Global Crisis

A potentially very strong El Niño is emerging as a major risk for global agricultural markets, threatening to disrupt rainfall, raise temperatures and expose some of the world’s most important tropical crops to severe weather stress.

The U.S. Climate Prediction Center now sees a greater than 90% chance of a very strong El Niño during the northern hemisphere autumn and winter of 2026 to 2027. For commodity markets, the concern is not simply that El Niño causes drought. Its effects vary sharply by region, meaning excessive rainfall in one major producing country can occur alongside extreme dryness in another.

That makes the phenomenon particularly important for soft commodities such as cocoa, coffee and sugar, whose production is concentrated in climate sensitive tropical regions.

Why El Niño matters for commodity markets

El Niño occurs when sea surface temperatures in the eastern Pacific become unusually warm as trade winds weaken. The pattern generally lasts between nine and 12 months and can alter global temperature and rainfall patterns.

For farmers, the problem is timing. Crops can be damaged not only by drought but also by excessive rainfall, heat, fungal disease and disrupted flowering or harvesting cycles.

This year’s potential El Niño also arrives at an unusually difficult moment for agricultural producers. Farmers are already dealing with higher fertiliser and diesel costs linked to the U.S. Israeli war on Iran. Another major weather shock could therefore amplify existing production pressures.

Historically, strong El Niño episodes have been associated with substantial increases in soft commodity prices. But the effects differ considerably between crops.

Cocoa faces one of the clearest risks

Cocoa appears particularly vulnerable because production is heavily concentrated in a relatively small number of countries.

Ivory Coast and Ghana together account for roughly half of global cocoa production, while Ecuador is the third largest producer. All three can experience significant El Niño related weather disruptions.

Every strong El Niño over the past 55 years has reduced cocoa output, according to WisdomTree.

The previous El Niño illustrates why the relationship is more complicated than simply associating the phenomenon with drought. During the initial phase of the 2023 to 2024 event, West Africa experienced unusually heavy rainfall. Excess moisture contributed to fungal disease affecting cocoa trees.

Conditions subsequently shifted toward intense heat and unusually dry Harmattan winds. Trees weakened by disease struggled to flower, further damaging production.

That sequence demonstrates the real danger for cocoa: El Niño can produce multiple weather shocks during the same crop cycle.

The consequences can quickly reach global consumers. Cocoa prices nearly tripled in 2024 after the West African harvest failed, eventually exceeding $12,000 per metric ton.

A very strong El Niño could therefore revive fears of another supply deficit if weather conditions deteriorate across major growing regions.

Coffee faces a divided outlook

Coffee presents a more complicated picture because the world’s two major varieties are concentrated in different regions.

Robusta coffee is particularly exposed to El Niño because Vietnam and Indonesia, which together account for about half of global robusta production, typically experience higher temperatures and reduced rainfall under the weather pattern.

The timing is especially important. Dry conditions can hit these countries during crop development, with the consequences becoming visible during harvesting later in the year.

Citi analysts warned that dryness in Vietnam and Indonesia could significantly reduce robusta yields.

Arabica coffee presents a different picture.

Brazil, responsible for nearly half of global arabica production, can initially benefit from warmer conditions because they reduce the risk of damaging winter frosts.

But that advantage could prove temporary. El Niño typically brings hotter and drier conditions to Brazilian coffee growing regions later in the year, when the next crop is developing.

That creates the possibility of a delayed supply shock in 2027.

Sugar could be the exception

Sugar demonstrates why El Niño does not automatically translate into a bullish commodity market.

Brazil, the world’s largest sugar exporter, can experience heavier rainfall during the second half of the year. Excessive rain can disrupt harvesting and affect sugar quality.

India and Thailand face the opposite problem. El Niño generally reduces rainfall during the summer monsoon, creating additional pressure on production.

India is already expecting its lowest monsoon rainfall in 11 years, at around 90% of the long-term average. Hedgepoint estimates that even a moderate El Niño could reduce Indian sugar production by around 1 million metric tons.

Yet there is an important counterweight.

El Niño’s wetter conditions in Brazil could ultimately support the country’s following sugar crop. Since Brazil accounts for roughly half of global sugar exports, stronger Brazilian production could offset losses elsewhere.

That means sugar may not experience the same sustained price pressure as cocoa or robusta coffee.

The bigger problem is climate uncertainty

The most important market implication is not simply whether El Niño becomes “very strong.” It is where its effects materialise and when.

Agricultural markets operate on highly specific growing cycles. Rain arriving at the wrong stage can be just as damaging as drought. Excessive rainfall can create disease, while heat can interfere with flowering and crop development.

Climate change further complicates the picture.

The relationship between El Niño and agricultural weather is becoming harder to interpret because rising global temperatures can intensify the consequences of existing climate patterns. A weather event that might previously have produced manageable stress can now occur against a much hotter baseline.

