Houthis

US correspondence reviewed by Asharq Al-Awsat has revealed that Washington had delivered a warning to the Houthis through what were described as “security channels.”

The precise substance of the warning was not apparent from the correspondence, but it was followed by a clear US assertion that Washington was not negotiating with the group.

The Houthis’ attempt to send a reassuring message that they would not target US vessels appears to reflect an effort to consolidate their position following weeks of military operations that culminated in advances along Yemen’s western coast overlooking the Bab Al-Mandab Strait.

The advance poses a renewed threat to international shipping through the strategic waterway, which carries around 12 percent of global trade.

The US clarification in the diplomatic correspondence came a day after remarks by US President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance indicating that there had been communication with the Houthis, although neither explained the nature of those contacts.

Meanwhile, during a UN Security Council session on the Bab Al-Mandab Strait on Tuesday, Washington stated:

“The US supports Yemen’s legitimate government in confronting the Iran-backed Houthi militia. We call on the Houthis to halt their advance, withdraw from the territory they have seized and stop launching attacks.”

On the ground, the Yemeni government is working to raise military readiness in an effort to regain the initiative after recent setbacks on the Taiz and western coast fronts.

Government forces, meanwhile, have made slow but seemingly more consolidated gains on other fronts, including Al-Jouf and Al-Bayda. They have also continued to repel Houthi attacks and respond to militia buildups near Marib.

Government forces are engaged in fierce battles with the Houthi militia, which began escalating its military operations in August 2026.

The Houthis’ opponents accuse the group of violating deescalation arrangements under instructions intended to ease pressure on Iran.

And allow Iran’s Revolutionary Guard to use the group as a means of exerting pressure on the US during the war Washington launched in February 2026, which later intensified after Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz.

Why security channels?

Observers speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat said that the use of security channels does not in itself indicate negotiations, a deal, or even US acceptance of the Houthis’ assurances.

Al-Baraa Shaiban, a fellow at Britain’s Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, said the Houthi group was attempting to compensate for its lack of regional and international recognition by exaggerating the significance of opening communication channels with the US administration.

Asked about the phrase “security channels,” Shaiban said Western governments routinely maintain this type of contact with militias and terrorist groups.

Such communication, he said, remains limited, takes place outside diplomatic or political frameworks and is confined to sensitive or urgent security matters.

Iranian tactics

Reports of Houthi communication with the US were not treated in Yemen as merely another passing news item.

Many Yemenis sought to understand the group’s sudden move, particularly given that the Houthis’ slogan explicitly invokes “death to America.” The question, therefore, was how the group could simultaneously be communicating with Washington.

Mahmoud Shuhra, a fellow at Britain’s Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the current developments were “part of the Houthi strategy, which is an extension of Iran’s and the Revolutionary Guard’s behaviour and negotiating tactics.”

Shuhra, a former Yemeni diplomat, explained that the Houthi behaviour is based on gradual escalation, followed by a rapid military confrontation.

“If they achieve gains during that confrontation, they then begin offering reassurances in order to avoid being drawn into an all-out war,” he said.

He argued that this is effectively what happened in Bab Al-Mandab.

“The Houthis have now swallowed a very large bite and are trying to digest it,” he said.

The group is currently seeking to consolidate its gains, he added, and needs to offer reassurances in the meantime in order to avoid an immediate response against it.

This, he said, explains the attempt to reassure the US and the wider international community.

The Houthis also routinely seek to isolate their opponents, according to Shuhra, a tactic that has been repeatedly used in the past.

He recalled the group’s takeover of Sanaa, when the Houthis initially sought to reassure all political factions.

Once they had consolidated their presence, he said, they began meeting each faction separately and portraying the others as the enemy, eventually sidelining them all.

“The group now wants to use the same approach at the international level, regardless of how successful it may ultimately be,” he said.

Tehran, Iran – Another attempt to clinch a deal between Iran and Oman to restore some traffic to the Strait of Hormuz has been set back by a lack of regional consensus on the future of the waterway.

Officials from Iran, Iraq and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations – minus objecting Bahrain – were scheduled to meet in Oman’s port city of Salalah on Monday to confer on new temporary routes in the Strait of Hormuz amid Tehran’s ongoing hot-and-cold war with the United States.

On Sunday night, the region’s officials announced the postponement of the meeting, without giving a new date. None of the stakeholders gave any indication that the postponement was directly linked to recent Houthi and Iraqi militia attacks on Saudi Arabia.

However, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Saudi objection was the reason for the postponement, without providing further details.

US media outlets Axios and CNN reported that Saudi Arabia had submitted amendments to the Iran-Oman proposal for Hormuz because it had concerns that the wording would establish a new status quo which would be unacceptable to Riyadh.

It comes days after Saudi Arabia shut down its critical East-West oil pipeline – the kingdom’s key route for energy exports – after drone attacks in the area originating from Iraq. US President Donald Trump said these attacks were likely conducted at Tehran’s behest.

Saudi Arabia has also faced repeated attacks by the Houthis, who took control of Yemen’s Red Sea coast over the weekend.

Hours after the Salalah meeting was postponed, the Saudi civil defence issued alerts for Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan and Najran in southern and western parts of the kingdom. The Houthis claimed to have fired dozens of ballistic missiles and drones at military facilities in Khamis Mushait, in retaliation for air strikes across Yemen, which it blames on Saudi Arabia.

What comes next?

Iran has said it will engage with the US on the future of the Strait of Hormuz and ending the war only if there are tangible moves to lift Washington’s naval blockade on the country and return to the June memorandum of understanding.

With continued disruptions to the passage of vessels through the strait, Iran has signalled that it intends to continue pursuing the bilateral agreement with Oman over Hormuz, which it said was finalised last month.

“In consultation with Oman, in the next step, we will make a decision on how to announce or register the agreement,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei told reporters during a weekly news conference on Monday.

When the two countries initially advanced the bilateral deal, Trump threatened to bomb Oman if it “gets in the way” of US talks with Iran.

Ali Vaez, deputy director of the Middle East and North Africa programme at the Crisis Group, told Al Jazeera that Tehran wants to use its leverage over Hormuz for regional legitimacy – and ultimately to pressure the US.

“The broader the regional buy-in, the harder it becomes for the US to dismiss the arrangement as an Iranian diktat,” he told Al Jazeera.

GCC states, suffering from a sharp decrease in energy receipts, want ships moving and their economies insulated from a war they neither started nor can end. But Vaez said Washington is unlikely to lift the blockade on Iran even if the region blesses the arrangement between Muscat and Tehran.

“[The US] will find it much harder to sustain a policy that its own partners increasingly see as perpetuating the crisis,” Vaez said

Temporary entry and exit

The Omani-Iranian planned agreement envisions temporary entry and exit routes for commercial vessels in the strait, with Tehran repeatedly stating that this would not mean that the Strait of Hormuz has reopened.

Iran and Oman are the only two countries with territorial waters in the Strait of Hormuz. The proposed inbound corridor reportedly goes through Iranian waters, while the outbound corridor mostly passes through Omani waters, with small parts still in Iranian territory.

During Monday’s scheduled meeting, Iran and Oman were supposed to share precise maps and discuss the details of the routes with GCC members Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait, and Iraq, which is outside the bloc. The deal could reportedly include voluntary tolls to fund navigation, environmental protection and search-and-rescue operations.

Bahrain, which has borne the brunt of Iranian attacks since the US-Israel war on Iran started at the end of February, said it would not participate in the forum since it would amount to “appeasement”. The Tasnim news outlet, affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), claimed Israel pushed Bahrain to refuse participation.

How does Yemen fit in this picture?

The latest diplomatic movement comes after days of explosive developments in Yemen, when the Houthis, officially known as Ansar Allah, essentially took control of the Bab al-Mandeb strait and the Red Sea after a lightning offensive against government forces.

Thomas Juneau, assistant professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa, said the Houthi advances represent a significant gain for Iran. Its Yemeni allies’ position in the Red Sea offers Iran an important new bargaining chip in future negotiations with the US.

“The Houthis are not a simple arm of Iranian foreign policy. They operate largely based on their own interests, and do not take and execute Iranian commands,” he told Al Jazeera. “But Houthi and Iranian interests are largely, if not always fully, aligned. They cooperate closely on the basis of those shared interests.”

