported by Iranian guidance, are reportedly planning counterattacks to reclaim territories lost to the Houthis, who have advanced significantly along Yemen’s coast under Iranian direction. The Houthis have claimed that maritime navigation remains safe, except for Saudi vessels, which are subject to a ban.

With information from Reuters

ADDIS ABABA: About 1,400 people have fled Yemen for Djibouti due to fighting between government forces and Iran-allied Houthis, Djibouti’s minister of economy and finance said Saturday.

Houthi fighters control a large part of northern Yemen, including the capital Sanaa and Hodeida in the west. They have advanced along the coast in just days and on Thursday seized the port city of Mokha.

The Houthis have since taken control of the coastline and islands in the Red Sea, and on Friday tightened their grip on the Bab Al-Mandab Strait, which is vital to global shipping through the Suez Canal.

“1400 #refugees arrived in #Djibouti from #Yemen in just 24 hours,” Ilyas Moussa Dawaleh wrote on X.

Located opposite Yemen on the Horn of Africa, tiny Djibouti borders the Bab Al-Mandab Strait at the entrance to the Red Sea from the Gulf of Aden.

Safiya Ibrahim, humanitarian response coordinator for the International Organization for Migration, told AFP that “vulnerable groups such as women and children have reached the shores of Obock, with more expected in the coming days.”

According to the United Nations, at least 76,000 people have been displaced in Yemen since July, with the number quadrupling in the last week after the latest fighting.

Last week, Houthi fighters launched a new offensive against Saudi-backed government forces, targeting zones bordering the Bab Al-Mandab Strait.

The waterway has taken on new importance, particularly for Saudi oil exports, since the Strait of Hormuz was blocked by Iran.

Hundreds have been killed in the fighting on both sides.

Yemen’s Houthi rebels have captured Mocha port and now threaten to control the main waterway of the Bab al-Mandeb strait. They have also attacked several cities in Saudi Arabia, wounding about 70 people, including women and children.

The repeated attacks against Saudi energy, civil, and defence facilities, combined with the maritime blockage by Iran and its Yemeni partner the Houthis, directly raise the question of the Mecca Pact’s operationalisation between Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan.

The Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia can activate the mutual defence agreement. If that happens, what could a Pakistani and Turkish intervention look like?

The answer to this question necessitates some crucial background first.

The US – the main security partner of the Gulf states – has signalled for a while now that it expects regional countries to take primary responsibility for their own defence and deterrence, with US help remaining critical but limited.

That posture is already visible on the ground. Since the start of the US-Israel war on Iran, the US has not been able to provide comprehensive defence for its regional partners. On several occasions, it has even failed to stop attacks on its own bases in the Gulf.

With US presence receding and Washington emphasising regional burden-sharing, Gulf states have had to look into a new defence architecture. In September 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed their first mutual defence agreement, which expanded in August this year to include Turkiye and became the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement.

The three countries have since established a joint secretariat, with its headquarters in Riyadh, with Pakistan taking the chairmanship for an initial three-year term.

The pact remains in a gestation period. It does not publicly identify the thresholds or scenarios under which a member would move to direct military intervention. Its organisational and institutional structure, including rules of engagement, mechanisms of consultation, and collective defence and deterrence, are yet to be formally developed.

Now, back to the question of how the pact will be operational if a member state is attacked.

Earlier this week, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif said that an unprovoked aggression against Saudi Arabia, or a spillover of the Yemen conflict into the kingdom, would make the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement operational, adding that “there should be no doubt in this.”

Asif, however, did not share specific details on what shape that operationalisation would take. Last month, Turkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan clarified that the Mecca Pact would work the same way as NATO: If a member state is attacked, it must actively request and define the specific type of help it needs.

NATO’s Article 4 allows for a member to call alliance consultations and exchange of information. Article 5 requires mutual assistance from allies, but it leaves each state to decide the nature of that assistance.

