GCC

On Wednesday, Israel and Lebanon announced yet another ceasefire – after they had seemingly already agreed to a truce on April 16.

Iran and the United States have formally had a ceasefire in place since April 8. And Israel and Hamas, the Palestinian group, have had a ceasefire in Gaza since October 10, 2025.

Yet Israel’s attacks on Lebanon continue unchecked, with strikes on the Naqoura and Nabatieh districts of southern Lebanon on Friday, resulting in at least one death. Iran and the US have continued to trade periodic attacks that have picked up in intensity in recent days. The Iranian military has also fired missiles and drones at Gulf nations such as the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Bahrain, which it accuses of enabling US attacks on Iran during the ceasefire.

And in Gaza, Israel continues to carry out bombings, including one that killed nine people in a residential building this week, despite a supposed truce aimed at ending its genocidal war on the Palestinian territory.

So what does it mean for a ceasefire to be in place when fighting continues? What does international law say? And why do violations so rarely lead to consequences?

We speak to legal experts to understand:

What is a ceasefire?

Simply put, it’s a pause in fighting designed to create space for negotiations, explained Mark Kersten, assistant professor of criminal justice and criminology at the University of the Fraser Valley.

“A ceasefire is effectively a cessation of hostilities, but typically not understood to be a permanent one,” he told Al Jazeera.

It is also often fundamentally a political agreement rather than a strongly enforceable legal instrument, said Michael Lynk, an emeritus professor at Western University in Canada.

Unlike peace treaties, which often have guarantors responsible for oversight and enforcement, ceasefires can be breached with few immediate legal consequences, Lynk told Al Jazeera.

This is especially true in Gaza and Lebanon, where the United States has acted as the principal broker and overseer. While some countries have criticised Israeli strikes in Lebanon, Lynk says there has been little pressure on Washington for allowing repeated violations.

“A number of Global North countries have criticised the continuing Israeli attacks on Lebanon despite the ceasefire, but they have not called out the US for allowing Israel to repeatedly breach the ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon.”

So are ceasefires legally binding – or not?

Yes, they are, argues Toby Cadman, a British international human rights lawyer and cofounder of Guernica 37 Chambers.

But, like Kersten and Lynk, Cadman said that ceasefires – which he described as the “temporary, military and diplomatic suspension of military operations” – are inherently fragile. Unlike peace treaties, ceasefires do not resolve the underlying conflict or end the legal state of war.

“It suspends the fighting; it does not end the state of armed conflict,” he said.

Where there is a broader peace agreement, such as in Gaza, the ceasefire too stands – at least in theory – on a stronger footing, said Lynk. The Gaza peace plan that accompanied the ceasefire was endorsed by the UN Security Council through Resolution 2803, which calls for the agreement to be implemented “in its entirety, in good faith and without delay”.

In theory, states could ask the Security Council to sanction parties violating the Gaza agreement. In practice, Lynk explained, the US veto on the body means that neither Israel, nor the US itself, can realistically be censured.

“This is why ceasefires and peace treaties are ultimately political documents because it requires political will to enforce them,” Lynk said.

Who decides when a ceasefire has been violated?

Palestinians have repeatedly pointed to the violation of the Gaza ceasefire by Israel. The US and Iran routinely accuse each other of breaching their truce. And Israel and Lebanon do the same when it comes to their ceasefire.

So who decides whether a ceasefire has been violated – and by whom?

The answer, according to Cadman, is that “there is no neutral arbiter empowered to determine, with binding effect, who has breached.”

Monitoring mechanisms do exist, but they are largely political bodies overseen by the same states that brokered and guaranteed the agreements. In the case of Gaza and Lebanon, that is the United States. But Washington occupies the unusual position of mediator, guarantor and Israel’s closest military and diplomatic ally.

That means allegations of violations are often filtered through political calculations rather than assessed by an independent legal authority, say experts.

What about international law?