Juneau sees the ability for Iran and the Houthis to potentially partially block traffic in the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandeb – two of the world’s most crucial maritime bottlenecks – would give them tremendous influence over the global economy, and thus the US.

The Houthis are trying to seize the opportunity to “institutionalise the de facto reality of their veto on maritime traffic” in the southern Red Sea and replicate partial Iranian success in doing the same in the Strait of Hormuz, Juneau said.

Iran has stressed that their allies’ gains in the Red Sea cannot be separated from the Saudi-led blockade and attacks on Houthi areas in Yemen since 2015.

“We know very well that continued war between Islamic countries in the region only has one winner, and that winner is no one but the Zionist regime, which is after persisting tensions and conflict in our region and between Islamic countries,” Iranian spokesperson Baghaei said.

Yemeni government forces have advanced in western Taiz after successfully repelling a Houthi offensive.

Armed forces affiliated with Yemen’s internationally recognised government have retaken positions from the Houthis and are advancing in the southwestern Taiz province as clashes intensify.

Reporting from Taiz on Monday, Al Jazeera Arabic’s Yasser Hassan said forces loyal to the Saudi Arabia-backed Yemeni government advanced in western Taiz on Sunday after successfully repelling a Houthi offensive.

“This comes with the support of air strikes targeting Houthi gatherings. The air force continues to bomb the Houthis. On the west coast in Mocha, Dhubab, and their surroundings,” Hassan said, citing a source in government forces.

In a statement on Monday, the Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah (supporters of God), said they launched attacks on targets in Saudi Arabia using dozens of ballistic missiles and drones.

The group said the attacks targeted “military facilities and infrastructure, including aircraft hangars, radar installations, runways, ammunition depots and other targets at King Khalid airbase in Khamis Mushait”, Saudi Arabia.

It said the attacks were a response to a Saudi offensive, which involved more than 300 air strikes across Yemen over five days.

There was no immediate comment from Saudi Arabia on the Houthi claims.

On Sunday, the Saudi civil defence agency sent alerts for the city of Abha and the region around Khamis Mushait, but they were quickly lifted shortly afterwards.

Fighting in Yemen’s more than 10-year civil war reignited in July, threatening a United Nations-brokered truce that halted large-scale violence in 2022, after the Houthis declared a maritime blockade on Saudi Arabia and began targeting its ships in the Red Sea.

The fighting soon spilled over beyond the country’s borders, with the Houthis carrying out air attacks on southern Saudi Arabia, including oil facilities. Dozens of people were wounded in those attacks.

Clashes in Yemen intensified last week after the Houthis captured parts of the country’s Red Sea coast, fortifying their hold on the Bab al-Mandeb strait, a key waterway which handles about 12 percent of global trade, including 11 percent of maritime oil and 8 percent of liquefied natural gas (LNG).

The waterway has been an economic lifeline for Saudi Arabia and its oil exports, as the Strait of Hormuz has been effectively blocked by Iranian forces since the United States and Israel launched their war on Iran in February.

The Houthis captured more strategic islands in the southern Red Sea, The Associated Press news agency reported on Monday, citing Yemeni government and Houthi officials.

Houthi fighters were deployed on the islands of Greater Hanish and Lesser Hanish about 86 nautical miles (160km) north of the Bab al-Mandeb, according to two government officials and a Houthi official, the AP reported.

Meanwhile, the International Organization for Migration said on Sunday the fighting in Yemen in recent weeks had displaced nearly 86,000 people.

It added that some of those displaced by the conflict were fleeing Yemen altogether, with more than 2,000 people reaching neighbouring country Djibouti.

MOGADISHU, Somalia: Somalia’s business community is seeking alternative shipping routes due to disruptions and security concerns around the Bab Al-Mandab Strait and the Strait of Hormuz after Iran-backed Houthis captured a key port city and an island, sending thousands of Yemenis fleeing to neighboring Djibouti.

Companies have traditionally imported goods from Asia through Gulf countries, such as the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. Now, some are trying a more direct approach.

“The latest tensions in the Bab Al-Mandab Strait, as well as those in the Strait of Hormuz, have negatively impacted us,” said Mohamed Ali Nur, director of Mogadishu Seaport. “But we have also taken measures to avoid that disruption.”

Nur said his port has worked with exporters to find alternative routes.

“For the first time, we brought a ship carrying sugar directly from Sri Lanka,” Nur said. “This could be a strategy we developed because of these tensions.”

Yemen’s internationally recognized government and Saudi Arabia have been battling the Houthis for 12 years.

The recent escalation has ended a ceasefire that had largely stopped civil war across Yemen since 2022.

Now the number of people from Yemen fleeing the fighting is soaring.

On Sunday, the International Organization for Migration said over 85,000 people have been displaced since the beginning of the month. More than 2,000 people have reached Djibouti, which neighbors Somalia, the agency said.

At Mogadishu’s busy seaport, cargo ships continue to unload food and other commodities. Somalia is particularly dependent on maritime trade for many of the goods its people use every day.

For ordinary Somali consumers, changes in shipping routes can eventually be felt in the markets, where imported food and other goods are sold. Longer or more complicated journeys can mean higher transportation costs and delays in getting products onto store shelves.

Capt Ali Jemdi, who is originally from Syria and ships cargoes of sugar, said uncertainty in the region is already creating concerns for ships operating along the routes.

“There is some trouble over there because of the war,” he told The Associated Press, referring to the Arabian Gulf and surrounding waters. “The Bab al-Mandab may also have some issues for the vessel.”

He said the instability could make maritime transportation and trade more difficult.

AL-MUKALLA: Yemen’s government forces are better prepared, more experienced and better armed to defend the central city of Marib against any renewed Houthi offensive, a senior military official said, amid reports that the Iran-backed group is massing forces around the province.

Brig. Yahya Al-Hatemi, director of the Yemeni army’s military media, told Arab News that government forces had gained significant battlefield experience during more than a decade of fighting and were ready to repel any attempt by the Houthis to advance on Marib.

“The armed forces have generally become more organized, powerful and effective,” Al-Hatemi said.

“Over the past decade, they have gained combat experience that enabled them to overcome adversity, master military tactics and identify the enemy’s strengths and weaknesses.”

Marib has become one of the most strategically important government-held areas in Yemen since the war escalated in 2015.

It is home to more than 2 million displaced people, major army bases, oil and gas fields and a key power station. The Houthis have repeatedly attempted to seize the city, but previous offensives have failed.

Over the weekend, Yemeni media reported that the Houthis had sent large numbers of fighters and military equipment to areas of Marib province under their control, raising fears of preparations for another offensive.

The reported buildup followed major Houthi gains along Yemen’s western coast, including the seizure of the Red Sea port city of Mokha and advances toward the Bab Al-Mandab area.

Al-Hatemi said the army was aware that Marib could become the Houthis’ next major target.

“We know that the new pressure will be directed at Marib,” he said.

“However, Marib has significant military strength and divine protection. Moreover, the Houthis lack a popular support base there. Quite the opposite: The local environment is hostile to them.”

The Houthis launched a major offensive to capture Marib in early 2021, with fighting continuing into early 2022 and leaving hundreds of civilians and combatants dead or wounded.

The campaign largely subsided following the UN-brokered truce in April 2022, although the Houthis continued launching missile and drone attacks and mobilizing forces around government-held parts of the province.

Military commanders say the situation is different today.

Government forces are operating under a more unified command and have accumulated years of experience fighting the Houthis across multiple fronts.

For the first time in more than a decade, Yemen’s military has also reactivated its air force, which has recently carried out strikes against Houthi positions.

“The armed forces were supplied with military equipment they had previously lacked, while the army and navy were restructured,” Al-Hatemi said.

“In addition, the air force, which had been absent for 11 years, was reactivated.”

Presidential Leadership Council member and Marib Gov. Sultan Al-Aradah expressed similar confidence, saying government forces were capable not only of defending the province but eventually of taking the initiative and launching a broader campaign against Houthi-held territory.

“There is no doubt that Marib is part of the broader battlefields across the country,” Al-Aradah told Saba TV.

“From the beginning, the Marib front has focused solely on victory, supporting the people and supporting all fronts across Yemen. The objective of the forces in Marib and elsewhere is to restore the capital, Sanaa.”

Al-Aradah urged families in Houthi-controlled areas not to send their children to fight alongside the group.