In 2012, after Syria shot down a Turkish warplane, Ankara invoked Article 4 for consultation and requested specific defence assistance. Instead of demanding direct military intervention, the Turkish government explicitly asked for Patriot missile defence batteries. NATO approved the request and deployed the systems to protect Turkish airspace.

In this context, if the Mecca Pact is to be operationalised, it would have to be Saudi Arabia that defines the type of military assistance and involvement that it needs. If, for example, Riyadh makes an actual request for Pakistani direct military intervention, beyond materiel and intelligence support, Islamabad would be obliged to comply. But the request, and the scale of the response, would still likely need to be defined and agreed in a consultation meeting.

For now, none of this has been tested as Riyadh has not invoked the pact with either Pakistan or Turkiye.

In the meantime, diplomatic efforts have intensified, with Pakistani Field Marshal Asim Munir and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud talking to Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.

Islamabad has also publicly urged Iran to rein in the Houthis from attacking Saudi Arabia and threatening the Bab al-Mandeb, and has reminded Tehran of Pakistan’s commitment to Riyadh’s defence through the pact. Ankara would likely play its own part in diplomatically restraining the Houthis and Iran.

If diplomacy fails and Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia or the Bab al-Mandeb continue, Turkiye and Pakistan would likely expand the air and technological support they already provide. Islamabad already has an air squadron of about 16 JF-17 Thunder multirole aircraft, defence systems, and thousands of troops deployed in Saudi Arabia.

But a direct military operation by Pakistani forces inside Yemen remains unlikely at the moment. Given the disastrous and lasting impacts of its participation in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union on behalf of the US, Pakistan would be far more wary of joining a war against Iran and its allies, for fear of spillover into its western border provinces’ economy, domestic security, sectarian balance, and societal harmony. Pakistani leaders would find it hard to build domestic consensus for direct attacks on the Houthis or a fight with Iran.

The likely scenario is that Pakistan would increase joint diplomatic pressure on Iran to restrain the Houthis, further augment its support for Saudi defence, and push for a multinational naval coalition to secure the Bab al-Mandeb. Adopting this restraint would still keep the essence of the Mecca Pact intact, while putting more weight behind regional de-escalation.

The new security architecture that agreements like the Mecca Pact are setting up will take years to mature. Until the mechanisms and rules of collective response develop, Pakistan’s existing bilateral defence relationships with Saudi Arabia and other Arab partners will continue to focus on defence needs.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Tehran, Iran – Iranian authorities and state media have praised the Houthis’ capture of Yemen’s Red Sea coast, which some see as giving Tehran more leverage against the United States.

The Houthis, a political and armed group dominated by Zaidi Shia Muslims, have been fighting against the Western-backed Yemeni government since capturing the capital, Sanaa, in 2014.

The Houthis captured a series of Red Sea coastal cities and islands this week, essentially giving them control over the vital Bab al-Mandeb strait.

The Iran-allied group’s recent victories have been praised in Iran, and are viewed by some as part of Tehran’s wider war against the US, ongoing since February 28.

“The victories of Yemen’s Ansar Allah in the western coast is a narrative of a divine triumph and the fruit of years of steadfastness in the most difficult of battlefields,” Hossein Mohebbi, spokesman of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), wrote on X on Saturday.

Amid the Houthis’ recent battlefield wins against the fragmented Saudi-backed forces, senior Iranian officials have cheered their Yemeni allies on.

The Houthis’ capture of the port city of Mocha on Friday delivered a huge blow for the Yemeni government, which now has no direct access to the Red Sea.

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Iranian parliament speaker and chief negotiator with Washington, reposted a comment made by slain Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in 2024, saying the “resistance” of the Houthis will inevitably lead to victory.

“The brave Yemeni people will certainly triumph, by permission of God Almighty,” Ghalibaf added on Thursday, in Arabic.

Iran’s First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref said the government is happy with the Houthi advances, and urged leaders in the region to pursue “the rationality of liberation from dependency [from the US and the West], and unity under the banner of Islam”.