This means commodity traders increasingly have to price not just the probability of El Niño, but the interaction between El Niño, climate change and already strained agricultural supply chains.

What could happen to prices?

The clearest risk is concentrated in cocoa and robusta coffee, where production is particularly exposed to adverse conditions in major growing countries.

Cocoa has perhaps the greatest vulnerability because West Africa dominates global supply and has already experienced serious weather related production problems. Another major disruption could quickly tighten inventories and push prices higher.

Robusta coffee faces a similar risk if drought develops across Vietnam and Indonesia.

Sugar is more balanced. Production losses in India and Thailand could be partly or potentially substantially offset by improved Brazilian conditions for the following crop.

The broader lesson is that El Niño is not a uniform commodity shock. It redistributes weather risks across producing regions, creating winners and losers within the same market.

Why consumers should care

The effects will ultimately extend beyond commodity exchanges.

Higher cocoa prices can increase chocolate production costs. Coffee shortages can raise prices for roasters and consumers, while sugar disruptions can affect everything from beverages to processed foods.

And because agricultural markets are interconnected, a weather shock in one producing region can encourage buyers to compete more aggressively for supplies elsewhere.

The potential super El Niño therefore arrives at a particularly sensitive moment for global food markets.

If forecasts prove correct, the next several months could test whether commodity markets have adequately priced the risks of increasingly volatile weather.

The real threat is not El Niño alone. It is El Niño hitting an agricultural system already under pressure from rising costs, concentrated production and a changing climate.

With information from Reuters.

Governments have become remarkably efficient at producing information. During crises, official statements, emergency regulations and public updates appear almost instantly. Yet recent global emergencies have exposed a fundamental paradox: more information does not necessarily create greater public trust.

The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated this with exceptional clarity. Around the world, governments introduced unprecedented public-health measures, revised policies at remarkable speed and communicated with citizens almost continuously. Despite these efforts, public responses varied dramatically. Accurate information competed with rumours, institutional confidence fluctuated and misinformation often spread faster than official corrections.

The challenge extended well beyond the pandemic. Whether societies face natural disasters, armed conflicts, cyberattacks or public-health emergencies, governments confront the same question: how can accurate information become trusted information?

Most discussions of crisis communication focus on governments and public institutions. Established frameworks such as the CDC’s Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC) model and Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) have shaped modern practice by emphasising transparency, consistency and timely communication.

These principles remain indispensable.

Yet they share an important assumption-that once reliable information is produced, effective communication naturally follows.

Recent experience suggests otherwise.

Between governments and citizens lies an often-overlooked stage of communication. Official information rarely reaches the public directly. Instead, journalists, editors, producers and broadcasters interpret complex events, provide context and translate institutional language into messages ordinary audiences can understand.

This intermediary role becomes especially important during uncertainty.

People rarely judge information on facts alone. They also respond to clarity, consistency and the credibility of those delivering the message. Two governments may release nearly identical information yet receive very different public reactions because the communication itself inspires different levels of confidence.

Television illustrated this particularly well during the COVID-19 pandemic. While social media accelerated both verified information and misinformation, television remained one of the most trusted sources of crisis reporting because journalists explained changing regulations, interpreted complex developments and provided continuity during uncertain periods.

In such moments, credibility becomes inseparable from presentation.

This raises a broader question. If governments are responsible for making decisions, who ensures those decisions are understood?

Despite its practical importance, that question has received surprisingly little attention.

One researcher exploring this overlooked dimension of crisis communication is Kazakh journalist Kydyr-Zhan Mukhatayev. His work examines what happens after official information reaches television audiences.

Using Kazakhstan’s experience during the COVID-19 pandemic as a case study, Mukhatayev argues that broadcasters should not be viewed as passive channels transmitting government messages. Through editorial judgement, presentation and audience engagement, they actively influence how information is interpreted, trusted and ultimately acted upon.

When Information Isn’t Enough

A Case Study with Broader Implications

Mukhatayev explores this relationship through two complementary studies based on Kazakhstan’s broadcasting experience during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The first examines the professional role of television journalists during prolonged uncertainty. Rather than focusing exclusively on government communication, it considers how broadcasters themselves contributed to public understanding through responsible reporting, editorial judgement and effective communication.

The second expands the discussion beyond the pandemic, presenting crisis broadcasting as an interconnected system in which institutional credibility, journalism, visual communication and audience psychology continuously influence one another.

Although grounded in Kazakhstan’s experience, the questions raised extend far beyond one country. They suggest that successful crisis communication depends not only on what governments say but also on how professional media transform official information into messages citizens are prepared to understand, trust and follow.

How Trust Is Actually Built

Mukhatayev’s research brings these elements together into a single analytical perspective. Rather than viewing broadcasting as a channel for delivering official information, it presents television journalism as an active component of crisis management capable of strengthening-or undermining-public confidence.