“I hope they do not send their misled children into death traps … horrific slaughterhouses that make one shudder with shame,” he said.

“It is deeply regrettable to witness, right before our eyes, these scenes where hundreds, even thousands, of misled individuals are sent off — unaware of where they are going or whom they are fighting.”

Al-Aradah accused the Houthis of reigniting the war through their latest military escalation and blamed Iran for encouraging the group to reject peace efforts.

He also praised Saudi Arabia for its support for Yemen’s internationally recognized government.

“Our Arab brothers, foremost among them Saudi Arabia, provide great support to the Yemeni people in all fields,” he said.

“They stand by Yemen’s constitutional legitimacy and support the Yemeni people in addressing their economic and humanitarian hardships. They also stand by us in our efforts to achieve stability and prosperity under a legitimate state.”

The renewed attention on Marib comes as the battlefield has widened following Houthi advances in western Yemen.

The militia’s gains around Mokha and Bab Al-Mandab have increased pressure on government forces and raised questions over where the Houthis will seek to concentrate their next major offensive.

For government commanders, however, the stated objective now extends beyond simply defending Marib.

“The priority now is to restore the Yemeni state and rid Yemen of terrorist organizations, foremost among them the Houthis, regardless of their form or nature,” Al-Aradah said.

“This is an irreversible commitment tied to the will of the people. There will be no turning back until the state is restored, whatever it takes.”

Saudi Arabia has closed its East-West oil pipeline due to a drone attack linked to Iranian-backed militias in Iraq. This pipeline is crucial for Saudi Arabia, as it allows the country to bypass the congested Strait of Hormuz, which has faced reduced tanker traffic due to an ongoing conflict between the U.S. and Iran. The Saudi Energy Ministry stated that the closure is a precautionary measure; the pipeline typically carries about 4 to 5 million barrels of oil per day, contributing 4% to 5% of global oil supply. The attack caused injuries and damage, but the exact impact on oil exports is still being evaluated.

President Trump, while attending a golf event in Ireland, suggested that Iran was likely responsible for the attack and predicted that oil prices would drop after the upcoming U.S. midterm elections. Recently, oil prices have surged, with diesel prices in the U.S. topping $6 a gallon due to tensions in the region. Reports surfaced that the Houthis, aligned with Iran, seized the strategic Perim Island in the Red Sea.

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia reached out to Trump for military assistance against the Houthis, but Washington decided not to intervene directly at that moment, offering intelligence support instead. There were concerns that the attacks on the pipeline and Perim Island could escalate tensions further, especially since diplomatic efforts to resolve the war have stalled.

Iran’s parliamentary committee has stated that negotiations are futile unless the U.S. meets Iran’s demands, particularly concerning recognition of its control over the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian foreign ministry announced plans for discussions with Gulf states in Oman regarding the strait. Meanwhile, Iraq’s government dismissed a military commander connected to the attack and has closed the Shalamcheh border crossing with Iran as a precaution to prevent further incidents.

The Saudis have not retaliated yet, following a request from Iraq’s prime minister, but they maintain the right to take necessary actions to protect their interests. Saudi Arabia’s oil production has plummeted to its lowest level in over 30 years, partly due to attacks on maritime vessels by Houthi factions. These forces, supported by Iranian guidance, are reportedly planning counterattacks to reclaim territories lost to the Houthis, who have advanced significantly along Yemen’s coast under Iranian direction. The Houthis have claimed that maritime navigation remains safe, except for Saudi vessels, which are subject to a ban.

With information from Reuters

ADDIS ABABA: About 1,400 people have fled Yemen for Djibouti due to fighting between government forces and Iran-allied Houthis, Djibouti’s minister of economy and finance said Saturday.

Houthi fighters control a large part of northern Yemen, including the capital Sanaa and Hodeida in the west. They have advanced along the coast in just days and on Thursday seized the port city of Mokha.

The Houthis have since taken control of the coastline and islands in the Red Sea, and on Friday tightened their grip on the Bab Al-Mandab Strait, which is vital to global shipping through the Suez Canal.

“1400 #refugees arrived in #Djibouti from #Yemen in just 24 hours,” Ilyas Moussa Dawaleh wrote on X.

Located opposite Yemen on the Horn of Africa, tiny Djibouti borders the Bab Al-Mandab Strait at the entrance to the Red Sea from the Gulf of Aden.

Safiya Ibrahim, humanitarian response coordinator for the International Organization for Migration, told AFP that “vulnerable groups such as women and children have reached the shores of Obock, with more expected in the coming days.”

According to the United Nations, at least 76,000 people have been displaced in Yemen since July, with the number quadrupling in the last week after the latest fighting.

Last week, Houthi fighters launched a new offensive against Saudi-backed government forces, targeting zones bordering the Bab Al-Mandab Strait.

The waterway has taken on new importance, particularly for Saudi oil exports, since the Strait of Hormuz was blocked by Iran.

Hundreds have been killed in the fighting on both sides.

Yemen’s Houthi rebels have captured Mocha port and now threaten to control the main waterway of the Bab al-Mandeb strait. They have also attacked several cities in Saudi Arabia, wounding about 70 people, including women and children.

The repeated attacks against Saudi energy, civil, and defence facilities, combined with the maritime blockage by Iran and its Yemeni partner the Houthis, directly raise the question of the Mecca Pact’s operationalisation between Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan.

The Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia can activate the mutual defence agreement. If that happens, what could a Pakistani and Turkish intervention look like?

The answer to this question necessitates some crucial background first.

The US – the main security partner of the Gulf states – has signalled for a while now that it expects regional countries to take primary responsibility for their own defence and deterrence, with US help remaining critical but limited.

That posture is already visible on the ground. Since the start of the US-Israel war on Iran, the US has not been able to provide comprehensive defence for its regional partners. On several occasions, it has even failed to stop attacks on its own bases in the Gulf.

With US presence receding and Washington emphasising regional burden-sharing, Gulf states have had to look into a new defence architecture. In September 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed their first mutual defence agreement, which expanded in August this year to include Turkiye and became the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement.

The three countries have since established a joint secretariat, with its headquarters in Riyadh, with Pakistan taking the chairmanship for an initial three-year term.

The pact remains in a gestation period. It does not publicly identify the thresholds or scenarios under which a member would move to direct military intervention. Its organisational and institutional structure, including rules of engagement, mechanisms of consultation, and collective defence and deterrence, are yet to be formally developed.

Now, back to the question of how the pact will be operational if a member state is attacked.

Earlier this week, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif said that an unprovoked aggression against Saudi Arabia, or a spillover of the Yemen conflict into the kingdom, would make the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement operational, adding that “there should be no doubt in this.”

Asif, however, did not share specific details on what shape that operationalisation would take. Last month, Turkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan clarified that the Mecca Pact would work the same way as NATO: If a member state is attacked, it must actively request and define the specific type of help it needs.

NATO’s Article 4 allows for a member to call alliance consultations and exchange of information. Article 5 requires mutual assistance from allies, but it leaves each state to decide the nature of that assistance.

In 2012, after Syria shot down a Turkish warplane, Ankara invoked Article 4 for consultation and requested specific defence assistance. Instead of demanding direct military intervention, the Turkish government explicitly asked for Patriot missile defence batteries. NATO approved the request and deployed the systems to protect Turkish airspace.

In this context, if the Mecca Pact is to be operationalised, it would have to be Saudi Arabia that defines the type of military assistance and involvement that it needs. If, for example, Riyadh makes an actual request for Pakistani direct military intervention, beyond materiel and intelligence support, Islamabad would be obliged to comply. But the request, and the scale of the response, would still likely need to be defined and agreed in a consultation meeting.

For now, none of this has been tested as Riyadh has not invoked the pact with either Pakistan or Turkiye.

In the meantime, diplomatic efforts have intensified, with Pakistani Field Marshal Asim Munir and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud talking to Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.

Islamabad has also publicly urged Iran to rein in the Houthis from attacking Saudi Arabia and threatening the Bab al-Mandeb, and has reminded Tehran of Pakistan’s commitment to Riyadh’s defence through the pact. Ankara would likely play its own part in diplomatically restraining the Houthis and Iran.

If diplomacy fails and Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia or the Bab al-Mandeb continue, Turkiye and Pakistan would likely expand the air and technological support they already provide. Islamabad already has an air squadron of about 16 JF-17 Thunder multirole aircraft, defence systems, and thousands of troops deployed in Saudi Arabia.