The “grand victory” of the Houthis once again proved that “security is not a commodity that can be bought,” added Mohammad Mokhber, an adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.

How could this benefit Iran?

The Houthis began to attack several vessels in the Red Sea they claimed were linked to Israel in 2023, as part of their stated aim to pressure Israel to end the genocidal war on Gaza.

This prompted bombing campaigns by the US, United Kingdom and Israel against Houthi positions in Sanaa, Hodeidah and other areas.

Saudi Arabia, which joined the war against the Houthis in 2015, has largely stayed out of the current eruption in fighting in Yemen.

After their recent victories, the Yemeni group can now exercise more control over the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandeb strait.

The Houthis’ control of Yemen’s Red Sea coastline and multiple islands – including the island of Mayun, also known as Perim, sitting about 3km (1.9 miles) off Yemen’s mainland – provides the group with close-range access to the Bab al-Mandeb strait.

A video published on Friday showed a Houthi commander telling soldiers they will no longer need missiles and drones to threaten shipping in the crucial waterway. They could simply position artillery along the coast and fire in all directions at ships, he said.

The Houthis have not declared the strait closed, but the group’s military spokesperson, Yahya Saree, said on Friday that “maritime navigation is safe for all companies except for Saudi vessels.”

Likewise, Iran’s partial control of the Strait of Hormuz on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula has been a key tool of leverage for Tehran in the war against the US.

The prospect of closing down the strait could potentially be used by Tehran in future negotiations over ending the war with the US.

Iranian officials are expected to meet regional Arab representatives on Monday for talks over how to facilitate shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, which Tehran maintains remains closed.

They have said they favour a collective regional approach on passage through the strategic waterway.

Iran claims it has reached an understanding with Oman, which also has territorial waters in the strait.

The US, which has continued its naval blockade of Iran’s ports and intensified sanctions on Tehran, reportedly opposes the agreement.

Authorities in Tehran have signalled there will be no talks with Washington under the current circumstances.

“As long as the American side does not accept all of Iran’s conditions, dialogue and negotiation are of no use,” Ebrahim Azizi, head of the hardline Iranian parliament’s national security commission, wrote on X on Saturday.

‘Lord of the straits’

At the start of the working week in Iran on Saturday, hardline and IRGC-linked newspapers and media outlets celebrated the recent Houthi advances.

Keyhan, whose editor-in-chief was appointed by Ali Khamenei, called the advances “the miracle of resistance” and said they had “put the US and Israel in a bind”.

The Quds newspaper, published by the influential Astan-e Quds Razavi in Mashhad, called Iran and the Houthis “the lord of the straits”.

But even though Tehran has repeatedly threatened that Bab al-Mandeb could be further disrupted if the war continues, Iran’s diplomatic apparatus did not immediately link the Houthi advances with the current fight against the US.

As has often been the case, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs insisted that the Houthis make their decisions independent of Tehran, with their own interests at heart, including ending Saudi Arabia’s blockade on Yemen.

The Iranian Foreign Ministry also called for an end to the Saudi siege on Houthi-controlled areas, an immediate return to negotiations between the group and Riyadh, and respect for Yemen’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The ministry also pushed back on the idea that the Houthis act merely as a proxy for Tehran.

“What is happening now in Yemen is the result of the Yemenis losing patience,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei told state television on Friday night.

“It is not fair to ignore the fact that they were under a cruel blockade for years, and concluded that the United Nations and regional mechanisms could not resolve the issues.”

The latest developments on the ground in Yemen are so significant that their seriousness cannot be understated. Iran now has an arm on the vital Bab Al-Mandab Strait through its proxy, the Houthi militia, which has seized the port of Mokha and the Yemeni islands in the southern Red Sea.

The Houthis’ aggressive military activities leading up to the attack pointed to one of three possibilities: either they were targeting Saudi areas bordering Yemen to the north, oil facilities in Yemen’s Marib province or the port of Mokha, from which they could go on to threaten international shipping.