For Kersten, Gaza and Lebanon expose a fundamental contradiction within the international legal system. On paper, international law has succeeded in establishing a broad consensus about the legality of what is taking place.

“The vast majority of the world recognises that what is happening in both contexts is not just wrong, but illegal – thanks to international law.”

Yet recognition has done little to halt the violence. “Little is being done to save lives and stop the carnage,” he said.

The result is a widening gap between legal findings and political action. Courts can investigate, collect evidence and issue rulings as the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice have both done against Israel, but that does not stop bombs from falling or guarantee compliance on the ground.

For Kersten and Lynk, the problem is not a lack of legal standards; it is the persistent failure of states to enforce them, particularly when powerful actors are involved.

“The lack of effective accountability is the hole in the heart of international law and our modern international political system,” Lynk said.

But Kersten said what was clear was that international humanitarian law, human rights law and international criminal law remain fully applicable during a ceasefire.

“Ceasefire provides no legal cover to commit atrocities against civilians.”

That means allegations of war crimes can still be investigated and prosecuted even while a ceasefire is in effect.

Is ‘self-defence’ a justification for attacks during a ceasefire?

Cadman highlights the legal argument most frequently used to justify continued strikes by Israel on Gaza and Lebanon, and by the US against Iran: self-defence.

These arguments rest on Article 51 of the UN Charter, which carves out the right for states to launch unilateral military action against other nations if they are acting in self-defence.

But Cadman said the interpretation of that clause is heavily contested.

“Article 51 answers an armed attack that has happened or is genuinely imminent; it is not a standing licence for preventive strikes.”

So why do countries feel they can get away with attacks during a ceasefire?

Asked by reporters on Wednesday how he defined a ceasefire, given the continuing – though sporadic – attacks that the US and Iran have exchanged in recent weeks, US President Donald Trump said: “It’s a different part of the world, you know. I’d say in that part of a ceasefire is when you’re shooting in a more moderate manner.”

Trump’s comments underscore what legal experts say is at the heart of the persisting violence in Gaza, Lebanon and the Gulf: The lack of any meaningful enforcement mechanism.

The Security Council is constrained by veto powers. The ICJ can issue binding orders but cannot enforce them. The ICC can issue arrest warrants, but depends on states to carry them out.

“The unifying theme is an enforcement deficit,” Cadman said.

Cadman argued that the problem is not that international law lacks rules. Rather, those rules are often applied selectively. “The law is not formally different for Israel or the US; its application is selective.”

Kuwait and Bahrain have condemned an Iranian missile and drone attack, which Tehran says targeted US military facilities in the Gulf. A strike hit Kuwait’s airport, causing at least one death, dozens of injuries and flight suspensions. Tehran says the strikes are retaliation for US attacks on Iran.

Qatar’s Deputy Prime Minister Sheikh Saoud bin Abdulrahman bin Hassan bin Ali Al Thani has told the Shangri-La Dialogue that his country would oppose a permanent toll for passage through the Strait of Hormuz.

He added that Qatar would find a temporary fee negotiable, if it was to be used to help reopen the waterway, by removing sea mines, for example.

Convictions handed down amid an intensified crackdown by Bahraini authorities on individuals accused of having ties to Tehran.

Bahrain has sentenced nine people to life in prison for carrying out what authorities describe as “hostile and terrorist acts” in cooperation with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Two other defendants were also jailed for three years each after being convicted of collaborating with the IRGC in what prosecutors described as “terrorist and espionage” activities, state media reported on Sunday.

The convictions were handed down during an intensified crackdown by Bahraini authorities on individuals accused of ties to Tehran. The crackdown followed a wave of Iranian strikes on Bahrain after the United States and Israel launched their war on Iran in late February. Iran began striking all of its Gulf neighbours in response, saying it was targeting American interests, including military bases.

Prosecutors said some of the defendants photographed vital and strategic sites in Bahrain on behalf of the IRGC. Others were accused of facilitating the transfer of funds from Iran to Bahrain, including through cryptocurrency transactions, to finance the operations. Authorities also alleged that individuals inside the country were recruited to support some of the plans.