But a direct military operation by Pakistani forces inside Yemen remains unlikely at the moment. Given the disastrous and lasting impacts of its participation in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union on behalf of the US, Pakistan would be far more wary of joining a war against Iran and its allies, for fear of spillover into its western border provinces’ economy, domestic security, sectarian balance, and societal harmony. Pakistani leaders would find it hard to build domestic consensus for direct attacks on the Houthis or a fight with Iran.

The likely scenario is that Pakistan would increase joint diplomatic pressure on Iran to restrain the Houthis, further augment its support for Saudi defence, and push for a multinational naval coalition to secure the Bab al-Mandeb. Adopting this restraint would still keep the essence of the Mecca Pact intact, while putting more weight behind regional de-escalation.

The new security architecture that agreements like the Mecca Pact are setting up will take years to mature. Until the mechanisms and rules of collective response develop, Pakistan’s existing bilateral defence relationships with Saudi Arabia and other Arab partners will continue to focus on defence needs.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Tehran, Iran – Iranian authorities and state media have praised the Houthis’ capture of Yemen’s Red Sea coast, which some see as giving Tehran more leverage against the United States.

The Houthis, a political and armed group dominated by Zaidi Shia Muslims, have been fighting against the Western-backed Yemeni government since capturing the capital, Sanaa, in 2014.

The Houthis captured a series of Red Sea coastal cities and islands this week, essentially giving them control over the vital Bab al-Mandeb strait.

The Iran-allied group’s recent victories have been praised in Iran, and are viewed by some as part of Tehran’s wider war against the US, ongoing since February 28.

“The victories of Yemen’s Ansar Allah in the western coast is a narrative of a divine triumph and the fruit of years of steadfastness in the most difficult of battlefields,” Hossein Mohebbi, spokesman of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), wrote on X on Saturday.

Amid the Houthis’ recent battlefield wins against the fragmented Saudi-backed forces, senior Iranian officials have cheered their Yemeni allies on.

The Houthis’ capture of the port city of Mocha on Friday delivered a huge blow for the Yemeni government, which now has no direct access to the Red Sea.

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Iranian parliament speaker and chief negotiator with Washington, reposted a comment made by slain Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in 2024, saying the “resistance” of the Houthis will inevitably lead to victory.

“The brave Yemeni people will certainly triumph, by permission of God Almighty,” Ghalibaf added on Thursday, in Arabic.

Iran’s First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref said the government is happy with the Houthi advances, and urged leaders in the region to pursue “the rationality of liberation from dependency [from the US and the West], and unity under the banner of Islam”.

The “grand victory” of the Houthis once again proved that “security is not a commodity that can be bought,” added Mohammad Mokhber, an adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.

How could this benefit Iran?

The Houthis began to attack several vessels in the Red Sea they claimed were linked to Israel in 2023, as part of their stated aim to pressure Israel to end the genocidal war on Gaza.

This prompted bombing campaigns by the US, United Kingdom and Israel against Houthi positions in Sanaa, Hodeidah and other areas.

Saudi Arabia, which joined the war against the Houthis in 2015, has largely stayed out of the current eruption in fighting in Yemen.

After their recent victories, the Yemeni group can now exercise more control over the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandeb strait.

The Houthis’ control of Yemen’s Red Sea coastline and multiple islands – including the island of Mayun, also known as Perim, sitting about 3km (1.9 miles) off Yemen’s mainland – provides the group with close-range access to the Bab al-Mandeb strait.

A video published on Friday showed a Houthi commander telling soldiers they will no longer need missiles and drones to threaten shipping in the crucial waterway. They could simply position artillery along the coast and fire in all directions at ships, he said.

The Houthis have not declared the strait closed, but the group’s military spokesperson, Yahya Saree, said on Friday that “maritime navigation is safe for all companies except for Saudi vessels.”

Likewise, Iran’s partial control of the Strait of Hormuz on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula has been a key tool of leverage for Tehran in the war against the US.

The prospect of closing down the strait could potentially be used by Tehran in future negotiations over ending the war with the US.

Iranian officials are expected to meet regional Arab representatives on Monday for talks over how to facilitate shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, which Tehran maintains remains closed.

They have said they favour a collective regional approach on passage through the strategic waterway.

Iran claims it has reached an understanding with Oman, which also has territorial waters in the strait.

The US, which has continued its naval blockade of Iran’s ports and intensified sanctions on Tehran, reportedly opposes the agreement.

Authorities in Tehran have signalled there will be no talks with Washington under the current circumstances.

“As long as the American side does not accept all of Iran’s conditions, dialogue and negotiation are of no use,” Ebrahim Azizi, head of the hardline Iranian parliament’s national security commission, wrote on X on Saturday.

‘Lord of the straits’

At the start of the working week in Iran on Saturday, hardline and IRGC-linked newspapers and media outlets celebrated the recent Houthi advances.

Keyhan, whose editor-in-chief was appointed by Ali Khamenei, called the advances “the miracle of resistance” and said they had “put the US and Israel in a bind”.

The Quds newspaper, published by the influential Astan-e Quds Razavi in Mashhad, called Iran and the Houthis “the lord of the straits”.

But even though Tehran has repeatedly threatened that Bab al-Mandeb could be further disrupted if the war continues, Iran’s diplomatic apparatus did not immediately link the Houthi advances with the current fight against the US.

As has often been the case, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs insisted that the Houthis make their decisions independent of Tehran, with their own interests at heart, including ending Saudi Arabia’s blockade on Yemen.

The Iranian Foreign Ministry also called for an end to the Saudi siege on Houthi-controlled areas, an immediate return to negotiations between the group and Riyadh, and respect for Yemen’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The ministry also pushed back on the idea that the Houthis act merely as a proxy for Tehran.

“What is happening now in Yemen is the result of the Yemenis losing patience,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei told state television on Friday night.

“It is not fair to ignore the fact that they were under a cruel blockade for years, and concluded that the United Nations and regional mechanisms could not resolve the issues.”

The latest developments on the ground in Yemen are so significant that their seriousness cannot be understated. Iran now has an arm on the vital Bab Al-Mandab Strait through its proxy, the Houthi militia, which has seized the port of Mokha and the Yemeni islands in the southern Red Sea.

The Houthis’ aggressive military activities leading up to the attack pointed to one of three possibilities: either they were targeting Saudi areas bordering Yemen to the north, oil facilities in Yemen’s Marib province or the port of Mokha, from which they could go on to threaten international shipping.

The battles of the past few days ended with the seizure of the port of Mokha, Perim Island at the mouth of the Bab Al-Mandab Strait and the islands of Hanish and Zuqar. This confirmed that the operation is an extension of Iran’s activities in the waters of the Gulf. Iran can now halt oil shipping through both the Strait of Hormuz and Bab Al-Mandab. This comes in the decisive weeks leading up to the US midterm elections, meaning that if the Iranians are seeking to resume negotiations with the Trump administration, they will do so under conditions that strengthen their demands.

The issue also has implications for regional security that extend beyond Yemen’s borders. The Houthis now control a port and islands that enable them to threaten shipping and cooperate with Iran-aligned terrorist militias in Somalia.

As for the dynamics of the Yemeni war itself, the Houthis have certainly made significant gains but they have also expanded the front against themselves by seizing areas around Mokha. This vast area will require further confrontations with the Houthis, in addition to forcing them to devote resources to defending the many fronts that have opened for the first time since their defeats in 2018.

The Middle East is going through a dangerous period of turmoil and its flashpoints are interconnected.

Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

In fact, what happened this week resembles what happened nearly a decade ago. Houthi fighters reached the port of Mokha and even pushed beyond it to Dhubab, the last point in southwestern Yemen. It is considered the narrowest point separating Asia from Africa, lying only about 30 km across the sea from Djibouti.

After roughly three years of militia control, coalition forces were able to defeat the Houthis and liberate Mokha, Dhubab and the islands, including Perim and Zuqar.

Yemen’s government forces are going through a period of rebuilding and consolidating their various national forces. This is a difficult task as they work to liberate areas controlled by the Houthis, which are the country’s most densely populated and most rugged regions, amid extremely difficult political and economic conditions. Securing Yemen goes beyond the country’s borders. It also serves regional security and the security of global maritime trade. This requires international support for Yemen, not just support from Saudi Arabia and the countries of the region.