Beyond COVID-19

The Next Crisis Will Test More Than Governments

Global hunger declined for the third consecutive year in 2025, offering a rare piece of positive news for food security after years of setbacks caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, conflict and economic instability. Yet the United Nations warns that the gains remain fragile, with climate change, geopolitical tensions and disruptions to global trade threatening to reverse recent progress.

According to the latest State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World report, jointly produced by five U.N. agencies, approximately 645 million people or 7.8% of the global population experienced hunger last year. That marks an improvement from 8.1% in 2024 and 8.6% in 2022, continuing a gradual downward trend.

While the figures suggest the world is moving in the right direction, U.N. experts caution that achieving the goal of ending hunger by 2030 remains far from guaranteed.

Hunger Declines Across Every Continent

For the first time in several years, every continent recorded improvements in hunger levels, including Africa, where progress has historically been the slowest.

Asia accounted for much of the global improvement, led by significant gains in India, while Latin America and the Caribbean continued building on earlier successes. Several African nations—including Ethiopia, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Senegal—also reported improvements after years of deteriorating food security.

Despite these advances, Africa remains the world’s most food-insecure region. Around 309 million people, or roughly one in every five Africans, continue to suffer from chronic undernourishment.

U.N. officials described the continent’s improvement as encouraging but modest, emphasizing that much more investment will be needed to sustain progress.

India Emerges as a Key Driver

India played a central role in reducing global hunger statistics.

Home to nearly one-fifth of the world’s population, the country has lowered hunger levels to below 10%, driven by expanded welfare programs, increased agricultural productivity and improvements in food distribution.

The country’s progress demonstrates how targeted government policies combined with economic growth can substantially improve food security even in densely populated developing economies.

Elsewhere, the Dominican Republic also achieved sufficient progress to be removed from the global hunger map.

Climate and Geopolitical Risks Persist

Despite encouraging trends, the U.N. warns that several emerging risks could quickly undermine global food security.

One of the most immediate concerns is the disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, where escalating tensions in the Middle East have increased transportation costs and driven up prices for fuel and fertilizers—critical inputs for agricultural production worldwide.

Higher energy costs inevitably translate into more expensive food production and distribution, placing additional pressure on consumers already facing elevated food prices.

Meanwhile, forecasters are monitoring the possible emergence of a strong El Niño weather pattern, which could reduce crop yields across many vulnerable regions through droughts, floods and extreme temperatures.

Together, geopolitical instability and climate shocks threaten both food availability and affordability.

Hunger Is Falling, But Healthy Diets Remain Unaffordable

The report also highlights an important distinction between reducing hunger and improving nutrition.

Although fewer people are experiencing chronic hunger, 2.69 billion people still cannot afford a healthy diet.

The U.N. estimates that a nutritious daily diet costs an average of $4.28 per person when adjusted for purchasing power—well beyond the reach of many households in low-income countries.

The affordability gap is especially severe in Africa, where 66.1% of the population cannot afford healthy food, more than double the levels recorded across much of Asia and Latin America.

Poor transport infrastructure, inadequate cold-storage facilities and fragmented regional trade continue to make nutritious foods such as fruits, vegetables, dairy and meat significantly more expensive across the continent.

Nutrition Challenges Extend Beyond Hunger

The report also warns that improving calorie intake alone is not enough.

Child malnutrition remains widespread in many developing countries, while anemia among women continues to worsen. At the same time, adult obesity is increasing globally, illustrating the growing “double burden” of malnutrition in which undernutrition and unhealthy diets coexist.

This reflects broader structural problems within global food systems, where inexpensive calories are often more accessible than balanced nutrition.

What’s Next?

U.N. experts remain cautiously optimistic that global hunger can continue declining through 2030, provided governments maintain investments in agriculture, strengthen international trade and improve resilience against climate shocks.

However, the outlook depends heavily on geopolitical stability. Continued conflict in the Middle East, disruptions to major shipping routes, worsening climate events or prolonged trade barriers could rapidly increase food prices and slow or reverse recent gains.

Analysis: Progress Is Real, But Food Security Remains Fragile

The latest U.N. report demonstrates that coordinated public policies, agricultural investment and social protection programs can reduce hunger on a global scale. India’s progress, alongside improvements across Latin America and parts of Africa, shows that meaningful change is possible even amid economic uncertainty.

Yet the report also highlights a growing challenge: food security is increasingly shaped by forces beyond agriculture itself. Climate change, global shipping disruptions, energy prices and geopolitical conflicts now influence what people eat as much as farming does. While hunger is declining, access to affordable, nutritious food remains out of reach for billions. Sustaining progress will therefore require not only producing more food, but building more resilient supply chains, improving regional trade and adapting agricultural systems to an increasingly volatile global environment.

With information from Reuters.