Bahrain began arresting individuals allegedly linked to Iran in March, shortly after the conflict began.

Earlier this month, authorities detained a further 41 people.

Less than two weeks later, more than 60 people were stripped of their citizenship for allegedly supporting Iranian attacks on Bahrain and “colluding with foreign entities”.

The London-based Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy described the move as “dangerous” and said it constituted a clear violation of international law.

Other Gulf states have also arrested individuals accused of cooperating with Iran. Last month, the United Arab Emirates said it had dismantled a group allegedly planning to carry out what officials described as “terrorist acts”.

Bahrain is home to a large Shia population. Many of its members have long accused the authorities of political and economic marginalisation. The government denies discriminating against Shia citizens, accusing Iran of fuelling unrest in the country.

The crisis caused by the US-Israel war on Iran has affected the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) at different levels.

Oman has barely felt any shock as its ports and terminals continue operating as usual. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been able to reroute some oil exports through terminals in Yanbu and Fujairah, respectively, to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar, on the other hand, have been practically cut off from the global market and are facing the prospect of economic contraction.

Under these circumstances, the GCC states more than ever need to demonstrate unity and address the crisis through collective action. The issue of solidarity is not about showing benevolence to neighbours. It is about setting up mechanisms now that can diminish the consequences and value of any future threat of closure. It is about the survival of the whole idea of GCC unity and the leverage it has on the global scene.

Collective action, common interest

Even if some sort of agreement is reached between the warring sides today, the GCC will continue to suffer under the shadow of the nearly three-month closure. States face the risk of losing clients due to the risk of not fulfilling their obligations or being perceived as a risky supplier. Only a joint effort can stop a free fall.

So far, self-interested approaches are winning over collective action. For instance, the UAE’s exit from OPEC was largely driven by the perception of the Emirati leadership that the Strait of Hormuz crisis was an opportunity to grab greater oil market share.

If this trend of unilateral crisis response continues, it would have grave economic consequences for the whole GCC and threaten its existence. With no burden-sharing mechanism, Gulf countries would end up competing against each other in a zero-sum game. This would reduce the influence the GCC has as a regional bloc and diminish its ability to sway energy markets.

Up until now, there have been some demonstrations of solidarity in rhetoric. During the GCC consultative meeting in Jeddah on April 28, Gulf leaders attempted to show unity and discuss possible ways out of the crisis. The meeting led to discussions about what the GCC states could do in practical terms, yet there are still no signs that these discussions have moved beyond the expert level.

Nevertheless, there are practical steps the GCC can take now that could help address the present crisis and ensure stability in the face of future risks. One of them could be the introduction of swap arrangements.

Swap as an instrument of solidarity

There are three relevant swap mechanisms that the GCC could consider: physical, contractual and quality swap deals. Physical and contractual swap deals allow one party to deliver an equivalent commodity to fulfil a contract on behalf of another.

A quality swap, on the other hand, exchanges one grade or product for another to align the feedstock needs of refineries or optimise transport costs.

Thus, instead of Kuwaiti, Qatari or Bahraini cargo physically passing through the Strait of Hormuz, a buyer can receive an acceptable substitute at Yanbu, Fujairah, Duqm, Ras Markaz, Sohar, Qalhat, Singapore, India, Korea, Japan or Europe, while the parties involved settle the accounts through future delivery, cash compensation, product exchange, or a retained-volume fee.

The swap does not require the trapped commodity to move immediately. It requires a transparent title, valuation and reconciliation, so that a substitute commodity can be delivered to the end user.

The strongest swap deals, therefore, resemble clearing systems. They are most reliable when they are established before the crisis, but they can also be assembled during a crisis if the parties already have pre-existing experience of trading, a trusted customer base or alternative physical infrastructure to be utilised.