The Middle East is going through a dangerous period of turmoil and its flashpoints are interconnected. We see this in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere, and these challenges require collective cooperation to contain them. Many people underestimate the Yemeni Houthi movement, believing it to be a local problem that can easily be contained militarily or politically. In reality, the Houthis resemble Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Stopping or containing the threat posed by such armed groups requires a joint effort. The fall of the Assad regime in Syria had consequences that extended beyond its borders, weakening Hezbollah in Lebanon and dismantling part of the region’s network of weapons, drugs and terrorism. Yemen’s forces will not be able to fight the Houthis alone. Regional and international efforts must come together to accomplish the task.

• Abdulrahman Al-Rashed is a Saudi journalist and intellectual. He is the former general manager of Al Arabiya news channel and former editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat, where this article was originally published.

X: @aalrashed

Abdulrahman Al-Rashed is a veteran columnist. He is the former general manager of Al Arabiya news channel, and former editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat. Twitter: @aalrashed

More from Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

TOKYO: Japan strongly condemned the attacks by the Houthis on Saudi Arabia and reiterated its call on them to refrain from escalating the situation both inside and outside Yemen.

“The Houthis’ continued military attacks have resulted in numerous casualties, including among civilians. Japan renews its strong denunciation of the recent series of attacks by the Houthis. Attacks on civilians and civilian facilities, as well as any actions that impede the free and safe navigation of vessels, cannot be tolerated,” Japan’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement on Friday night.

The ministry stressed that stability in Yemen is directly linked to the stability of the entire Middle East, and Japan reiterates the importance of achieving peace in Yemen. It also noted that peace and stability in the Middle East, including ensuring free and safe navigation through the Bab Al-Mandab Strait, are of the utmost importance to the entire international community, including Japan, from the perspective of energy security.

“Japan will continue to make every diplomatic effort, in cooperation with the international community, including Yemen and Saudi Arabia, toward an early de-escalation of the situation,” the statement said.

The rapid Houthi advance down Yemen’s Red Sea coast this week is an astonishing military victory, but not quite the game-changer it is being portrayed as.

The group has been able to threaten the vitally important shipping route, but they have been doing so since 2023. This new victory consolidates that control, proving that Yemen’s government is not currently in a position to defeat them.

The prior Houthi control over the northern section of Yemen’s Red Sea coastline, including the major port city of Hodeidah, has allowed the Iran-allied rebel group, for years, to first attack shipping linked to Israel and the United States – and then, in recent months, Saudi Arabian-linked vessels.

That control also damaged the global economy. Long before the US war with Iran and the transformation of the Strait of Hormuz into a tool to throttle international trade, Houthi attacks around Yemen had turned Bab al-Mandeb into a similar weapon, and led to bombing campaigns against the Houthis by the US, the United Kingdom, and Israel.

Houthi officials themselves have emphasised this, with one leading official, Abdulqader al-Murtada, saying earlier this week that the group did “not need control over Bab al-Mandeb, for the blockade [on Saudi ships] is already in place”. Al-Murtada could point Saudi ships that have avoided Bab al-Mandeb since the Houthis began attacking them in July, even before their latest progress.

However, the Houthi lightning advance makes it even easier for the group to disrupt shipping. They now have access to the Red Sea’s narrow entry point and several islands in it, allowing them to use shorter-range weapons and more easily reach vessels they want to attack and board, as well as potentially using sea mines to further restrict shipping.

Not going away

The increase in the Houthi ability to target shipping – even with the caveats outlined above – does have an impact on market sentiment. Oil prices have increased as traders price in the ability for Iran and its allies to disrupt shipping in Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb, the two maritime chokepoints of the southern Arabian Peninsula.

However, the consequences of this advance are not limited to the increased ability of the Houthis to attack shipping, but to the increasing reality that the Houthi problem on the Red Sea is not going away.

For months, after Saudi Arabia backed a Yemeni government campaign against southern Yemeni separatist forces earlier this year, the mood had shifted in the country’s anti-Houthi camp.

The perception was that the Yemeni government, led by the Presidential Leadership Council, had finally gotten its act together. President Rashad al-Alimi repeatedly spoke of a unified military chain of command, allowing the military to overcome the divisions blamed for its inability to defeat the Houthis.

Yemeni and Saudi officials had hinted at an anti-Houthi campaign all year. The Red Sea coastline was a possible location: the largely flat geography suited the government, allowing Saudi Arabia to effectively use its air power; much of the population is not made up of the Houthis’ traditional support base; and prior Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping meant that there would likely be international buy-in for such a campaign.

The seizure of the Red Sea coastline has broken all of those narratives.

The momentum the Yemeni government thought it had, even at the start of this week when it claimed advances in al-Jawf, to the east of the Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa, is now gone.

After months of projecting unity, Yemen’s anti-Houthi camp is once again turning on itself, trading accusations of blame for the defeat.

Saudi dilemma

The message the Houthis have for Saudi Arabia is clear: ‘Your partners in Yemen can’t defeat us.’

Therefore, the potential Houthi argument is that Saudi Arabia has to make a deal with them and agree to their terms, including Riyadh funding public sector salaries, access to income from Yemen’s oil and gas reserves, and no restrictions on flights and shipping to Houthi-controlled ports.

The Houthis have an incentive to lock in their gains and raise the cost of escalation before Saudi-backed Yemeni forces can reorganise.

Their attacks on Saudi Arabia, escalating in the past week, have been damaging, and the group is promising more if Riyadh increases its military support for the Yemeni government.

The risk of any such intervention is clearly there for Saudi Arabia. But so is the risk of inaction. The Houthis have repeatedly demanded more concessions when they were in positions of strength.

With the Yemen war unresolved, the Houthis may decide to escalate again in the future, even if a deal is agreed now.

And so, policymakers in Riyadh could determine that it makes more sense to make a concerted effort to deal with the problem head-on now, rather than allow it to fester into the future.

The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) warns that the figure is rising ‘by the hour’ as it calls for safe humanitarian access.

More than 46,000 people have been driven from their homes in Yemen in the wake of the latest escalation in fighting between Houthi rebels and government forces, according to United Nations data.

The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) warned that the figure is rising “by the hour” in a statement issued on Friday.

The UN agency called on all parties to the conflict to guarantee safe humanitarian access and protect civilians, aid workers and humanitarian assets on the ground.

“Families are being forced to flee for the second or third time in this conflict, with almost nothing left,” Amy Pope, head of the IOM, said in the statement.

The agency said many people had reportedly fled Mocha with their belongings overnight after the Iran-allied Houthi rebels captured the strategically important Red Sea port city from the internationally recognised government on Thursday.

Entire villages were said to have been abandoned in some areas of the war-torn country. The IOM urged the parties to the conflict to guarantee humanitarian access and ensure the safety of aid workers.

The statement came amid reports on Friday that the Houthis had captured a strategically located island in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and now control Yemen’s entire Red Sea coast.

‘Two new crises’

Separately on Friday, the UN also voiced concern over the Houthis seizing a key humanitarian compound and its assets in Mocha, warning that humanitarian personnel and facilities must be protected.

“The compound houses staff of UN agencies working to provide humanitarian assistance to vulnerable communities in the area,” UN deputy spokesperson Farhan Haq told reporters.

All UN personnel working at the compound had left before the seizure and were “safe and accounted for”, Haq added.

Haq stressed that humanitarian personnel, premises and assets “must be respected and protected at all times”, while calling for safe and unimpeded humanitarian access so life-saving assistance can continue reaching people in need.

Farea Al-Muslimi, a Yemen researcher at the London-based Chatham House thinktank, told Al Jazeera that deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Yemen will build on what was already one of the world’s worst crises.

“Yemen was already going through one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world,” Al-Muslimi said.

“It got terribly worse after the Houthis cracked down on aid organisations in northern Yemen. But the war continued despite the fragile truce, and what that meant was the destruction of what remained of the economy, with millions of families left without income,” he said.

Al-Muslimi warned that the latest escalation “will create two new crises”, one being further internal displacement, noting that “we’ve already seen more than 10,000 families displaced in the last week alone”, and the other being rising prices for goods inside Yemen.

“Since this is [happening in] a maritime [trade] corridor, it will, for sure, drive further violence inside Yemen, but also from outside Yemen,” Al-Muslimi added.