The battles of the past few days ended with the seizure of the port of Mokha, Perim Island at the mouth of the Bab Al-Mandab Strait and the islands of Hanish and Zuqar. This confirmed that the operation is an extension of Iran’s activities in the waters of the Gulf. Iran can now halt oil shipping through both the Strait of Hormuz and Bab Al-Mandab. This comes in the decisive weeks leading up to the US midterm elections, meaning that if the Iranians are seeking to resume negotiations with the Trump administration, they will do so under conditions that strengthen their demands.

The issue also has implications for regional security that extend beyond Yemen’s borders. The Houthis now control a port and islands that enable them to threaten shipping and cooperate with Iran-aligned terrorist militias in Somalia.

As for the dynamics of the Yemeni war itself, the Houthis have certainly made significant gains but they have also expanded the front against themselves by seizing areas around Mokha. This vast area will require further confrontations with the Houthis, in addition to forcing them to devote resources to defending the many fronts that have opened for the first time since their defeats in 2018.

The Middle East is going through a dangerous period of turmoil and its flashpoints are interconnected.

Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

In fact, what happened this week resembles what happened nearly a decade ago. Houthi fighters reached the port of Mokha and even pushed beyond it to Dhubab, the last point in southwestern Yemen. It is considered the narrowest point separating Asia from Africa, lying only about 30 km across the sea from Djibouti.

After roughly three years of militia control, coalition forces were able to defeat the Houthis and liberate Mokha, Dhubab and the islands, including Perim and Zuqar.

Yemen’s government forces are going through a period of rebuilding and consolidating their various national forces. This is a difficult task as they work to liberate areas controlled by the Houthis, which are the country’s most densely populated and most rugged regions, amid extremely difficult political and economic conditions. Securing Yemen goes beyond the country’s borders. It also serves regional security and the security of global maritime trade. This requires international support for Yemen, not just support from Saudi Arabia and the countries of the region.

The Middle East is going through a dangerous period of turmoil and its flashpoints are interconnected. We see this in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere, and these challenges require collective cooperation to contain them. Many people underestimate the Yemeni Houthi movement, believing it to be a local problem that can easily be contained militarily or politically. In reality, the Houthis resemble Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Stopping or containing the threat posed by such armed groups requires a joint effort. The fall of the Assad regime in Syria had consequences that extended beyond its borders, weakening Hezbollah in Lebanon and dismantling part of the region’s network of weapons, drugs and terrorism. Yemen’s forces will not be able to fight the Houthis alone. Regional and international efforts must come together to accomplish the task.

• Abdulrahman Al-Rashed is a Saudi journalist and intellectual. He is the former general manager of Al Arabiya news channel and former editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat, where this article was originally published.

X: @aalrashed

Abdulrahman Al-Rashed is a veteran columnist. He is the former general manager of Al Arabiya news channel, and former editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat. Twitter: @aalrashed

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TOKYO: Japan strongly condemned the attacks by the Houthis on Saudi Arabia and reiterated its call on them to refrain from escalating the situation both inside and outside Yemen.

“The Houthis’ continued military attacks have resulted in numerous casualties, including among civilians. Japan renews its strong denunciation of the recent series of attacks by the Houthis. Attacks on civilians and civilian facilities, as well as any actions that impede the free and safe navigation of vessels, cannot be tolerated,” Japan’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement on Friday night.

The ministry stressed that stability in Yemen is directly linked to the stability of the entire Middle East, and Japan reiterates the importance of achieving peace in Yemen. It also noted that peace and stability in the Middle East, including ensuring free and safe navigation through the Bab Al-Mandab Strait, are of the utmost importance to the entire international community, including Japan, from the perspective of energy security.

“Japan will continue to make every diplomatic effort, in cooperation with the international community, including Yemen and Saudi Arabia, toward an early de-escalation of the situation,” the statement said.