In fact, the swap deals are not something completely unfamiliar to the GCC member states. In 2013, when Egypt failed to fulfil its contractual gas obligations, Qatar agreed to export its own liquefied natural gas (LNG) directly to the customers that Egypt otherwise could not serve while it channelled its gas for domestic needs.

In 2021, the UAE’s Emirates National Oil Company (ENOC) won a tender to swap 84,000 tonnes of Iraqi fuel oil for 30,000 tonnes of Grade B fuel oil and 33,000 tonnes of gas oil to supply to Lebanon. In 2024, the state-owned Oman LNG conducted about two swap tenders per month, with Atlantic cargoes originating from the United States delivered to Spain, while the company delivered its LNG to clients in Asia.

All of these examples show that Gulf countries and their national energy companies have the required expertise to carry out intra-GCC swaps.

The most practical way to implement such deals now would be to establish an energy swap facility through a coordinated clearing mechanism among national oil companies, major regional refiners, selected traders, insurers, banks and key Asian and European buyers.

Its function would be to match blocked obligations with delivery alternatives and to reconcile the value later.

Insurance for the future

The implementation of any swap arrangement would require substantive effort to operationalise, not to mention a high level of political will, trust and mutual determination. Moreover, at present, there are physical limitations before any arrangement, as the GCC infrastructure does not have the capacity to reroute export volumes that pass through the Strait of Hormuz completely.

In the immediate term, swap arrangements imply that one group of countries – Saudi Arabia, Oman and the UAE – would sacrifice a bit of income and market share to the advantage of the others, namely Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait, by allocating part of their current export, storage or transport capacities. But in the longer term, all would benefit.

The critical call is on Saudi Arabia, which has the largest options to bypass Hormuz and provide the largest pool of deliverable crude. Its command of customer credibility, global familiarity with Saudi oil grades, Red Sea export infrastructure and Aramco’s trading capacity make it the main pillar of any future swap system.

Complementing its role as market regulator within OPEC/OPEC+ with the leadership within the GCC, Riyadh can help stabilise the market by covering priority cargoes for strategic buyers.

The UAE can also play a major role by utilising its export capacity through Fujairah, and so can Oman, which has crude storage capacity at Ras Markaz, refining capacity at Duqm, LNG experience and ports that can receive and dispatch cargoes without having to cross the Strait of Hormuz.

If such swap deals are implemented, they can strengthen the GCC unity and help the members avoid internal economic rivalry in the future. More importantly, they can encourage the launch of a larger regional infrastructure drive that would lessen dependence on the Strait of Hormuz and diminish its value as a geopolitical tool to be used against the Gulf.

If there are a well-functioning swap mechanism and infrastructure in place that can be used whenever a threat of closure is made, then clients would feel more confident in continuing their relationships with all Gulf suppliers. In the longer term, this could serve as the GCC’s insurance against any new turbulence in the region.

The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

United States President Donald Trump says he has decided to pause an attack on Iran at the behest of Gulf leaders after Tehran sent a new peace proposal to Washington through Pakistan.

On Monday, Trump said there is now a “very good chance” the US could reach an agreement with Iran to prevent Tehran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

An initial, temporary ceasefire commenced on April 8, six weeks into the war. Since then, armed hostilities have largely subsided, but a durable peace agreement remains elusive, with both the US and Iran dissatisfied with each other’s proposed terms.

Also on Monday, Saudi Arabia said it had intercepted three drones, one day after a drone attack hit the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant in the United Arab Emirates. This has raised more concerns about the potential for renewed military escalation in the Gulf as peace negotiations drag on.

What has Trump said about a new attack on Iran?

Following the reported drone attacks on the UAE and Saudi Arabia on Sunday and Monday, Trump wrote in a Truth Social post: “For Iran, the Clock is Ticking, and they better get moving, FAST, or there won’t be anything left of them. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE!”

Then, later on Monday, Trump wrote another post, saying he had been asked by the leaders of Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE to hold off on a planned attack on Iran scheduled for Tuesday since “serious negotiations are now taking place.”