“The Yemeni population will continue to suffer, first and foremost, more than anyone else, inside or outside the country.”

The Iranian-backed Houthi rebels have captured Mokha – a key Red Sea port in southwestern Yemen near the Bab al-Mandab (BAM) Strait. There are also reports they seized two islands located in the Red Sea shipping lanes. These moves against the Saudi Arabian-backed forces that previously held these areas could further cement the Houthis’ control over the narrow chokepoint to the Gulf of Aden, where the group has already imposed a blockade on Saudi oil exports.

The Houthis’ drive to control the BAM has been emboldened by the U.S. being stretched thin in its ongoing fight against Iran. Combined with Tehran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz, this threatens to add to the Islamic Republic’s command over the flow of oil from the Middle East. It is a maximum pressure campaign on the U.S. and global markets, something we have predicted for years. Amid all this activity, the per-barrel price of Brent Crude is well over the $100 mark now.

The rapid advance on Mokha was planned and backed by Iran, according to the leader of Saudi-backed forces that retreated from Mokha, which is about 50 miles north of the BAM. It took place as Tehran has taken a more belligerent stance in the region that has seen it reportedly damage U.S. aircraft in a recent attack on Jordan earlier this week and get closer to striking U.S. Navy warships with ballistic missiles.

“The Joint Forces have formed a command center south of the city of Mokha, following Houthi breakthroughs across various combat axes under heavy fire, in which the Houthis used various types of weapons,” Deputy Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), Lt. Gen. Tareq Saleh, said in his acknowledgment that his forces lost the port. The PLC was created in 2022 to represent the internationally recognized government of Yemen.

“The armed forces on the West Coast — the National Resistance, the Giants [Brigades], and the Homeland Shield — in addition to units of the Taiz axis west of the governorate, have paid a heavy price, martyrs and wounded, over the past days as they confronted the Houthi attack, which was planned by Iran, supported by it, and carried out with the participation of its various proxies/tools.”

“Thanks to God, our armed forces were able to repel an enemy combat formation a short time ago in the province of Taiz, forcing it to withdraw,” Houthi spokesman Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree proclaimed. “This was achieved by targeting it with a number of locally manufactured surface-to-air missiles.”

Videos have emerged showing Houthi forces inside Mokha and its airport and a large amount of equipment being seized.

Even before the capture of Mokha, the rebel group held the BAM under threat with its array of drones and missiles, some of which it launched from deeper in Yemen. In fact, the group became the first to fire anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) at vessels during its campaign against Red Sea shipping.

Mokha, however, provides a potential new surveillance and launching point for the Houthis to deploy mines as well as aerial drones and uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) they can use to attack shipping. As we have reported previously, the rebel group pioneered the operational use of some of these weapons.

The Houthis “are determined to control the ports in order to use booby-trapped boats from areas close to shipping lanes,” Col. Abdul Basit Al-Baher, a Yemeni army officer and military analyst, told Arab News last month as the rebels were pushing closer to the port.

You can see video and images of a Houthi USV that struck the Greek-owned ship Tutor in the Red Sea in 2024 below.

In addition to Mokha, the Houthis also reportedly captured two important islands that could also add to its control over shipping through the strait. However, TWZ cannot independently confirm this.

There are claims that the Houthis seized Perim Island, which sits right in the middle of the BAM. In 2021, satellite images we obtained showed completion of a new, approximately 6,150-foot-long runway on the island as well as hangars and other facilities. The installation was supposedly meant primarily to support drone operations and was built by the United Arab Emirates.

This strategically located island sits in the narrowest part of the BAM, less than two miles west of Yemen and about 13 miles east of Djibouti, giving the Houthis a commanding presence at the mouth of the Red Sea.

Zuqar Island, which was also reportedly captured, sits in the middle of the Red Sea about 80 miles north of Perim Island. In the custody of the Yemeni government since 1998, it was being “used by government forces to track shipping traffic, monitor movements by Houthi rebels and stop weapons smuggling in the Red Sea,” according to The National.

Last year, images emerged of construction of a runway on the island.

It is unclear who built this island runway, though there have been indications that it could have been the United Arab Emirates once again.

A closer look at the new 2.1 km runway on Yemen’s 🇾🇪 Jabal Zuqar Island in the southern Red Sea shows a small apron with one completed aircraft hangar and another likely under construction, plus a taxiway leading to two military emplacements, likely to shelter aircraft or UAVs. https://t.co/cnphe6yCeO pic.twitter.com/iOwr7C6I91

— Rich Tedd 🛰 ✈️ (@AfriMEOSINT) October 20, 2025

Zuqar Island sits about 7 km east of the northbound shipping lane in the Red Sea. Control over these two islands could allow the Houthis to mirror the pattern Iran established in the Strait of Hormuz by directing traffic to pass through a narrow passage between Qeshm and Larak islands.

The conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis grew out of a civil war in Yemen that erupted in 2014. It expanded a year later when a Saudi-led coalition joined forces with the government ousted by the Houthis and raged on until the parties reached a tenuous ceasefire in 2022. The Saudis held off on getting involved in the recent Red Sea conflict which saw the U.S. and coalition warships duking it out with the Houthis, and eventually led to a U.S.-led air campaign over Yemen. Tensions, however, reignited after that conflict ended when the Houthis joined the U.S.-Iran conflict on the side of their major supporter. In addition to the aforementioned blockade, the Houthis began striking Saudi refineries.

The Houthis already control the port of Hodeidah, about 100 miles to the north. Capturing Mokha and the two islands extends their reach even closer to the BAM. 

In the wake of the Houthi blockade imposed in July, traffic in the BAM fell by 15%, according to Lloyd’s List Intelligence.

“On average, 273 ships sailed through the chokepoint each week between 27 July and 23 August,” the organization reported. “The naval ban on Saudi Arabia came into effect on 20 July, and the weekly average in the run up date was 319. Still, traffic remains above volumes seen before the crisis in the Middle East Gulf that led to a flurry of activity in the Red Sea as Saudi oil was redirected to Yanbu.”

As we have explained in the past, Saudi Arabia has diverted millions of barrels of oil per day through pipelines to its Yanbu port on the Red Sea in an effort to minimize the energy shortages due to the hostilities near the Persian Gulf.

The biggest impact of the blockade, Lloyd’s List Intelligence notes, is that it is driving up the cost to deliver oil by forcing traffic north through the Suez Canal, “extending voyage times and tying up capacity. In the Middle East, rising use of Hormuz shuttle tankers and multiple STS transfers is creating delays and increasing vessel utilization. Combined, these rising inefficiencies have led to the third VLCC spot-rate spike since the beginning of the crisis in the Middle East Gulf.” 

The Houthi strikes on Saudi’s oil infrastructure, including a Houthi missile and drone attack against the Saudi Aramco refinery at Jazan on the Red Sea earlier this week, add a further dilemma for Riyadh, making it harder to get its product to points of shipment.

Video of of the aftermath of those strikes, which you can see below, emerged on social media.

All this is raising the specter of the U.S. having to get as involved as it did during the previous Houthi campaign against shipping that ended last September, which could pull resources away from Iranian-focused operations, if supporting such an operation is even possible at all at this point. The Navy, and other key elements of the U.S. military, is overstretched and worn down by continuous deployments for many months leading up to Venezuela and then Iran, and now six months after Operation Epic Fury.

U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf are under increasing pressure as tensions with Iran continue to simmer. On Tuesday, several U.S. Air Force jets were damaged in an Iranian missile barrage on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, according to CBS News. An A-10 Thunderbolt II close support jet lost a wing and about eight F-15E Strike Eagle multi-role fighters were slightly damaged and returned to service, the network noted.

There is also a report that Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao said Iranian forces “blew the hell out of Bahrain” where the U.S. military has a number of key facilities, including the headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. The country has been the subject of frequent Iranian barrages since the U.S. and Israel first attacked on Feb. 28.

Cao’s assessment matches what we have seen and heard prior to his comments and raises anew the question of whether the U.S. will return to Bahrain and other bases in the region heavily attacked by Iran.

In an exclusive interview, Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao told me that Iranian forces “blew the hell out of Bahrain.”