He added that he had instructed Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine and the US military not to carry out the scheduled attack. However, he said, he “further instructed them to be prepared to go forward with a full, large scale assault of Iran, on a moment’s notice, in the event that an acceptable Deal is not reached”.

What do we know about the latest peace plan Iran has submitted?

Iran has submitted a revised 14-point peace plan to end the war, the semi-official Tasnim news agency reported on Monday.

Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei told a news briefing on Monday that Tehran’s response to the previous US proposal had been “conveyed to the American side through mediator Pakistan”, according to Tasnim.

Washington and Tehran have exchanged multiple proposals in recent weeks amid a ceasefire that has mostly halted six weeks of fighting. However, the initial direct talks mediated by Pakistan in Islamabad in April stalled, and Trump said last week the ceasefire is “on life support”.

While the specific proposals in the latest plan from Iran have not been made public, Baghaei said demands include the release of its assets frozen abroad and the lifting of sanctions.

“The points raised are Iranian demands that have been firmly defended by the Iranian negotiating team in every round of negotiations,” he said.

Iran has also previously demanded compensation for damage inflicted by US-Israeli attacks, an end to the ongoing US naval blockade of Iranian ports and a halt to fighting on all fronts, including in Lebanon, where Israeli forces continue daily attacks and have mounted a ground invasion in the south of the country.

Washington has urged Tehran to dismantle its nuclear programme and lift a blockade on the Strait of Hormuz, which, before the war, carried one-fifth of the world’s crude oil and liquefied natural gas ‌(LNG) supply.

What are the main sticking points between Iran and the US?

A major point of contention is Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium. During negotiations, Washington has urged Tehran to give away its enriched uranium, a demand Tehran has resisted.

Iran is believed to have about 440kg (970lb) of uranium enriched to 60 percent. A 90 percent threshold of enriched uranium is needed to produce a nuclear weapon. Iran has never officially declared an intention to build nuclear weapons. The US wants this stock to be handed over to it, but Iran is reportedly only willing to consider handing it to a third party – if at all.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told reporters on the sidelines of a meeting of foreign ministers from BRICS nations in New Delhi last week that Iran and the US have reached a “deadlock” on the question of Iran’s “enriched material”.

As a result, he said, the topic is being “postponed” until later stages in the talks. “For the time being, it is not under discussion, it’s not under negotiation, but we will come to that subject in later stages.”

Araghchi confirmed he had spoken to Russian officials about an offer from Moscow to store Iran’s enriched uranium. He said Iran may consider Russia’s proposal at an “appropriate time” and that he appreciates Moscow’s efforts.

“When we come to that stage, obviously we will have more consultations with Russia and see if the Russian offer can help or not,” he said.

The US and Iran are also arguing about whether Iran should be allowed to enrich uranium at all. Under the Obama-era Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, signed with several countries in 2015, Iran was able to continue enriching to 3.87 percent – enough for the development of a nuclear power programme. Trump withdrew the US from that agreement in 2018, despite consistent reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran had stuck to its terms. Now, the US wants a moratorium on all uranium enrichment for a period of up to 20 years, it says.

Another sticking point between the two countries is the Strait of Hormuz in the Gulf.

Since early March, Iran has restricted shipping through the strait, a narrow waterway linking Gulf oil producers to the open ocean and through which 20 percent of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies are shipped during peacetime. Iran has allowed passage by vessels from select countries, but they are required to negotiate transit with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

In its previous proposals to end the war, Iran has mentioned charging fees or tolls for vessels seeking to pass through the state. Washington has repeatedly rejected the prospect. In April, the US announced a naval blockade on ships entering or leaving Iranian ports, further adding to the disruption of global oil and gas supplies.

Iran’s state media reported, citing the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that technical teams from Iran and Oman met in Oman to negotiate a mechanism for safe transit in the Strait of Hormuz.