While open-source analyses have long indicated that the U.S. Fifth Fleet Headquarters at Naval Support Activity Bahrain sustained extensive damage in the early…

— Ryan Morgan (@R_S_Morgan) September 10, 2026

On the sea, Iranian missiles are getting closer to hitting U.S. Navy warships, the Wall Street Journal reported.

“At least three times in the past week, Iranian forces have launched missiles at American warships, including an aircraft carrier, taking direct aim at the U.S. Navy in a way it hasn’t done since the start of the war,” the newspaper noted. “The attempted strikes on warships have led to much closer calls than previous attempts, with Iran using maneuverable warheads, people familiar with the attacks said.”

Amid this activity, traffic through the Strait remains suppressed.

“Vessel transits via the Strait of Hormuz fell on Wednesday to seven from 12 ​the previous day, preliminary ship-tracking data showed on Thursday, with ‌levels also below the 10-day average of 14,” Reuters reported. “Out of these seven ships, four vessels exited and three entered, according to the data.”

However, an exact figure is hard to come by. Some vessels could be sailing through the ​waterway with their transponders turned off and would not be counted ​toward the totals, the outlet added.

As it is, oil prices are skyrocketing. As of noon Thursday, the per barrel price of Brent Crude exceeded $107, the highest price since July when it fell to just over $77 per barrel, according to OilPrice.com.

It will take some time before we get a better picture of how the Houthi seizure of the port of Mokha, and possibly Perim and Zuqar islands, will affect the global economy due to rising oil prices, either through reduced supply, increased cost of delivery or some combination of the two. With no end in sight to the U.S. conflict with Iran that helped to drive these actions, the Yemeni rebel group has incentives to inflict economic pain wherever it can.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

NEW YORK CITY: Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the UN warned the Security Council on Thursday that “the international community cannot call for de-escalation” in Yemen “while at the same time allowing the continued flow of support that enables this (Houthi) militia to continue its hostile and criminal conduct.”

The warning from Abdulaziz Alwasil came during an emergency council session to discuss Houthi attacks against the Kingdom this week. It was requested by the UK, the penholder on Yemen, and Bahrain.

He said the latest strikes on Saudi cities, which began on Tuesday, were not an isolated episode but “an extension of a systematic, hostile approach pursued by this militia since its coup against the legitimate Yemeni government in 2014,” and part of a pattern that has also targeted commercial shipping and threatened freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait.

He said a press statement by the council on Aug. 7 condemning Houthi missile strikes on the Kingdom since July 13, and attacks against commercial vessels since July 22, had gone unheeded, and the militia had answered the international warnings with further escalation.

Alwasil said Saudi Arabia had backed nearly every major effort to end the Yemen war — including the Gulf Initiative, the transitional period, the National Dialogue Conference, the Geneva, Kuwait and Stockholm talks, a 2021 initiative and the UN-brokered truce in 2022 — but the Houthis had repeatedly met those efforts with renewed violence.

“My country affirms its legitimate right to defend itself, its citizens and residents, and to safeguard our national resources,” he said, adding that Riyadh “will not hesitate to take all measures necessary to deter Houthi attacks and to protect our security, sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

He called on the council to enforce Resolutions 2216, which imposed an arms embargo and sanctions on the Houthis, and 2722, which demanded an immediate halt to Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, and to send “a clear and firm message” that leaves no room for misinterpretation that attacks on the Kingdom must stop.

Yemen’s ambassador, Abdullah Alsaadi, affirmed Sanaa’s “full solidarity with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, its leadership, government and people,” and its “absolute rejection of the use of any part of the Yemeni territory as a platform for launching missiles and drones, or for threatening the security of the Kingdom or any neighboring country.”

He said the attacks amounted to the “hijacking” of Yemen’s own sovereign decisions over war and peace, carried out by a militia that operates outside of state institutions and was “militarily and technically supported by the Iranian terrorist regime.”

Saudi Arabia had shown “a great degree of restraint,” Alsaadi said, and been “the principal partner of the Yemeni people and state” in supporting institutions, salaries and services throughout the war. But he cautioned that “restraint should not be misconstrued as weakness.”

The security of Yemen and of Saudi Arabia “cannot be separated from one another,” he added, as he called for full enforcement of the arms embargo on the Houthis, and accountability for those who finance and arm the group.

The renewed escalation in Yemen is no longer simply a Yemeni battlefield development. For Saudi Arabia, it is becoming a direct test of national security, economic resilience and the kingdom’s ability to prevent the wider regional war from spilling further across its borders.

The latest Houthi attacks have demonstrated this clearly. Missiles and drones have hit civilian and economic sites in Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jizan and Najran, injuring dozens of civilians and causing fires and temporary disruption at energy facilities. The attacks came as fighting intensified in Yemen and around the western coast, while the Houthis continued to threaten maritime traffic in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb.

Saudi Arabia therefore faces two interconnected threats: Attacks on its territory and attempts to disrupt the maritime routes on which regional and international trade depends.

This creates a difficult strategic equation for Riyadh. Saudi Arabia has spent the past several years trying to move away from direct military involvement in Yemen and towards diplomacy, de-escalation and support for a political settlement. A return to an open-ended war would contradict that strategy and impose unnecessary political and economic costs.

But restraint cannot mean accepting repeated attacks on Saudi territory.

A different security environment

The security challenge today differs considerably from the first years of the Yemen war.

Saudi Arabia has strengthened its air and missile defences, improved coordination between its military and security institutions and accumulated considerable experience in countering drones and ballistic missiles. It is therefore much better prepared to defend its territory than it was a decade ago.

Yet the Houthi threat has also evolved.

The group possesses a combination of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and increasingly sophisticated drones. Even when most incoming weapons are intercepted, relatively inexpensive systems can impose disproportionate defensive costs and create uncertainty around airports, industrial facilities, border communities and energy infrastructure.

This means Saudi security cannot depend on interception alone. No air defence system can guarantee a perfect shield indefinitely.

The strategic objective must therefore be deterrence: Convincing the Houthis that attacks on Saudi territory will impose costs greater than any political or military benefit they expect to obtain.

This does not necessarily require returning to the large-scale military campaign of previous years. Riyadh has more options today. These include intelligence operations, strengthening Yemeni government forces, improving border security, disrupting missile and drone supply networks and, where necessary, conducting proportionate operations against facilities directly involved in attacks on Saudi Arabia.

The distinction is important. Saudi Arabia does not need to choose between doing nothing and returning to a full-scale war.

The economic front

The economic consequences are equally important.

Saudi Arabia is one of the world’s largest energy exporters, which makes attacks on its oil infrastructure internationally significant even when physical damage is limited. The latest attacks affected energy facilities and contributed to renewed concern in already nervous global oil markets.

There is an apparent paradox here: Regional instability can push oil prices higher and temporarily increase Saudi oil revenues. But higher prices caused by war should not be confused with economic benefit.

Saudi Arabia’s economic strategy under Vision 2030 depends increasingly on stability, investment, tourism, logistics, technology and the development of major projects outside the oil sector. Persistent missile and drone attacks can raise insurance and transport costs and affect perceptions of regional risk even if the kingdom’s underlying economy remains strong.

The greater strategic concern is maritime security.

Saudi Arabia occupies a strategic position between two of the world’s most important energy corridors: The Strait of Hormuz to the east and Bab al-Mandeb to the west. Disruption of both routes represents a serious challenge not only for Saudi Arabia but for the global economy.

This is why the Red Sea dimension of the Yemen conflict is particularly important. Bab al-Mandeb connects the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. A sustained Houthi ability to threaten shipping there would increase freight and insurance costs and potentially divert vessels around Africa.

Saudi Arabia, however, possesses an important strategic advantage: Its energy infrastructure is not completely dependent on the Gulf. The kingdom can transport significant quantities of oil through its East-West pipeline to terminals on the Red Sea. This provides an alternative to Hormuz and gives Riyadh greater strategic flexibility.

That advantage does not, however, eliminate Saudi Arabia’s exposure to insecurity elsewhere in the Red Sea, including around Bab al-Mandeb.

Protecting Bab al-Mandeb should therefore be understood not simply as a Saudi or Yemeni interest but as an international economic and security requirement.

Avoiding the Houthi trap

The greatest danger for Riyadh may be political rather than purely military.

The Houthis could benefit from drawing Saudi Arabia back into an extensive war. It would allow them to portray the conflict once again as a confrontation between Yemen and an external power rather than a struggle among Yemenis over the future of their state.

Saudi Arabia should avoid this trap.

Confronting the Houthis must remain fundamentally a Yemeni responsibility. The internationally recognised Yemeni government and its forces should carry the principal burden of confronting Houthi expansion on the ground, while Saudi Arabia provides political, economic, intelligence and defensive support.

This is particularly important on the western coast. If the Houthis consolidate their military position around strategic areas overlooking the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb, the consequences will extend far beyond Yemen.

The objective should not be to retake Sanaa through another large-scale air campaign or restart an indefinite regional war. It should be to prevent the Houthis from using military force to change the regional balance, threaten neighbouring states or threaten international maritime arteries.

Diplomacy backed by deterrence

Saudi policy is therefore likely to operate on several tracks simultaneously.

First, Riyadh will continue strengthening its air and missile defences and protecting critical infrastructure. Second, it can increase support for Yemeni government forces while avoiding unnecessary direct involvement in ground combat. Third, it will seek broader regional and international cooperation to secure the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb.

At the same time, diplomatic channels should remain open.

Saudi Arabia has repeatedly demonstrated its preference for a negotiated settlement in Yemen. But negotiations are sustainable only when both sides believe that escalation carries unacceptable costs.

Diplomacy, therefore, must be backed by credible military power.

Saudi Arabia has strong incentives to prevent Yemen from becoming another permanent front in the wider regional confrontation. The kingdom’s economic transformation requires stability, while its geopolitical interests require secure borders, uninterrupted energy exports and freedom of navigation.

But the same logic that encourages restraint also places limits on it.

If attacks on Saudi cities, civilians and energy infrastructure continue, Riyadh will increasingly regard the issue not as intervention in the Yemeni civil war but as the defence of Saudi territory.

That distinction will shape what comes next.

Saudi Arabia does not need another prolonged Yemen war. Nor does Yemen. But avoiding one requires restoring deterrence while preserving the possibility of a political settlement.

The most effective Saudi strategy, therefore, is neither unlimited escalation nor passive restraint. It is calibrated pressure: Defend the kingdom, strengthen legitimate Yemeni institutions, protect the Red Sea, keep diplomatic channels open and make clear that attacks on Saudi territory will carry consequences.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Sanaa, Yemen – The United Nations-recognised Yemeni government and the Houthi group have been using warplanes, missiles, drones and other weapons as they engage in intense fighting on multiple fronts in the country’s north, west and central regions.

At least 194 people have been killed and 880 others wounded in the past two weeks of fighting in parts of Taiz, the western coast, al-Jawf, Marib and Dhalea, according to aid agencies.

Iran-backed Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah (supporters of God), have intensified attacks on the coastal district of al-Makha (Mocha) located on the western coast, among others, to gain a foothold in the Red Sea – a vital shipping lane.

On the other hand, government forces have been battling to expand in Taiz and boost their control of Marib, an oil-producing region in the north.

Fighting has also been raging in the al-Jawf governorate bordering Saudi Arabia and Dhalea, which connects the Houthi-controlled north to the country’s south under the internationally recognised government.

Experts say gains or losses on any of these strategically important fronts could have significant consequences for either side.

Taiz and western coast fronts

“The hills and mountainous areas of Taiz and the western coast are key targets for the Houthis, who have repeatedly attempted to advance there,” Yazeed al-Jeddawy, the research manager at the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, said.

“The Houthis are trying to seize commanding terrains, cut supply routes between the coastal Mocha district and Taiz, and prevent government troops on the western coast from linking up with the Taiz Military Axis,” said al-Jeddawy.

In Taiz and along the western coast, al-Jeddawy says, the immediate contest is over the heights and roads connecting Taiz to al-Makha.

Situated roughly 60km (37 miles) from the Bab al-Mandeb strait, al-Makha enjoys a highly strategic position on the Red Sea. For a month now, the Houthis have launched missile and drone attacks on the city, causing massive damage to its port facilities and killing and injuring several civilians.

Recently, the group has also attempted to extend its ground operations towards al-Makha city.

“The Houthis seem intent on tightening their hold around [al-Makha] and moving closer to the Dhubab–Bab al-Mandeb area. A substantial advance would strengthen their position near the southern entrance to the Red Sea and give them greater leverage over international shipping,” he added.

Fuad Mussed, a Yemeni political analyst and author, told Al Jazeera that the strategic importance of the western coast and Taiz fronts stems from their proximity to Bab al-Mandeb, a chokepoint connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and one of the world’s most important shipping routes.

“The Houthis seek to move closer to this vital waterway to threaten maritime traffic. Such a move aims to keep the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb under the influence of Iran and use them as leverage against regional and international powers. This is a strategy Tehran has been pursuing for years,” Mussed said.

Iran has blocked the Strait of Hormuz, a global oil chokepoint, to use it as leverage in the war against the United States. It has also warned that its allies could shut shipping via Bab al-Mandeb. Iran also attacked Saudi Arabia’s pipeline used to export oil from the Red Sea.

In July, the Houthis declared a blockade against Saudi vessels transiting through the Red Sea – an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz.

Marib and al-Jawf fronts

Over the past few weeks, pro-government forces have attacked Houthi-held territories in Marib and al-Jawf, facing further retaliation from the Houthis.

Saddam al-Huraibi, a Yemeni political commentator, said the Marib front is fateful for both sides.

“Marib is a government stronghold in north Yemen. So, a Houthi expansion in Marib would threaten government presence and weaken its leverage in the north. That is why pro-government troops are ready to fight tooth and nail on this front line,” al-Huraibi told Al Jazeera.

For the Houthis, the takeover of Marib will deepen the group’s authority and step towards controlling the oil and gas infrastructure. The Iran-backed group captured vast swaths of northern Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa, in 2014, but Marib has remained in government hands since.

“Dominating Marib’s oil and gas resources has been a Houthi goal for over a decade. Without facing a crushing defeat in Marib, they would keep fighting to achieve that goal,” al-Huraibi said.

Adjacent to Marib, al-Jawf is also a hub of tense fighting between the Houthis and government forces. A government gain there would lay the groundwork for further advances, while a strong Houthi defence could undermine government forces’ morale and prompt them to retreat.

“Government-aligned forces have lately focused much of their offensive effort on al-Jawf. Government gains in al-Jawf would ease the threat to Marib while requiring the Houthis to defend a much broader area,” al-Huraibi said.

Al-Jeddawy said government gains could open routes towards the north – Saada, Amran or Houthi positions north of Marib.

The Houthis have carried out attacks in Saudi Arabia, including energy facilities in the country’s south. They have also accused Saudi Arabia of launching multiple attacks in al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Marib and Taiz provinces in support of government forces.

The Dhalea front

Fighting on the Dhalea front, a strategic gateway between Houthi-held territory and the southern governorates, has intensified in recent weeks.

Fighting there did not fully stop during the relative calm, which began in April 2022 following the UN-brokered ceasefire.

A Houthi advance there could open a route for their fighters to reach other southern territories. On the other hand, a Houthi setback would encourage government forces to push towards Ibb, controlled by the group.

“[Houthi] advances in Dhalea could expose the southern hinterland, while [government advances] could threaten Houthi positions and supply routes towards Ibb, al-Bayda and, farther north, Sanaa,” al-Jeddawy noted.

With the escalating fighting, the Houthis face pressure on several fronts, but the group has been readying for a range of scenarios, Khaled Ghorab, a pro-Houthi general, said.

“The [Houthi] Yemeni armed forces were never caught off guard by the prospect of escalation; rather, they worked to build and develop their own military capabilities based on tactical combat plans designed to counter a comprehensive, sustained attack launched simultaneously from land, sea and air,” he said.

Ghorab noted that this state of readiness enables the Houthi forces to carry out a direct response to sources of the threat – whether deep within enemy territory or at sea – targeting military bases or aircraft carriers as far as the Horn of Africa.

While the warring parties compete to seize strategic positions on several front lines, the latest escalation is also closely related to the wider regional confrontation.

“Iran has an interest in keeping Yemen and the Red Sea active as sources of leverage, while parts of the government camp believe the Houthis are under growing strain and that this is an opportunity to weaken them,” al-Jeddawy, the Sanaa-based researcher, said.

“The escalation still reflects domestic military and political aims, but its timing and direction cannot be separated from the regional war,” he told Al Jazeera.