A third likely major point of friction – although one which may also be kicked into later discussions – is Iran’s support for a network of “proxy” armed groups around the Middle East which it calls its “axis of resistance”. These include the Houthis in Yemen, who have also caused disruption by launching attacks on Israel-linked ships in the Red Sea in the past, Hezbollah in Lebanon and multiple groups based in Iraq and Syria.

Iran has raised concerns about the vulnerability of submarine cables in the Strait of Hormuz, which are crucial for the region’s digital economy. This narrow waterway, known for its importance in global oil shipments, also supports several fibre-optic cables connecting countries from India and Southeast Asia to Europe via the Gulf states and Egypt.

Submarine cables are essential for transmitting data and power, carrying about 99% of the world’s internet traffic. They play a significant role in telecommunications, cloud services, and online communication. Damage to these cables can lead to internet slowdowns, outages, disrupted e-commerce, and delayed financial transactions, causing economic consequences, according to analyst Masha Kotkin.

Gulf countries, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have invested billions into artificial intelligence and digital infrastructure to reduce dependence on oil, with their national AI companies relying heavily on undersea cables for data transfer. Key submarine cables in the Strait of Hormuz include the Asia-Africa-Europe 1 (AAE-1), the FALCON network, and the Gulf Bridge International Cable System, with additional infrastructures being built.

Despite the growth in submarine cable length, faults have remained stable at around 150–200 incidents yearly, largely due to human activities like fishing and anchor dragging, with state-sponsored sabotage being a potential risk. Other threats include undersea currents, earthquakes, and typhoons. To mitigate these risks, the industry has measures such as burying cables and selecting safer routes.

The ongoing Iran war has caused significant disruption to energy supply and regional infrastructure, though subsea cables have not yet suffered damage. However, military operations increase the risk of unintentional damage from ships inadvertently impacting cables. Historical incidents, like one in 2024, highlight these risks.

Repairing damaged cables in conflict areas presents challenges, including obtaining permits and addressing the dangers of remaining fighting or mines. Once conflicts end, another challenge lies in re-evaluating the sea floor to ensure the cables’ safety.

If subsea cables are damaged, there are alternatives like land-based links, but experts warn that satellite systems cannot replace them due to limited capacity and higher costs. Low-Earth-orbit networks like Starlink are not a scalable solution for millions of users at present.

with information from Reuters

Rights groups have described the move as a “blatant abuse of power”.

Bahrain has stripped dozens of people of their citizenship for allegedly supporting Iranian attacks on the country.

Bahrain’s Ministry of Interior announced on Monday that it had revoked the citizenship of 69 people, some of whom were related, after accusing them of sympathising with Iran and “colluding with foreign entities”. The move comes after Tehran carried out strikes on facilities in Bahrain as part of the war launched against Iran by Israel and the United States.

The directive, issued by King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, stated that all 69 people were “of non-Bahraini origin”. Under Bahraini law, a person can be stripped of citizenship if they are deemed to have caused harm to the country or shown disloyalty.

The London-based Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy described the move as “dangerous” and a clear violation of international law.

The organisation said the individuals had not been publicly identified, and it remained unclear whether they had been arrested, whether they were inside or outside Bahrain, and whether they held another nationality.

Iranian strikes

Tehran began striking its Gulf neighbours on February 28, shortly after Israel and the United States began the war by launching attacks on Iran.

Tehran accused the targeted countries of allowing the US to conduct its strikes from their territory. Iran’s retaliatory attacks reportedly caused significant damage to US military sites across the region, including a Navy base in Bahrain, which was hit by missiles and drones.

Iran ceased its attacks on Gulf neighbours on April 9, following the introduction of a ceasefire brokered by Pakistan. Negotiations to permanently end the war are ongoing three weeks later.

Bahrain’s Shia population has long accused authorities of marginalising them. During the Arab Spring in 2011, mass protests against the country’s leadership broke out. The Bahraini government has long blamed Iran for fomenting unrest against it.